[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 90 (Tuesday, June 18, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6386-S6404]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa is recognized.


                           Amendment No. 4047

 (Purpose: To freeze at the level programmed for fiscal year 1998 the 
    amount that may be expended for infrastructure programs of the 
     Department of Defense in order to increase funding for force 
                             modernization)

  Mr. GRASSLEY. My purpose for rising is to introduce an amendment. I 
am not going to send the amendment to the desk quite yet. Also, I 
inform the leadership on both sides of the aisle that I do not have any 
intention of speaking for an extra long period of time. But before I 
agree to a time limit, I want to make some opening remarks in regard to 
my amendment. After that, I will have an opportunity to sit down and 
probably work something out with the leadership on the time.
  Mr. President, we are at a point in the defense authorization bill 
where I want to bring up the point that we ought to be saving some 
money in infrastructure costs, but we are not. We ought to be saving 
some money in infrastructure costs because it is just natural that 
infrastructure ought to be somewhat less as we downsize the military, 
both from the standpoint of personnel and from the standpoint of the 
number of bases we have, and a lot of other factors. The fact that we 
really are not, the point of my amendment is to drive that point home, 
but also to offer a plan that will allow us to guarantee that when we 
are told that money should be saved, that it is in fact saved.
  We are in a situation here, Mr. President, where from a political 
standpoint we ought to have the votes to accomplish what I want to 
accomplish. I do not anticipate that we do. I anticipate that we are in 
a long process of educating the people of this country and the Members 
of this body to the fact of what I have already stated, that if we are 
going to close bases to save money, somewhere we ought to be able to 
show the American people that here is X numbers of dollars we saved. 
Because that is what we were told would happen; if we closed bases, we 
would save money. But we have had even experts like the General 
Accounting Office audit to identify the savings, and they have issued 
reports that it is not saved.
  But we are also in a political environment here where--in past years, 
it has been very easy for us to make some points on saving money from 
the standpoint of my being a conservative Republican. Leading the 
efforts to cut the defense budget or to save money, I would almost have 
the full support of Members on the Democratic side of the aisle because 
they were generally of the opinion that Republican Presidents were 
spending too much on defense, even wasting money on defense, so 
fiscally minded Republicans, joining together with Democrats, would 
have enough votes to actually win the battle and to save the taxpayers 
money.
  But now we have a political situation in the last 3 years where we 
have a Democrat President and a Republican Congress, and we find people 
on the Democratic side of the aisle, even though that President may be 
spending money above and beyond the level he should be doing it as 
Commander in Chief, they seem to be in a position where they want to 
get behind their President even if they might disagree with him on the 
amount of money he is spending. So we have a divided Democratic Party 
more so than usual on the issue of saving defense money.
  As is typical on this side of the aisle, my Republican side of the 
aisle, it seems that there is a willingness just to give more money to 
defense because somehow by giving more money you get more defense.
  The point that I try to drive home so often to my colleagues and I 
think it is legitimate; and I am speaking now just about people in this 
body who consider

[[Page S6387]]

themselves conservative; and for the most part those are people who are 
also registered as Republicans and elected to this body as 
Republicans--is that we are constantly admonishing the other side of 
the aisle, for decades, that you cannot solve in the typical way 
liberals like to solve problems, throwing money at those problems, and 
somehow just by spending more money on a lot of social problems, you 
actually solve those problems; and we would always say, ``Well, you 
know, it's not how much money you spend, but it's how you spend it, and 
how you invest it, whether or not you're going to get your money's 
worth.''

  We do not seem to have the same caution on this side of the aisle 
when it comes to money for defense. We seem to take the attitude that 
if you just put more money in the defense budget, give more money to 
the Pentagon, somehow you are just automatically going to have more 
defense.
  I raise this argument more so at the level of adopting the budget as 
opposed to the defense authorization bill. I suppose that is really a 
better place to make that generic argument about more money for defense 
or less money for defense. But I think it is legitimate, when we are 
dealing with a very specific item like infrastructure costs, and 
particularly when we were told over the last several years that if we 
close bases we ought to save money, and if we cut down on the number of 
personnel in the Defense Department we ought to save money, that after 
a few years of that argument, you ought to be able to look and say, 
``Yes. We have saved X number of dollars. Here it is.'' I would have 
believed it. The General Accounting Office expected to find it. But the 
reports of the General Accounting Office do not confirm those savings.
  The point is, savings are real things. You ought to be able to see 
them. My amendment is geared toward the proposition that if there is 
going to be savings, we ought to know where those savings are and what 
they ought to be used for and that, if they are going to still be spent 
in the defense budget and not reduce the deficit, at least we ought to 
know what they buy. So that is the basis for my amendment.
  But I will to get into more detail about my amendment, more specifics 
in just a moment. I want to remind my colleagues of the debate we had 
on April 15 in this body. It was a very excellent debate on what the 
size of the defense budget should be. At that point, the budget 
resolution we had before us had already added in an extra $12 billion 
to the budget for defense. That is $12 billion over and above what the 
President had recommended that we spend on defense. I opposed that 
move. I opposed it by offering an amendment to cut back most of that 
money. The vote was 57 to 42 against what I was trying to accomplish.
  The majority rules in this body, and I am willing to accept it. But 
all that extra money then is in the bill before us as a result of the 
decision that we made on the budget resolution and also the decision of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee to go to the maximum allowed under 
the budget resolution.
  Most of this money is for modernization of our military capabilities. 
But, sadly, an analysis of the bill shows that $12 billion does not buy 
much at the Pentagon. That should come as no surprise to people who 
have been watching the defense budget and how the Defense Department 
has operated over a long, long period of time. It does not come as any 
surprise to me.
  The money has been spread around in so many different areas that all 
we end up with is a few bits and pieces. If you would take the key area 
of combat aircraft as an example, this is what we get. We get six extra 
F-18's, two extra AV-8B's, four extra F-16's. That is it, 12 more 
fighters. The military needs to buy hundreds of fighters each year to 
modernize the force. The other areas are not much better. We do get a 
few extra missiles, a few extra transports, a few extra helicopters. 
But I might say that we do not get one extra ship for the Navy, as an 
example.

  Now, all of this added together, I suppose somebody is going to make 
a case that it is absolutely needed and it is going to improve and 
modernize our military considerably. But it seems to me that when you 
see exactly what we get, then it is not even a reasonable downpayment 
on modernization. And $12 billion--of course, when you look at what 
this bill has for a total expenditure for a year--happens to be peanuts 
at the Pentagon, kind of a drop in the bucket.
  So this brings me to a point that I have hammered on for years, as I 
indicated, admonishing my colleagues, particularly on the Republican 
side of the aisle, that throwing more money at the Department of 
Defense is not going to solve the problem. We will never succeed in 
modernizing the force structure at these prices without fundamental 
reform.
  Now, it happens that there are even outstanding members of the Armed 
Services Committee that have been fighting a long time for fundamental 
reform. I want to commend my colleagues for fighting for fundamental 
reform. I think that fundamental reform is very, very important to make 
sure that whatever extra money we spend--including the $250-some-
billion we are going to spend--is invested wisely and we get the most 
bang for the buck. But it seems to me that the reform ought to go ahead 
of the additional $12 billion.
  We have had some types of reform over the last 15 years. But, again, 
we think we make some dramatic changes--what we feel are dramatic 
changes--in the way the Defense Department does business. After you 
look back at it, you really do not see the changes come about that we 
had hoped for when we passed the reforms or the reforms that go on 
within the Defense Department that can be done without actually passing 
the legislation.
  We have had a host of defense reforms, one after the other. But there 
tends to be a big gap between promises and reality. None of these 
reforms have worked completely as advertised. We do not get all of the 
desired impact that we want to have.
  Some could even been classified as bureaucratic tricks to cover for 
business as usual. It all leads up to the fact that what the Department 
of Defense needs to do is to find a new way of doing business--a 
completely new way of doing business, a new attitude, a new culture 
there. But, in fact, we really never really get the complete changes 
that ought to be made so that we get our money's worth when we put 
additional money in for modernization, or anything else.
  If we do not get this fundamental reform, I think we still have to 
say, as good as our Armed Forces are, how much better they could be, 
how much more we would get for our investment of money if these reforms 
would really happen. We are talking about changing a basic culture. To 
do that, you need new ideas and new strategies. Most importantly, you 
need a disciplined management. You have to find ways to make reforms 
work--and work now, not later--not in the year 2001.
  So I am suggesting in the amendment, which I will deposit at the desk 
shortly, a way of making sure that we get real modernization with the 
savings that we are supposed to get from infrastructure savings. We 
have already had four rounds of base closures. We have had a shrinking 
force. This should mean savings in infrastructure accounts. The 
Department of Defense has promised these savings, but the savings, as I 
have indicated, are not there. So promises do not match the reality.
  My amendment would, hopefully, make the savings real. So this is what 
I propose to do would accomplish that goal. I will give you seven 
specific objectives of my amendment.
  The first is to seek to establish a better balance between force 
structure and infrastructure costs. I will show you, eventually, how 
there is an imbalance there--an imbalance that does not make sense to 
me, but it is still an imbalance.

  Second, this balance would be brought about and achieved by freezing 
the infrastructure budget at the fiscal year 1998 level of $145 
billion. The freeze would save $10 billion in fiscal year 1998 to the 
year 2001.
  Fourth, the Secretary of Defense would transfer the savings to the 
procurement accounts to pay for modernization. This is the key, then, 
to getting money from savings that we ought to be able to account for 
and get it into modernization, not into overhead. That ought to be 
going down; instead, it is going up.
  The fifth point is that key readiness accounts would be protected. 
That

[[Page S6388]]

would be like for spare parts, training, and a lot of other things like 
that.
  Sixth, the savings would be reflected in the future years' defense 
program submitted to Congress next year so that we would be able to 
know what it was and to see it and to have it accounted for.
  Seventh, we would have the Comptroller General review and verify the 
savings, so we have somebody outside of the Defense Department, with no 
vested interest, verifying what Defense does, in the sense of just the 
accounting, or being accountable for the money, and not micromanaging 
anything that the Secretary of Defense might do.
  Now, what is going to be strange to the managers of this bill--both 
Republican and Democrat--is that I see my goals being 100 percent 
consistent with the Department of Defense plans. So you take what they 
say they want to do, which, as I have indicated, is not being done, and 
make sure that it is done. It seems to me that if there is anyplace for 
the Congress of the United States to be involved in some detail of the 
Defense Department's work, it is nothing more than to make sure that 
they do what they say they are going to do, what they report to us they 
are going to do, to kind of make their performance in office 
commensurate with their rhetoric. That's making them accountable. That 
is perfectly consistent with constitutional oversight functions of the 
Congress of the United States.

  This DOD plan was presented to the Armed Services Committee as 
recently as March 5, 1996. At that time, Secretary of Defense Perry 
testified that $10 billion in savings from base closings would be used 
to pay for modernization. A very distinguished member of the Armed 
Services Committee who was just here--and I suppose he is going to 
speak on my amendment. I am glad to have him engage in this debate. But 
we know this very distinguished member as a person who is a real hero 
for the defense of our country as well as being a very good Senator, 
John McCain. I am going to say he also agrees. He may stand up here 
shortly and say that he disagrees, but at least I want to give my 
version of that.
  He has said that there is a gross imbalance between our military 
forces and the infrastructure. He says we need to eliminate excess 
infrastructure, we need to save money. He has a white paper on our 
national defense. That is the way I interpret it. There is just one 
minor problem on what the Secretary of Defense said on March 5 of this 
year when he was going to take this $10 billion in savings from the 
base closings and use it for modernization. The savings promised by Mr. 
Perry do not exist. The General Accounting Office just audited those 
accounts. You cannot find any savings. The savings have evaporated into 
thin air.
  Mr. President, earlier this year, on April 25, I spoke about the 
General Accounting Office report on this subject. What I said then I am 
going to repeat now. Anybody can read that. It is entitled, ``Defense 
Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for 
Modernization.'' It was published on April 4, just 2 months ago. 
Unfortunately, it was based on the fiscal year 1996 future year defense 
program publication.
  The fiscal year 1996 future year defense program was submitted to 
Congress over a year ago. So I suppose to some extent, as things move 
very rapidly, it is somewhat out of date. It is at least a year old. I 
thought I should have more current data. I thought that the Pentagon 
bureaucrats might have been able to get their act together since last 
year. Maybe they succeeded in getting infrastructure costs on the right 
track. I think we could legitimately surmise that they should have done 
that.
  So not being able to get this information, I wrote to Mr. Bowsher on 
May 10 of this year asking him to provide me the updated information 
drawn from the fiscal year 1997 future year defense plan. I thank Mr. 
Bowsher and his expert staff, including Mr. Bill Crocker, for working 
so hard and to turn around my request in less than 2 weeks. That is 
pretty fast even for a responsible organization like the General 
Accounting Office. It must be a record.
  I have the General Accounting Office's brandnew report right here 
with me. It is entitled, ``Defense Infrastructure: Cost Projected To 
Increase Between 1997 and 2001.'' This is dated May 1996.
  Before I get started, I think it is important to define 
infrastructure cost. This is the money that DOD spends to house, train, 
and support the Armed Forces and keep them ready to go. The General 
Accounting Office has provided a brief description in this publication 
of each category of infrastructure costs. The General Accounting Office 
has also provided a table that shows how infrastructure costs are 
spread across the various appropriations accounts.
  I ask unanimous consent to have that material printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                  Categories of Defense Infrastructure

       Installation support consists of activities that furnish 
     funding, equipment, and personnel to provide facilities from 
     which defense forces operate. Activities include construction 
     planning and design, real property maintenance, base 
     operating support, real estate management for active and 
     reserve bases, family housing and bachelor housing, supply 
     operations, base closure activities, and environmental 
     programs.
       Acquisition infrastructure consists of all program elements 
     that support program management, program offices, and 
     production support, including acquisition headquarters, 
     science and technology, and test and evaluation resources. 
     This category includes earlier levels of research and 
     development, including basic research, exploratory 
     development, and advanced development.
       Central logistics consists of programs that provide support 
     to centrally managed logistics organizations, including the 
     management of material, operation of supply systems, 
     maintenance activities, material transportation, base 
     operations and support, communications, and minor 
     construction. This category also includes program elements 
     that provide resources for commissaries and military exchange 
     operations.
       Central training consists of program elements that provide 
     resources for virtually all non-unit training, including 
     training for new personnel, aviation and flight training, 
     military academies, officer training corps, other college 
     commissioning programs, and officer and enlisted training 
     schools.
       Central medical consists of programs that furnish funding, 
     equipment, and personnel that provide medical care to active 
     military personnel, dependents, and retirees. Activities 
     provide for all patient care, except for that provided by 
     medical units that are part of direct support units. 
     Activities include medical training, management of the 
     medical system, and support of medical installations.
       Central personnel consists of all programs that provide for 
     the recruiting of new personnel and the management and 
     support of dependent schools, community, youth, and family 
     centers, and child development activities. Other programs 
     supporting personnel include permanent change of station 
     costs, personnel in transit, civilian disability 
     compensation, veterans education assistance, and other 
     miscellaneous personnel support activities.
       Command, control, and communications consists of programs 
     that manage all aspects of the command, control, and 
     communications infrastructure for DOD facilities, information 
     support services, mapping and charting products, and security 
     support. This category includes program elements that provide 
     nontactical telephone services, the General Defense 
     Intelligence Program and cryptological activities, the Global 
     Positioning System, and support of air traffic control 
     facilities.
       Force management consists of all programs that provide 
     funding, equipment, and personnel for the management and 
     operation of all the major military command headquarters 
     activities. Force management also includes program elements 
     that provide resources for defense-wide departmental 
     headquarters, management of international programs, support 
     to other defense organizations and federal government 
     agencies, security investigate services, public affairs 
     activities, and criminal and judicial activities.

                    TABLE 2.--DIRECT INFRASTRUCTURE BY APPROPRIATION, FISCAL YEARS 1997-2001                    
                                              [Dollars in billions]                                             
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                  Fiscal year--                 
                         Appropriation                         -------------------------------------------------
                                                                  1997      1998      1999      2000      2001  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation and maintenance.....................................    $56.30    $56.17    $56.41    $57.57    $59.50

[[Page S6389]]

                                                                                                                
Military personnel............................................     33.53     33.10     33.67     34.33     35.20
Research, development, test, and evaluation...................     10.47     10.89     11.20     11.43     11.89
Military construction.........................................      4.99      4.15      4.15      3.84      3.96
Family housing................................................      3.98      3.84      4.08      4.08      4.12
Procurement...................................................      2.38      2.53      3.48      3.21      3.46
Revolving funds and other \1\.................................      0.93      1.11      1.06      1.13      1.17
                                                               -------------------------------------------------
      Total direct infrastructure \2\.........................   $112.58   $111.80   $114.05   $115.61   $119.30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These include adjustments for foreign currency fluctuations and service and Defense Logistics Agency managed
  stock fund cash requirements.                                                                                 
\2\ Totals may not add due to rounding.                                                                         
                                                                                                                
Source: GAO analysis of DOS data.                                                                               




                            agency comments

       The data and analysis in this report were provided to DOD 
     for review and comment. In oral comments, DOD stated the data 
     were complete and accurate with the analysis.


                         scope and methodology

       To define and evaluate DOD's infrastructure activities in 
     the 1997 FYDP, we interviewed the acting Director, Force and 
     Infrastructure Analysis Division in the Office of the 
     Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation. Our 
     analyses are based on data contained in the fiscal year 1997 
     FYDP. In addition to the FYDP and associated annexes, we 
     reviewed DOD's Reference Manual for Defense Mission 
     Categories, Infrastructure Categories, and Program Elements, 
     prepared in conjunction with the Institute for Defense 
     Analysis. We also reviewed the President's fiscal year 1997 
     budget submission and our prior reports.
       Our work was conducted during the month of May 1996 in 
     accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
     standards.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. I wish I could say, Mr. President, that the Department 
of Defense has turned the corner. I wish I could report that 
infrastructure costs were coming down. But the latest report of the 
General Accounting Office tells me that nothing has changed since the 
last future year defense plan, meaning 1996. The trends have to be the 
same. The Pentagon still has infrastructure costs on the wrong track. 
They are still on an up-ramp instead of on a down-ramp. This is what 
the new data show. As the Department of Defense budget top line goes 
up, infrastructure costs go up. Infrastructure costs should come down 
even if the top line goes up. The infrastructure costs ought to be 
decoupled from the top line. The infrastructure costs need to be 
recoupled to the force structure because that is what Secretary Perry 
says is his intent.
  The infrastructure costs in the military force structures are not in 
sync. They are out of whack. We need to bring them back into balance. 
As I read what Senator McCain has written in his white paper, he says 
that is what we must do as well. But that is not what has happened. The 
Department of Defense seems to be creating new infrastructure faster 
than the old stuff is made excess.
  That is what this new data tells us. This is its new data that the 
General Accounting Office has followed for 1 year that was not 
available until the General Accounting Office updated it. It shows a 
steady increase in the infrastructure costs for fiscal year 1997 
through fiscal year 2001.
  I want to repeat. There is a very steady increase from $146 billion 
in fiscal year 1997. It dips by $1 billion to $145 billion in 1998, but 
then it goes right back up to $148 billion in 1999; $2 billion more in 
the year 2000. Then it leaps by $5 billion to $155 billion in the year 
2001. That is a projected increase of $9 billion over the next 5 years. 
If Congress keeps pumping up the defense budget, these numbers will 
increase even more.
  The data portrayed on table 1 of this new General Accounting Office 
report is particularly troublesome.
  I also ask unanimous consent at this point to have table 1 printed in 
the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                TABLE 1.--PROJECTED FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORIES, FISCAL YEARS 1997-2001               
                                            [In billions of dollars]                                            
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     Infrastructure categories                       FY 1997  FY 1998  FY 1999  FY 2000  FY 2001
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Installation support...............................................    25.10    23.64    22.68    22.53    23.03
Central training...................................................    19.35    19.40    20.08    20.71    21.46
Central medical....................................................    15.47    15.82    16.13    16.64    17.38
Central logistics..................................................    13.33    13.30    14.18    14.15    14.70
Force management...................................................    12.91    12.38    13.05    13.12    13.35
Acquisition infrastructure.........................................    10.25    10.64    10.97    11.19    11.76
Central personnel..................................................    10.33    10.24    10.41    10.60    10.83
Central command, control, and communications.......................     5.78     5.84     6.05     6.05     6.20
Resource adjustments \1\...........................................      .05      .53      .50      .62      .58
  Total direct infrastructure \2\..................................   112.58   111.80   114.05   115.61   119.30
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ These include adjustments for foreign currency fluctuations and service and Defense Logistics Agency managed
  stock fund cash requirements.                                                                                 
\2\ Totals may not add due to rounding.                                                                         
                                                                                                                
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.                                                                               

       As shown in figure 3 and table 2, most direct 
     infrastructure activities are funded by operation and 
     maintenance and military personnel appropriations. Thus, if 
     DOD is to achieve significant infrastructure savings for 
     future force modernization, the savings must come from these 
     accounts. However, these appropriations have been closely 
     associated with the readiness and quality-of-life of the 
     force, the Secretary of Defense's priority areas for the last 
     few years.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, this table breaks the infrastructure 
costs into nine distinct categories. The new General Accounting Office 
data shows major increases in every category, with one important 
exception, and that would be installation support. Even installation 
support shows increases in the outyears. The four BRAC commissions 
proposed closing 97 bases. Yet, installation support costs are 
projected to rise. I think it is legitimate to ask why. Is it because 
few, if any, of those bases have really been closed?
  The downstream savings promised by base closings and a shrinking 
force structure should be reflected in these numbers, but they are not. 
We should be able to identify where the savings are. I do not expect to 
see any savings. We will not ever see those savings unless we hold the 
Department's feet to the fire.
  A comparison of the numbers in the fiscal year 1996 future year 
defense plan with the numbers in the 1997 future year defense plan 
suggests that installation support figures on table 1 are misleading. 
That comparison reveals a shocking trend. That comparison suggests that 
base support costs will actually increase by $1 billion per year 
between the years 1997 and the year 2001.
  Take fiscal year 1997 just for example. The fiscal year 1997 column 
in the 1996 future year defense plan shows installation costs at $23.96 
billion.
  Then if you go over to the fiscal year 1997 column, in the the 1997 
future year defense plan, the number goes up to $25.1 billion. That is 
an increase of $1.14 billion in 1 year in projected installation 
support. The next year it is the same thing. The number goes from 
$22.76 billion up to $23.64 billion, and that is an increase of $900 
million.
  I need to clarify one point about the numbers. The numbers on the 
table that I have submitted for the Record do not match up with the 
totals for the infrastructure costs that I used a moment ago, and there 
is a reason for that discrepancy. About $35 billion in infrastructure 
costs get lost in what we refer to as DBOF--that stands for Defense 
business operation fund--each year. We know the money is in there 
someplace, but the General Accounting Office cannot track it because 
dollars in the Defense business operation fund are not identified in 
the future year defense program.
  And so I think it is very ironic because DBOF was established to 
improve cost accounting at the Pentagon. In fact, that was the whole 
idea about DBOF. Here is $35 billion in annual DOD costs that cannot be 
tracked because of the Defense business operation fund. We cannot audit 
them because of the fund. The fund is an obstacle to accurate cost 
accounting.
  There is yet another problem. That problem is that the Department of 
Defense had a $4 billion plug figure in last year's numbers, and they 
pulled it out of the new future year defense plan,

[[Page S6390]]

making it look as if some of the funding levels were coming down. The 
Department of Defense said the $4 billion that was plugged in for last 
year was miscoded. The miscoded dollars were pulled out of the 
infrastructure costs and, in a sense, just heaved overboard. I suppose 
somebody could say they were transferred to another part of the future 
year defense plan, but if they cannot be tracked, no one knows.
  That makes me think they are kind of phony numbers.
  In a nutshell, Mr. President, that is what is in this latest report 
of the General Accounting Office on defense infrastructure. I hope my 
colleagues will take this as I have referred to it for several minutes 
here, taking statistics from it, to make a case for my amendment that I 
will offer.
  This latest report, I think, states for another year that Mr. Perry's 
promised savings are nowhere in sight. His $60 billion modernization 
plan then is, if the savings are not available, hung out to dry. It is 
dead in the water.
  And so I come here pleading with my colleagues that Congress needs to 
help Mr. Perry. Without a doubt, reason is on his side.
  On March 5, he presented to the Congress of the United States through 
the Armed Services Committee that there is going to be x amount of 
savings, and this is the resource for modernization. That all makes 
sense, right? But is it going to happen? With an increase in 
infrastructure costs and overhead, it is going to be eaten up someplace 
else. The modernization that we think we are planning on being there is 
not going to materialize. In fact, at the beginning of my time today I 
pointed out how little we actually get for modernization when you look 
at the materiel that is purchased.
  So I cannot come here and condemn Mr. Perry for not having good 
intent and a plan that he thinks will accomplish what he wants to 
accomplish. But it just is not going to happen. So my amendment would 
make sure that money finds its way into modernization and not into this 
overhead and infrastructure cost where it is going to inevitably end up 
because four rounds of base closings and a shrinking force structure 
should be producing substantial savings. Because it should be producing 
substantial savings, we ought to identify those savings and reserve 
them for the purpose that Mr. Perry suggested. He wants to recover 
those savings to pay for modernization. And so unless we freeze these 
accounts, the savings are going to be frittered away on new 
infrastructure projects. My amendment will help Mr. Perry do what he 
says must be done.
  I send my amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thompson). The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Iowa [Mr. Grassley] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4047.

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle A of title X add the following:

     SEC.   . FORCE MODERNIZATION FUNDED BY REDUCTIONS IN SPENDING 
                   FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Funding Freeze at Programmed Level for Fiscal Year 
     1998.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the total 
     amount expended for infrastructure programs for each of 
     fiscal years 1998 through 2001 does not exceed 
     $145,000,000,000.
       (b) Use of Savings for Force Modernization.--The Secretary 
     of Defense shall take the actions necessary to program for 
     procurement for force modernization for the fiscal years 
     referred to in subsection (a) the amount of the savings in 
     expenditures for infrastructure programs that is derived from 
     actions taken to carry out that subsection.
       (c) Protection of Program for Spare Parts and Training.--In 
     formulating the future-years defense programs to be submitted 
     to Congress in fiscal year 1997 (for fiscal year 1998 and 
     following fiscal years), fiscal year 1998 (for fiscal year 
     1999 and following fiscal years), fiscal year 1999 (for 
     fiscal year 2000 and following fiscal years), and fiscal year 
     2000 (for fiscal year 2001 and following fiscal years), the 
     Secretary shall preserve the growth in programmed funding for 
     spare parts and training for fiscal years 1998 through 2001 
     that is provided in the future-years defense program that was 
     submitted to Congress in fiscal year 1996.
       (d) Reductions To Be Shown in Fiscal year 1998 Future-Years 
     Defense Program.--The future-years defense program submitted 
     to Congress in fiscal year 1997 shall reflect the programming 
     for the reduction in expenditures for infrastructure programs 
     that is necessary to carry out subsection (a) and the 
     programming for force modernization that is required by 
     subsection (b).
       (e) GAO Review of Fiscal Year 1998 Future-Years Defense 
     Program.--The Comptroller General shall review the future-
     years defense program referred to in subsection (c) and, not 
     later than May 1, 1997, submit to Congress a report regarding 
     compliance with that subsection. The report shall include a 
     discussion of the extent, if any, to which the compliance is 
     deficient or cannot be ascertained.
       (f) Infrastructure Programs Defined.--For the purposes of 
     this section, infrastructure programs are programs of the 
     Department of Defense that are composed of activities that 
     provide support services for mission programs of the 
     Department of Defense and operate primarily from fixed 
     locations. Infrastructure programs include program elements 
     in the following categories:
       (1) Acquisition infrastructure.
       (2) Installation support.
       (3) Central command, control, and communications.
       (4) Force management.
       (5) Central logistics.
       (6) Central medical.
       (7) Central personnel.
       (8) Central training.
       (9) Resource adjustments for foreign currency fluctuations 
     and Defense Logistics Agency managed stock fund cash 
     requirements.
       (g) Future--Years Defense Program Defined.--As used in this 
     section, the term ``future-years defense program'' means the 
     future-years defense program submitted to Congress pursuant 
     to section 221 of title 10, United States Code.

  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I should like to inquire of the 
distinguished Senator if he is willing to enter into a time agreement 
on this amendment?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. You propose one, and then I will respond after it is 
proposed.
  Mr. THURMOND. I would suggest maybe 20 minutes to a side.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes.
  Mr. THURMOND. Is that agreeable?
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes, that is agreeable.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time on 
the Grassley amendment be limited to 40 minutes equally divided in the 
usual form and that no amendments be in order, and that following the 
use or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote on or in 
relation to the amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. I say to the manager of the bill, I would like to yield 
the floor now and listen to the opposition to my amendment before I 
speak again.
  Mr. THURMOND. As I understand, the Senator is willing to agree to 40 
minutes equally divided.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Yes. We have already agreed to that. So I have 20 
minutes that I control and you have 20 minutes that you control.
  Mr. THURMOND. That is correct.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. If the Senator would be so kind, I would like to have 
him use some of his 20 minutes so I can hear the opposition to my 
amendment, and then I would like to respond to that.
  Mr. THURMOND. I will be glad to speak at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to this 
amendment. If the Senate votes to pass this provision and it is 
eventually signed into law, it could have a serious negative impact on 
the readiness of our military forces.
  Like my good friend, the Senator from Iowa, I am concerned about the 
amount of money that the Department of Defense annually expends for 
infrastructure. In fact, the Defense authorization bill that we are 
considering now and is before us, reduces such programs by 
approximately $600 million and allocates these funds for higher 
priority programs including force modernization.
  Mr. President, I believe that we should carefully examine any 
reduction that is proposed in order to ensure that we do not adversely 
impact our military forces. I am sure that my fellow Senators will 
agree with me when

[[Page S6391]]

I say that we do not want to jeopardize our national security or the 
men and women in uniform who protect that security.
  With this in mind, I must inform my colleagues that the proposed 
amendment could force severe funding reductions to important programs 
such as the medical care of military personnel, military housing, and 
military intelligence activities. Are we sure we can reduce these 
programs without negatively impacting upon military readiness?
  Does the Senator from Iowa really believe that we should reduce such 
programs? Does he want to deny health care to our men and women in 
uniform? Does he want to force the families of military personnel to 
live in substandard housing? Mr. President, I cannot speak for every 
Member of this Chamber, but I know that I cannot support such 
reductions.
  Mr. President, I agree with the Senator from Iowa that we must look 
for new and innovative management practices in order to find ways to 
shift funds from the infrastructure accounts to the modernization 
accounts. However, we must be sure that the shifting of such funds does 
not significantly impair military readiness. Reducing funds for 
unnecessary infrastructure is a task which the Armed Services Committee 
performs each year during its markup of the Defense Authorization Act 
and, as I have already noted, this year we reduced such funds by $600 
million. In addition, the bill before us today includes a provision 
that would require the Department to examine new ways of maintaining 
its forces in order to further reduce funding required for day-to-day 
operations, and make these funds available for force modernization.
  Mr. President, I cannot advocate, nor agree to support, an arbitrary 
cut such as that advocated by this amendment. We must preserve the 
flexibility of the President and the Secretary of Defense to request 
what they believe is necessary to ensure our national security. If the 
Congress disagrees with this request, it can authorize and appropriate 
a different mix of funding.
  Mr. President, I urge my fellow Senators to vote ``no'' on the 
Grassley amendment.
  Mr. President, I now yield to the able Senator from Arizona, Senator 
McCain.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Iowa who 
continues to be a persistent, constructive critic of defense issues, 
especially in the area of spending. I think this GAO report is a good 
one and should have a sobering effect on our defense planners, who 
somehow believe and support a precept that I have long questioned, and 
that is that base closings and other savings are going to support the 
modernization of the force.
  The Senator from Iowa, I think, through his efforts, and also that of 
this GAO report, points out clearly that there are not going to be 
savings. In fact, according to this GAO study--which I must say needs 
to be fleshed out, I am sure my colleague from Iowa would agree--it 
shows there is going to be an increase in cost.
  Just one example of that, one of the clear reasons for that, is the 
base closing issue. We believed for a long time there would be enormous 
savings associated with base closures. Those bases needed to be closed. 
More need to be closed. But the fact is we are not realizing those 
savings. In fact, the opposite has been the case. Rather than sell the 
valuable land on which these bases reside, we give it away to the local 
community. We are finding more and more toxic waste sites and areas of 
pollution that need to be cleaned up, and anyone who has ever had any 
contact with that issue knows that the costs rapidly spiral in a 
dramatic fashion when you are talking about cleanups. In fact, as the 
Senator from Iowa points out, these costs have been much higher, much, 
much higher than we had originally estimated.
  The Senator from Iowa was kind enough to make reference to the white 
paper that I did concerning tiered readiness, and this GAO report and 
his amendment highlight the absolute criticality of making the kind of 
hard choices which we are not making today because there is no possible 
way we are going to maintain the level of readiness, operations, and 
training of our Armed Forces and at the same time modernize the force.
  We have a Hobson's choice, because the money simply is not there and, 
as the Senator from Iowa correctly points out, much less money is there 
than even we had envisioned. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
has stated on numerous occasions that we need about $60 billion for the 
purchase of modernization. We have, the last number I saw, was about 
$30 billion.
  Having said all those things, I still have to disagree with this 
amendment. One reason is because of its scope. For example, the 
amendment calls for reductions in spending for such programs as health 
care, personnel, and training. I do not see how you can impose 
arbitrary cuts on those programs. One of the aspects that we are most 
proud of in the military today is the quality of life, that is, the 
quality of young men and women that we have been able to attract and 
keep in the military. I am not sure that we could maintain that if we 
just, across the board, forced certain cuts without designating where 
they should be.
  I want to emphasize that I believe we are spending money in ways that 
are really not appropriate. In this year's bill we added some $600 
million in military construction that was not needed. We add two new 
oceanographic ships for $99.4 million. We have added $13 million to 
fund a new bureaucracy in the case of civilian research in 
oceanography. We are going to add on $15 million for the High Frequency 
Active Aural Research Program. This program has benefited from 
congressional add-ons since 1990, costing a total of $76 million in 
just 7 years, with another $115 million required. We continue to 
purchase B-2 bombers. In this bill we included an additional $759 
million in the National Guard and Reserve equipment account, plus as 
much as $242 million in additional unrequested equipment earmarked for 
the Guard and Reserve in the regular service procurement accounts. 
Within this amount is $284 million for six unrequested C-140J aircraft 
for the Guard and Reserve, a tactical airlift aircraft that the Air 
Force has not yet been able to afford.

  Mr. President, the list goes on and we are spending money that we 
should not spend. We have lost sight of the fundamental reason why we 
spend money on defense, and that is to defend the security of the 
Nation.
  I strongly suggest to my friend from Iowa that there are different 
ways of doing this. I look forward to working with him on this. I will 
have a couple of amendments that I hope will impose some savings. I am 
told there will be some additional military construction projects which 
will be attempted to be added to the bill here on the floor. I hope my 
colleague from Iowa will help me in trying to defeat those, although I 
am not totally optimistic about chances of success.
  But, as I oppose the amendment, I thank my colleague from Iowa 
because the fact is that the American people are losing confidence that 
their tax dollars that are earmarked for defense are being spent 
wisely. If that continued erosion reaches its logical conclusion, 
sooner or later we are going to reach a point where the American people 
will not support sufficient funding to meet our vital national security 
interests.
  Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Nine minutes twenty seconds.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
  Mr. GRASSLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Iowa.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
  First of all, I accept Senator McCain's offer to work with him on 
this issue, because I am very impressed with the intent of his white 
paper and his first-hand knowledge of the military, being the military 
hero that he is and serving our country so well and being on the Armed 
Services Committee and his expertise in that area. So whether my 
amendment is adopted or not, I accept the offer to work with Senator 
McCain.
  I would, first of all, like to respond to some specific points both 
Senator Thurmond and Senator McCain raised, but also to give an example 
from military persons themselves about what

[[Page S6392]]

needs to be done about infrastructure costs and his frustration that 
infrastructure costs have not gone down.
  First of all, on the legitimacy of questioning whether my amendment 
is going to hurt funding for command and control and for medical 
support, it will not, but it seems to me, without my saying it, common 
sense ought to dictate that a shrinking force structure and fewer 
military bases should reduce command and control and medical 
requirements.
  My amendment would, in fact, just freeze; it would not reduce. It 
would reduce increases, yes, but there are no cuts that come as a 
result of my amendment. Increasing infrastructure costs are 
inconsistent with the philosophy behind the base closure process. My 
amendment would hold the Department of Defense infrastructure costs at 
$145 billion per year. Now, remember, this is, as we are, in a process 
of closing bases and reducing the number of personnel connected with 
defense.
  It seems to me that the Department of Defense needs to address the 
critical shortfalls and allocate money to meet the highest priorities 
within the infrastructure accounts. At this point in the base closure 
process and at this point in the reduction of personnel, infrastructure 
should not be on the rise.
  We need to make sure that we eliminate the excess infrastructure and 
that we save the money that Secretary Perry promised, not just for the 
sake of saving money, but Secretary Perry says that is money that we 
are going to use for modernization. If it goes to infrastructure costs, 
which are going up, it is not going to go for modernization.
  It was also suggested that my amendment might harm training and 
readiness, but very specifically I want to address that issue. 
Subsection (C) of my amendment specifically protects key readiness 
accounts, including training and spare parts.
  I now want to refer to some remarks that were made by Marine Maj. 
Gen. John Sheehan. He is the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic 
Command. I think he made some very pertinent remarks, a person in the 
military, a person in command who views how the taxpayers' dollars are 
being used every day. If you do not want to listen to a civilian's 
point of view, like the Senator from Iowa has a civilian point of view, 
it seems to me that we ought to pay some attention to those who are in 
the military, because General Sheehan offers some very real insight.
  His insights were given at a June 6 breakfast hosted by the 
Association of the U.S. Army's Institute for Land Warfare. I have 
excerpts of his comments from a trade journal called Inside the 
Pentagon. It was in the June 13 issue, page 20.
  In a nutshell, this is what General Sheehan said:

       The overflow of staff organizations within the Department 
     of Defense consumes too many personnel and resources and puts 
     the force structure at risk.

  That is a major general who said that.
  Opponents of my amendment say it is going to put certain aspects, 
like readiness and training and command and control and medical 
treatment, in jeopardy. Here is a major general who says what we are 
doing now, if we maintain the status quo, is putting our force 
structure at risk. Of course, he is talking about the Department of 
Defense infrastructure. This is what General Sheehan had to say:

       There is a debate that's being formed right now, where the 
     only sides in the debate are modernization versus force 
     structure. . .

  He says:

       My argument says we ought to take a very serious top-down 
     look at the overhead costs of doing business.

  He asked:

       Why do we have so many headquarters? Of what value are 
     they?

  The general has identified one of the big drivers in infrastructure 
costs, and he has identified them as excess headquarters and excess 
commands. General Sheehan says:

       We have too many excess headquarters and too many commands.

  So he has put his finger on one of the root causes of the problem.
  He pinpoints the problem, and I want to quote from his report. He 
says:

       There are 199 DOD staff organizations of two-star level or 
     above, and the number has not changed since 1989.

  I say, parenthetically, that is about the time the Berlin Wall came 
down.
  His 1989 benchmark is important because the force has shrunk 30 to 40 
percent since that time. So, headquarters should shrink as the force 
gets smaller, but headquarters are not shrinking.
  As an example, he cited the U.S. Army in Europe with its 23 staff 
echelons to command only 65,000 soldiers. He also cited the U.S. 
Southern Command as another example of a top-heavy organization.
  General Sheehan raised this provocative question:

       Why is it, for example, that you have SOUTHCOM with 770 
     officers commanding less than 4,000 men?

  Mr. President, I say to my colleagues, listen to what General Sheehan 
says:

       Why is it that you have SOUTHCOM with 770 officers 
     commanding less than 4,000 people?

  He goes on to say:

       There are still 65 NATO headquarters with over 21,000 staff 
     officers sitting around doing paperwork. That's more staff 
     officers than two NATO nations have in land forces.

  We have more people doing paperwork than two NATO nations have in 
their land forces.
  So you have to ask yourself.
  General Sheehan says--

       . . . of $1.79 billion we invest in NATO on burdensharing, 
     why is $800 million of that just for infrastructure?

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's 10 minutes have expired.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 more minutes. I know 
that is all the time I have, but I think what General Sheehan says is 
very important.
  General Sheehan has hit the nail on the head, and this is his main 
argument:

       Bloated staff organizations have created a demand for 
     personnel that can starve warfighting units into hollowness.

  A hollow fighting unit like we had in the late 1970's, in other 
words.
  Bloated command staffs and headquarters are an outgrowth of top-heavy 
rank. In other words, General Sheehan is saying, we have excess 
admirals and generals, and each one needs a home, and every senior 
officer needs a command, a headquarters, a base, a staff, or a large 
department of some kind, somewhere, someplace to look over.
  Take the Navy, for example. At the height of World War II, the Navy 
had 6,768 ships. Those 6,768 ships were commanded by 333 admirals. That 
is one admiral for about 20 ships. Today's 363-ship Navy is commanded 
by 218 admirals. That is almost one admiral for every ship. To be 
precise, it is one and two-thirds ships per admiral.
  General Sheehan is wrestling with this problem, and doing it from the 
standpoint of a person serving his country, in uniform, on the line 
where the money is being spent--or should we say, on the line where the 
money is being wasted.
  He told the audience that he is searching for technical solutions to 
the problems of swollen staff organizations. This is what he had to 
say:

       What is needed are systems that can help reduce the 
     overhead costs for commanding large forces. With all this 
     technology and smarts running around, why aren't we more 
     efficient?

  That is a question that every Senator ought to ask before he votes 
for this bill.
  In other words, General Sheehan has made an excellent case for 
cutting infrastructure costs.
  The military today is top-heavy with rank and staff organizations and 
command headquarters left over from the cold war. That is the official 
word from the commander of the United States Atlantic Command. That is 
a pretty good authority.
  General Sheehan has clearly identified the culprit. He obviously 
understands the problem. And he is also frustrated by his inability to 
get rid of his own excess command fat.
  We know that the Department of Defense cannot do it, so we need to 
help them. So if you vote for my amendment, you will help General 
Sheehan do what he says he sees is necessary to get more bang for their 
defense dollar.
  He put it this way:

       Nobody likes to cut their own staff.

  He goes on to say:

       I've never seen a butcher hand a pig a cleaver and say, 
     ``Go make pork chops.''


[[Page S6393]]


  So Congress needs to lend a helping hand to people like General 
Sheehan.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this report about 
General Sheehan's speech printed in the Record, the article from Inside 
the Pentagon.
  There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

               [From Inside the Pentagon, June 13, 1996]

     Atlantic Commander Criticizes Profusion of Staff Organizations

                         (By Douglas Berenson)

       Marine Corps Gen. John Sheehan, commander-in-chief of the 
     U.S. Atlantic Command; last week decried the profusion of 
     staff organizations within the Department of Defense, arguing 
     they consume too many personnel and resources, and therefore 
     put at risk already strained force structure. Sheehan, who 
     has previously targeted the top-heavy command structure of 
     the NATO alliance (Inside the Pentagon, Sept. 21, 1995, pl), 
     offered his remarks at a June 6 breakfast hosted by the 
     Association of the U.S. Army's Institute for Land Warfare.
       ``There is a debate that's being formed right now, where 
     the only sides are in the debate [are] modernization versus 
     force structure. My argument says we ought to take a very 
     serious top-down look at the overhead costs of doing 
     business. Why do we have so many headquarters? Of what value 
     are they?'' Sheehan asked.
       Sheehan noted that within the Department of Defense, there 
     are 199 staff organizations of two-star level of above, a 
     number that has not changed since 1989. As an example, he 
     cited the fact that the U.S. Army in Europe has 23 staff 
     echelons to command 65,000 soldiers. He said that U.S. 
     Southern Command offered another example of a top-heavy 
     organization. ``Why is it, for example, that you have 
     SOUTHCOM [with] 770 officers commanding less than 4,000 
     men?'' he wondered.
       He argued that these bloated staff organizations have 
     created a demand for personnel that can starve warfighting 
     units into hollowness. ``Why is it that the Bradley fighting 
     vehicle spends so much time in gunnery when you go into the 
     field? Why is it you don't spend more time in the integration 
     of operations of the rifle unit coming out the back [of the 
     Bradley]? It's because of this process,'' Sheehan said, 
     noting that Bradley infantry squads are often fielded at 
     lower than their optimum strength.
       Sheehan argued that the ``tooth-to-tail'' ratio has become 
     badly skewed against the warfighter, such that, ``we field in 
     the entire Army 125,000 killers.'' The rest of the force is 
     made up of support and staff personnel, he said. Sheehan 
     warned that the staff non-commissioned officer corps is being 
     decimated, and that as the services focus on freeing up money 
     to spend on force modernization, they are ``forcing great 
     people out of the system.''
       Sheehan noted that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Dennis Reimer 
     has been working to streamline the Army's structure in 
     response to these problems. ``Dennis Reimer has to be allowed 
     to go after the European staff structure. He has got to be 
     allowed to go after the SOUTHCOM staff structure and take 
     some of that staff structure out to keep combat capability.''
       Sheehan warned that ``the next organization to go is the 
     2nd ACR [Armored Cavalry Regiment]. That would be a travesty. 
     We need light, mobile attack type forces with a protected gun 
     system for the battlefield of the future.''
       ``Nobody likes to cut their own staff,'' Sheehan observed, 
     quipping, ``I've never seen a butcher hand a pig a cleaver 
     and say, `Go make pork chops.'''
       Sheehan appealed to the assembled audience to help find 
     technical solutions to the problem of swollen staff 
     organizations. What is needed, he said, are systems that can 
     help reduce the overhead costs for commanding large forces. 
     ``With all this technology and smarts running around, why 
     aren't we more efficient?''
       As he has in the past, Sheehan levelled similar criticism 
     against the NATO command structure. In addition to his 
     responsibilities as U.S. Atlantic Command chief, Sheehan 
     serves simultaneously as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO's 
     Atlantic Command. ``As a major NATO commander, my main 
     complaint against my NATO allies is that many of these 
     countries took their force structure out and took a peace 
     dividend without reinvesting in the future. [But] they didn't 
     take the overhead out . . .
       ``There are still 65 NATO headquarters, with over 21,000 
     staff officers sitting around doing paperwork,'' Sheehan 
     continued. ``That's more staff officers than two NATO nations 
     have land forces. And so you ask yourself, of $1.79 billion 
     we invest in NATO on a burdensharing basis, why is $800 
     million of that just in infrastructure?''

  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield the floor and reserve the 
balance of my time. I inquire of the amount of time I have left versus 
the amount of time that the opposition has.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 6 minutes, 24 seconds. The 
opposition has 9 minutes, 10 seconds.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Dan 
Ciechanowski, a fellow with Senator Kyl, be granted floor privileges 
for the duration of the consideration of the DOD authorization bill.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote 
occur on or in relation to the Grassley amendment No. 4047 at 5:30 
p.m., and following the conclusion or yielding back of time the 
amendment be laid aside until 5:30 p.m. this evening.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I yield back the balance of my time on 
my amendment.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I yield back my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is laid aside until 5:30.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Delila 
Lacevic be accorded the privileges of the floor during the pendency of 
the defense authorization bill. She is employed with the Center for 
Democracy and is working as a staff fellow in my office.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to offer an amendment on my behalf 
and on behalf of Senators Leahy, Harkin, and Bumpers.


                           Amendment No. 4048

(Purpose: To reduce to the level requested by the President the amount 
  authorized to be appropriated for research, development, test, and 
                evaluation for national missile defense)

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for himself, 
     Mr. Leahy, Mr. Harkin, and Mr. Bumpers, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 4048.
       On Page 31, strike out line 2 and insert in lieu thereof 
     the following:
       ``$9,362,542,000, of which--
       ``(A) $508,437,000 is authorized for national missile 
     defense;''.

  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, if I could have the attention of the 
Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will come to order.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I am offering an amendment that would 
reduce, by $300 million, the amount of money authorized in this piece 
of legislation for national missile defense.
  For those who do not know much about this process and have not been 
involved in the lexicon of Defense issues, the national missile 
defense, or Defend America, or antiballistic missile system, or Star 
Wars, all relates to a system that some say is needed to be built in 
order to defend America against incoming attacks from missiles launched 
by a potential adversary, ICBM's that would be launched by a rogue 
nation, or ICBM's that are launched accidentally. All of these are 
described as threats to our country, and it is proposed by a number of 
Members of the Congress, and others, that we should build a defense 
system against them.
  Now, if I were to provide a chart to the Senate that showed an array 
of the threats against our country, the threats would range all over 
the board. The threats against our country would be, for example: A 
terrorist who fills a rental truck with a fertilizer bomb and drives it 
in front of a courthouse or Federal building in Oklahoma and murders 
scores and scores of American citizens. A threat against our country 
might be not a fertilizer bomb in a rental truck, but perhaps a small 
glass vial of the deadliest biological agents

[[Page S6394]]

known to mankind, placed in a subway strategically, killing thousands 
and thousands of people. A threat to our country perhaps would be a 
suitcase bomb, or a nuclear device no bigger than the size of a 
suitcase put in the trunk of a Yugo car and left at a dock in New York 
City to hold hostage an entire city. Another threat might be a nuclear 
device on the tip of an incoming cruise missile launched by air, 
ground, or sea, by a potential adversary. Another threat might be a 
full-scale nuclear attack by an adversary, with dozens or scores of 
incoming missiles, ICBM's, or cruise missiles for that matter. Another 
threat might be that some rogue nation, some international outlaw on 
the scene, gets ahold of an ICBM and launches one intercontinental 
ballistic missile at our country tipped with a nuclear warhead. Or 
another might be simply an accidental launch of someone who possesses 
an ICBM with a nuclear warhead.
  All of these are potential threats to our country. They are not new 
threats. These threats have existed for some long while. In fact, a 
much greater threat existed some years ago than the ones I have just 
described, and the greater threat was hundreds and hundreds and 
hundreds of missiles in the ground, in silos, armed with multiple 
warheads, aimed at American cities, aimed at American military targets, 
all poised and ready to be fired by a potential adversary called the 
Soviet Union.
  The Soviet Union does not exist any longer. The Soviet Union was 
fractured into a series of independent states--the Ukraine, Russia, and 
others--in which there were missiles with nuclear warheads targeted at 
the United States. But a series of arms control agreements with the old 
Soviet Union, and now with the independent states, has changed that 
much larger threat. It has not erased the threat, but it has changed 
the much larger threat. Arms control agreements now mean that Soviet 
missiles that used to be aimed at our country in many cases no longer 
exist.
  Mr. President, I showed this piece of metal on a previous occasion. I 
ask unanimous consent that I be allowed to show it to my colleagues 
again.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, this is a piece from a hinge on the 
massive door that covered missile silo No. 110, in Pervomaysk, Ukraine. 
This comes from a silo that housed an SS-19, which had half a dozen 
warheads aimed at the United States of America. Each of those warheads 
had a yield of 550 kilotons each, 20 times the power of the atomic bomb 
dropped on Hiroshima.
  I want to show my colleagues a chart that describes something that I 
think is quite remarkable. This is that missile site, which housed 
missile No. 110. On June 5 of this year, this photo shows the Ukrainian 
Defense Minister Shmarov on the left and his U.S. counterpart, 
Secretary Perry, watering sunflowers planted in the ground where there 
use to be a Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile. In other words, 
it is where there previously existed a missile with nuclear warheads 
aimed at America, and there now are sunflowers growing. The silo is 
gone, the missile is gone, and there are sunflowers.
  How did this happen? Was this a magic act? Was Harry Houdini 
involved? No. This happened through a great deal of diligent, hard 
work. Some of it was here in the Senate, which approved the arms 
control agreements that were negotiated between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. Substantial credit, in my judgment, should go to 
Senators Lugar and Nunn, who worked to create the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program, which funds the dismantling of nuclear weapons in 
the former Soviet states. The Soviets, the Russians and Ukrainians now, 
began destroying nuclear weapons.
  That destruction of nuclear weapons means that one way to protect 
America is to destroy a foreign missile before it leaves the silo; 
destroy the missile before it leaves the silo. This chart shows what 
happened. There used to be a missile. Now there are sunflowers. What a 
wonderful thing for humankind--that a missile that used to be aimed at 
us is now gone. This bit of hinge does not exist as a functional piece 
of some kind of nuclear threat against the United States. It is not 
just missiles that Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn have through their 
initiative in the U.S. Senate helped to destroy. Here is a picture of 
Soviet workers sawing off the wings of Soviet long-range bombers. This 
is success. Arms control agreements have worked. They have 
substantially reduced the nuclear threat. We are today every day seeing 
in the old Soviet Union--now Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan--missiles 
being destroyed, bombers being destroyed, and the world is a safer 
place as a result.
  Some would come to the floor of the Senate and say, ``None of this 
matters very much.'' The hundreds of ICBM's that are now gone do not 
matter much. The fact that the President of Ukraine announced that his 
country, which had previously housed thousands of nuclear warheads, is 
now nuclear free; no nuclear warheads in the Ukraine is quite a 
remarkable thing. Some would come to the floor of the Senate, and say, 
``That does not mean much. What we need to do is begin a new arms race. 
We need an America to begin building on an expedited basis with 
expedited deployment a National Missile Defense Program. And we insist 
on doing it in a way that would make it a multiple-site system, in a 
way that would provide that it has a space-based component,'' both of 
which would jeopardize the arms control agreements we currently have. 
And they say, ``Well, if we jeopardize those arms control agreements, 
so be it. We will force the other parties to renegotiate.''
  I am not coming to the floor of the Senate saying that research and 
development on missile defense programs are not relevant or unworthy. I 
have supported them in the past. I support them today. The 
administration requested $508 million in this bill for research and 
development on national missile defense systems and programs.
  In fact, if taxpayers are interested we have spent $98 billion on 
strategic and theater missile defense programs; $98 billion. The most 
recent proposal that was brought to the Senate for its consideration, 
the Congressional Budget Office says, will cost anywhere between $30 
billion and $60 billion to construct without regard to the cost of its 
operation. That is what it will cost simply to build on an expedited 
basis the kind of national missile defense that was called the Defend 
America Program that the sponsors envision.
  I support the recommendation of the Pentagon to spend $508 million 
for research and development of a national missile defense system. What 
I do not support is the Congress saying, ``Pentagon, you do not know 
what you are talking about. We insist on adding $300 million more.''
  Let me read a comment from the Vice Chiefs of Staff in the Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council. It says:

       The Joint Requirements Oversight Council believes that with 
     the current projected ballistic missile threat, which shows 
     Russia and China as the only countries able to field a threat 
     against the U.S. homeland, the funding level for national 
     missile defense should be no more than $500 million a year 
     through the Future Years Defense Plan.

  That is what the Joint Requirements Oversight Council says. One might 
argue they are not experts. I do not know how one could credibly argue 
that. They are the Vice Chiefs of Staff of our Armed Services. But one 
could make that case and try to make that point. These are the people 
who ought to know, in my judgment.
  General Shalikashvili in a letter to Senator Nunn says the following:

       Efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM 
     Treaty may jeopardize Russia's ratification of START II, 
     and could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I.

  These are the arms control agreements that resulted in taking these 
missiles and warheads out of the ground and reducing the threat posed 
to the United States of America.
  General Shalikashvili says the following. He says:

       I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will 
     result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands 
     more nuclear weapons thereby increasing both the cost and the 
     risks that we face.

  We will hear no doubt, especially when the Defend America Act comes 
back to the Senate, if it does--and I cast a vote on that recently. 
This was a bill to potentially require $30 to $60 billion of 
expenditure on the part of the taxpayers--just to build, not to 
operate. It is not the right way in my

[[Page S6395]]

judgment to do it. But that was the vote we had. Of course, I voted 
against cloture because, if we are going to have a debate on this, 
there ought to be a debate. There ought to be a thorough and lengthy 
debate. It is of substantial importance for this country, its foreign 
policy, its defense policy, and certainly for the taxpayers.
  We will no doubt have comments made here--I do not intend to address 
these at the moment, although I would be happy to come back and do so--
that reflect the comments we heard last year during the same debate. We 
will have maps put up talking about the threat that North Korea could 
pose to Alaska, or the threat that some other rogue nation would pose 
to Hawaii. Those statements are not justified by the facts. Those are 
not threats that are currently justified by information given by this 
country's intelligence community.
  It seems to me that we ought to worry a bit about how we are spending 
money, for what purpose we are spending money, and where we are going 
to get the money. This $300 million is the first incremental first step 
on a long staircase. And we had a quote from Senator Dole at a press 
conference. The question was asked where the money was going to come 
from. ``Senator, how much do you think this is going to cost, and where 
is that money going to come from?''
  The answer: ``Well, I'll leave that up to the experts.''
  The experts are not going to pay the bill. The taxpayer will pay this 
bill--$300 million this year, a long step on a long staircase leading 
up to the Congressional Budget Office suggesting as much as $60 
billion.
  In the main, this is a security issue. I accept that and agree to 
debate it on that premise. But it is also an issue that combines the 
question of security with the question of, ``What is it going to 
cost?'' Well, it is reasonable to ask: How much did we spend, and how 
much are we going to spend to get a system? What kind of protection 
will it provide us?
  In North Dakota, we have some experience with this. We have in my 
State the only antiballistic missile system that was ever built in the 
free world. In today's dollars, they have spent about $26 billion. It 
looks a little like this. It is a big concrete pyramid. It was 
incidentally mothballed in the same year that it was declared 
operational. That was built in the early 1970's with billions of 
taxpayers' money spent.
  I mentioned that somewhere between $96 and $98 billion was spent in 
the aggregate in pursuit of missile defense technology. I also said I 
am not opposed to spending all of the money but that I am opposed to 
this rush to add extra money to this defense authorization bill. And I 
will be opposed to adding the money to the appropriations bill as 
well--to demand that we have accelerated deployment in a system that we 
are told will cost up to $60 billion, and the accelerated deployment 
must be combined with a multisite system, and a space-based system 
that, in my judgment, will jeopardize most of our arms control 
agreements, agreements that I think are critically important to this 
country.
  I would say this to my friends who support this--and I have great 
respect for many who will stand up and support this aggressively: 
Senator Kyl has in the past, Senator Inhofe and others. I suspect the 
Senator from Virginia will weigh in on this subject. I have great 
respect for their views, but I do believe this. You have to make the 
case that spending this extra money is critically necessary for our 
defense. I do not think that case can be made, No. 1. And, No. 2, you 
also ought to make the case, given what we have talked about--the 
danger of the Federal deficits and who is for more spending and who is 
for less spending--you also ought to make the case, who is going to pay 
for this? Where is the $60 billion going to come from?
  This bill contains the first small increment of $300 million, which 
may not seem like a lot of money to some but I think is a whole lot of 
money for the American taxpayers to shell out when they do not need to 
shell it out. This is a proposal that we do not need, a proposal that 
we cannot afford, a proposal the Pentagon says it does not want, and a 
proposal this country should not adopt. It defies common sense for this 
Congress to say to General Shalikashvili: It does not matter what you 
think; it does not matter what you say about arms control agreements; 
it does not matter how much you want to spend. We demand you spend more 
on this because we believe this ought to be built on an accelerated 
basis.
  I say you have to make the case that that be done first, and I do not 
think the case can be made. And second, as you make that case, if you 
think you can make the case, tell us, who are you going to get to pay 
for this? Which taxes are you going to raise to get $60 billion?
  Mr. President, I indicated previously we will no doubt have comments 
from those who say there is a direct threat to some States in our 
country from this, that, or the other approach. I began speaking about 
the array of threats to our country and let me end with the same 
notion. If we are concerned about the principal threats to our country, 
it seems to me somewhere back on the far side of the range of threats 
that are likely would be that a Mu'ammar Qadhafi acquires through some 
magic an intercontinental ballistic missile that he is able to launch 
complete with a nuclear warhead destined for some American city. That 
is one of the least likely threats.
  Far more likely a threat is an international rogue, some 
international bandit on the scene who is more likely to acquire a dozen 
other devices, including, if you are talking missiles, a much more 
easily acquired missile such as a cruise missile, easier to acquire and 
easier perhaps to operate. It is much more likely that we will find a 
threat other than that which they are going to build the national 
missile defense system to protect our country against. Should our 
country be unprotected? No. We have always had protection with this 
understanding: every missile launched against our country has a return 
address. Every missile launched against America has a return address 
because we know who launches it. We see all launches in this world 
through our satellites. Should any country, any rogue nation, any 
adversary be foolish enough to launch a missile with a warhead against 
this country, that country will cease to exist quickly. Our defense and 
our deterrent has always been our ability to let everyone in this world 
understand you launch a nuclear weapon against our country, and our 
nuclear arsenal, the most capable in the world, will erase from the 
face of the Earth those with that kind of judgment.
  That nuclear arsenal still exists, and I hope that we will support 
the amendment to reduce the $300 million. We will still be left with 
$508 million, which is a substantial amount of money, for research and 
development, but we will have sent a signal that we do not want to 
begin climbing the first step on a stairway to a $60 billion 
expenditure, the justification for which has not and in my judgment 
cannot be made at this point in this Chamber.
  (Mr. ABRAHAM assumed the chair.)
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
  Mr. DORGAN. I would be pleased to yield.
  Mr. WARNER. I have followed very carefully his points here. As a 
matter of fact, it is basically a recitation--and I say this most 
respectfully--of the points the Senator made last year. The Senator has 
been consistent in his message. But I was taken by his closing remarks 
of the history of the relationship between those nations possessing 
intercontinental systems and how our planet has thus far avoided any 
confrontation.
  This is a subject that I have been dealing with since 1969 when I 
went to the Department of the Navy, I do not want to calculate how many 
years ago. But the Senator is absolutely right; it was the deterrence 
that prevented any confrontation between the former Soviet Union and 
the United States of America. It was the doctrine of mass destruction, 
mutual massive destruction. But we were dealing in those days, despite 
our antipathy toward communism, with governments, with military 
organizations that were able to grasp the reality of mutual assured 
destruction and had a very tight command and control over every single 
one of those sites.
  I should say that in the many years I followed this, having served on 
the Intelligence Committee, there were isolated incidents where there 
was alcohol involved on a site here and there.

[[Page S6396]]

 We saw the occasional reports. But, fortunately, the command and 
control was exercised so as to eliminate what I personally regard as 
the prime reason for this expenditure, the accidental or unintentional 
firing.
  In the former Soviet Union, the rocket forces were the elite. Only 
the finest men and, I suppose in some instances, women were put into 
those units. We did not have in those days the risk that I think is 
present today of the accidental or unintentional firing.
  Quite apart from the dollars and cents--and we could debate on into 
the night as to what the estimates are to build the system and the time 
in which it is to be done, but I cannot look into the faces of my 
fellow Americans and say that there is any budget or any calculation 
which would induce me not to support this given the horrific damage 
from a single accidental firing of an ICBM against a major city. Take 
whatever you want as the budget to build this system. If you hit on 
57th and 5th Avenue in New York City, it would be billions and billions 
of dollars in property damage and incalculable lives.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator is warming up to a 
question.
  Mr. WARNER. I am sort of on a roll here, and I rather enjoy it, but 
my point is, what is your concept of a single accidental firing, a risk 
present today that was not present during the height of the cold war? 
That is essentially the purpose of this system.
  Mr. DORGAN. The Senator asks a good question, and I understand it 
well because he set it up quite well. I say to the Senator, you 
describe this in the context of a rogue nation or an international 
terrorist who gets hold of one missile and launches one missile against 
the United States. I contend that it is far more likely that an 
international terrorist would get hold of a suitcase and put it in a 
rusty Yugo on the dock in New York City than be able to find an ICBM 
and launch an ICBM at the United States. The point I made at the start 
of my discussion is you have an array of threats against our country. 
The one you describe is a threat, there is no question about that.

  Let me give you another one. How about----
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, if the Senator will----
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me give you a threat.
  Mr. WARNER. I am ready to concede that you are correct. It may well 
be the suitcase----
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me continue before you concede. You are conceding a 
small part. Let us assume a captain of a Typhoon submarine goes half 
wacko somewhere out in the ocean and launches the entire supply of 
warheads on that submarine, which is 200 warheads, ICBM's, sea-launched 
ICBM's against this country. That is a rogue threat. There is nothing 
proposed by anyone, that I am aware of, nothing under any condition or 
any system or any bizarre scheme I am aware of that is going to protect 
this country against that large a threat, is that correct?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct. We do not have 
anything and that is in the realm of risk. I think farther down the 
scale than the single isolated incident is either in Russia or, indeed, 
North Korea--they are rapidly approaching the potential, with their 
Taepo Dong missile, which could reach Hawaii or Alaska.
  My point is the Senator is correct. There is a risk from the 
suitcase. There is a risk from a berserk crew on a Typhoon submarine. 
And there is a risk associated with the accidental firing of a single, 
or perhaps two missiles against the United States.
  But the fact that we have a number of risks does not eliminate the 
responsibility of every Member of this Chamber to apply, diligently, 
every resource we have in this country to stop these risks.
  Mr. DORGAN. I would say this to the Senator, I fully accept the 
responsibility of doing the research and development on a missile 
program, a national missile defense program of some type for which 
there is, in this bill, $508 million--plus $300 million added by the 
committee, saying $508 million is not enough, we want to add $300 
million more. I respect the obligation to be doing the research and 
development to be available and to be ready to deploy a system if it 
becomes certain that we need this system and conceivable we can build 
it in a cost-effective way. I am ready to do that.
  But what I am saying to the Senator is this. If you come to us with 
proposals that the Defense Department says threaten to undermine the 
arms control treaties that now exist that result in destroying the 
missiles in the ground--all the missiles are out of the Ukraine at this 
point.
  The fact is today--I know the Senator knows this because we have 
people on both sides of the aisle who have engineered this, and I would 
say the Senator has been instrumental in a number of these areas in 
helping this along--we are seeing adversaries' missiles now being 
destroyed, sawed in half, cut up. It seems to me you would agree that 
the very best way to destroy a potential adversary's missile is to 
destroy it before it leaves the ground. If you propose a national 
missile defense system that threatens the underpinnings of our arms 
control agreements, it seems to me what you have done is add to the 
arsenal of weapons that are potentially going to be weapons against us.
  So I am willing to walk down the road, to talk about threats and how 
one responds to them. I am not willing, under any circumstances, not 
any, to do anything that I think starts to take apart the arms control 
agreements. It is not just me that says that. It is the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and others who say this threatens to destroy the 
foundation of these arms control agreements.

  Once you start to do that you are not dealing with little rogue 
threats out there. You are not dealing with some international nut case 
who manages to find some ICBM and then manages to find a nuclear tip to 
put on the top of it. Then you are dealing with the questions of 
hundreds, perhaps thousands of additional weapons and launchers that 
will be retained when they should in fact have been destroyed, because 
we were trying to enter into arms control agreements that really do 
accomplish a reduction in the threat.
  So, I hope--I have taken some time, but I hope the Senator 
understands. I am not opposed to research and development. I am opposed 
to adding, on top of that, money that means we will run off and buy and 
build and damn the consequences. I would listen to some very thoughtful 
people who say you are going to injure the opportunities we have had in 
the past and will have in the future, as a result of the arms control 
agreements. That is my major concern.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to reply. Let us say that the 
Senator and I have a disagreement on the arms control issue. I firmly 
believe that we can resolve with Russia any apprehension that they may 
have with respect to the development of this system in a manner that 
will pose a threat to them. As a matter of fact, I would argue it is in 
their interests that we have such a system because, should a missile be 
fired we could have some errors on our side, thinking a strike had been 
launched against us and suddenly trigger something against Russia.
  But let us say we have a disagreement on arms control. But how does 
the Senator from North Dakota answer the question: We have no arms 
control with China, yet they have the capability of an accidental 
firing. We have no arms control with North Korea, yet they are within 3 
or 4 years of having a missile that could hit two of our States. What 
does the Senator say to those arguments?
  Mr. DORGAN. The entire philosophy of arms control is to reduce the 
stock of nuclear arms and launchers and devices to deliver arms that 
now exists and to try very hard to work on the issue of 
nonproliferation of nuclear arms. We must do a better job of that.
  Do you know why? Because I think people are all too interested in 
going off and building things. The efforts at nonproliferation are not 
very sexy. It is not an area that produces the same kind of thing that 
a building project does. A building project, you pour concrete and get 
something that you can see and everybody can say, ``Look what we 
have.'' We ought to, in our country, it seems to me, take seriously 
this issue of who has and who is going to have nuclear weapons and pose 
a threat in the future.
  If the Senator says it matters with respect to China, yes, it does. 
Sure it matters. It matters with respect to North Korea, yes. It also 
matters with

[[Page S6397]]

respect to what our intelligence community tells us about the 
capabilities of these countries, No. 1. I will be happy to put that in 
the Record, because we are at odds on that issue.
  But, second, it matters very much, it seems to me--it matters very 
much that this country behave in a way that recognizes it is in our 
interests to have fewer nuclear weapons in the world. And our arms 
control agreements, as deficient as they might be--some would want them 
much more aggressive--have started the process of doing what you and I 
might have thought unthinkable not too long ago.
  The Senator was in the Chamber when I showed this chart. I want to 
show it again, because I suspect 8, 10 years ago, no one would have 
believed this. Ten years ago would anyone have believed that the 
Secretary of Defense and the Defense Minister of the Ukraine would be 
planting sunflowers on ground where there was planted an SS-19 aimed at 
the United States of America?
  Mr. WARNER. I say to my good friend, Secretary Perry came and met 
with members of the Armed Services Committee at a breakfast hosted by 
the distinguished chairman, Chairman Thurmond, this morning, and 
recounted the very incident portrayed by this picture. We concede all 
that.

  But I would like to come back to this issue. You stress arms control. 
We have a disagreement on that. Come back to China. We have no arms 
control--do you not agree they have the capability today of a missile 
system that could hit Alaska and could hit Hawaii, and that there could 
be an accidental or rogue firing in that nation? Just witness what 
happened in connection with the Straits of Taiwan here just several 
months ago, when we saw what in my judgment were actions by China, 
presumably under tight command and control, where those actions were in 
defiance of what I call responsible conduct by major nations in this 
hemisphere.
  Let us go back. Let us see if we can narrow debate. They have the 
system, am I not correct?
  Mr. DORGAN. Let me ask the Senator, since he has raised the question 
of China, does the Senator know approximately the estimate of how many 
ICBM's the Chinese possess?
  Mr. WARNER. I do, but I am not sure it is a matter we should bring 
out in public at this time.
  Mr. DORGAN. Does anyone know whether that is classified information?
  Mr. WARNER. Let us just concede that we know they have them. I do not 
know the number--I do know it but I am not sure--let us just assume 
that they have a system. I think you and I can agree on that.
  Mr. DORGAN. Does the Senator also agree that, should any nation----
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will just let us 
take a voice vote on the Grassley amendment?
  Mr. DORGAN. I will be happy to.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, notwithstanding the previous unanimous- 
consent request, I ask unanimous consent that we resume consideration 
of the Grassley amendment. I understand Senator Grassley has agreed to 
have the amendment voted on by a voice vote. I understand there is no 
further debate on this question.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                       Vote on Amendment No. 4047

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will vote on amendment No. 4047 of 
the Senator from Iowa. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 4047) was rejected.
  Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was rejected.
  Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I want to make certain the Record shows 
the Senator from Virginia voted in the negative by voice vote.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Record will so reflect.


                           Amendment No. 4048

  Mr. WARNER. Parliamentary inquiry, are we now returning to the 
colloquy?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota has the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. And the distinguished Senator was about to pose a 
question.
  Mr. DORGAN. I was about to ask the question, if the Senator agreed 
with me, if a rogue nation--China, I suppose, would not be in the 
definition of ``rogue nation'' here; China is a trading partner of 
ours.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, it depends on the day of the week. They do 
have some actions----
  Mr. DORGAN. Normally, those who refer to rogue nations or 
international outlaw leaders have three or four in mind. Now, the 
Senator raises----
  Mr. WARNER. You are correct, China should not be put in the same 
category as the generic term ``rogue nation.'' I am talking about the 
accidental, unintentional firing.
  Mr. DORGAN. I understand. The Chinese have, as you know, without 
discussing it, very few intercontinental ballistic missiles. The 
Senator raises the question of the potential of a country with 
intercontinental ballistic missiles launching an attack against the 
United States.
  The question I want to ask is, does the Senator agree with me that 
there cannot be an intercontinental ballistic missile launched without 
a return address; we will know instantly where it is launched from?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the Senator is correct in that.
  Mr. DORGAN. If the launching of an intercontinental ballistic missile 
means this country immediately knows where that launching took place, 
is it reasonable to expect, if they attack the United States, they 
would expect a response that would annihilate the country sending the 
missile? The point is, that has been a deterrence that has been around 
for sometime. I thought the Senator was really talking about a real 
outlaw, nut leader someplace out there in space, and now he has raised 
the question of China.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, for the purpose of this debate, there are 
really only two nations which possess intercontinental systems that can 
strike the United States, and that is Russia and China. China has a 
system which can reach not only two States, Alaska and Hawaii, but, 
indeed, we have reason to believe that it could reach the central parts 
of the mainland United States. For the record, I am not talking about 
an organized command and control attack on the United States by China. 
I am talking about the accidental firing, the unintentional--perhaps in 
a training mission--firing of a live missile, either from Russia or 
China. Should not we have the bare minimum capability in this country 
to defend against a single or perhaps two or three missiles being 
fired?

  I say yes. Our difference is the schedule on which it is to be built. 
You have reasons to believe that $500 million is enough. I feel 
strongly, as does the committee, that $800 million is the required 
amount to keep the research and development at the most expeditious 
pace, such as a President can make the decision with regard to 
deployment.
  Mr. DORGAN. The Senator has narrowed this interestingly. So let me 
ask this question. The Air Force has proposed a system that they say is 
a minimal cost system to respond to exactly what you are talking about: 
one isolated case of one intercontinental ballistic missile, perhaps 
with one warhead, being launched accidentally or deliberately at 
someplace in this country.
  There is a plan floating around that they say will cost $2 billion, 
$2.5 billion to defend against that, not to give us a defense that is 
not impenetrable, but one that gives a reasonable certainty of stopping 
that limited threat.
  I ask the Senator, is that what the Senator would support and would 
that be sufficient?
  Mr. WARNER. This Senator is in favor of supporting a system that 
could perhaps interdict up to 10, 12, 15, maybe as many as 20, 
certainly not an exchange as was practical, that potentially could have 
occurred between the former Soviet Union and the United States. China's 
total arsenal we have agreed we should not discuss here, but it has 
numbers that could approximate those amounts of exchange. That is not 
an accidental firing in reality or unintentional to send 10 or 20 
missiles. Nevertheless, the system should be built to cope with it.
  Mr. DORGAN. If I understand your response, you are not proposing then 
a

[[Page S6398]]

system that would in any way protect this country against a lunatic 
Typhoon submarine captain who launches 200 warheads from a Typhoon 
submarine against this country? You are not proposing a system that 
protects us against that?
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, the system that I have in mind could limit 
the damage. Now, whether it could deal with all 20 missiles fired----
  Mr. DORGAN. Two hundred warheads.
  Mr. WARNER. I am not prepared to give you an answer.
  Mr. DORGAN. Two hundred warheads.
  Mr. WARNER. If you interdict the missile, you get 10 warheads.
  Mr. DORGAN. It depends on when you interdict the launcher. But my 
point was, I guess most people would say you are not proposing a system 
that could respond to that threat. So, again, on the scale of threats, 
you have some you respond to, some you do not. Look, I would not 
support a penny for research and development if I did not think it is 
reasonable for us to be trying to figure out what are the threats and 
what is a reasonable approach to begin thinking about them and planning 
to meet them when they become sufficiently real that the intelligence 
community says this country needs to do something about those threats.
  The Senator knows, and we have said before in this debate, that the 
intelligence community in this country does not concur that this is the 
time to do what is being proposed we do. The Defense Department tells 
us that it will undercut the arms control agreements and launch us into 
an orbit to spend an enormous amount of money against a system that the 
Senator now concedes will not respond to the more aggressive or robust 
threats.
  Mr. WARNER. Well, Mr. President, all I can say is that what we 
envision is a limited system to deal with the accidental or 
unintentional firing. I am not prepared, nor any of us are really 
prepared, to give you precise numbers, whether it could interdict the 
entire load of a Typhoon. It depends on when interdiction takes place, 
whether there is warhead separation. There are a lot of factors that 
deal with it.
  I want to also put in the Record, I respect your arguments about the 
suitcase. Fortunately, I think technology is not quite at the point 
where that is the highest risk now, but we have in place a number of 
systems to deter and, indeed, interdict the suitcase. It is just my 
concern we have nothing--nothing--in place to interdict the stray two 
or three missiles that could be accidentally fired or a terrorist 
firing against our Nation.
  That is the direction in which this Senator wants to move as 
expeditiously as possible. And we have O'Neill, who was the prior 
head--he just resigned--of the BMD office, who said $800 million is the 
figure. I happen to agree with him. You happen to disagree. Therein, I 
think, we framed the argument.
  Mr. DORGAN. You say $800 million. Let me make just a couple 
additional points. Again, I respect very much the Senator from 
Virginia. I have admired his work for a long while. We disagree from 
time to time on things. We disagree on this. I, nonetheless, think he 
contributes a great deal to defense policy.
  This little pager that I use is about the size, I am told, of the 
device that brought down the Pan Am flight by a terrorist planting a 
device this size on the Pan Am 747 which crashed in Lockerbie, 
Scotland. That was a terrible attack. We know what the terrorist attack 
was with a rental truck in Oklahoma City. We know of many terrorist 
accidents. We know of the deadly chemical agent attack in Japan on the 
subway. We know of the bombing of the World Trade Center by terrorists.

  The Senator raises the question, what about the ultimate terrorist 
act of a terrorist getting ahold of, not a suitcase, not a Yugo, but an 
ICBM, not a cruise, an ICBM missile, and tipping it with a nuclear 
warhead and launching it against our country?
  Again, I will say to the Senator, there is a prospect advanced by one 
of the services that they say would cost $2 billion that would use 
existing technology to provide a defense against a very limited, 
isolated, single missile kind of rogue nation or accidental launch. 
That proposal does exist.
  The Senator and I may not have much disagreement if he said, let us 
take the limited option at minimum dollars and provide the protection 
against that threat that he has just described in some detail. I am not 
sure we would have much disagreement about that.
  That is not what is being proposed, as the Senator knows. What is 
being proposed is a robust system, multiple sites, space-based 
components, accelerated deployment. That is a much, much different, 
much more expensive and much more extensive proposal than what we are 
discussing.
  So again I say, if the isolated circumstances that the Senator 
describes were met by a $2 billion system, which one branch of the 
service has given me a detailed briefing on, I do not know that we 
would have a big disagreement. But what we are talking about here--and 
I believe the Senator in his heart knows we are talking about--is the 
potential of $60 billion over the years to build a much more capable 
system, at the end of which we will not have addressed the threat of a 
robust attack against this country.
  I worry that if we spend that money, we may develop the circumstance 
of saying to the American people, we now have a missile defense system 
we have spent $60 billion for, just to build, not to operate, and then 
someone says, ``What if somebody launches 50 missiles against us?'' We 
say, ``Well, we're sorry about that. We're not going to be able to deal 
with that.''
  If we are talking threat, let us respond to the most aggressive 
threats first. Let us do the things that are necessary to do research 
and development on national missile defense.
  I notice my friend from Oklahoma is now on the floor. I mentioned 
earlier he is someone who has an interest on this subject. I mentioned 
him in a kindly way.
  But I just believe that to rush off and commit $300 million above 
what General Shalikashvili recommends, Secretary Perry and others 
recommend as is prudent and wise, given our circumstances and arms 
control, and other needs, I think that is not in this country's 
interests. So I appreciate the colloquy the Senator and I have had.
  Mr. WARNER. I shall yield the floor momentarily. I have enjoyed the 
colloquy. But let us make it clear, this additional $300 million by the 
Armed Services Committee was for the purpose of the ground system. And 
it is our collective judgment that that amount of money is needed to 
keep an aggressive R&D going.
  I strongly support it. And $300 million is not specifically earmarked 
for any system. It in fact is the BMD's program that they have at the 
moment. We have disagreements as to the total cost. That is clear. But 
I think we isolated this to be a debate between two individuals who 
feel equally strongly from their various perspectives.
  I think we owe it to the American public to do everything we can to 
put in place such systems to deter against a suitcase, to deter against 
the Typhoon suddenly coming up and firing its whole load. But I see 
this as a risk, which I think is far greater, the accidental firing of 
a single or a double, by either a terrorist or someone who comes in and 
seizes an installation in China or Russia, some group, band, who goes 
in and seizes it and fires it somehow. That is what I want to stop.
  Mr. DORGAN. If the Senator would yield on that point.
  Mr. WARNER. Yes.
  Mr. DORGAN. I encourage the Senator to receive the briefing, if he 
has not yet, on the planning that has been done by the Air Force for a 
minimal system at minimum cost to address exactly that circumstance.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have gotten that briefing. I am just not 
sure that that is a sufficiently robust system to meet the requirements 
as I see them.
  Mr. President, there are other Senators anxious to speak. I thank the 
Senator. I yield the floor.
  Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I will make some remarks with regard to the 
matter at hand, and the general feeling that I have with regard to the 
bill.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska has the floor.
  Mr. EXON. Did my colleague from South Carolina wish to make some

[[Page S6399]]

kind of a point? I have been recognized. I would be glad to yield to 
him.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, we have been debating this amendment now 
for over an hour. I just wanted the Senator from North Dakota to 
consider entering into a time agreement on his amendment at this time.
  Mr. EXON. The Senator from South Carolina had a question for the 
Senator from North Dakota.
  Mr. THURMOND. I wonder if the Senator would agree to a time agreement 
on this amendment.
  Mr. DORGAN. I have no intention of delaying the vote. There are a 
number of Senators who do want to speak briefly.
  Mr. THURMOND. What is a time the Senator would wish to suggest?
  Mr. DORGAN. Senator Conrad from North Dakota wants to speak and 
Senator Exon wishes to speak.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. EXON. All the Senator from Nebraska is attempting to do is move 
things along. If an agreement is reached with regard to a time 
agreement, I will certainly yield to the managers of the bill and the 
Senator from North Dakota to make that statement. In the meantime, I 
would like to proceed with the statement I have regarding the bill.
  Mr. President, the Senator from South Carolina, the distinguished 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is a very, very dear friend 
of mine. He does an excellent job and has as long as this Senator has 
been in the U.S. Senate. He works very well with Senator Nunn, the 
ranking member of the committee. They have worked very hard on this 
defense authorization bill that this Senator supported when it came out 
of the Armed Services Committee. But at that time I sent a first signal 
that I would be attempting to make some changes to improve the bill in 
several areas that I thought needed attention.
  I will simply say to my good friend from South Carolina, that he has 
made noble efforts in the committee. We had thorough discussion on a 
lot of these issues that we are going to be taking up in the form of 
amendments now that the bill is on the floor, which I think is entirely 
proper.
  What this Senator has been attempting to do since this bill came out 
of the authorization committee, and as late as this morning--as 
referenced by my distinguished friend and colleague from Virginia, we 
met with the Secretary of Defense--what I am trying to do is, as much 
as possible, make this defense authorization bill vetoproof.
  In other words, if we can accommodate some of the wishes of the 
President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense and others, 
that have key roles to play in what happens to the authorization bill 
that we will eventually pass here, it is to make it as acceptable as 
possible to reach some compromises on several things where I think 
there should be compromises, make it somewhat more acceptable to the 
Clinton administration, and then we will have accomplished something 
rather than passing a defense authorization bill that will end up dead 
in the water in the form of a veto.

  So the comments that I am now about to make are designed, as best I 
can design them, to try to reach a compromise, a compromise, if you 
will, up front in the process of the Senate working its will on the 
defense authorization bill, and hopefully have a bill that will mean 
something.
  Mr. President, the defense authorization bill before the Senate is a 
rather rare piece of legislation, one might say. It is one of the few 
spending or authorization bills for the next year receiving a sizable 
increase--I repeat, a sizable increase--above the administration's 
request.
  To be specific, at $267 billion, the 1997 defense authorization bill 
dwarfs--dwarfs--Mr. President, any other discretionary spending program 
in the Federal budget. Like an out of shape prizefighter, it enters the 
ring $13 billion overweight from the position of the President of the 
United States.
  Having been overfed by the majority of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee--and I hope we can at least partially correct that--the 
quarter of a trillion-dollar defense bill before the Senate is not just 
$13 billion above the Pentagon's proposed budget, it is $1.7 billion in 
excess of the originally passed budget resolution, and $4.1 billion 
more than the 1996 defense spending bill. At a quarter of a trillion 
dollars, the 1997 defense authorization bill is flush, with $13 billion 
in unrequested spending authority, much of which adds unnecessarily to 
our national debt, while adding, in the opinion of this Senator, little 
or nothing to our national defense.

  The 1997 defense authorization bill should be termed the ``wish 
list'' bill. It is so much so that every service official and regional 
military commander that appeared before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee on the bill was asked by the members of the majority a 
question, and certainly Federal managers of domestic programs have 
frequently heard that recently, and it is going to be driven home again 
during this debate. This was the question that was asked of these 
various military officials: ``If you were given additional funds above 
the budget request, how would you spend it?''
  Let me repeat that. Can you imagine a military person sitting before 
the Armed Service Committee and they are asked a question, ``If you 
were given additional funds above the budget request, how would you 
spend it?'' What kind of a reply would you expect? To no one's 
surprise, when blank checks were enticingly dangled before the witness, 
the replies were as prompt as they were lengthy. No military leader 
worth his salt, under such a scenario, could not find something that he 
could use.
  Of the $13 billion added to the President's defense budget request, 
$11.4 billion, or nearly $9 out of every $10 added, went toward 
procurement and research and development programs. But approximately $2 
billion of the add-on dollars proposed in the Pentagon's wish list is 
not even part of the Pentagon's own budget plan for the next 5 years, 
and certainly it is not, nor has it been previously, projected.
  What is more, a similar portion of the $13 billion committee add-on 
is neither part of the long-range budget, nor any armed services wish 
list, including the wish lists that are included in this proposal.
  In other words, the Armed Services Committee did not even get enough 
requests, after dangling that enticing proposition before the 
witnesses, to add up to the billions that we are spending. In other 
words, nearly $4.6 billion of the $13 billion-plus-up to the Pentagon's 
outyear budget plan, or a part of the services' wish list. It is 
something that came through the fat-feeding program in the Armed 
Services Committee.
  In my opinion, it is vital that the American public understand this 
important distinction between several options:
  One, what the President proposed in his budget for defense spending. 
Two, what the Pentagon says it needs to provide for our national 
defense. Three, what the military witnesses wish they could have after 
having the proposition dangled in front of them. Four, what level of 
funding the committee ultimately approved.
  Such a wish-list approach to defense budgeting is not responsible, in 
this Senator's opinion, and stands out as a glaring exception to the 
manner in which painful cuts have been levied against domestic budget 
accounts. Nor is the end product of $13 million in additional defense 
spending justified and, certainly not, Mr. President, in order to do 
what we are trying to do in these times, when we are supposedly being 
prudently fiscal, to reach a balanced budget by the year 2002.
  A cursory look at the defense authorization bill before the Senate 
indicates that a rising budget tide floats all boats. Among the largest 
beneficiaries of the committee's blank check wish list in the budget 
includes these items: An $856 million increase in the proposed 
ballistic missile defense spending, which has just been debated to some 
extent on the floor of the Senate preceding my remarks; a $760 million 
increase in the National Guard and Reserve equipment; a $750 million 
increase in DDG-51 destroyer funding; a

[[Page S6400]]

$701 million increase in new attack submarine funding; a $700 million 
increase in military construction and housing funding; a $351 million 
increase in V-22 aircraft funding; and a $341 million increase in F-16 
and F-18 funding for 10 unrequested aircraft.
  These increased spending levels are only a downpayment--I emphasize 
once again, Mr. President, the funding levels I have just cited are 
only a downpayment for future spending that will confound budget-making 
in the years to come.
  Mr. President, at a minimum, the spending level included in the 
defense authorization bill should be reduced by $1.7 billion to be 
brought into conformance with the budget resolution so as to eliminate 
hollow budget authority in the bill. But the Senate should not stop 
there. We should question the need for the remaining $11 billion 
increase and whether this extraordinary increase is needed to properly 
defend the national security interest of the United States.
  Perhaps the starting point for reduction in spending authority 
contained in this bill should begin at $4.6 billion, the sum total of 
weapon add-ons and program increases not requested in the service wish 
lists, or contained in the Pentagon's long-range budget plan.
  At a later point during the consideration of this bill, I will 
propose an amendment along with Senators Bingaman, Kohl, Levin, and 
Wellstone, to reduce the top-line defense spending figure by a modest 
$4 billion. This represents a full $600 million less, Mr. President, 
than the $4.6 billion in unsupported, unjustified, and unwise spending 
authority.
  In essence, the Exon amendment would retain $9 billion in defense 
spending authority over and above the President's request. Now, let me 
repeat that. The Exon amendment would retain $9 billion in defense 
spending authority above and added on top of what the President has 
suggested. If the Exon amendment is agreed to by the Senate, our Nation 
would still be spending $155 million more in 1997 than in 1996. I would 
have more to say about this amendment when it is offered.
  One of the most questionable of the committee add-ons, in the opinion 
of this Senator, is $856 million for missile defense programs--most 
notably, the $300 million add-on for a national missile defense system.
  The Senator for North Dakota has an amendment before the Senate at 
this time, which has been debated for the last hour and a half. I also 
intend to support that, and I have included that in the numbers that I 
have presented and will be presenting later in the form of an Exon 
amendment, with several important cosponsors.
  Earlier this month, the Senate debated the wisdom of the Dole star 
wars proposal to pursue a crash program to field a continental missile 
defense system by the year 2003. It was pointed out then that the 
threat does not and will not exist in the near term to justify such a 
proposition. In the longer term, all of us are continuing to look at 
various types of missile defenses that we may need in the long term.
  Furthermore, the Dole star wars bill as presently drafted would cost, 
according to the Congressional Budget Office, anywhere from between $31 
and $60 billion. So the $300 million plus that we are talking about now 
would grow to $31 billion to $60 billion just to deploy, and perhaps 
another $10 billion on top of that to operate. The committee's $350 
million increase is an initial downpayment; $350 million may not sound 
like a whole lot of money. But that is a downpayment, if you will, on a 
multibillion dollar program most likely, at a minimum, in the range of 
$50 billion between now and the year 2002.
  Downpayments are easy, as the average American family knows. But in 
this case this is a system that I urge the Senate to delete as wasteful 
expenditures even though there may be some arguments and some people 
sincerely feel that we should move faster than the Pentagon and the 
experts in the field tell us we should in this area. As was the case in 
last year's authorization bill, there are language provisions in the 
1997 defense authorization bill which are unwise and may prove to be a 
problem down the road in getting this bill signed by the White House. 
This is something that I opened my remarks on by saying that I was 
trying to steer this bill into something that is workable and not 
another knockdown, dragout between the Congress and the President.
  Mr. President, two provisions in particular stand out as being 
questionable forays by the majority of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee into the area of foreign policy, and each could possibly 
jeopardize bilateral efforts between the United States and Russia to 
lower our nuclear inventories in a balanced and accountable fashion.
  One provision ultimately interprets the ABM Treaty demarcation 
between long-range and short-range missile defenses at a time when our 
nations are negotiating this very issue right now.
  The second language provision that I have concerns about is with 
regard to changing the bilateral Antiballistic Missile Treaty to a 
multilateral treaty that includes several of the independent states of 
the former Soviet Union. This is a major concern of the President of 
the United States. And, unless this language is corrected, I think we 
stand a high chance of a veto. The majority's insistence that such 
multilateralization of the treaty would constitute a substantive change 
in requiring reratification by the Senate is equally meddlesome on the 
part of the committee.
  As President Clinton stated in his April 8 letter to the Armed 
Services Committee chairman, Strom Thurmond, he has strong objections 
to this matter for very valid reasons, in the opinion of this Senator. 
He said in that letter: ``Refusing to recognize Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan as coequal successors to the Soviet Union with regard to the 
ABM Treaty would undermine our own interests in seeing that these 
countries carry out their obligations as successors to the Soviet Union 
under other arms control treaties, such as START I--and START II 
and others--and the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty,'' which 
is very important.

  Mr. President, to summarize, this year's defense authorization bill 
is a marked improvement over last year's bill. I have saluted the 
committee for its action on that in the opening of these remarks. Yet, 
changes must be made, in the opinion of this Senator, to reduce 
unjustified spending increases and delete intrusive foreign policy 
language before I can enthusiastically support this bill. However, I 
would say, Mr. President, that overall I congratulate Senator Thurmond, 
my friend, colleague, and chairman of the committee, for other than 
some of the shortcomings that I see. I salute him for a very well-
balanced bill in several other areas.
  I appreciate the consideration, the cooperation, and the 
understanding. For those of us who tried to make some changes in the 
committee, the chairman of the committee did not agree with us, but as 
usual he gave us every opportunity to make our point. We in turn 
supported the bill as it came out of committee with the clear 
understanding to the chairman that we would be making some changes on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate.
  I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.


                      Unanimous-Consent Agreement

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now 
be 60 minutes equally divided for debate on the pending Dorgan 
amendment with no amendment in order to the amendment; that at the 
conclusion or yielding back of time the amendment be set aside; and, 
further, that at 9 a.m. on Wednesday, June 19, the Senate resume 
consideration of the Dorgan amendment and there be 15 minutes equally 
divided for debate with a vote on or in relation to the Dorgan 
amendment at the expiration of that debate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in light of this agreement, there will 
be no more votes this evening. The next rollcall vote will occur at 
approximately 9:15 tomorrow morning.


                           Amendment No. 4048

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous agreement, there are 60 
minutes equally divided on the Dorgan amendment.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I now yield myself such time as may be 
required under the Dorgan amendment.

[[Page S6401]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it is unfortunate that the Senator from 
North Dakota does not think that the American people deserve to be 
defended against the only military threat that faces them in their 
homes every day, a threat that is growing more severe every year. 
Simply stated, what the Dorgan amendment seeks to do is perpetuate 
American vulnerability.
  We have heard quite a bit about how there is no threat and how 
investment in national missile defense is a waste of money. Let's 
remember that more Americans died in the Persian Gulf war as a result 
of a single missile attack than any other cause. I don't imagine that 
their families would view missile defense investments as a waste.
  It has been argued that there is no threat to justify deployment of a 
national missile defense system to defend the United States. This view 
is strategically shortsighted and technically incorrect. Even if we get 
started today, by the time we develop and deploy an NMD system we will 
almost certainly face new ballistic missile threats to the United 
States. Unfortunately, it will take almost 10 years to develop and 
deploy even a limited system.
  Much has been made of the intelligence community's estimate that no 
new threat to the United States will develop for 10 years or more. This 
estimate, however, only has to do with new indigenously developed 
missile threats to the continental United States. It treats Alaska and 
Hawaii as if they were not part of the United States. Moreover, the 
intelligence community has confirmed that there are numerous ways for 
hostile countries to acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles in 
much less than 10 years by means other than indigenous development.
  North Korea has also demonstrated to the world that an ICBM 
capability can be developed with relatively little notice. The Taepo-
Dong II missile, which could become operational within 5 years, is an 
ICBM. Each new development of this missile seems to catch the 
intelligence community by surprise. It certainly undermines the 
argument of those who downplay the threat and the intelligence 
community's own 10-year estimate.
  Even if we knew with certainty that no new threat would materialize 
for 10 years there would still be a strong case for developing and 
deploying a national missile defense system. Deploying an NMD system 
would serve to deter countries that would otherwise seek to acquire an 
ICBM capability. A vulnerable United States merely invites 
proliferation, blackmail, and even aggression.
  It has also been argued that the administration's NMD program is 
adequate to hedge against an emerging threat. Unfortunately, the budget 
request does not adequately support the administration's own plan. 
Since the administration's NMD program is supposed to preserve the 
option of deploying an NMD system by 2003 it is appropriate for 
Congress to add sufficient funds to ensure that such an option is truly 
viable. The director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization has 
testified repeatedly to Congress that about $800 million per year is 
needed for NMD in order to preserve such an option. This is precisely 
what the Armed Services Committee has recommended.
  For those who argue that the Senate Armed Services Committee is 
throwing money at ballistic missile defense, I would point out that the 
amount in this bill for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is 
only slightly higher than the Clinton administration's own bottom-up 
review recommended for fiscal year 1997.
  The bottom line is simple. If you think that the American people 
should not be defended against ballistic missiles, then you should 
support the Dorgan amendment. If you think that the United States 
should preserve the option of deploying an NMD system by 2003, then 
vote against this amendment. I strongly urge my colleagues to put 
themselves on the side of defending the American people.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and acknowledge the able Senator 
from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe.
  (Mr. BURNS assumed the chair.)
  Mr. INHOFE. I thank the Senator and I certainly concur in the 
comments that he is making. It is a very frustrating thing to have 
knowledge of the threat that exists out there and merely because the 
American people are not aware of it, we are ignoring the defense of our 
country which I have always understood when I was growing up should 
have been the primary concern or function of Government, to protect its 
citizens.
  In a few of the things that have been said by a number of those who 
are on the opposite side of defending America was the discussion about 
the threat of suitcases, of carrying around bombs, of terrorist 
activities. Being from Oklahoma, nobody needs to tell me about 
terrorist activities. I understand. It is almost as if to say that 
because there are crazy people out there that burn churches and carry 
around suitcases, we need to address that and not address the potential 
of an attack on the United States of America by an ICBM, armed with a 
warhead that can be a weapon of mass destruction, chemical, biological 
or nuclear. It is like saying you do not want to have car insurance 
because you want to have insurance on your home. You want to have a 
comprehensive policy that insures you against everything. There is a 
threat out there and I think we need to talk about that, and certainly 
now is the appropriate time because we have heard Senator after Senator 
stand up and allege there is no threat out there; the cold war is over.
  It was 2 years ago that James Woolsey, who was the CIA Director under 
President Clinton, made a statement, and his statement 2 years ago was 
we know of between 20 and 25 nations that either have or are in the 
final stages of completing weapons of mass destruction, biological, 
chemical or nuclear, and are working on the missile means to deliver 
those weapons.
  That was 2 years ago. He updated that statement and said there are 
somewhere closer to 30 nations now. Let us look at who those nations 
are, the type of people, the mentality of those individuals who are 
potentially armed with this type of destruction, countries like Iraq 
and Iran and Libya and Syria, North Korea, China, Russia, countries 
where just not too long ago, for example, Saddam Hussein, a guy who 
murdered his own grandchildren, made the statement back during the 
Persian Gulf war that if we had waited 5 more years to invade Kuwait, 
we would have had the capability of sending a weapon of mass 
destruction to the United States.
  Well, here it is. It is now 5 years later. So let us assume that some 
of these guys might be right. They come up and they say, well, we do 
not want to do it because it might in some way affect adversely the ABM 
Treaty. The ABM Treaty was put together back in 1972, and we cannot say 
this was done in a Democrat administration. It was not. I am a 
Republican. Richard Nixon was a Republican. Henry Kissinger, I assume, 
was a Republican. At least he worked for a Republican. And he put 
together a plan. The ABM Treaty at that time was designed to address 
the problem of two superpowers in the world environment. Those 
superpowers were the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and so they put 
together a plan that said we will restrict our nuclear capability 
bilaterally.
  So let us assume that they would do it. I never believed they would. 
Let us assume they would. If you bring that up to today, there is no 
longer a U.S.S.R. It is now Russia. Let us assume that Russia would 
agree to stepping into this issue as the former U.S.S.R. And live up to 
the expectation of the ABM Treaty. What about these other 25 or 30 
nations out there?

  Let us assume that the United States and Russia are downgrading their 
nuclear capability. At the same time what is Iraq doing? What is China 
doing? What are the other countries doing? They are certainly not a 
part of this treaty.
  It was brought out by one of the Senators in the Chamber a few 
minutes ago that these people are not part and parcel to the treaty so 
they could continue to increase their nuclear capability, the weapons 
of mass destruction, and their capability to develop a missile means of 
delivering them.
  If we do not want to take the word of somebody who is not here as to 
how significant and how applicable today is the policy of a mutually 
assured destruction, listen to what Henry Kissinger said just the other 
day. I had lunch

[[Page S6402]]

with him. I asked him if I could quote him. He said yes. His statement 
was, ``It is nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.'' And that 
is exactly what we are doing. Let us for a minute talk about the cost. 
I have never heard anyone throw around figures like I have heard in the 
Chamber of the Senate--talking about another $30 billion to $60 
billion. The CBO estimate of $30 to $60 billion over 14 years was 
taking every system that is out there right now and saying we want to 
deploy all of these systems by a date in the future.
  No one has ever suggested that. Right now, we are talking about in 
this bill looking at what options are there. Let us take the Aegis 
system. We have a $40 to $50 billion investment in 22 ships that are 
floating out there right now. They have missile launching capability. 
They are there. They are already bought and paid for. We need to spend 
about $4 billion more to give that system capability of reaching up 
into the upper tier and giving us a defense from an attack of a missile 
that might be coming from North Korea or from someplace else. In that, 
we already have an investment. Mr. President, 90 percent of it is 
already paid for. We have some estimates here that were made by the 
team B of the Heritage Foundation. That is made up of people like Hank 
Cooper, the former director of the Strategic Defense Initiative, and 
several others. All of them are acknowledged experts. No one has ever 
questioned their credibility. They say that a Navy-wide area defense 
system on Aegis cruisers would cost between $2 and $3 billion over the 
next 6 years, plus $5 billion for a sensor satellite.

  We are talking about, now, not $70 billion, we are talking about 
somewhere in the neighborhood of $7 to $8 billion over the next 6 
years. So let us get this in perspective. Let us assume there could be 
some truth to the statements that these experts like James Woolsey are 
making, and, in fact, the threat is out there. Let us assume the 
Russians already have one.
  This morning in a speech on the floor I used several articles, four 
or five of them. I wish I had them with me now. I did not think this 
subject would come up again. But we talked about how China is now 
selling technology to Pakistan, how Syria and Libya have a new, cozy 
arrangement with each other.
  Here is an article right here that I did not use. The headline of 
this article, found in the Washington Times, dated May 20, ``China's 
arsenal gets a Russian boost. Deal for ICBM technology a threat to 
U.S., classified Pentagon report says.''
  Then it says:

       China, under the guise of buying space launchers, is 
     enhancing its strategic arsenal with technology and parts 
     from Russia's most lethal intercontinental ballistic missile, 
     the SS-18, [that is the MIRV'd missile with 10 warheads] says 
     a classified Pentagon intelligence report.

  Further quoting,

       Incorporating the SS-18-related military guidance or 
     warhead technologies into China's strategic missile forces 
     would greatly improve Beijing's ability to threaten targets 
     in the United States. . .

  Now, that is in a confidential report that so far no one has refuted. 
Let us keep in mind that was about the time that a high Chinese 
official said--during the time they were experimenting with missiles in 
the Strait of Taiwan, the Chinese were conducting experiments--they 
said, ``We don't have to worry about the United States coming to their 
aid because they,'' the United States, ``would rather protect Los 
Angeles than they would Taipei.''
  I would characterize that at the very least as an indirect threat at 
the United States. It is like the Senator from South Carolina said, the 
honorable chairman of this committee, he said, ``We are being held 
hostage.'' Threats like this: ``They are not going to do that, because 
if they do that we will go after them.'' Do they have the capability? 
According to the reports, yes, they have the capability.
  So I just think we need to look at this in terms of the costs that 
have been grossly, dramatically inflated into something that is totally 
unrealistic--the constant use of terms like ``star wars'' and other 
things to put this into some kind of fiction environment so people will 
think this thing is not real.
  Keep in mind what was started in 1983 and was right on target all the 
way up through about last year, when the President vetoed the DOD 
authorization bill from last year, and in his veto message said he did 
not want to spend any more money on a national missile defense system. 
In light of that, since that has happened, we have probably had more 
threats that have come to the United States than we have at any other 
time.

  We have talked about the cost. I am from Oklahoma. The cost of the 
damage that was done to the building itself in Oklahoma City was $500 
million, half a billion dollars. That is just a drop in the bucket as 
to the total cost. The bomb that caused so much damage in Oklahoma had 
the power of 1 ton of TNT. The smallest nuclear warhead known at the 
present time is 1 kiloton, 1,000 times bigger than that bomb.
  So I would like to have anyone, any of these Senators who seem to be 
so passive in their interest in protecting ourselves from a missile 
attack, to stop and look and remember, recall what happened in Oklahoma 
City on April 19 of last year and multiply that by 1,000. It does not 
have to be just in New York City. It does not have to be in Los 
Angeles. It could happen in North Dakota, it could happen in Nebraska, 
or anywhere.
  I will conclude by saying if all these experts say the threat is out 
there, if all of them say the Taepo Dong 2 missile will have the 
capability of reaching the United States by the year 2000, and there 
are missiles in existence today that can already reach us, and this 
missile technology is permeating all the way through the various 
countries like Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan and other nations, if 
this is out there, just ask the question--we are talking about $300 
million right now. We are talking about $300 million, far less than 
just the damage to the building in Oklahoma City. Ask yourself the 
question: What if we are wrong?
  I challenge any of those on the other side of the aisle who want to 
take this money and put it into social programs, to ask themselves: 
What good are these social programs if we were wrong on this, on our 
estimate as to the extent of the capability of these countries to reach 
the United States?
  I see this as a very difficult time for us. It is difficult because 
it is very difficult for us to convey to the American people the truth, 
and the truth is, we have threats from many, many nations now. It is 
something that we should have as our single highest priority in this 
body, and that is to protect the lives of Americans. That is what we 
are attempting to do.
  I said this morning I am supporting this bill. I think we got the 
very most we could out of a defense authorization bill. It is still not 
adequate. We should be moving forward in a more rapid pace to put 
ourselves in a position to spend this other 10 percent of the 
investment we have already spent and give ourselves some type of 
defense for a missile that comes over, outside the atmosphere, to the 
United States. The technology is there. We saw it during the Persian 
Gulf war. We know you can knock down missiles with missiles. This is 
our opportunity to go forward with this program in a very minimum that 
we must do to fulfill our obligation to the American people.
  Last, let us look at this in terms of a nonpartisan or bipartisan 
priority. Back during the years that John Kennedy was President of the 
United States, regarding our budget to run the entire Government of the 
United States, 60 percent of that was on defense, 17 percent on human 
services. Today, approximately 17 percent is on defense and 60 percent 
on human services. I think we have this completely turned around. This 
is our opportunity to try to get back on track to making America strong 
again, defending ourselves against a very serious threat.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[[Page S6403]]

                           Amendment No. 4049

   (Purpose: To authorize underground nuclear testing under limited 
                              conditions.)

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I have an amendment I would like to send to 
the desk. I ask unanimous consent we lay aside the pending amendment, 
and I send an amendment to the desk.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], for himself and Mr. 
     Reid, proposes an amendment numbered 4049.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       At the end of subtitle F of title X add the following:

     SEC.   . UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING CONSTRAINTS.

       (a) Authority.--Subject to subsection (b), effective on 
     October 1, 1996, the United States may conduct tests of 
     nuclear weapons involving underground nuclear detonations in 
     a fiscal year if--
       (1) the Senate has not provided advice and consent to the 
     ratification of a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban 
     treaty;
       (2) the President has submitted under subsection (b) an 
     annual report covering that fiscal year (as the first of the 
     fiscal years covered by that report);
       (3) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that 
     report; and
       (4) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described 
     in subsection (d) within that 90-day period.
       (b) Report.--Not later than March 1 of each year, the 
     President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services 
     and on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committees on 
     National Security and on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a 
     report containing the following matters:
       (1) The status on achieving a multilateral comprehensive 
     nuclear test ban treaty, unless the Senate has already 
     provided its advice and consent to the ratification of such a 
     treaty.
       (2) An assessment of the then current and projected safety 
     and reliability of each type of nuclear warhead that is to be 
     maintained in the active and inactive nuclear stockpiles of 
     the United States during the four successive fiscal years 
     following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.
       (3) A description of the number and types of nuclear 
     warheads that are to be removed from the active and inactive 
     stockpiles during those four fiscal years, together with a 
     discussion of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons that is 
     planned or projected to be carried out during such fiscal 
     years.
       (4) A description of the number and type of tests involving 
     underground nuclear detonations that are planned to be 
     carried out during those four fiscal years, if any, and a 
     discussion of the justifications for such tests.
       (c) Testing by United Kingdom.--Subject to the same 
     conditions as are set forth in paragraphs (1) through (4) of 
     subsection (a) for testing by the United States, the 
     President may authorize the United Kingdom to conduct in the 
     United States one or more tests of a nuclear weapon within a 
     period covered by an annual report if the President 
     determines that is in the national interest of the United 
     States to do so.
       (d) Joint Resolution of Disapproval.--For the purposes of 
     subsection (a)(4), ``joint resolution'' means only a joint 
     resolution introduced after the date on which the committees 
     referred to in subsection (b) receive the report required by 
     that subsection the matter after the resolving clause of 
     which is as follows: ``Congress disapproves the report of the 
     President on nuclear weapons testing, transmitted on 
     ______________ pursuant to section ______ of the National 
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997.'' (the first 
     blank being filled in with the date of the report).
       (e) Implementation of Test Ban Treaty.--If, with the advice 
     and consent of the Senate to ratification of a comprehensive 
     nuclear test ban treaty, the United States enters into such a 
     treaty, the United States may not conduct tests of nuclear 
     weapons involving underground nuclear detonations that exceed 
     yield limits imposed by the treaty unless the President, in 
     consultation with Congress, withdraws the United States from 
     the treaty in the supreme national interest.
       (f) Report of Superseded Law.--Section 507 of Public Law 
     102-377 (106 Stat. 1343; 42 U.S.C. 2121 note) is repealed.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I will describe this very briefly. It is 
actually a simple amendment. I will only discuss it here for about 3 or 
4 minutes, then we can have further discussion tomorrow when there are 
more Members present, when they desire to do so.
  This is an amendment dealing with nuclear testing, and the effect of 
it is to simply extend the time for the President to decide to test a 
nuclear weapon to the point that the United States ratifies a 
comprehensive test ban treaty and it goes into effect.
  Today, the law is, as of September 30, the President could not order 
a nuclear test unless another country were to test a weapon.
  What this amendment would do is to allow the President to order a 
test for safety and reliability purposes; in other words, not dependent 
upon whether another country happened to engage in testing, and that 
right would exist until such time as this country ratified and a CTBT 
went into effect. This chart describes very simply what we are doing.
  The current law is that as of September 30 of this year, the 
President's ability to order a test would no longer exist, unless 
another country engaged in a test. And then once a CTBT is entered into 
force, there is no test except for extreme national emergency.
  What our amendment would do is to continue the status quo until such 
time as there is a CTBT, and the rationale is very simple. The fact 
that another country tests does not necessarily mean that the United 
States should test. Our ally France has conducted nuclear tests. China 
has conducted nuclear tests and plans to conduct some more. And in 
neither of those events is it necessarily the case that as a result the 
United States should test.
  We have no reason to test just because some other country does. But 
there is always the possibility that the President would want to order 
a test in order to assure stockpile safety and reliability. If we had 
some reason to believe, for example, that one of our weapons was no 
longer safe and we wanted to test that it was safe or to find out why 
it was not safe, in that event, today the President has such a right to 
order such a test, and he would continue to have that right until such 
time as the CTBT is adopted.
  That is it. That is as simple as the amendment is.
  I further state, the Congress would have the right under this 
amendment to ratify the President's decision or to reject it, based 
upon reports that the President would continue to send to us. Today, 
the President is required to send us a report, and we would continue to 
require that report be sent to us on the status of the stockpile and 
whether any testing is required.
  Under this amendment, if the President said he wanted to conduct a 
test, the Congress would have the ability to tell him he could not do 
so. This is not something that we are suggesting that the President do 
or suggesting that he would do it. It is simply a safety valve, if you 
will, in the event of some untoward event with our stockpile that the 
President should conclude that a test is necessary that he would have 
the ability to do that.
  It does not affect the CTBT negotiations in any way. As I said, our 
amendment simply goes up to the time that a CTBT is entered into. It is 
that simple, Mr. President.
  If Members wish to further discuss it tomorrow, I will be happy to 
try to answer any questions about it or discuss it. I cannot imagine it 
would be particularly controversial.
  Mr. President, if there is no one seeking to speak, I suggest the 
absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further 
proceedings under the quorum call be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The 
Senator from South Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the subject matter of this amendment 
will probably be quite contentious. I hope not. I hope that other 
Members will see that the amendment does not advocate opposition to 
concluding a comprehensive test ban and that it does not promote 
testing. With that in mind, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the distinguished Senator from Arizona.
  As I understand the amendment, it would authorize the President to 
conduct underground nuclear weapons tests after October 1, 1996, if a 
comprehensive test ban treaty has not been ratified by the United 
States. In order to conduct an underground nuclear test, the President 
would have to submit a report to Congress detailing justification for 
the test. In order to stop the test from being conducted, the Congress 
would have to pass a joint resolution within 90 days.

[[Page S6404]]

  During the debate on the Exon-Hatfield legislation which prohibits 
nuclear testing, I voiced my concerns for the safety and reliability of 
the nuclear stockpile without the ability to test. So long as our 
defense relies on nuclear weapons, we must ensure the safety and 
reliability of the stockpile. That requires the authority to conduct 
underground nuclear tests. I urge my colleagues to adopt the amendment.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

                          ____________________