[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 88 (Friday, June 14, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S6272-S6275]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA

  Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I come to the floor today as the chairman 
of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs to discuss what 
in my view is the continuing deterioration of the democratic process in 
Cambodia.
  In October 1991, the signing of the Paris peace accords ended years 
of devastating civil war in Cambodia and started that country on the 
road to instituting a democratic civil society. Cambodia's leaders 
agreed to support a democratic resolution of the country's longstanding 
civil war, to protect and advance human and political rights and

[[Page S6273]]

fundamental freedoms for its citizens, and to begin the difficult task 
of rebuilding the economy and civil institutions. The U.N. transitional 
authority in Cambodia [UNTAC], established to implement the accords, 
supervised the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, 
repatriated over 350,000 refugees, and oversaw the first free national 
elections in 1993. The constitution adopted in September 1993 
established a multiparty democracy, committed the Government to hold 
new elections by 1998, required that Cambodia recognize and respect 
human rights as defined in the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, and other relevant international agreements and 
treaties.
  The transformation was not without its costs. The United States and 
other donor countries and the United Nations spent an estimated $2.8 
billion implementing the accords and subsequent elections. United 
States assistance to Cambodia alone since the mid-1980's has totaled 
more than $1 billion. Beginning in fiscal year 1994, the U.S. Agency 
for International Development [AID] planned on providing about $111 
million over 3 years. The AID mission in Phnom Penh planned to spend $8 
million to help the Government plan for national elections, and has 
programs in place to improve the functioning of the National Assembly 
and the legal system.
  Yet despite all of this work by both the donor countries and the 
people of Cambodia, I am still concerned that Cambodia's nascent 
democracy is showing some signs of being under attack. First, the 
country faces some serious obstacles to holding national elections by 
1998. As noted in a February 1996 GAO report on Cambodia, and I quote:

       Cambodia's constitution requires that the government hold 
     national elections by 1998. However, the country currently 
     lacks the electoral framework (laws, regulations, an 
     independent commission) and resources (both human and 
     financial) needed to hold elections. Although U.S. and other 
     foreign officials estimate that creating such a framework 
     will take considerable time and involve many difficult 
     political decisions, little has been accomplished so far. In 
     late 1995, the Cambodian government began drafting an 
     electoral law. Discussion at a late October 1995 seminar, 
     sponsored partly by the U.S. Agency for International 
     Development (usaid), explored the relative advantages of 
     different types of electoral systems. By December 1995, the 
     government still had not completed a draft electoral law and 
     was falling behind a proposed timetable for holding elections 
     in mid-1998.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 Event                               Timing             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Draft national election law...........  November 1995 (not met).        
Interior Ministry reviews draft law...  December 1995 (not met).        
Co-Prime Ministers review draft law...  January-February 1996.          
Draft law submitted to the National     Spring 1996.                    
 Assembly.                                                              
Natinal Assembly enacts law...........  Summer 1996.                    
Implement new law (create an election   1997.                           
 committee, issue regulations, train                                    
 workers, educate voters).                                              
Hold national elections...............  May 1998.                       
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Pre-election technical assessment for Cambodia prepared by the  
  International Foundation for Electoral Systems, August 1995.          

       According to U.S. and other foreign officials, Cambodia 
     lacks the human and financial resources needed to hold an 
     election on the scale of the one held by the United Nations 
     in 1993. The U.N. electoral assistance unit could help plan 
     and organize the elections, but this would require a 
     significant financial commitment from the international 
     community. Although some international assistance may be 
     provided, such as election monitors, some U.S. and other 
     foreign officials doubt that the international community will 
     support a costly, large-scale operation to help conduct the 
     elections.
       The Cambodian government currently appoints local officials 
     but has proposed holding local elections in 1996 or 1997. 
     Some U.S., other foreign government, and Cambodian officials 
     support holding local elections because they would introduce 
     democratic practices at the local level. Other such officials 
     oppose holding local elections because they would divert 
     limited financial and human resources from the task of 
     holding national elections and/or because antidemocratic 
     government officials could use local elections as evidence of 
     democratic progress and then cancel national elections.

  While preparations for the logistical framework to support the 
elections is lagging, there is also concern that even if the elections 
are held in 1998 it is doubtful that they would be free and fair. As 
the GAO report notes:

       The Interior Ministry is drafting the election law and may 
     be responsible for organizing the elections. Ministry 
     deliberations and work are not open to public oversight and 
     participation, and the Ministry played a role in the violence 
     and intimidation before the 1993 elections.
       According to some U.S. and other foreign government 
     officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and others, 
     the Cambodian government cannot ensure that parties could 
     campaign without violent intimidation and that voters would 
     feel free from retaliation. The United Nations Transitional 
     Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was unable to control key 
     government ministries before the 1993 elections, and the 
     Cambodian People's Party (CPP) used some of them to sponsor 
     violence against its political opponents. Some foreign 
     officials and reports point out that CPP still controls the 
     Interior Ministry and its internal security forces, plus the 
     armed forces. Several NGOs report that fear of politically 
     motivated violence is a key issue for members of the National 
     United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and 
     Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Buddhist Liberal 
     Democratic Party (BLDP) but not for CPP members.
       In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of 
     State noted that Prime Minister Ranariddh has proposed 
     establishing an independent, neutral commission under the 
     King to control the police and armed forces during the 
     elections to prevent them from intervening in the elections. 
     However, we question the effectiveness of such a commission 
     in controlling the police and armed forces when UNTAC, with 
     over 20,000 personnel, was unable to control them before the 
     1993 elections.

  Recently, the friction between the two main political parties--
FUNCINPEC and the CPP--has come to the forefront. As my colleagues 
know, in order to bring an end to the civil war these two parties 
entered into a power-sharing agreement whereby members of both parties 
occupy the most important political posts in the Government. Recently, 
the First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh--the head of FUNCINPEC--
complained that Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and members of his party 
were failing to abide by an earlier agreement that power should be 
shared at all levels of government. Ranariddh spoke of withdrawing his 
party from the Government, in response to which Hun Sen threatened to 
use military force to deter protests against the Government and any 
dissolution of the National Assembly. It seems clear that the term 
``political strength'' in Cambodia will continue to refer to the number 
of guns a particular party has.
  Besides the obvious disruptive effects this interparty friction is 
having within Cambodia, it is also complicating its external affairs. 
To illustrate, Cambodia's drive to join ASEAN is being held up because 
the other member nations consider a key criterion for being admitted to 
the regional grouping to be political stability--something of which the 
other countries presently consider Cambodia to be short.
  The GAO report continues by noting that voters lack widely available 
resources of accurate information about the elections, particularly 
radio; and that political parties other than the CPP are weak and lack 
a unified leadership:
       UNTAC officials knew that providing Cambodian voters with 
     accurate information was essential for free and fair 
     elections. Consequently, guaranteeing fair access to the 
     media--especially radio, because most Cambodians are 
     illiterate and television stations have limited broadcast 
     areas--for all political parties was an essential element of 
     UNTAC's pre-election strategy. Several studies conclude that 
     the 1993 elections probably could not have taken place or 
     succeeded without the flow of information provided largely by 
     ``Radio UNTAC.'' Unfortunately, Cambodia currently lacks 
     widely-available media sources of accurate information. 
     Although more than 30 newspapers operate in Cambodia, they 
     have limited nationwide distribution and the quality of their 
     news reporting is unreliable. Also, the government tightly 
     controls broadcast media licenses, limiting opposition 
     parties' access to radio and television. For example, a BLDP 
     official told us that the government had turned down the 
     party's application for a radio station license. Moreover, as 
     discussed later, the government has grown increasingly 
     intolerant of dissenting opinions. USAID's strategy for 
     promoting democracy in Cambodia recognizes the media's 
     weaknesses; one of its objectives is to increase media access 
     and professionalism. In commenting on a draft of this report, 
     the Department of Defense said that, despite restricted 
     access to the media, outspoken government critics still may 
     be able to generate popular support and influence the 
     elections.
       With the possible exception of CPP, Cambodian political 
     parties lack the leadership, organization, and financial 
     resources to conduct effective national campaigns, according 
     to U.S. and other foreign officials and reports and other 
     documents we reviewed. Over a decade of single-party rule has 
     given CPP the opportunity to build a solid party structure 
     (largely indistinguishable from the government bureaucracy) 
     at the provincial, district, communal, and village levels. 
     Meanwhile, U.S. officials and NGOs indicate that FUNCINPEC 
     and BLDP have weak party structures at these levels and are 
     further weakened by political infighting. Given their weak 
     party structure and disunity, several

[[Page S6274]]

     NGOs and others conclude that the parties will be unable to 
     compete effectively in future elections.
       USAID plans to provide training to strengthen the 
     capabilities of all political parties to participate in the 
     election. However, several observers suggested that CPP, with 
     its generally better organization and structure, might 
     benefit disproportionately from such training. Several U.S., 
     other foreign government, and NGO officials questioned the 
     wisdom of providing training to strengthen any of the 
     existing parties because they are undemocratic and 
     authoritarian. USAID officials said that they plan to fund 
     training for grassroots civic organizations instead of 
     established political parties. The National Democratic 
     Institute suspended political party training in Cambodia in 
     1995 but plans to work with other NGOs to train election 
     monitors and educate voters.

  The major political parties are already beginning to gear up for the 
race. A recent report in the Cambodia Times noted that Second Prime 
Minister Hun Sen has made several tours of the countryside ``presenting 
gifts of rice, foodstuffs and krama [Cambodian scarves presented as 
welcoming gifts] * * * the Cambodian People's Party [which Hun Sen 
heads] has also carried out many projects to build schools and 
irrigation canals and [has] dug numerous wells in the provinces.'' The 
FUNCINPEC Party led by Prince Ranariddh, in response to the surge in 
the CPP's popularity, has begun to make similar moves. At the end of 
last month, both parties complained that programs broadcast on 
Television Kampuchea slighted them in favor of their opponent. What 
worries me, Mr. President, is that without a strong framework in place, 
electioneering in Cambodia may devolve back into the situation which 
existed before 1991 where political strength depended on the number of 
guns a party had rather than the number of seats in the Assembly.
  In addition, the report paints a pessimistic view of the development 
of the adherence to human rights:

       Cambodia has ratified and agreed to abide by all major 
     international agreements guaranteeing human and political 
     rights, for example, the International Covenant on Civil and 
     Political Rights. Yet the current government has made limited 
     progress since late 1993 in meeting the basic international 
     human rights standards contained in these agreements. Indeed, 
     some U.S., other foreign governments, and Cambodian officials 
     and NGOs conclude that Cambodia's human rights situation 
     worsened during 1995.
       According to human rights NGOs, the United Nations Center 
     for Human Rights (UNCHR) office in Phnom Penh, and USAID 
     documents, Cambodian military and police forces continued to 
     violate human rights frequently during the past 2 years. 
     These sources reported numerous cases of extortion, beatings, 
     robberies, and other violations by soldiers and police. USAID 
     and Cambodian officials and others noted that this problem 
     touches on the larger issue of desperately needed reforms of 
     the Cambodian bureaucracy, including the provision of 
     adequate pay for police, military, and other government 
     officials to reduce or eliminate low-level corruption, which 
     currently is endemic.
       According to human rights NGOs, UNCHR, some U.S. and 
     Cambodian officials, and USAID documents (1) few Cambodians 
     had received due process or fair trials in the past 2 years; 
     (2) prosecutors and judges lacked basic training and skills 
     for properly investigating, preparing, presenting, and 
     deciding cases; and (3) trained public defenders remained 
     scarce. They also said that official corruption was 
     widespread and growing, undermining the rule of law, and that 
     the government had resisted some legislators' attempts to 
     introduce anti-corruption legislation in the National 
     Assembly.
       Human rights NGOs and UNCHR told us that Cambodia's prisons 
     remain overcrowded and still fall short of meeting basic 
     international and humanitarian standards for the treatment of 
     prisoners. In late 1994, NGOs reported that they found a 
     secret government prison where prisoners were tortured and 
     denied basic human needs. According to the Department of 
     State, this prison was closed in 1994.

  Finally, in the area of political rights, recent Government actions 
indicate increasing official intolerance for dissent from both inside 
and outside the Government. This intolerance has a predictable chilling 
effect on efforts to improve the Government's effectiveness and reduce 
corruption. For example, as I noted on the floor on June 22, one 
outspoken member of the National Assembly--Sam Rangsi, a frequent 
critic of the Central Government--was expelled after attacking 
Government corruption and several others have been threatened with 
expulsion if they speak out.
  Prince Norodom Sirivut, a member of the royal family and political 
opponent of Hun Sen, was charged and convicted in absentia in February 
of plotting to kill the latter. The trial was seen by legal and human 
rights observers as evidence that Cambodia's judiciary is controlled by 
politics.
  On May 2 of this year, the Government ordered all political parties 
except the four represented in the National Assembly. While aimed 
primarily at Sam Rangsi's Khmer Nation Party, a party formed after Sam 
was expelled from the FUNCINPEC because he disagreed with the party 
leadership, the order affects 16 parties that were legally registered 
for the 1993 election but won no seats in the Assembly. Recent attempts 
by the KNP to open offices in outlying districts were met with armed 
police forces which closed the offices down.
  As I noted on September 5, the Government closed some newspapers and 
prosecuted several members of the press, enacted restrictions on press 
freedoms, and tightly controlled broadcast licenses. Several members of 
the press critical of the Government have been beaten or killed. Non 
Chan, editor of the Samleng Yuveakchon Khmer, was gunned down in broad 
daylight in Phnom Penh. Ek Mongkol was also shot and wounded in broad 
daylight. At the end of May, unidentified assailants assassinated 
opposition newspaper editor Thun Bunli. Thun was editor of the 
newspaper Oddamkeakte Khmer, a frequent critic of the CPP. Thun's 
funeral procession, consisting of members of Sam Rangsi's KNP, was 
broken up by hundreds of police armed with shock batons and assault 
rifles. The Government attempted to muzzle the press further by 
criticizing an existing journalists' association and pressuring members 
to join a competing association formed and controlled by the 
Government.
  In addition, the co-Prime Ministers attempted to close the UNHCR 
office in Phnom Penh in response to its criticism of human rights 
abuses, but later backed down under international pressure. In May, the 
Interior Ministry also ordered provincial authorities to produce 
reports on the past and current activities of local and international 
aid agencies, religious organizations, and associations.
  Mr. President, I appreciate that we cannot expect the development of 
a perfect democratic system in Cambodia overnight. I also do not want 
the Cambodian Government to feel that I am somehow denigrating the 
strides it has made. But the problems cropping up in Cambodia are not 
related to the more esoteric nuances of democracy, they are the basic 
building blocks: a free press, an independent judiciary, and the like. 
Statements by some members of the Government--most notably Hun Sen--
that we have no business butting in or being concerned about their lack 
of progress overlook one important point: as one of the major financial 
donors responsible for the continuing operation of the country, we do 
indeed have a role to play. I agree with the State Department; if 
Cambodia continues its downward spiral, the United States and other 
donor nations should reconsider the amount and extent of our financial 
aid.
  Mr. President, I also continue to be concerned about an issue that 
brought me to the floor on July 21 last year: the trading in Cambodian 
timber across the Thai-Cambodia border. Cambodia shares a lengthy and 
relatively uninhabited border with Thailand. The entire region consists 
primarily of heavily forested jungle; formerly, 76 percent of 
Cambodia's 176,520 square kilometers of land area was covered by 
forest. That amount, however, has declined dramatically over the last 
15 years due to increased commercial harvesting of timber. The loss has 
been especially pronounced in western Cambodia, where a handful of 
foreign firms are responsible for a majority of the deforestation.

  As I noted last year:

       These companies purchase concessions from the Cambodian 
     government, and theoretically make payments to the government 
     based on the amount of cubic meters of timber felled. The 
     timber is then exported over the Thai border, either by boat 
     or overland on dirt roads built expressly for that purpose by 
     the companies, where they are collected at places called rest 
     areas before being sent further on into Thailand. According 
     to both Thai and Cambodian regulations, the logger/exporter 
     must secure a certificate of origin from the Cambodian 
     government, a permit from the Thai embassy in Cambodia, and 
     permission from the Thai Interior Ministry to import the logs 
     into Thailand.

[[Page S6275]]

       There is one more party, however, that plays a major role 
     in the logging: the Khmer Rouge. Led by the infamous Pol Pot, 
     the KR controlled the government of Cambodia from 1975 to 
     1979. During that time, it was directly responsible for the 
     genocide of more than one million Cambodians in the ``Killing 
     Fields.'' Since the 1991 UN peace agreement established a 
     democratic government in Cambodia, the KR has been relegated 
     to the role of a rebel guerilla force. Although the 
     government has made some inroads in combatting the KR, 
     including implementing a somewhat successful amnesty program, 
     the KR remains a strong force in the western khet of 
     Battambang, Pursat, Banteay Meanchey and Siem Reap. Despite 
     the campaign being mounted against them, though, they still 
     receive a steady flow of food, military supplies, and 
     currency sufficient to pay their 10,000 to 20,000 man 
     militia; and therein lies the connection to the timber trade 
     and the Thai military.
       Over the past several years, the press has consistently 
     reported that the Thai military has been providing assistance 
     and support to the Khmer Rouge. The links between the two are 
     longstanding. Beginning in 1979, Thailand acted as a funnel 
     for Chinese-supplied arms being transshipped to the KR--
     apparently in return for an end to Chinese support for rebel 
     Thai communists in northern Thailand. Since then, the 
     evidence suggests that the Thai have regularly supplied the 
     KR with logistical support and materiel. In return for this 
     support, Thai business interests and certain government 
     sectors have benefitted from access to timber and gem 
     resources within that part of Cambodia along the Thai border 
     controlled by the KR. Their interest is sizeable; in 1993, 
     the U.S. Embassy in Thailand estimated that Thai logging 
     companies had some $40 million invested in timber 
     concessions in KR-held areas.
       It is from the sale of these resources that the KR acquires 
     funds sufficient to continue its reign of terror in Cambodia. 
     The process is actually quite simple. Foreign companies 
     interested in harvesting timber in western Cambodia purchase 
     official lumber concessions from the government in Phnom 
     Penh. Having dealt with the de jure government, however, the 
     companies must then deal with the de facto government in 
     western Cambodia: the KR. The companies pay the KR for the 
     right of safe passage into KR-held territory, to fell the 
     timber, and to transport it out to Thailand safely. The 
     present going rate of payment to the KR per cubic meter is 
     between 875 and 1000 baht, or between $35 and $40. It is 
     estimated that the weekly income [in 1995] to the KR from 
     timber carried across just two of the many border points 
     [was] around $270,000, with total monthly income to the KR 
     estimated at between $10 and $20 million.
       Once felled and placed on the back of trucks, the logs are 
     driven across the Thai border. That crossing, however, is not 
     without its costs. The Thai military--the Marines, actually--
     controls a 4-mile wide strip along the Thai side of the 
     border, and in order to negotiate it the logging trucks must 
     pass through guarded checkpoints where, it appears, payments 
     in the form of ``tolls'' or bribes are made to Thai concerns.
       The Thai have consistently, albeit often disingenuously, 
     denied any ties to the KR or to the timber trade. Each round 
     of denials, however, is soon followed by press reports and 
     concrete evidence to the contrary. For example, in 1994 
     Thailand officially ``closed'' its border with Cambodia 
     partly as a result of the murder of more than twenty Thai 
     timber workers by the KR and partly as a result of 
     international criticism. In a press statement made shortly 
     thereafter, Maj. Gen. Niphon Parayanit, the Thai commander in 
     the region, stated flatly that the border was closed, that 
     the military had severed all links with the KR, and that 
     ``there [was] no large-scale cross-border trade going on.'' 
     The official denials . . . continued . . . including one . . 
     . by Prime Minister Chuan noted in the May 26 [1995] edition 
     of the Bangkok Post.
       Despite these denials though, and despite a Cambodian ban 
     on logging, credible eyewitness reports from members of the 
     London-based group Global Witness fully confirm[ed], in my 
     opinion, that the trucks are still rolling across the Thai 
     border. If--as the Thai military alleges--it is not involved 
     in the timber trade either directly or by turning a blind eye 
     to the shipments, I can think of no other explanation than 
     that the military personnel in the border zone are completely 
     incompetent. One of the more heavily travelled timber roads 
     in the border zone, one that according to my information is 
     in daily use even as I speak, is within sight of one of the 
     Thai Marine camps. Nor can the central Thai government claim 
     ignorance; Global Witness [in 1995] brought to light a timber 
     import permit signed by the Thai Interior Minister.

  Mr. President, I stated that continuing Thai support for the KR--in 
this or any manner--concerned me greatly for several reasons. First and 
foremost, the financial support the trade afforded to the KR continued 
to allow it to survive thereby seriously endangering the growth and 
continued vitality of the nascent Cambodian democracy. That system, as 
I have noted today, is having enough trouble getting off the ground and 
running smoothly without having to deal with the KR insurgency. Second, 
Thailand's actions ran counter to its obligations under the 1991 peace 
accord and served to undermine it. Finally, the clandestine nature of 
the timber extraction has removed it from the control of the Cambodian 
Central Government. It was subsequently free to continue without regard 
to any regulations aimed at limiting the amount of timber taken, 
preventing serious ecological damage, ensuring sustained growth, or 
protecting the lives and livelihoods of the local populace.
  Unfortunately, Mr. President, since my statement last year the 
situation has only gotten worse. Workers from Global Witness returned 
to Thailand in November and December 1995, and once again since then, 
have furnished my staff with completely credible evidence that the 
trade continues unabated. They have furnished me with photographs, 
documentary evidence, and the precise locations of several timber 
staging areas on the Thai side of the border. They have even acquired 
one of the passes issued by the KR to drivers of the logging trucks 
that drive in from Thailand. The Phnom Penh Post, as recently as April, 
has run a series of articles detailing the illicit timber trade. 
Instead of taking the time of the Senate by reciting the evidence in 
detail, I would direct my colleagues to two Global Witness reports: 
``Corruption, War and Forest Policy: The Unsustainable Exploitation of 
Cambodia's Forests'' issued in February 1996; and ``RGC Forest Policy 
and Practice: The Case for Positive Conditionality'' issued in May of 
this year.
  Mr. President, if a significant effort not made as promised by the 
Thai Government to fully investigate and then stem the cross-border 
trade and their dealings with the KR, then I would find myself placed 
in the position of calling on our Government to abide by that provision 
of Public Law No. 103-306 requiring that the President shall terminate 
assistance to any country or organization that he determines is 
assisting the KR either directly or indirectly through commercial 
interaction. I intend to send the Secretary of State a copy of my 
statement today, and ask him to respond in writing as to the 
administration's position on this issue.

                          ____________________