[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 95 (Tuesday, June 25, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6761-S6816]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                        CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of S. 
1219, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A bill (S. 1219) to reform the financing of Federal 
     elections, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to speak against cloture on 
this bill, but I also want to talk about what I think is good about the 
bill and why I am voting against cloture.
  First, I want to say, if I were titling this bill, it would be called 
the Incumbency Protection Act, because that is what limitations on 
expenditures for campaigns will do. It will take away the right of a 
challenger to be able to raise more money than an incumbent with the 
advantage of name identification and to be able to go forward with a 
message.
  What they say in this bill is that it is voluntary. It is voluntary, 
but you pay quite a price if you do not adhere to the limits. You, 
then, will be faced with 30 minutes of free broadcast time against you, 
if you do not adhere to the limits. You will have reduced postal rates 
against you. This is really coercive. Then there is the cost. My gosh, 
the Postmaster General has said he will have to raise all postal rates 
if he has to provide reduced rates.

[[Page S6762]]

  So I want to talk about why I think this is the most important part 
of the bill. But I also want to talk about what I think is good in the 
bill because, if we ever want to come back to this, there are some 
improvements that we really ought to make, and I will be supportive of 
these things. I love the idea of requiring 60 percent of campaign funds 
to be raised from individuals in a State. I think that is something 
that will enable the people in the State to have the right say in the 
election of their Members of the U.S. Congress, in the election of 
their Senators.
  I am for limitations of personal money for a campaign. I think you 
have to make sure it would be constitutional, so you would say a person 
can spend any amount of his or her own money that he or she wants to, 
but he or she could only be repaid a certain amount. I think that is a 
wise thing, because I, too, am alarmed, as many of us are, by people 
who would just pour millions of their own money into a campaign and, in 
effect, be able to buy an election; because that is what people see. 
They have the access to the airways with money, and it does become, I 
think, an inequitable situation.
  Limitations on the amounts of contributions by PAC's to the same 
amount as individuals contribute is good. I do think PAC's, however, 
have been misrepresented, not only on this floor but around the 
country, because I think political action committees, most often, are 
grassroots efforts within a company. Why would we not want the working 
people of this country to be able to contribute $25 or $100 or $500, if 
they desire to do it? PAC's are voluntary and they should be voluntary. 
But if people want to participate in our process, I think they should 
be encouraged. Frankly, I think many of the companies in this country 
have done a wonderful job of encouraging their employees to be a part 
of a PAC. When they do that, the employees are able to have the 
candidates come before them. They will have the Democrat and the 
Republican. They will be able to have debates. I think that is healthy. 
That makes more people interested in the process, have a stake in the 
process, and be good citizens. That is what we want to encourage in our 
democracy.

  I am for the provision that would not allow the franking privilege 
for mass mailings in an election year. I do not use the franking 
privilege for mass mailings at all. I have not detected I am any less 
in contact with my constituents. I think it is a good thing, in an 
election year, not to have the franking privilege for mass mailings. I 
think we could easily do that.
  So these are things that I think are great steps in the right 
direction, and I commend my colleagues, Senator McCain and Senator 
Feingold, for bringing these forward because these are things I could 
vote for.
  The reason I am going to vote against cloture is because the 
overriding, most important part of this bill goes against everything 
that freedom in a democracy stands for, and that is the limitations on 
contributions, voluntary, but nevertheless I think it creates a very 
uneven situation.
  I am a person who could be on the other side of that because in my 
personal experience I ran against an incumbent who was much better 
funded than I was, who had the PAC contributions from Washington that I 
have heard so much talk about on this floor. I had a very hard time 
raising money against this incumbent. But you know what? The people 
were looking at the message. And even though my message was much less 
generously funded than my opponent's message, nevertheless the people 
were able to make this choice.
  I do not want to limit the incumbent or the challenger. If the 
message is right, we need to have the freedom to get it out. I, of 
course, think that limiting an incumbent and saying you can only spend 
this much, and limiting the challenger and saying you can only spend 
this much, is going to favor the incumbent. There is just no question 
about that. And even though I was on the other side of that, I think it 
is wrong and I think I will stand always against any kind of 
limitations, whether it is cloaked in a voluntary cloak of armor or 
not, because it is not really voluntary when you are then going to the 
television stations or the postal service or going to the radio 
stations and saying, ``Ah, yes.''--these people that are voluntarily 
saying that they are going to stay within the limit--``You're going to 
pay for that difference.''
  What is the nexus? Why are we telling television stations or the 
Postal Service, which is going to have to raise rates on everyone else 
in America, that you should subsidize this arbitrary limitation that is 
voluntary? It just does not make sense, Mr. President.
  So I am going to vote against cloture because I think the overriding 
issue here is limitations. If you want to see the hardship of 
limitations, look at the States that have the limitations in place. 
Look at the Presidential election right now. One candidate has a 
primary and therefore has to spend the money in the limitation. The 
other candidate does not have a primary. This could be reversed. It 
could be the year that there is a Republican incumbent and the 
Democrats have a primary. Either way, it makes for an artificial 
limitation that is not fair. I do not think we want to put that in 
place now for Members of Congress and Members of the Senate.
  Let me just say that we do have limitations on contributions that I 
think are quite reasonable. Could they be lower? Yes. I mean, $500, 
$1,000--it could be lower if we wanted it to be lower. I would 
certainly be flexible in that area. But you know, when I look at the 
States around this country that have no limitations whatsoever on 
contributions and there are people taking $100,000 for a campaign for a 
State office, and we are talking about $1,000 limitations on 
contributions or $5,000 from a PAC that is an amalgamation of many 
employees in a company, I think we are assuring that there is going to 
be a grassroots base. We have that assurance right now.
  I had 40,000 contributors to my campaigns for the U.S. Senate. I ran 
twice within 2 years. Forty thousand. My average contribution was about 
$100. I think that is a grassroots effort. I had many $5 and $10 
contributions. That does make sure that no one has particular access to 
a person because of some huge contribution.
  I think we can do a lot to improve our campaign finance in this 
country, Mr. President, but I just think this bill is not the right 
approach. I hope that we can work on this and continue to work on it, 
because as I said, I think, having limitations on personal use of 
funds, having the 60 percent requirement of raising money in your home 
State, not using the franking privilege in an election year are very 
good, solid recommendations from this bill. So I hope that we will be 
able to work on something, but, Mr. President, this is not the right 
vehicle. Thank you, and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. McConnell addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Let me thank my good friend from Texas for her 
excellent statement on the issue before us. I appreciate her 
contribution to this debate, not only at this time but in previous 
rounds. She is right on the mark, it seems to me, in concluding that 
this bill falls well short of anything the Congress ought to foist on 
to the American people, and particularly the restrictions on all the 
individuals across the country that want to participate in the 
political process.
  I would just say to my friend from Texas--I did not get a chance 
yesterday to tell her this--even the National Education Association, 
almost never aligned with people like the Senator from Texas and 
myself, wrote me a letter yesterday saying how awful this bill was, and 
said they hoped it would be defeated. They also pointed out that the 
average contribution to the NEA PAC was $6, and asked the question, why 
in the world participation of that sort would be a bad thing for 
American democracy and something the Congress ought to eliminate?
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Certainly.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Is it not true that the Postmaster General has raised 
serious questions about this bill, and what he would be required to do 
is in the way of raising postal rates for everyone because of the 
subsidy that would be required under this bill for lower postal rates 
in an election year?
  Mr. McCONNELL. In a letter I received from the Postmaster General

[[Page S6763]]

yesterday, he comes out against the bill. Obviously, the Postmaster 
General is not accustomed to taking positions on legislation up here. 
But his point is that this is in effect a transfer of cost to the 
postal ratepayers across America.
  That is one of the reasons the Direct Marketing Association, the 
direct mail people--they are a private business--also opposes this, 
because in effect it is passing on to the postal ratepayers an enormous 
expense.
  This bill is not free. The notion has been put forth that somehow the 
spending limits are free. In fact, it passes the cost on to the 
broadcasting industry and on to the postal patrons of this country.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Not only that, since we have virtually a monopoly in 
the postal system, it is like a taxpayer subsidy because it is 
requiring every person in America that wants to send a letter to pay 
more for this limitation that we are putting in place. It just does not 
qualify as a true voluntary limitation.
  Mr. McCONNELL. No, it is not voluntary and not free, I say to my 
friend from Texas. It is not voluntary because if you choose not to 
shut up, if you choose not to take the Government prescribed speech 
limits, you have to pay more for your television. So it is not 
voluntary. And it is not free because the broadcasting industry is 
called upon to subsidize campaigns and the postal patrons are called 
upon to subsidize campaigns. So it is neither voluntary nor free.
  I thank very much my friend from Texas for pointing this out.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I yield the floor back to the Senator from Kentucky. 
But I commend the Senator from Kentucky for his great leadership in 
this area because he is the person who has studied this issue 
thoroughly and has taken things that sound very good, and has talked 
about what the real impact is going to be on the consumer that has to 
pay 32 cents to send a letter right now. And that is a lot to ask when 
you look at the fine print here. I commend the Senator from Kentucky 
for helping us understand it.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank the Senator from Texas.
  Mr. President, how much time does my side have left?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 87 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, how much time do the proponents of the 
bill have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 103 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, before I turn to my very distinguished colleague from 
West Virginia for his remarks, let me just make a couple points in 
response to the Senator from Texas and the Senator from Kentucky.
  First of all, it seems, almost as if in an effort to stop this bill 
from even being amended, that the kitchen sink is being thrown at this 
bill. Now we hear the Postmaster General is one of the lead opponents 
of the bill. But this completely disregards the resolution that we have 
placed in the bill, the Senator from Arizona has placed in the bill, 
that would provide that the money that is saved from preventing Members 
of Congress from franking during an election year would be used to 
provide a relatively modest funding necessary to provide the postal 
discounts which will only be given to those Senators and Members of 
Congress who agree to the spending limits. So that again is another red 
herring.
  Second, it does not matter how many times the other side says that 
this bill is not voluntary, it is voluntary. There are no such 
mandatory restrictions across the board for citizens as has been 
suggested by the Senator from Kentucky and the Senator from Texas.
  It does not matter how many special interests--whether it is the NEA, 
the AFL-CIO, or business PAC's--it does not matter how many times they 
tell you our scheme for allowing people to voluntarily abide by limits 
and give them benefits; it does not matter how many times they say that 
is not voluntary. It is. It is voluntary.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I am happy to yield to the Senator.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. I want to ask the Senator, what would happen under 
your bill if there was not enough money saved from the use of the frank 
to cover the cost of the discounted mailing?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. If that happens, which I doubt, it would have to come 
out of the budget of the post office.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. In other words, it does not necessarily cover all of 
the costs?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Our estimates are from----
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. The Postmaster General says he would have to raise 
all of the rates, because it comes from the post office.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Our estimates are that it would cover it. We go on the 
basis of estimates here. That is our assumption. Even if there was a 
small gap, the effect would be minimal.
  Let me quickly wrap up--because I want to turn to the Senator from 
West Virginia--and indicate again a very serious distortion. The 
Senator from Kentucky keeps saying that it will cost people who do not 
abide by the limits more. That is just not true. They will not pay a 
dime more than they pay today. They will still be eligible for the 
lowest commercial rate as the TV stations are required to give them. 
They will not have to pay more for their postal rates. It is simply 
untrue they will have to pay more than they do today. True, they will 
not get the lower costs that those who abide by the limits will get, 
but do not let anyone tell you people have to pay more under our bill. 
They can still spend as much as they want, and they will not have any 
higher cost for what they do.
  Finally, Mr. President, what this is about, really, is whether 
candidates who are more rooted back in their home States will have a 
better chance, or whether those who are dominated by big money or by 
D.C. special interests will dominate.
  I have this cartoon from one of the most distinguished political 
cartoonist of the 20th century. This is the context in which the vote 
today is being seen. We can talk here about how important PAC's are, 
and somehow this will put artificial limits on candidates. This is what 
the American public knows today's vote is about. It shows a gentleman 
from the U.S. Congress talking to a lobbyist with a lot of money and a 
cigar. The guy says, ``No more little gifts or junkets--from now on, 
it's strictly campaign cash.''
  Mr. President, the American public knows we have finally done 
something about lobbying disclosures. The American public knows we have 
cracked down on the practice of gift giving, one of the most offensive 
practices to the American people. But they also know the big granddaddy 
of them all, the important issue is the money that is awash in this 
campaign because of campaign financing.
  If we do not take the action today to move this bill forward, if we 
fail in this bipartisan effort, this cartoon will be prophetic. This 
cartoon will show that all that has happened is that the gifts and the 
lobbying are being transferred through the campaign cash system. I do 
not think we should let that happen.
  Mr. President, with that, I yield 15 minutes of the proponents' time 
to the distinguished Senator from West Virginia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Brown). The Senator from West Virginia.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished manager of the 
bill, and I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, for nearly 2 years now many of our Republican 
colleagues, particularly those in the House of Representatives, have 
trumpeted the glories of their so-called Contract With America. To 
listen to some, this was the document that held the secrets to solving 
the Nation's problems. It was the primer for a reform-minded Congress--
something that would bring great respect to this institution and its 
Members. Yet, there is one item conspicuously absent from the much-
touted, so-called contract. I note with amazement that what is 
completely missing from that celebrated ideological text is any mention 
of campaign finance reform. I have looked and I have looked and I have 
looked and it is just not there.
  We are told by those who promote the contract that a balanced budget 
constitutional amendment is good for

[[Page S6764]]

the country. We are told that the line-item veto is good for the 
country. But, for seemingly inexplicable reasons, many of those who 
have spent their time clamoring for change have decided that putting an 
end to our current grotesque and out-of-control campaign spending 
system is just not worthy of attention.
  How unfortunate, Mr. President, because I, along with many of my 
colleagues, truly believe that until Members of Congress come to grips 
with the simple fact that campaign finance reform is much more 
important than any of these other reforms, this institution will 
continue to be perceived as the property of the special interests--that 
is exactly what it is, the property of the special interests--owned 
lock, stock, and barrel. We all know it. And, as the public opinion 
polls indicate, the American people know it, too.
  It is a great disappointment to me that too few Members seem to 
understand this. Time and time again, those of us who have pushed for 
these reforms have seen our efforts rebuffed. Indeed, Mr. President, as 
Majority Leader in 1987 and 1988, I tried eight times--eight times--to 
get cloture on campaign finance reform legislation. And eight times I 
lost. More importantly, however, eight times the American people lost.
  That is why this legislation before us today is so important. It is 
an effort, a bipartisan effort, to put a stop to the noxious system 
currently in place for the financing of senatorial campaigns. It is a 
measure that does not favor challengers or incumbents, or candidates 
from either political party. On the contrary, this bill, the McCain-
Feingold bill, takes a balanced approach that will go a long way toward 
creating a level playing field.
  Mr. President, one needs to look no further than this Chamber to see 
the pressing need for this type of reform. I believe that the primary 
problem in this body, the root problem plaguing the Senate today is 
what I would term the ``fractured attention''--the fractured attention 
of Senators. Countless times, action on the Senate floor has been 
slowed or delayed because Senators are not in Washington, or if they 
are, they are away from the Capitol. That absence is not because those 
Senators are off on vacation or taking their leisure. They are not off 
somewhere lounging in the sun, neglecting their duties here. On the 
contrary, as each of us knows all too well, Senators are often 
elsewhere because of the need to raise unthinkable sums of money--
unthinkable sums--money essential for running for reelection.
  Plato thanked the gods for having been born a man, and he thanked the 
gods for having been born a Greek. He also thanked the gods for having 
been born in the age of Sophocles. Sophocles said, ``There's nothing in 
the world so demoralizing as money.'' Sophocles was not an American 
politician, but he knew what he was talking about.
  I can say after 50 years in politics, there is nothing so demeaning, 
nothing so demeaning as having to go out with hat in hand, passing a 
tin cup around and saying, ``Give me, give me, give me, give me.'' Not 
that old song, ``Give me more and more of your kisses,'' but ``Give me 
more and more of your money. Give me more and more of your money.''
  Sophocles said, ``There's nothing in the world so demoralizing as 
money.'' And, indeed, in this Senate, the need for Members to 
constantly focus on raising the huge sums necessary to stay in office 
has taken a heavy toll.
  The incessant money chase is an insidious demand that takes away from 
the time we have to actually do our job here in Washington. It takes 
away from the time we have to study and to understand the issues, to 
meet with our constituents, to talk with other Senators, and to be with 
our families and to work out solutions to the problems that face this 
Nation.
  Mr. President, consider this: According to data provided by the 
Congressional Research Service, the combined cost of all House and 
Senate races in the 1994 election cycle was $724 million, a sixfold 
increase from 1976. Even more troubling, though, at least from the 
perspective of our colleagues, is that the average cost of a winning 
senatorial campaign rose from barely $600,000 in 1976 to more than $4 
million in 1994. Four million dollars. And that, of course, is just the 
average.

  In 1994, nearly $35 million was spent by the two general election 
candidates in California, while the candidates in the Virginia Senate 
race spent $27 million.
  What do those astounding numbers say to someone who may wish to stand 
for election to the Senate? What does the prospect of needing $35 
million, or $27 million, or even $4 million say to the potential Senate 
candidate? What it says, Mr. President, is that unless you win the 
lottery, or unless you strike oil in your backyard, or unless you are 
plugged into the political money machines, unless you actively compete 
to be part of the ``aristocracy of the money bag'' you are a long shot, 
at best, to win election to the United States Senate. And that fate is 
meted out to prospective candidates before they have even presented an 
idea, or given a speech, or offered a policy position.
  The money chase is like an unending circular marathon. Since the 
share of money coming from small contributors has declined while the 
share contributed by big political action committees has increased, 
candidates have to look more and more outside their home States to 
raise big bucks. The traveling, the time away from the Senate, the time 
away from talking with constituents, the time robbed from reading and 
reflection, the personal time stolen from wives, children, and 
grandchildren, the siphoning off of energies to the demands of 
collecting what has been called campaign grease is making us all less 
able to be good public servants. Ironically, we spend much time and 
raise huge sums of money in order to be reelected to the Senate so we 
can serve our States and our country. Then, once here, we cripple our 
ability to serve our State and our country by spending an inordinate 
amount of our time on the money treadmill so we can come back for yet 
another try at serving our States and our country.
  That kind of system sends the clear message to the American people 
that it is money, not ideas and not principles, that reigns supreme in 
our political system. No longer are potential candidates judged first 
and foremost on their positions on the issues, or by their experience 
and capabilities. No longer. Instead, potential Senators are judged by 
their ability to raise the millions of dollars that are needed to run 
an effective campaign. Publilius Syrus said that, ``a good reputation 
is more valuable than money.'' Senators should stop and reflect on that 
observation because our reputations and the feeling that we can be 
trusted by the American people are both in severe free-fall.
  The American people believe that the key to gaining access and 
influence on Capitol Hill is money. Can anyone blame them for coming to 
that conclusion?
  Now, Mr. President, if I were starting out in politics today, with a 
background like mine--working in a gas station, being a small grocer, a 
welder in a shipyard, a meatcutter, just common ordinary trades--I 
could not even hope to raise the sums of money needed for today's 
campaigns. In 1958, when Jennings Randolph and I ran together for the 
two Senate seats that were open--he ran for the short term, and I ran 
for the full 6-year term--we ran on a combined war chest of something 
like $50,000 or less. When I first started out in politics, I would win 
a campaign for the House of Representatives and spend as much as $200, 
perhaps. Think of it. If I had been forced to raise $1 million, $2 
million, $4 million, or $10 million the first time I ran for the 
Senate, in 1958, I would not have given it a second thought. In fact, I 
would not even have gotten past the first thought. I would not have 
been able to even contemplate running for office--a poor boy like 
myself.
  The ever-spiraling cost of public office is not a healthy trend. The 
Congress could become the exclusive domain of the very wealthy. The 
common man, without the funds to wage a high-powered, media-intensive 
campaign could be removed from effectively competing in the political 
arena, reserving it for the exclusive use of the very wealthy and the 
well-connected.
  That is why we must stop this madness. We must put an end to the 
seemingly limitless escalation of campaign costs. We must act to put 
the U.S. Senate within the reach of anyone with the desire, the spirit, 
the brains, and the spunk to want to serve once again.

[[Page S6765]]

 We must bring into check the obscene spending which currently occurs. 
The Bible says, ``The love of money is the root of all evil.'' In 
politics, the need for huge sums of money just to get elected is 
certainly at the root of most of what is wrong with the political 
system today.
  Mr. President, I congratulate Mr. McCain and Mr. Feingold. I urge my 
colleagues, for the sake of this institution if for no other reason, to 
support cloture on this vital legislation.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from West Virginia. 
I cannot think of a more eloquent testimony to the need for this reform 
than the statement that this great Senator, if he were starting out 
today, probably would not even have considered running for the U.S. 
Senate because of the incredible barrier of the money to be raised.
  Our bill is a voluntary scheme that allows people who would try to 
follow in Senator Byrd's tradition to raise a modest amount of money 
and have benefits for agreeing to do that. I greatly appreciate that.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 82 minutes remaining, and 
Senator McConnell has 89 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I now yield up to 15 minutes to the 
distinguished Senator from California, who has been a stalwart in 
support of campaign finance reform.
  Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. President.
  I thank the Senator from Wisconsin and the Senator from Arizona. I 
want to compliment both Senator McCain and Senator Feingold for this 
effort.
  I intend to vote for cloture, and should cloture on this bill be 
successful, I will either propose a substitute of the whole or two 
second-degree amendments to this bill.
  I would like to take the time allotted to me this morning, Mr. 
President, to explain my position on campaign finance reform.
  I believe very strongly that the time has come to engage the debate. 
If nothing else, I believe I am kind of a walking, talking case for 
campaign spending reform. In the 1990 race for Governor, I had to raise 
about $23 million. In the first race for the Senate in 1992, $8 
million; in the second race, $14 million.
  One newspaper just estimated that in the big States a candidate 
really has to raise about $2,000 a day just to run for reelection to 
the Senate of the United States. It certainly should not have to be 
this way.
  Essentially I agree with the basic tenets of the McCain-Feingold 
legislation. I agree that the time has come to try a system that would 
voluntarily cap campaign spending with a high of about $8.2 million in 
the big States like California, going down to $1.5 million in States 
with lesser population.
  I believe that efforts should be made to limit the amount of personal 
funds that can be used in a campaign. I believe that an effort to 
promote honesty in advertising and reducing the influence of connected 
PAC's in the outcome of elections is important.
  As always in an election year, we hear a lot of talk about Congress 
enacting meaningful campaign spending reform. But when it comes to 
actually doing something about it we tend to hide behind one procedural 
maneuver or another that allows us to vote the right way but gets us 
nowhere toward achieving a piece of legislation.
  In the last Congress a campaign finance bill passed both the Senate 
and the House but got bogged down because the necessary 60 votes to 
invoke cloture on a motion to proceed with a conference were not 
present in the Senate. I understand that this will likely be the 
problem here today. I hope we do get the 60 votes for cloture, and I 
hope that in the ensuing debate a solid campaign finance reform bill 
can emerge.
  Legislation I introduced last year and which, for the most part, 
forms the basis of McCain-Feingold, addresses what I believe are the 
areas most in need of reform: The limiting of spending; creating a 
level playing field between wealthy candidates who finance their own 
campaigns and candidates who rely on contributions; and finally 
ensuring honesty in campaign advertising.
  One of the problems where I have a very real difference with the 
present bill is on the issue of a candidate using vast sums of his or 
her own money to finance a campaign. Either the substitute bill, or a 
second-degree amendment which I will offer if we gain cloture on this 
bill, mirrors parts of the campaign finance bill introduced by Senator 
Dole in the last Congress. It also attempts to limit the ability of a 
wealthy candidate to buy a seat in Congress. The provisions of the 
amendment I would propose are a little different than anything that has 
been introduced before now.
  Under my substitute bill, after qualifying as a candidate for a 
primary, a candidate must declare if he or she intends to spend more 
than $250,000 of their own funds in the election. If the candidate says 
``I am going to spend more than $250,000 of my own money in this 
election'' then the contribution limits on his or her opponent are 
raised from $1,000 to $2,000. If a candidate declares that he or she 
will spend more than $1 million on the race from their own pocket, then 
the contribution limit on his or her opponents would be raised to 
$5,000. This is different from McCain-Feingold where there is only the 
jump to $2,000. And the reason it is different is because in the larger 
States, if an individual is going to spend more than $1 million, as 
happened in my case where my opponent spent about $30 million of his 
own money, it is impossible to catch up with the smaller contributions. 
Therefore, raising the limit to $5,000 only in instances where in 
individual States they are going to spend more than $1 million of their 
own money would enable a more level playing field.

  The amendment I will propose would also address the issue of PAC's. 
As you know, McCain-Feingold would prohibit all PAC contributions 
whether or not these PAC's are connected PAC's; that is, connected to a 
business or a labor union or a nonconnected PAC. By that, I mean 
organizations that are developed let us say to promote women for public 
office, or let us say to support a cause in candidates who support that 
cause for public office. The law permitting nonconnected PAC's would 
remain unchanged in my amendment. As a fallback, if the ban on 
connected PAC's is found to be unconstitutional, it provides that 
contributions from connected PAC's be limited to 20 percent of a 
campaign's receipts.
  In my view, a blanket ban on all political action committees in a 
sense throws the baby out with the bath water. I think we need to be 
encouraging people to be involved in politics and not discouraging 
them. Virtually every legal scholar who has examined this question 
believes that a complete ban on all PAC's is unconstitutional.
  The Congressional Research Service has advised the Senate, and I 
quote: ``A complete ban on contributions and expenditures by connected 
and nonconnected PAC's appears to be unconstitutional in violation of 
the first amendment.''
  I support the ability of a group or organization to encourage small 
donations from their members to candidates of their choice. In some 
cases, these members send their contributions made out directly to the 
candidate's campaign to that organization to be gathered or bundled and 
presented collectively to the candidate. In other cases, the 
organization simply asks for donations to be made directly to the 
candidates they recommend. This is not the same as writing a check to 
an intermediary or to a political action committee and then having the 
political action committee decide how to disburse the funds.
  The McCain-Feingold bill bans bundling in all political action 
committees. My amendment would not affect bundling, and I believe this 
is a crucial difference in these two bills.
  For example, there are two organizations which have helped women run 
for political office. One is EMILY's List, and one is WISH List. One is 
a Democratic organization and one is a Republican organization. Both of 
these groups collect smaller donations primarily from women. They 
bundle those funds from many sources to a single candidate.

[[Page S6766]]

  In the 1994 election cycle, EMILY's List members supported 55 women 
candidates. They raised a total of about $8.2 million. The average 
donation to EMILY's List was less than $100.
  WISH List, a much smaller and newer organization than its Democratic 
counterpart, supported 40 Republican women candidates and raised 
approximately $400,000. None of these funds were given directly to 
either of these groups and neither group used the funds to lobby on 
legislation before Congress. Both EMILY'S List and WISH List researched 
the records of women candidates and advised their members which 
candidates they recommended supporting. Based on that information, the 
members decided who to support and how much they wished to donate, and 
they donated directly to the candidates, sent their check to either 
WISH List or EMILY'S List who then put the checks together and sent 
them to the candidates.
  I believe that has been helpful in electing women to both Houses of 
this Congress. Currently, there are nine women in the Senate. When I 
came to this body, there were only two elected women.
  Groups like WISH List and EMILY'S List are an important factor in 
helping more women run for office. Frankly, I do not have a problem 
with any organization going out and endorsing candidates, writing to 
their members, and saying if you would like to contribute to these 
candidates, please go ahead and do so. I have no problem whether that 
group is the Christian Coalition, whether it is the National Rifle 
Association, whether it is EMILY'S List or WISH List. I think the 
encouragement of small contributions to candidates that support a cause 
that you believe in is important to the American political system.
  My separation from what Senators McCain and Feingold have done is 
that this bill wipes out all PAC's, connected and unconnected. I would 
ban connected PAC's but permit unconnected PAC's to continue their 
bundling efforts.
  The other difference I have would be in how you would voluntarily 
have the spending limits to create two different levels. If a wealthy 
candidate were to enter a race and say, I do not intend to adhere to 
the spending limits; I intend to spend $250,000 to $1 million of my own 
money, then your opponent's limit goes to $2,000. If the wealthy 
candidate says, I am going to spend more than $1 million, then the 
limit of the opponent goes to $5,000.
  I strongly support the $50 disclosure requirement. I strongly support 
the incentives that are built into this bill which would provide free 
radio time, special mailing to those who do comply with the voluntary 
spending limits.
  I believe this is an important bill. I am proud to vote for cloture. 
I hope that the Senators of this body would see some merit in either 
the two amendments I will offer as second-degree amendments or the 
substitute of the whole to do the two items that I mentioned.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition? The Senator from 
Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Let me just say briefly in response to the speech of 
the Senator from California, which I listened to carefully, she also is 
a member of the Rules Committee and participated in the hearings. I do 
not remember whether she was there--she may have been--the day that 
Col. Billie Bobbitt, retired U.S. Air Force officer, testified before 
the committee in opposition to this bill. I want to take a minute to 
quote some of her observations. She is a member of EMILY'S List, which 
would effectively be put out of business by this legislation, as the 
Senator from California has, I believe, acknowledged. That might have 
been one of the amendments she would offer were she in a parliamentary 
position where that were permissible. But, in any event, Colonel 
Bobbitt, retired Air Force officer, said, ``I'm in one of the 
organizations,'' referring to EMILY'S List, ``35,000 active members 
from all 50 States, and along with voting, I haven't missed an 
election,'' she said, ``in 51 years. EMILY'S List is the primary means 
through which I participate,'' said Colonel Bobbitt, ``in the electoral 
process.''
  She goes on in her testimony, ``In the decade since EMILY'S List 
began, more women than ever have been elected to Congress, and EMILY'S 
List is a big reason why. EMILY'S List has allowed women to compete and 
win.''
  She went on to say, with regard to the bundling, in effect, that 
EMILY'S List does--she describes it. She says, ``This is what's called 
bundling, which I know Common Cause and some others have criticized, 
but to me it's just good old American democracy at work.'' So said 
Colonel Bobbitt.
  She goes on to say, ``That's not bad for the system. That's good for 
the system. Thousands of small contributions are able to offset the big 
money coming from the rich and powerful. We are making the system more 
participatory and more competitive,'' said Colonel Bobbitt.
  Then she concluded by saying, ``My membership in EMILY'S List is a 
way for me to be connected to the political life of the Nation and to 
my fellow citizens. It allows me to band together with others who share 
my views and work toward a common end. I do not pretend to be a 
constitutional scholar,'' she says, ``but like most Americans, I carry 
within me an almost innate knowledge of the first amendment rights of 
citizenship--freedom to practice religion, freedom to speak my mind, 
freedom to assemble with fellow citizens in support of a common goal. I 
believe without a doubt that any membership in EMILY'S List is secured 
by such rights, and I believe that organizations like EMILY'S List, 
which encourage political participation by average citizens, are in the 
best tradition of American democracy.''
  I just wanted to quote what Colonel Bobbitt, an active member of 
EMILY'S List, had to say about the underlying legislation, which she 
obviously believes would greatly restrict her rights to participate in 
the political process.
  Mr. President, I wanted to take a moment here to make some 
observations about the injunctive authority that I view in this bill as 
provided to the Federal Election Commission. As I read the underlying 
bill which we are debating, section 306, ``Authority to Seek an 
Injunction,'' basically, what this section does is give to the 
Government, the Government of the United States, the right to step in 
and, prior to the issuance of speech, restrain it. It gives the 
Government the authority to engage in prior restraint of political 
speech by stepping in and getting a temporary injunction. This is but 
one of a number of clearly unconstitutional measures granted to the 
Government by this bill.
  In addition, obviously, if this bill were somehow to pass 
constitutional muster, which is extremely unlikely, the Federal 
Election Commission, which today has great difficulty in auditing the 
races of the candidates running for the one race in America at the 
Federal level where we have, arguably, spending limits--it takes 5, 6 
years to audit those few races that they have to audit--it is just, I 
think, reasonable to ask the question: How big would the Federal 
Election Commission be if it had to regulate the speech of 535 
additional races as well as engage in the injunctive relief powers 
apparently given to it by the bill, as well as whatever additional 
regulatory authority it might be able to assert over independent 
expenditures?
  In short, I think it is reasonable to assume, Mr. President, that we 
would have an FEC the size of the Veterans Administration. If there is 
anything this Congress is about, it seems to this Senator it is not 
building more large Federal bureaucracies.
  We have been trying to balance the budget, to downsize the 
Government, to restrain our appetite for not only spending but for 
regulation, and, clearly, this is a regulatory power grab of enormous 
proportions, I would say, Mr. President--of enormous proportions. It 
could well be that is one of the reasons an awful lot of the groups in 
this country this time, across the ideological spectrum, have decided 
to get off of the sidelines and into the game and stand up for their 
rights to participate in the political process.
  This bill is not just about us, that is, the candidates for office; 
it is also about all the groups organized that, under the first 
amendment, have a constitutional right to participate in the political 
process.
  Let me just go down some of the letters that I have received on this 
bill,

[[Page S6767]]

first from the Christian Coalition, a letter dated yesterday, June 24, 
1996, in response to an effort to modify this bill, which was agreed 
to, and we do have a modified version in the Chamber today.
  The Christian Coalition says it strongly urges a no vote on cloture.

       Contrary to the letter sent out by Senators McCain, 
     Feingold, and Thompson on June 19, the amended version of S. 
     1219 still contains the flawed provisions that seriously 
     threaten voter guides. The voter guide problem has NOT been 
     corrected.

  According to the Christian Coalition.
  The letter goes on:

       The amended S. 1219 continues to place the First Amendment 
     right to educate the public on issues in serious jeopardy. It 
     redefines ``express advocacy'' so that for the first time 
     ever the Federal Elections Commission would regulate issue 
     advocacy by citizen groups.
       The Supreme Court has repeatedly protected voter education 
     from Government regulation unless it expressly advocates the 
     election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.

  The letter goes on:

       This interpretation ensures that the First Amendment right 
     of like-minded citizens to discuss issues is not infringed by 
     federal campaign law. But under S. 1219, this free speech 
     would be subjected to great uncertainty, and as it is likely 
     to be interpreted by the FEC, possible illegality. S. 1219 
     could effectively cripple the Christian Coalition's voter 
     education activities, including the distribution of voter 
     guides.

  I will not read further from that letter, but I ask unanimous consent 
the entire letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                          Christian Coalition,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1996.
     Vote No on Cloture on the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance 
         Bill.
       Dear Senator: Tomorrow the Senate will vote on whether to 
     invoke cloture on S. 1219, the McCain-Feingold campaign 
     finance bill. Christian Coalition strongly urges you to vote 
     NO on cloture. Contrary to the letter sent out by Senators 
     McCain, Feingold, and Thompson on June 19, the amended 
     version of S. 1219 still contains the flawed provisions that 
     seriously threaten voter guides. The voter guide problem has 
     NOT been corrected.
       The amended S. 1219 continues to place the First Amendment 
     right to educate the public on the issues in serious 
     jeopardy. It redefines ``express advocacy'' so that for the 
     first time ever the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) would 
     regulate issue advocacy by citizens groups.
       The Supreme Court has repeatedly protected voter education 
     from government regulation unless it ``expressly advocates'' 
     the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 
     This interpretation ensures that the First Amendment right of 
     like-minded citizens to discuss issues is not infringed by 
     federal campaign law. But under S. 1219, this free speech 
     would be subjected to great uncertainty, and as it is likely 
     to be interpreted by the FEC, possible illegality. S. 1219 
     could effectively cripple the Christian Coalition's voter 
     education activities, including the distribution of voter 
     guides.
       Although the sponsors of this legislation have amended the 
     bill to exempt the distribution of elected officials' voting 
     records (vote ratings and congressional scorecards), the new 
     provision still threatens the distribution of candidates' 
     positions on the issues (voter guides).
       This new definition of express advocacy is but just one of 
     the bill's many egregious provisions. Under subsection (a) of 
     Section 241, the expenditures made by a Christian Coalition 
     chapter leader for voter education could be considered 
     contributions to a candidate if that same chapter leader 
     happened to merely retain the same lawyer or accountant as 
     a candidate, even though the chapter leader did not 
     cooperate or consult with the candidate at all.
       Section 211 is so broadly written that it could prevent a 
     Christian Coalition chapter leader from also holding a local 
     party position even though the two activities are separate 
     and not interrelated.
       Section 306 would give the FEC the authority to seek 
     injunctions if it believes ``there is a substantial 
     likelihood that a violation . . . is about to occur.'' Such a 
     prior restraint of free speech is unconstitutional. It is 
     only justified in weighty cases such as national security 
     concerns, but should never be permitted to prevent core 
     political free speech. The free speech rights of citizen 
     organizations should not be infringed by the FEC at the 
     eleventh hour of an election.
       The Christian Coalition does not have a political action 
     committee. However, as a free speech issue, we believe 
     citizens should be able to pool resources to form political 
     action committees under reasonable restrictions. We therefore 
     object to section 201.
       On behalf of the members and supporters of the Christian 
     Coalition, we strongly urge you to vote on the side of the 
     First Amendment and free speech. Please vote NO on cloture. 
     Thank you for your attention to our concerns.
           Sincerely,

                                                 Brian Lopina,

                                                         Director,
                                      Governmental Affairs Office.

  Mr. McCONNELL. In addition to that, the National Right to Life 
Committee, in a letter dated June 22, says that it has ``* * * analyzed 
the new substitute and finds that, to an even greater degree than the 
original bill, it rides roughshod over the First Amendment.'' The 
National Right to Life Committee also opposes this bill.
  I will not read further from that letter, but I ask unanimous consent 
the entire letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                 National Right to


                                         Life Committee, Inc.,

                                    Washington, DC, June 22, 1996.
     Re In opposition to McCain-Feingold substitute (S. 1219) to 
         regulate and restrict political speech.
     Senator Mitch McConnell,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: On June 18, we sent you a letter 
     expressing the strong opposition of the National Right to 
     Life Committee (NRLC) to the McCain-Feingold ``campaign 
     reform'' bill (S. 1219). Since then, the sponsors have 
     produced a new substitute amendment, on which the Senate will 
     conduct a cloture vote on Tuesday, June 25, at 2:15 p.m.
       NRLC has analyzed the new substitute and finds that, to an 
     even greater degree than the original bill, it rides 
     roughshod over the First Amendment. Through multiple overt 
     and covert devices, the substitute attempts to suppress 
     advertisements, publications, and other forms of speech on 
     federal public policy issues, including but not limited to 
     speech that refers to candidates for federal office. 
     Therefore, NRLC again urges you to vote No on the motion to 
     invoke cloture on S. 1219, which will be scored as a key pro-
     life vote for the 104th Congress.
       The substitute bans PACs and therefore bans independent 
     expenditures--except for political parties and rich 
     individuals. [Sec. 201] This ban would prevent citizens of 
     ordinary financial means from effectively expressing their 
     political viewpoints.
       If the PAC ban is declared unconstitutional, the substitute 
     contains ``backup'' provisions to suppress independent 
     expenditures by requiring advance notice of intended 
     expenditures--even though some of those expenditures will 
     never actually occur [Sec. 242(3)]--and by rewarding 
     candidates who are thought to be disadvantaged by independent 
     expenditures [Sec. 101].
       In addition, the substitute [Sec. 241] says that an 
     independent expenditure can no longer be conducted at all by 
     anyone who ``has played a significant role in advising or 
     counseling the candidate's agent at any time on the 
     candidate's plans, projects, or needs relating to the 
     candidate's pursuit of nomination for election, or election, 
     to Federal office, in the same election cycle, including any 
     advice relating to the candidate's desision to seek Federal 
     office.'' [emphasis added] In other words, any person or 
     group that remarked to a potential candidate, ``We'd like 
     you to consider running for Congress,'' would thereby 
     trigger a ``gag rule'' under which any subsequent 
     independent expenditure on behalf of that candidate would 
     be illegal. Moreover, this clause could be triggered by 
     even one-sided communication from an interest group to an 
     incumbent, discussing (for example) public opinion in a 
     given state regarding a piece of pending legislation.
       The substitute [Sec. 241(a)] seeks to broaden the 
     definition of ``express advocacy'' far beyond the definition 
     enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). 
     The bill would enact the ``taken-as-whole' test that has been 
     rejected by the federal courts on constitutional grounds. 
     Under this expansive definition, the bill would restrict the 
     distribution of issue-oriented material that does not, in 
     fact, urge the election or defeat of any candidate.
       In a June 19 ``Dear Colleague'' letter Senators McCain, 
     Feingold, and Thompson said that they added a provision to 
     exempt ``voting guides'' from the bill's restrictions, but 
     the actual provision in the substitute is vastly narrower 
     than what is described in the ``Dear Colleague'' letter. The 
     purported ``exemption'' [see Sec. 241(a)] applies only to ``a 
     communication that is limited to providing information about 
     votes by elected officials on legislative matters.'' On its 
     face, this ostensible ``exemption'' does not apply to 
     information regarding the public policy positions of non-
     incumbents, or to dissemination of any information on 
     candidates' positions obtained from press accounts, candidate 
     questionnaires, speeches, interviews, or a host of other 
     sources. Moreover, even the purported exemption for 
     information on ``votes'' is effectively meaningless because 
     of other provisions and definitions in the bill, such as the 
     definition of what constitutes a ``contribution'' to a 
     candidate (see below).
       The substitute [Sec. 241(b)(3)] would restrict ads and 
     other forms of speech that contain no reference whatever to 
     an election or even to any candidate, by defining certain 
     speech on legislative issues as a contribution to a like-
     minded candidate with whom there has been communication 
     regarding those issues. For example, if NRLC communicated 
     with a senator regarding the merits of a certain abortion-
     related bill, which the senator

[[Page S6768]]

     later voted for, and if NRLC later ran advertisements in that 
     senator's state discussing that bill, this could be regarded 
     as a ``contribution'' to the incumbent (even if the senator 
     is not mentioned in the ad), and therefore subject to all of 
     the other restrictions and penalty clauses in the bill. The 
     costs of non-partisan voter guides that contain information 
     obtained from candidate questionnaires or other 
     communications with an incumbent or a challenger could also 
     be regarded as ``contributions'' under this provision.
       The substitute [Sec. 306] explicitly authorizes the Federal 
     Elections Commission, if it believes ``there is a substantial 
     likelihood that a violation of this Act is occurring or is 
     about to occur,'' to obtain a temporary restraining order or 
     temporary injunction to prevent publication, distribution, or 
     broadcast of material that the FEC believes to be outside the 
     bounds of the types of political speech that would be 
     permitted under the law. This authorization for prior 
     restraint of speech violates the First Amendment.
       The overall effect of the bill would be to greatly enhance 
     the already formidable power of media elites and of very 
     wealthy individuals to ``set the agenda'' for public 
     political discourse--at the expense of the ability of 
     ordinary citizens to make their voices heard in the political 
     process.
       Therefore, the National Right to Life Committee urges you 
     to vote No on cloture on S. 1219. Because S. 1219's 
     restrictions on independent expenditures and voter education 
     activities would ``gag'' the pro-life movement from 
     effectively raising right-to-life issues in the political 
     realm, NRLC will ``score'' this vote as a key pro-life vote 
     for the 104th Congress.
       Thank you for your consideration of NRLC's concerns 
     regarding this legislation.
           Sincerely,
     David N. O'Steen, Ph.D.,
                                               Executive Director.
     Douglas Johnson,
                                             Legislative Director.
     Carol Long,
                                                Director, NRL-PAC.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Interestingly enough, a group with which I have not 
frequently been allied, and not many Members of this side of the aisle 
have been allied, the National Education Association, sent a letter to 
me dated yesterday, June 24, in which the NEA stated it opposed this 
bill and called upon all Senators to vote against cloture. The NEA 
pointed out, in referring to the ban on political action committees, 
that ``The average contribution of NEA members who contribute to NEA-
PAC is under $6.'' So, their question is, How in the world is that bad 
for the political process. So they, too, oppose this legislation and 
urge a vote against cloture.
  I will not read further from that letter, but I ask unanimous consent 
the entire letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                               National Education Association,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1996.
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator: The National Education Association (NEA) 
     opposes S. 1219, the Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 
     1996, sponsored by Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Russell 
     Feingold (D-WI). This measure would hamper the ability of 
     citizens to participate in the political process in a 
     meaningful way and limit the ability of organizations to make 
     their voices heard in an open, democratic process.
       Political action committees have encouraged millions of 
     Americans to become involved in the political system, many 
     for the first time. Many Americans are able to make small 
     political contributions that serve as entree into greater 
     political participation. Individuals are more likely to work 
     for a candidate or issue when they have contributed money, 
     and they are more inclined to make a contribution when they 
     know it will make a difference in the outcome.
       Political action committees stimulate small, individual 
     donations. The average contribution of NEA members who 
     contribute to NEA-PAC is under $6. These small contributions 
     from middle-income citizens help counterbalance the ability 
     of wealthy individuals to influence policymakers. Eliminating 
     political action committees would not reduce the importance 
     of money in politics. It would reduce the importance of 
     working people in politics.
       Political action committees also play an important role in 
     communicating with members of organizations about issues that 
     affect them. NEA would resist any effort to constrain the 
     ability of the Association--or any other organization--to 
     communicate with members and candidates about issues 
     affecting children, public education, and education 
     employees.
       NEA strongly supports campaign finance reform that 
     encourages participation and requires full disclosure of all 
     sources of political financing. Moreover, we support partial 
     public financing of election campaigns as a means of leveling 
     the playing field for challengers and incumbents. S. 1219 
     would weaken efforts to increase voter participation, limit 
     the involvement of low- and middle-income citizens in the 
     political process, and discourage efforts to educate and 
     engage the electorate. We urge you to oppose cloture on S. 
     1219, and should the Senate vote on the measure, to oppose it 
     and its substitute.
           Sincerely,
                                           Mary Elizabeth Teasley,
                                 Director of Government Relations.

  Mr. McCONNELL. The National Rifle Association, in a letter dated 
yesterday, said:

       We have examined the draft text of that possible substitute 
     [the bill that is actually before us today] and our 
     opposition . . . is not only unabated--it is, if anything, 
     stronger than before.

  So the National Rifle Association also urges a vote against cloture 
because they believe it adversely affects their ability to participate 
in the political process.
  I will not read further from that letter, but I ask unanimous consent 
the entire letter be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                        National Rifle Association


                                                   of America,

                                       Fairfax, VA, June 24, 1996.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: We understand that an amendment in 
     the nature of a substitute may be offered during this week's 
     debate on S. 1219, the Senate campaign finance bill. As you 
     know, we have repeatedly expressed our opposition to S. 1219, 
     as we believe it unjustifiably and unconstitutionally 
     restricts the First Amendment right of organizations to 
     communicate with their members and the general public in the 
     political process.
       We have examined the draft text of that possible substitute 
     amendment and our opposition to S. 1219 is not only 
     unabated--it is, if anything, stronger than before. The ban 
     on activities of political action committees remains in the 
     substitute, and would have a devastating effect on the 
     ability of ordinary citizens such as our members to act 
     jointly in support of candidates.
       Additionally, the new proposed reporting requirements for 
     independent expenditures, and the provisions intended to 
     dilute the effect of such expenditures, would have a chilling 
     impact on the effectiveness of such communications. Coupled 
     with the continuing effort to broadly redefine ``express 
     advocacy,'' Sections 241 and 242 represent one of the 
     broadest attacks on free speech rights seen in years, 
     affecting not only electoral but other legislative 
     communications. Giving the Federal Election Commission a 
     power to engage in prior restraint makes the attack even more 
     serious.
       We appreciate the support for the right to free speech 
     which you've shown in your opposition to S. 1219, and we urge 
     you to continue your work on this very important issue. If 
     there is anything we can do to be of assistance to you, 
     please don't hesitate to call.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Tanya K. Metaksa,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Also, obviously the National Association of Business 
PAC's, NAB-PAC, which would essentially be put out of business and lose 
their ability to participate in the political process, opposes the 
bill.
  The American Conservative Union and the Conservative Victory Fund 
oppose it as well. I will not read from those letters, but I ask 
unanimous consent the letters be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                                      The American


                                           Conservative Union,

                                    Alexandria, VA, June 25, 1996.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     Russell Senate Office Building,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: On behalf of the one million 
     members and supporters of the American Conservative Union, I 
     urge you to oppose S. 1219, the McCain-Feingold campaign 
     finance reform act.
       As a party to the seminal Buckley v. Valeo decision, ACU 
     has had a long-standing interest in our nation's campaign 
     finance system. Over the years, we have worked with many 
     Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle to try to 
     reform the system in a manner consistent with constitutional 
     guarantees of free speech--even as we have opposed efforts to 
     change the system in a manner which abridges those freedoms.
       McCain-Feingold does just that. Its fundamental reliance on 
     spending limits--whether ``voluntary'' or otherwise--is 
     merely the worst of its many wrong-headed provisions. The 
     problem with our current system is not that too much money is 
     raised and spent; as countless studies have shown, we spend 
     as a nation far more to advertise products such as soft 
     drinks and potato chips in a given year than we do on all 
     campaign spending combined. Do you really want to vote for 
     spending limits and in effect tell your constituents that as 
     far as you're concerned, their decision over which soft drink

[[Page S6769]]

     to purchase is more important than which leaders to choose?
       Rather, the problem in our current system of campaign 
     financing is that too much time is spent collecting the 
     amounts of money needed to compete effectively in a 
     competitive marketplace. Because of the contribution limits 
     enacted in the Federal Election Campaign Act, too many 
     candidates spend too much time chasing too few dollars--which 
     is what gives special interest groups a disproportionate 
     influence over legislators. If what you are really seeking is 
     a way to reduce the influence of the special interests, 
     simply lift the contribution limits.
       But McCain-Feingold's reliance on spending limits is not 
     its only fault. Other wrong-headed provisions include 
     taxpayer subsidization of both print and broadcast 
     communications, and the bill's outright abolition of 
     political action committees. Public subsidies amount to 
     partial taxpayer financing of politicians--something 
     overwhelmingly opposed by the American people. Nor should 
     PACs be abolished; to do so would be an unconstitutional 
     infringement on the rights of free association and free 
     speech.
       McCain-Feingold is a bad bill. Kill it and start over.
           Yours sincerely,
                                                   David A. Keene,
     Chairman.
                                                                    ____



                                    Conservative Victory Fund,

                                    Washington, DC, April 2, 1996.
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman: I want to bring to your attention a bill 
     that would bring irreparable damage to the political process. 
     Congresswoman Linda Smith has introduced HR 2566 which bans 
     contributions from political action committees to individuals 
     running for Congress. I'm deeply concerned about this.
       In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo that 
     campaign finance restrictions burdened First Amendment 
     rights. The only purpose recognized by the Supreme Court to 
     justify restrictions on PAC contributions is the prevention 
     of real or apparent corruption.
       Most of the arguments used for additional limits on 
     political contributions from political action committees do 
     not stand up under scrutiny. Originally, the goal of campaign 
     finance reform was to reduce the influence of money, to open 
     up the political system, and to lower the cost of campaigns. 
     Since the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign 
     Act, which were done in the name of ``campaign finance 
     reform'', spending has risen sharply and incumbents have 
     increased both their reelection rate and the rate at which 
     they outspend their challengers.
       As you know when you first ran for Congress, money is of 
     much greater value to open-seat candidates or challengers 
     than to incumbents. Studies show that added incumbent 
     spending is likely to have less effect on vote totals than 
     the challenger's added spending. Limits on political 
     contributions hamper challengers from getting their voice 
     heard while incumbents have significant advantages in name 
     recognition. Campaign finance laws lock into place the 
     advantages of incumbency and disproportionately harm 
     challengers.
       We oppose HR 2566 and any other such bills. The First 
     Amendment is based on the belief that political speech is too 
     important to be regulated by the government. The Conservative 
     Victory Fund has helped you and hundreds of other 
     conservatives since its creation in 1969. HR 2566 would 
     eliminate the Conservative Victory Fund.
           Sincerely,
                                                Ronald W. Pearson,
                                               Executive Director.

  Mr. McCONNELL. So there are a number of groups who, in the past, have 
largely not been heard from during these debates who have decided to 
take a position, to get interested, and to express their views. This 
is, of course, something we greatly welcome since--the point I would 
like to make--obviously this bill not only affects candidates for 
office, it affects everybody's ability to participate in the political 
system. These groups do not like our effort to push them out of the 
process. They do not feel that their involvement in politics is a 
harmful thing. They think it is protected by the first amendment, and I 
think they are right.
  Also, just in closing, I see the Senator from Utah is ready to take a 
few moments or more, if he would like. One of my biggest adversaries on 
this issue, over the last decade, has been my hometown newspaper, the 
Louisville Courier-Journal, which is the largest newspaper in our 
State. I was amazed to pick up the paper this morning and read an 
editorial in which they even think this is a bad bill. They even think 
this is a bad bill. This is the most liberal newspaper in Kentucky. I 
was astonished. Obviously, it made my day.
  I would like to read a couple of comments. They are predicting the 
cloture will not be invoked. They say, ``This outcome would be more 
regrettable if the bill were better.'' They go on to say:

       [Most] . . . of the rest of the package would be a step 
     back from real reform, while making the election finance 
     regulatory effort more complex and of less service to the 
     public.

  Further, they say:

       The abolition of those endlessly maligned PAC's would make 
     special interest money harder to trace while denying small 
     givers a chance to participate. A limit on out-of-state 
     contributions sounds good, but it could cut two ways. Indeed, 
     it would probably be more damaging to candidates who 
     challenge the local powers-that-be than one who thrives on 
     special interest support. Anyway, both provisions are surely 
     unconstitutional.

  They are right about that.

       As for a scheme to lure candidates to limit spending by 
     offering them free TV time contributed by the networks, it's 
     simply wrong to foist the cost of cleaner government on a 
     handful of businesses--and their advertisers, stockholders 
     and viewers. If there's a cost to election reform, it should 
     be borne by all taxpayers.

  It is a curious ally but I am proud to have them on board.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that other letters of 
opposition in addition to those I referred to a few moments ago, as 
well as the editorial of today in the Louisville Courier-Journal, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                         Reform's Tired Refrain

       As the U.S. Senate convenes today for yet another vote on 
     election finance ``reform,'' the setting is all too familiar.
       The measure is backed by liberal and conservative members 
     of Congress--including Republicans who, in response to public 
     disgust with incumbent Democrats, promised to change the 
     money system. Good government and citizens groups complain--
     legitimately--that the national legislature is awash in vast 
     sums of money given by favor seekers.
       The likely result? That's expected to be a rerun, too. 
     Barring unexpected strength among the reformers, a filibuster 
     organized by Mitch McConnell will halt Senate action. In any 
     event, the House probably won't find time to act this year.
       This outcome would be more regrettable if the bill were 
     better. Sadly, it has only one good provision--an end to the 
     ``soft money'' scam that allows corporations and labor unions 
     to give political parties millions of dollars, purportedly 
     for vague ``party-building'' activities. If this reform alone 
     survives, Congress could claim some progress.
       But much of the rest of the package would be a step back 
     from real reform, while making the election finance 
     regulatory effort more complex and of less service to the 
     public.
       The abolition of those endlessly maligned PACs would make 
     special interest money harder to trace while denying small 
     givers a chance to participate. A limit on out-of-state 
     contributions sounds good, but it could cut two ways. Indeed, 
     it would probably be more damaging to a candidate who 
     challenges the local powers-that-be than to one who thrives 
     on special interest support. Anyway, both provisions are 
     surely unconstitutional.
       As for a scheme to lure candidates to limit spending by 
     offering them free TV time contributed by the networks, it's 
     simply wrong to foist the cost of cleaner government on a 
     handful of businesses--and viewers. If there's a cost to 
     election reform, it should be borne by all taxpayers.
       It may be, indeed, that Congress is incapable of devising 
     workable change. And that may matter less and less.
       The good news is that Kentucky and other states are 
     experimenting with new approaches to paying for campaigns. To 
     the extent that states are also developing solutions to 
     welfare and other national problems--a positive trend in our 
     view--a national political establishment wallowing in dollars 
     showered on it by Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco and others 
     becomes increasingly irrelevant.
                                                                    ____

                                        National Rifle Association


                                                   of America,

                                       Fairfax, VA, June 24, 1996.
       Dear Senator: We understand that an amendment in the nature 
     of a substitute may be offered during this week's debate on 
     S. 1219, the Senate campaign finance bill. As you know, we 
     have repeatedly expressed our opposition to S. 1219, as we 
     believe it unjustifiably and unconstitutionally restricts the 
     First Amendment right of organizations to communicate with 
     their members and the general public in the political 
     process.
       We have examined the draft text of that possible substitute 
     amendment and our opposition to S. 1219 is not only 
     unabated--it is, if anything, stronger than before. The ban 
     on activities of political action committees remains in the 
     substitute, and would have a devastating effect on the 
     ability of ordinary citizens such as our members to act 
     jointly in support of candidates.
       Additionally, the new proposed reporting requirements for 
     independent expenditures, and the provisions intended to 
     dilute the effect of such expenditures, would have a chilling 
     impact on the effectiveness of such communications. Coupled 
     with the continuing effort to broadly redefine ``express 
     advocacy,'' Sections 241 and 242 represent one of the 
     broadest attacks on free speech rights

[[Page S6770]]

     seen in years, affecting not only electoral but other 
     legislative communications. Giving the Federal Election 
     Commission a power to engage in prior restraint makes the 
     attack even more serious.
       We urge you to oppose S. 1219's attack on the right of free 
     political speech. If there is anything we can do to be of 
     assistance to you, please don't hesitate to call.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Tanya K. Metaksa,
     Executive Director.
                                                                    ____

         Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1996.
       Members of the U.S. Senate: The Senate will soon be asked 
     to consider S. 1219, the ``Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act 
     of 1995.'' The United States Chamber of Commerce Federation 
     of 215,000 businesses, 3,000 state and local chambers of 
     commerce, 1,200 trade and professional associations, and 76 
     American Chambers of Commerce abroad urges your opposition to 
     this legislation, which would restrict the participation by 
     Political Action Committees (PACs) and individuals in the 
     political process.
       The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has long promoted individual 
     freedom and broad-scale participation by citizens in the 
     election of our public officeholders. In this regard, we 
     oppose efforts to eliminate or restrict the involvement of 
     PACs in our political process. We believe that PACs are a 
     critical tool by which individuals voluntarily participate in 
     support of their collective belief.
       In addition, there are other proposals contained in the 
     bill that would greatly inhibit long-standing protected 
     freedoms. These attempts to further limit the ability of 
     individuals or collective political participation should be 
     defeated as an infringement on the basic principle of free 
     speech. Further, a public mandate on the private sector to 
     subsidize the election of public officials without regard to 
     support for a candidate also must be defeated.
       We believe that an indispensable element of our 
     constitutional form of government is the continued power of 
     the people to control, through the elective process, those 
     who represent them in the legislative and executive branches 
     of government. Any attempt to reform the system through 
     eliminating PACs or further restricting contribution levels 
     has the consequence of unreasonably restricting the rights of 
     American citizens. Rather, we support a system that relies on 
     accountability through public disclosure, voluntary 
     participation without government mandates, and confidence in 
     the electorate to make sound decisions through the free 
     exchange of ideas and information.
       Therefore, we urge your opposition to S. 1219, as well as 
     your opposition to invoking cloture on such legislation, 
     which seeks to restrict the participation of individuals or 
     PACS in the political process.
           Sincerely,
     R. Bruce Josten.
                                                                    ____

                                        National Rifle Association


                                                   of America,

                                       Fairfax, VA, June 19, 1996.
       Dear Senator: It is our understanding that a cloture vote 
     has been scheduled for June 25, 1996 on S. 1219, the Senate 
     Campaign Finance Reform Act. We believe this will be the most 
     critical vote that you will cast this year in protecting the 
     constitutional rights of your constituents. Speaking for the 
     more than three million members of the National Rifle 
     Association (NRA), we strongly urge you to vote against 
     bringing this measure, or this issue, before the Senate in 
     any form. S. 1219 is a misguided attempt to limit 
     participation in the political process, and represents a 
     direct challenge to the right of free speech which we all 
     should cherish and strive to protect.
       Those who support S. 1219 have suggested that it will 
     enlarge or enhance participation in the political process. We 
     believe those who promote this view are either misinformed or 
     unaware of the consequences of this legislation. In fact, S. 
     1219 will not level the political playing field, but will 
     rather increase opporunities for political manipulation by 
     those who have access to national media outlets, at the 
     expense of those who do not.
       The main focus of the NRA is in protecting the right to 
     keep and bear arms. However, we believe that our system of 
     government depends on preserving all of our Constitutional 
     protections. Associations like the NRA facilitate 
     participation by concerned citizens who otherwise would not 
     have the resources to speak out on a national level. By 
     removing their ability to offer their views in independent 
     forums by combining their individual resources you would, for 
     all intents and purposes, eliminate their First Amendment 
     rights.
       As we have noted in previous correspondence (letters dated 
     01/25/96 and 05/7/96), in the Buckley v. Valeo decision of 
     1976, the Supreme Court stated that ``* * * legislative 
     restriction on advocacy of the election or defeat of 
     political candidates are wholly at odds with the guarantees 
     of the First Amendment.'' S. 1219 contains the same kind of 
     legislative restrictions, and we believe therefore that it is 
     clearly unconstitutional.
       Again, I urge you to reject S. 1219, and all other ill-
     conceived attempts at limiting free speech and participation 
     in the political process.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Tanya K. Metaksa,
     Executive Director.
                                                                    ____

                                                 National Right to


                                         Life Committee, Inc.,

                                    Washington, DC, June 18, 1996.
       Dear Senator: We understand that the Senate is likely to 
     vote on or about June 25 on whether to invoke cloture on the 
     McCain-Feingold bill (S. 1219), which would make sweeping 
     changes in federal election laws.
       The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) is strongly 
     opposed to S. 1219. In banning PACs, the bill also bans 
     independent expenditures--except by wealthy individuals. This 
     provision would flagrantly violate the First Amendment right 
     of individual citizens who share a common viewpoint on an 
     important public policy issue, such as abortion, to pool 
     their modest financial resources in order to participate 
     effectively in the democratic process. The average donation 
     to NRL-PAC is $31.
       The bill would also place severe new limitations even on 
     issue-oriented voter education materials that do not urge the 
     election or defeat of any candidate. This, too, violates the 
     First Amendment. The overall effect of S. 1219 would be to 
     greatly enhance the already formidable power of media elites 
     and of very wealthy individuals to ``set the agenda'' for 
     public political discourse--at the expense of the ability of 
     ordinary citizens to make their voices heard in the political 
     process.
       Therefore, the National Right to Life Committee urges you 
     to vote No on cloture on S. 1219. Because S. 1219's 
     restrictions on independent expenditures and voter education 
     activities would ``gag'' the pro-life movement from 
     effectively raising right-to-life issues in the political 
     realm, NRLC will ``score'' this vote as a key pro-life vote 
     for the 104th Congress.
       A vote in opposition to S. 1219 is consistent with the 
     position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1976 Buckley 
     v. Valeo decision: ``In the free society ordained by our 
     Constitution, it is not the government, but the people--
     individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as 
     associations and political committees--who must retain 
     control over the quantity and range of debate on public 
     issues in a political campaign.''
       Moreover, the overwhelming majority of Americans oppose the 
     concept embodied in S. 1219. The Wirthlin Worldwide firm 
     conducted a nationwide poll on May 28-30, which included this 
     question:
       ``Do you believe that it should be legal for individuals 
     and groups to form political action committees to express 
     their opinions about elements and candidates?''
       Yes, should be legal: 83%.
       No, should not be legal: 13%.
       Thank you for your consideration of NRLC's concerns 
     regarding this legislation.
           Sincerely,
     Douglas Johnson,
                                             Legislative Director.
     Carol Long,
     Director, NRL-PAC.
                                                                    ____

                                                 National Right to


                                         Life Committee, Inc.,

                                     Washington, DC, June 7, 1996.
       Dear Member of Congress: The House Oversight Committee will 
     soon mark up some form of ``campaign finance reform'' 
     legislation. The committee will consider, among other things, 
     proposals to either (1) ban PACs and thereby also ban 
     independent expenditures, or (2) not ban PACs, but place new 
     restrictions on independent expenditures.
       National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) is strongly opposed 
     to any legislation that would further restrict independent 
     expenditures, whether by banning PACs or in any other 
     fashion. Such proposals would infringe on the First Amendment 
     rights of individual citizens, sharing a common viewpoint on 
     an important public policy issue, to pool their modest 
     financial resources in order to participate effectively in 
     the democratic process.
       As you review various ``campaign reform'' proposals during 
     the weeks ahead, please keep in mind the words of the Supreme 
     Court in its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision:
       ``In the free society ordained by our Constitution, it is 
     not the government, but the people--individually as citizens 
     and candidates and collectively as associations and political 
     committees--who must retain control over the quantity and 
     range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.''
       The Wirthlin Group conducted a nationwide poll on May 28-
     30, which included this question:
       ``Do you believe that it should be legal for individuals 
     and groups to form political action committees to express 
     their opinions about elections and candidates?''
       Yes, should be legal, 83%.
       No, should not be legal, 13%.
       Thank you for your consideration of NRLC's concerns 
     regarding this legislation.
           Sincerely,
     Douglas Johnson,
                                             Legislative Director.
     Carol Long,
     Director, NRL-PAC.
                                                                    ____

                                                 National Right to


                                         Life Committee, Inc.,

                                                   April 30, 1996.
       Dear Senator: You are being pressured by so-called ``public 
     interest'' groups to pass campaign finance reform measures 
     under the guise of ``cleaning up the system.'' More 
     specifically, you are being asked to support a floor vote on 
     S. 1219, the McCain-Feingold-Wellstone bill.

[[Page S6771]]

       We urge you to oppose S. 1219. Attorneys that span the 
     ideological spectrum agree that S. 1219 would destroy free 
     speech and grievously injure both the right to association 
     and the right to petition government.
       It is a myth that the American public is clamoring for 
     campaign finance reform. In a recent poll conducted by the 
     Tarrance Group, only one person, out of 1000, volunteered 
     campaign finance reform as the biggest problem facing the 
     country. When the poll respondents were given a list of 10 
     problems and asked to rank them, campaign finance reform came 
     in last, with only 1% selecting that topic.
       Under S. 1219, an individual would be able to make 
     independent expenditures, but because of the ban on political 
     action committees, a group of individuals would be forbidden 
     to organize, pool their resources, and coordinate their 
     activities. This would leave the political process open to 
     very wealthy individuals and the media, but would prohibit 
     the vast majority of citizens from effectively making their 
     voices heard.
       S. 1219 defines ``express advocacy'' so broadly as to sweep 
     in ``issue advocacy.'' Thus, citizens' groups would, in 
     effect, be prohibited from publishing voter guides or giving 
     candidates' voting records. Several federal courts have 
     already struck down attempts by the Federal Election 
     Commission to do the same thing.
       Free speech is essential to democracy. It is important not 
     only for the press and wealthy individuals, but also for 
     ordinary citizens. We urge you to take any steps necessary, 
     including opposing cloture, to prevent S. 1219 or any similar 
     measure that infringes upon the First Amendment rights of 
     citizens from being approved by the Senate.
       We also oppose the appointment of any unelected commission 
     that has the authority to issue a final report on campaign 
     finance reform that would not be subject to the regular 
     amendment process on the Senate floor.
     Christian Coalition.
                                                                    ____

                                                 National Right to


                                         Life Committee, Inc.,

                                 Washington, DC, November 8, 1995.
     Senator Mitch McConnell,
     Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: Campaign finance ``reform'' that 
     destroys the freedom of speech is not reform.
       Current measures under consideration in the Senate would 
     largely prevent citizen involvement in the political process. 
     We realize there is a lot of pressure from the press to 
     ``reform'' the election process. However, limiting free 
     speech for citizens, while it may please some elements in the 
     press because it greatly increases their own power, is 
     neither politically wise nor constitutional.
       We have the three major objections to S. 1219, the ``Senate 
     Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995'' as sponsored by 
     Senators McCain and Feingold, and therefore will vigorously 
     oppose this measure.


1. S. 1219 would almost eliminate involvement in the political process 
        for ordinary citizens who are not independently wealthy

       S. 1219 would permit only individuals, or political 
     committees organized by candidates and political parties, to 
     solicit contributions or make expenditures ``for the purpose 
     of influencing an election for Federal office.''
       Many political action committees (PAC), such as the 
     National Right to Life PAC, exist because their members want 
     to work together to elect candidates who share their views 
     and beliefs. Under the current system, citizens are free to 
     coordinate activities through PACs in order to discuss 
     issues, express their views on positions taken by candidates, 
     and urge voters to support or oppose certain candidates. This 
     dialogue is very important to the political process and very 
     important to the American system.
       Under the Act, an individual can make independent 
     expenditures, but a group of individuals cannot organize and 
     coordinate their activities. This opens the political process 
     to wealthy individuals, but prohibits the vast majority of 
     citizens from pooling resources to make their voices heard.
       If citizen groups and their political action committees are 
     eliminated, the only entities left that are freely able to 
     discuss candidates and the issues, except the candidates 
     themselves, are a few wealthy individuals and the news media. 
     That is not the intention of the First Amendment.
       Another problem for you to consider is that many in the 
     media have a bias against pro-life and pro-family candidates. 
     If the media is allowed free speech and citizens groups are 
     not, that will be a real disadvantage for pro-life and pro-
     family candidates.


 2. the new definition of ``express advocacy'' is unconstitutional and 
                 represses the free speech of citizens

       Section 251 of S. 1219 attempts to ``clarify'' Independent 
     Expenditures, However, it redefines ``express advocacy'' to 
     now include protected ``issue advocacy.''. This extremely 
     broad new definition of express advocacy would sweep in 
     protected issue advocacy, such as voter guides which state 
     the positions candidates have taken on issues or give 
     candidates' voting records.
       The new definition goes far beyond what the United States 
     Supreme Court said was permissible to regulate as 
     electioneering in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
     (1976). In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that, in order to 
     protect issue advocacy (which is protected by the First 
     Amendment), government may only regulate election activity 
     where there are explicit words advocating the election or 
     defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
       This new definition would expand the umbrella of ``express 
     advocacy'' so broadly that citizen groups other than PACs 
     would also be effectively prohibited from informing the 
     public about candidates' positions on issues as well as 
     voting records. This curtailment of citizens' freedom of 
     speech would not affect the major media whose political power 
     would be vastly enhanced, since one balancing force currently 
     in the public forum would be eliminated.
       The Supreme Court would, again likely find this new 
     definition of ``express advocacy'' unconstitutional, and 
     voters would find it exceedingly repressive.


         3. s. 1219 authorizes unconstitutional prior restraint

       Section 306 of the Act authorizes an injunction where there 
     is a ``substantial likelihood that a violation . . . is about 
     to occur.'' The FEC would be authorized to seek injunctions 
     against expenditures which, in the FEC's expansive view, 
     could influence an election. Such a preemptive action against 
     the freedom of speech is unconstitutional except in the case 
     of national security or similarly weighty situations. Prior 
     restraint should never be allowed in connection with core 
     political speech. There simply is no governmental interest of 
     sufficient magnitude to justify the government stopping 
     persons from speaking.
       This country's open system of representative democracy is 
     the envy of the world. If you try to ``fix'' it by limiting 
     people's voices, then you head towards totalitarianism. 
     Whatever its flaws, democracy is the best system the world 
     has seen to date.
       Free speech is essential to democracy. It is important not 
     only for the press and wealthy individuals, but also for 
     ordinary citizens. The only way ordinary citizens can have 
     any meaningful opportunity to exercise their right of free 
     political speech in modern America is if they are allowed to 
     pool their funds in PACs. For the record, the average 
     donation from National Right to Life members to its PAC is 
     $31.
       The status quo on speech by membership organizations and 
     independent expenditures by political action committees 
     works. Disclosure laws governing PACs already provide 
     detailed information on where the money came from and how it 
     was spent. The current process allows citizens to be involved 
     in their government. That it how it should be.
       We are enclosing a copy of the legal analysis of S. 1219 by 
     James Bopp, Jr., General Counsel for NRLC. National Right to 
     Life urges you to protect the constitutional rights of your 
     constituents and oppose S. 1219.
           Respectfully,
     Wanda Franz, Ph.D.,
                                                        President.
     David N. O'Steen, Ph.D.,
                                               Executive Director.
     Carol Long,
                                                     PAC Director.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 75 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Utah, 10 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah is recognized.
  Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, I spoke at some length yesterday in a 
philosophical fashion, going back to the Founding Fathers and the 
Federalist Papers, hoping to turn the debate into that kind of an 
analysis of our basic freedoms and our political approach. Today I want 
to get very down and dirty, as they say; very practical. It has been my 
observation throughout this entire controversy, and it goes back to the 
last Congress as well as this one, that the efforts at campaign finance 
reform really constitute an incumbent protection activity. The Senator 
from Arizona, my friend, Senator McCain, said that if the challengers 
were voting here they would all vote for this bill because he showed 
the chart that showed most of the PAC money went to incumbents.
  I have been a challenger. The memory is still fresh in my mind, even 
though I am now an incumbent. And I can assure all who do not know 
anything about the political process, that an incumbent comes into a 
race with incredible advantages. Let me give an example. I did not run 
against an incumbent Senator but I ran against an incumbent 
Congressman. These are the advantages he brought to the race.
  He had a staff, paid for by the taxpayers, that was available to 
research every issue, provide him with a paper on every issue, and in 
the course of press releases give him the press support that he 
required.
  He held a press conference late in the campaign in which he attacked 
me for a wide variety of things. The press person who scheduled that 
press conference, who wrote the press release,

[[Page S6772]]

and who handled all press inquiries relating to it was paid by the 
taxpayer because he was on the Congressman's staff. I had to have 
people there to protect my interests. They were all paid for out of 
campaign funds because I had no congressional staff. I am not saying 
that he broke the law. I am not saying that he did anything improper. I 
am just outlining this is the way it is.
  He had name recognition going back to 8 years of service in the House 
of Representatives. I thought I had some name recognition because my 
father had served in the Senate. I figured everybody would remember the 
name ``Bennett'' favorably in connection with the Senate. Boy, did I 
find out differently. In the first poll that was taken, I was at 3 
percent, with a 4-percent margin of error. I could have been minus 1. 
How do I counteract that 8 years of name recognition that he has built 
up? I had to raise the money. How did I pay for the people who were 
there to counteract the people that he had on his congressionally 
supported staff? I had to raise the money.
  Is it a fair fight when you say the incumbent is at level x and the 
challenger must also be at level x, when the incumbent has all of these 
advantages that are worth money that the challenger has to raise money 
in order to produce? When you say, let us get a fair fight and let us 
do it by saying that the challenger is unable to raise money to take 
care of the things that the incumbent does not have to raise money for, 
you are automatically creating a circumstance in favor of the 
incumbent.
  Some political observers have said to me, ``Why are you opposed to 
this now that you are an incumbent? We can understand that you were 
opposed to campaign reform while you were a challenger because as a 
challenger you were at a disadvantage in the face of campaign reform. 
But now that you are an incumbent, and particularly now that your party 
has a majority of the incumbents, why isn't your party in favor of an 
incumbent protection act that will put all of these disadvantages on 
the backs of the challenger?''
  Well, I go back to my statement yesterday. I have philosophical 
challenges with these attempts to do that which I consider would 
produce damage to our basic philosophical underpinnings in this 
country. I did not quote the Federalist Papers just to prove that I had 
read them. I went through that process to demonstrate that I have a 
philosophical objection to what it is we are trying to do here, even 
though, should this bill pass, I would be benefited as an incumbent. I 
am convinced, if this bill were to pass, that I would be benefited as 
an incumbent, that I would be in a circumstance where it would be 
impossible for anybody to challenge me. But I am willing to run the 
risk of having them challenge me because that is the American pattern 
and that is what is in the Constitution that all of us have sworn to 
uphold and defend here in this body.
  So, Mr. President, I am not going to vote for cloture. I am not going 
to vote to support a bill that is an incumbent protection act. I am 
going to say we will all stand exposed to the challenge of challengers 
who have the energy and the message necessary to raise the money to 
challenge us and not hide behind limits that say that we can use the 
advantages of our offices and our challengers cannot. I believe it is 
as simple as that. I believe that honest fairness says we will oppose 
this bill, and, therefore, we oppose cloture on the bill. I yield the 
floor.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. How much time do the proponents have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The proponents have 67 minutes 15 seconds.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Florida, who has been one of the original supporters of this 
legislation and has helped us all through the difficult process of 
trying to get it up for a vote. I thank him very much.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Will the Senator yield me 5 seconds?
  Mr. GRAHAM. I yield the Senator 5 seconds.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. I thank the Senator.


                         Privilege Of The Floor

  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that David 
Hlavac, who is interning with me, be allowed to be on the floor 
throughout the duration of this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I first will extend my commendation to 
Senators Feingold and McCain and the others who have worked so hard to 
craft what is truly a bipartisan proposal to deal with one of the 
serious cancers in our American democratic system, and that is the way 
in which we manage and finance campaigns for the Congress. This bill is 
another example that, if we are going to do the public's will, it must 
be done in a bipartisan spirit.
  Mr. President, we have spent a lot of this year and last year talking 
about the creative energy of the States, the desire to return greater 
responsibility to the States for many of our most basic domestic 
programs. We have acknowledged that the States, given that 
responsibility, given their flexibility to respond to the specific 
circumstances that they face, would unleash a new wave of innovation to 
bring us creative solutions to some of our most vexatious problems.
  Mr. President, I say that we can take some encouragement as to the 
legitimacy of that position by looking at what States have done in the 
area of campaign finance reform. States were faced with basically the 
same problem that we are dealing with this morning--the problem of 
campaign money run amok and the need to change campaign financing 
mechanisms in order to restore public confidence.
  The experience of my State of Florida, I believe, is instructive in 
this regard. In 1991, the State legislature overhauled Florida's 
campaign finance system. It instituted a $500 cap on individual 
contributions. Prior to that it had been as much as $3,000. It provided 
for public financing of campaigns. It instituted overall caps on 
statewide races. It provided incentives to abide by the cap.
  What has happened in the relatively brief period that Florida has had 
these campaign finance reforms? In 1990, there was an incumbent 
Governor running for reelection. That incumbent Governor spent 
$10,670,000. Four years later, there was a different incumbent Governor 
running for reelection. In that campaign he spent $7,480,000. I note 
that the incumbent in 1990, who spent almost a third more, lost. The 
incumbent in 1994, under the new standards, was reelected. Common Cause 
of Florida attributes the decrease in campaign spending directly to 
Florida's enactment of campaign finance reforms.
  Mr. President, the States can control the terms and conditions of 
elections for State officials. It is our responsibility to do likewise 
for the Congress. I applaud the effort that is before us today. It is a 
genuine, thoughtful response to a serious national problem. I do not 
pretend that it is perfect. We have already heard on the floor several 
persons who, like myself, will vote to invoke cloture and support this 
bill, but who also are prepared to support modifications that we think 
would perfect it.
  For instance, I do not believe that political action committees are a 
poisonous political evil that should be banned. But, Mr. President, if 
accepting some restraints on political action committees is necessary 
to achieve the bipartisan consensus for the passage of this sorely 
needed legislation, I am prepared to vote to do so.
  Mr. President, there are many infirmities in our current system which 
have already been identified. Remedies have been prescribed. I wish to 
focus on one of those infirmities. That is, that the enormous amount of 
money in political campaigns has fundamentally changed the nature and 
purpose of congressional campaigns.
  What should be the purpose of a political campaign? In my opinion, it 
should include at least two dual relationships. First, there should be 
a duality of relationship in terms of education. Yes, the candidate is 
trying to educate the public as to who he or she is, what he or she 
stands for, what would be the objective of service in public office, 
what they would try to accomplish. But there is an equally important 
side of the education duality, and that is that the citizens are 
influencing the candidate. A campaign should be a learning experience. 
The campaign should better prepare the candidate to serve in public 
office by

[[Page S6773]]

the experiences, the exposure, that the campaign will provide.

  There is a second duality, and that is the development of a 
democratic contract. The citizens should have some reasonable 
expectation that if they vote for a particular candidate, the policies 
that candidate has advocated will, in fact, form the basis of the 
candidate's efforts once in office, and the public official should have 
the right to expect that in office he would have the support of the 
public, the mandate of the public to achieve those policies upon which 
his or her campaign was predicated. These dualities, a duality of 
education and a duality of the forming of a democratic contract, these 
are essential elements of our system of representative democracy.
  However, Mr. President, the excess of money in campaigns has changed 
the nature and the purpose of the campaign. It has, in fact, allowed 
candidates to hide from the voters rather than to use the campaign to 
learn from and more effectively communicate with the public. Candidates 
now move from the television studio to record 30-second sound bites, 
often of a highly negative character, to the telephone to solicit 
campaign contributions to pay for those 30-second sound bites. There is 
little time left to interact on a personal level with the voter.
  By providing for spending limits, this bill would direct voters from 
the television studio back to the street to look for ways other than 
money to appeal to voters, by interacting with them, discussing issues, 
debating of the candidates, so that voters can make an accurate 
assessment of who they wish to represent.
  I personally, Mr. President, would like to see a requirement that one 
who participates in the public assistance to a campaign, whether 
Presidential candidates participating for direct-cash infusion or 
congressional candidates who, under this legislation, would benefit by 
preference in perks like postal and broadcast rates, that they would 
commit themselves to participate in a stipulated number of public 
appearances with their opponents. I believe that is the truest way in 
which the public can form an opinion as to the qualities and 
capabilities of the persons who seek to represent others.
  Mr. President, providing for a voluntary system of spending limits, 
while simultaneously requiring candidates to raise at least 60 percent 
of campaign funds from their home State, are positive steps toward 
bringing candidates and voters together. Passage of this bill would be 
a positive step toward realizing the goal of our political process, 
allowing the voter to truly understand, truly assess the candidate's 
view, and thus to make an informed judgment, while simultaneously 
helping to prevent politicians from becoming insulated and mitigate 
voters' disaffection.
  Mr. President, by passing this bill today, we can restore a 
meaningful dialog between the voter and the candidate. By doing so, we 
can all share in giving this country a great victory, and restoring the 
public's faith in the political process. I urge this bill's passage.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield up to 5 minutes to the Senator 
from North Dakota.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I intend to vote for cloture today. I do 
not do so believing this is a perfect bill. There are some provisions 
in this measure I do not support. I do not support the complete 
abolition of PAC's, for example. But I believe we ought to be debating 
campaign finance reform. Therefore, I will vote for cloture to get a 
campaign finance reform bill on the floor of the Senate so we can offer 
amendments and see if we can perfect the bill in a way that will 
represent the public interest.
  In my judgment, the financing of political campaigns is spinning out 
of control--more and more dollars in each campaign, more and more 
wealthy candidates financing their own campaigns. Campaigns in America 
have not so much become a competition of ideas--this is what campaigns 
ought to be--but a 30-second ad war. Not so much by candidates, but by 
the creators of the 30-second little ``bomb bursts'' that are put on 
television to try and destroy other reputations. These hired guns 
hardly serve the public interest, yet campaigns really have become a 
competition of 30-second ads.
  When I last ran for the U.S. Senate, I was much better known than my 
opponent, so I made a novel proposal, which he did not accept, 
unfortunately. I wish he would have. I said: I am better known than 
you, but if we can agree to certain things, I think in many respects it 
will even things up. Let neither of us do any advertising at all. 
Neither of us will do any radio or television ads, no 30-second ads, no 
ads of any kind. You and I will put our money together, and we will buy 
an hour of prime time television each week for the 8 weeks prior to the 
election, and each week we will show up without handlers, without 
research notes, at a television studio with no monitor, and for an hour 
in prime time, statewide on North Dakota television, you and I will 
discuss the future. We will discuss whatever you want to discuss, 
whatever I want to discuss, such as why we are seeking a seat in the 
U.S. Senate, what kind of future we see for this country, what kind of 
policies we think will make this a better country.
  I thought, frankly, 8 hours of prime time television, statewide, with 
both of us addressing each other and addressing why we were running for 
the U.S. Senate, might have been the most novel campaign in the 
country. My opponent chose not to accept that. Instead, we saw a 
barrage of 30-second ads. I do not think it provided any illumination 
for the North Dakota voters in that campaign. I think it would have 
been a better campaign had we had 8 hours prime time, statewide 
television, without handlers, to talk about what we thought was 
important for the future of this country. We did not have that kind of 
campaign.
  So, the question for the Senate now is, what kind of campaign finance 
reform would be useful in this country? There are wide disagreements 
about how this ought to be addressed. For instance, I saved this 
article, the headline of which quotes my friend Speaker Gingrich as 
saying, ``Gingrich calls for more, not less, campaign cash.'' Speaker 
Gingrich gave a speech downtown, and he fundamentally disagrees with me 
that there is too much money in politics. He says there is not enough 
money in politics; there ought to be more money in politics.
  I think that if we can find a way--and this bill provides one 
mechanism--to limit campaign spending and require full disclosure on 
all contributions, at that point you will start ratcheting down the 
cost of political campaigns in this country, and I think you will do 
this country a public service.
  Last weekend when I was at Monticello, the home of Thomas Jefferson, 
I was reminded again of the work and words of this great American in 
the early days of this country. It seems to me Tom Jefferson would view 
what goes on in political campaigns in America today as a perversion of 
democracy. Today's campaigns are not, as I said earlier, a competition 
of ideas about how to make this a better country. They are much more a 
30-second ad war that does not serve the public interest.
  I intend to vote for cloture. I hope we will obtain cloture and have 
this important piece of legislation on the floor, open for amendments. 
I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield up to 15 minutes to Senator 
Thompson of Tennessee, who has been one of the main authors of this 
bill and has been key to making this a bipartisan reform effort. I 
thank him for his good work on this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.
  Mr. THOMPSON. I thank the Senator. I thank the majority leader for 
bringing this matter to the floor at this time. I thank my 
distinguished colleagues, Senator McCain and Senator Feingold, for 
their leadership on this bill. I am proud to be one of the original 
cosponsors of this particular legislation.
  Mr. President, after having listened to over a day of debate on this 
issue, I think the question now could be simply put. Are we satisfied 
with our current system of financing Federal campaigns in this country? 
Do we think it is a good system? If we are not satisfied, are we 
willing to at least take the first step--perhaps not a perfect step--
toward doing something about it?

[[Page S6774]]

  I approach this from the standpoint of one who was recently a 
challenger and who is now an incumbent running for reelection in 2 
years, having gotten the unexpired term of the Vice President for a 2-
year term. I am now running as an incumbent for a full term. So I have 
seen it from both sides.
  I also approach it from the standpoint of one who made a commitment 
to the people of Tennessee that I will try to change the system that we 
have now working in Washington and that I was dissatisfied with the 
process by which our legislation is enacted. But I think it is 
fundamentally the business of the U.S. Congress to address how we elect 
our public officials, how long they stay, and what their motivations 
are when they get here. So I am delighted to be a part of this effort.
  The system now--let us take a look at the system that we have now. I 
believe I can be objective in describing it. Elections certainly cost 
more and more and more. We see Senate campaigns now that cost $10, $20, 
and $30 million. The combined expenditures in one Senate campaign were 
over $40 million. We have a system where more and more time is taken by 
Members of Congress, at a time when technology and all the demands of 
modern campaigning require campaigns to cost more and more. More and 
more, we, the Members of, supposedly, the world's greatest deliberative 
body, wind up having no time to deliberate anymore because of the 
fractured nature of our lives. For someone to run in a State such as 
mine, I have calculated that now it would be about $15,000 a week that 
I would have to raise, year in and year out, to run the kind of 
campaigns that would be traditionally raised in a State such as mine.
  Mr. President, that is not why I came to the U.S. Senate. We have a 
system now where more and more of the perception is that contributions 
are tied to legislation. Perhaps that was not a problem when the 
amounts were smaller. But now we see larger and larger contributions, 
usually soft money contributions, with regard to larger and larger 
issues, millions of dollars being spent, billions of dollars being 
decided by massive pieces of legislation in the U.S. Congress.
  We have a system where it is no longer ideological. The money does 
not flow to ideas. The money flows to power. Whoever is the incumbent 
party likes the system. Whoever is not the incumbent party plans on 
being the incumbent party. Democrats have killed this legislation for 
years, and now that the Republicans are in power, we are trying to 
return the favor. We have a system whereby, in individual cases, people 
are drawing closer and closer relationships with individual pieces of 
legislation and massive amounts of money that are being spent by the 
people affected by the legislation.
  We constantly see news stories, day in and day out. There is a strong 
perception among the American people that any system that costs so much 
money and any system that requires us to go to such great lengths to 
get that money cannot be on the level. We see, day in and day out, 
editorials across the country. Common Cause has compiled 261 editorials 
from 161 newspapers and publications. What they say is not a pretty 
picture. It is not that I necessarily agree with the analysis made of 
these articles, but this is the perception among editorial writers 
across the country--liberal papers and conservative papers. The most 
conservative paper in my home State, in Tennessee, the Chattanooga Free 
Press, a Republican paper, has one of the editorials contained in this 
compilation. What they say, I think, is what is perceived by the 
American people. They say that neither party wants to end the abuses. 
One of the editorials says, ``In Congress, Money Still Talks.'' Another 
says, ``New Year's Sale on Votes.'' Another says, ``Money Brings 
Votes.'' Another says, ``Congressmen Admit Being Bought by 
Contributions.'' Another says, ``Republican Reform; GOP Already Bought 
Off.''
  Mr. President, that hurts. The Chattanooga Free Press in Tennessee 
says in its article--it entitles it, ``The Campaign Money Evil.'' 
Another article says, ``Getting What it Paid For,'' talking about 
American industry. Another says, ``Feeding Frenzy on the Hill,'' 
talking about us and our fundraising activities. Another says, ``Buying 
the Presidency.'' While we are not dealing with a Presidential 
campaign, if I heard it correctly on the Brinkley show, now, 
apparently, for $50,000 you can sleep in the Lincoln bed at the White 
House. Another says, ``NRA Buys Recent House Votes.'' You can say 
that----
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. THOMPSON. Yes.
  Mr. McCAIN. That is $130,000. It is not as cheap as $50,000.
  Mr. THOMPSON. Well, that certainly seems more reasonable. Another 
says, ``Big Money Talks.'' Another says, ``Taste of Money Corrupts 
Politics.'' This is from Texas. Another says, ``The Great `Unsecret' of 
Politics.'' That is the relationship between contributions and votes. 
Another says, ``Legal Bribery Still Controls Congress.'' I do not 
believe that, but a lot of people believe that, and we have to ask 
ourselves why. Another says, ``Campaigns up for Sale.''
  Mr. President, how much more of this can we stand as an institution? 
How can we go before the American people with the tough choices that we 
are going to have to be leading on, convincing the people, with no 
credibility? Ten percent of the people in this country have a great 
deal of confidence in Congress. Twelve percent have a great deal of 
confidence in the executive branch. Eighty percent of the people, at 
least, favor major change here. We always want to be responsive to the 
American people, until it comes to something that affects us and our 
livelihoods--whether it is term limits, campaign finance reform, or 
some other issue that affects us directly as politicians. Then we come 
up with all kinds of excuses why it will not work.
  We have a system where soft money, of course, has completely made a 
sham of the reforms that were put in place in earlier years. We all 
know that. It is a bipartisan problem. Soft money now is up 100 
percent--a 100-percent increase--with hundreds of thousands in 
contributions, in many cases that we see. So there has been a 100-
percent increase since the last election cycle.

  Now, that is the system, Mr. President. I do not think it is a very 
good one. I submit that it is not a good system. Some opponents of 
reform say there is not enough money in politics. It is not a question 
of too much; it is not enough; that $700 million spent in 1994 is not 
enough. They say that more money is spent on soap detergent 
advertisement, or whatever kinds of advertisement, than on political 
campaigning. I hope that that analogy will fall on its face without 
serious analysis, but a lot of people use that. No. 1, we are not in 
the soap-selling business. No. 2, if Procter & Gamble were advertising 
in a way that undermined the credibility of the company, they would not 
be doing it. No. 3, these businesses have only one goal, and that is 
profit. I would like to think that we have an additional goal in the 
U.S. Congress.
  Other opponents say that it restricts freedom and the ability to 
participate. This is, of course, a voluntary system, No. 1. And No. 2, 
we are not talking about mom and pop sitting around the kitchen table 
deciding how to distribute their $100 or $250 to a Presidential 
campaign or a senatorial campaign. They can still do that any way they 
want to do it.
  With regard to the PAC issue, which I will discuss in a moment, it 
simply means that if this legislation were passed, instead of sending 
it to a political action committee, they would have to make a decision 
themselves as to which candidate they wanted to send it to. There is no 
restriction of freedom here on anyone except those in Washington who 
receive all those minicontributions from various people and make the 
political decision as to how to use that money. Their freedom will be 
restricted somewhat. There is no limit whatsoever in this legislation 
on anybody's ability to participate in the process. People need to 
understand that.
  The current limitation we have is $1,000 on individual contributions. 
That is a limitation. That is the same limitation that we have here; no 
new limitation.
  Many people say that certainly we want reform. Everybody knows we 
need reform. ``It is a lousy system but not this reform. I would 
support it, if this particular feature was in, or out,'' or whatnot. I 
think that it is tempting to

[[Page S6775]]

want to have it both ways; to be for reform but never be for a reform 
measure. Some people say it is an incumbent protection business, like 
my friend Senator Bennett. I take a different view from that. I think 
that under the system now he is certainly correct. Incumbents have 
substantial advantage. What this legislation would do is, let us say, 
at least place some limitation on the major incumbent advantage; and 
that is the ability to raise unlimited amounts of money. The incumbents 
are still going to have the advantages that they always had. But at 
least you are saying to that incumbent if he voluntarily chooses to 
participate that there will be some cap on the amount of money that you 
spend. You are an incumbent now. The money is going to come to you not 
because people believe in you in many, many cases any more but simply 
because you are an incumbent, and you have the power and authority at 
that point. They say, ``Well, it restricts people from coming in and 
spending enough money to overcome the incumbent.'' How often does that 
happen in the real world? When it happens, it is somebody who is an 
extremely wealthy individual. And it happens then sometimes.
  So you wind up with professional politicians on the one hand who are 
able to raise large sums of money because they are incumbents, and 
wealthy individuals on the other. That is what our system is becoming--
those two classes of people and nobody else.
  This legislation would level the playing field and let more people of 
average means participate. This bill is voluntary. Under it campaigns 
will cost less. I think that is the crucial feature. A lot of us who 
support this legislation have different ideas about that. To me the PAC 
situation is not a crucial feature.
  Opponents are certainly correct when they point out that the PAC's 
were a reform measure in and of themselves in 1974 in the aftermath of 
Watergate. We thought that would substantially reform the process, and 
now PAC's are an anathema to a lot of people.
  The fact of the matter is--and both sides should understand and know 
this--that people, whether they be businesses or labor unions or 
whoever, individuals can still send money in. They can still 
contribute. They can still get together and decide that they want to 
individually send contributions in.
  In my campaign I ran against an individual that did not accept PAC 
money. He got all of the same kind of money that he wanted. It is a 
little more cumbersome. But we are not eliminating special interest 
money if we eliminate PAC's.
  So to me that is more of a symbolic measure than it is anything else. 
The real crucial measure is limiting the overall amounts of money--that 
$500 million that was spent in congressional races in the last election 
time. It will take less time. It will allow my colleagues to spend the 
time on the things that they were elected to do.
  I believe it would level the playing field; 90 percent of all 
incumbents--in this revolution that was supposedly having all this 
turnover of all of those who want to be reelected--90 percent are 
reelected. For those of my friends who always look and see who supports 
a piece of legislation before they decide whether they are for it or 
against it, and all of them who decry the trial lawyers and the AFL-CIO 
and the, well you finally found something that you all agree on because 
they are all in agreement with the opponents of this legislation that 
this is a bad piece of legislation. So maybe they will lay off those 
groups for a little while in the future.
  Mr. President, this is not a division any longer of business versus 
labor or of Democrats versus Republicans. It is a division of people 
who want to change the system and those who genuinely do not believe 
that we ought to have it. I would like to think that this is reform 
time. I would think that this would do more to assist in our attempt to 
balance the budget than anything else because much of the pressure that 
this process has within, in it is pressure to spend money. It would be 
a genuine reform measure.

  The lobbying and gift reform measures were something long overdue. We 
needed to do it. But we are in a situation now where you cannot buy me 
a $50 meal or a $51 meal but you can go out and get together a few 
hundred thousand dollars for me for my campaign. So that does not make 
a whole lot of sense.
  I do not think that we ought to get in a situation where we are for 
reform until it affects us individually and our livelihood when we are 
affecting everybody else's livelihood on a daily basis. I think it 
should not be viewed with suspicion among my Republican colleagues. I 
think too often that we are trying to figure out how this is going to 
benefit them, or us. The fact of the matter is we do not know. There is 
no way to figure it. There is no way to tell. It depends on swings. 
Sometimes we are going to be in. Sometimes we are going to be out. 
Sometimes a new scheme might hurt us. Sometimes it might help us. But 
the bottom line is that we should not be afraid of fundamental reform 
that the American people want, that we all know that we need, and we 
should get back to winning not on the basis of who can raise the most 
money but on the basis of the competition of ideas.
  That is what we pride ourselves in. That is why we think we were 
successful last time. That is why we think we will be successful again. 
Let us get back to that concept.
  It is for those reasons that I support this legislation and urge my 
colleagues to do so.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, a couple of observations, and then I am 
going to yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Washington.
  I have listened with interest over the years to the debate in this 
debate about the suggestions of the money chase and dividing up the 
amount of money one might raise in a campaign by every week of service. 
My good friend from Tennessee, for example, suggested that he would 
have to raise $15,000 a week throughout his entire term to be 
competitive in Tennessee.
  I think it is important to remind everyone of the statistics which 
are irrefutable. Eighty percent of the money raised in a Senate 
reelection cycle was raised in the last 2 years. Senators are not out 
raising money every week through a 6-year term. In fact, in the last 
cycle 80 percent of the money raised by Senators was raised in the last 
2 years.
  So I am unaware of anybody here in the Senate that is working on 
fundraising week in and week out through the course of the 6-year term.
  Second, let me just say again that I always find it somewhat amusing 
the extent to which the revelation that little is spent on campaigns 
relative to consumer items like yogurt tends to exercise the proponents 
of this bill almost to distraction. But, of course, it is absolutely 
appropriate when it is said too much is spent on campaigns. You would 
have to ask the question: Compared to what? Compared to what? For that 
observation to mean anything it has to be compared to something.
  In 1994, in House and Senate races, about $3.74 per eligible voter 
was spent. We spent about on politics in the last cycle what consumers 
spent on bubble gum. Roughly $600 million was spent on bubble gum. In 
1996, Americans will spend $174 billion on commercial advertising.
  So it is appropriate when dealing with the basic premise underlying 
this measure that too much is being spent to ask the question about the 
premise: How much is too much? My view is that $3.74 per voter is 
pretty hard to argue is too much to spend communicating with the 
electorate.
  Mr. President, my good friend from Washington has been quite patient, 
in the Chamber for some time now, and I will be glad to yield to him 10 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I believe it important in discussing an 
issue of this significance to begin once more with fundamental 
principles. The most fundamental principle affected by this debate is 
found in the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
which in relevant part reads, ``Congress,'' that is to say us, ``shall 
make no law abridging the freedom of speech.''
  Mr. President, I turn to page 31 in this bill in section 201 and I 
read, ``No

[[Page S6776]]

person other than an individual or a political committee may make a 
contribution to a candidate.''
  ``No person other than an individual or a political committee may 
make a contribution to a candidate.'' In other words, any voluntary 
association is entirely denied the right to participate in the most 
effective possible way in a political campaign by making any 
contribution to a candidate at all.
  Here we live in the third century of a Nation, the particular genius 
of which has been the accomplishment of myriad purposes by voluntary 
associations, and we are seriously considering a bill that says no 
voluntary association can make a contribution to a candidate for the 
Senate.
  Our opponents can read us 1,000 opinions of law professors to the 
effect that that does not violate the first amendment, but a third 
grader would understand that it does. It is a clear abridgment of the 
right of free speech. Moreover, that brief comment reflects the entire 
nature of this bill. Everything in it is designed to restrict political 
participation, to abridge the effective right of free speech in the 
political arena. But it does not restrict everyone's right of free 
speech in every fashion. No, it discriminates among methods of 
political speech. It imposes severe restrictions upon candidates who, 
while they may elect to stay out of the system, nonetheless are 
severely penalized by advantages given to their opponents if they 
repudiate this outrageous system. It not only prevents these voluntary 
associations from making any contribution but even an individual is 
likely to be prohibited from making a contribution to a candidate when 
that candidate has reached the rather modest maximum permitted under 
this law to gain certain other advantages.
  It, of all things, severely restricts as a great evil political 
parties. For some reason or another, it is based on the proposition 
that both the Republican and Democratic Parties are highly undesirable 
organizations that must be severely restricted in their fundraising and 
prevented in many cases from providing support to their own candidates.
  Now, while candidates have their rights abridged, organized groups 
have their rights abridged, individuals have their rights abridged, and 
political parties have their rights abridged, whose free speech rights 
are not abridged by this bill? Well, first, television networks and 
stations and their reporters and their editorial writers can continue 
to say as much as they want to say and to be as biased as they wish to 
be with respect to any election campaign, and not only are no 
restrictions placed on their ability to engage in those activities but 
the candidates who are their victims, whom they oppose, are not granted 
any ability to raise money to counteract what they may consider to be 
biased editorials or biased news stories. Newspapers fall into exactly 
the same category, whether in the reports of their political writers or 
the editorial support that they provide for candidates--no limitations 
there but severe limitations on the ability to respond to those 
newspapers.

  And one other important element. All organizations, all groups that 
are willing to engage in the subterfuge that they are not endorsing 
candidates or promoting elections by simply reporting through 30-second 
commercials on their interpretation of the way in which candidates who 
hold office have voted, and so all of the commercials, the tens of 
millions of dollars of commercials we have seen in the last 6 months 
paid for by labor unions attacking Members of the House of 
Representatives for their votes on Medicare reform and the balanced 
budget, none of those are restricted in any way by the proposals in 
this bill. All that is restricted is the ability of a candidate 
attacked by these millions of dollars effectively to respond to those 
attacks.
  Now, I do not know how much value there is in plumbing the 
motivations of the authors of the bill. Perhaps they feel that form of 
political participation ought not to be restricted in any fashion. 
Perhaps they feel that even though they cannot stand a political action 
committee giving money to a candidate's campaign, that same group ought 
to be permitted without limitation and without restriction to buy 
advertisements attacking candidates or incumbents on their lifestyle or 
their record, that that somehow or another is good policy. I think, 
however, the reason there is no limitation on this form of free speech 
is that they know perfectly well, the sponsors know perfectly well that 
such restrictions would be found to be unconstitutional. And so they 
only restrict free speech where they think they can get away with it, 
even though they make a situation that at the present time is unfair 
far more unfair than is the status quo.
  Mr. President, acknowledge, those who oppose this bill, that the 
people of the United States by special interest groups that would be 
benefited by having their opponents removed from the equation and 
newspaper and television editorialists who would be benefited by having 
their views less effectively counteracted, have created a situation 
where a majority of the people of the United States do not like the 
present system and want reform. This bill is entitled ``Reform,'' and 
we are, therefore, supposed to pass it. But we went through this 
experience more than 20 years ago when the present law was passed. 
Every argument that has been made here for 2 days was made then. That 
present system was terrible. We had to have limitations. We had to 
create things called political action committees in which people could 
engage in political action. We would restore confidence in the system.
  Well, Mr. President, not a single one of the desires or the goals or 
the promises of those proponents has been accomplished at this point, 
and so what are we asked to do now? Back off and start over with a very 
simple proposition that just says everyone disclose where his or her 
money comes from and trust the intelligence of the people to sift 
through the arguments that they get? No. We are told if 1,000 
restrictions were not enough, let us try 2,000 restrictions and see if 
it does not work better. That is the theory of this bill.

  We hear a great deal about how terribly prejudicial in favor of 
incumbents the present system is. But, then, why do we wipe out the one 
organization that will always support a challenger in a race, the 
challenger's political party?
  The Republican Party will support the challenger to a Democrat, the 
Democratic Party will support the challenger to a Republican, if they 
think that challenge is remotely viable. So this bill is not about 
incumbents and nonincumbents. If it were, it would encourage 
contributions to political parties. It would lift the restrictions on 
the amount of support that political parties can provide for its 
candidates. But, instead, it treats parties, if anything, as a greater 
evil than candidates themselves.
  No, this is not campaign reform. This is a huge bureaucracy, the 
design of which is to abridge the freedom of speech of candidates for 
the U.S. Senate, exactly what the first amendment tells Congress it may 
not do.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky is recognized.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from 
Washington for an absolutely brilliant discourse on the impact of this 
bill on the political process. As usual, he is right on the mark, and I 
thank him for his important contribution to this debate.
  My friend and colleague from New Hampshire has been on the floor for 
some time. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 51 minutes remaining.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
New Hampshire.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. GREGG. I thank the Senator from Kentucky. I also congratulate the 
Senator from Washington for his very thoughtful and concise discussion 
relative to this bill. I wanted to focus on a narrower issue which 
really plays out some of the points raised by the Senator from 
Washington.
  I heard a prior Senator's statement, ``This is a bill that levels the 
playing field.'' I only perceive this as leveling if you perceive the 
north slope of some mountain in the Himalayas, Mount Everest, for 
example, to be level. The fact is, this is not a leveling bill. The 
fact is, this bill, because it fails to address the independent 
expenditure issue, is a bill which, were this a teeter-totter, would 
have one side directly up in the

[[Page S6777]]

air and the other side directly on the ground.
  We have to realize that under this bill one of the core elements of 
what I consider to be inappropriate activity in the political area, but 
which others would consider to be good politics, as they are supported 
by it, is not addressed at all. It was in March, for example, that the 
AFL-CIO held a rather unique convention here in Washington, where they 
voted, as an institution, to levy a special assessment on their 
membership, which assessment was meant to raise approximately $25 
million of a $35 million goal dedicated to defeating Republicans. There 
was no other purpose. It was openly stated. They were going to spend 
$35 million for the purpose of defeating Republicans. So they had this 
special assessment of $25 million which went out against all their 
union membership.

  Someone took a poll of the union membership, and it turns out the 
union membership, at least 58 percent of the union membership, did not 
realize they were going to have to pay this mandatory fee; 62 percent 
of the union membership opposed this mandatory fee; 78 percent of the 
union membership did not know they had the right to get the fee back; 
84 percent would support making union leaders here in Washington, the 
big bosses, disclose exactly what their money is spent for; and only 4 
percent thought that engaging in political elections was the most 
important responsibility of major unions.
  So, what we have here is an instance where the AFL-CIO is going to go 
out, and they have the right to do this, and raise $25 to $35 million 
and spend it against people who they, the union bosses here in 
Washington, do not agree with. It happens that the rank and file 
membership, to a large degree, do agree with the agenda of the 
Republicans here in Washington. In fact, 87 percent of the union 
membership supports welfare reform and 82 percent of union membership 
supports the balanced budget amendment and 78 percent happens to 
support tax reductions and the $500-per-child tax credit, all of which 
happen to be Republican initiatives, all of which are opposed by 
President Clinton, all of which have been opposed by Democratic 
Members. But, once again, the big bosses here in the unions in 
Washington have decided to assess, essentially, a tax against the union 
membership, and that tax, raising $25 to $35 million, is going to be 
used to attack Republicans who happen to support philosophies which are 
supported by a majority of the union membership.
  Yet, this bill remains silent on this rather significant gap in the 
campaign election laws. If you were in the process of addressing 
campaign election laws, I think by the very fact it remains silent, you 
must ask: Why? Why would such a colossal amount of money that is going 
to be poured into the political system be ignored by a bill like this?
  Well, folks, I think it is called politics. I think it is called 
political influence. I think it is because the majority of the sponsors 
of this bill happen to be mostly related in their political philosophy 
to the bosses of the unions here in Washington. As a result, there is 
no desire to address something which might affront that group of 
political forces in this country, who are significant. They have always 
been significant in this country. They have a major role to play, and 
always should have a major role to play. But there is unquestionably a 
significant issue of credibility raised by the failure to address this 
issue. In fact, it is such a significant issue of credibility that I 
think it brings down the whole bill, because it draws the whole bill 
into question, as to its integrity, as to its purpose--not integrity, 
wrong word--as to its purpose, as to its legitimacy.
  It could be corrected rather easily, actually. You could simply put 
language in which would say union members shall have the affirmative 
right, which shall have to be confirmed or which shall have to be--let 
me restate that. Union members will have to approve how their dues will 
be spent when it comes to political actions and political activity.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 5 minutes of the Senator has expired.
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield the Senator 2 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 2 additional minutes.
  Mr. GREGG. I have an amendment which proposes that: the Union Members 
Protection Act. It essentially says that before union members' dues can 
be spent in the manner in which these $25 million to $35 million are 
going to be spent, the union member will have the right to 
affirmatively approve that or disapprove it. In the case of 
disapproving it, the money will not be spent. That will bring into the 
process at least the ability of the union members to avoid this tax if 
they decide to avoid this tax; in the process, to direct the funds in a 
manner which they feel is appropriate to their own political position, 
not to those of a few bosses here in Washington.
  That type of correction is not in this bill. Not only is it not in 
this bill, but were that amendment to be brought forward, this bill 
would be filibustered by the supporters of the bill, I suspect. 
Certainly, if there was a chance it was going to be passed, it would be 
filibustered by the proponents of this bill. Why? Political interests.
  So the credibility of this proposal, I think, is highly suspect, not 
only substantively on the grounds of constitutionality that was raised 
by Senator Gorton, but on the grounds of the politics of the bill, 
because when you leave this large a gap in the issue of how you are 
going to reform campaign financing, you basically are saying your 
intention is not to reform campaign financing; your intention is to 
tilt the playing field once again in favor of one political group which 
happens to have a significant amount of influence amongst the sponsors. 
Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin is recognized.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Very briefly, before I turn it over to the Senator from 
Massachusetts. I, too, listened to the constitutional analysis by the 
Senator from Washington and the strong agreement by the Senator from 
Kentucky. The one suggested that any third grader would know that the 
PAC ban, with a backup provision, is unconstitutional. I am sorry, but 
I will say one thing about that. The Senator from Kentucky and the 
Senator from Washington voted for precisely that proposal 3 years ago 
under the Pressler amendment. So, apparently, at that time they did not 
understand, apparently, what any third grader would understand, which 
is that this in fact is constitutional, because it provides that, if 
the PAC ban is found unconstitutional, there is a backup provision. So 
that entire analysis disregards their own voting record and their own 
past position, which is that that is constitutional.
  Mr. President, I yield up to 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, thank you. I thank the Senator from 
Wisconsin.
  Mr. President, I was really fascinated to listen to our colleague 
from New Hampshire. I really never knew, but now I guess the Senate has 
learned something new, that the Senator from Tennessee, Senator 
Thompson, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, are the tools 
of the union bosses. That is a rather remarkable concept. I am sure the 
Senator from Arizona will struggle, as will the Senator from Tennessee, 
for years to get out from under that moniker.
  I think that both that and the argument of the Senator from 
Washington just underscore what is really going on here today in the 
U.S. Senate. Every argument that can conceivably be laid out on the 
table in pretense on the merits is really just an effort to avoid what 
this vote today is really about. This vote today is about whether or 
not the U.S. Senate is willing to stay here and work to produce 
campaign finance reform or whether it is happier with the status quo. 
That is the vote. It is very simple.
  Eighteen months ago we could have started doing campaign finance 
reform. I think it was 12 months ago there was a famous handshake 
between Newt Gingrich and the President suggesting there would be a 
commission to deal with campaign finance reform. But not only did 
Congress not follow through on the commission, as neither the

[[Page S6778]]

President nor the Speaker did, but at the last moment here we are on 
day one of consideration of this bill and we have to have a cloture 
vote. That tells the whole story.

  This is not a serious effort to legislate. This is not a serious 
effort to take an amendment from the Senator from New Hampshire and 
deal with this problem of constitutionality or of union bosses. After 
all, they only have 53 votes last time I counted. It seems to me that 
if it is truly an issue of the unions, that 53 Republicans are very 
quickly going to be summoned to the floor to vote against whatever 
union advantage is being built into this bill.
  So let us cut the charade here. This is not a serious effort to 
legislate. This is, once again, the Senate's moment of tokenism to 
pretend or at least expose--because Senator Feingold and Senator McCain 
insisted on it--that there are a majority of Senators here who are 
unwilling to deal with the issue of campaign finance reform.
  There is not even a serious discussion going on of an alternative. 
There is no alternative that has been proposed. There is no serious set 
of alternatives that have been put forward to try to say, ``Well, if we 
don't want to do it your way, here's a better way of doing it.'' There 
is no better way on the table.
  The Senate has been forced to bring one vehicle to the floor today, 
one effort, one pathetic gasp to try to suggest that we are prepared to 
deal with what the majority of Americans want us to deal with, which is 
the putrid stench of the influence of money in Washington that is 
taking away democracy from the people of the country. Everybody knows 
it. Every poll in the Nation just screams it at us.
  Ninety-two percent of registered voters believe that special interest 
contributions affect the votes of the Members of Congress. Eighty-eight 
percent believe that people who make large contributions get special 
favors from politicians. The evidence of public discontent just could 
not be more compelling. It is now spoken in the way in which Americans 
are just walking away from the system. Only 37 percent turned out to 
vote in the last election. They are walking with their feet away from 
what they perceive as an unwillingness of the Congress to deal with 
this.
  The vote today, Mr. President, is very simple. Do you want to deal 
with campaign finance reform or do you want to play the game again and 
be content and pretend that there is some great constitutional issue?
  I listened to the Senator from Washington raise the first amendment. 
My God, three-quarters of the people today talking about the first 
amendment and no curbs on free speech are the first people to come down 
here and vote against the Supreme Court's decision with respect to the 
protection of free speech and the flag. So they choose it when it suits 
their purposes, and then they go protect it when it also suits their 
purposes. Selective constitutionalism.
  Any third-grader does understand that if there is a voluntary system, 
purely voluntary, by which people participate in limits, there is no 
restraint on free speech. Anybody who wants to go out and spend their 
millions of dollars and avoid accountability within the rest of the 
system can do so under this bill. There is no limit.

  If perchance there were to be some problem with the PAC's and 
constitutionality, because of the freedom of association, the House of 
Representatives, in their bill, has an alternative. It is perfectly 
legitimate for us to send this bill to a conference committee, work in 
the conference committee, come up with a reasonable alternative and 
come back here. It is really inconceivable that the Republican Party, 
which is the majority of the U.S. Senate with 53 votes, is going to be 
disadvantaging itself in any amendment on the floor of the U.S. Senate, 
because they can summon all 53 votes to beat back any amendment that 
does not draw away some measure of those who are reasonable on their 
side.
  So this is not an effort to legislate. This is an effort to 
procrastinate once again. It is a vote on whether you desire to have 
campaign finance reform or whether you are content to suggest that 
there are problems with this bill sufficient that we cannot even deal 
with it on the floor or work through the legislative process.
  I have some problems with this bill. I do not like every component of 
it. I personally would like to see more free time available. I think 
there are a number of other options that we could work on. But I am 
content to live with what the majority of the U.S. Senate thinks is 
appropriate. I am content to have whatever advantage to our side or 
their side be put to the test of the legislative process. That is what 
we are supposed to do. Instead, once again, the special interests are 
going to win here today. Probably most likely this issue will not be 
able to be seriously considered this year yet again.
  I have worked on this since the day I came here with Senator Bradley, 
Senator Biden, Senator Mitchell, and Senator Boren. We have passed it 
in certain years here. But the game has been played with the House so 
it comes back at the last minute. Each side can blame the other for not 
really being serious about it or for filibustering it to death.
  In the end, Mr. President, the American people lose again, because 
everyone knows that the budget deficit is partly driven by the 
interests that succeed in preventing any tough choices from being made. 
Everyone knows what the money chase and the money game in Washington is 
all about. We would all be better off if we were to reduce that. I hope 
that colleagues today will come together in an effort to try to say, 
let us at least legislate through the week and see if we could engage 
in a serious effort to try to deal with one of the most pressing 
problems facing America's fledgling democracy.
  Mr. President, I yield back whatever time I may have to the manager 
of the bill.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gregg). The Senator has 43 minutes 
remaining.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield to the distinguished chairman of the Rules 
Committee--and we have listened to a great many hearings this spring on 
this matter--I yield 10 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I thank the floor managers, both floor 
managers, and indeed my colleague from Kentucky. As a senior member of 
the Rules Committee he sat side by side with me throughout what I am 
sure will be reviewed as a very prodigious, fair, and balanced series 
of hearings, which I will cover, given that the Rules Committee has 
jurisdiction over this particular bill and like bills.
  This morning, however, Mr. President, I make it very clear that while 
I support many areas of campaign finance reform, and I shall address 
those areas, this particular bill that is before the Senate is not one, 
in my judgment, which will solve any of the problems. Therefore, I 
shall be voting against it in accordance with the procedural votes.
  I will start my comments by quoting from Thomas Jefferson. Virginians 
are very proud of our heritage of freedom which is reflected by Mr. 
Jefferson, who said: ``To preserve the freedom of the human mind * * * 
and freedom of the press, every spirit should be ready to devote itself 
to martyrdom; for as long as we may think as we will, and speak as we 
think the condition of man will proceed in improvement.''
  Jefferson's thoughts on the first amendment reflect my own personal 
concern that our constitutional right to speak out as individuals and 
as groups receive the utmost protection as we labor as a legislative 
body to make badly needed reforms to our campaign finance system.
  The pending bill would amend our campaign finance laws applicable to 
elections to Congress. This bill, S. 1219, was referred to the 
Committee on Rules and Administration some time ago. In addition to S. 
1219, 14 other bills that would amend our campaign finance laws have 
also been referred to the committee. These bills address myriad issues 
and offer a variety of potential solutions to the concerns many of us 
have.
  I am well aware that the calls for campaign finance reform have been 
heard for many years. I am well aware, also, of the many proposals this 
body has considered over the past sessions. I am also well aware these 
efforts were ultimately unsuccessful because they did not reflect the 
consensus of the American people. It is easy to label

[[Page S6779]]

something campaign finance reform and immediately find support from 
those across this Nation, like myself, who have a level of frustration 
with the current framework of laws. Ultimately, however, each of those 
bills must stand on its own merits. I will not merely vote for 
something called reform without being convinced that the proposals are 
constitutional and beneficial to our political process.
  Our committee gave careful consideration to a wide variety of issues. 
First, our committee heard from Senators McCain of Arizona, Feingold of 
Wisconsin, Thompson of Tennessee, Wellstone of Minnesota, Feinstein of 
California, and Bradley of New Jersey. Members of the House of 
Representatives also appeared before our committee.
  We then heard testimony from some of the foremost experts across our 
Nation on campaign finance reform, including Prof. Larry Sabato and 
Prof. Lillian BeVier from the University of Virginia; Norman Ornstein 
from the American Enterprise Institute; Thomas Mann from the Brookings 
Institution; Bradley Smith from the Cato Institute; David Mason of the 
Heritage Foundation; Prof. Herbert Alexander from the University of 
Southern California; Dr. Candice Nelson of American University; Prof. 
Michael Malbin from the Rockefeller Institute of Government; Ann 
McBride of Common Cause; and Joan Claybrook with Public Citizen.

  We also heard from a number of citizens who participated in campaigns 
by contributing to political action committees--PAC's--or by making 
donations to be bundled. We heard these voters' worries that their 
voices would be greatly diminished if their ability to participate in 
PAC's and bundling were completely denied. In addition to these 
witnesses, we also asked the Chairmen of the Republican and Democratic 
National Committees, Mr. Haley Barbour and Mr. Donald Fowler to testify 
before our committee. Each party official testified to the need to 
strengthen--I repeat, strengthen--not weaken the political parties and 
enhance their links to their State counterparts.
  Because several of the bills before the committee mandated some form 
of free or reduced-fee television time and reduced postage rates, as S. 
1219 does, we also heard from representatives of the broadcast industry 
and parties affected by the health of the postal service. They advised 
us of the impact on these proposals, pro and con, on their operations.
  Further, because of my personal belief that we should not pass 
legislation that has a high degree of likelihood of being struck down 
by the Federal court system as unconstitutional, we asked a number of 
legal experts and scholars to address the constitutionality of some of 
the various proposals before the committee, particularly the proposal 
to ban PAC's. Among those commenting on the issues were Joel Gora of 
Brooklyn Law School on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union, 
Robert O'Neil of the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free 
Expression, Archibald Cox of Harvard Law School, and Frederick Schauer 
with the Kennedy School at Harvard.
  To date, the committee has held six extensive hearings on campaign 
finance reform--the most extensive, I repeat, the most extensive 
hearings on this subject of campaign finance reform, held here in the 
Senate since 1991. A number of conclusions were reached, although not 
formally, by the individual Members. I shall speak for myself.
  First and foremost is the overwhelming consensus that the PAC ban 
contained in S. 1219 is unconstitutional. There is little doubt on 
this, with near unanimous agreement from the legal experts. Mr. 
President, we should not pass legislation in the name of reform, 
knowing that the Federal courts will strike down the bill. There is 
always the urge to try and create something to throw out there and go 
back and tell our constituents, ``Well, we handled it--we handled 
campaign finance reform,'' but I personally cannot do that with clarity 
of conscience, knowing that there is a high likelihood that the Federal 
court system will strike it down.
  A second point: in addition to the PAC ban, there are other serious 
constitutional concerns in S. 1219. One main problem lies in the 
extremely broad definitions of ``independent expenditures'' and 
educational advertising which would serve to greatly restrict 
information about the candidates. According to the Free Speech 
Coalition which represents groups from far left to far right, ``This 
extremely broad definition of `expressed advocacy' would sweep in 
protected issue advocacy such as voter guides.''
  Perhaps even more startling, S. 1219 allows the Federal Election 
Commission to obtain prior restraining orders against groups it 
suspects might violate the new, broader restrictions on presently-
independent political activities. Let me emphasize this point. Federal 
bureaucrats would have the power to stop--I repeat, stop--somebody from 
exercising their first amendment rights before they say or publish 
anything. One commentator called this result ``a grotesque legislative 
assault on bedrock American freedoms * * * ''
  The PAC and bundling bans, combined with the breadth of S. 1219's 
coverage and restrictions on independent expenditures violate a maxim 
clearly articulated by our Supreme Court in Buckley versus Valeo when 
the Court stated ``The concept that government may restrict the speech 
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice 
of others is wholly foreign to the first amendment.''
  Make no mistake about it, S. 1219 would severely restrict the speech 
of many of our citizens, resulting in a terrific enhancement of others. 
This we cannot condone. Again, to quote Mr. Jefferson:

       There are rights which it is useless to surrender to the 
     government, and which governments have yet always been found 
     to invade. [Among] these are the rights of thinking, and 
     publishing our thoughts by speaking or writing.

  He made this observation in 1789, but despite the transformation of 
our country and the changes in our Government, it is as true today as 
it was in 1789.
  A third observation is that, while reduced fee or free TV coverage 
and postage might serve to reduce the cost of campaigns, requirements 
such as these are not really free--they simply shift the costs from 
candidates to postal users, broadcast stations, and other television 
advertisers. To the extent candidates for political office are granted 
even more reduced fee postage rates than they already have, the postal 
user--virtually every American citizen and business--will bear the 
cost, for the Postal Service must make up the lost revenue from these 
users.
  And, in addition to the lost revenues the TV broadcasters will face, 
there are extremely severe management problems associated with S. 
1219's mandate for TV stations to provide coverage of political 
candidates. Not the least of these would be trying to offer television 
time to candidates in large population centers such as New York City 
where dozens of contested elections will take place in New York, New 
Jersey, and Connecticut--you might have more than 50 candidates each 
entitled to prime time TV coverage. And this doesn't even consider 
party primaries which might feature many candidates per election.
  And, as I have noted in our hearings, how will local politicians 
react if they see candidates for Federal elections being offered 
extremely cheap ads and mailings. If we start down this road, how will 
we say no to the local sheriff or other State and local politicians who 
run for office? In sum, these reduced fee proposals--which are better 
described as cost shifting provisions--are not well thought out. More 
thorough analysis and understanding of the impact they will have on the 
postal and broadcast industries and the American people is necessary.
  In addition, several of the provisions of S. 1219 could result in 
less information being available to voters. Spending caps obviously 
might cause cutbacks in campaign activity, whether advertising, 
traveling, or get-out-the vote activities. Bringing more independent 
expenditures under spending caps also could reduce the amount of 
information that is available. This concern has been voiced by others. 
David Frum of the Weekly Standard stated:

       [P]olitical reformers imagine that by capping campaign 
     spending America could somehow purify its politics, replacing 
     vulgar and deceptive radio spots with lofty Lincoln-Douglas-
     style debates and serious-minded

[[Page S6780]]

     presentations of positions in 30-minute unpaid public service 
     announcements on television. The far likely effect of 
     campaign expenditure caps, though, would be to invite 
     cheating and to deprive less attentive voters even of what 
     little information they now get to guide their vote.

  This discussion of present reform proposals would of course be 
incomplete without mentioning the fact that the Federal Election 
Commission would need a veritable army of investigators and auditors to 
keep up with their new mandates. We know that the FEC has had 
difficulty winding up audits of Presidential campaigns in a timely 
process, and I hesitate to think about the prospect of the FEC trying 
to keep up with hundreds of congressional candidates every 2 years.

  While these hearings result in the conclusion that S. 1219 will not 
produce the type of reform that is needed, they also have revealed many 
potential reforms which might be quite beneficial to our political 
process without trampling on the first amendment. The many experts who 
testified at these hearings provided us with a multitude of proposals 
that should be examined more thoroughly.
  I was particularly impressed by some of the suggestions made by Prof. 
Larry Sabato of the University of Virginia, who has been at the 
forefront of campaign finance reform and is a well-renowned speaker and 
author on the subject. I ask unanimous consent that a statement 
submitted by Professor Sabato be printed in the Record at the 
conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. WARNER. Professor Sabato's main focus lies in broadening and 
strengthening our disclosure laws, so that all types of significant 
political involvement are available for public inspection. The American 
people are the best judge of improper or excessive influence, and it 
may be time to require greater access to information about those who 
give to candidates for Federal office and those who spend more to 
influence campaigns. Of course, we would need to weigh the need for and 
degree of privacy that should be afforded to individual donors, but 
this is clearly a subject that should be addressed in any campaign 
finance reform.
  I have been impressed with other suggestions which have been raised 
in our hearings, such as: limiting the amount of money a PAC can give 
to a candidate from funds raised out of State; raising the contribution 
limits for initial donations to challengers to facilitate their entry 
into the political campaign process; and permitting challengers to draw 
a salary from their contributions.
  Then there is the sensible suggestion to index contribution limits 
for inflation--perhaps had this been done in the last reforms in the 
1970's, candidates would have more time to debate the issues and meet 
the voters and need less time to raise money. This change would also 
reduce the growing tendency for rich candidates to use their money 
to buy credibility. As discussed by the eminent commentator, David 
Broder:

       All the contribution limits are accomplishing today is to 
     create an ever-greater advantage for self-financed 
     millionaire candidates. . . If we really want to be ruled by 
     a wealthy elite, fine; but it is a foolish populism that 
     insists it despises the influence of wealth, and then resists 
     liberalizing campaign contribution limits.

  While I disagree with their proposals, I commend my colleagues for 
making a commitment to this difficult issue. I can understand their 
frustration in attempting to craft legislation which might meet 
constitutional muster and find legislative support. Their bill has 
served the useful purpose of generating an extensive set of hearings on 
campaign finance reform and the many ideas I have mentioned.
  Yet, the hearings which the Rules Committee held will be for nought 
if we proceed on S. 1219 today, in its present form. We must learn from 
these hearings. The committee should be permitted to proceed with its 
hearings. The Rules Committee will hold authorization and oversight 
hearings this coming Wednesday, June 26 on the Federal Election 
Commission [FEC]. These hearings will include a discussion of some 18 
recommendations that would update the campaign finance laws and 
streamline the administration of the campaign finance laws. In 
addition, we are studying the possibility of holding one more hearing 
on the Presidential election process and reform suggestions that might 
be beneficial. After that the full extent of the committee hearings 
will be made available to the entire Senate and to others for study and 
review, with the goal that this educating process will produce an 
effective and positive reform bill.
  While I understand the frustration of some of my colleagues with this 
issue, I cannot shirk my duty with regard to this legislation--it 
contains unconstitutional and unwise provisions, and we should not pass 
this legislation into law.

                               Exhibit 1

  Testimony of Professor Larry J. Sabato \1\ --Hearing of the Senate 
         Committee on Rules and Administration, May 8, 1996 \1\


       phony cures versus a workable solution: deregulation plus

       The campaign finance system's problems are vexing. Is it 
     possible to fashion a solution to all of them simultaneously? 
     Over the years, the reformers' panacea has been taxpayer 
     financing of elections and limits on how much candidates can 
     spend. Public financing is a seductively simple proposition: 
     if there is no private money, presumably there will be none 
     of the difficulties associated with private money. But in a 
     country such as ours, which places great emphasis on the 
     freedoms of speech and association, it is unrealistic to 
     expect that the general citizenry or even many of the elite 
     activists will come to support greater federal subsidization 
     of our election system at the cost of their individual and 
     group political involvements. Spending limits are also 
     enticing. Are politicians raising and spending too much 
     money? Let's pass a law against it! Yet such a statute may be 
     difficult to enforce in an era when politicians and the 
     public seek less regulation, not more--not to mention the 
     serious, maybe fatal, problem of plugging all the money 
     loopholes (the C(4)s; Supreme Court-sanctioned, unlimited 
     ``independent expenditures'' by groups and individuals 
     unconnected to a campaign, and so on). Once again, the 
     biggest, the original, and the unpluggable loophole is the 
     First Amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at the end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Public financing and spending limits are both also 
     objectionable on the basic merits: the right to organize and 
     attempt to influence politics is a fundamental constitutional 
     guarantee, derived from the same First Amendment protections 
     that need to be forcefully protected. To place draconian 
     limits on political speech is simply a bad idea. (The call 
     for a ban on political action committees suffers from the 
     same defect.)
       Once again, even if candidates could be persuaded to comply 
     voluntarily with a public financing and spending limits 
     scheme, such a solution would fail to take into consideration 
     the many ways that interest groups such as the Christian 
     Coalition and labor unions can influence elections without 
     making direct contributions to candidates. Even if we passed 
     laws that appeared to be taking private money out, we would 
     not really be doing so. This is a recipe for deception, and 
     consequently--once the truth becomes apparent--for still 
     greater cynicism.
       In our opinion, there is another way, one that takes 
     advantage of both current realities and the remarkable self-
     regulating tendencies of a free-market democracy, not to 
     mention the spirit of the age. Consider the American stock 
     markets. Most government oversight of them simply makes sure 
     that publicly traded companies accurately disclose vital 
     information about their finances. The philosophy here is that 
     buyers, given the information they need, are intelligent 
     enough to look out for themselves. There will be winners 
     and losers, of course, both among companies and the 
     consumers of their securities, but it is not the 
     government's role to guarantee anyone's success (indeed, 
     the idea is abhorrent). The notion that people are smart 
     enough, and indeed have the duty, to think and choose for 
     themselves, also underlies our basic democratic 
     arrangement. There is no reason why the same principle 
     cannot be successfully applied to a free market for 
     campaign finance.\2\ In this scenario, disclosure laws 
     would be broadened and strengthened, and penalties for 
     failure to disclose would be ratcheted up, while rules on 
     other aspects--such as sources of funds and sizes of 
     contributions--could be greatly loosened or even abandoned 
     altogether.
       Call it Deregulation Plus. Let a well-informed marketplace, 
     rather than a committee of federal bureaucrats, be the judge 
     of whether someone has accepted too much money from a 
     particular interest group or spent too much to win an 
     election. Reformers who object to money in politics would 
     lose little under such a scheme, since the current system--
     itself a product of reform--has already utterly failed to 
     inhibit special-interest influence. (Plus, the reformers' new 
     plans will fail spectacularly, as we have already argued.) On 
     the other hand, reform advocates might gain substantially by 
     bringing all financial activity out into the open where the 
     public can see for itself the truth about how our campaigns 
     are conducted. If the facts are really as awful as reformers 
     contend (and as close observers of the system,

[[Page S6781]]

     much of what we see is appalling), then the public will be 
     moved to demand change.
       Moreover, a new disclosure regime might just prove to be 
     the solution in itself. It is worth noting that the stock-
     buying public, by and large, is happy with the relatively 
     liberal manner by which the Securities and Exchange 
     Commission regulates stock markets. Companies and brokers 
     (the candidates and consultants of the financial world) 
     actually appreciate the SEC's efforts to enforce vigorously 
     what regulations it does have, since such enforcement 
     maintains public confidence in the system and encourages 
     honest, ethical behavior, without unnecessarily impinging on 
     the freedom of market players. Again, the key is to ensure 
     the availability of the requisite information for people to 
     make intelligent decisions.
       Some political actors who would rather not be forced to 
     operate in the open will undoubtedly assert that extensive 
     new disclosure requirements violate the First Amendment. We 
     see little foundation for this argument. As political 
     regulatory schemes go, disclosure is by far the least 
     burdensome and most constitutionally acceptable of any 
     political regulatory proposal. The Supreme Court was explicit 
     on this subject in its landmark 1976 Buckley v. Valeo ruling. 
     The Court found the overweening aspects of the Federal 
     Election Campaign Act (such as limits on spending) violated 
     the Bill of Rights, but disclosure was judicially blessed. 
     While disclosure ``has the potential for substantially 
     infringing the exercise of First Amendment rights,'' the 
     Court said, ``there are governmental interests sufficiently 
     important to outweigh the possibility of infringement, 
     particularly when the free functioning of our national 
     institutions is involved.''
       The Court's rationale for disclosure remains exceptionally 
     persuasive two decades after it was written:
       First, disclosure provides the electorate with information 
     ``as to where political campaign money comes from and how it 
     is spent by the candidate'' in order to aid the voters in 
     evaluating those who seek federal office. It allows voters to 
     place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely 
     than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels 
     and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate's financial 
     support also alert the voter to the interests to which a 
     candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate 
     predictions of future performance in office.
       Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and 
     avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large 
     contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity. 
     This exposure may discourage those who would use money for 
     improper purposes either before or after the election. A 
     public armed with information about a candidate's most 
     generous supporters is better able to detect any post-
     election special favors that may be given in return. And . . 
     . full disclosure during an election campaign tends ``to 
     prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.'' In 
     enacting these requirements [the Congress] may have been 
     mindful of Mr. Justice Brandeis' advice: ``Publicity is 
     justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
     diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; 
     electric light the most efficient policeman.'' \3\
       A new disclosure-based regime, to be successful, would 
     obviously require more stringent reporting rules. Most 
     important, new reporting rules would require groups such as 
     organized labor and the Christian Coalition to disclose the 
     complete extent of their involvement in campaigns. Currently, 
     such groups rely on a body of law that holds that under the 
     First Amendment, broadly based ``nonpartisan'' membership 
     organizations cannot be compelled to comply with campaign 
     finance laws, nor can groups that do not explicitly advocate 
     the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate. 
     However, expert observers of the current system, such as 
     former Federal Election Commission chairman Trevor Potter, 
     believe the Court has signaled that constitutional protection 
     for such groups extends only to limits on how much they can 
     raise or spend, not to whether they are required to disclose 
     their activities.\4\ The primary advantage of this step is 
     that it would formally bring into the political sphere groups 
     that clearly belong there. By requiring organizations such as 
     the Christian Coalition and labor unions to disclose, their 
     role in elections can be more fully and fairly debated.
       Another possible objection to broadening the disclosure 
     requirements would be the fear that the rules would drag a 
     huge number of politically active but relatively 
     inconsequential players into the federal regulatory 
     framework. Clearly, no one wants the local church or the 
     Rotary Club taken to court for publishing a newsletter 
     advertisement that indirectly or directly supports 
     candidates of their choice. To our mind, this is easily 
     addressed by establishing a high reporting threshold--
     something between $25,000 and $50,000 in total election-
     related expenditures per election cycle. After all, the 
     concern is not with the small organizations, but the big 
     ones. The Christian Coalition, the term limits groups, and 
     organized labor have all raised and spent millions of 
     dollars annually and operated on a national scale. It is 
     not hard to make a distinction between groups such as 
     these and benign small-scale advocacy.
       Another necessary broadening of disclosure would involve 
     contributions made by individuals. While most political 
     action committees already disclose ample data on their 
     backers and financial activities, contributions to candidates 
     from individuals are reported quite haphazardly. New rules 
     could mandate that each individual contributor disclose his 
     place of employment and profession, without exception. The 
     FEC has already debated a number of effective but not overly 
     oppressive means of accomplishing this goal (although to date 
     it has adopted only modest changes). The simplest solution is 
     to prohibit campaigns from accepting contributions that are 
     not fully disclosed. Disclosure of campaign expenditures is 
     also currently quite lax, with many campaign organizations 
     failing to make a detailed statement describing the purpose 
     of each expenditure. It would be no great task to require 
     better reporting of these activities as well.
       The big trade-off for tougher disclosure rules should be 
     the loosening of restrictions on fundraising. Foremost would 
     be liberalization of limits on fundraising by individual 
     candidates. This is only fair and sensible in its own right: 
     there is a glaring disconnection between the permanent and 
     artificial limitations on sources of funds and ever-mounting 
     campaign costs. One of the primary pressures on the system 
     has been the declining value in real dollars of the maximum 
     legal contribution by an individual to a federal candidate 
     ($1,000 per election), which is now worth only about a third 
     as much as when it went into effect in 1975. This increasing 
     scarcity of funds, in addition to fueling the quest for 
     loopholes, has led candidates (particularly incumbents) to do 
     things they otherwise might not do in exchange for funding. 
     Perversely, limits appear to have increased the indebtedness 
     of lawmakers to special interests that can provide huge 
     amounts of cash by mobilizing a large number of $500 to 
     $1,000 donors. By increasing contribution limits, candidates 
     would enjoy more freedom to pick and choose their 
     contributors. Given the option, we hope more candidates would 
     turn primarily to those contributors whose support is based 
     on values and ideological beliefs, spurning the favor-
     seekers. By lifting disclosure and contribution levels at the 
     same time, politicians' access to ``clean'' funds would rise 
     while scrutiny of ``dirty'' funds would be increased. The 
     idea is to concede that we cannot outlaw the acceptance of 
     special-interest money, but the penalties for accepting it 
     can be raised via the court of public opinion. So at the very 
     least, the individual contribution limit should be restored 
     to its original value, which would make it about $2,800 in 
     today's dollars, with built-in indexing for future inflation. 
     We would actually prefer a more generous limit of $5,000, 
     which would put the individual contribution limit on a par 
     with the current PAC limit of $5,000 per election.
       For political parties, there seems little alternative to 
     simply legitimizing what has already happened de facto: the 
     abolition of all limits. When the chairman of a national 
     political party bluntly admits that millions of dollars in 
     ``soft money'' receipts mean that the committee will be able 
     to spend millions of dollars in ``hard money,'' it is time 
     for everyone to acknowledge reality. Moreover, such an 
     outcome is not to be lamented. Political parties deserve 
     more fundraising freedom, which would give these critical 
     institutions a more substantial role in elections.
       How would the new disclosure regime work? While the FEC has 
     already moved to impose some tighter disclosure requirements, 
     it lacks the resources as currently constituted to enforce 
     the new rules across the board. However, the solution does 
     not necessarily require a massive increase in funding. Under 
     a disclosure regime, the agency could reduce efforts to 
     police excessive contributions and other infractions, 
     devoting itself primarily to providing information to the 
     public. The commission's authority to audit campaigns 
     randomly would have to be restored to ensure compliance, and 
     sanctions for failure to disclose would have to be increased 
     substantially. In addition, the commission should be given 
     the power to seek emergency injunctions against spending by 
     political actors who refuse to comply with disclosure 
     requirements. And to move the FEC away from its frequent 
     three-to-three partisan deadlock, the six political party 
     commissioners (three Democrats and three Republicans) ought 
     to be able to appoint a seventh ``tie-breaker'' commissioner. 
     Presumably anyone agreeable to the other six would have a 
     sterling reputation for independence and impartiality. 
     Another remedy for predictable partisanship on the FEC would 
     be a one-term limit of six years for each commissioner. Freed 
     of the need to worry about pleasing party leaders in order to 
     secure reappointment, FEC commissioners could vote their 
     consciences more often and get tough with election scofflaws 
     in both parties.
       Finally, in exchange for the FEC relinquishing much of its 
     police powers, Congress could suspend much of its power over 
     the FEC by establishing an appropriate budgetary level for 
     the agency that by law would be indexed to inflation and 
     could not be reduced. Another way of guaranteeing adequate 
     funding for a disclosure-enhanced FEC is to establish a new 
     tax check-off on Form 1040 that would permit each citizen to 
     channel a few dollars of her tax money directly to the FEC, 
     bypassing a possible vengeful Congress's appropriations 
     process entirely. The 1040 solicitation should carefully note 
     that the citizen's tax burden would not be increased by by 
     his designation of a ``tax gift'' to the FEC, and that the 
     purpose of all monies collected is to inform the public about

[[Page S6782]]

     the sources of contributions received by political 
     candidates. It is impossible to forecast the precise reaction 
     of taxpayers to such an opportunity, of course, but our bet 
     is that many more individuals would check the box funding the 
     Federal Election Commission than the box channeling cash to 
     the presidential candidates and political parties. In today's 
     money-glutted political system, the people's choice is likely 
     to be reliable information about the interest groups and 
     individuals investing in officeholders.


                          concluding comments

       The purpose of these reforms is to make regulation of 
     campaign financing more rational. Attempts to outlaw private 
     campaign contributions or to tell political actors how much 
     they can raise and spend are simply unworkable. Within broad 
     limits, the political marketplace is best left to its own 
     devices, and when those limits are exceeded, violators would 
     be punished swiftly and effectively.
       Regarding the pro-incumbent bias of contributors, there is 
     unfortunately no obvious practical solution. It is impossible 
     to predict how a deregulated system would affect the existing 
     heavy bias toward incumbents by contributors, both PAC and 
     individual. In truth, there may be no way to eliminate pro-
     incumbent financial bias.\5\ However, it is possible that 
     expanding private resources through deregulation will 
     actually end up helping challengers more than incumbents. A 
     substantial body of research shows that the amount an 
     incumbent spends is less determinative of election outcomes 
     than the amount a challenger spends.\6\ Simply put, 
     challengers do not need to match incumbent spending, but need 
     merely to reach a ``floor'' of financial viability. 
     Deregulations's greatest impact could actually be in helping 
     challengers reach this floor. If fears about the effects a 
     free market will have on competition prove warranted, 
     however, a modest federal subsidy in the form of discounts on 
     mail or broadcast time--so that every nonincumbent candidate 
     could at least reach the floor--would seem reasonable and 
     might be acceptable even to some conservatives as long as it 
     could be tied to deregulation.
       If Deregulation Plus proves too radical, perhaps it is time 
     to revive the sensible scheme proposed in 1990 by the U.S. 
     Senate's Campaign Finance Reform Panel, which attempted to 
     bridge the gap between partisans on the basic issues by 
     suggesting many ideas, including so-called flexible spending 
     limits.\7\ These are limits on overall campaign spending by 
     each candidate, with exemptions for certain types of 
     expenditures by political parties (such as organizational 
     efforts), as well as small contributions from individuals who 
     live in a candidate's own state. Since the Supreme Court has 
     ruled that spending limits must be voluntary, incentives such 
     as reduced postal rates and tax credits for the small 
     individual donations mentioned above should be offered. The 
     flexible limits scheme represents a reasonable compromise 
     between the absolute spending limits with no exemptions 
     favored by Democrats and the opposition to any kind of limits 
     expressed by Republicans.
       Flexible limits or Deregulation Plus ought to be 
     supplemented by free broadcast time for political parties and 
     candidates, as well as strengthened disclosure laws that 
     cover every dollar raised and spent for political 
     purposes.\8\ Detailed free-time proposals have been made 
     elsewhere but ignored by a Congress fearful of alienating a 
     powerful lobby, the National Association of Broadcasters.\9\ 
     Yet no innovation would do more to reduce campaign costs or 
     help challengers than this one. Fortunately, technological 
     advances such as ``digital'' television--which will multiply 
     available ``analog'' TV frequencies by a factor of about six 
     once it is available in 1997--are creating new opportunities 
     to implement an old idea. Federal Communications Commission 
     chairman Reed E. Hundt has recently endorsed the provision of 
     free time for candidates and parties once digital TV comes 
     into being, noting that free time was ``not practically 
     achievable in an analog age [but is] entirely feasible with 
     the capacity and band width explosion of the digital era.'' 
     \10\
       In this area and others in the field of campaign finance, 
     it is time for new thinking and creative ideas to break the 
     old partisan deadlocks that prevent reform of an 
     unsatisfactory system.


                               Footnotes

     \1\ This is an excerpt from the just published book, ``Dirty 
     Little Secrets: The Persistence of Corruption in American 
     Politics'' (New York: Times Books), by Larry J. Sabato and 
     Glenn R. Simpson. All rights reserved.
     \2\ We are indebted to attorney Jan Baran of the law firm 
     Wiley, Rein & Fielding for this analogy.
     \3\ Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.1, at 66-7 (1976).
     \4\ Interview with Trevor Potter, July 12, 1995.
     \5\ Frank Sorauf, one of the most astute students of campaign 
     finance, has raised the possibility that ``voluntary funding 
     of campaigns for public office is intrinsically committed to 
     the support of incumbents and likely winners.'' Frank J. 
     Sorauf, ``Competition, Contributions, and Money in 1992,'' in 
     James A. Thurber and Candice J. Nelson (eds.), ``Campaigns 
     and Elections American Style'' (Boulder, Colo.: Westview 
     Press, 1995), p. 81.
     \6\ For a cogent review of the literature, see Frank Sorauf, 
     ``Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities'' (New Haven, 
     Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 215-16. There is an 
     increasing number of dissenters to this view. For instance, 
     Christopher Kenny and Michael McBurnett argue that those who 
     say that the level of incumbent spending has no effect 
     neglect the interrelationship of challenger and incumbent 
     spending in producing the outcome of the election. Incumbent 
     spending is at least partially a function of challenger 
     spending, that is, when challengers spend more, incumbents 
     respond to the increased competition with greater outlays. 
     When this interrelationship is taken into account, both 
     challenger and incumbent spending levels affect the outcomes 
     of the races; Kenny and McBurnett provide empirical evidence 
     to show the effect is statistically significant. (See Kenny 
     and McBurnett, ``An Individual Level Multiequation Model of 
     Expenditure Effects in Contested House Elections.'' American 
     Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 699-707).
     \7\ See ``Campaign Finance Reform: A report to the Majority 
     Leader, the Minority Leader, United States Senate, by the 
     Campaign Reform Panel,'' March 6, 1990, p. 41. Coauthor 
     Sabato was one of the panel's six members, appointed by then 
     Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (Democrat of Maine) 
     and then Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole (Republican of 
     Kansas).
     \8\ See Larry J. Sabato, Paying for Elections: The Campaign 
     Finance Thicket (New York: Twentieth Century Fund-Priority 
     Press, 1989), esp. pp. 25-42, 61-64. For example, disclosure 
     laws do not currently cover contributions to foundations that 
     presidential candidates sometimes form. These foundations 
     often pay for pre-campaign travel, and openly promote their 
     candidate-creator.
     \9\ The Campaign Finance Reform Panel mentioned above 
     endorsed the free broadcast time proposal in ibid, pp. 25-42.
     \10\ Remarks delivered at the Nieman Foundation, Harvard 
     University, May 5, 1995, p. 7. Hundt has proposed making 
     these new frequencies available under two government-imposed 
     restrictions (1) some broadcast time must be devoted to 
     educational programming for children, and (2) free broadcast 
     time must be given to political candidates and parties. See 
     also Max Frankel, ``Airfill,'' New York Times Magazine, June 
     4, 1995, p. 26; and Mary McGrory, ``The Vaster Wasteland,'' 
     Washington Post, June 4, 1995, p. C1.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I thank my good friend, the chairman of 
the Rules Committee for his excellent statement and say again how much 
I enjoyed sitting to his right listening to the testimony this spring. 
Thanks for a very important contribution to this matter.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I appreciate the sentiment. I commend the 
Senator for his corporate knowledge. Indeed, he is the Oracle of Delphi 
in this matter.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Utah.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, it seems to me we really cannot debate 
campaign finance reform without debating the way in which political 
funds are not only given to candidates but also acquired from people.
  Campaign contributions are usually donated voluntarily. You can get 
an invitation to a fundraiser or a direct mail solicitation, and you 
can decide whether to contribute to that candidate, cause, or party.
  We all consider this one of the basics of American democracy. 
Individuals must support it by supporting the candidates they believe 
in. But there are people in our country for whom this very fundamental 
freedom of choice is not given--members of labor unions. I may be one 
of the few ever in the history of Congress to actually have earned his 
union card and worked in the construction industry for 10 years.
  It is certainly no secret that unions collect dues from their members 
and that, in many cases, an individual has to join a union in order to 
be employed in a particular industry or with a particular company. So 
there is no effective choice about paying union dues for these people.
  But to add insult to injury, these Americans, who are forced to pay 
union dues, must also suffer the fact that unions donate millions of 
dollars to candidates that any individual may not support.
  The recent announcement by the AFL-CIO that this big labor--you would 
have to say now mega-labor--organization would donate $35 million to 
candidates this year may be welcomed by some--certainly all Democrats--
but disappointing to any who may not agree with the choices.
  Take President Clinton, for example. I daresay that there may be any 
number of union members out there who do not support President 
Clinton's reelection.
  In my view, this violation of fundamental choice and freedom of 
speech is compounded by the fact that labor unions do not even disclose 
their soft money contributions, which amount to millions.
  At this particular time, I would like to place in the Record a 
Congressional Research Service report for Congress entitled ``Political 
Spending by Organized Labor: Background and Current Issues.'' This 
report is astounding. They indicate that in Presidential elections, it 
is estimated that from $400 to $500 million in moneys go basically to 
the Democratic Party.
  I ask unanimous consent that that report be printed in the Record at 
this point.

[[Page S6783]]

  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

  Political Spending by Organized Labor: Background and Current Issues

                         (By Joseph E. Cantor)


                                summary

       Labor unions have traditionally played a strong role in 
     American elections, assisting favored candidates through 
     their direct and indirect financial support, as well as 
     through manpower and organizational services. While direct 
     financing of federal candidates by unions is prohibited under 
     federal law, unions can and do establish political action 
     committees (PACs) to raise voluntary contributions for 
     donation to federal candidates. This PAC money is also known 
     as ``hard money,'' because certain federal limits on 
     contributions make it harder to raise. It is also fully 
     disclosed under federal law. Other aspects of labor's 
     political support take the form of ``soft money,'' which is 
     not limited by federal law and is not as hard to raise. Soft 
     money is generally considered to be a formidable factor in 
     organized labor's political strength. This spending is 
     largely unregulated, either because it is restricted to 
     seeking to influence only its members and their families or 
     because it does not advocate specific candidates' election or 
     defeat. The soft money aspect of labor's political activity 
     has aroused controversy because of fundraising methods and 
     the relative dearth of disclosure.


           origin of distinction between hard and soft money

       During World War II, the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, 
     known as the Smith-Connally Act, prohibited unions from 
     making contributions in federal elections.\1\ In 1947, the 
     Taft-Hartley Act made this wartime measure permanent and 
     expanded it to include primary elections and any expenditures 
     in connection with federal campaigns.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Footnotes at end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Organized labor responded to the 1943 prohibition on 
     donating union treasury money be creating the first separate 
     segregated fund (SSF), commonly known as a PAC. Through CIO-
     PAC, the Congress of Industrial Organization established the 
     precedent of collecting voluntary contributions from its 
     members, which could be dispensed to favored candidates. 
     Other national and local unions followed suit: 17 national 
     labor PACs gave $2.1 million to federal campaigns in 1956, 
     and 37 such PACs spent $7.1 million in 1968.\3\ This 
     money, raised and spent according to federal regulation, 
     came to be known as hard money.
       The concept of soft money arose during the several decades 
     before the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971 was 
     enacted [P.L. 92-225]. During that period, unions used money 
     from their treasuries--as opposed to PAC money--for political 
     activities other than donations in federal elections. These 
     included: (1) contributions to state and local candidates, 
     where union donations were allowed; (2) such ``educational,'' 
     ``non-partisan,'' activities as get-out-the-vote and 
     registration drives and distribution of voting records; and 
     (3) public service activities to promote their philosophy 
     through union newspapers and radio shows.\4\ It was generally 
     understood at that time that spending on such activities 
     might influence federal elections less directly or overtly 
     than candidate contributions; hence, it was not subject to 
     federal limits or disclosure rules. Thus, the term soft money 
     has come to mean money that is raised and spent outside the 
     purview of federal election law and that is not permitted in 
     federal elections, but which might have at least an indirect 
     impact on those elections.
       The 1971 FECA incorporated the concept of union and 
     corporate SSFs in federal law for the first time. This 
     landmark legislation also distinguished between political 
     activities that were and were not to be federally regulated 
     and thus, without using the term, provided the legal basis 
     for union (and corporate) soft money. The Act amended 18 
     U.S.C. 610 (which banned union, corporate, and national bank 
     spending in federal elections) to give specific authority for 
     these organizations to use their general treasury money for 
     political activities. It thus exempted certain union and 
     corporate activities from FECA definitions of 
     ``contribution'' and ``expenditure,'' if the activities are 
     aimed at restricted classes (for unions, members and their 
     families, and, for corporations, stockholders and their 
     families). The specified activities were communications 
     (including partisan ones), nonpartisan registration and get-
     out-the-vote drives, and costs of establishing, 
     administering, and soliciting contributions to an SSF. The 
     1976 FECA Amendments (P.L. 94-283) recodified this provision 
     as 2 U.S.C. 441b, added executive and administrative 
     personnel and their families to corporations' restricted 
     class, and allowed membership organizations, cooperatives, 
     and corporations without capital stock to set up SSFs.
       The FECA thus created a legal framework for unions to set 
     up PACs to raise and spend money directly in federal 
     elections, subject to federal regulation (hard money), and to 
     use its treasury money for specified activities aimed only at 
     its restricted class and not subject to federal regulation 
     (soft money).\5\


                          current regulations

       Under recently amended regulations, unions (and 
     corporations) were acknowledged to have great latitude in 
     communications with their restricted classes. Under these 
     regulations, unions are exempt from FECA definitions of 
     ``contribution'' and ``expenditure'' for communications on 
     any subject, registration and get-out-the-vote drives (not 
     just ``nonpartisan'' efforts), and costs of setting up, 
     administering, and fundraising for an SSF. Such efforts, 
     however, may only be aimed at union members, executive or 
     administrative personnel, and their families.\6\
       New regulations, promulgated to implement the intent of 
     various Supreme Court decisions,\7\ also introduced the 
     standard of express advocacy in deciding what types of 
     communications are permitted by and to whom.
       ``Expressly advocating means any communication that . . . 
     uses phrases . . . which in context can have no other meaning 
     than to urge the election or defeat of one or more clearly 
     identified candidate(s) . . . .'' \8\
       Communications containing express advocacy are permitted by 
     unions if limited to the restricted class; correspondingly, 
     communications without express advocacy may be made to the 
     public, if done independently of any candidate.\9\


                    hard money activity: union pacs

       Given the rising costs of elections and the higher 
     contribution limits for PACs than individuals in federal 
     elections ($5,000 versus $1,000), PACs became a growing 
     source of campaign funds in the past 20 years.\10\ As the 
     pioneers in the PAC field, labor PACs grew in both overall 
     numbers and money contributed, although by both measures, 
     they have been increasingly overshadowed by corporate and 
     other types of PACs.
       When the Federal Election Commission (FEC) first recorded 
     PAC activity in January 1975, 201 of the 608 PACs (one-third) 
     were labor PACs. As of January 1996, there were 334 labor 
     PACs, only 8.3% of the total 4,016 PACs.\11\
       Another common gauge of federal PAC activity is the money 
     contributed to congressional candidates (relatively little is 
     given to presidential candidates). In 1974, Labor PACs 
     contributed $6.3 million to congressional candidates, half of 
     the $12.5 million from all PACs;\12\ in 1994, labor PACs gave 
     $40.7 million, 23% of the $179.6 million from all PACs.\13\
       While union PACs do not play as large a role among all PACs 
     as they did 20 years ago, they have been able to remain 
     competitive by giving larger donations than most PACs. While 
     there are far fewer labor than corporate PACs, the average 
     labor PAC contribution of federal candidates in 1994 was 
     twice the average for a corporate PAC. Given labor's 
     traditional ties with the Democratic Party, it is not 
     surprising that labor PAC donations are largely directed the 
     Democrats. In 1994, for example, 96% of labor PAC 
     contributions went to Democrats, compared with 49% for 
     corporate PACs, 60% for non-connected (unsponsored) PACs, and 
     54% for the trade/membership/health category.\14\ The 
     relative political uniformity among labor PACs is viewed by 
     some as another way in which labor maximizes its political 
     power.


                 soft money activity: union treasuries

       Although there are no complete, publicly available data on 
     amounts of union treasury money spent. One press account 
     expressed a widely held view:
       ``Labor's real importance to candidates, though, is not so 
     much the PAC dollars unions contribute directly to campaigns 
     as the expenditures they make from their treasuries to lobby 
     among their members. In each election, labor spends millions 
     of dollars in advocating its preferred candidates before the 
     union rank and file, but how many millions is unknown, and 
     estimates vary widely.'' \15\

                            Forms of support

       Two major types of activities are financed by union 
     treasuries which promote labor's political philosophy: (1) 
     the exempt activities aimed at their restricted class (as 
     described); and (2) non-express advocacy communications aimed 
     at the public (also referred to as issued advocacy or public 
     education).
       In the exempt activities category, unions have a ready 
     infrastructure (phone banks, office space, etc.) and a ready 
     pool of volunteers to make their internal communications and 
     voter drives a significant force. While these efforts may 
     only involve a restricted class and while corporations have 
     the same rights as unions in all soft money activities, the 
     Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports that labor's 
     restricted class totaled 16.4 million people in 1995, plus 
     families.\16\
       In terms of public education and issue advocacy, unions 
     engage in the same type of efforts as many other groups in 
     the public arena. These often involve media ads to influence 
     public opinion on policy issues. By avoiding overt appeals to 
     elect or defeat specific candidates, these groups may promote 
     their political and philosophical goals without triggering 
     federal campaign finance regulation.

            Source of funding and compulsory dues issue \17\

       Union treasuries are financed in large part through dues 
     paid by members. In addition, under some union security 
     agreements, workers who do not join a union must pay a form 
     of dues called agency fees. There are no available data on 
     how many workers pay agency fees, but the BLS data indicate 
     that some 2 million workers were represented by unions but 
     who were not union members.

[[Page S6784]]

     Some portion of these workers pay agency fees as a condition 
     of employment.
       Due to the compulsory nature of agency fees, some workers 
     have objected to the unions' political uses of their 
     payments. Among several relevant rulings, the Supreme Court, 
     in Communication Workers of America v. Beck [487 U.S. 735 
     (1988)], said that a union may not, over the objections of 
     dues paying nonmember employees, spend funds collected from 
     them on activities unrelated to collective bargaining. Hence, 
     objecting employees could get a pro rata refund of their 
     agency fees representing costs of non-collective bargaining 
     activities.
       While the court rulings have left no doubt that dissenting 
     workers are entitled to such refunds if requested, issues 
     have arisen as to the extent to which unions should notify 
     such workers of these rights. On April 13, 1992, President 
     Bush issued Executive Order 12800, requiring federal 
     contractors to post notices to employees informing them of 
     ``Beck'' rights; this was rescinded by President Clinton 
     on February 1, 1993 (Executive Order 12836). Bills have 
     been introduced in recent Congresses to either prohibit 
     the use of ``compulsory union dues'' for political 
     purposes or to require greater notification of all 
     workers' (not just non-members') rights regarding the use 
     of their dues or agency fees.

                    Dollar value of union soft money

       The only soft money unions must disclose under the FECA are 
     express advocacy communications with members, but only when 
     they exceed $2,000 per candidate, per election, and excluding 
     communications primarily devoted to other subjects.\18\ In 
     1992, unions reported $4.7 million on such activities.\19\
       While unions are required to file financial reports under 
     the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 
     (P.L. 86-257), these reports are arranged by type of 
     expenditure (e.g., salaries, administrative costs) rather 
     than by functional category (e.g., contract negotiation and 
     administration, political activities). Under President Bush, 
     the Department on Labor proposed regulations to change 
     reporting to require functional categories (October 30, 
     1992); in a proposed rulemaking notice on September 23, 1993, 
     the Department, under President Clinton, rescinded the change 
     to functional categories.\20\
       Due to the limitations of public disclosure, one must look 
     to estimates of the total value of labor soft money. Such 
     estimates, which amount to educated guesses and may be 
     influenced by the political orientation of the observer, 
     range from the $20 million labor supporters claim is its 
     value in presidential campaigns,\21\ to the $400-$500 million 
     critics estimate for total labor soft money in a presidential 
     election year.\22\
     \1\ 57 Stat. 167. Earlier in the century, the Tilman Act of 
     1907 [34 Stat. 864] had banned contributions from 
     corporations and national banks.
     \2\ The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947; 61 Stat. 159.
     \3\ Alexander, Herbert E. ``Financing the 1976 Election.'' 
     Washington, Congressional Quarterly Press, 1979. p. 559.
     \4\ Alexander, Herbert E. ``Money in Politics.'' Washington, 
     Public Affairs Press, 1972, 1972. p. 170; Heard, Alexander, 
     ``The Costs of Democracy.'' Chapel Hill, University of North 
     Carolina Press, 1960. p. 177-8.
     \5\ The 1976 FECA Amendments required disclosure of internal 
     communications once they exceed $2,000, the only exempt 
     activity subject to federal disclosure requirements.
     \6\ 11 C.F.R. Sec. 114.1(a)(2)(i)-(iii)
     \7\ Most notably, FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
     Inc. [479 U.S. 238 (1986)].
     \8\ 11 C.F.R. Sec. 100.22
     \9\ 11 C.F.R. Sec. 114.3(a), (b), (c)(1) and 114.4(c)(1). (If 
     public communications are coordinated with a candidate, they 
     would constitute prohibited in-kind contributions, regardless 
     of content.)
     \10\ 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1) and (2); to be eligible for the 
     $5,000 limit, most PACs easily meet the criteria for 
     ``multicandidate committees'' (i.e., they must be registered 
     for at least 6 months, receive contributions from more than 
     50 persons, and donate to 5 or more federal candidates).
     \11\ U.S. Federal Election Commission. FEC Release Semi-
     Annual Federal PAC Count (press release): Jan. 23, 1996.
     \12\ Common Cause. Campaign Finance Monitoring Project. 1974 
     Congressional Campaign Finances. Vol. 5--Interest Groups and 
     Political Parties. Washington, 1976. p. xii.
     \13\ U.S. Federal Election Commission. 1994 PAC Activity 
     Shows Little Growth Over 1992 Level, Final FEC Report Finds 
     (press release): Nov. 1995.
     \14\ Ibid.
     \15\ Brownstein, Ronald, and Maxwell Glen. Money in the 
     Shadows. National Journal, v. 18, Mar. 15, 1986. p. 633.
     \16\ U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
     Employment and Earnings, v. 43. Jan. 1996. p. 210.
     \17\ For fuller discussions of these issues, see: U.S. 
     Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. ``Use of 
     Compulsory Union Dues for Political and Other Ideological 
     Purposes.'' CRS Report 94-565A, by Thomas M. Durbin and 
     Margaret Mikyung Lee. Washington, 1994.; --. ``Labor 
     Controversies: Suspension of Davis Bacon''; ``Open Shop 
     Bidding Requirements''; and `` `Beck' Rights.'' CRS Report 
     93-458E, by Gail McCallion, Vince Treacy, and William 
     Whittaker. Washington, 1993.
     \18\ 11 C.F.R. Sec. 100.8(b)(4) and 104.6.
     \19\ U.S. Federal Election Commission. ``Communication Cost 
     Index.'' July 7, 1993.
     \20\ U.S. Department of Labor. Labor Organization Annual 
     Financial Reports. Federal Register, v. 58, no. 243, Dec. 21, 
     1996. p. 67595.
     \21\ Alston, Chuck. Republicans Seek to Reduce Labor's Clout 
     at the Polls. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports, v. 48, 
     Mar. 31, 1990. p. 963.
     \22\ Testimony of Reed Larsen (National Right To Work 
     Committee) and Professor Leo Troy (Rutgers University). U.S. 
     Congress. House of Representatives. House Oversight 
     Committee. March 19, 1996.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, let me reiterate: in my view, this 
violation of fundamental choice and freedom of speech is compounded by 
the fact that labor unions do not even disclose their soft money 
contributions, which amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars. That 
$35 million which we have all been reading about in the newspapers is 
really nothing. It is almost a wash compared to what they really spend. 
The unions pull in somewhere, it is estimated, around $4 to $6 billion 
a year, and up to 85 percent of that money, according to some 
estimates, is used for political purposes on local, State and Federal 
levels.
  The Supreme Court, in 1988, in Beck versus Communications Workers of 
America, declared that workers were entitled to know how much of their 
dues were being directed to political uses and to receive a refund for 
that portion of dues paid.
  I think a brief description of the Beck case is useful. Harry Beck 
was a telephone company technician working for the Bell Telephone 
System. He was not a member of the Communications Workers of America, 
but was required to pay agency fees to the union under the labor 
contract it negotiated with American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
  In June 1976, 20 employees, including Mr. Beck, initiated a suit 
challenging the CWA's use of their agency fees for purposes other than 
collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance 
adjustment. Specifically, Mr. Beck and his coworkers alleged that the 
expenditure of their fees on activities such as organizing the 
employees of other employers, lobbying for legislation, and 
participating in political events violated the union's duty of fair 
representation and section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.

  The Supreme Court agreed that Mr. Beck and other objecting employees 
had a right to a refund from the union for the portion of their fees 
being used for political and other noncollective bargaining or 
representational purposes. This decision was, of course, significant 
for its holding that unions in the private sector are not permitted, 
over the objections of employees such as Mr. Beck, to expand funds 
collected from them for political and other activities unrelated to 
collective bargaining. In that regard, the Beck decision was a logical 
and reasoned follow-on to prior Supreme Court cases regarding the 
rights of employees covered by the Railway Labor Act to object to that 
portion of their dues or fees expended for noncollective bargaining 
purposes. See Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) and Ellis v. 
Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
  The Beck decision was significant in its affirmation (1) that the 
Federal courts properly exercised jurisdiction over such cases as a 
violation of the unions' duty of fair representation and, (2) that such 
union conduct was also prohibited under the National Labor Relations 
Act, enforcement of which is charged to the National Labor Relations 
Board.
  The rest of the system really is this. Regardless of what the court 
ruled--and it took some 8 years before the NLRB even got around to 
issuing its first ruling on a Beck-related case in 1995--all of the 
burden is being placed on the employee instead of on the union. For an 
employee to be able to withdraw his or her dues and to require 
disclosure, the employee has to go to court, file a claim before the 
NLRB, and/or has to go through all kinds of procedural maneuvers, and 
basically has to resign from the union and lose all of that employee's 
democratic rights to vote for or against strikes, for or against 
contract ratification, et cetera. In the end, the employee is basically 
out of a lot of money, out of his power of representation, and out of 
his right to vote. Why? Simply because one employee, pitted against a 
powerful union, has sought a voice in how his or her union dues is 
being spent for political purposes.
  I do not see how we can consider campaign finance reform without 
correcting this injustice.
  Nothing should be a more fundamental American right than political 
expression. Those Americans whose union dues are diverted for political 
purposes--without disclosure and without an adequate rebate system--
have been treated as second-class citizens.
  The NLRB has not only failed to implement the Beck decision, but the 
executive order issued by President Bush was rescinded during President 
Clinton's first days in office. That is amazing to me. If we want true 
campaign finance reform, why would we not clarify

[[Page S6785]]

this injustice to individual workers all over America?
  What is even more amazing to me is that my colleagues on the other 
side of the aisle have fought any attempt to deal with this issue. 
Several years ago, I oferred a simple and straightforward amendment to 
campaign finance reform that would merely have required that unions 
disclose to dues paying members how their dues money is being spent. It 
was defeated.
  It is about time that we realize that mega-labor unions are among the 
biggest--they are the biggest--special interests in the electoral 
system, and that their political capital was not always given away 
freely.
  Unless this issue can be addressed, I do not see how we can call this 
campaign finance reform. It is more a continuation of campaign finance 
coercion.
  Employees have a right to know how much of their moneys are used for 
partisan political activities with which they disagree. That is what 
the Supreme Court said, and that ought to be enforced. This bill will 
do nothing about that.
  Mr. President, I yield back whatever time I have.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I yield the Senator from Colorado 2 
minutes.
  Mr. BROWN. I will take 1 minute. I ask unanimous consent that the 
Brown amendments 4108, 4109, as offered to S. 1219, be withdrawn 
because they were improperly drafted.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I want to indicate my highest praise and 
respect for the authors of the underlying bill. I think they come with 
good intentions and an honest bipartisan effort. I am concerned about 
the bill. I am concerned about the prospect of us dividing up broadcast 
time. It does seem to me that that is a taking of property without 
compensation, and I believe it is a major flaw in the plan before us.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, not for the first time I have heard 
complaint about the power of unions and how this bill does not address 
that appropriately. It just came from the Senator in the chair. If do 
you not like it, come to the floor and propose an amendment and do 
something about it. There are 53 votes on this side. Do not refuse to 
move forward with the bill. If you do not like the bill--everybody 
comes down here and says, ``I am for campaign finance reform, but just 
not this one.'' If you are not for this one, come to the floor after we 
invoke cloture, and propose your amendments. We have 53 votes on this 
side, 47 on that side. If they share the view of the Senator from Utah, 
then you can amend it and take care of it. But do not expect the 
American people to accept this story about ``I am for campaign finance 
reform but not this one,'' and then not vote to cut off debate because 
it is a filibuster, and then we cannot move forward with the bill.

  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield on that point?
  Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, let me reiterate what the Senator said. 
It was not our idea to have a cloture vote up front so there could not 
be amendments. That was the idea of the other side. That is the only 
way we could get the bill up for a vote.
  I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. HATCH. Will the Senator yield for 10 seconds?
  Mr. BRADLEY. Not out of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. HATCH. If it is on our time?
  Mr. BRADLEY. I would be prepared to yield on the manager's time.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I yield the time out of my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
  Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, let me say this up front. If cloture is 
invoked, that type of amendment would not be germane and would not be 
permitted. If cloture is not invoked, I intend to bring up the 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I think it says a lot if the Senate is 
not able to move forward on this good piece of legislation. I think 
this inability to move forward says two things.
  The first thing it says is that fundamental campaign finance reform 
will not begin in Washington. It will begin in the States. The 
opponents of this bill like the status quo. They do not want to change 
the status quo. They have not offered an alternative. They have only 
picked at the bill. They want to keep money and politics just as it is 
today because they know how to work the system.
  The fact is the American people have a different view. I am astounded 
how much opposition to this bill is rooted in a kind of Washington 
understanding of this country. The people in this country look at 
elected Representatives and Senators and they think we are controlled. 
They think we are controlled by special interest money. Some think we 
are controlled by parties that blunt our independence. Some think we 
are controlled by our opposition that prevents us from saying what we 
really believe and only saying things that will advance us to the next 
level of office. Some even think we are controlled by pollsters who 
give us focus views and phrases and paragraphs, that we do not think 
for ourselves, saying things because we have convictions in our heart.
  The fact is that the opponents of this provision do not get it. This 
year there will be referendums in California, Colorado, Alaska, 
Arkansas, and Maine, and all of those referendums will be sending one 
message: reduce the role of money in politics; cut back on the role of 
money in politics.
  Those referendums will be followed in the years to come by other 
referendums, and maybe after another 2 or 3 years the people in this 
body who like the status quo will change. I hope they will, because I 
believe money and politics today distort democracy.

  That leads to the second point. We need to confront the central 
issue. The central issue is Buckley versus Valeo. The only way to 
confront Buckley versus Valeo directly is with a constitutional 
amendment.
  The distinguished Senator from South Carolina and I have offered such 
an amendment for a number of years that would say simply that the 
Congress and the States may limit what is spent in a campaign in total 
and what an individual may spend on his or her own campaign. Until we 
take that step, we are going to be constructing Rube Goldberg types of 
contraptions to try to get around the central issue, which is, money is 
not speech. Anybody who believes that money is speech, in my opinion--
the Supreme Court said it was, and, therefore, it is the law of the 
land. That is why we need to amend the Constitution. But I do not 
believe that a rich man's wallet in free-speech terms is the equivalent 
of a poor man's soapbox. We have to confront that issue directly. 
Otherwise, we are going to be in these debates about antacid and bubble 
gum. Even that debate is a diversion from the central issue, which is 
changing the way we now do politics in Washington, but even that issue 
is based on a confusion.
  Capitalism is different than democracy. The distinguished Senator 
from Kentucky said, ``Well, we have to compare antacids and bubble gum 
because''--compared to what? I would suggest you compare the amount of 
money in politics in 1980 versus the amount of money in politics today 
and the size of the contribution and the sources of the money.
  Without question, money is distorting democracy. And, indeed, we have 
had other times in American history where there have been distortions 
in our democracy. We have changed it by recourse of the constitutional 
amendment.
  Many people will remember earlier in this century when women did not 
have the right to vote. The absence of that voice in the polling booths 
distorted democracy. We passed a constitutional amendment giving women 
the right to vote in order to restore a broader participation.
  I believe today money is playing the same role. The fact of the 
matter is that until we confront this issue, skepticism is going to be 
high. People say, ``Well, it is not the No. 1 issue on people's 
minds.'' That is true. The No. 1 issue on people's minds is, how do I 
put

[[Page S6786]]

bread on the table? How do I pay the utility bill? How do I send my 
kids to college? They are dealing with the economic transformation 
which we are in. That is the No. 1 issue. But when they say, ``Do any 
of the politicians have any relation to my dealing with these issues,'' 
people say no, because politicians are controlled by money. That is why 
this is a linchpin issue.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from New Jersey.
  Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Connecticut.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I thank the Senator.
  Mr. President, let us be very clear. I think we all get a sense of 
what is going to happen here in about 3 hours and 45 minutes, and that 
is cloture, instead of being invoked, is not going to be invoked.
  Everyone ought to understand this. This is the vote. This will be 
your vote in this Congress on campaign finance reform. It is going to 
come down to this. It will get obscured so much because it is a 
procedural vote. But how you vote on this will be determined on how you 
are judged on the issue of campaign finance reform.
  The idea that we ought to reject the effort to invoke cloture here 
because we want to make perfect the enemy of the good, I think is a 
great tragedy. I think it is so transparent that anyone watching this 
will see right through it--to come up and say, ``I don't like this 
aspect or that aspect,'' therefore denying the opportunity for cloture 
to be invoked. As I listened to our distinguished colleague from Utah 
suggest an amendment that might have something to do with whether or 
not organized labor would be able to participate with soft money, or 
that independent campaigns will not be allowable in a postcloture 
environment, it is ridiculous on its face.
  So I want to commend our colleague from Arizona and our colleague 
from Wisconsin for bringing this up. I am proud to be a cosponsor of 
it. I have believed for years that we had to move directly and 
aggressively in this area of campaign finance reform.
  Mr. President, in Connecticut, it is $16,000 a week. That is what you 
have to raise over a 6-year period every week, week in and week out, if 
you are going to be successful in taking on or waging an effective 
campaign.
  We know today--quite candidly, all of us in this Chamber know--that 
the respective leaders of our campaign committees are out recruiting 
affluent candidates. Go out and buy a candidate who is well-heeled 
financially, and you have a pretty good candidate, someone who can 
write their own checks. Why seek those kind of candidates? Why? Because 
you understand that it is money. It is money that allows you to ante up 
and to get an entry fee into the contest.
  There is a woman by the name of Linda Sullivan who a few weeks ago in 
Rhode Island--and I do not know much about it, what the issues are or 
what she stands for--said: ``I took my race out of Congress because Mr. 
and Mrs. Smith can no longer be candidates of the Congress of the 
United States on an average basis in their finances.''
  So we all know her situation. Every single one of us knows that the 
debates around here are directly affected by it. Positions people take 
are directly affected by this issue.
  This is not a sweeping piece of campaign finance reform legislation, 
but it is the first effort we are going to have to make a difference in 
this area. After years of talking about it we now have a chance to do 
something about it.
  Mr. President, I am general chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee. I just want to say, while not everyone in my party agrees 
with this, that I happen to believe this is important. This is the one 
opportunity we are going to have to make a true difference on how we 
wage campaigns in this country.
  I plead with our colleagues on both sides of the aisle. We have never 
had a bipartisan proposal here before. It has always been partisan. 
This is a chance to go on record. This is a vote on campaign finance 
reform.
  Mr. President, I rise on the floor today for what I believe is a 
truly historic debate.
  As America's elected leaders we play a critical role as guarantors 
and protectors of our Nation's democratic institutions.
  And with this legislation today, we have a unique opportunity to 
fulfill that mandate as leaders--by beginning the long and arduous 
process of restoring the American people's faith in their Government 
and their democracy.
  The McCain-Feingold bill will not change the American people's 
seemingly inherent cynicism toward their Government overnight.
  That is an ongoing process--and one that should be of paramount 
concern to every Member of this body.
  However, by reducing the role of money in our campaign system, this 
legislation takes a critically important first step toward cleaning up 
our political process.
  In my view, there are few issues we in Congress consider that have as 
overwhelming and direct an impact on the functioning of our democracy 
than the laws governing how we run campaigns in this country. For many 
of us, campaigns are often the most direct means by which we, as 
elected representatives, communicate with our constituents.
  But, today those lines of communications are frayed by a political 
process that rewards those with money and influence, rather than 
working families and Americans struggling to make ends meet.
  Created as a Government of the people and for the people, our 
Government today seems to operate more for the well-connected few than 
the country as a whole.
  That's why, more than any other time in our history, the American 
people's confidence in their Government and its elected leaders is 
abysmally low.
  Poll after poll provides ample evidence that the American people 
believe special interests and lobbyists have a greater influence on our 
endeavors than the will of the voters.
  I believe wholeheartedly that the vast majority of those who serve in 
the U.S. Congress are well-intended and responsive to the varied needs 
of their constituents.
  However, I think I speak for many of my colleagues when I say it is 
becoming more and more difficult to make that argument to the American 
people.
  Because, when the American people look to Washington they do not 
always see citizen-legislators who focus their full energies on 
tackling the problems impacting America's working families.
  Instead, they see corporate lobbyists working hand-in-hand with 
lawmakers to turn back the clock on 25 years of environmental 
protection.
  They see special interest lobbyists with unfettered access to 
committee rooms drafting legislation that fails to keep our workplaces 
safe and protect the food we eat.
  When they look to Washington, they hear politicians in positions of 
great power and influence bemoaning the lack of money in our political 
process.
  They see leaders who insist that the political process is starving 
even though $724 million was consumed on House and Senate campaigns in 
1994 alone.
  When they look to Washington they see unlimited access and influence 
given to the fewer than 1 percent of Americans who can, and do, give 
more than $200 a year to political campaigns.
  And, when they look out on the campaign trail they see a political 
process dominated by candidates with deep pockets, instead of those 
with new ideas.
  Whatever one may think of Steve Forbes' ideas on the flat tax or 
economic growth, it is doubtful that most Americans would know about 
them if he were not a multimillionaire.
  Consider that in his run for the Republican Presidential nomination, 
Forbes spent $400,000 per delegate that he won in the Republican 
primaries. Our colleague Senator Phil Gramm, spent $20 million to win 
10 delegates. For Bob Dole, his victory in the Iowa caucuses cost him 
about $35 a vote.
  In fact, Presidential candidates spent more than $138 million by the 
end of January 1996--all before a single American voter had stepped 
into the voting booth to cast their ballot.
  Is it any wonder the American people are cynical and disenchanted 
with their elected leaders?
  But, the vast sums of money needed, for even unsuccessful runs for 
public office, are simply out of reach of the average American.
  Eighty-five years ago, former President Theodore Roosevelt said ``the

[[Page S6787]]

Representative body shall represent all the people rather than any one 
class of the people * * * .''
  But today, not only are we becoming more responsive to one class of 
citizens, but the reins of leadership are increasingly available to 
only a select few Americans.
  Throughout my more than 21 years of public service, it has been my 
great privilege to serve the people of Connecticut in the U.S. 
Congress.
  Every time I come to the floor of this body I am humbled by the great 
men and women who came before me: Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, Everett 
Dirksen, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Russell, and the list goes on.
  But today in America, I genuinely fear that the next generation of 
Clays, Websters, Doles, and Byrds will be excluded from a process that 
favors the privileged few.
  This is not just partisan rhetoric. There are real Americans who are 
being thwarted from seeking public office.
  Just a few weeks ago, I read about Linda Sullivan, president of the 
Warwick City Council in Rhode Island.
  Ms. Sullivan considered seeking the Democratic Party's nomination for 
the seat of Congressman Jack Reed, who is running for the Senate.
  But, she decided against it because she simply couldn't raise the 
$450,000 needed to seek the nomination.
  And I want everyone to hear what she said, because it says a lot 
about our current campaign system.

       Unfortunately, my campaign has come face to face with the 
     financial reality that governs today's politics in America. 
     Sadly, Mr. and Mrs. Smith cannot go to Washington anymore.

  Now, I do not know Ms. Sullivan personally. I do not know anything 
about her ideas, her policy prescriptions or her capability as an 
effective legislator.
  But, what I do know is that the exclusion of an entire segment of the 
population from the political process threatens to undermine the whole 
notion of participatory democracy in this country.
  What is more, it fundamentally limits the choices of the American 
people to politicians who, more and more, are incapable of 
understanding the problems of working class Americans.
  Aristotle once said that; ``Democracy arises out of the notion that 
those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects.''
  But, when it comes to political campaigns in this country and the 
access that working Americans have to their lawmakers, those words ring 
hollow.
  Mind you there are no silver bullets for ending the American people's 
inherent cynicism or feeling of disempowerment toward their government.
  But the legislation we are debating today is the foundation by which 
we must begin this process of change.
  First of all, by limiting overall campaign spending, the McCain-
Feingold bill would allow candidates to focus less time on raising 
money and more time on tackling the issues that truly affect the 
American people.
  Now, I know some of my colleagues argue that this provision of the 
bill violates the 1976 ruling that political campaign spending is a 
form of political speech, and thus protected by the first amendment.
  But, this legislation imposes only voluntary limits on campaign 
spending. No candidate would be mandated to accept them.
  In fact, no provision in this legislation would prevent a candidate 
from spending as much money as they wanted to.
  However, if they chose to abide by these voluntary limits, candidates 
could receive free television time, could purchase advertisements at 
lower rates, and could send out mail at cheaper rates.
  Additionally, the bill would tackle the issue of millionaire 
candidates by exempting candidates from the bill's benefits if they 
spend more than $250,000 of their own money.
  The McCain-Feingold bill is by no means perfect. In particular, we 
need to be sure that working people are not restricted from 
participating in the political process and that grass-roots and 
volunteer activities are not constrained.
  However, it is an excellent place to start in reforming the means by 
which we fund political campaigns in this country.
  Let me clear on one point: I am not a Johnny-come-lately to this 
debate. In 1985, I sponsored one of the first legislative proposals to 
reform campaign finance laws.
  And as a Congressman, Senator, and now general chairman of the 
Democratic party I have flourished within the framework of the current 
system.
  But, after 20 years of public service I am more convinced than ever 
that the current approach to funding political campaigns in this 
country is broken and desperately in need of reform.
  Time after time, we have talked about reform--particularly when it is 
an election year--but in the end we have done nothing. We have 
appointed commissions, we have proposed legislation, we have ordered 
reports, analyses and studies, and yet in the end, it seems that it is 
just business as usual.
  Well today, I call on all my colleagues to chart a new course, to put 
aside their partisan differences, to ignore how this bill affects our 
reelection chances and put first and foremost in our deliberations the 
good of the Nation.
  Let us not forget that a Government that is viewed with suspicion and 
mistrust by its own people cannot sustain our Democratic institutions.
  As Henry Clay, a former Member of this body once said:

       Government is a trust, and the officers of the government 
     are trustees; and both the trust and the trustees are created 
     for the benefit of the people.

  Let us remember that: our democracy exists for the benefit of the 
people--and not their elected leaders.
  As leaders, we must not shirk our responsibility to do all we can to 
restore that sense of trust to the American people. The McCain-Feingold 
bill begins that process and I believe that as a body we have a solemn 
responsibility to embrace this legislation.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that in the event 
that cloture is invoked, that two amendments be made in order and 
germane, one on the Beck decision and the other on allowing unlimited 
spending on campaigns.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have no objection.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I withdraw the unanimous consent request, 
but I want to make it clear that in the event that cloture is invoked, 
that the unanimous consent proposal made would make those amendments 
germane to this bill. But I withdraw the unanimous consent request.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The request is withdrawn.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, how much time remains on our side?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 24 minutes and 23 seconds.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma 5 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma.
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator for yielding. I do not think I will 
even take that much time. I know time is very precious right now. I 
have been listening to the debate, and I am the first one to say I am 
not on any of the committees that deal with this, so it is not that I 
have been entrenched in this issue. I agree with one thing the Senator 
from Connecticut said, and that is it is very transparent, the things 
that are going on around here.
  The Senator from Utah was very specific and I think very articulate 
in the way that he addressed how this would affect labor unions. It is 
my understanding that even in the reporting aspects of soft money each 
local could give up to $10,000 without even reporting it. So let us 
assume that they report accurately and that someone who says that a 
local says it is contributing less than $10,000 is in fact correct. I 
am not ready to accept that. But let us assume that is right. If you 
have a hundred locals, you are talking about a million dollars. No one 
will ever know where it came from. This is money that is used very 
effectively in campaigns.
  So as far as I am concerned, one of the big areas that should be 
regulated is left out of this thing, and that is labor unions. And then 
there is trial lawyers. I have to tell you that every time I run for 
office there are thousand-dollar checks coming from all

[[Page S6788]]

over, from trial lawyers from all over America because I am the one who 
has on his agenda a desire that I am going to fulfill to see to it we 
have real meaningful tort reform in this country, to make us 
competitive again. So we have the trial lawyers out there with the 
ability to send in, on their own contributions of $1,000 apiece, to 
maybe six different campaigns. Maybe there are 100 of them who are out 
there. All you have to do is look at an FEC report and you can see that 
they are doing it.
  Let me make one comment about PAC's. Everyone assumes that political 
action committees are something evil. Political action committees allow 
small people to get involved, people who are of low incomes to get 
involved in the process, and there is not any other way they can get 
involved. I have been a commercial pilot for I guess 38 years. I have 
been active in aviation. I believe that aviation makes a great 
contribution to the technology of aerospace and many other things, and 
consequently I am supported by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, AOPA, 340,000 members. Each one puts in about $5 and they 
do contribute to people who are supportive of the industry that they 
believe in.
  The NRA, they have taken a lot of hits recently. Who are the NRA? 
When you sit up here, you are looking at millions of dollars in 
Washington, but if you were with me last weekend in Hugo, Cordell, Lone 
Grove, Sulphur, those are people who belong and they might give $5 a 
year because they honestly in their hearts believe in the second 
amendment rights to the Constitution. I do, too. They contribute. These 
are not big fat cats, wealthy people. So I think to categorize PAC's as 
being something that is evil in our society is wrong.
  The third thing I do not like about this legislation that is coming 
up, and I will be opposing it, is the arrogance that is there. We have 
reduced postage for us--not for you, not for anybody else but for us. 
Now, what happens when you reduce our postage? It is all out of one 
fund. So other postage is going to end up going up. It is just sheer 
arrogance that we should be treated differently than everybody else.

  We passed legislation, a very good bill through this Chamber at the 
very first of this Congress and that was the bill which made us live 
under the same laws as everybody else. All of a sudden people around 
here are looking, pointing fingers, saying, should we have done that? 
Here we are again, coming right on the heels of that, saying we are 
going to give us a benefit nobody else has.
  The Senator from Massachusetts a minute ago stood up and said we 
ought to have more free time on TV. Who are those broadcasters out 
there? Are they all fat cats? I go around Oklahoma. We have small 
stations. They are going to give time, and if they do not give free 
time, they are going to have to give a reduced rate, 50 percent of the 
lowest rate. That is for us because we are in Congress. We are 
important people. We are supercitizens--not everybody else, just us.
  The arrogance in the way we are approaching that, saying we are 
entitled to things other people are not entitled to I find to be very 
offensive.
  Mr. President, I conclude by saying I agree with the Senator from 
Connecticut. This is transparent. The two biggest offenders, the ones 
who contribute the most to campaigns--and I would categorize them as 
organized labor and trial lawyers--are not going to be inhibited in any 
way by this bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I thank my good friend from Oklahoma for his important 
contribution to this debate.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 19 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from 
Georgia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia is recognized.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky for 
his diligent and dedicated efforts to this debate for a long, long 
period of time--probably longer than he wishes.
  I know it has been said many times but I think everybody should see a 
caution flag go up when the Republican National Committee, the National 
Taxpayers Union, the National Right to Life Committee, the National 
Rifle Association, the American Civil liberties Union, the Christian 
Coalition, Direct Marketing Assocation, National Association of 
Broadcasters, National Assocation of Business PAC's, National Education 
Association, the complete political spectrum, all are opposed to this 
legislation. Why? Because it is an infringement on the first amendment 
of the Constitution of the United States. It is that simple.
  Just moments ago I was at a hearing where a former Presidential 
candidate, Gov. Lamar Alexander, said it best. He said these efforts to 
regulate and restrict have left labor with full constitutional rights 
of the first amendment, political parties with full constitutional 
rights of the first amendment, the entire media of the United States 
with the full rights of the first amendment, and only one category is 
being denied their rights under the first amendment, and who is that? 
It is the candidates, the candidate for President, the candidate for 
Senate, the candidate for Congress. The only class for which we 
restrict first amendment rights, the people who will ultimately 
represent America are the single class we carve out to deny first 
amendment rights.

  Mr. President, this kind of legislation envisions a very narrow 
sanitized environment, almost like a prize fight with two contestants 
inside a defined ring, and there are rules that define how that combat 
will be conducted. But in the case of American politics, vast resources 
affect the outcome of the election. Take my State. The largest 
newspaper in the State is the Atlanta Constitution. It has a 
circulation of a half a million, on Sunday 750,000, and they can say 
anything they choose and meddle in every political race, and with 
everybody's acknowledgment, and even theirs, with a very biased and 
fixed agenda.
  So in seeking office a candidate who might not agree with that agenda 
is not simply dealing with his or her opponent; they are dealing with 
the extraneous factors--the media itself, the State's largest daily 
newspaper. Why is it that this corporation, the Atlanta Constitution--
it is a corporation, I might add--is not restricted under campaign 
finance? Why are their first amendment rights protected but Ace 
Hardware's are not? They can say anything they choose. They can put an 
editorial in their editorial page every day for a month. They can 
comment, as they do, on the fortunes of a political campaign every day. 
To buy an ad in that paper might cost, one page, $14,000, or a half a 
page $7,000. So think of the enormous resources that are being invested 
in meddling or commenting, however you want to put it, on the outcome 
and fortunes of a political race.
  We take the candidate and draw narrow parameters around that 
candidate in terms of how he or she can communicate.
  Frankly, I think it is the candidate that should be the freest to 
express him or herself, to talk about and interpret his or her beliefs. 
The idea of restraining that candidate's capacity only enlarges the 
forces of those who do not ultimately represent the people--the 
journalists, the media. Would it not be far better to let the person 
who is going to represent the American people, the person who is going 
to represent the people from the good State of Georgia, to be on equal 
footing with all these other resources? The answer to that question is 
yes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I ask for 1 additional minute.
  Mr. McCONNELL. I yield my colleague 1 minute.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I think the Governor of Tennessee said it best. The 
first amendment is protective for the labor movement, for the media, 
for special interest groups, and one class in American politics has 
been carved out for denial of first amendment rights: the candidates. 
That is not appropriate.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Georgia, 
special thanks for a superb presentation.
  I just want to make one additional comment to follow on. The 
proponents of this kind of legislation have said

[[Page S6789]]

over the years they wanted to level the playing field. I would say to 
my friend from Georgia, he and I compete in the political arena in the 
South. In order to level the playing field in my State, not only would 
you have to get a number of the newspapers sold to different kinds of 
owners, you would also have to change the voter registration and 
history of the State in order to create a remotely level playing field 
upon which a person with the disability that the Senator from Georgia 
and I share, that disability of being registered Republicans, so we 
could compete on a truly level playing field.
  In fact, even the attempt to create a level playing field is 
constitutionally impermissible. Buckley verus Valeo addressed that 
particular issue. So I thank my friend from Georgia for a remarkable 
contribution to this debate.
  Mr. COVERDELL. I thank the Senator from Kentucky.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 15 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield 1 minute to the Senator from Minnesota.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota.
  Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, it has been my honor to work with 
Senator Feingold and Senator McCain from the very beginning, and 
Senator Thompson. I spoke yesterday, so I will be very brief, less than 
a minute.
  The way in which big money has come to dominate politics, I believe, 
is the ethical issue of our time. Too few people have way too much 
power and say, and the vast majority of the people in our country are 
not well represented.
  The standard of a representative democracy is that each person should 
count as one and no more than one. That standard is violated every day 
by the way in which big money dominates politics in our country today. 
I say to my colleagues, I have worked on gift ban. I have worked on 
lobby disclosure. This is the reform vote of the 104th Congress. We are 
just asking for an opportunity to have the debate, move the bill 
forward, and make it better.
  Mr. President, to go to a commission--I say to my colleagues, do not 
look for cover, because a commission to study the problem is not a step 
forward, it is a great leap backward.
  Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the 
McCain-Feingold-Thompson bill, S. 1219. Although this bill is not the 
ideal resolution of this complicated issue, it is clear that the time 
has come to reform the campaign finance architecture.
  Campaign finance reform is needed to restore the American people's 
faith in the electoral process. Americans are frustrated; many believe 
that the current system cuts them off from their Government. A recent 
League of Women Voters study found that one of the top three reasons 
people don't vote is the belief that their vote will not make a 
difference. We saw the result of this cynicism in 1994 when just 38 
percent of all registered voters headed to the polls.
  Voters, and not money, should determine election results. The money 
chase has gotten out of control, and voters know that big money stifles 
the kind of competitive elections that are essential to our democracy. 
The effort to raise the money needed to run for election ends up making 
it more difficult to make needed reforms in a whole range of areas. 
This system must be reformed.
  The effort needed to raise the average of $4.3 million per Senate 
race in the last election decreases the time Senators need to meet 
their obligations to all of their constituents. Furthermore, when 
voters see that the average amount contributed by PAC's to House and 
Senate candidates is up from $12.5 million in 1974 to $178.8 million in 
1994--a 400-percent rise even after factoring in inflation over that 
period--there is a perception that lawmakers are too reliant on special 
interests to make public policy that serves the national interest. More 
and more voters believe that Members of Congress only listen to these 
special interest contributors, while failing to listen to the very 
constituents who put them into office.
  That is part of the reason why there is overwhelming public support 
for reform. And make no mistake, there is a real public consensus that 
reform is needed--now. Ordinary Americans want--and deserve--Government 
that is responsive to their needs and problems. The way to do that is 
through spending limits. Spending limits will make our system more open 
and more competitive. Spending limits can help focus elections more on 
the issues, instead of on advertising.
  Unfortunately, however, for all of its strengths, S. 1219 does not 
cure all the flaws of our current campaign finance system. The 
legislation has gaps, and in some areas, it has made mistakes, mistakes 
that deserve the Senate's attention before this bill becomes law.
  When the Senate considered campaign finance reform in the 103d 
Congress, I quoted a column by David Broder. He made the point that 
many of the reforms that resonate strongly with the public ``have a 
common characteristic: they would all increase the power of the 
economic and social elite that most vociferously advocates them. And 
they might well reduce the influence of the mass of voters in whose 
name they are being urged.''
  I think that we need to take Mr. Broder's warning to heart. We must 
be sure that we don't have a process that only further empowers 
political elites that are already empowered. We want campaign finance 
reform that allows candidates more time to talk to voters. Voters want 
to know that the system works for ordinary Americans and not just those 
few who can devote substantial time and money to politics. They deserve 
better than the present system.
  The inordinate effort required to raise massive amounts of money 
within the strictures of contribution limits make fundraising a 
continuous and time consuming condition of elections.
  It is also worth keeping in mind that campaign finance reform cannot 
work for every American unless it also works for every candidate, 
including minority candidates and women. Minority and women candidates 
currently have less access to the large sums needed to run for office 
today than other candidates. That financial inequity is one of the 
primary reasons both women and minorities have long been under-
represented in both the Senate and House. The spending limits in S. 
1219 are very important in addressing their concerns, but reform will 
only be truly successful if it increases opportunities for candidates 
from all walks of life and our society. Campaign finance reform will be 
counted as a failure if the numbers of women and minorities in Congress 
goes down, rather than up, under a new system.
  S. 1219 attempts to level the playing field for all competing 
candidates. It establishes a voluntary system by which candidates who 
agree to limit their overall spending receive certain benefits, 
including 30 minutes of free broadcast time, television and radio time 
at 50 percent off of the lowest unit rate, and reduced postage rates.
  If a complying candidate's noncomplying opponent has raised or spent 
10 percent more than the State spending limits, then the complying 
candidate can spend 20 percent more than the spending limit and still 
be in compliance with the bill. If a noncomplying candidate raises or 
spends 50 percent more than the spending limits, the complying 
candidate's limits increase 50 percent without penalty.
  Furthermore, complying candidates cannot spend more than the lesser 
of 10 percent of their spending limit, or $250,000, from their personal 
funds. When a candidate declares their intention to spend more than 
$250,000 of personal funds, the $1,000 contribution limit for 
individuals is raised to $2,000 for complying candidates, and the non-
complying candidate does not qualify for any of the bill's benefits.
  These steps represent real progress, but the problems here are very 
serious, and need much more attention. Those who are independently 
wealthy have unequal access to the political system, and if reform is 
to work, we have to do something about that.
  Self-financing candidates are a rapidly growing phenomenon in our 
current political system. In 1994, one candidate for the Senate spent a 
record setting $27 million, almost all of which was his own money. And 
over the last year, a Presidential candidate spent $30 million of his 
own money for the primary elections alone. Without workable spending 
limits that apply to every candidate, those who can break the limits by 
dipping into their own deep pockets will end up dominating

[[Page S6790]]

our politics, even more than is the case now. Talented, but less 
wealthy candidates will have it tougher than ever. The trend toward a 
Congress comprised disproportionately of millionaires does a disservice 
to representative democracy. Such trends are a very troubling aspect of 
the loss of confidence in our system. This bill does not resolve that 
fundamental flaw.

  Imposing spending limits on millionaire candidates is very difficult, 
given the Supreme Court's decision in the case of Buckley versus Valeo, 
which used a first amendment justification to invalidate a 
congressional attempt to impose limits on the amount a candidate can 
contribute to his or her own campaign. However, there are things that 
Congress should consider that might be able to bring self-funding 
candidates into a campaign spending limits regime, or at least provide 
enough disincentives so that these candidates will no longer profit 
politically by using their own resources to finance their campaign cash 
flow.
  The relevant provision of the 1971 Campaign Act that was invalidated 
in Buckley provided that a Presidential candidate could spend no more 
than $50,000 out of personal resources. It is at least possible that 
with a much more generous, though not unlimited, opportunity for 
candidates to spend their own money, the infringement of individual 
freedom is less severe, and perhaps not substantial as stated by the 
Court in Buckley. After all, it is one thing to tell a candidate that 
he or she can't spend more than $50,000 of personal money; it is quite 
another to say he or she can't spend more than $1 million--and that the 
rest must be raised from small contributors in order to demonstrate 
broad political support.
  If candidates were required to seek and demonstrate support from a 
broad range of individuals--an important component of the democratic 
process--the Supreme Court might see the first amendment issue somewhat 
differently. An appropriate analogy would be the laws that require 
candidates to obtain a certain number of signatures as a requirement 
for access to the ballot. In other words, the reason for this limit 
would not be to equalize resources, but to ensure that the amounts 
candidates spend have some relation to breadth of support. This 
proposal may be at least arguably consistent with Buckley, since the 
Court in that case recognized that the Government has ``important 
interests in limiting places on the ballot to those candidates who 
demonstrate substantial popular support.''
  In fact, it is that statement by the Court which demonstrates the 
flaw in the Buckley versus Valeo decision. In the not too distant past, 
a candidate had to have the endorsement of a political party, or have 
his or her own strong, grass roots organization in order to have the 
large number of people it takes to gather sufficient petitions to be 
put on the ballot. Now, however, it is actually possible to hire people 
to collect petition signatures, so petitioning does not necessarily 
demonstrate broad support the way it used to. In fact, a wealthy 
candidate, under the current state of the law, doesn't have to have any 
broad support at all to gain access to the ballot, only enough money to 
hire enough petition collectors. If the important government interest 
the Buckley Court acknowledged is to be protected, therefore, some 
limits on the use of money by wealthy candidates is required. The use 
of money by wealthy candidates has to be brought into the bill's 
reforms.

  Bringing self-funded candidates completely under the bill's reform 
umbrella is a necessary step, but another area of the bill also needs 
another look--the treatment of groups such as EMILY's List and WISH 
List. EMILY's List and WISH List have helped bring women into politics. 
EMILY's List and the efforts of the women's fundraising organizations 
is one of the main reasons there are now 33 Democratic and 16 
Republican women in the House, 8 women Senators instead of just 1, and 
2 Democratic women governors.
  EMILY's List has energized women; it has given more women a way to 
participate in our political system--women who have never participated 
before. As the New York Times noted, ``alone among fund-raising 
organizations, EMILY's List doles out millions of dollars and then 
seeks nothing back from its beneficiaries. Its only mission is to get 
women elected to Congress and the State houses.'' I think that kind of 
activity should be encouraged, and not limited.
  EMILY's List has helped open up our system; it has showed more women 
that the system can work for them. I think that EMILY's List is 
American democracy in its purest form. EMILY's List should be applauded 
and encouraged, and not terminated.
  I want to conclude, Mr. President, by returning to where I began. I 
think that it is long past time for Congress to reform the campaign 
financing system. This bill goes a long way toward making some real 
changes to our current system. It is far from perfect, but it is a work 
in progress. The bill's flaws can be corrected as we move forward 
through the remainder of the legislative process. I am therefore voting 
today to take the next step, to invoke cloture, because the bill cannot 
be corrected if it is not considered by the Senate. And if we fail to 
invoke cloture, this bill will fail. I do not want to see that happen, 
and neither do the American people. They expect us to act on real 
campaign finance reform this year. I will cast my vote to meet that 
expectation; I hope all of my colleagues will do likewise and that this 
Senate will meet its duty to the American people to change campaign 
finance.
  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, here we go again, Mr. President. Another 
chapter in the never ending effort to reform the way we finance 
political campaigns.
  I feel like I am driving a race car around a track and no matter how 
long and how far I drive, the checkered flag just never seems to come 
down. We never seem to reach the finish line. We are never able to 
finish what we start.
  And, now, today, the question before us is whether we will even be 
allowed to start--whether we will even be allowed to debate the issue 
of campaign finance reform.
  I have been on this track for almost 24 years now. One of the first 
things I did as a new Senator back in 1973 was to testify before the 
Senate Rules Committee on the need for campaign finance reform--on the 
need for spending limits and public funding of congressional campaigns; 
on the need for equal competition based on ideas, not money, between 
challengers and incumbents. Let me tell you, I did not make many 
friends.
  But, I believed then--and I believe as strongly today--that campaign 
finance reform is the single most significant thing Congress could do.
  The American people have come to believe the system has failed. The 
American people have lost faith in their leaders and in their 
Government. The American people feel alienated and distant from the 
very people who represent them.
  There are several reasons for this. But, the biggest--and probably 
what all others boil down to--is the way we fund our elections: the 
influence of money; the influence of special interests; the influence 
of everyone, it seems, except the average middle-class American.
  A middle-class American does not make a $1,000 contribution. A 
middle-class American does not hire a lobbyist to wander the Halls of 
the Capitol and make $5,000 campaign contributions. A middle-class 
American does not ask a Congressman to hand out campaign contributions 
on the floor of the House of Representatives.
  No. A middle-class American walks into the voting booth on election 
day, if he or she has not been turned off by that time, and engages in 
the most important exercise in a democracy. He or she casts a ballot 
for a person to represent them.
  But, when it is all said and done, many middle-class Americans feel 
that they are not being represented. They have become apathetic, 
cynical, and distrustful. And, I'm afraid this is not a whim or a 
passing feeling. It may be wrong in reality--it may be right--but it 
should not be taken lightly by those of us in Congress. There is a 
major crisis of confidence in the American electorate, and it puts at 
risk everything else we attempt to do. That is why I believe campaign 
finance reform is the crucial issue of our time.
  So, Mr. President, our mission is clear. We must restore integrity 
and confidence in the political process.

[[Page S6791]]

 And, to do that, we must have comprehensive campaign finance reform.
  Unfortunately, today, we are not even voting on a campaign finance 
reform bill. This is a vote on whether we will be allowed to vote on 
the bill. And, you wonder why the American people are so sick of this 
system.
  The special interests have circled the wagons. They are on the 
warpath to kill campaign finance reform.
  So, I implore my colleagues: stand today with the American people. 
Let us take up this bill--the first bipartisan campaign finance reform 
bill in nearly a generation. Let us debate the issue. And, let us 
decide the issue on the merits, not on inside-the-beltway maneuvering.
  The American people demand no less.
  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, this past February, over 4 months ago, I 
took the Senate floor to announce my cosponsorship of S. 1219. As I 
spoke about how unique this bill is--one of the only truly bipartisan 
attempts to reform campaign laws in two decades--I could not help 
thinking to myself, ``here we go again.''
  I have only been a Senator for a little over 3 years. In Senate 
terms, that is not very long. But I have been here long enough to see 
campaign finance reform come up, and be killed. In the 103d Congress, 
shortly after the 1992 elections, I proudly cosponsored campaign reform 
legislation. I was eager to answer the voters' hopes for cleaner, more 
thoughtful politics.
  I watched colleagues come to the floor, proclaim the need for 
reforms, and declare their support for good legislation. The Senate 
passed that bill, S. 3, and sent it to the House. A short time later, I 
saw it killed amidst partisan bickering, despite the mad scramble of 
Senators wanting to be seen as leading the charge for reforms.
  In the end, nothing was accomplished, and here we are today living 
under the same campaign system that has created so much cynicism and 
mistrust among the voters.
  So when I endorsed S. 1219, I thought ``here we go again'' because I 
was embarking on my second attempt to reform campaign laws. But this 
time, instead of thinking we could simply pass a bill and send it to 
the White House, I knew we had our work cut out for us.
  Now it is June, and the 104th Congress will adjourn in a few months. 
While we are only now taking up campaign reform, I am still encouraged. 
For the first time in a long time, the Senate is considering a truly 
bipartisan bill. It has not been drafted by one party or another to 
give themselves a leg up.
  It has been drafted by a Republican and a Democrat, John McCain and 
Russ Feingold, because they know that until the two parties come 
together and focus on common sense reforms we can all agree on, nothing 
will get done. It is supported by thoughtful new Senators like Fred 
Thompson of Tennessee and Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois who, like me, 
were elected to make changes in the political system.
  We have a very narrow window of opportunity today. It is narrow 
because we have only a few months left in this Congress, and we have a 
lot of work to do. It is an opportunity because it is a bipartisan 
bill, free of taint, and maybe--just maybe--capable of restoring some 
faith to the people. In light of this, it is critical that we move 
quickly.
  I urge my colleagues to stop, look, and listen. Listen to people at 
the coffee shops. Talk to friends, to family members. Walk through a 
neighborhood. A basic, fundamental lack of faith in Government lays at 
the root of peoples' concerns about the future. Until something 
dramatic happens to address public confidence in the political system, 
we can expect the gap between the people and their Government to widen.
  There is nothing I can think of that would be worse for this country; 
for alienation breeds apathy, and apathy erodes accountability. America 
is the greatest democracy the world has ever known, and it was built on 
the principle of accountability: government of the people, by the 
people, for the people. We simply must restore peoples' faith in their 
Government.
  At the core of the problem is money in politics. Right now the system 
is designed to favor the rich, at the expense of the middle class. It 
benefits the incumbents, at the expense of challengers. And most of 
all, it fuels the special interest, inside-the-beltway machine at the 
expense of the average person back home.
  The average person feels like they can no longer make a difference in 
this system. Earlier this year, my campaign received a $15 donation 
from a woman in Washington State. She included a note to me that said, 
``Senator Murray, please make sure my $15 has as much impact as people 
who give thousands.''
  She knows what she is up against, but she is still willing to make 
the effort. Unfortunately, people like her are fewer and farther 
between, and less willing than ever to try to make a difference.
  We see her problem when people like Ross Perot or Steve Forbes are 
able to use personal wealth to buy their way into the national 
spotlight. Ninety-nine percent of the people in America could never 
even imagine making that kind of splash in politics. Should we rely 
only on the benevolence of a few wealthy individuals to ensure strong 
democracy in this country? I don't think that is what the Founding 
Fathers had in mind.
  The political consultants will say negative ads work, because they, 
quote, ``move the numbers.'' They will say we need to raise millions of 
dollars because that is what it takes to get a message out.
  But that ignores the reality in Main Street America every day. The 
very campaigns they say we need to run to win are bleeding the life out 
of our political system. Every time we go through an election with 
expensive, negative campaigns, we pay a severe price in voter 
participation and citizen apathy.
  Add up election, after election, after election in the modern 
political era, and elected officials are facing a huge bill for 
accountability they may not be able to pay. I fear that once lost, 
citizens may never re-engage in their democratic system.
  During this debate, I have heard Senators take issue with certain 
provisions in S. 1219. I have heard colleagues question the 
constitutionality of spending limits. I have heard them make the case 
that this bill takes the wrong approach. I have heard them argue for 
reform, but not this way.
  Mr. President, these arguments miss the point entirely. The upcoming 
vote is not about whether you agree with every provision of S. 1219. It 
is about whether this Senate is willing to step up and pass campaign 
reform legislation this year.
  I myself am not completely satisfied with S. 1219. The McCain-
Feingold bill is very broad, and does something about nearly every 
aspect of the system: It restricts political action committee 
contributions; it imposes voluntary spending limits; it provides 
discounted access to broadcast media for advertising; it provides 
reduced rates for postage; it prohibits taxpayer-financed mass mailings 
on behalf of incumbents during an election year; it discourages 
negative advertising; it tightens restrictions on independent 
expenditures; and it reforms the process of soft money contributions 
made through political parties.

  Mr. President, these are very strong, positive steps, especially the 
ones addressing independent expenditures. Over the past few years, 
through the so-called Gingrich Revolution, we have seen an explosion of 
campaign spending by special interest groups, many from Washington, DC, 
attempting to swing elections in their own favor. These expenditures 
are ideologically driven, often highly partisan, and serve only to 
manipulate voters in the most sinister way. They corrupt our elections. 
They are not disclosed, so we do not know who makes them, and they 
violate the spirit of every disclosure requirement in law today.
  If enacted as a package, all the steps I just mentioned would make 
our system of electing Federal officials more open, competitive, and 
fair. I feel strongly that we must take such steps to re-invigorate 
peoples' interest in the electoral process, and in turn to restore 
their confidence in the system.
  There are some provisions in S. 1219 that could be problematic, 
however. For example, the bill would require 60 percent of a 
candidates' donors to reside within his or her State. This might work 
fine for someone from New

[[Page S6792]]

York or California. However, it could put small-state candidates at a 
real disadvantage, particularly if their opponent is independently 
wealthy.
  I also question the ban on PAC's. Under the right regulations, I 
believe PAC's have a legitimate role in the process, for two reasons. 
First, PAC's are fully disclosed, and subject to strict contribution 
limits. That means we have a very detailed paper trail from donor to 
candidate for everyone to see. Second, they give a voice to individual 
citizens like women and workers and teachers who, if not organized as a 
group, might not be able to make a difference in the process.
  A serious question about PAC's remains, however: do they unfairly 
benefit incumbents at the expense of challengers? This is a legitimate 
question, and one I think we should focus on closely in this debate.
  Finally, I am deeply concerned about how this bill would effect 
organized fundraising by third party groups that do not even lobby 
Congress. Groups like EMILY's List and WISH List support pro-choice 
women candidates of both parties, though they do not actually lobby 
Congress on legislation.
  They give people of modest means like me an opportunity to compete on 
the electoral playing field. For too long, this field has been 
dominated only by wealthy, well financed candidates, establishment 
candidates, or incumbents. In my 1992 campaign I was out-spent nearly 
three-to-one. Without the support of groups like this, I would not have 
even been able to make the race.
  By banning these groups, S. 1219 would send a signal to people 
everywhere: do not even think about playing this game unless you can 
afford the price of admission.
  However, as I said a moment ago, this vote is not about every little 
detail. Let us remember something: this whole debate--arguments for and 
against--comes against the backdrop of a campaign finance system that 
has not been reformed since Watergate, over 20 years ago. Public faith 
in government today has sunk below what it was in 1974. So in spite of 
my personal concerns, I will vote to invoke cloture on the McCain-
Feingold bill. And after cloture is invoked, I will support amendments 
that address the issues I have raised.
  Right now, we need to move forward. People in this country want to 
feel ownership over their elections; they want to feel like they, as 
individuals, have a role to play and can make a positive difference. 
Right now, for better or worse, not many people feel that way, and the 
trend is going the wrong direction. Real campaign reform will be the 
strongest, easiest step this Senate could take to begin restoring 
peoples' faith in the process.
  Set aside the legalistic, technical arguments for a moment. Get out 
from behind all the procedural maneuvering. Put aside partisan 
leanings. We have an opportunity right now, today, to show the voters 
something. We can put pressure on the other body to act on similar 
legislation. We can actually move reform efforts forward in a credible 
way, and get something done this year.
  A citizen from New Hampshire, Frank McConnell, made a good case just 
the other day. He came to Washington to push this bill, and he said if 
Congress wanted to, if it really wanted to, it could do the work and 
have a bill to the President's desk in a couple weeks.
  We know the President would sign it, because he said so in his State 
of the Union Address earlier this year. Frank McConnell was right: if 
we want to, we can just do it. Here we are again. We are considering 
campaign reform legislation. There is not much time left. I thank the 
two sponsors of this bill, Senator McCain and Senator Feingold, and I 
urge my colleagues to step up and support the motion to invoke cloture.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak briefly on S. 
1219, the Campaign Finance Reform Act and to discuss two amendments I 
intend to offer to the bill if the Senate invokes cloture on the bill 
tomorrow.
  As a cosponsor of S. 1219, I am pleased to join with my friend and 
colleague from Arizona, Senator McCain, and my friend and colleague 
from Wisconsin, Senator Feingold, in supporting this legislation. I 
want to commend Senators McCain and Feingold for their efforts in 
bringing this measure to the Senate for its consideration. They have 
been tireless champions of the need to reform our campaign finance 
system and I am encouraged by the way they have worked together to 
develop a bipartisan approach to a problem that has escaped solution 
for so many years.
  As my colleagues know, 2 years ago I completed an expensive and 
negative campaign. The only positive thing that I brought from that 
experience was the time I was able to spend listening to the concerns 
of New Mexicans and traveling around the State.
  Unquestionably, one of the most significant recollections I have of 
the campaign is the enormous amount of money that I was forced to raise 
and spend to defend against a wealthy opponent who attacked early and 
continued with a negative campaign until the votes were counted.
  That is one of the reasons why I support S. 1219 and why I have 
supported every serious attempt to fix our campaign finance system. 
Clearly, Mr. President, the system is broke and anyone who thinks 
otherwise simply has not looked at the facts. More and more of our time 
is spent raising money, special interest groups have too much influence 
at the expense of the individual American, and, most important, the 
American people have lost confidence in their elected officials because 
they no longer believe that we have time to listen to them. Instead 
they believe that only the wealthy can serve in Congress and that we 
are engaged in an endless pursuit of special interest money. While this 
is not true in all cases, I am very concerned that if we do not reform 
the current system soon, the fears of average Americans will become 
real.
  Mr. President, we need to change the system and I believe that the 
bill offered by Senators McCain and Feingold offers us a chance to 
regain the confidence of those who sent us here.
  If cloture is invoked tomorrow, I intend to offer two amendments to 
this legislation. These amendments are contained in legislation I 
offered earlier this year with my friends and colleagues Senator Pell 
and Senator Campbell, S. 1723.
  The first amendment requires that if a qualified candidate for 
Federal office references his or her opponent in a TV advertisement 
they must do so themselves if they want to take advantage of the lowest 
unit-rate charge provided to candidates for Federal office under the 
Communications Act of 1934. If the candidate voluntarily chooses not to 
make the reference herself, or himself, the candidate would not be 
eligible for the lowest unit rate for the remainder of the 45-day 
period preceding the date of a primary or primary runoff election or 
during the 60 days preceding the date of a general or special election. 
The candidate would, of course, continue to have access to the 
broadcast station and would be able to air whatever advertisement they 
wish, but they would not be eligible for the special benefit that 
Congress has provided under the Communications Act.

  The second amendment requires that broadcasters who allow an 
individual or group to air advertisements in support of, or in 
opposition to, a particular candidate for Federal office, allow the 
candidate in the case where a candidate is attacked, the same amount of 
time on the broadcast station during the same period of the day.
  Mr. President, these are not new concepts. In the 99th Congress, 
Senator Danforth offered a bill to require a broadcast station that 
allowed a candidate to present an advertisement that referred to her 
opponent without presenting the ad herself, to provide free rebuttal 
time to the other candidate. Since then, other variations of what has 
become known as talking heads legislation have been incorporated in 
overall campaign finance reform bills and introduced as free standing 
bills.
  In a little over a month, both national parties will be holding their 
conventions. After that the race will be on, not only for the White 
House but also for 435 House seats and 33 Senate seats and untold 
number of State and local elections. I can say in all honesty that I do 
not envy my colleagues here in the Senate, whether they are Republican 
or Democrat, because I now that they will soon be subjected to the same

[[Page S6793]]

type of negative attacks ads that I had to face in my last election. 
Many of these ads will contain misrepresentations, distortions, and 
outright untruths. A voice will appear on the television but it will 
not be the candidate's. Perhaps an image will appear but it will not be 
the candidate's either. Instead, the candidate will be hiding behind 
the message and that message will undoubtedly be negative.
  Mr. President, I am told that public opinion polls show that 
politicians are held in only slightly higher esteem than lawyers and 
journalists. While that may be true, I know that my colleagues, 
regardless of their political affiliation, are honorable men and women 
who care about their respective States and our Nation. They are also 
courageous. It is not easy putting your reputation and privacy on the 
line to run for public office at any level. Unfortunately, the negative 
perception persists. I believe that one of the reasons for that is the 
trend in today's campaigns to attack, attack, and attack, to go 
negative early and stay negative until the votes are counted. As 
Senator Danforth noted, legislation requiring the candidate himself to 
present ads that reference his opponent would serve the purpose, ``to 
open up speech, open up the ability to respond, the ability to defend 
oneself. In the case of a candidate making a negative attack, we try to 
improve the sense of responsibility and accountability by making it 
clear that the candidate who makes the attack should appear with his 
own face, with his own voice.''
  I believe that the amendment I am discussing today, just like the 
legislation by Senators McCain and Feingold, will begin the process of 
restoring the confidence of the American people in public service as an 
honorable endeavor and in the election process as one where ideas and 
platforms, not the candidate's personalities, are debated.
  Mr. President, I would again like to commend my colleagues Senators 
McCain and Feingold for their commitment to bringing this legislation 
to the floor of the Senate and I hope that we will all vote tomorrow to 
allow debate and votes on amendments and the underlying legislation. 
The American people deserve nothing less.
  Mr. FRIST. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the important issue of 
campaign finance reform. I applaud the efforts of my colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle for bringing this issue to the forefront of our 
public policy debate.
  The sole objective of any serious campaign finance reform must be to 
open up the political process--to make it easier for more Americans to 
get involved, to have more competitive races, to increase the free 
exchange of ideas and debate, and to make our elections more reflective 
of the will of the people.
  To that end, I strongly support the following steps and believe they 
are a sound foundation for campaign finance reform:
  First, we should insist on full disclosure of all campaign spending, 
by candidates, parties and nonparties alike. Currently, many special 
interest groups have a huge impact on elections yet are not required to 
and don't disclose anything about their political spending. Full and 
fair disclosure will let the voters weigh the relative influence of all 
who participate in the process.
  Second, we should place PAC's and individuals on an even footing by 
increasing the individual contribution limit to $5,000 and indexing it 
for inflation. This will reduce both the influence of PAC's and the 
amount of time elected officials must spend fundraising;
  Third, we should ban the use of franked mass mailings by incumbents 
in the calendar year of an election--although I would ban them 
completely; and
  Fourth, we should require candidates to raise a stated percentage, 
for example 60 percent, of their individual contributions from people 
residing within their home States.
  The first amendment is the starting point for any discussion of 
campaign finance reform. It ensures that, among other things, citizens 
can participate in politics through publicly disclosed contributions to 
the campaigns of their own choosing. It also permits citizens to spend 
their own hard-earned dollars, independent of any candidate, to 
influence elections via letters to the editors of their local papers, 
pamphlets, and even television, radio, and newspaper advertisements. 
This is a precious right to Americans. It sets us apart from many other 
countries.
  Many, however, believe that we spend too much money on this first 
amendment right. Yet, given the importance of such speech, it is 
surprising to find that in the 1994 House and Senate races, said to be 
among the most expensive ever, we spent roughly $3.74 per eligible 
voter. According to columnist George Will, this is about half as much 
as Americans spend annually on yogurt.
  Simply put, Mr. President, the amount of money spent in campaigns 
should not be the focus of our debate--that is not the problem. Let a 
well-informed public, not a Federal bureaucrat, decide whether a 
candidate has spent too much in a campaign or has accepted too much 
from a particular source. I believe there are significant negative 
consequences to current efforts to reduce campaign spending. First, 
significant restrictions on the amount of money that can be spent by a 
candidate will reduce the amount of information available to voters. 
Less information means a less-informed electorate. That is the opposite 
of what we want to accomplish. More importantly, spending limits on 
candidates will merely increase the influence and power of special 
interests because they are not subject to spending limits and aren't 
required to disclose their election financing efforts.

  Second, limits on campaign spending would overwhelmingly benefit 
incumbents. Congressional spending limits are subject to manipulation 
that sets the spending threshold just below the amount that the 
challenger must spend to have a legitimate shot at defeating the 
incumbent. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration, Capital University law professor, Bradley A. Smith, 
said that in the 1994 Senate elections, the successful challengers 
spent more than would be allowed under the legislation currently being 
debated by this body, S. 1219. Thus, the spending limits proposed in S. 
1219 would have worked to the incumbent's advantage in each case. 
Overall, every 1994 Senate challenger who spent less than the ceiling 
set in S. 1219 lost; every incumbent who spent less than that ceiling 
won.
  Finally, spending limits reduce the ability of campaigns to speak 
directly to the voters, without the filter of the media. The news media 
does play a critical role in the election process, but further 
increasing their control over the flow of political information is not 
positive reform.
  Similarly, a limitation on contributions, like spending limits, is 
inherently biased in favor of incumbents. Incumbents with high name 
recognition and existing voter data bases are able to raise necessary 
campaign dollars, in small amounts, with far more ease than no-name 
challengers. Therefore, challengers must look to a small number of 
large contributors to launch a campaign. This initial seed capital is 
essential for challengers to get their name and message out to the 
voters. The limits on contributions imposed by the 1974 amendments to 
the FECA have limited the ability of challengers to raise seed capital.
  I believe that further restrictions on contributions will force 
candidates to spend more time fundraising and less time meeting voters 
and discussing the issues. Contribution limits are a significant cause 
of the drain that fundraising has become on a candidate's time. 
Instead, I favor placing PAC's and individuals on an even footing. The 
existing $1,000 limit placed on individuals should be raised to 
$5,000--the same level as PAC's--and indexed for inflation. The $1,000 
contribution limit established by FECA in 1974, had it kept pace with 
inflation, would be worth approximately $3,000 today. Raising the 
individual contribution limit will help level the playing field between 
challengers and incumbents. It will put individuals on an even par with 
PAC's, reduce the time candidates need to spend raising campaign funds, 
and reduce the emphasis on a candidate's personal wealth.
  Yesterday and today, I've heard the arguments concerning other 
aspects of the current legislation before us, namely provisions that 
mandate free air time and greatly reduced postage rates to candidates. 
I am opposed to those provisions, however good intentioned

[[Page S6794]]

they are, because they would place a greater burden for funding Federal 
campaigns on the backs of American taxpayers.
  Proposals to force American businesses to give away their products 
free of charge are misplaced and run counter to a free-market society. 
Accordingly, I oppose attempts to mandate that private broadcasters be 
forced to give free air time to candidates. Similarly, allowing deep 
discounts in postal rates is merely a subsidy paid for by the general 
taxpayers. These are not sound reforms.
  As I mentioned earlier, strong campaign finance reform should also 
mandate the complete and full disclosure of all funds that unions and 
other special interest groups spend for political activity. This is a 
critical point. We cannot outlaw special interest money, but the 
potential penalties for accepting it can be raised via the court of 
public opinion.
  We are all aware of the current multimillion dollar effort by 
organized labor to spend upward of $35 million to try and buy back 
control of the House for the Democrats. They are getting the money for 
this massive, partisan campaign through compulsory union dues, even 
though 40 percent of their membership voted for Republicans in 1994.
  No union member should be forced to make compulsory campaign 
contributions to support any candidate or issue unless they freely 
choose to do so. That is the foundation for our constitutional form of 
government and the first amendment freedoms we enjoy as citizens. To be 
forced, as a condition of employment to do otherwise, is wrong.
  As unfair as this is to union members, it is even more poisonous to 
our political process. There is no disclosure or reporting of the 
sources or the expenditures paying for these activities. Under current 
law, the unions are not required to file and do not file any disclosure 
to report these political expenditures. This should be changed.
  In closing, I would like to quote a section of the 1976 decision by 
the Supreme Court in the Buckley versus Valeo decision:

       In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not 
     the government, but the people--individually as citizens and 
     candidates and collectively as associations and political 
     committees--who must retain control over the quantity and 
     range of debate on public issues in a political campaign.

  Our system is not perfect, and we do need meaningful campaign finance 
reform. But, placing artificial limits on spending sends the opposite 
message of what we should be saying. We should not drive spending 
control away from candidates and parties and to special interests. We 
should not enact reforms that will result in less information to the 
public. We should open up the system to allow for maximum dissemination 
of information and maximum exchange of ideas and debate. I intend to 
work toward this type of campaign finance reform, and I urge my 
colleagues to do likewise.
  Mr. BAUCUS. Mr. President, I rise in support of the important 
campaign finance reform legislation that is before us today.
  I support this legislation because I believe it represents the right 
kind of change. While not a perfect solution, it will help put our 
political process back where it belongs: with the people. And it will 
take power away from the wealthy special interests that all too often 
call the shots in our political system.
  Yet, ironically, by failing to act; by failing to pass this 
legislation; we will also be opening the door to change--the wrong kind 
of change. Our political system will continue to drift in the dangerous 
direction of special interest.
  Over the years since 1971, when Congress last enacted campaign 
finance reform, special interest groups supporting both political 
parties have found creative new ways, some of questionable legality, to 
get around the intent of our campaign finance laws. Things like soft 
money, independent expenditures, and political action committees all 
came about as a consequence of very well-intended attempts at campaign 
finance reform.


                            Need for Reform

  This is an arcane subject, but it hits home. One of the benefits to 
walking across Montana, in addition to the beautiful scenery, is that I 
hear what real people in Montana think. Average folks who do not get 
paid to fly to Washington and tell elected officials what they think. 
Folks who work hard, play by the rules, and are still struggling to get 
by.
  People are becoming more and more cynical about government. Over and 
over, people tell me they think that Congress cares more about fat cat 
special interests in Washington than the concerns of middle class 
families like theirs, or that Congress is corrupt.


                       Effect on the Middle Class

  Middle-class families are working longer and harder for less. They 
have seen jobs go overseas. Health care expenses rise. The possibility 
of a college education for their kids diminished. Their hope for a 
secure retirement evaporate. Today, many believe that to make the 
American dream a reality, you have to be born rich or win the lottery. 
Part of restoring that dream is restoring confidence that the political 
system works on their behalf, not just on behalf of wealthy special 
interests.
  I believe that this Congress has taken some small but important steps 
in that direction:
  First, we passed a tough, fair gift ban to ensure that special 
interests are not out wining and dining Members of Congress and 
executive branch officials. Helping to reassure folks that individuals 
in Government, whether you agree with their policies or not, are acting 
in what they sincerely believe is the country's best interest. I am 
proud to say that my office has taken this one step further--and 
instituted a tougher than required gift ban--months before the Congress 
voted.
  Second, we passed a comprehensive lobbying disclosure bill--
eliminating the cloak of secrecy which lobbyists once operated under, 
by requiring greater disclosure of lobbying activities by both the 
individuals conducting and contracting the lobbying.
  Now it is time for us to take the real step to win-back the public 
trust--it is time for us to pass a tough, fair, and comprehensive 
campaign finance reform bill. That bill must accomplish three things. 
First, it must be strong enough to encourage the majority if not all 
candidates for Federal office to participate. Second, it must contain 
the spiraling cost of campaign spending in this country. Finally, and 
most importantly, it must control the increasing amounts of undisclosed 
and unreported soft-money that is polluting our electoral system.


                 REFORM MUST REDUCE COSTS OF CAMPAIGNS

  Under the current campaign system, the average cost of running for a 
Senate seat in this country is $4 million. In 1994, nearly $35 million 
was spent between two general election candidates in California. And 
nearly $27 million was spent in the Virginia Senate race.
  There are some in Congress, I believe House Speaker Newt Gingrich is 
one, who say we do not spend enough on campaigns in this country.
  When a candidate is faced with the daunting task of raising $12,000 a 
week--every week--for 6 years to meet the cost of an average campaign, 
qualified people will be driven away from the process. If we allow 
ideas to take a back seat to a candidate's ability to raise money--
surely our democracy is in danger.
  Let me be clear--my first choice would simply be to control campaign 
costs by enacting campaign spending limits. However, the Supreme Court, 
in Buckley versus Valeo, made what I believe was a critical mistake--
they equated money with free speech--preventing Congress from setting 
reasonable State-by-State spending limits that everyone would have to 
abide by.
  I have voted several times to overturn the Buckley decision and allow 
Congress to set limits that everyone would have to obey.


                       WHAT'S RIGHT WITH THE BILL

  While I must admit this bill is not perfect, compromise never is, it 
will do several crucial things to reign in campaign spending. First is, 
that it is the first bipartisan approach to campaign finance reform in 
more than a decade.
  Second, the bill establishes a system that does not rely on taxpayers 
dollars to work effectively.
  The bill encourages campaigns to accept a voluntary spending limit in 
exchange for free and reduced cost access to television advertising, 
and postal rates.
  Last, the bill bans both PAC contributions, and indirect soft-money 
campaign spending, while at the same

[[Page S6795]]

time increasing disclosure and accountability in political advertising.
  Every election year, in addition to the millions of dollars in 
disclosed contributions, there are the hundreds of millions in 
unreported, undisclosed contributions spent by independent expenditure 
campaigns and issue advocacy funded by soft-money contributions to 
national political parties.
  Where out-of-State special interest groups can spend any amount of 
money they choose, none of which is disclosed, all in the name of 
educating voters--when, in fact, their only purpose is to influence the 
outcome of an election. More times than not the seesawing 30-second 
sound bites do more to confuse than to educate.
  This lack of accountability is dangerous to our democracy. These 
independent expenditure campaigns can say whatever they wish for or 
against a candidate, and there is little that candidate can do--short 
of spending an equal or greater amount of money to refute what are 
often gross distortions and character assasinations.
  However, as I said earlier, the bill is not perfect. As currently 
written, it fails to address critical issues in campaign reform.


                      What's Wrong with this Bill

  I am concerned that this bill forces an unfunded mandate on 
television broadcasters by requiring them to donate up to 30 minutes of 
free prime time advertising air time to each candidate who abides with 
the limits in the bill. While I believe this free and reduced cost air 
time is critical to encouraging campaigns to accept spending limits, I 
don't believe that broadcasters should be forced to bear the entire 
burden.
  I'm pleased that the sponsors have included language to provide 
broadcasters with an exemption in the case of economic hardship, 
however, it is my belief that we should do more.
  Last, but perhaps most importantly, this bill does not contain the 
strong enough enforcement provisions that are critical to ensure that 
individuals who promise to abide by the spending limits don't dump 
large sums of money into the campaign weeks or even days before the 
election.
  Since 1985 I have fought to limit the spiraling cost of Federal 
elections in this country by cosponsoring five different campaign 
finance reform proposals, as well as supporting efforts to amend the 
Constitution to allow the Congress to set reasonable spending limits.
  I remain committed to this cause and will do everything in my power 
to ensure that the Congress passes meaningful campaign finance reform, 
this year.
  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, those who follow campaign finance reform 
are well aware of my thoughts on this issue. I have long advocated four 
very straightforward and specific changes in reforms in campaign 
finance law:
  First, a flat-out prohibition on House and Senate candidates raising 
money outside their home State;
  Second, the abolition of PAC's as we know them;
  Third, the creation of a strong disincentive to super-wealthy 
candidates throwing masses of family money into a campaign;
  Fourth, the elimination of ``soft-money:'' contributions to political 
parties for activities such as voter registration drives and political 
advertising which indirectly--but intentionally--help one particular 
candidate;
  I am pleased to see that this year's legislation includes campaign 
finance reform ideas I initiated many years ago, specifically, a 
limitation on the amount of personal or family funds a wealthy 
candidate may contribute to his or her own race; and a limitation on 
the acceptance of out-of-State contributions.
  Unfortunately, this year's legislation also includes deeply 
problematic provisions. These provisions, so called voluntary 
restrictions on spending, are based on the premise that spending caps 
are the solution to the problems with our campaign system.
  The taxpayers will end up helping finance these campaigns because by 
accepting spending caps under this bill, candidates would receive steep 
discounts from the Federal Government in postal rates, as well as from 
television and radio broadcasters for advertising time. In addition, 
once candidates exceed voluntary spending limits, the Federal Election 
Commission [FEC] would raise the contribution limits for the opponents 
of these candidates.
  These spending caps threaten first amendment free speech rights. 
Moreover, these voluntary spending limits create burdensome new 
regulatory responsibilities and powers for the FEC. If enacted, the 
legislation before us today will create a quagmire of regulations 
making Federal campaigns even more dependent upon professional campaign 
strategists and lawyers, and less dependent upon, and more distant 
from, our constituents.
  For these reasons, while I firmly believe that we need campaign 
finance reform, I cannot support today's proposed legislation in its 
current form.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to S. 1219, the Senate 
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1996.
  There are several major campaign finance proposals that are now being 
considered by the Congress. I am pleased to offer my views on each of 
them.
  The most far-reaching campaign finance reform proposals involve the 
taxpayer financing of congressional campaigns. I do not favor that 
approach. I do not think that liberal Democratic taxpayers should be 
forced to finance my political campaigns any more than conservative 
Republican taxpayers should be forced to finance the campaigns of 
liberal Democratic politicians.
  Other campaign finance proposals have sought to place limits on how 
much money campaigns can spend. Such proposals raise serious 
constitutional questions. In the case of Buckley versus Valeo, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional for Congress to limit 
the ability of individual candidates to spend their own money to 
finance their own political campaigns. How is it fair, then, for 
Congress to limit the ability of candidates who are not wealthy to 
raise campaign money? If wealthy candidates can spend all of the money 
that they want while candidates of modest means cannot, then we will 
soon have a Congress made up almost exclusively of wealthy individuals.
  Still another approach is that which is embodied by S. 1219. Under 
the McCain-Feingold bill, voluntary campaign spending limits would be 
adopted and candidates who complied with those limits would be provided 
with free and-or sharply reduced rates of advertising by the news 
media. I do not favor this approach because I do not think that 
Congress should compel private entities to offer their services at 
below-market rates. Therefore, I simply cannot support this bill.
  The McCain-Feingold bill, as well as others, also proposes the 
elimination of political action committees [PAC's]. I have voted for 
this reform in the past.
  I believe that the best way to reform our system of campaign finance 
is to find ways in which to encourage more participation by small 
donors. I am proud to say that in my political campaigns over the 
years, I have been supported by many thousands of small contributors.
  I also strongly support the current system under which congressional 
campaigns must disclose the sources and amounts of financial 
contributions from all entities--large and small. I believe that the 
public has a right to this information.
  I believe that a responsible and meaningful package of campaign 
finance reform legislation can and should be developed and passed by 
the Congress. I support that effort.
  Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to express my concerns 
regarding S. 1219, the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1996, and to 
explain my vote against the cloture petition.
  Let me begin by stating that I support campaign finance reform. 
However, the reform we need is not to be found in S. 1219. In my view, 
the biggest problem with the way our political campaigns are financed 
is that it gives rise to the perception that special interest donations 
are dominating the political agenda. Indeed, many Americans believe 
that special interest money is the source of great corruption in our 
political campaign system.
  While we should try to address this problem statutorily, I feel it is 
unnecessary to wait for legislation before those of us concerned act. 
To that end, when I ran for the Senate in Michigan in 1994, I 
personally imposed my own limits on the amounts I would accept

[[Page S6796]]

from both out-of-State sources and political action committees, and 
they were as strong or stronger than those in S. 1219. I lived up to 
that pledge and still won my seat.
  Now I recognize that not everyone will disarm unilaterally, so I do 
believe we must seek to achieve a similar outcome legislatively. 
Unfortunately, S. 1219 is overly broad and, if anything, likely to tilt 
the field even further in the direction of special interest influence.
  In my view the central question we must address in reforming campaign 
financing is ``whose voice shall be heard during the campaign?'' The 
proposals set forth in S. 1219 would have the ironic effect of limiting 
the speech of the candidate while expanding the speech of the special 
interest groups. The proposed legislation would encourage candidates to 
abide by certain expenditure limits, thereby restricting their ability 
to communicate with the voters. Conversely, the legislation does little 
to curb the ability of special interest groups to spend their money 
independently of any restrictions. This allows interest groups to 
define the central issues of the campaign. It forces candidates to 
follow the lead of these interest groups, preventing the voters from 
hearing directly from the candidates and judging for themselves which 
candidate has the proper positions and the proper priorities.
  I believe that the solution begins with limiting the amount of out-
of-State/district contributions and PAC donations as I did in my own 
campaign. By limiting out-of-State/district contributions we can 
address the perception that House and Senate Members are not primarily 
focused on the priorities of their own constituents. Similarly, by 
placing a limit on the amount of PAC contributions a candidate may 
receive, we can address the concern that public officials are unduly 
influenced by special interest groups.
  Mr. President, I am also concerned about provisions in S. 1219 which 
shift resources from the private sector to the candidates. These 
provisions, in effect, allow candidates to do as they please with other 
people's involuntarily extracted money. The idea that taxpayers, 
through special postage rates, should subsidize complying campaigns, 
seems to me wrong. And, just as the taxpayers should not be obligated 
to finance someone else's political speech I feel it inappropriate to 
extract such subsidies from the owners of broadcast entities.
  Mr. President, I believe that campaign finance reform should focus on 
limiting PAC and out-of-State/district money. I have codified these 
limits in my own campaign finance reform bill which I believe has the 
effect of permitting candidates to speak freely while curbing the 
influence of special interest and out-of-State moneys. In contrast, S. 
1219 permits the increased influence of special interest money while 
curbing candidates' ability to communicate with the voters. For these 
reasons, I have voted against cloture and look forward to advancing my 
own legislation in the future.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I have just been handed two very timely 
additions to this debate: an editorial in today's Wall Street Journal 
entitled ``Muzzling Campaign Speech'' and a letter dated today from the 
American Civil Liberties Union noting in some detail their many 
objections to the McCain-Feingold bill.
  I would note for the benefit of those who persist in 
mischaracterizing the proposed spending limits as ``voluntary'' that 
the first point in the ACLU letter is the emphatic assertion that they, 
in fact, are not. The bill would severely handicap a noncomplying 
candidate relative to a complying candidate so there really would be no 
choice other than to comply. At this point, I ask unanimous consent 
that the ACLU letter and the Wall Street Journal article be printed in 
the Record. For the benefit of colleagues who have not yet read the 
editorial I would note that the closing sentence captures the essence 
of the bill before us today: ``The Senate should vote down the McCain-
Feingold bill before it does to American democracy what Clinton-Care 
would have done to medicine.''
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1996]

                        Muzzling Campaign Speech

       Some 20 years after Congress first restricted campaign 
     speech, the Senate will vote today on a campaign finance 
     proposal that suggests the way to correct the problems those 
     misguided ``reforms'' have created is with more restrictions. 
     We don't think so.
       To the government goo-goos, led by Common Cause, money is 
     the root of all evil in politics and should be pulled out 
     regardless of the cost or the Constitution. They have 
     convinced GPO Senator John McCain and Democrat Russ Feingold 
     to propose a bill that would pass out subsidies for low-cost 
     mail and television advertising to candidates who abide by 
     ``voluntary'' spending limits. This is public financing under 
     another guise. Subsidizing the mailing of more campaign 
     literature alone could cost $100 million, money the Postal 
     Service would have to recover by raising rates for other 
     customers.
       Having created a permanent entitlement to cut-rate campaign 
     ads, the goo-goos would then ban contributions from political 
     action committees. Advocacy organizations from Emily's List 
     on the left to the Christian Coalition on the right would see 
     their activities scrutinized by the Federal Election 
     Commission, which lately has seen one after another of its 
     edicts struck down by the courts.
       In 1976 the Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo that 
     political contributions and spending are the equivalent of 
     political speech. Giving the FEC more control over politics 
     will limit speech. The McCain-Feingold bill would cede 
     authority to the FEC over any ``expression of support for or 
     opposition to a specific candidate'' and permit it to block 
     such expression with an injunction if the agency believes 
     there is a ``substantial likelihood that a violation . . . is 
     about to occur.'' The prospect of this enhanced federal power 
     had driven groups as disparate as the American Civil 
     Liberties Union and the American Nurses' Association to 
     oppose the bill.
       The desire to police politics better by making the federal 
     government a meaner watchdog with a longer leash is based on 
     flawed premises. The first is that the influence of money in 
     politics is excessive and out of control. In fact, House and 
     Senate races, which unlike Presidential races don't rely 
     partly on public financing, saw about $700 million spent on 
     them in 1994. As George Will has pointed out, that's about 
     half of what Americans spend on yogurt every year.
       What is excessive in politics is not the money spent, but 
     the amount of political power that government in our time has 
     to direct economic outcomes and regulate behavior. Given that 
     Congress can either put whole industries at risk or hand them 
     a subsidized bonanza, what's surprising is that more money 
     isn't spent trying to influence the people running for 
     Congress. The reformers, especially inside the Beltway, give 
     the clear impression that the government is so indisputably 
     virtuous in its every mandate that private parties should bow 
     before it, rather than spend money to defend themselves, an 
     effort almost always seen by the Beltway as the work of non-
     virtuous ``special interests.''
       The second mistaken premise behind campaign reform is that 
     the country is clamoring for it. We're told, for instance, 
     that 1992 Perot voters will have the heads of elected 
     officials on a platter if they don't crack down on campaign 
     cash. But there is little evidence of that. A Tarrance Group 
     survey in April found that just one voter out of a thousand 
     identifies campaign reform as the country's most pressing 
     problem. Voters are justifiably skeptical of political 
     reforms proposed by incumbent politicians.
       This is not to say that nothing can be done. We are 
     attracted by the realistic ideas of Larry Sabato and Glenn 
     Simpson in their new book ``Dirty Little Secrets.'' They 
     conclude that individual limits on campaign contributions, 
     which haven't been indexed for inflation in 22 years, should 
     be raised and a regime of full disclosure on all political 
     spending should be created. That will let the voters both 
     hear from candidates other than incumbents and let them weigh 
     the relative influence of everyone participating in the 
     process.
       The current effort at campaign finance reform has a lot in 
     common with the failed Clinton health-care plan, which sought 
     to ``fix'' the problems created by government involvement in 
     health care by having the government micromanage the entire 
     health care sector. The Senate should vote down the McCain-
     Feingold bill before it does to American democracy what 
     ClintonCare would have done to medicine.
                                                                    ____



                               American Civil Liberties Union,

                                      New York, NY, June 25, 1996.
       Dear Senator:
       The American Civil Liberties Union had the privilege of 
     testifying before the Senate Rules Committee on February 1, 
     1996 and at that time we elucidated our objections to the 
     ``reform'' proposals set forth in the Feingold-McCain bill, 
     S. 1219. Throughout the current Senate debate, our opposition 
     has been repeatedly referenced. Rather than reiterate all of 
     our objections in detail in this letter, I encourage you to 
     read the testimony prepared on our behalf by Professor Joel 
     Gora, of the Brooklyn Law School.
       Congress is endeavoring to reform current campaign finance 
     laws and regulations in an effort to reduce the perceived 
     adverse impact of monetary contributions on federal 
     elections. The call for reform is also punctuated

[[Page S6797]]

     by cries of corruption. If there is corruption then Congress 
     does have the obligation to correct systemic problems, and to 
     ensure that the Federal Election Commission is exercising 
     fair and consistent enforcement of the existing laws. But 
     influence is not synonymous with corruption, and labeling 
     certain monetary contributions as such perpetuates notions of 
     corruption that have not been, in our view, adequately borne 
     out by the hearings before the Senate Rules Committee.
       While rooting out corruption is a worthwhile objective, S. 
     1219 goes much further than merely attempting to eliminate 
     perceived corruption. Current proposals before the Senate 
     dramatically change the rules concerning financing of federal 
     campaigns in ways that do greater harm to civic participation 
     in the federal electoral process than good. Most importantly 
     S. 1219 directly violates First Amendment guarantees of 
     freedom of speech and freedom of association.
       Some of our specific objections to the Feingold-McCain (S. 
     1219) and similar proposals include:
       The bill's ``voluntary'' expenditure limits are coercive 
     and violate First Amendment principles. The bill requires the 
     receipt of public subsidies to be conditioned by a 
     surrendering of the constitutional right to unlimited 
     campaign expenditures. The bill grants postage and 
     broadcasting discounts only those candidates that 
     ``volunteer'' for spending limits. The bill raises an 
     individual's contribution limit from $1,000 to $2,000 for 
     those candidates that agree to spending limitations and 
     therefore fiscally punishes those candidates who wish to 
     maintain their constitutional right of unlimited spending.
       The bill's ban of Political Action Committees are a 
     violation of freedom of association and is therefore 
     unconstitutional. Such a provision would result in a 
     restriction in protected speech for any group the Federal 
     Election Committee deemed a ``political committee.'' All 
     relevant constitutional precedent, including Buckley v. Valeo 
     424 U.S. 1, 57 (1976) and FEC v. National Conservative 
     Political Action Committee 470 U.S. 480 (1985), clearly 
     suggest that the Supreme Court would overturn such a ban.
       The limitation on out-of-state contributions is 
     constitutionally suspect and is disturbingly insular. In-
     state limitations potentially deny underfinanced, lesser-
     known insurgent candidates of the kind of out-of-state 
     support they may need. As long as citizens in the affected 
     district are the ones who select the candidate, how the 
     candidate is financed is a less compelling concern. After 
     all, Congress is our national legislature, and although its 
     representatives are elected from separate districts and 
     states, the issues it debates and votes on are of concern to 
     citizens from all over the nation.
       The bill's disclosure requirements and regulations on 
     ``soft money'' do not take into consideration the 
     constitutional divide between candidate-focused expenditures 
     and contributions, which are subject to some regulation, and 
     all other non-partisan, political and issue-oriented speech, 
     which are not. This restriction does not live up to the 
     ``most compelling government interest'' standard in regards 
     to electoral advocacy as required by the Supreme Court in 
     Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 78-80. This restriction 
     also does not satisfy the minimum scrutiny of a 
     ``compelling'' state interest in the regulation of political 
     parties as required by the Supreme Court in Tashjian v. 
     Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
       The bill's new provisions governing the right to make 
     independent expenditures unconstitutionally invades the 
     absolutely protected area of issue advocacy. By broadening 
     the definition of ``express advocacy'' the bill would 
     encompass the kind of essential issue advocacy which Buckley 
     has held to be completely immune from government regulation 
     and control.
       The bill so broadly defines ``coordination'' that virtually 
     an individual who has had any interaction with a candidate or 
     any campaign officials, in person or otherwise, is barred 
     from making an independent expenditure. A disaffected 
     campaign worker or volunteer for example, who leaves the 
     campaign because he or she thinks a candidate has acted 
     improperly, is barred from making independent expenditures 
     against the candidate, for, ironically, they will be deemed a 
     contribution.
       The bill gives unacceptable new powers of political 
     censorship to the Federal Election Commission. The FEC would 
     be permitted to go to court and seek an injunction on the 
     allegation of a ``substantial likelihood that a violation . . 
     . is about to occur.'' This is fraught with First Amendment 
     peril because individuals and groups will face ``gag orders'' 
     until a determination of wrongdoing is made.
       This bill serves the purpose of unfairly protecting 
     incumbency by further limiting the overall amount of speech 
     allowed during a campaign. A limitation in the quantity of 
     speech makes the incumbent's name recognition and ability to 
     create free press and media attention all the more valuable.
       This bill unfairly hinders access to the political process 
     of independent and third party candidates by limiting access 
     to public financing and avenues for receiving private 
     donations.
       Constitutionally acceptable campaign finance reform 
     proposals could include the following elements:
       Uncoerced public financing that include the following 
     provisions: Floors or foundations upon which candidates can 
     build their campaigns, not ceilings to limit them, the 
     availability of public financing to all legally qualified 
     candidates who have demonstrated an objective measure of 
     support, the availability of matching funds without 
     unconstitutional conditions attached, institution of the 
     frank to all legally qualified federal candidates.
       Raise individual contribution limits. This will serve to 
     decrease reliance on PAC sources of support.
       Modest tax credits of up to $500 for private political 
     contributions.
       Public access and timely disclosure of large contributions. 
     This is the most appropriate way to deal with problems of 
     undue influence on elected officials.
       Thank you for your consideration of our views.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Laura W. Murphy,
                                                         Director.
  Mr. FAIRCLOTH. Mr. President, first and most importantly, I strongly 
support reform of our campaign finance system. Regrettably, there are 
several broad problems with McCain-Feingold bill.
  First, I have serious concerns that this bill does more to limit the 
rights under the First Amendment, than it does to reform our campaign 
finance laws. It bans political action committee contributions--but it 
does nothing to empower the individual by raising individual campaign 
contribution limits.
  Second, as we have come to learn, it is impossible to plug all of the 
money loopholes in politics. This legislation bans outside expenditures 
by political action committees and other interest groups, yet it does 
nothing to limit the use of labor union dues for political purposes.
  Finally, there are unintended consequences of well-intentioned 
reform. After all, the present system we are attempting to change is a 
product of earlier ``reforms'' from the post Watergate years.
  Mr. President, specifically, I have concerns that spending limits 
function as an incumbent protection act. Further, the spending limits 
aid those without a primary. Look at the recent Presidential election. 
Senator Dole spent the maximum to get the GOP nomination--and is now 
virtually out of money with respect to the spending limits.
  If we really want to change our system, we should have enacted term 
limits. Members of Congress should be more concerned with the next 
generation than the next election but the constant pressure of re-
election affects votes and contributions.
  Mr. President, any reform system should be tilted more in favor of 
public disclosure of campaign contributions. The Federal Election 
Commission's main mission should be to publicize campaign finance 
information to the people.
  Finally, contributions limits from individuals should be adjusted to 
keep pace with inflation. The declining value in real dollars of the 
maximum contribution from an individual to a Federal candidate is now 
worth only about a third as much as when it went into affect in 1975. 
This change would lessen reliance on political action committee 
contributions and shorten the time candidates must spend asking for 
money.
  Remember, State candidates in North Carolina can accept $4,000 
contributions per election while Federal candidates can only receive 
$1,000. Adjusting the contribution limits for individuals coupled with 
greater disclosure would be a significant improvement.
  For this reason, Mr. President, I cannot support the McCain-Feingold 
bill in its present fashion. We share the goal of reforming the 
campaign finance system but there is a difference in the details. My 
suggestion for reform includes term limits, greater public disclosure 
of contributions, and increasing the limits on contributions from 
individuals to lessen reliance on political action committees.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, to make concluding remarks, and later 
Senator McCain will make other concluding remarks, let me again clarify 
the point about constitutionality. The Senator from Virginia said 
clarity of conscience prevents him from working for this bill because 
of the PAC ban. But the fact is the Senator from Kentucky and the 
Senator from Virginia and the Senator from Washington all voted for the 
Pressler amendment 3 years ago that does exactly what our

[[Page S6798]]

bill does. It bans PAC's, but if the courts say PAC's cannot be banned, 
it has a voluntary limit on PAC's. The reason they voted for it then, 
the reason it is OK now, is because it is constitutional, and this is a 
red herring.
  The real issue here is what this vote is going to be. This is the 
vote on campaign finance reform. I admire the candor of the Senator 
from Kentucky, who simply says he wants to kill campaign finance reform 
this session. He is not up here proposing an alternative. He admits 
that is his goal. That is the vote.
  This is the first bipartisan bill in 10 years. Who will benefit from 
this bill? Many people will benefit. Incumbents will benefit from 
having more time to work on the issues, to not have their fractured 
attention, as the Senator from West Virginia indicated. Challengers 
will be the main beneficiaries. Just look at the real statistics. 
Incumbents blow challengers out of the water with the money. Does 
anyone out there believe this bill would actually help incumbents? I 
can tell you as a former challenger, this bill would have made a 
tremendous difference and would have made the process more fair.
  We would also benefit in this country from the inclusion of all the 
people who never choose to run. You heard the Senator from West 
Virginia say he never would have run for office if it would have 
involved this amount of money. I bet the former majority leader, 
Senator Dole, would not have run either. So there will be winners under 
this bill and especially people back home.
  But there will be losers under this bill. The losers are the people 
who got together on April 30, all the lobbyists and all the PAC's in 
this town that have been cited by the other side. They all got together 
to kill this bill. They said it would prevent their free speech. But 
the fact is, they are the Washington gatekeepers. They are the people 
you have to go up to when you are running for office and say, ``Will 
you give us the money?''
  I used to go back and say to a banker in Wisconsin or a labor member 
in Wisconsin, ``Can you provide us with some help?'' Do you know what 
they would say? ``We have to check in with Washington. Washington has 
to say yes.'' This bill will drive people back to their own home States 
and take away the power from the gatekeepers.
  How does it work? I mentioned it before. Here is one example. Here is 
a letter about how it works, and I will omit the name of the 
Representative.

       During this year's congressional debate on dairy policy, 
     Representative [Blank] has led the charge for dairy farmers 
     and cooperatives by supporting the federation's efforts to 
     maintain the milk marketing order program and expand 
     program markets abroad. To honor his leadership the 
     federation is hosting a fundraising breakfast for [Blank] 
     on Wednesday, December 6, 1995. To show your appreciation 
     to [Blank], please show up at Le Mistral Restaurant at 8 
     a.m. for an enjoyable breakfast with your dairy 
     colleagues. PAC's throughout industry are asked to 
     contribute $1,000.

  That is how it is done in this town. That is what the gatekeepers 
want to keep, and that is what we have to crack down on and eliminate.
  To make my final remarks, let me say this thing has just gotten worse 
year after year. I want to finish by reading a few quotations from 
people who have been troubled about this over time. Woodrow Wilson:

       The Government of the United States is a foster child of 
     the special interests. It is not allowed to have a will of 
     its own.

  President Eisenhower:

       Many believe politics in our country is already a game 
     exclusively for the affluent. This is not strictly true; yet 
     the fact that we may be approaching that state of affairs is 
     a sad reflection on our elective system.

  From Barry Goldwater:

       It is not ``We, the people,'' but political action 
     committees and moneyed interests who are setting the Nation's 
     political agenda and are influencing the position of 
     candidates on the important issues of the day.

  From Jack Kemp, explaining why he would not run for President in 
1996:

       There are a lot of grotesqueries in politics, not the least 
     of which is the fundraising side. . .. I don't seem to be 
     talking about the things that the fundraising people want me 
     to talk about.

  Finally, from Robert F. Kennedy, who said:

       The mounting cost of elections is rapidly becoming 
     intolerable for a democratic society, where the right to 
     vote--and to be a candidate--is the ultimate political 
     protection. For we are in danger of creating a situation in 
     which our candidates must be chosen only from among the rich, 
     the famous, or those willing to be beholden to others who 
     will pay the bills.

  Mr. President, what Robert Kennedy said over 30 years ago is even 
worse than he could have imagined today. What he feared has come to 
pass, and our bill would begin the process of returning campaigns and 
elections, and yes, our Government, back to the people at home.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 12 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I do not think there is any issue which 
we deal with that more clearly sums up the differences of the two 
parties toward American participation in politics than the issue of 
campaign finance reform.
  Make no mistake about it, Mr. President, this is a partisan issue. 
The Republican National Committee opposes the bill. The Democratic 
National Committee supports the bill. So there is nothing particularly 
bipartisan about the bill. There are a few Republicans who support it 
and a few Democrats who oppose it, but the heart of the matter is, this 
is a very partisan matter as currently presented to the Senate.
  Why is it partisan? It is partisan, Mr. President, because 
Republicans for the most part, accompanied by some interesting allies, 
from the ACLU to the National Education Association, believe there is 
nothing inappropriate about American citizens participating in the 
political process. We think that ought to be applauded, not condemned. 
We are not offended by those exercising their rights to petition the 
Congress, those exercising their right to engage in free speech. We do 
not think that is bad for America, Mr. President. We think it is good 
for America.
  Whether our opponents on the other side of the aisle like it or not, 
the Supreme Court has been very clear that the speech of political 
candidates cannot be restricted. Thank God for Buckley versus Valeo, 
one of the great decisions in the history of the Supreme Court.
  The speech of candidates should not be restricted. That is an 
extremely important principle, Mr. President. After all, if we make the 
candidates shut up and if we make the people who want to support them 
shut up, who controls the discourse, the debate? Why, someone else. 
Where will this transfer of power go? One place it will go, obviously, 
is to the newspapers, most of whom love this legislation because they 
realize it will enhance their power as the campaigns' power to 
communicate is diminished. So they think this is a terrific idea.
  Many of the large membership interest groups are not particularly 
worried about this legislation because they know you cannot 
constitutionally restrict their ability to communicate with their own 
members, what we call nonparty soft money, or in any real way restrict 
their ability to communicate with the public, what we call independent 
expenditures, both of which, or the latter of which is certainly 
protected by the Buckley case.
  So what this is all about, Mr. President, is who gets to speak and 
how much--who gets to speak and how much--and whether or not private 
citizens can continue to band together and support candidates of their 
choice.
  It is said that too much is spent, which means to say there is too 
much speech in the American political system. My view is that it is not 
inappropriate to ask, when you say too much is being spent--compared to 
what? In the last cycle we spent about as much on political speech as 
we did on bubble gum. Put another way, $3.74 per voter in the last 
cycle. I would argue, Mr. President, that is not too much political 
speech--not too much political speech.
  Then they say, the public is clamoring for this reform. A 
comprehensive poll by the Tarrance polling group back in April of 1996 
asked that question in a variety of different ways. Suffice it to say, 
one person out of the 1,000 interviewed thought this was an important 
issue confronting the country. There is no clamoring for this. The

[[Page S6799]]

interest in this all depends on how you ask the question. If you ask 
the question: Do you think it is a good idea to restrict my right to 
participate in the political process? Obviously, people are not in 
favor of that.
  There has been some debate about whether this is constitutional. Let 
me say maybe the other side has been able to scrape up a few people 
with a law degree calling this constitutional, but the heavies in this 
field do not think it is. The American Civil Liberties Union--sometimes 
we love them; sometimes we hate them, but, boy, do they know a lot 
about the first amendment and have had a lot of success over the years 
in this country. They believe this matter is clearly and unambiguously 
unconstitutional.

  Assuming it could get past the constitutional problems, Mr. 
President, pushing all these people out of the process and putting a 
speech limit on the campaigns, how would those speech limits be 
enforced? By, of course, the Federal Election Commission, which would 
soon be the size of the Veterans Administration trying to restrict the 
free speech of not only 535 additional political races, but also of a 
bunch of outsiders who might inadvertently band together and try to 
speak. So the FEC is given injunctive relief, so it can go into court 
and shut people up who are engaging in speech that the Government does 
not want to be expressed.
  That is what this bill is about--building a massive Federal 
bureaucracy to restrict the speech of candidates and of groups in this 
country. This is one of the worst ideas we have debated around here 
since the last time a proposal like this was up on the Senate floor.
  The Court said very clearly, if you want to try to entice campaigns 
into shutting up, and the Government wants to say it is not good for 
candidates to speak more than a certain amount--we see that in the 
Presidential system and the nightmare that has become. As Senator 
Gorton pointed out yesterday, there is only one person in America who 
is told to shut up at that point, and that is one of two candidates who 
is running for President, Bob Dole. That is what we ought to be 
reforming, the Presidential system.
  But the Court said, if you want to entice people into shutting up, 
not speaking too much, you can offer them some kind of subsidy, a 
Federal subsidy. So the Presidential system says to the candidates 
running for President: You can only raise $1,000 per person. So, when 
looking at that difficult task of trying to put together a nationwide 
campaign at $1,000 a person, every candidate virtually, except Ross 
Perot and John Connally, has said, ``OK. I'll shut up. You bought me 
off. There is no way I can possibly raise enough money to run at $1,000 
a person.'' Then they get the Federal subsidy.
  In this bill, in order to allow the sponsors to claim that there is 
no taxpayer money in it, they shift the subsidy to a couple of private 
industries. They say, we are going to call on the broadcasting industry 
to reduce the prices for political ads by 50 percent. What will happen? 
Why, of course, they will pass on the cost of that to all the other 
people advertising. So those taxpayers are going to have to pay more 
for their product because of the Government-mandated program.
  There is a second industry that is affected by this as well, Mr. 
President. That is the people who use the mails. There is a postal 
subsidy in here. The Postmaster General wrote me yesterday saying he 
opposed this. Of course, the Direct Marketing Association opposes this. 
Of course, the National Association of Broadcasters opposes this. They 
are not particularly interested in having to reach into the coffers of 
their businesses to pay for political views with which they might 
disagree.
  So getting back to the direct mail subsidy, the rates of everybody 
else who uses the Postal Service are going to be increased so a subsidy 
can be provided by those taxpayers to support the expression of views 
with which they may disagree.
  So, Mr. President, spending limits are not free. There is no way to 
concoct, under the Buckley case, any effort to shut people up that does 
not have some cost. You can shift it around and kind of claim it is not 
part of the Treasury. You can assess a business maybe. But they are not 
free.
  So what is wrong with this bill? Just about everything you can think 
of. It is based on the fallacious assumption that too much is being 
spent. It is based on the notion that the public is clamoring for it. 
Neither of those propositions is true. It assumes there is some way to 
level the political playing ground for everyone, which is impossible to 
achieve. It is unconstitutional, clearly and obviously. It would create 
a gargantuan Federal Election Commission with the mission to shut 
people up all across America. It would call upon two industries, the 
broadcast industry and the direct mail postal users, to pay for the 
price of all of this big Government.

  For all of these reasons, obviously, Mr. President, this bill should 
be defeated. The way to defeat this bill is to vote ``no'' on cloture.
  Mr. President, I have a variety of magazine articles that have come 
out against this bill, including Weekly Standard, the Wall Street 
Journal, Rollcall, the National Review, and the Baltimore Sun, and I 
ask unanimous consent that the editorials be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 16, 1995]

                      The Man Who Ruined Politics

       So Colin Powell is not running for President. Neither is 
     Jack Kemp, Bill Bradley, Dick Cheney, Sam Nunn or William 
     Bennett. Voters are left with the likely choice between two 
     rather tired war horses, Bill Clinton and Bob Dole. No other 
     Democrat is challenging an obviously vulnerable incumbent, 
     and Republican contenders such as Phil Gramm, Pat Buchanan 
     and Lamar Alexander hover in single digits. In this second 
     rank we now also have millionaire publisher Steve Forbes, who 
     started from nowhere to grab the first rung on the ladder. 
     And of course, billionaire Ross Perot still haunts the scene.
       If you don't like the remaining field, blame Fred 
     Wertheimer and Common Cause, the organization he until 
     recently ran and still animates, are the principal architects 
     of the cockamamie financial gauntlet we inflict on our 
     potential leaders. Common Cause is point-lobby for the goo-
     goos, that is, the earnest folks always trying to jigger the 
     rules to ensure good government. One of their conceits is 
     that money is the root of all political evil, so they seek 
     salvation in the Sisyphean task of eliminating its influence. 
     The chief result of this is a rule outlawing individual 
     political contributions of more than $1,000, and a 
     bureaucracy called the Federal Election Commission to count 
     angels on pinheads in deciding, for example, what counts as a 
     contribution.
       A serious Presidential campaign is likely to cost $20 
     million. This means a potential Presidential has to start by 
     persuading 20,000 different people to pony up a grand. Take 
     an arbitrary but probably generous hit rate of 5%, and he (or 
     she) has to pass the tin cup 400,000 times. Admittedly these 
     numbers oversimplify, but they give you the idea. Mr. 
     Wertheimer's brainstorm means fund-raising is so consuming 
     that candidates have no time for anything else. Even more 
     important, it is a process virtually designed to drain a 
     potential President of any residue of self-respect.
       This may not be the only thing General Powell means when he 
     says running requires a fire he does not yet feel, but it is 
     certainly a big one. His adviser Richard Armitage explicitly 
     said, ``Colin Powell going out and asking people for money 
     and then spending all that money wasn't attractive.'' Mr. 
     Kemp was similarly explicit in not wanting to undertake the 
     fund-raising exercise, and it no doubt inhibited Mr. Cheney 
     as well. On the Democratic side, finding 20,000 donors to 
     challenge an incumbent is an even more daunting challenge; 
     Senator Bradley and Senator Nunn decided to quit rather than 
     fight.
       It is no accident that the dropouts are precisely the types 
     the goo-goo crowd would like to keep in politics, which is to 
     say, those motivated by principle instead of sheer ambition. 
     In 1988, to take an earlier example, the exploratory field 
     included Don Rumsfield, who had been a Congressman, White 
     House Chief of Staff, Defense Secretary and a spectacularly 
     successful corporate chief executive. But he threw in the 
     towel rather than run up possibly unpayable debts--``as a 
     matter of principle, I will not run on a deficit.''
       The doleful effect of such limitations were entirely 
     predictable; indeed, they were predicted right here. As early 
     as 1976, when the Supreme Court partly upheld the 1974 
     Federal Election Campaign Act, we wrote that the law ``will 
     probably act like the Frankenstein's monster it truly is. It 
     will be awfully hard to kill, and the more you wound it, the 
     more havoc it will create.'' In the face of hard experience, 
     of course, the goo-goos prescribe more of the same, to the 
     point where ``campaign finance reform'' has become the Holy 
     Grail.
       To be fair, the Wertheimer coven hasn't had its way 
     entirely. The logic of the goo-goo impulse is public 
     financing of political campaigns, an idea mostly hooted down 
     by the same taxpayers who eagerly embrace term limits--though 
     in Presidential campaigns public finance serves as the carrot

[[Page S6800]]

     getting candidates to accept the FEC nit-picking. And the 
     Supreme Court, while backing away from the obvious conclusion 
     that limiting political expenditures is prima facie an 
     infringement of free speech, couldn't bring itself to say 
     someone can't spend his own money on his own campaign.
       Thus the millionaire's loophole. Mr. Perot was able to use 
     his billions to confuse the last Presidential elections, 
     going in, out and back in at will. So long as he doesn't 
     accept public money, he can spend as he likes.
       Mr. Forbes is an even more interesting case, since he was 
     chairman of Empower America, the political roost of both Mr. 
     Kemp and Mr. Bennett. Who would have guessed a year ago, the 
     latter asks, that the Empower America candidate would be 
     Steve Forbes. On the issues Mr. Forbes is perhaps an even 
     better candidate than his colleagues--backing term limits 
     where Mr. Kemp opposes them, for example--and without his 
     message his money wouldn't do much good. Still, to have a 
     better chance at ultimately winning, it would have been 
     logical for him to bankroll one of his better-known 
     colleagues. But that's against the law, thanks to Mr. 
     Wertheimer, so Mr. Forbes has to hit the stump himself.
       With widespread disaffection with the current field, and 
     especially in the wake of the Powell withdrawal, the lunacy 
     of the current rules is coming to be recognized. The emperor 
     has no clothes, think tank scholars are starting to say--
     notably Bradley A. Smith of the Cato Institute, whose views 
     were published here Oct. 6. Following Mr. Smith, Newt 
     Gingrich said last weekend we don't spend too much on 
     political campaigns but too little. This heresy was applauded 
     this week by columnist David Broder, which may herald a 
     breakthrough in goo-goo sentiment itself.
       Formidable special interests, of course, remain opposed to 
     change in the current rules. Notably political incumbents who 
     want campaigns kept as quiet as possible and have learned to 
     milk other special interests who want access. So rather than 
     having some maverick millionaire funding his pet candidate on 
     reasons that might relate to ideas and issues, we have all 
     parties funded by Dwayne Andreas and his sisters and his 
     cousins and his aunts, better to protect ethanol subsidies. 
     Finally, of course, we have Mr. Perot and his United We Stand 
     hell-bent for further restrictions on campaign finance, 
     better to protect the political process for billionaires like 
     himself.
       Not so, thankfully, Mr. Forbes, who sees campaign spending 
     limits as an incumbent protection device. He recently told an 
     Iowa audience, ``If Congress abolished the franking 
     privilege, then I'd be impressed.'' Lift the caps on giving 
     and spending, but make sure everything is disclosed, he says. 
     ``That's real reform.''
                                                                    ____


              [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1996]

                          Ruining Politics--II

       Not long ago these columns described how the crazy 
     campaign-finance reforms dreamed up by the likes of Fred 
     Wertheimer and Common Cause have been ruining politics. 
     Oregon voters just got another such lesson in their special 
     Senate election this week.
       Democrats are understandably pleased with their narrow 
     (less than 1% margin) victory, but so too are the Sierra 
     Club, the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), the Teamsters, 
     the gay and lesbian lobby, the public-employee unions, NARAL 
     (the abortion rights outfit), the National Council of Senior 
     Citizens and the AFL-CIO. All of these liberal groups weighed 
     in with what campaign finance laws call ``independent 
     expenditures'' on behalf of Democrat Ron Wyden. Call this the 
     Common Cause loophole.
       In the world of campaign reformers, money is the root of 
     all evil. So they spend their time denouncing candidates who 
     raise it for bending to ``special interests.'' Yet what the 
     reformers won't advertise is that there's nothing much they 
     can do about the special interests who decide to spend money 
     on their own.
       As they did to great effect in Oregon. The AFL says it 
     devoted 35 full-time professionals and sent out 350,000 
     pieces of partisan mail for the cause. The Sierra Club and 
     LCV spent $200,000 on 30,000 postcards, 100,000 telephone 
     calls and very tough TV and radio spots accusing Republican 
     Gordon Smith of ``voting against . . . groundwater 
     protection, clean air, pesticide limits, recycling.''
       The topper was a Teamster radio spot, run on seven stations 
     in five cities, that in effect accused Mr. Smith of being an 
     accomplice to murder because a 14-year-old boy died in an 
     accident at one of his companies. ``Gordon Smith owns 
     companies where workers get hurt and killed. He has 
     repeatedly violated the law. Those are the facts.''
       In fact, the young worker had died after a fall in a grain 
     elevator while being supervised by his father, who still 
     works for Mr. Smith and doesn't blame him. An analysis of the 
     ad in the liberal Oregonian newspaper essentially concluded 
     that the whole thing was false. (By the way, the ad was the 
     work of consultant Henry Sheinkopf, who is part of Bill 
     Clinton's re-election team this year and likes to say he 
     believes in the politics of ``terror.'' We trust Mr. Clinton 
     will soon give him his post-Oklahoma City ``civility'' speech 
     to read.)
       Even Mr. Wyden felt compelled to criticize the rhetoric of 
     the ad, but since it wasn't run by his campaign, he couldn't 
     be blamed for it, even as it cut up his opponent. That's the 
     beauty of these ``independent expenditures'': They work for a 
     candidate without showing his fingerprints. Mr. Wyden even 
     took the high road earlier this month and announced that both 
     candidates should stop negative campaigning, while his allies 
     kept dumping garbage on Mr. Smith through the mail and on the 
     airwaves!
       Now, we understand that Republicans do this, too. The NRA 
     doesn't play beanbag. And as a millionaire businessman, Mr. 
     Smith was able to spend enough of his own money to answer 
     this stuff in his campaign. But candidates who aren't 
     millionaires have to find money somewhere else, which means 
     from people and interests that have money. Yet if Mr. 
     Wertheimer and Common Cause get their way, nonrich candidates 
     would find their ability to raise that money drastically 
     limited. The special interests would still be able to sling 
     their junk, while a candidate would lack the cash to respond.
       Something very much like this probably cost Republicans the 
     governorship last year in Kentucky, where the AFL spent 
     lavishly for the Democrat but the Republican was hemmed in by 
     spending limits. And, of course, operations such as the AFL 
     or the teachers unions have an unlimited supply of money from 
     forced union dues, while other liberal special-interest 
     groups get taxpayer subsidies that Republican Senators like 
     Vermont's Jim Jeffords are refusing to kill. (Question: What 
     does Mr. Jeffords have against electing other Republicans?) 
     If Congress tried to restrict such ``independent'' spending 
     in some new reform, the Supreme Court would probably (and 
     rightly) strike it down as a violation of the First 
     Amendment.
       The bigger point here is that John McCain, Fred Thompson, 
     Linda Smith and other Republicans who've joined up with 
     Common Cause need to rethink their allegiances. They're 
     lending credibility to an exercise that is sure to backfire 
     on their party, if not on them, and probably on our 
     democracy. How ironic it would be if, in the name of 
     controlling special interests, our sanctimonious reformers 
     merely made them more powerful.

  Mr. McCONNELL. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
testimony on the constitutionality of the broadcast provisions in the 
bill prepared for the National Association of Broadcasters.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

     Constitutional Infirmities of Pending Political Broadcasting 
                              Legislation

   (Prepared for National Association of Broadcasters by P. Cameron 
 DeVore, Gregory J. Kopta, Robert W. Lofton, of Davis Wright Tremaine)


                                summary

       Pending Congressional campaign finance reform legislation 
     would substantially expand federal political candidates' 
     ``reasonable access'' to broadcast time, raising fundamental 
     issues under both the First and Fifth Amendments to the 
     United States Constitution. Several bills would require 
     broadcasters to provide free and/or heavily discounted time 
     to political candidates as an incentive for candidates to 
     voluntarily comply with campaign spending limits. The goal of 
     this legislation apparently is to reduce the cost of federal 
     election campaigns for House and Senate seats and thereby 
     enhance the integrity of the electoral process.
       By requiring broadcasters to finance political candidates, 
     the pending legislation would compel broadcasters to engage 
     in protected speech. Such a requirement could only be 
     justified by compelling necessity, and then only if precisely 
     tailored to the government's interest. Mandating that 
     broadcasters, rather than candidates, pay to communicate 
     partisan political messages would not advance the 
     government's interest in enhancing the integrity of the 
     electoral process. In addition, the government could advance 
     that interest more effectively through numerous alternatives 
     that do not involve encroachments on First Amendment 
     freedoms.
       Broadcasters historically have been subject to more 
     restrictions than have other media on their constitutionally 
     protected editorial discretion, but the traditional rationale 
     of spectrum scarcity no longer justified singling out 
     broadcasters for reduced First Amendment protection, 
     particularly in light of the multiplicity of other outlets 
     for diverse viewpoints. The pending legislation nevertheless 
     could not survive even the ``intermediate scrutiny'' 
     requirements of narrow tailoring to a substantial 
     government purpose. Compelling broadcasters to finance 
     political campaigns would bear no relationship to 
     broadcasters' public interest duties, and would upset the 
     delicate balance between their journalistic freedoms and 
     their obligations as licensees of the public airwaves. By 
     singling out broadcasting from other media and usurping 
     broadcast facilities and time, the proposed legislation 
     also denies broadcasters equal protection of the law and 
     takes their property without just compensation, in 
     violation of the Fifth Amendment.
       For all of these reasons, it is our view that those aspects 
     of the pending legislation that require broadcasters to 
     provide free or subsidized time for political candidates' 
     speech would likely be held unconstitutional by the courts.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed

[[Page S6801]]

in the Record a constitutional analysis conducted for the National 
Right to Life Committee.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                          Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom,


                                             Attorneys at Law,

                                Terre Haute, IN, November 7, 1995.
     Re: Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995.
     David O'Steen, Ph.D.,
     National Right to Life Committee,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Dr. O'Steen: You have asked me, as General Counsel for 
     the National Right to Life Committee (``NRLC''), to evaluate 
     the proposed Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995 
     (``The Act''). We have done so.
       Based on our evaluation, we recommend that NRLC oppose the 
     Act because of the effects it would have on NRLC activities. 
     These are set forth below.


                              SECTION 201

       Section 201 would abolish connected political action 
     committees (``PACs''). The Act prohibits membership 
     corporations, such as National Right to Life, from having a 
     connected PAC. This would abolish National Right to Life PAC. 
     This would severely affect the ability of NRLC to influence 
     federal elections because NRLC would not have a connected 
     PAC.
       Section 201 also permits only individuals or political 
     committees organized by candidates and political parties to 
     solicit contributions or make expenditures ``for the purpose 
     of influencing an election for Federal office.'' This appears 
     to do two things.
       First, it appears to prohibit independent PACs, so that 
     persons associated with NRLC couldn't create an independent 
     PAC to do express advocacy for or against candidates.
       Second, it also appears to bar nonprofit, nonstock, 
     ideological organizations--which under FEC v. Massachusetts 
     Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986), could do independent 
     expenditures--from making such independent expenditures on 
     behalf of or in opposition to candidates.


                              section 251

       Assuming that under the Act independent expenditures can be 
     done by someone other than an individual,\1\ so that NRLC 
     still could have a PAC capable of making contributions and 
     expenditures to influence an election, there remains a 
     problem. The problem is with the definition of independent 
     expenditure in the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ There is a way this could happen. Apparently due to 
     concerns about the constitutionality of what Section 201 of 
     the bill does (Sec. 324 of the FECA), the Act creates a fall-
     back position for times when those provisions might not be in 
     effect, i.e., might be enjoined for unconstitutionality. This 
     fall-back provision is that during the time when the ban on 
     connected and independent PACs might be enjoined from 
     enforcement the total that a candidate can receive from a 
     ``multicandidate'' PAC is ``20 percent of the aggregate 
     Federal election spending limits applicable to the candidate 
     for the election cycle.'' Thus, the fallback is that if 
     connected and independent PACs cannot be abolished 
     altogether, then the total contributions from such PACs would 
     be capped. Under this provision, the ability of NRL PAC to 
     contribute to federal candidates would be severely affected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       The Act defines ``independent expenditure'' as an 
     expenditure containing ``express advocacy'' made without the 
     participation of a candidate. ``Express advocacy'' is defined 
     extremely broadly:
       ``18(A) The term ``express advocacy'' means when a 
     communication is taken as a whole and with limited reference 
     to external events, an expression of support for or 
     opposition to a specific candidate, to a specific group of 
     candidates, or to candidates of a particular party.
       ``(B) The term ``expression of support for or opposition 
     to'' includes a suggestion to take action with respect to an 
     election, such as to vote for or against, make 
     contributions to, or participate in campaign activity, or 
     to refrain from taking action.''
       This extremely broad definition of ``express advocacy'' 
     would sweep in protected issue advocacy which NRLC does, such 
     as voter guides. For example, criticizing a candidate for his 
     or her proabortion stand near an election time would fall 
     within the express advocacy definition because it would 
     constitute ``an expression of . . . opposition to a specific 
     candidate.'' This phrase goes far beyond what the United 
     States Supreme Court said was permissible to regulate as 
     electioneering in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
     (1976). In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that in order to 
     protect issue advocacy (which is protected by the First 
     Amendment), government may only regulate election activity 
     where there are explicit words advocating the election or 
     defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
       In sum, these provisions of the Act would prevent NRLC from 
     engaging in constitutionally-protected issue advocacy.


                              section 306

       Section 306 of the Act authorizes an injunction where there 
     is a ``substantial likelihood that a violation . . . is . . . 
     about to occur.'' Thus, the FEC would be authorized to seek 
     injunctions against expenditures which, in the FEC's 
     expansive view, could influence an election. Such a 
     preemptive action against speech is an unconstitutional prior 
     restraint and is unconstitutional except in the case of 
     national security or similarly weighty situations. Prior 
     restraint should never be allowed in connection with core 
     political speech. There simply is no governmental interest of 
     sufficient magnitude to justify the government stopping 
     persons from speaking. Because prior restraints of speech are 
     so repugnant to the Constitution, the usual remedy is to 
     impose penalties after the speech is done, if a violation of 
     law occurred in connection with the speech.
       Therefore, under the Act, the Federal Election Commission 
     would be authorized to pursue injunctions against the 
     political speech of persons or organizations suspected of 
     violating the Act. This means that NRLC would be subject to a 
     prior restraint of its speech, even issue advocacy, on the 
     eve of an important election. Given its history of expansive 
     readings of its powers to regulate constitutionally-protected 
     speech, the Federal Election Commission should never be 
     handed the weapon of prior restraint.
       As stated at the beginning, there are severe problems with 
     the Act. The Act would profoundly alter NRLC's ability to 
     affect federal elections. Therefore, we recommend that 
     National Right to Life Committee oppose the Act.
           Sincerely,
     James Bopp, Jr.
     Richard E. Coleson.

  Mr. McCONNELL. In addition, I have individual columnists like George 
Will and David Broder who have expressed opposition to various parts of 
this measure, and I ask unanimous consent that those columns be printed 
in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                     [From Newsweek, Apr. 15, 1996]

                       Civic Speech Gets Rationed

                          (By George F. Will)

       Surveying the constitutional and political damage done by 
     two decades of campaign finance ``reforms,'' friends of the 
     First Amendment feel like the man (in a Peter De Vries novel) 
     who said ``In the beginning the earth was without form and 
     void. Why didn't they leave well enough alone?'' Reformers 
     should repent by repealing their handiwork and vowing to sin 
     no more. Instead, they are proposing additional constrictions 
     of freedom that would further impoverish the nation's civic 
     discourse.
       The additions would be the Forbes-Perot Codicils, abridging 
     the right of a rich person to use his or her money to seek 
     elective office. This will be called ``closing a loophole.'' 
     To reformers, a ``loophole'' is any silence of the law that 
     allows a sphere of political expression that is not yet under 
     strict government regulation.
       Jack Kemp, Bill Bennett, Dan Quayle, Dick Cheney and 
     Carroll Campbell are among the Republicans who were deterred 
     from seeking this year's presidential nomination in part by 
     the onerousness of collecting the requisite funding in 
     increments no larger than $1,000. You may or may not regret 
     the thinness of the Republican field this year, but does 
     anyone believe it is right for government regulations to 
     restrict important political choices?
       There are restrictions on the amounts individuals can give 
     to candidates and on the amounts that candidates who accept 
     public funding can spend. Limits on individuals' giving force 
     candidates who are less wealthy than Forbes or Perot to 
     accept public funding. Such restrictions are justified as 
     necessary to prevent corruption and promote political 
     equality. But Prof. Bradley A. Smith of Capital University 
     Law School in Columbus, Ohio, demolishes such justifications 
     in an article in The Yale Law Journal, beginning with some 
     illuminating history.
       In early U.S. politics the electorate was small, most 
     candidates came from upper-class factions and the candidates 
     themselves paid directly what little campaign spending there 
     was, which went for pamphlets, and for food and whisky for 
     rallies. This changed with Martin Van Buren's organization of 
     a mass campaign for Andrew Jackson in 1828. Democratization--
     widespread pamphleteering and newspaper advertisements for 
     the increasingly literate masses--cost money. Most of the 
     money came from government employees, until civil service 
     reform displaced patronage.
       Government actions--Civil War contracts, then land and cash 
     grants to railroads, and protectionism--did much to create 
     corporations with an intense interest in the composition of 
     the government. Then government created regulations to tame 
     corporate power, further prompting corporate participation in 
     politics. Smith says that in 1888 about 40 percent of 
     Republican national campaign funds came from Pennsylvania 
     businesses, and by 1904 corporate contributions were 73 
     percent of Teddy Roosevelt's funds. Democrats relied less on 
     corporate wealth than on the largesse of a small number of 
     sympathetic tycoons: in 1904 two of them provided three 
     quarters of the party's presidential campaign funds. By 1928 
     both parties' national committees received about 69 percent 
     of their contributions in amounts of at least $1,000 (about 
     $9,000 in today's dollars).
       Only a few campaigns have raised substantial sums from 
     broad bases of small donors. These campaigns have usually 
     been ideological insurgencies, such as Barry Goldwater's in 
     1964 ($5.8 million from 410,000 contributors), George 
     McGovern's in 1972 ($15 million from contributions averaging 
     about $20) and Oliver North's 1994 race for a U.S. Senate 
     seat from Virginia (small contributors accounted for almost 
     all of the $20 million that enabled North to outspend his 
     principal opponent 4 to 1 in a losing effort).

[[Page S6802]]

       The aggressive regulation of political giving and spending 
     began in 1974, in the aftermath of Watergate. Congress, 
     itching to ``do something'' about political comportment, put 
     limits on giving to candidates, and on spending by 
     candidates--even of their personal wealth. Furthermore, 
     limits were placed on total campaign spending, and even on 
     political spending by groups unaffiliated with any candidate 
     or campaign. In 1976 the Supreme Court struck down the limits 
     on unaffiliated groups, on candidates' spending of personal 
     wealth and on mandatory campaign spending ceilings. The Court 
     said these amounted to government stipulation of the 
     permissible amount of political expression and therefore 
     violated the First Amendment.
       But in a crucial inconsistency, the Court upheld the limits 
     on the size of contributions. Such limits constitute 
     deliberate suppression by government of total campaign 
     spending. And such suppression constitutes government 
     rationing of political communication, which is what most 
     political spending finances. Furthermore, in presidential 
     campaigns, limits on the size of contributions make fund 
     raising more difficult, which coerces candidates (at least 
     those less flush than Forbes or Perot) into accepting public 
     funding. Acceptance commits candidates to limits on how much 
     can be spent in particular states during the nominating 
     process, and on the sums that can be spent in the pre- and 
     post-convention periods.
       Now, leave aside for a moment the question of whether the 
     ``reformers'' responsible for all these restrictions remember 
     the rule that Congress shall make no law abridging the 
     freedom of speech. But why, in an era in which the United 
     States has virtually eliminated restrictions on pornography, 
     is government multiplying restrictions on political 
     expression? (Here is a thought rich in possibilities: Would 
     pornographic political expression be unregulatable?)
       When reformers say money is ``distorting'' the political 
     process, it is unclear, as Smith says, what norm they have in 
     mind. When reformers say ``too much'' money is spent on 
     politics, Smith replies that the annual sum is half as much 
     as Americans spend on yogurt. The amount spent by all federal 
     and state candidates and parties in a two-year election cycle 
     is approximately equal to the annual sum of a private 
     sector's two largest advertising budgets (those of Procter & 
     Gamble and Philip Morris). If the choice of political leaders 
     is more important than the choice of detergents and 
     cigarettes, it is reasonable to conclude that far too little 
     is spent on politics.
       The $700 million spent in the two-year election cycle that 
     culminated in the November 1994 elections (the sum includes 
     all spending by general-election candidates, and indirect 
     party-building expenditures by both parties, and all indirect 
     political spending by groups such as the AFL-CIO and the NRA) 
     amounted to approximately $1.75 per year per eligible voter, 
     or a two-year sum of $3.50--about what it costs to rent a 
     movie. In that two-year cycle, total spending on all 
     elections--local, state and federal--was less than $10 per 
     eligible voter, divided among many candidates. And because of 
     the limits on the size of contributions, much of the money 
     was not spent on the dissemination of political discourse but 
     on the tedious mechanics of raising money in small amounts. 
     Furthermore, the artificial scarcity of money produced by 
     limits on political giving and spending has strengthened the 
     incentive for the kind of spending that delivers maximum bang 
     for the buck--harsh negative advertising.
       Does a money advantage invariably translate into political 
     potency? Try telling that to Forbes, who spent $440 per vote 
     in finishing fourth in the Iowa caucuses. True, the candidate 
     who spends most usually wins. But as Smith notes, correlation 
     does not establish causation. Money often follows rather than 
     produces popularity: many donors give to probable winners. Do 
     campaign contributions purchase post-election influence? 
     Smith says most students of legislative voting patterns agree 
     that three variables are more important than campaign 
     contributions in determining legislators' behavior--party 
     affiliation, ideology, and constituent views. ``Where 
     contributions and voting patterns intersect, they do so 
     largely because donors contribute to those candidates who 
     are believed to favor their positions, not the other way 
     around.''
       Smith argues that limits on campaign giving and spending 
     serve to entrench the status quo. As regards limits on 
     giving, incumbents are apt to have large lists of past 
     contributors, whereas challengers often could best obtain 
     financial competitiveness quickly by raising large sums from 
     a few dedicated supporters. If today's limits had been in 
     place in 1968, Eugene McCarthy could not have mounted his 
     anti-war insurgency, which depended heavily on a few six-
     figure contributions. As regards spending limits, the lower 
     they are the better they are for incumbents: incumbents are 
     already well known and can use their public offices to seize 
     public attention with ``free media''--news coverage.
       The rage to restrict political giving and spending 
     reflects, in part, the animus of liberals against money and 
     commerce. There are, after all, other sources of political 
     influence besides money, sources that liberals do not want to 
     restrict and regulate in the interests of ``equality.'' Some 
     candidates are especially articulate or energetic or 
     physically attractive. Why legislate just to restrict the 
     advantage of those who can make or raise money? Smith notes 
     that one reason media elites are apt to favor restricting the 
     flow of political money, and hence the flow of political 
     communication by candidates, is that such restrictions 
     increase the relative influence of the unrestricted political 
     communication of the media elites.
       To justify reforms that amount to government rationing of 
     political speech, reformers resort to a utilitarian rationale 
     for freedom of speech: freedom of speech is good when it 
     serves good ends. This rationale is defensible; indeed, it 
     has a distinguished pedigree. But it has recently been 
     repudiated in many of the Supreme Court's libertarian 
     construings of the First Amendment. Those decisions, taking 
     an expansive view of the First Amendment in the interest of 
     individual self-expression, have made, for example, almost 
     all restrictions on pornography constitutionally problematic. 
     And such libertarian decisions generally have been defended 
     by liberals--who are most of the advocates of restrictions on 
     campaign giving and spending.
       But liberals of another stripe also advocate campaign 
     restrictions. They are ``political equality liberals'' rather 
     than ``self-expression liberals.'' They favor sacrificing 
     some freedom of speech in order to promote equal political 
     opportunity, as they understand that. Such liberal 
     egalitarians support speech codes on campuses in the name of 
     equality of status or self-esteem for all groups, or to bring 
     up to equality groups designated as victims of America's 
     injustices. Liberal egalitarians support restrictions on 
     pornography because, they say, pornography deprives women of 
     civic equality by degrading them. And liberal egalitarians 
     support restrictions on political expression in order to 
     achieve equal rations of political communication for all 
     candidates.
       Prof. Martin Shapiro of the University of California's Law 
     School at Berkeley writes that ``almost the entire first 
     amendment literature produced by liberal academics in the 
     past twenty years has been a literature of regulations, not 
     freedom--a literature that balances away speech rights . . . 
     Its basic strategy is to treat freedom of speech not as an 
     end in itself, but an instrumental value.'' And Bradley Smith 
     says that ``after twenty years of balancing speech rights 
     away, liberal scholarship is in danger of losing the ability 
     to see the First Amendment as anything but a libertarian 
     barrier to equality that may, and indeed ought, to be 
     balanced away or avoided with little thought.
       Fortunately, more and more people are having second 
     thoughts--in some cases, first thoughts--about the damage 
     done to the political process, and the First Amendment, by 
     the utilitarian or ``instrumentalist'' understanding of 
     freedom of speech. Campaign ``reforms'' have become a blend 
     of cynicism and paternalism--attempts to rig the rules for 
     partisan advantage or the advantage of incumbents' or to 
     protect the public from what the political class considers 
     too much political communication. Any additional ``reforms,'' 
     other than repeal of the existing ones, will make matters 
     worse.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Nov. 14, 1995]

                           Gingrich's Heresy

                          (By David S. Broder)

       Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) knew he was headed into a 
     test of wills with the president that might force a shutdown 
     in the government and boost his already high negative 
     ratings. The last thing he needed was another fight--
     especially one in which his position would guarantee 
     denunciation from all respectable quarters.
       Nonetheless, when Gingrich testified the other day at a 
     congressional hearing on campaign finance, he deliberately 
     committed heresy. He argued that too little money--not too 
     much--is going into campaigns.
       The editorial pages and columnists issued the predictable 
     squawks. The speaker also took fire from the rear: The 
     freshman Republicans who have been his shock troops were in 
     shock. They wanted to hear him say, as everyone from Common 
     Cause to Ross Perot regularly intones, that American politics 
     is ``awash'' in special-interest money.
       That is the operative premise of all the favorite 
     ``reforms'': abolition of PACs (political-action committees); 
     allowing only people from the home state or home district to 
     contribute to a candidate; getting rid of ``soft-money'' 
     corporate contributions, which pay for political party 
     facilities and grass-roots operations.
       All of this Gingrich challenged in his testimony on Nov. 2. 
     The total amount spend on House and Senate races in 1994 was 
     $724 million--a record sum and shocking to many. But the cost 
     of 435 House races and 33 Senate campaigns was, he pointed 
     out, roughly double what the makers of the three leading 
     antacids budgeted for advertising last year. This is a 
     scandal?
       Ah, but it said, the candidates and office-holders were 
     forced to spend an inordinate amount of time dialing for 
     dollars, going hat in hand to prospective contributors. True 
     enough, but the main reason is that contribution limits have 
     not been adjusted for inflation in 21 years. In 1974 the 
     limit on individual contributions was set at $1,000. That is 
     worth $325 today. If you really want politicians spending 
     less time fund-raising, Gingrich suggested, lift that limit 
     to $5,000 and index it for inflation.
       If this were not heretical enough, the speaker had one 
     other idea. Instead of thinking of campaign finance as a 
     separate problem, screaming for solution, think about a way 
     to pay for the cost of politics that would

[[Page S6803]]

     actually serve the interests of voters and of governing.
       Do that, he said, and you may find that the best remedy is 
     not to legislate limits on contributions or spending but to 
     enable greater activity by the political parties--
     Republicans, Democrats and any third force that may emerge to 
     challenge them.
       The biggest problem in our campaign finance system, he 
     said, is the gross disparity between what House incumbents 
     can raise and what most challengers can muster. The PACs are 
     a big part of this problem for they use their contributions 
     to ensure access to legislators handling their issues. The 
     PAC system, as Gingrich said, ``has become an arm of the 
     Washington lobbyists'' and needs to be reduced in 
     significance.
       But limiting PAC contributions is likely to be an empty 
     gesture. Increasingly, organized interest groups are mounting 
     independent expenditure campaigns, boosting their friends and 
     targeting their enemies, which they can do without limit.
       Since we cannot effectively stifle these special-interest 
     voices, Gingrich said, let us submerge them in appeals from 
     the parties. Increase substantially the limits on what people 
     can give to political parties, he said. And allow those 
     parties to contribute far more than they do now to help 
     challengers offset the many advantages incumbents enjoy--not 
     only greater leverage on the PACs but all the staff, office 
     and communications facilities that are provided at taxpayers' 
     expense.
       Barring such changes, Gingrich rightly said, we are almost 
     certain to see a continuation of the trend to millionaire 
     candidates. Because the wealthy are allowed (by Supreme Court 
     decision) to spend whatever they wish on their own campaigns, 
     the Senate has become a millionaires' club and the House is 
     moving in the same direction.
       All of this was a challenge to conventional wisdom. But 
     Gingrich is not, in fact, alone. In the same week that he 
     testified, the libertarian Cato Institute and the liberal 
     Committee for the Study of the American Electorate published 
     essays arguing that the supply of political money should be 
     increased, not decreased. As Curtis Gans, the author of the 
     latter study, pointed out, ``The overwhelming body of 
     scholarly research . . . indicates that low spending limits 
     will undermine political competition by enhancing the 
     existing advantages of incumbency.''
       Gingrich has been accused of foot-dragging on the handshake 
     agreement he struck with President Clinton last June to form 
     a bipartisan commission on campaign finance.* * *
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1996]

                        A Senate of Millionaires

                          (By David S. Broder)

       Want a perfectly safe bet on the November election results? 
     Bet that there will be even more millionaires in the U.S. 
     Senate.
       What once was called ``The World's Most Exclusive Club'' 
     increasingly requires personal wealth as a condition for 
     membership. The combination of rising campaign costs and 
     foolishly frozen limits on individual contributions has 
     increased the advantage of self-financed candidates. The 1996 
     candidate lists are full of them.
       In Georgia, for example, all three Republicans seeking 
     nomination to the vacancy created by the retirement of 
     Democratic Sen. Sam Nunn are men of substantial means. In 
     Minnesota, former Republican senator Rudy Boschwitz, a 
     wealthy retired businessman, is trying to reclaim the seat he 
     lost to populist professor Paul Wellstone six years ago. And 
     in a half-dozen other states, Republicans either have or are 
     trying to recruit challengers who can afford to pay their own 
     way.
       What is more striking is the extent to which the 
     Democrats--the self-styled party of the people--have begun to 
     rely on affluence as the criterion for picking their Senate 
     candidates.
       In Colorado, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Virginia, 
     the favored candidates for the Democratic nomination are all 
     men of independent means, and in many cases, without wealth 
     would not be considered to have Senate credentials. In 
     Illinois, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Oregon, men of similar 
     backgrounds are given a chance of winning nomination because 
     of their bankrolls. It is not a new pattern. Among the 
     Democratic senators seeking reelection this year is John D. 
     (Jay) Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, who spent more than 
     $10 million of his own money to be elected in 1984.
       Retiring Sen. Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), a banker's son who 
     earned big money as a New York Knicks basketball star, writes 
     about the advantage wealth confers on a politician in his 
     newly published memoir, ``Time Present, Time Past.'' Bradley 
     recounts how he decided he could afford to give or lend a 
     quarter-million dollars to his first Senate campaign in 
     1978--about one-fifth of his budget. ``It assured me that I 
     could compete even if I didn't raise as much as I had 
     hoped,'' he says. ``With the existence of that self-generated 
     cushion, I was able to raise more. When potential 
     contributors see a campaign with money, they assume it's 
     well-run, and they are more likely to make contributions. 
     Everyone likes to be with a winner, whether in basketball or 
     politics.''
       Bradley points out that he was a piker compared with many 
     of his colleagues. ``Four years later in New Jersey, Frank 
     Lautenberg, a wealthy computer executive with no elective 
     experience, would spend over $3.5 million of his own money to 
     win a U.S. Senate seat. . . . In Wisconsin in 1988, Herb Kohl 
     promised to spend primarily his own money in his Senate 
     campaign; $7.5 million later, he won.''
       Financial disclosure statements show that at least 28 of 
     the 100 sitting senators have a net worth of $1 million or 
     more--many of them much more. Michael Huffington, a Texas oil 
     man, spent $28 million of his own money in trying for a 
     California Senate seat in 1994--but still lost. The price is 
     going up.
       Wealth is not a determinant of votes in the Senate. There 
     are liberals like Rockefeller and Ted Kennedy along with 
     conservatives. But wealth confers an unfair advantage in the 
     campaigns for the Senate, and makes it much harder than it 
     should be for people of talent, but no wealth, to compete.
       The main reason for this disadvantage is the 
     unrealistically low limit on individual contributions. The 
     law, as Bradley notes, provides that ``whereas a candidate 
     could contribute as much of his own money as he chose, he 
     could accept individual contributions of only $2,000 from 
     others--$1,000 of it for the primary and $1,000 for the 
     general election.''
       The contribution limits were set 22 years ago and never 
     have been adjusted; inflation has eroded their value by two-
     thirds since then. Raising contribution limits is far down 
     the list of proposals of most campaign finance reformers; 
     many want to freeze them or reduce them.
       But all the contribution limits are accomplishing today is 
     to create an ever-greater advantage for self-financed 
     millionaire candidates. Steve Forbes's rivals in the 
     Republican presidential race are complaining that his wealth 
     is tilting the odds in the contest, where he is the only one 
     who is paying his own way and therefore spending as much as 
     he wants. But the Senate picture is not very different.
       If we really want to be ruled by a wealthy elite, fine; but 
     it is a foolish populism that insists it despises the 
     influence of wealth, and then resists liberalizing campaign 
     contribution limits.
       Rich men understand that. It's too bad the reformers can't 
     figure it out.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 31, 1996]

                ``Frontline's'' Exercise in Exaggeration

                          (By David S. Broder)

       As if the cynicism about politics were not deep enough 
     already, PBS's ``Frontline'' last night presented a 
     documentary called ``So YOU Want to Buy a President?'' whose 
     thesis seems to be that campaigns are a charade, policy 
     debates are a deceit and only money talks.
       The narrow point, made by Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), an 
     early dropout from the 1996 presidential race, about 
     millionaire publisher Malcolm S. (Steve) Forbes Jr., is that 
     ``somebody is trying to buy the White House, and apparently 
     it is for sale.''
       The broader indictment, made by correspondent/narrator 
     Robert Krulwich, is that Washington is gripped by a ``barter 
     culture'' in which politicians are for sale and public policy 
     is purchased by campaign contributions.
       The program rested heavily on a newly published paperback, 
     ``The Buying of the President.'' Author Charles Lewis, the 
     head of the modestly titled Center for Public Integrity, was 
     a principal witness, and Kevin Phillips, the conservative 
     populist author who wrote the book's introduction, was also a 
     major figure in the documentary.
       It dramatized the view asserted by Lewis in the conclusion 
     of his book: ``Simply stated, the wealthiest interests 
     bankroll and, in effect, help to preselect the specific major 
     candidates months and months before a single vote is cast 
     anywhere. . . . We the people have become a mere afterthought 
     of those we put in office, a prop in our own play.''
       Viewers say a number of corporate executives--no labor 
     leaders, no religious leaders, no activists of any kind, for 
     some reason--who have raised and contributed money for 
     presidents and presidential candidates and thereafter been 
     given access at dinners, private meetings or overseas trade 
     missions.
       It is implied--but never shown--that policies changed 
     because of these connections. As Krulwich said in the 
     transcript of a media interview distributed, along with an 
     advance tape, with the publicity kit for the broadcast, ``We 
     don't really know whether these are bad guys or good guys. . 
     . . I'm not really sure we've been able to prove, in too many 
     cases, that a dollar spend bought a particular favor. All 
     we've been able to show is that over and over again, people 
     who do give a lot of money to politicians get a chance to 
     talk to those politicians face to face, at parties, on 
     planes, on missions, in private lunches, and you and I 
     don't.''
       If that is the substance of the charge, the innuendo is 
     much heavier. At one point, Krulwich asked Lewis, in his most 
     disingenuous manner, ``Do you come out convinced that 
     elections are in huge part favors for sale, or in tiny 
     part?''
       And Lewis replied that while ``there are a lot of wealthy 
     people that do want to express broad philosophical issues,'' 
     the ``vested interests that have very narrow agendas that 
     they want pursued see these candidates as their handmaidens 
     or their puppets. The presidential campaign is not a horse 
     race or a beauty contest. It's a giant auction.''
       That is an oversimplified distortion that can do nothing 
     but further alienate a cynical electorate. Of course, money 
     is an important ingredient in our elections and its use 
     deserves scrutiny. But ideas are important too, and grass-
     roots activism even more so. The Democratic Leadership 
     Council's Al From

[[Page S6804]]

     and the Heritage Foundation's Robert Rector have had more 
     influence in the last decade than any fund-raisers or 
     contributors, because candidates have turned to them for 
     policy advice.
       John Rother of the American Association of Retired Persons 
     and Ralph Reed of the Christian Coalition work for 
     organizations that are nominally nonpartisan and make no 
     campaign contributions at all. But their membership votes--so 
     they have power.
       The American political system is much more complex--and 
     more open to influence by any who choose to engage in it--
     than the proponents of the ``auction'' theory of democracy 
     understand, or choose to admit.
       By exaggerating the influence of money, they send a clear 
     message to citizens that the game is rigged, so there's no 
     point in playing. That is deceitful, and it's dangerously 
     wrong to feed that cynicism.
       Especially when they have nothing to suggest when it comes 
     to changing the rules for the money game.
       At one point, Phillips said that the post-Watergate reforms 
     succeeded only in having ``forced them [the contributors and 
     politicians] to be more devious.'' That is untrue. Those 
     reforms, which mandated the disclosure of all the financial 
     connections on which the program was based, also created 
     publicity which, even Krulwich and Co. admitted, foiled the 
     ``plots'' of some contributors.
       And Krulwich, for his part, suggested very helpfully that 
     ``every high-profile politician agrees that some things have 
     got to change. Change the limits. Change the rules. Change 
     the primaries. Change the ads. Change enforcement. You gotta 
     change something.''
       How about changing the kind of journalism that tells people 
     that politicians are bought-and-paid-for puppets and you're a 
     sucker if you think there's a damn thing you can do to make 
     your voice heard?

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, over the years working on this issue I 
have written several pieces which I ask unanimous consent to have 
printed--one in the Washington Post and one in the USA Today--in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1996]

                    Just What Is A Special Interest?

                          (By Mitch McConnell)

       President Clinton, in his State of the Union address, 
     beseeched Congress to enact campaign finance reform to reduce 
     ``special interest'' influence. Campaign finance reforms that 
     the president favors would constrict fundamental democratic 
     freedoms to participate in the political process. In other 
     words: speech would be limited and some citizens' freedom to 
     participate in elections beyond voting would be ``reformed'' 
     out of existence based on their alleged status as ``special 
     interests.'' But if ``special interest'' is not defined, how 
     are we to know just whose influence should be curbed?
       Judging from the fervent bipartisan (and third party) scorn 
     heaped on ``special interests,'' the casual observer would 
     logically assume that this scourge of democracy was readily 
     identifiable. The Congressional Record, newspaper editorials 
     and campaign speeches are replete with diatribes against the 
     ``special interests.'' A recent search of newspapers on the 
     Nexis database found more than 60,000 articles and editorials 
     containing the phrase ``special interest.''
       ``Special interest'' is the most pejorative phrase in the 
     American political lexicon since ``communist-pinko.'' Judging 
     from the reformers' scathing rhetoric, rooting out these 
     special interests is a job for a new Senate Committee on Un-
     American Activities.
       In fact, the special interest tag depends on the viewer's 
     vantage point rather than on any objective criteria. So-
     called good government groups would have people believe that 
     the antonym is ``public'' interest--as defined by them. These 
     groups usually construe good government to mean big 
     government and therefore deem big government to be in the 
     public interest. By this logic, opposition to any government 
     regulation or tax virtually guarantees a special interest 
     charge.
       Capitalism should not be a dirty word in a free society, 
     but having observed the enmity directed toward its 
     practitioners in many quarters, one could reasonably wonder. 
     Some nonprofit so-called ``good government'' groups readily 
     pin the special interest label on profit-seeking enterprises. 
     Yet behind corporate balance sheets are employees, families, 
     shareholders and communities of which they are part.
       Does the special interest connotation extend to employees 
     and their families? To the legions of Americans whose 
     retirement funds and investments are keyed to the stock 
     market? By such extrapolation does the ``special interest'' 
     smear cut a wide swath.
       What happens when a purported public interest organization 
     is funded by a group that is universally regarded as a 
     ``special interest,'' such as the plaintiffs' lawyers? Are we 
     to conclude that the special interest in this instance is 
     subsumed in the nobler public interest? Or is the public 
     interest group simply laundering the special interest 
     influence money and acting as a front organization? Or is it 
     merely coincidence when their interests converge on, say, 
     lawsuit reform?
       Most people would probably conclude that a special interest 
     is contrary to the majority interest. Should special interest 
     be defined as being not immediately relevant to more than 
     49.9 percent of American citizens? Must its membership 
     comprise a majority of the country to be legitimate? If so, 
     such a qualification should be carefully pondered, as 
     ``special interests'' could be equated with any narrow or 
     minority interest, thus automatically tarnishing what could 
     be a very worthy cause.
       Being a senator from Kentucky, I regularly go to bat for 
     Kentucky industries (and their employees, suppliers and 
     subcontractors) threatened by onerous regulations and 
     taxation. These industries may, in the minds of some people, 
     epitomize ``special interest.'' To me, they and the 
     Kentuckians whose livelihoods depend on them are 
     constituents, and my assistance to them is in the public's 
     interest.
       Is a Pacific Northwest lumber company automatically a 
     special interest? The company's employees? How about the 
     Washington-based environmentalists who would sacrifice jobs 
     and disrupt human lives for the sake of an owl? Are owls 
     special interests?
       The truth is that the special interest label is a political 
     weapon utilized, often reflexively and perhaps thoughtlessly, 
     by people throughout the ideological spectrum. It can be 
     found in statements I have made in the past. Using it is a 
     hard habit to break. Nevertheless, in the interest of more 
     honest and civil public discourse, the invocation of the 
     ``special interest'' mantra to propel a reform agenda or 
     wound an opponent is a habit that should be broken.
       All Americans have a constitutional right to petition the 
     government and participate in the political process, however 
     unpopular the cause or narrow its appeal may be. Americans do 
     not forfeit those rights because they have been tagged with 
     the special interest label.
       The campaign finance reform debate, in particular, is 
     advanced on the premise that special interest influence is 
     pervasive, corrosive, and must be abated at all costs. But 
     the cost of the alleged reforms in terms of constitutional 
     freedom for all Americans is high. And the special interest 
     premise is deeply flawed. So the next time you hear someone 
     hail campaign finance reform as the answer, ask them what is 
     the question. And when they say special interest influence is 
     the problem, ask them: What is a special interest?
                                                                    ____


                    [From USA Today, June 11, 1996]

                   Disaster for Taxpayers, Candidates

                          [By Mitch McConnell]

       The most talked-about campaign-finance schemes are 
     unconstitutional, undemocratic, bureaucratic boondoggles. 
     Further, their sponsors think taxpayers should foot the bill. 
     And for good measure, these ``reform'' schemes also would 
     greatly increase the power of the media.
       Perhaps that is simply a fortunate happenstance for the 
     liberal newspapers pushing them. In any event, the media 
     clearly have a ``special interest'' in campaign finance 
     ``reforms'' which would increase their power by limiting the 
     speech of every other participant in the political process.
       Because political campaigns exist to communicate with 
     voters, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled two decades ago that 
     campaign spending must be accorded First Amendment 
     protection. Ergo, campaign spending limits are 
     unconstitutional speech limits.
       The simple fact is that communication with America's nearly 
     200 million eligible voters is expensive. For instance, one 
     full-page color campaign ad in a Friday edition of USA TODAY 
     would cost $104,400. Television and mail are also essential 
     means of communicating with voters.
       These are expensive venues, but they are the only way to 
     reach all the voters in large, modern electorates. Limiting 
     campaign spending would limit political discourse by 
     candidates, thereby enhancing the power of the media. That is 
     bad public policy.
       For all the whining, the fact is that congressional 
     campaign spending (less than $4 per eligible voter in 1994) 
     is paltry relative to what Americans spend on consumer items 
     like bubble gum and yogurt.
       What we should do is adjust the individual contribution 
     limit for inflation.
       The contribution limits candidates must abide by in 1996 
     were set over two decades ago (when a new Ford Mustang cost 
     $2,700). These inflation-eroded limits benefit the well-off 
     (rich candidates who can fund entire campaigns out of their 
     own pockets) and the well-known (principally incumbents) who 
     have a large base from which to draw contributions.
       Enhanced public disclosure of all campaign-related spending 
     is also a worthy reform that would enable voters to make 
     informed decisions on Election Day.
       By comparison, the so-called ``good government'' groups' 
     campaign-finance schemes would be disasters. Delay is 
     preferable to the enactment of such constitutional 
     monstrosities.

  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, some information about the cost to the 
Postal Service, estimated by this postal rate subsidy, and I ask 
unanimous consent that be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


[[Page S6805]]




                                          U.S. Postal Service,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1996.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: I am writing to voice my concerns 
     about campaign finance reform legislation, S. 1219, which 
     would place an unfair financial burden on the Postal Service 
     and its ratepayers.
       Let me first say that the Postal Service takes no position 
     on the general merits of campaign finance reform. This issue 
     appropriately rests with the Congress. However, S. 1219, as 
     well as several other campaign finance reform bills in the 
     House and Senate, provide for reduced postage rates for 
     eligible candidates. These bills do not contain a funding 
     mechanism through which the Postal Service would be 
     reimbursed for the difference between regular rate postage 
     and the reduced rate used by the candidates. In essence, the 
     legislation creates an unfunded mandate, and the costs would 
     have to be absorbed by our customers, the postal ratepayers. 
     Testimony at campaign finance reform hearings estimated the 
     reduced postage costs for S. 1219 to be $50 million per 
     election. Estimates for other campaign finance bills with 
     reduced postage provisions range from $50 to $150 million per 
     election.
       I would also like to point out that it is very unlikely 
     that the Postal Service and its customers would be made whole 
     even if a funding mechanism were included in campaign finance 
     reform legislation. After years of underfunding our annual 
     appropriation for Congressionally mandated reduced rate 
     mailings, Congress enacted the 1993 Revenue Forgone Reform 
     Act. In eliminating future funding for reduced rate mailings, 
     this law mandates that the Postal Service receive a series of 
     42 annual appropriations of $29 million as partial 
     reimbursement for past funding shortfalls. Even this 
     ``partial'' relief is now threatened as our House Treasury, 
     Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations 
     Subcommittee proposed that this appropriation be reduced by 
     over $5 million during their markup of our FY '97 
     appropriations bill.
       I recognize the importance of the campaign finance reform 
     issue in Congress this year, and it is with reluctance that I 
     express these concerns to you. Nonetheless, S. 1219, as well 
     as others, would offer political candidates reduced postage 
     costs at the expense of the Postal Service and its customers. 
     I urge you and your colleagues to identify alternate 
     provisions that would not require postal ratepayers to bear 
     the burden of campaign finance reform.
           Best regards,
     Marvin Runyon.
                                                                    ____



                           Direct Marketing Association, Inc.,

                                    Washington, DC, June 19, 1996.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: It now appears that S. 1219, 
     campaign finance legislation sponsored by Senators McCain and 
     Feingold, is scheduled for debate next week.
       We strongly urge you to cast a no vote on the cloture 
     motion that will be offered during the debate.
       As I have written to you before, DMA is opposed to S.1219, 
     largely because of the provisions for low cost mailings for 
     Senatorial candidates, without compensation to the Postal 
     Service for lost revenues.
       We estimate that, should the House pass similar 
     legislation, these provisions could cost the Postal Service 
     as much as $350 million dollars over a two-year election 
     cycle. Every penny of this will ultimately come out of the 
     pocket of the businesses and consumers who use the mails.
       The Postal Service finds itself in an increasingly 
     competitive environment. In order to survive, the Postal 
     Service must be able to price its products competitively. It 
     cannot do this if costs are arbitrarily added to its rate 
     base. Legislation such as this endangers the financial base 
     of the Postal Service and the service it can provide to 
     American businesses and consumers.
       Again, we urge you to vote no on the cloture motion.
           Sincerely,
     Richard Barton.
                                                                    ____



                                       National Association of

                                                 Broadcasters,

                                   Washington, DC., June 24, 1996.
     Hon. Mitch McConnell,
     U.S. Senate,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator McConnell: First, I would like to thank you 
     for the leadership role you have taken in opposing S. 1219, 
     the campaign finance reform legislation introduced by 
     Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold.
       As originally introduced, this legislation would require 
     broadcasters to offer qualified Senate candidates an 
     additional 50% discount off the discounted television 
     advertising rates candidates currently receive. The 
     legislation further requires broadcasters give candidates 
     free advertising time. We believe these provisions are 
     unconstitutional and impose significant financial burdens on 
     local broadcasters and we must oppose the legislation.
       We understand Senators McCain and Feingold have introduced 
     a substitute to S. 1219. At your request we have reviewed the 
     broadcast provisions of the substitute. We have done so and 
     have determined that for the most part the broadcast 
     provisions are the same as those in S. 1219. There is, 
     however, new language in the broadcast section which causes 
     us great concern.
       The new provision would give to the U.S. Court of Federal 
     Claims exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to the 
     constitutionality of the broadcast rate and free time 
     provisions. Further, by its terms it precludes any injunctive 
     relief, providing only for money damages. It is unclear 
     whether this is an attempt to somehow deny us the opportunity 
     to bring a First Amendment claim against these provisions. No 
     other section of the bill appears to have the same 
     requirement and we do not understand why the broadcast 
     provisions are given a different avenue for judicial review.
       We must oppose the substitute to S. 1219, and we continue 
     to support your efforts in opposing this legislation. If I 
     can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to 
     phone.
           Sincerely,
                                                 Edward O. Fritts,

                                                        President.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, calling the McCain-Feingold voluntary 
does not make it so, its proponents protestations to the contrary. 
Anyone who dared not to comply with its voluntary limits would have to: 
pay twice as much as their opponent for TV ads and more for postage; 
with half the contribution limit; and forgo 30 minutes of free time.
  All this and their complying opponent's spending limit would be 
increased up to 100 percent to counteract any excessive spending. 
Moreover, the complying candidate could spend unlimited amounts to 
counteract--dollar-for-dollar--independent expenditures.
  So I say again, technically, mugging victims had options, too. That 
does not mean that handing over their wallets to muggers were voluntary 
acts. And I should stress here that the essential point in regard to 
the voluntariness of the candidate spending limits is not--as the 
Senator from Wisconsin stated yesterday--that candidates who did not 
comply with spending limits would be giving up benefits they do not 
currently enjoy such as the 50 percent discount and the free TV time. 
What makes the provision unconstitutional is the severe handicapping 
candidates would experience if they did not comply with the limits.
  This is a crucial distinction from the presidential system. Steve 
Forbes did not have to pay twice as much for TV ads as the complying 
presidential candidates. He did not forego free time and Bob Dole's 
spending limit did not increase when independent expenditures were made 
against him. And his spending limit did not increase when Forbes spent 
over the limit. Had the presidential system had the inducements of the 
McCain-Feingold bill, Steve Forbes might very well have elected not to 
get into the race, at all.
  It simply would not make sense for a candidate not to comply with the 
McCain-Feingold bill unless he or she were so extraordinarily wealthy 
they could spend many times the spending limit for their own wallet. So 
you could have two extreme types of campaigns under McCain-Feingold--
very low spending ones complying with the limits and extremely 
expensive campaigns. What would disappear is the middle ground--not as 
cheap as the McCain-Feingold model but not at the extreme high-end, 
either.
  If you looked long and hard enough and had common cause and public 
citizen helping, even a tiny needle in a giant haystack could be found. 
And so it is that at long last--after a decade of debate on this 
scheme--some people with law degrees have been located to say the 
McCain-Feingold/common cause spending limit structure is 
constitutional. How expert they are remains to be seen and their 
submittals on the subject will certainly be scrutinized.
  In any event objective liberals and conservatives can agree that the 
American Civil Liberties Union is the repository of expertise on first 
amendment issues. The ACLU led, and triumphed, in the fight against 
mandatory spending limits 20 years ago in the Buckley versus Valeo 
case. And the ACLU will be in front again--along side me--should 
anything resembling the McCain-Feingold bill ever become law. The ACLU 
is singularly focused on constitutional freedom and has probably 
aggravated just about everybody at sometime with unpopular stands. But 
they have a remarkable record of success in this area.
  At this point I will read excerpts from the ACLU's testimony--given 
by professor and Buckley versus Valeo attorney Joel M. Gora--before the 
Senate Rules Committee on February 1 of this year.

       The provision for ``voluntary'' spending limits in Senate 
     campaigns violates the free

[[Page S6806]]

     speech principles of Buckley v. Valeo. The outright ban and 
     severe fall back limitations on PACs violate freedom of 
     speech and association, as do the limitations on 
     ``bundling.'' The unprecedented controls on raising and 
     spending ``soft money'' by political parties and even non-
     partisan groups intrude upon First Amendment rights in a 
     manner well beyond any compelling governmental interest. The 
     revised provisions governing the right to make independent 
     expenditures both improperly obstruct that core area of 
     electoral speech and impermissibly invade the absolutely 
     protected area of issue advocacy. The reduced recordkeeping 
     threshold for contributions and disbursements, from $200 down 
     to $50, invades associational privacy. And the new powers 
     given to the Federal Election Commission to go to court in 
     the midst of a campaign to enjoin ``a violation of this Act'' 
     pose an ominous and sweeping threat of prior restraint and 
     political censorship.
       S. 1219 suffers from many of the same flaws as the original 
     statute at issue in Buckley v. Valeo. There the ACLU 
     contended that the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 was 
     bad constitutional law because it cut to the heart of the 
     First Amendment's protections of political freedom. It 
     limited the ability of groups and individuals to get their 
     message across to the voters. The very essence of the First 
     Amendment is the right of the people to speak, to discuss, to 
     publish, to join together with others on issues of political 
     and public concern. This constitutional protection of the 
     right of the people to join together to form groups and 
     organizations and societies and associations and unions and 
     corporations to articulate and advocate their interests is 
     the genius of American democracy. And this is particularly 
     vital in connection with political election campaigns when 
     issues, arguments, candidates and causes swirl together in 
     the public arena. Yet, the 1974 Act imposed sweeping and 
     Draconian restraints on the ability of citizens and groups, 
     candidates and committees, parties and partisans to use their 
     resources, to make political contributions and expenditures, 
     to support and embody their freedom of speech and 
     association.
       The ACLU also insisted the Act was poorly crafted 
     ``political restructuring'' rather than real ``political 
     reform'' because it exacerbates the inequality of political 
     opportunity, enhances dependence upon money and moneyed 
     interests in politics and magnifies the power of incumbency 
     as the single most significant factor in politics. Limits on 
     giving and spending make it harder for those subject to the 
     restraints to raise funds and easier for those outside the 
     restraints to bring their resources to bear on politics. 
     Limiting individual contributions to $1,000 per candidate, 
     while allowing PACs, made legitimate by the ``reforms,'' to 
     contributes $5,000 per candidate, would make it harder to 
     raise money from individuals and make candidates more 
     dependent on PACs. And PACs, often representing entrenched 
     interests, would be more likely, though far from inevitably, 
     to prefer incumbents to challengers as beneficiaries of their 
     largesse. The Act would stifle not expand political 
     opportunity. What you had, we warned, was an unconstitutional 
     law, enacted by Congress, approved by the President, enforced 
     by an agency, the Federal Election Commission, beholden to 
     each, and designed to restrain the speech and association of 
     those who would criticize or challenge or oppose the elected 
     establishment. Talk about the powers of incumbency. That's 
     why we called the Act an ``Incumbents Protection Act.''
       In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that any 
     government regulation of political funding--of giving and 
     spending, of contributions and expenditures--is regulation of 
     political speech and subject to the strictest constitutional 
     scrutiny. The Act's limitations on political expenditures--by 
     committees, campaigns and candidates, no matter how 
     wealthy--flatly violated the First Amendment. Nothing can 
     justify the government telling the people how much they 
     could spend to promote their candidacies or causes. Not in 
     this country. Nothing. ``In the free society ordained by 
     our Constitution it is not the government, but the 
     people--individually as citizens and candidates and 
     collectively as associations and political committees--who 
     must retain control over the quantity and range of debate 
     on public issues in a political campaign.'' Buckley v. 
     Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,57 (1976).
       Nor could the Congress try to help ``equalize'' political 
     speech and the ability to influence the outcome of elections 
     by imposing restraints on some speakers: ``. . . the concept 
     that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
     our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others 
     is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.'' Buckley v. Valeo, 
     424 U.S. at 48-49.
       Unfortunately, the decision in Buckley upheld the Act's 
     contribution limits of $1,000 for individuals and $5,000 for 
     political committees. The Court did this because of its 
     stated concern that unlimited gifts to candidates was a 
     recipe for corruption, a ruling that ensured the two decades 
     of frustration and unfairness that have ensured. With no 
     limits on overall campaign spending or on wealthy candidates, 
     and with independent campaign committees, issues groups and 
     the press free to use their resources to comment on 
     candidates and causes without limit; but with less well-
     funded candidates hampered in their ability to raise money 
     from family, friends and supporters, the stage was set to 
     make two factors dominant: the advantages of incumbency and 
     the dependency on PACs.
       The advantages of incumbency meant that public resources 
     such as franking privileges, government funded newsletters 
     and free television coverage (C-Span) made it easier for 
     Members of Congress to communicate with the voters, while 
     challengers have to spend restricted amounts of money in 
     order to achieve the same visibility.
       The dependency on PACs resulted from severe limitations on 
     the amounts of money that individuals can contribute directly 
     to candidates, coupled with the markedly increased cost of 
     campaigning, which made PAC contributions a very important 
     source of campaign funding. And the individual contribution 
     limit was kept at $1,000, which, adjusted for inflation, is 
     probably worth about $400 in real dollars today.
       That is why for twenty years candidates have had to look 
     more to PACs order to raise funds and incumbents, in 
     particular, have had an easier ability to do so.
       And for twenty years, the ACLU has suggested the way to 
     solve these various disparities and dilemmas is to expand 
     political participation, by providing public financing or 
     support for all legally qualified candidates, without 
     conditions and restrictions, not to restrict contributions 
     and expenditures which enable groups and individuals to 
     communicate their message to the voters.
       Unfortunately, in all of its critical aspects, S. 1219, The 
     Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995 fails to 
     facilitate broader political participation and it also 
     unconstitutionally abridges political expression.

  Mr. President, the proponents of this bill are very mistaken if they 
believe the spending limits are constitutional. The ACLU differs:

       Title I of the bill, providing ``spending limits and 
     benefits'' for Senate election campaigns, is an attempt to 
     coerce what the law cannot command: limitations on overall 
     campaign expenditures and on the use of personal funds for a 
     candidate's own campaign. It is a backdoor effort to impose 
     campaign spending limits--which inevitably benefit 
     incumbents--in violation of the essential free speech 
     principles of Buckley v. Valeo and the doctrine of 
     unconstitutional conditions. And it should be observed 
     that what triggers benefits for some candidates and 
     burdens for others is not that a candidate approaches or 
     exceeds relevant spending limits, but simply refuses to 
     agree to be bound by them.
       The ACLU believes that the receipt of public subsidies or 
     benefits can never be conditioned on surrendering 
     constitutional rights. To do so would be to penalize the 
     exercise of those rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
     593, 597 (1972); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 
     (1984). Since candidates have an unqualified right to spend 
     as much as they can to get their message to the voters, and 
     to spend as much of their own funds as they can, and to raise 
     funds from supporters all over the country, they cannot be 
     made to surrender those rights in order to receive public 
     benefits.
       In Buckley the Court suggested that Congress could 
     establish a system whereby candidates would choose freely 
     between full public funding with expenditure limits and 
     private spending without limits, ``as long as the candidate 
     remains free to engage in unlimited private funding and 
     spending instead of limited public funding.'' Republican 
     National Committee v. Federal Election Commission, 487 F. 
     Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980). 
     See Buckley at 57, n. 65. Contrary to its supporters' claims, 
     S. 1219 does not establish such a regime of voluntary 
     campaign spending limits. Rather, the bill denies significant 
     benefits to and imposes burdens on those candidates who 
     refuse to agree to limit their campaign expenditures, while 
     conferring a series of advantages upon those candidates who 
     agree to the limits.
       First, by banning PAC contributions entirely, the bill 
     makes it more difficult for candidates to raise and spend 
     money at all, which will make them more susceptible to 
     accepting the expenditure and other limitations. Candidates 
     who refuse to accept spending limits have to work harder to 
     raise funds because the limits on contributions to their 
     opponents are raised automatically from $1,000 to $2,000. And 
     then such disfavored candidates have to pay full rates for 
     broadcasting and postage. Finally, the expenditure ceilings 
     of their opponents are raised by 20% to make it easier to 
     counter the messages of ``non-complying'' candidates.
       In short, this scheme does everything possible to help the 
     candidate who agrees to spending limits to overwhelm the 
     candidate who does not. That is not a level playing field.
       Indeed, in Buckley the Court upheld public funding of 
     Presidential campaigns because its purpose was ``not to 
     abridge, restrict or censor speech, but rather to use public 
     money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and 
     participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a 
     self-governing people.'' 424 U.S. at 92-93. S. 1219 fails 
     this test, for its purposes and effect are to limit speech, 
     not enhance it. Recent cases have invalidated other schemes 
     for making candidates ``voluntarily'' agree to expenditure 
     and other restraints by penalizing those who do not, see 
     Shrink Missouri Government PAC v. Maupin,--F.3d--, 64 Law 
     Week 2409 (8th Cir. 1995) (restricting funding sources of 
     those who refuse to agree to abide by expenditure limits 
     violates the First Amendment) (``We are hard-pressed to 
     discern how the interests of good government could possibly 
     be served

[[Page S6807]]

     by campaign expenditure laws that necessarily have the effect 
     of limiting the quantity of political speech in which 
     candidates for public office are allowed to engage.'' Id. 
     at--);
       Moreover, even if the Act did create a level playing field, 
     the incumbent starts the game 10 points ahead because of 
     greater fund-raising ability, name recognition, access to the 
     news media and other benefits of incumbency. All things being 
     equal, the incumbent starts out ahead. Any law which imposes 
     financial penalties and disincentives on speech because of 
     the interaction between the status of the speaker and the 
     content of the speech is constitutionally suspect. See 
     Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State 
     Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (law improperly 
     escrowed profits from writings about a criminal's crime); 
     United States v. National Treasury Employee's Union, 516 
     U.S.--(1995) (invalidating overbroad honorarium ban on 
     moonlighting speeches and articles by federal employees). 
     Schemes of public benefits for political action which are 
     structured in such a fashion that the government seems to 
     be showing favoritism to certain categories of candidates 
     and penalizing others also have been held to be a form of 
     unconstitutional political discrimination, violative of 
     both free speech and equality principles. See Greenberg v. 
     Bolger, 497 F. Supp. 756, 774-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) 
     (preferential mailing rates for major parties struck down 
     as violative of the First Amendment); Rhode Island Chapter 
     of the National Women's Political Caucus v. Rhode Island 
     State Lottery Comm'n, 609 F. Supp. 1403, 1414 (D.R.I. 
     1985) (allowing major parties but not other groups to 
     conduct fundraising lottery events violated the First 
     Amendment); McKenna v. Reilly, 419 F. Supp. 1179, 1188 
     (D.R.I. 1976) (state parties' allocation of tax check off 
     funds to endorsed candidates and exclusion of funds to 
     unendorsed candidates violated First Amendment).
       Finally, some of the strings attached to the benefits 
     offered would impose unprecedented controls on political 
     speech by dictating the format of campaign speech. The 
     requirement that free air time cannot be used for campaign 
     commercials of less than 30 seconds is an impermissible 
     interference with the content of political speech. See 
     McIntyre v. Ohio Election Commission, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 
     (1995). The only conceivable purpose for this restriction is 
     that Congress thinks 10 second spot commercials are 
     politically objectionable. That is the kind of content-based 
     judgment that Congress cannot make, even when it is 
     conferring a benefit; nor can Congress compel the structure 
     of speech in that fashion. See McIntyre, supra; Wooley v. 
     Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Riley v. National Federation of 
     the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
       The McIntyre and Riley decisions also call into question 
     the provisions of the Bill (Section 302, Campaign 
     Advertising) that mandate certain specific identifications 
     and disclosures in the text of print, display or broadcast 
     political advertisements. In McIntyre the Court reaffirmed 
     the historic right of political anonymity and invalidated a 
     requirement that leaflets on referenda issues state the name 
     of the person responsible for the publications. And in Riley, 
     the Court struck down a compulsory disclosure statement on 
     charitable solicitation literature, finding a violation of 
     the settled principle that the First Amendment encompasses 
     ``the decision of both what to say and what not to say.'' 487 
     U.S. at 797.
       2. The complete ban on, as well as the ``fallback'' 
     restrictions of, Political Action Committees are invalid 
     under clear Supreme Court precedent.
       Subtitle A of Title II, the Draconian provision which 
     proudly proclaims that it enacts ``Elimination of Political 
     Action Committees from Federal Election Activities'' and 
     which bans PAC political activity, is flatly 
     unconstitutional. In outlawing all political expenditures and 
     contributions ``made for the purpose of influencing an 
     election for Federal office''--except those made by political 
     parties and their candidates,--Section 201 of the bill cuts 
     to the heart of the First Amendment's protection of freedom 
     of political speech and association. It gives a permanent 
     political monopoly to political parties and political 
     candidates, and would silence all those groups that want to 
     support or oppose those parties and candidates.
       ``PACs'' of course have become a political dirty word. We 
     tend to think of the real estate PACs or the Trial Lawyers' 
     PAC or the insurance and medical PACs or the tobacco-related 
     PACs. But the ACLU's first encounter with a ``PAC'' was when 
     we had to defend a handful of old-time dissenters whom the 
     government claimed were an illegal ``political 
     committee.'' The small group had run a two-page 
     advertisement in The New York Times, urging the 
     impeachment of President (and re-election candidate) 
     Richard Nixon for bombing Cambodia and praising those few 
     hardy Members of Congress who had voted against the 
     bombing. In the summer of 1972, before the ink was dry on 
     the brand new Campaign Act of 1971, the Justice Department 
     used that ``campaign reform'' law to haul the little group 
     into court, label them a ``political committee'' and 
     threaten them with injunctions and fines unless they 
     complied with the law--all for publicly speaking their 
     minds on a key political issue of the day. The Court of 
     Appeals quickly held that the group was an ad hoc issue 
     organization, not a covered ``political committee.'' But 
     we got an early wake-up call on what ``campaign reform'' 
     really meant.
       Of course, ``real'' PACs, i.e., those that give or spend 
     money to or on behalf of federal candidates, come in all 
     sizes and shapes. They can be purely ideological or primarily 
     self-interested, or both simultaneously. And they span the 
     political spectrum. Labor PACs were organized first, in the 
     1940's, usually to provide funds, resources and personnel to 
     assist political candidates, usually Democrats. Corporate 
     PACs came on line in the early 1970's, usually on the 
     Republican side. And both corporate and labor PACs were 
     legitimized and liberated by the ``reforms'' of the FECA, 
     which allowed those and all other PACs to contribute five 
     times as much money to federal candidates as individuals 
     could. All this turned the Federal Election Campaign Act into 
     the PAC Magna Carta Act.
       We think all that PAC activity is simply a reflection of 
     the myriad groups and associations that make up so much of 
     our political life. And so many of them are an effective way 
     for individuals to maximize their political voice by giving 
     to the PAC of their choice. While many PAC contributors and 
     supporters probably do fit the stereotype of the glad-
     handing, Washington-based influence peddler, millions of PAC 
     supporters contribute less than $50 and expect nothing from 
     the candidates in return. Indeed, for millions of Americans, 
     writing a check to the candidate, committee or cause of their 
     choice is a fundamental political act, second in importance 
     and meaning only to voting.
       Proposals to restrict, restrain or even repeal PACs would 
     suppress the great variety of political activity those PACs 
     embody. Most of those proposals are doomed to defeat as 
     unconstitutional. All of them are doomed to defeat as futile.


                       Banning PAC Contributions

       There is not a word in Buckley v. Valeo or any of the other 
     relevant cases on regulation of PACs which suggests that the 
     Court would uphold a total ban on PAC contributions to 
     federal candidates. Political contributions are fundamentally 
     protected by the First Amendment, as embodiments of both 
     speech and association. PACs do amplify the political voices 
     of their contributors and supporters across the entire 
     spectrum of American politics, and the Court is not likely to 
     let you still all those voices.
       Moreover, banning PAC contributions is futile as a reform. 
     All the PAC money that cannot be contributed directly to 
     candidates will go instead into an upsurge of independent 
     expenditure campaigns for favored or against disfavored 
     candidates.


                        Banning PAC Expenditures

       The Supreme Court made it clear that independent PAC 
     expenditures are at the core of the First Amendment and 
     totally off limits to restrictions. Federal Election 
     Commission v. National Conservative Political Action 
     Committee, 470 U.S. 480 (1985). It may be a little less 
     tidy to run an independent campaign, than to write a check 
     to your favored candidate, but PACs will adapt. They're 
     good at that. And little will have been gained-except 
     making it harder for candidates to raise money since you 
     will have deprived them of a major source of resources, 
     without providing any alternatives. Candidates of moderate 
     means will be particularly vulnerable to campaigns by 
     personally wealthy opponents.


                       reducing pac contributions

       The ``fallback'' provision, which goes into effect when the 
     flat ban is ruled unconstitutional, as it surely will be, 
     would lower PAC contributions from $5,000 to $1,000 per 
     candidate per election. This might be a closer constitutional 
     question. But the Court threw out a $250 limit on 
     contributions to a referendum campaign committee. See 
     Committee Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 
     (1981). Indeed, just recently the Eighth Circuit likewise 
     invalidated a $300 contribution limitation for donations to 
     statewide candidates. Carver v. Nixon, -- F.2d -- ,64 Law 
     Week 2407 (8th Cir. 1995). And Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 
     (1988) held that people had a right to spend money to hire 
     others to gather election petition signatures, strongly 
     reaffirming the right of a person to use his or her resources 
     to enlist others to advance their causes. In any event, this 
     provision is fatally overbroad because it treats all PACs 
     alike, even those made up only of small contributors.
       Finally, apart from the First Amendment issues, what 
     purpose is served by reducing the ability of candidates to 
     raise money without providing alternatives?

  Mr. President, earlier I mentioned Col. Billie Bobbit (USAF), the 
EMILY's List member who is quiet certain the first amendment protects 
her right to participate in elections via bundling. Colonel Bobbitt's 
instincts are right on the mark as the ACLU testimony observes:

                                bundling

       The same objections pertain to the ban on ``bundling'' of 
     individual PAC contributions. This fallback proposal would 
     abridge freedom of association which the Supreme Court has 
     recognized as a ``basic constitutional freedom.'' Kusper v. 
     pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973). And the Court has pointedly 
     observed that ``the practice of persons sharing common views 
     banding together to achieve a common end is deeply embedded 
     in the American political process.'' Citizens Against Rent 
     Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981). The practice 
     of bundling reflects broad issue support to a candidate, 
     indicating that continued support is dependent on

[[Page S6808]]

     continued adherence to the views represented by the group. 
     The proposed bill would severely restrict ideological groups 
     like Emily's List, which have made a critical contribution to 
     expanding political opportunity and opening up political 
     doors to candidates and groups so long excluded.


                      receiving pac contributions

       The fallback provision would also prohibit any PAC from 
     making a contribution which raises a candidate's PAC receipts 
     above 20% of the campaign expenditure ceilings applicable to 
     that election. But this restraint also seems overbroad. The 
     corruption concern becomes very attenuated in this setting, 
     and the rationale for the overall 20% limit seems weak 
     against First Amendment standards. Once the limit is reached, 
     candidates and PACs, in effect, would be banned totally from 
     political interaction with one another, which would seem as 
     constitutionally vulnerable as a total ban and have the 
     effect of a limitation on campaign expenditures. And what of 
     new groups that wanted to support a candidate after the 
     candidate's PAC quota had been reached, especially if the 
     campaign turns on an issue--abortion for example--of great 
     moment to that group?
       Finally, all of this begins to resemble yet another 
     backdoor effort to limit overall campaign expenditures, in 
     violation of Buckley's core principles.


             limiting out-of-state political contributions

       Somehow, I have always found particularly troublesome those 
     proposals to limit the amount of out-of-district or out-of-
     state contributions to candidates. Section 241 does not seem 
     to operate as a direct ban on out-of-State contributions. 
     Rather it provides that a candidate must receive not less 
     than 60% of their overall contributions from in-state 
     individuals in order to remain in compliance with the 
     spending limits and receive the statutory benefits. 
     Obviously, this is a backdoor effort to limit PAC 
     contributions to candidates, since so many PAC contributors 
     come from States different from the candidates their PACs 
     contribute to, as do the PACs themselves. It also seems to be 
     an effort to insulate incumbents from well-funded challenges 
     supported from another State.
       Any potential justification for this ban seems highly 
     unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Analogizing this 
     restriction to a voter's residency requirement falls short 
     after McIntyre v. Ohio Board of Elections,--US--(1995) which 
     held that restrictions on political speech about candidates 
     or referenda cannot be upheld on the grounds that they are 
     merely ballot or electoral regulations, because, in reality, 
     they are free speech limitations. Indeed, a federal court in 
     Oregon recently so held in overturning a requirement that 
     state and local candidates had to raise all their campaign 
     funds from individuals who resided within their election 
     districts. Vannatta v. Keisling,--F. Supp.--(D. Ore. 1995).
       Moreover, in-state limitations could deprive particular 
     kinds of underfinanced, insurgent candidates of the kind of 
     out-of-state support they need. Just as much of the civil 
     rights movement was funded by contributors and supporters 
     from other parts of the nation, so, too, are many new and 
     struggling candidates supported by interests beyond their 
     home states. This proposal would severely harm such 
     candidacies. Perhaps, that is its purpose.
       Finally, Congress is our national legislature, and although 
     its representatives come and are elected from separate 
     districts and states, the issues you deal with are, by 
     definition, national issues that transcend district and state 
     lines and may be of concern to citizens all over the nation. 
     When such issues become central in certain campaigns, people 
     and groups from all over the country should be entitled to 
     have their views and voices heard on those issues. Any other 
     approach takes a disturbingly insular and isolated view of 
     political accountability and the obligations of a Member of 
     Congress.
       3. The new controls on ``soft money'' contributions and 
     expenditures are unprecedented and unjustified restraints on 
     political parties.
       The new sweeping controls on ``soft-money'' contributions 
     to and disbursements by political parties and other 
     organizations, federal, state or local, would expand the 
     reaches of the FECA into unprecedented new areas and far 
     beyond any compelling interest would require.
       For the first time, any amounts expended or disbursed by a 
     political party in an election year ``for any activity which 
     might affect the outcome of a Federal election, including but 
     not limited to any voter registration and get-out-the-vote 
     activity, any generic campaign activity and any communication 
     that identifies a Federal candidate. . .'' would be subject 
     to regulation. See Section 212. The full panoply of FECA 
     compliance and control would be brought to bear on the 
     enormous amount of political party activity which heretofore 
     has been exempt from controls because it was not directly and 
     explicitly focused on specific federal candidates. And even 
     beyond that, ``soft money'' spending by persons other than 
     political parties is also for the first time subject to 
     comprehensive regulation, with reporting, disclosure and 
     notification requirements mandated as well as a required 
     certification of whether the disbursement ``is in support 
     of, or in opposition to, one or more candidates or any 
     political party.''
       The reach of these new proposals is breathtaking. Starting 
     with Buckley v. Valeo, the Court has recognized a fundamental 
     constitutional distinction between candidate-focused 
     expenditures and contributions, which can be subject to 
     certain specific regulation, and all other non-partisan, 
     political and issue-oriented speech, advocacy and 
     association. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 78-80, 
     First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 
     (1978); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 479 U.S. 238, 
     249 (1986). The reason for this First Amendment Continental 
     Divide is to insure that the permissible regulation of 
     candidate-focused political campaign funding remains confined 
     to that area, and does not expand to encompass all the 
     funding of all political issues and groups. These regulations 
     of funding which is not candidate-focused transgresses this 
     boundary and requires, at the very least, the demonstration 
     of the most compelling governmental interests, necessarily 
     and narrowly achieved by the sweeping new controls.
       Moreover, any regulation of political parties is a 
     regulation of a quintessential First Amendment 
     instrumentality and likewise requires compelling 
     justification, at a minimum. See Tashjian v. Republican 
     Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Eu v. San Francisco Democratic 
     Party, 489 U.S. 214 (1989). Political parties play a vital 
     role in galvanizing the political life of the nation. Indeed, 
     many political scientists have expressed mounting concern 
     that one consequence of the current regime of candidate-
     focused political funding and activity is unfortunately to 
     undermine the role of parties, special interest groups or ad 
     hoc coalitions as instruments for political activity and 
     vitality. For that reason, an expanded amount of party 
     spending on voter registration, party identification, get-
     out-the-vote drives, and partisan-based issue discussion 
     (``The Republicans want to cut Medicare and Medicaid. Don't 
     let them do it.'' or, ``The Democrats support a welfare 
     state. Say no to government dependents.'') should be a 
     welcome development, rather than the target for new and 
     overbearing regulatory restrictions. It is also a 
     constitutionally-derived right: ``. . . Discussion of public 
     issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are 
     integral to the operation of the system of government 
     established by our Constitution . . . In a republic where the 
     people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make 
     informed choices among candidates for office is essential.'' 
     Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-15.
       Finally, to some extent the motivations for the new 
     restraints on party activity may reflect a concern about the 
     source of the ``soft money'' funding, namely, from 
     corporations and large individual donors. In that regard, it 
     should be observed that Buckley upheld the $1,000 limit on 
     individual contributions to candidates in part because there 
     would be so many other ways in which people and organizations 
     could bring their financial resources to bear on politics. 
     See 424 U.S. at 28-29, 44-45. The bill would block avenues of 
     advocacy that the Buckley Court assumed would remain open.
       These issues are presently before the Supreme Court in an 
     important case in which certiorari was granted in early 
     January. See Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee 
     v. Federal Election Commission, O.T. 1995, No. 95-489, 
     reviewing, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995). At the very least, 
     any action on this section of the bill should await the 
     Court's resolution of the Colorado case. For your 
     information, the ACLU plans to file an amicus curiae brief in 
     support of the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign 
     Committee.
       4. The new provisions governing the right to make 
     independent expenditures improperly intrude upon that core 
     area of electoral speech and impermissibly invade the 
     absolutely protected area of issue advocacy.
       Two basic truths have emerged with crystal clarity after 
     twenty years of campaign finance regulations. First, 
     independent electoral advocacy by citizen groups lies at the 
     very core of the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment. 
     Second, issue advocacy by citizen group lies totally outside 
     the permissible area of government regulation.
       In Buckley the Court upheld the speech and association 
     rights of individuals to engage in independent campaign 
     expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of 
     political candidates. In Federal Election Commission v. 
     National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 
     480 (1985), the Court assured the same rights to political 
     action committees. And in Federal Election Commission v. 
     Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 470 U.S. 238 (1986) 
     the same right of express electoral advocacy was extended to 
     certain kinds of non-profit advocacy groups despite their 
     corporate form, although a later case held that other 
     corporate entities could be restricted in this regard. See 
     Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
       S. 1219 abridges these rights in two ways. First, Section 
     201 of the bill completely bans independent expenditures by 
     PACs, which is flatly unconstitutional, as noted above. On 
     the ``fallback'' assumption of such likely invalidation, 
     Section 251 redefines independent expenditures so narrowly 
     and ``coordinated'' expenditures so broadly that the area of 
     freedom of speech and association is drastically reduced and 
     abridged in the process.
       Under current law, an independent expenditures is one made 
     without the knowledge or permission of a candidate, his or 
     her agent or campaign committee. See 2 U.S.C. section 431(17) 
     (``The term `independent expenditure' means an expenditure by 
     a person expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
     clearly identified candidate which is made without

[[Page S6809]]

     cooperation or consultation with any candidate, or any 
     authorized committee or agent of such candidate, and which is 
     not made in concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, 
     any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such 
     candidate.''). Coordinated expenditures are treated like and 
     limited like contributions to a candidate.
       The proposed bill, however, so broadly defines coordination 
     that virtually any person who has had any interaction with a 
     candidate or any campaign official, in person or otherwise, 
     is barred from making an independent expenditure. For 
     example, under Section 251, any expenditure is deemed 
     coordinated, and not independent, if the person making it 
     ``has advised or counseled'' the candidate or his agents on 
     any matter relating to the campaign or election. If you use 
     the same political consultant or firm as the candidate you 
     are likewise deemed coordinated.
       These restrictions embody a new and impermissible version 
     of ``guilt by association,'' and a new kind of ``gag rule'' 
     by association. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) 
     (A speaker cannot be punished for organizing a meeting and 
     appearing on the same public platform where radicals were 
     also speaking). Indeed, it could have some perverse effects. 
     A disaffected campaign worker or volunteer, who leaves a 
     campaign because he or she thinks a candidate has acted 
     improperly, is barred from making independent expenditures 
     against that candidate, for, ironically, they will be deemed 
     a contribution.
       The other way in which the provision governing independent 
     expenditures is fatally flawed is in its expanded definition 
     of ``express advocacy,'' which is defined as a communication 
     that ``taken as a whole and with limited reference to 
     external events'' communicates ``an expression of support for 
     or opposition to'' a specific candidate or groups of 
     candidates. ``Expression of support'' includes ``a 
     suggestion to take action with respect to an election,'' 
     including ``to refrain from taking action.'' ``Throw the 
     rascals out'' has just become express advocacy.
       This broadened definition of ``express advocacy'' would 
     sweep in the kind of essential issue advocacy which Buckley 
     and cases predating Buckley by a generation, see Thomas v. 
     Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), have held to be immune from 
     government regulation and control. It seems to be targeted 
     exactly against the kind of voting record ``box score'' 
     discussion that emanates from the hundreds and thousands of 
     issue organizations that enrich our public and political 
     life. In Buckley, the Court adopted a bright line test of 
     express advocacy (words that in express terms advocate the 
     election of defeat of a candidate) in order to immunize issue 
     advocacy form regulation: ``So long as persons or groups 
     eschew expenditures that in express terms advocate the 
     election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they 
     are free to spend as much as they want to promote the 
     candidate and his views.'' Id. at 45. Indeed, the 1975 Act 
     contained a similar provision regulating issue groups and 
     their ``box score'' activities, and that section was 
     unanimously held unconstitutional by the en banc Court of 
     Appeals, without any further appeal by the government. See 
     Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 817, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The 
     expanded definition of ``express advocacy'' is similarly 
     flawed.
       5. The bill gives unacceptable new powers of prior 
     restraint and political censorship to the Federal Election 
     Commission.
       With all of these problems with the bill, particularly 
     those that pertain to issue advocacy and independent 
     expenditures, giving the Federal Election Commission sweeping 
     new powers to go to court to seek an injunction on the 
     allegation of a ``substantial likelihood that a violation . . 
     . is about to occur'' is fraught with First Amendment peril.
       As indicated earlier in this testimony, the very first suit 
     brought under the brand spanking new campaign reforms in 1972 
     was against a small group of dissenters who sponsored an ad 
     in The New York Times criticizing the President and praising 
     a handful of his Congressional critics. Reminiscent of some 
     of the language in the bill before you, the government's 
     claim was that the advertisement was an electioneering 
     message because it was ``in derogation of'' candidate Nixon 
     and ``in support of'' the praised Members who were also up 
     for re-election. While the courts quickly and sharply 
     rebuffed those efforts to use political campaign laws to 
     control issue advocacy, see United States v. National 
     Committee for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); 
     American Civil Liberties Union v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 
     (D.D.C. 1973), the Commission's record of sensitivity to 
     First Amendment values in the area of issue advocacy was once 
     described as ``abysmal.'' See National Committee for 
     Impeachment, supra, 469 F.2d at 1141-42 (Kaufman, C.J. 
     concurring). And ever since then, non-partisan, issue-
     oriented groups like the ACLU, the National Organization for 
     Women, the Chamber of Commerce, Right-to-Life Committees and 
     many others, have had to defend themselves against charges 
     that their public advocacy rendered them subject to all of 
     the FECA's restrictions, regulations and controls. And the 
     problem persists. See Federal Election Commission v. Survival 
     Education Fund, 65 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding, 2 to 1, 
     that 1984 fund-raising mailings critical of President 
     Reagan's foreign policies constituted a solicitation of a 
     contribution subject to FECA requirements).
       The kind of ``chilling effect'' that such enforcement 
     authority generates in the core area of protected speech 
     makes the strongest case against giving the Commission 
     additional powers to tamper with First Amendment rights.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 16 seconds remaining.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, I thank my staffers, Tamara Somerville 
and Lani Gerst for their good work on this most important issue. Tam 
and I have been through these battles a few times, including staying up 
all night, a couple years ago. She has been a great help. I have 
enjoyed working with her on this and thank her for her service to the 
Nation.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wisconsin has 9 minutes.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I thank Andy Kutler, Susan Martinez, and 
Larry Murphy.
  I ask unanimous consent that a letter from President Clinton, a 
longtime supporter of campaign finance reform, urging the Senate to 
pass this legislation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the record, as follows:

                                              The White House,

                                    Washington, DC, June 24, 1996.
     Hon. Thomas A. Daschle,
     Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: Just over a year ago, I shook hands with 
     Speaker Gingrich and publicly affirmed my commitment to 
     reforming the nation's campaign finance laws. Now I call on 
     Congress to send me legislation that will address the 
     American public's desire for real change in our political 
     process, and in so doing renew our democracy and strengthen 
     our country. I support the legislation now being considered. 
     In particular, I approve of several reforms such as placing 
     limits on spending, curbing PAC and lobbyist influence, 
     discounting the cost of broadcast time, and reforming the 
     soft money system.
       Organized interests have too much power in the halls of 
     government. Oftentimes, representatives from such interest 
     groups operate without accountability and are granted special 
     privileges that ordinary Americans don't even know exist. In 
     addition, elections that represent an opportunity in which 
     ordinary voters should have the loudest voice have become so 
     expensive that these voices are sometimes drowned out by big 
     money.
       Let us capitalize on the progress made in the last three 
     years. In 1993, we repealed the tax loophole that allowed 
     lobbyists to deduct the cost of their activities. In 1994, I 
     signed a law that applies to Congress the same laws if 
     imposes on the general public. Last year, Congress answered 
     my call to stop taking gifts, meals, and trips from 
     lobbyists, and I signed the Lobbying Disclosure Act into law. 
     We now have an opportunity to finish the job by addressing 
     campaign finance reform.
       As we work to reform campaign finance, we must do 
     everything in our power to ensure that we open, not limit, 
     the political process. Our goal is to take the reins of our 
     democracy away from big special interests, from big money, 
     and to return them to the hands of those who deserve them--
     ordinary Americans. Real reform is now achievable. I urge the 
     Senate to pass this legislation and give the American people 
     something we can all be proud of.
           Sincerely,
                                                     Bill Clinton.


                          broadcast provisions

  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, it has been suggested that the broadcast 
provisions in this bill may adversely affect the broadcast industry and 
I would like to respond to that point.
  First, with respect to the free time provision, it is important to 
understand that this is really a limited free time benefit. It is 
limited to 30 minutes of free time. Second, the free time is only 
available to general election candidates--not primary election 
candidates. And third, of the general election candidates, it is only 
available to those general election candidates who agree to limit their 
spending.
  We have also carefully crafted this provision to have as minimal 
effect on the broadcasters as possible. First, no one candidate can 
request more than 15 minutes of their free time from any one broadcast 
station. Second, use of the free time must occur in intervals between 
30 seconds and 5 minutes. This will ensure that the requirement to 
provide free time will not interfere with the normal programming of the 
broadcast station.
  And finally, the bill clearly states any broadcast station that can 
demonstrate that providing such free time will cause the station 
significant economic hardship is exempt from the free time requirement.
  So clearly, the free time provision is not going to have a 
significantly burdensome effect on the broadcasters.

[[Page S6810]]

  With respect to the 50-percent discount, it should be noted that this 
provision is really the linchpin of the legislation. Without public 
financing, there must be some alternative incentive to encourage 
candidates to voluntarily limit their campaign spending. Such an 
incentive had to have an effect similar to that of public funding in 
the Presidential system--that is, to lower campaign costs so the 
candidate can spend less time on the phone raising money and more time 
running a statewide grassroots campaign.
  As we all know, the great proportion of a Senate candidate's campaign 
budget is devoted to broadcast advertising. And therefore, the most 
sensible solution for lowering campaign costs is to cut the costs of 
running television advertisements.
  Keep in mind, Mr. President, current law already recognizes a public 
trustee standard with respect to broadcasters. Under current law, 
broadcasters must provide all Federal candidates with the lowest price 
they charge to commercial advertisers for similarly run advertisements.
  That is current law. All we are doing is providing an additional 
discount to that special price.
  This is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's 1969 ruling in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Company versus Federal Communications Commission 
decision. In the Red Lion decision, the Court upheld the congressional 
determination made in 1934 that the airwaves belong to the American 
people, and this decision has subsequently been used to require the 
broadcasters to provide services such as lowest unit rate and equal 
time to qualifying Federal candidates.
  To suggest that the provisions embodied in the McCain-Feingold bill 
are somehow a violation of the broadcasters first amendment rights is a 
proposition that has already been tossed out by the courts.
  Let me quote from the legal analysis of this issue prepared by Law 
Professor Fred Schauer of Harvard University. Professor Schauer writes,

       As long as Red Lion remains the law, Congress may within 
     limits consider broadcast time to belong to the public, and 
     to be subject to allocation in the public interest. In this 
     respect, therefore, price restrictions on advertising, and 
     direct grants of broadcast time, will not violate the First 
     Amendment as it is presently interpreted.

  So it is clear that what we are requiring in this campaign finance 
reform bill is not only sound public policy, but completely within the 
confines of first amendment principles.
  So now we come to the question of how this provision will affect the 
financial viability of the broadcast industry. Mr. President, when we 
talk about what sort of costs the broadcasters are going to incur as a 
result of this legislation, there are several important factors to keep 
in mind.
  First, with respect to the free time provision, we are only talking 
about general election candidates who agree to voluntarily limit their 
spending. In any given State, where only two Senate elections occur 
every 6 years, this will have a nominal impact on broadcasters. Even if 
all general election candidates do agree to comply with the bill and 
receive the benefits, that means that all of the broadcasters in a 
particular State will only have to provide 2 hours of free time over a 
6-year period.
  It may interest my colleagues to know that the Congressional Research 
Service has analyzed the broadcast provisions of the McCain-Feingold 
proposal, and prepared a cost-estimate of how much these provisions 
might cost the broadcast industry.
  I ask unanimous consent that the text of this report be placed in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  According to CRS, assuming all general election candidates were 
eligible for and used the free time benefit, this provision would cost 
the broadcast industry a maximum, a maximum Mr. President, of about $6 
million per Senate election.
  Figures provided by the National Association of Broadcasters [NAB] 
show that total political television advertising revenues in 1994 for 
the broadcast industry were $355 million. That is just political 
advertising revenues.
  Total television advertising revenues in 1994 were $24.7 billion.
  That means that the free time provision in the McCain-Feingold 
proposal, scored at a maximum of $6 million by CRS, would cost the 
broadcasters about 1.6 percent of their annual political advertising 
revenues, and less than three-hundredths of 1 percent (.025 percent) of 
their total annual advertising revenues. And of course, this would only 
occur in a brief period of time every 2 years.
  And what about the 50-percent discount provision, that has been 
purported to be potentially catastrophic for the broadcast industry. 
According to CRS, the total cost of the 50-percent discount provision 
in the primary and general election would be $48 million, again, 
assuming all candidates were eligible for the discount.
  So the most this provision would cost the broadcast industry 
according to CRS's independent analysis is less than $50 million.
  Again, how does this compare as a percentage of the industry's 
revenues, both political and commercial?
  Using the NAB's numbers on political advertising revenues and all 
other advertising revenues, this $48 million provision in S. 1219 would 
cost broadcasters, at most, about 13 percent of their political 
advertising revenues, and less than half of 1 percent (.19 percent) of 
their total advertising revenues. And again, this would only be every 2 
years.
  Mr. President, we are talking about less than one-half of 1 percent 
of the industry's revenues. And that is a maximum, it is likely to be 
much less than this.
  And as you can see from this chart, the broadcast provisions in the 
McCain-Feingold proposal would cost the broadcast industry less than 
two-tenths of 1 percent of their total advertising revenues in 1994. 
And again, these nominal costs would only have to be incurred twice 
every 6 years.
  So I think it is clear, Mr. President, that not only does the 
broadcast industry have a legal obligation to contribute to the 
political process, such a contribution would have a minimal effect on 
their overall revenues. The benefit to the public of cleaning up our 
congressional elections, in contrast, would be enormous.
  Mr. President, it has been suggested that the bipartisan proposal put 
forth by myself and the Senators from Arizona and Tennessee would 
somehow further entrench incumbents and make it more difficult for 
challengers to run for office.
  Mr. President, this is yet another argument put forth by the 
defenders of the status quo that does not pass the straight face test.
  First of all, let us remember what sort of campaign finance system we 
currently have and how it affects challengers and incumbents. I don't 
think that anyone can dispute that the current campaign finance system 
confers significant benefits on incumbent Senators that provides 
incumbents an overwhelming advantage over challengers.
  Incumbents start out with more name recognition. Incumbents are 
permitted to send out free mass mailings to the voters of their States, 
which often are little more than thinly disguised campaign newsletters.
  And most importantly, as virtually every legitimate study has shown, 
the campaign cash overwhelmingly flows to incumbents. Whether it is PAC 
money, soft money, bundled money--you name it. The campaign money 
always flows to incumbents.
  To suggest that spending limits will somehow make it more difficult 
for challengers to run for office is to suggest that challengers have 
access to the kind of money that incumbents have access to.
  That assertion is just factually false.
  Challengers cannot raise millions of dollars as incumbents can. The 
few challengers that are able to mount credible campaigns are those few 
challengers that are millionaires, and that is why more and more Senate 
campaigns are turning into races between an incumbent and a 
millionaire.
  As this first chart demonstrates, money does matter. In 1990, 1992, 
and 1994, the Senate average winning candidate not only outspent the 
loser in that particular race, but far outdistanced them.
  In fact, in most cases, the winning candidate doubled--doubled--Mr. 
President, what the losing candidate spent. That means that for every 
television

[[Page S6811]]

spot the losing candidate was able to run, the winning candidate was 
able to run two television spots--in some cases, three or four or five 
times as many spots.
  Now the fact that money is clearly the most determining factor in 
influencing the outcome of Senate elections is troubling by itself. It 
is a harsh indictment of the current limitless-spending campaign 
spending that the junior Senator from Kentucky is defending.
  But if we know that the candidate who spends the most money is likely 
to be the winning Senate candidate, the next logical question is, who's 
getting the money?
  As you can see, Mr. President, incumbents are getting the money. Not 
only are they getting the money, they are blowing challengers out of 
the water.
  That is the current campaign finance system--a system in which the 
candidate who spends the most money is the likely winner, and a system 
in which the money flows overwhelmingly to incumbents. The current 
system is rigged to protect incumbents, and our proposal, for the first 
time ever, will provide challengers who do not have access to millions 
and millions of dollars to run a fair and competitive campaign.
  We have spending limits in the Presidential system, Mr. President. 
Have they protected incumbents? They didn't protect President Ford. 
They didn't protect President Carter. And they didn't protect President 
Bush. The Presidential system, thanks to voluntary spending limits, has 
produced fair and competitive elections for 20 years now. The 
congressional system, with unlimited campaign spending, has produced 
the opposite.
  The evidence is clear, Mr. President and I am hopeful my colleagues 
will see through the phony and absurd argument that spending limits 
hurt challengers.


                      the constitutional argument

  Mr. President, I have listened to the arguments of the Senator from 
Kentucky, the Senator from Washington, and others, with respect to the 
constitutionality of this campaign reform proposal.
  I share his concern that we should not pass legislation that would be 
a clear violation of the first amendment.
  I stand behind no one when it comes to defending the first amendment 
and the principles it stands for. That is why I will not support a 
constitutional amendment that would allow us to impose mandatory 
spending limits. At one time, I did vote for a sense of the Senate 
resolution regarding such an amendment but I have come to believe that 
we should respect the Supreme Court's rulings on this issue, and that 
these rulings have provided enough guidance and direction that we can 
write a constitutional proposal that would be upheld by the Supreme 
Court.
  I have to say that what the Senator from Kentucky is suggesting, that 
the voluntary spending limits might be found by the courts to be 
unconstitutional, is unfounded. Mr. President, this argument is a giant 
red herring meant to divert attention away from the real issues.
  Let us be very clear about what the Supreme Court held in the Buckley 
versus Valeo decision in 1976. The Court said two very important things 
in the Buckley decision;
  First, the Court made a distinction between mandatory limitations on 
expenditures by candidates, and mandatory limitations on contributions 
to candidates. The Court said that we cannot place mandatory spending 
limits on all candidates, because that would infringe on the first 
amendment rights of those candidates who may wish not to abide by the 
spending limits.
  Second, the Court upheld mandatory limitations on campaign 
contributions, declaring that such contributions could have, or appear 
to have, a corrupting influence on the recipient of those 
contributions, and contributions could therefore be limited.
  Now, I have heard the Senator from Kentucky say on many occasions 
that the Supreme Court has said that money equals political speech and 
that since we cannot limit political speech, we cannot limit the flow 
of money. As the Senator from Kentucky just asserted, money, in his 
view, equals speech and we can't limit it.
  However, Mr. President, the Supreme Court did not, in fact, say that 
money is speech and cannot be limited, and saying it over and over 
again doesn't make it any more true.
  The Court did say that money is a form of speech, and can only be 
limited by the Government in certain circumstances. And as I said, one 
of those circumstances is in the form of limits on campaign 
contributions. If the Supreme Court had held that money equals absolute 
speech, then they would not have upheld limitations on campaign 
contributions.
  Besides contribution limits, the Supreme Court has said that there 
are other ways we can constitutionally limit the flow of campaign 
money, including campaign expenditures.
  As the Court said in the Buckley decision:

       Congress may engage in public financing of election 
     campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an 
     agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure 
     limitations. Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the 
     size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide 
     to forgo private fundraising and accept public funding.

  In short, the Presidential system is a completely voluntary system 
that offers incentives in the form of public financing to candidates 
who agree to limit their spending. That, the Court said, was perfectly 
constitutional.
  And that sort of voluntary system, specifically upheld by the Supreme 
Court in the Buckley decision, is what the McCain-Feingold-Thompson 
legislation is modeled after. We provide a voluntary system of spending 
limits and benefits. No one is forced to participate, no one is coerced 
into participating, and there are no penalties, not a single one, for 
candidates who choose not to voluntarily comply.
  Just like the Presidential system that has been specifically upheld 
by the Supreme Court.
  The assertion that the Senator from Kentucky is making, that 
voluntary spending limits tied to the offering of cost-saving benefits 
is unconstitutional, is a challenge that has been specifically rejected 
by the courts. Let me repeat that Mr. President. The argument that the 
Senator from Kentucky is making, that voluntary spending limits tied to 
benefits is unconstitutional, has specifically been rejected by the 
Federal courts.
  The case was Republican National Committee versus Federal Election 
Commission, and in that case a three-judge Federal panel specifically 
upheld the constitutionality of voluntary spending limits and rejected 
the argument put forth by the Senator from Kentucky. That decision was 
summarily affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
  It is true that unlike the Presidential system, the McCain-Feingold-
Thompson proposal does not have public financing. It would have been my 
preference to have public financing, but I agreed to forgo public 
financing as a part of this compromise proposal.
  Instead, we offer broadcast and postage discounts that will 
substantially reduce the costs of running for a Senate seat. And the 
outlandish suggestion has been made by a few--very few indeed--that 
this distinction, between public financing and advertising discounts, 
is what makes our legislation unconstitutional.

  Mr. President, that is an absurd proposition. The only way such a 
voluntary system could possibly be unconstitutional is if the system 
were not truly voluntary, or in other words, if candidates were 
essentially coerced into participating. How do you coerce a candidate 
into participating? By making the benefits so incredibly valuable and 
by imposing tough penalties against those who choose not to comply, so 
that there really is not choice for a candidate to participate or not.
  And this is where the Senator from Ketucky's--Senator McConnell--
argument completely falls apart. The court ruled in the Buckley case 
that public financing was not coercive. So for our bill to be 
unconstitutional, the benefits would have to be even more valuable than 
direct public financing.
  Mr. President, the benefits in our bill are very valuable. The 50-
percent broadcast discount alone will cut a candidate's advertising 
costs in half. But these benefits do not even come close to the value 
of direct public financing.
  Suppose you are a Federal candidate running a $1 million campaign. 
And

[[Page S6812]]

suppose you had a choice of two benefits; you could either have a 50-
percent discount on your broadcast advertising, or you could have a 
check for $1 million. Which benefit are you going to take?
  The question is obvious, Mr. President. Every candidate in America 
faced with such a choice would clearly favor the public financing. 
Public financing is a far more valuable benefit, and for the Senator 
from Kentucky to suggest otherwise flies in the face of the reality of 
our campaign system.
  I find it interesting that during the course of the many hearings 
that have been held in the Senate Rules Committee, much testimony was 
heard from several constitutional experts. However, only one of those 
experts, Law professor Fred Schauer of Harvard University, made it 
clear that he had no position on the policy aspects of the McCain-
Feingold bill. Every other expert called by the committee--on both 
sides of the issue--made clear that in addition to their legal views, 
they also has a bias as to either being in favor or opposition to the 
reform bill.
  And how did Professor Schauer respond to the Senator from Kentucky's 
claim that the voluntary structure of spending limits in our bill was 
unconstitutional? After pointing out that the arguments asserted by the 
Senator from Kentucky were the same arguments rejected in the RNC 
decision, a decision that was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
Professor Schauer said:

       If we stick to the question * * * and separate the 
     constitutional questions from the policy question * * * 
     voting against the bill on the assumption that it is clearly 
     inconsistent with existing Supreme Court and federal court 
     precedent is not an accurate characterization of the 
     precedent.

  Mr. President, the Schauer testimony is just a move in a chorus of 
objective analyses from constitutional experts around the country who 
have held that the voluntary spending limits in the McCain-Feingold-
Thompson bill does pass constitutional muster. Without asking for 
anyone's view on the policy implications of our proposal, we asked 
several authorities in the legal and academic community for their 
opinions about the constitutionality of this proposal.
  We asked the nonpartisan American Law Division of the Congressional 
Research Service to prepare a constitutional analysis of our proposal. 
The analysis, prepared by Paige Whitaker, a well-respected attorney 
with CRS who has prepared a number of reports for Congress on this 
issue and who has been called to testify before Congress on campaign 
reform, states very clearly that the voluntary system created in our 
bill of offering incentives in exchange for compliance with spending 
limitations is wholly consistent with the Court's ruling in Buckley 
versus Valeo.
  In addition to CRS, my office contacted some of the most well-known 
and respected first amendment authorities in the country.
  These authorities include Professor Daniel Hays Lowenstein of the 
UCLA Law School, Professor Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago 
Law School, Professor Fred Schauer of Harvard University, Professor 
Jamin Raskin of the Washington College of Law at American University 
and Professor Marlene Arnold Nicholson of the DePaul University College 
of Law.
  These experts, among the most widely respected first amendment and 
constitutional scholars in the country, all agree that the voluntary 
structure of spending limits tied to broadcast and postage discounts is 
fully consistent with the Constitution.
  Now, Mr. President, some have also suggested that the provision in 
our proposal to prohibit Political Action Committee contributions to 
Federal candidates may not pass constitutional muster. I, for one, am 
skeptical that you can constitutionally prohibit a group of individuals 
from banding together, pooling their resources and contributing to a 
Federal candidate any more than you can prohibit any single individual 
from contributing to a Federal candidate.
  However, we must remember that the Supreme Court has taken a 
favorable position with respect to the Government limiting campaign 
contributions, and indeed, the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of absolute prohibits on specific entities making 
campaign contributions, such as labor unions and corporations.
  Nonetheless, our proposal contemplates such a legal challenge, and 
contains specific fall-back provisions if the Supreme Court ruled a PAC 
contribution ban unconstitutional. These fall-back provisions would 
reduce allowable PAC contributions from $5,000 to $1,000, and stipulate 
that no candidate could receive more than 20 percent of the applicable 
spending limits in aggregate PAC contributions.

  Where did this fall-back proposal come from, Mr. President? It is the 
exact same proposal, word for word, that was contained in the Pressler-
Durenberger amendment offered to S. 3, the campaign finance reform bill 
considered in the 103d Congress.
  That amendment, which not only banned PAC contributions, also banned 
all PAC expenditures in a Federal election including independent 
expenditures, included these very fall-back limitations on PAC 
contributions if the Supreme Court ruled such a ban unconstitutional. 
The Pressler-Durenberger amendment passed the U.S. Senate by a vote of 
86 to 11.
  Yes, 86 to 11, Mr. President. I voted for it. Most of the Members of 
this body, including the Senator from Kentucky, voted for it.
  Our provisions dealing with PAC contributions are actually far more 
permissive than the provisions contained in the Pressler-Durenberger 
amendment which 86 Senators voted for.
  I should also say, Mr. President, that a proposal to not only ban PAC 
contributions, but also to prohibit PAC's from engaging in independent 
expenditures as the Pressler-Durenberger amendment did, can actually be 
found in another reform bill--a bill introduced by the junior Senator 
from Kentucky. I am somewhat surprised that the junior Senator from 
Kentucky, who has condemned such a proposal as unconstitutional and a 
blatant violation of the first amendment, would include such a 
provision in the reform bill he wrote.
  So, Mr. President, just a couple of years ago, 86 Senators went on 
record in favor of a PAC ban coupled with fall-back limitations in case 
of an unfavorable Supreme Court ruling. The provision in our proposal 
is actually far less restrictive than that included in the Pressler-
Durenberger amendment, as we only limit PAC contributions, not their 
independent expenditures. If 86 Senators, including the Senator from 
Kentucky, believed a complete PAC prohibition to be constitutional 
enough that they could vote for it, I see no reason why the same 
number, or even more Senators now could not support a far less 
restrictive regulation.
  In closing, Mr. President, I want to assure my colleagues that I 
believe, and the Senator from Arizona believes, that the key provisions 
of this legislation would be upheld by the courts. Moreover, 
nonpartisan experts from around the country, including the 
Congressional Research Service, who do not have a prejudice one way or 
the other on this proposal, have told us that these provisions are 
constitutional.
  I ask unanimous consent that a statement designating that the 
broadcast provisions in the bill would have only a relatively nominal 
impact in the broadcast industry be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                               Congressional Research Service,

                                              Library of Congress,
                                 Washington, DC, February 8, 1996.
     To: Honorable Russell Feingold, Attention: Andy Kutler.
     From: Joseph E. Cantor, specialist in American National 
         Government, Government Division.
     Subject: Estimated value of free and discounted TV time under 
         S. 1219--the Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995.
       This memorandum provides information relevant to estimating 
     the dollar value of the free and discounted TV air time that 
     would be offered to Senate candidates under S. 1219, the 
     Senate Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1995.
       S. 1219, introduced by Senator McCain and you, establishes 
     a system of voluntary expenditure limits for Senate 
     candidates, in exchange for three cost-reduction benefits: 
     (1) 30 minutes of free TV time; (2) additional TV time at 50 
     percent of the lowest unit rate (LUR); and (3) a reduced 
     postal rate for two mailings per eligible voter. This 
     memorandum focuses on estimating the value of the first two 
     benefits, dealing with TV time.

[[Page S6813]]

       As I have explained to you, and as has been reinforced in 
     my conversations with all my sources, both these tasks are 
     highly speculative, and the resulting estimates I have 
     derived are subject to challenge on any number of grounds. I 
     have used different methodology and sources for each of the 
     two tasks, relying in both cases on a combination of actual 
     cost figures, published estimates, and educated guesses and 
     assumptions by appropriate authorities. While these 
     assumptions can legitimately be challenged, I believe this 
     effort to represent a reasonable, logical attempt at a rough 
     approximation of the dollar value of the proposed benefits. 
     Appropriate caveats and sources are noted herein.


                      benefit no. 1: free tv time

                                proposal

       The bill would provide 30 minutes of free television air 
     time to participating candidates, to be used: (1) in the 
     general election period (i.e., once the candidate has 
     qualified for the general election ballot); (2) on Mondays-
     Fridays, between 6 PM and 10 PM (unless the candidate elects 
     otherwise); (3) in segments of between 30 seconds and 5 
     minutes; and (4) on stations within the State or an adjacent 
     State, but with no more than 15 minutes on any one station.


                              methodology

       Our goal was to make a reasonable determination of the 
     dollar value of 30 minutes of television advertising time 
     which Senate candidates would use during a general election 
     period.
       At the outset, one is faced with the fact that there are 
     enormous variations in costs of TV time. First of all, there 
     are 211 media markets in the U.S., with substantial 
     differences in costs among them. Second, the broadcast market 
     is a commodity market, subject to the laws of supply and 
     demand. Hence, there are wide variations in costs within a 
     single market or broadcast station, even for comparable 
     periods of time on comparable TV shows. Furthermore, there 
     are no sources on the exact cost of TV ads, because of the 
     extremely complex system for buying and setting rates for TV 
     time. Finally, our task was compounded by the uncertainties 
     involved in a political campaign setting, with the number of 
     candidates eligible for the benefit unknown and with the way 
     in which candidates might use the benefit (within the 
     parameters outlined in your legislation) unknowable.
       In undertaking this project, I was fortunate in obtaining 
     assistance from two Washington-area media buyers who are 
     substantially involved in campaign work.\1\ Despite their 
     cautionary notes about the nature of this task (as outlined 
     above), they understood the value of devising an 
     intellectually defensible estimate and provided essential 
     guidance in the process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Footnotes appear at end of letter.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Our effort first focused on devising an average cost of a 
     TV spot, based on the following assumptions: the 30 minutes 
     would be used by the Senate candidate in the form of 60 spots 
     of 30 seconds each; the candidate would seek to place all 
     free spots in prime time (your bill covers the early news (6 
     PM--7 PM) and prime access (7 PM--8 PM) periods, as well as 
     most of the prime time (8 PM--11 PM) period; and the 
     candidate would place the ads on as many of the most popular 
     (i.e., highly rated) shows as possible.
       According to the Media Market Guide \2\ for the fourth 
     quarter of 1995 (which covers the months relevant to a 
     general election), the national average cost per rating point 
     for a 30-second spot in prime time (aimed at an audience of 
     all adults over the age of 18) was $25,403.\3\ As this 
     represents the cost for a commercial advertiser, we 
     subtracted 15 percent to reflect the rate most stations 
     charge to political advertisers (this political rate, not 
     required by law, should not be confused with the lowest unit 
     rate which Federal law requires broadcasters to offer 
     candidates). We arrived at a national political rate per 
     point of $21,593. I then calculated a national average cost 
     per rating point, by dividing $21,593 by 211 (the number of 
     U.S. media markets), yielding an average political cost per 
     point of $102.
       In order to get a cost figure for an actual 30-second spot, 
     one must multiply the cost per point by the number of points 
     which a particular program (or TV show) commands. We chose 
     five popular TV shows in Monday through Friday prime time, 
     and then averaged their national rating point numbers. The 
     shows (and their national rating points) were: NYPD Blue, ABC 
     (15.90); 20/20, ABC (17.10); Law and Order, NBC (12.80); 
     Frasier, NBC (14.70); and Chicago Hope, CBS (14.90).\4\ The 
     average national rating points of these shows came to 15.1. 
     Hence, the average 30-second spot on a popular prime time 
     show is 15.1 multiplied by $102, or $1,540.
       If 60 of these 30-second spots are used, the benefit equals 
     $92,400 per candidate, on average. Obviously, a New York area 
     candidate's benefit would be much higher, while a Montana 
     candidate's benefit would be much lower.


                            Estimated Total

       To derive a national figure, we made a simple calculation, 
     based on the assumption of 66 major party general election 
     candidates, with no qualifying minor party candidates. Of 
     course, it is a considerable assumption that all major party 
     nominees would participate in this system, just as it is that 
     no minor party candidates would qualify. But as your bill 
     calls for an hour of free time per State, having minor 
     parties qualify would not change the total. Hence, 
     multiplying $92,400 by 66 candidates yields a national total 
     of $6,098,400, rounded to $6 million.\5\


                   BENEFIT NO. 2: DISCOUNTED TV TIME

                                PROPOSAL

       Your bill also provides participating Senate candidates the 
     benefit of buying additional broadcast time at 50 percent of 
     the lowest unit rate. This benefit would be available during 
     the last 60 days of the general election (when the LUR 
     requirement is in effect) and the last 30 days of the primary 
     election (the LUR is now available to candidates in the 45 
     days before a primary, but your bill would change that to 30 
     days).


                              METHODOLOGY

       Whereas the first benefit involves a specified amount of 
     time in specific time periods, this provision would affect an 
     indeterminate amount of broadcast purchases. Also, rather 
     than involving a new form of candidate activity (i.e., a free 
     service), this second benefit involves one candidates already 
     use, but with a prospectively lower cost. Hence, whereas the 
     first exercise was more theoretical, the second can be based 
     more on what we know about current behavior among Senate 
     candidates.\6\
       Specifically, by estimating the current level of campaign 
     air time, one can make a reasonable assessment of the dollar 
     value of the reduced cost benefit to candidates. This 
     exercise involves deriving a percentage estimate of the share 
     of overall campaign expenditures that can be attributed to TV 
     time buys during the periods affected by your bill, and then 
     extrapolating this percentage onto campaign expenditure data.
       There is no official source for data on broadcast 
     expenditures in Federal elections. While campaign 
     expenditures are required to be disclosed with the Federal 
     Election Commission (FEC), payments to broadcast stations 
     usually are not itemized and are often included among other 
     payments to media consultants; nor do the reports group 
     expenditures by category for easier retrieval of desired 
     information. Furthermore, the Federal Communications 
     Commission does not systematically compile data of this 
     nature from the broadcast stations. Until very recently, 
     observers were forced to rely on anecdotes, surveys, or 
     estimates of the amount of campaign money that was directed 
     specifically to broadcast time purchases.
       Following the 1990 congressional elections, two reporters 
     for The Los Angeles Times undertook a massive, systematic 
     study of congressional campaign expenditures in that 
     election--based on candidates' disclosure filings--and 
     arranged the data into categories.\7\ Comparable studies were 
     done following the 1992 and 1994 elections, by Dwight Morris 
     (one of the original authors) and Murielle Gamache. 
     Because of their exhaustive efforts and professional 
     skill, these studies are widely accepted by campaign 
     finance experts as containing the most reliable, 
     authoritative data on campaign expenditures by type of 
     service. Consequently, my estimates are based heavily on 
     the data in the most recent published study: Handbook of 
     Campaign Spending: Money in the 1992 Congressional Races, 
     By Dwight Morris and Murielle E. Gamache (Washington, 
     Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994. 592 p.). (The 1994 
     edition will be published later in 1996.)
       The summary tables, copies of which are attached, reveal 
     that in 1992, major party Senate candidates who ran in the 
     general election spend $86.8 million on ``electronic media 
     advertising.'' This category was defined on page xiv of 
     Handbook of Campaign Spending as including: All payments to 
     consultants, separate purchases of broadcast time, and 
     production costs associated with the development of radio and 
     television advertising.
       Because the data unavoidably include production costs and 
     consultant fees (which are irrelevant to the benefits in S. 
     1219 concerning air time), it is necessary to estimate the 
     percentage solely for air time. The authors report that most 
     media consultants add a 15-percent charge to media buys for 
     their services (which include producing the ads). Hence, I 
     would subtract this 15 percent, or $13.0 million, and assume 
     the remaining 85 percent of the ``electronic media 
     advertising'' total went for air time purchases. This leaves 
     $73.8 million for air time costs.
       Several other factors must be taken into account in making 
     the data in this study applicable to our purposes. First, the 
     electronic media figure includes radio advertising; our 
     interest is solely in television. In a telephone discussion 
     on February 1 with Dwight Morris, one of the authors, we 
     agreed that it would be reasonable to assume that 95 percent 
     of the total went for television. Hence, subtracting another 
     5 percent, or $3.7 million, leaves $70.1 million for TV air 
     time cost.
       Second, the data include spending by the candidates in the 
     primary as well as the general election period, as FEC data 
     unavoidably does. The benefits in S. 1219 would apply to both 
     periods, but only for the last 30 days in the primary and the 
     last 60 days in the general election. In our phone 
     discussion, Dwight Morris and I agreed that it would be 
     reasonable to assume that 90 percent of the media 
     expenditures occurred in the general election period. Taking 
     10 percent of $70.1 million yields $7.0 million for primary 
     TV air time spending and $63.1 million for TV air time in the 
     general election.
       The final estimation involved the extent to which the air 
     time in the primary is bought in the last 30 days and the air 
     time in the

[[Page S6814]]

     general election is bought in the last 60 days. Morris and I 
     agreed (as did some of the media buyers I worked with in the 
     first estimate) that at least 95 percent of the air time 
     would be used in those periods. Hence, subtracting an 
     additional 5 percent in each case leaves an estimated $6.7 
     million for TV air time in the last 30 days of a primary 
     and $59.6 million for TV air time in the last 60 days of a 
     general election.


                        General Election Benefit

       Step 1. Starting with $86.8 million total for electronic 
     media advertising, I subtracted the estimates of $13.0 
     million for consultant fees, $3.7 million for radio time, 
     $7.0 million for primary spending, and $3.5 million for time 
     purchased before the final 60 days of the general election. 
     The resulting $59.6 million (for TV air time in the final 60 
     days of the general election) represents approximately 69 
     percent of the ``electronic media advertising'' figure and 27 
     percent of the $219.1 million in total Senate candidate 
     expenditures in the Morris/Gamache study.
       Step 2. Although the comparable 1994 data are not yet 
     available, it may be instructive to apply the 27 percent 
     figure cited above to the total expenditures reported to the 
     FEC by 1994 Senate candidates. The FEC reported that $270.7 
     million was spent by major party Senate general election 
     candidates in the 1993-1994 election cycle.\8\ Because the 
     Morris/Gamache study included data for the six-year period 
     leading up to and including 1992, I added the $12.6 million 
     1994 Senate candidates spent from 1989 to 1992 (which I 
     calculated from the same press release). Hence, I arrived at 
     a total of $283.3 million spent by major party Senate general 
     election candidates in the entire six-year period. Assuming 
     the same 27 percent of total spending went for TV air time in 
     the last 60 days of the general election, I got an estimated 
     1994 figure of $76.5 million.
       Step. 3. The 1992 estimated cost of TV air time of $59.6 
     million and the 1994 estimate of $76.5 million can be 
     averaged (in case one of the years was an anomaly in the 
     context of overall spending trends), to yield $68.1 million, 
     rounded to $68 million for convenience. While this is just an 
     estimate, subject to all the caveats inherent therein, I 
     would be fairly comfortable using this as the basis for any 
     further estimates you may wish to make, specifically that the 
     value of the broadcast discount would be 50 percent of this, 
     or roughly $34 million.


                        Primary Election Benefit

       The process for estimating the benefit in the primary 
     period is complicated by the fact that our primary data 
     source not only does not distinguish between primary and 
     general spending, but it leaves out candidates who lost the 
     nomination contest. Hence, I added a fourth and fifth step to 
     the process: (1) use the Morris/Gamache 1992 data on cost 
     breakdowns, apportioning amounts to specific functions; (2) 
     apply the same percentage to 1994 FEC data; (3) average the 
     1992 and 1994 figures; (4) examine 1992 and 1994 FEC data on 
     primary losers, apply an appropriate percentage, and average 
     the two dollar figures; and (5) add the average from step 4 
     to the figure in step 3.
       Step 1. To apportion the share of primary election 
     candidates expenditures that were spent on TV air time in the 
     last 30 days of the primary, I started with the $86.8 million 
     total for electronic media advertising in the Morris/Gamache 
     study. I subtracted the estimates of: $13.0 million for 
     consultant fees, $3.7 million for radio time, $63.1 million 
     for general election spending, and $.35 million in time 
     purchased before the final 30 days of the primary election. 
     This left an estimate of $6.7 million as being spent by 1992 
     major party Senate candidates for TV air time in the final 30 
     days of the primary election. This figure represents 
     approximately 8 percent of the figure listed for electronic 
     media advertising and 3 percent of the $219.1 million in 
     total Senate candidate expenditures in the Morris/Gamache 
     study.
       Step 2. I next applied the 3 percent figure cited above to 
     the total expenditures reported to the FEC by 1994 Senate 
     candidates. Again, I started with the $270.7 million spent by 
     major party Senate general election candidates in the 1993-94 
     election cycle, and then added the $12.6 million these 
     candidates spent from 1989 to 1992. Applying the 3 percent 
     figure from 1992 to the resulting total of $283.3 million, I 
     got a 1994 figure of $8.5 million for the cost of TV air time 
     in the last 30 days of the primary election.
       Step 3. I averaged the 1992 estimated TV cost of $6.7 
     million and the 1994 estimate of $8.5 million, to yield $7.6 
     million, rounded to $8 million for convenience. This 
     represents estimated spending on TV air time during the last 
     30 days of the primary by candidates who went on to compete 
     in the general election.
       Step 4. Major party Senate candidates who were defeated in 
     primary elections spent a total of $75.9 million in 1992 \9\ 
     and $45.9 million in 1994.\10\ Because all of this money was 
     spent on the primary election, we adjusted only for 
     consultant fees, radio time, and time purchased before the 
     final 30 days. I assumed the same total percentage of money 
     went for TV time by the primary losers as by all candidates 
     in this six year study. Starting with the $86.8 million total 
     for electronic media advertising, I subtracted the estimates 
     of: $13.0 million for consultant fees, $3.7 million for radio 
     time, and $.35 million for time purchased before the final 30 
     days of the primary. This left $69.8 million, which is 
     approximately 32 percent of the $219.1 million in total 
     expenditures reported in the Morris/Gamache study.
       Applying this 32 percent to the $75.9 million spent by 1992 
     primary losers yields $24.3 million; applying the same 
     percentage to the $45.9 million spent by 1994 primary losers 
     yielded $14.7 million. Averaging the 1992 and 1994 figures 
     gave us $19.5 million, rounded to $20 million; this 
     represents an estimate of TV air time purchases in the last 
     30 days of the primary election by Senate primary losers.
       Step 5. Finally, I added the $8 million from step 3 for 
     party nominees to the $20 million for primary losers, 
     yielding an estimated total of $28 million as being spent on 
     TV air time by Senate candidates in the final 30 days of the 
     primary.\11\ Reducing this by half left us with $14 million, 
     as the estimated value of the 50 percent LUR reduction to 
     Senate primary candidates.


                  estimated primary and general total

       Using the methodology in this memorandum, I estimate the 
     value of the 50 percent broadcast rate reduction to be worth 
     $34 million to Senate candidates in the general election and 
     $14 million in the primary--a total of $48 million.
       I trust that this memorandum and the accompanying material 
     meet your needs in this matter. Please feel free to contact 
     me 7-7876 if I can be of further assistance.


                               footnotes

     \1\ Carole Mundy, of Fenn-King-Murphy-Putnam Communications, 
     Inc. in Washington, D.C., assisted in developing the 
     methodology and obtaining source material. Gail Neylan, of 
     Neylan & Roy--an independent media buying service, provided 
     guidance in corroborating and finetuning the approach 
     developed with Ms. Mundy.
     \2\ Media Market Guide, 4th Quarter 1995 (October-December). 
     NY, Bethlehem Publishing, Inc. 1995.
     \3\ Those cost per (rating) point is the standard unit used 
     by advertisers and media buyers in evaluating relative costs 
     of delivering one percent of the audience share in different 
     markets.
     \4\ Ratings based on: A.C. Nielsen Company, Network Programs 
     by DMA, November 1995.
     \5\ A more thorough effort might involve looking at each 
     State's media dynamics, given the variations in media market 
     configurations. A candidate in New Jersey, for example, has 
     to buy time in both the New York and Philadelphia markets, 
     while more than 90 percent of California voters are reached 
     by seven markets, all within that State's boundaries. These 
     types of calculations, while yielding perhaps a more accurate 
     estimate, involved undue time investment and raised 
     significant, complex additional questions.
     \6\ One caveat, of course, is that this approach is based on 
     current candidate behavior, not taking into account 
     prospective increased TV air time purchases because of the 
     lower cost. While this could well occur, this tendency would 
     be clearly circumscribed by the overall campaign spending 
     limits to which participating candidates must agree.
     \7\ Fritz, Sara, and Dwight Morris. Handbook of Campaign 
     Spending: Money in the 1990 Congressional Races. Washington, 
     Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1992. 567 p.
     \8\ U.S. Federal Election Commission. 1994 Congressional 
     Fundraising Sets New Record (press release): November 1995.
     \9\ U.S. Federal Election Commission. 1991-92 Congressional 
     Spending Soars to $680 Million (press release): January 1994.
     \10\ U.S. Federal Election Commission. 1994 Congressional 
     Fundraising Sets New Record (press release): November 1995.
     \11\ It may seem counterintuitive that primary losers would 
     spend twice as much on TV as primary winners, and this may 
     point up a flaw in our estimation process. But it is often 
     the case that well-funded primary candidates (often wealthy 
     individuals) spend large sums of money in losing attempts at 
     nomination, while in perhaps the majority of cases, Senate 
     party nominees (especially incumbents) have little or no real 
     opposition in the primary.

  Mr. FEINGOLD. I yield the remainder of my time to my friend and a 
leader today in the future on campaign finance reform, the Senator from 
Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from California.
  Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, I thank my friend for yielding. I thank 
him for his leadership, as well as that of Senator Feingold. Let me 
say, as one of the two Senators from California, we need to raise at 
least $20 million--that is obscene--to win a Senate seat. That means a 
candidate running for Senate for California must raise $10,000 a day, 7 
days a week, for each day of the 6-year term. This is unconscionable. I 
will support cloture. I will support campaign finance reform.
  I intend to vote for campaign finance reform and for this measure 
cutting off debate so we can have the opportunity to discuss this 
crucial issue. We must pass campaign finance reform this year.
  I feel we must limit the influence of special economic interests so 
that the public has no fear that Senators are representing those 
interests instead of the people of their State and the Nation.
  As a Senator from the largest State in the Union, I am particularly 
aware of the need for reform. Candidates for the U.S. Senate in 
California must raise at least $20 million. This means that a candidate 
running for the Senate must raise at least $10,000 a day, 7 days a 
week, for each day of a 6-year term. This is obscene.
  For me it is more important to meet with constituents here and in the

[[Page S6815]]

State, write legislation, and participate in debates like this one, let 
alone read as much as I can.
  There are several important aspects of campaign finance reform.
  First, to establish limits on campaign spending. The root of our 
problems with the current system is that campaigns spend too much. To 
me limits are one of the most important elements of reform.
  Second, we must end the practice of using soft money to evade 
contribution limits. Soft money originally was intended to be used for 
party building activities, but in many cases, it has turned into a 
negative campaign apparatus.
  There are many approaches to campaign finance reform. I favor the 
Feinstein bill because it recognizes the rights of organizations of 
every political persuasion to participate in the political process by 
gathering small donations to candidates.
  I speak from the heart when I say that we must pass campaign finance 
reform this year and begin to restore the faith and confidence of the 
American people.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Senate is about to determine whether 
bipartisan campaign finance reform will be an accomplishment of this 
Congress or not. As I noted yesterday, the Members of the 104th 
Congress can point with pride, well-earned pride, to the substantial 
institutional reforms that were passed by this Congress. But the reform 
which the public believes to be most necessary and most urgent--
campaign finance reform--is not yet among the accomplishments of this 
reform-minded Congress.
  Today, the Senate has an opportunity to begin remedying that 
deficiency, and take a giant step toward becoming one of the most 
important reform Congresses in American history. Invoking cloture 
cannot guarantee this legislation will be enacted into law, but we will 
be well on the way, Mr. President. Momentum toward final passage may 
well prove irresistible in the wake of a successful cloture vote.
  But should we fall short of that goal today, it will not mean a 
permanent end to this effort. Mr. President, we will have campaign 
finance reform; if not this year, then next; if not the 104th Congress, 
then the 105th. We will have campaign finance reform because the people 
demand it. The people have perceived in the manner in which we finance 
our reelection a profound inequity between incumbent and challenger; an 
inequity which serves to distance Members of Congress from the will of 
the people; to further estrange us from our employers, and indebt us to 
an array of monied interests. The people's will cannot be forever 
denied no matter how well inoculated we are by the financial advantages 
we claim as incumbents. The people will have this reform, if not by our 
work, then by the work of our replacements.
  Some may see in that statement a contradiction. If current campaign 
financing laws so greatly advantage incumbents then we should prove 
immune to public pressure for reform. We are indeed greatly advantaged 
by the current system, Mr. President, but no one, no matter how 
abundant his or her campaign coffers, can forever disregard a demand 
for reform that is supported by three-quarters or more of the American 
public. No one.
  Not all campaigns are waged in such clear opposition to the public 
will. In most elections, candidates generally avoid giving great 
offense to the voters. It is in most elections that incumbents are 
undeniably, unmistakably, and overwhelmingly advantaged over 
challengers.
  Opponents of this measure, who are my friends, argue eloquently that 
we who propose this reform are the enemies of the first amendment; that 
we are engaged in that most un-American of activities--the attempted 
abridgement of every American's right to free speech. I believe we have 
effectively refuted that serious charge, in part because we have had an 
ample body of opinion by constitutional scholars to rely on. For the 
record, let me state the obvious: I did not seek public office so that 
I might violate the Constitution. In my life, I have taken no oath more 
seriously than my oath to defend the Constitution. I hope my colleagues 
will accept that I am their equal in my love of our Constitution.
  Mr. President, we proponents of campaign finance reform do not seek 
to curtail the free speech of incumbents. We seek to give voice--a 
greater voice--to challengers than is usually the case under the 
present system of campaign financing. These are voluntary spending 
limits we have proposed. Yes, there are incentives in this bill to 
encourage candidates to abide by these limits, and disincentives to 
discourage candidates from exceeding them. But if a candidate feels 
that circumstances necessitate campaign expenditures in excess of these 
voluntary limits, he or she is free to make those expenditures.
  Their opponent, however, should not be unfairly disadvantaged by the 
other candidate's refusal of spending limits. So, we have included 
provisions in our legislation to help a candidate who abides by the 
limits keep pace with the campaign of the candidate who rejects the 
limits.
  Implicit in the arguments of this bill's opponents is the definition 
of free speech as more speech. They argue that if an incumbent does not 
spend more money on advertising than the challenger, either because of 
voluntary limits or because the challenger is allowed more discounted 
advertising and postage rates, then somehow the incumbent's free speech 
has been curtailed. In reality, Mr. President, our legislation does not 
abridge the incumbent's right to free speech; it advances the free 
speech of challengers. It refutes the notion that for speech to be 
free, one candidate must have more of it than another.
  Again, these are voluntary spending limits. They are voluntary and 
they are fair.
  Mr. President, the opponents of campaign finance reform are as 
passionate in their opposition as we are in our support. I do not doubt 
the sincerity of their conviction that too little money is spent on 
campaigns today. I disagree, of course, but I cannot challenge their 
earnestness nor resent the passion with which they advance their 
argument. On a few occasions, I have been known to invest my arguments 
with a little heated rhetoric, and it would be unfair of me to begrudge 
the genuine ardor our opponents hold for their cause, as unsound as 
that cause might be.
  I commend them for their willingness to extensively and openly debate 
this legislation, so that the public may judge from our arguments who 
has carried the day. The cloture vote will indicate legislative failure 
or success today. But it will not necessarily indicate whose argument 
has prevailed. Nor, as I noted at the beginning of my remarks, will 
this vote, should we fail to reach cloture, signal an end to this 
campaign for reform. We will be back next year. We will ultimately 
prevail.
  Before I conclude, Mr. President, I want to again commend the 
Republicans and Democrats who sponsored and helped to craft this first 
genuinely bipartisan campaign finance reform bill. They have all 
distinguished themselves in this debate, and in this crusade to keep 
faith with the people's just demands for reform. First among these 
friends is my partner, the Senator from Wisconsin, Russ Feignold. The 
Senator is a man of honor, and his sense of honor prevails over his 
sense of politics. That is a virtue, Mr. President, a sometimes 
inexpedient virtue, but a virtue nonetheless, and one which I greatly 
admire.
  Mr. President, the Senator from Wisconsin and I came to the Senate to 
argue with one another. We came to the Senate with different ideas 
about the proper size and role of Government in this country.
  We came here to serve our constituents by serving those ideas, and we 
want to spend our time here in open, fair, and honest debate over whose 
ideas are the most sound. We did not come here to spend the majority of 
our time raising vast funds to ensure our reelection. Nor did we come 
here to incur obligations to a few narrowly defined segments of this 
country. All Americans deserve fair representation by their Congress.
  Mr. President, despite our philosophical and political differences, 
Senator Feingold and I have made a common cause in our pursuit of 
genuine campaign finance reform. To do so, we both knew that we would 
have to relinquish all partisan advantages that had undermined previous 
legislative attempts at reform. We were determined to be fair, Mr. 
President, and on no occasion--no occasion--did Senator Feingold, or

[[Page S6816]]

any of the cosponsors, attempt to seed into this legislation an 
advantage for one party or the other. We were fair, we were committed 
to genuine reform, and we were and are determined.
  I have found the experience liberating, and I commend it to all of my 
colleagues. I urge all of my colleagues to join us in this necessary 
endeavor, to accept the public will and restore the public's respect 
for the institutions that are derived from their consent. Vote for 
cloture. Vote for reform.

                          ____________________