[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 85 (Tuesday, June 11, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1054-E1056]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          THIRD-COUNTRY ARMS DELIVERIES TO BOSNIA AND CROATIA

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                         Tuesday, June 11, 1996

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, last month I wrote to Secretary of State 
Christopher requesting the answers to several questions concerning 
recent press stories regarding United States policy on arms deliveries 
to Bosnia and Croatia by third countries during 1994 and 1995.
  Several committees of the Congress have already held closed and open 
hearings on this issue, including the Committee on International 
Relations on May 30. The House of Representatives has also voted to 
establish a special select subcommittee of the Committee on 
International Relations to investigate this issue.
  I received the answers posed in this letter in two parts, one dated 
April 24 and the other May 20. I would like to insert copies of both 
letters in the Record in an effort to keep my colleagues fully informed 
on the administration's position on this issue.


                                      U.S. Department of State

                                   Washington, DC, April 24, 1996.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     House of Representatives.
       Dear Mr. Hamilton: Thank you for your letter of April 11 to 
     Secretary Christopher concerning third-country arms 
     deliveries to Bosnia and Croatia during 1994 and 1995. You 
     pose a number of detailed questions which will take us some 
     time to research. Meanwhile, we welcome this opportunity to 
     provide you with an interim reply to some of the points you 
     raise.
       In the spring of 1994, the Administration had a difficult 
     decision to make when approached by Croatia on the question 
     of allowing third-country weapons to pass through Croatia to 
     the Bosnian Muslims. If we had objected to potential arms 
     shipments from Iran, the Muslim-Croat Federation might have 
     been destroyed in its infancy and a bad situation for the 
     Bosnians might have worsened. The approach we took--of 
     neither objecting to nor supporting the arms transfers--
     sought to balance our concern about the spread of Iranian 
     influence against the adverse military situation facing the 
     Federal. In the process, we did our best to serve the cause 
     of peace in Bosnia. The arms deliveries helped sustain the 
     Muslim-Croat Federation and reduced the military imbalance 
     without the certainly risks and pitfalls of the alternative 
     courses of action.
       Many in the Congress urged at the time that the United 
     States lift the arms embargo unilaterally. The Administration 
     opposed this policy on a number of grounds. We would have 
     been put in the position of arming the Bosnians in the face 
     of direct opposition from our own allies, triggering the 
     biggest rift in NATO since its founding. In addition, 
     UNPROFOR would almost certain have collapsed, in all 
     likelihood requiring U.S. troops to be called in to protect 
     withdrawing UNPROFOR soldiers. And if the Serbs had gone on 
     the offensive before the Bosnians were armed, a very real 
     possibility, the United States would have come under pressure 
     to intervene to prevent a Bosnian military defeat.
       Unilateral lift would also have required the United States 
     to violate binding UNSC resolutions. UN Security 
     Council Resolution 713, adopted in 1991 with the previous 
     Administration's firm support, required each member state 
     to cease deliveries of arms and military equipment 
     originating from its territory, and the United States met 
     this important international obligation. Resolution 713 
     did not require the United States to stop third-country 
     arms shipments to Bosnia. An enforcement mechanism was 
     authorized in November 1992 via NSC Resolution 787, which 
     called on member states acting individually or through 
     regional arrangements to halt all inward and outward 
     maritime shipping in order to inspect cargos and certify 
     destinations. Under these resolutions, the United States 
     placed a ban on U.S. arms sales to the states of the 
     former Yugoslavia and participated in multilateral 
     enforcement efforts both on sea (via NATO's operation 
     SHARP GUARD) and on land (via multilateral monitoring 
     under the auspices of the International Conference on the 
     Former Yugoslavia).
       After the Nunn-Mitchell legislation went into effect in 
     November 1994 prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for 
     the purpose of participation in, support for, or assistance 
     to the enforcement of the arms embargo against Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, the United States modified the rule under which 
     its forces in SHARP GUARD operated. For example, U.S. ships 
     with SHARP GUARD no longer diverted or delayed vessels that 
     contained arms or other cargo for the purpose of enforcing 
     the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina.
       The enactment of Nunn-Mitchell had little impact on the 
     enforcement of other aspects of the arms and economic embargo 
     on other parts of the former Yugoslavia. U.S. ships with 
     SHARP GUARD continued enforcing other UN Security Council 
     Resolutions, such as the economic embargo on Serbia and 
     Montenegro, and tracked vessels containing arms for Bosnia 
     even after maritime inspections had been concluded in order 
     to ensure that destination and cargo dispensation claims had 
     been met. The overall efficiency of the SHARP GUARD operation 
     may have decreased somewhat after Nunn-Mitchell, however, 
     because of limitations on the sharing of information by U.S. 
     ships with other SHARP GUARD participants on whether cargos 
     had been cleared because they were free of prohibited items 
     or because they contained weapons bound only for Bosnia.
       Some in Congress have raised the question of whether 
     Ambassador Galbraith's response to President Tudjman in 1994 
     that he had ``no instructions'' on whether the Croatian 
     government should allow an arms shipment to pass through its 
     territory to Bosnia constituted U.S. covert action. The 
     answer is that it did not. Under the law, covert action is 
     defined as ``an activity or activities of the United States 
     Government to influence political, economic, or military 
     conditions abroad, while it is intended that the role of the 
     United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged 
     publicly.'' The definition does not include, among other 
     things, traditional diplomatic activities.
       The legislative history makes clear that the U.S. will not 
     be deemed to be carrying out a covert action through third 
     parties unless the third parties are receiving direction and 
     assistance from U.S. personnel directly involved in carrying 
     out an activity that otherwise meets the definition of covert 
     action. The legislative history also makes clear that the 
     statutory definition of covert action does not include within 
     its scope requests to third countries to conduct covert 
     action. In 1991, President Bush vetoed legislation that would 
     have included such requests within the definition of covert 
     action. The legislation was subsequently enacted without this 
     language.

[[Page E1055]]

       Thank you again for writing. We hope this information is 
     helpful to you. We are working to gather the other 
     information you have requested and will provide it via a 
     separate letter shortly. Meanwhile, please do not hesitate to 
     contact me directly if we can be of other assistance.
           Sincerely,

                                               Barbara Larkin,

                                       Acting Assistant Secretary,
     Legislative Affairs.
                                                                    ____



                                     U.S. Department of State,

                                     Washington, DC, May 20, 1996.
     Hon. Lee H. Hamilton,
     House of Representatives.
       Dear Mr. Hamilton: I am writing to follow up on my letter 
     of April 24, in which we provided an interim reply to some of 
     the issues raised in your April 11 letter to Secretary 
     Christopher on third-country arms deliveries to Bosnia and 
     Croatia in 1994 and 1995. As you will recall, our earlier 
     letter focused on U.S. legal obligations under various UN 
     Security Council Resolutions, sanctions enforcement efforts, 
     as well as whether U.S. policies at the time constituted 
     covert action. We welcome this opportunity to answer your 
     remaining questions on what motivated the 1994 U.S. decision 
     to take no position in response to the Croatian Government's 
     request for our views on its serving as the channel for 
     third-country arms shipments to Bosnia.
       The following are our responses to your remaining 
     questions:
       Did the United States during 1994 make a decision to change 
     policy on enforcing the embargo and on the delivery of arms 
     to Bosnia by third parties through Croatia?
       If there was such a change of policy, what was it? Was the 
     decision to change policy on such deliveries a decision not 
     to object to such deliveries, to acquiesce in the deliveries, 
     or to support the deliveries?
       Was such a policy consistent with U.S. policy since 
     September 1991 to enforce the arms embargo?
       The Bush Administration voted for UN Security Council 
     Resolution 713 in September 1991 and later resolutions 
     imposing an arms embargo on all the states of the former 
     Yugoslavia. The hope was that containing the flow of arms 
     into the region could reduce the level of violence and 
     prevent the expansion of war from Croatia to Bosnia. Thus, 
     the Bush Administration's policy was to abide by the embargo 
     and to support its enforcement, including on some occasions 
     making diplomatic representations to other countries when 
     violations became known.
       By the time the Clinton Administration took office, it was 
     clear that the arms embargo had not only failed to prevent 
     the spread of the war to Bosnia, but also frozen the Bosnian 
     Government into a militarily inferior position (since Serbia 
     and rebel Serb forces in Bosnia and Croatia had retained the 
     bulk of the armaments of the former Yugoslav National Army). 
     Therefore, from the time it entered office, this 
     Administration sought to secure a multilateral lift of the 
     arms embargo against Bosnia as a means of increasing pressure 
     on the Serbs to accept a political settlement.
       Although it remained Administration policy to abide by the 
     arms embargo, it was not our policy in 1993 and 1994 to take 
     active steps--either military or diplomatic--to enforce the 
     arms embargo with respect to military shipments to Bosnia by 
     third countries. Our efforts to enforce the arms embargo were 
     confined to participation in NATO's operation SHARP GUARD in 
     the Adriatic Sea (with support from operation DENY FLIGHT). 
     While UN Security Council resolutions called upon states to 
     take enforcement actions against third countries, such 
     actions were not required by those resolutions. The overall 
     focus of our sanctions enforcement effort was on maintaining 
     economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro through 
     operation SHARP GUARD, through monitoring and enforcement 
     efforts along Serbia's borders, and through active diplomatic 
     efforts with front-line states and other potential sanctions 
     violators.
       In part as a consequence of the arms embargo, by early 1994 
     the parts of Bosnia remaining in government hands were in 
     danger of collapse: Sarejevo was surrounded, Gorazde was 
     under siege, the other eastern enclaves were highly 
     vulnerable, and water, electricity, and humanitarian aid 
     deliveries were threatened.
       The political and military dynamic in Bosnia changed in 
     March 1994. In that month, as a result of active U.S. 
     mediation by our Special Envoy, Ambassador Charles Redman, 
     the leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and the Bosnian Croat 
     community signed agreements ending their military conflict 
     and setting up a bi-communal Federation between Bonsia's 
     Muslims and ethnic Croats. The newly born Federation 
     immediately received strong U.S. diplomatic support, and 
     deservedly so; its founding principles reflected pluralistic 
     Western values and the cease-fire it engendered helped free 
     up government forces to defend their country against the 
     Serbs and, over time, altered the military balance.
       When President Tudjman of Croatia approached Ambassador 
     Galbraith in Zagreb in April 1994 to elicit U.S. views on 
     allowing third-country arms shipments to Bosnia via Croatia, 
     we determined that a negative response could have led to the 
     collapse of the Federation and a new deterioration of 
     the Bosnian Government's military position. Instead, we 
     decided that the best course was neither to object to nor 
     approve of arms transfers to Bosnia through Croatia. This 
     was consistent with our practice in the preceding months 
     not to take active steps to prevent third-country arms 
     shipments. At the same time, we did not believe it would 
     have been appropriate to endorse actions contrary to UN 
     Security Council resolutions. Thus we told Ambassador 
     Galbraith to state that he had ``no instructions'' on the 
     matter.
       Our decision eventually bore fruit. By sustaining the 
     Federation and eroding the Serbs' military advantage, it 
     paved the way for the American diplomacy, backed by NATO air 
     power, that produced the peace agreement at Dayton. Our 
     decision allowed us both to observe our legal obligations 
     under UN Security Council Resolution 713 and to promote the 
     achievement of peace.
       How did the Administration assess the implications of such 
     a policy change on international adherence to UN Security 
     Council Resolution 713 and U.S. efforts to get friends and 
     allies to stop trade, economic dealings, and investment ties 
     with Iran?
       Iran's entry into the Bosnian conflict occurred long before 
     the April 1994 decision. Iranian efforts to gain influence in 
     Bosnia date back to the 1980s. They gained momentum in 1991-
     92, in the early stages of the war, when the international 
     community proved unable to confront Serb aggression. During 
     this period, despite the UN arms embargo, Iran established 
     itself as Bosnia's principal arms supplier and dispatched 
     hundreds of Revolutionary Guard and other personnel to assist 
     in training Bosnian Government forces. Iranian military aid 
     was part of a multi-pronged campaign of support that also 
     included intelligence cooperation along with economic and 
     humanitarian assistance. We have no evidence that Iran's 
     presence in Bosnia increased significantly after April 1994. 
     It is also worth noting that, through the Dayton Accords and 
     subsequent diplomacy, we have reduced Iranian military 
     influence in Bosnia to its lowest levels in years.
       The April 1994 decision had no discernable impact on U.S. 
     efforts to gain international support for the use of economic 
     pressure to alter Iran's objectionable behavior, including 
     its support for terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass 
     destruction. Prior to 1994, our Allies had generally been 
     unresponsive to our requests that they not provide Iran with 
     economic benefits such as new official credits and loan 
     guarantees. In the past year, however, following the 
     President's decision to impose a trade and investment embargo 
     against Iran, most European countries have substantially 
     reduced the pace and volume of economic activity with Iran. 
     We continue to urge European governments to join our efforts 
     to pressure Iran economically. Based on our ongoing 
     consultations, including the April 19 meeting in Rome of 
     the U.S.-EU-Canada Working Group on Iran, we have 
     concluded that the April 1994 decision has not 
     significantly affected our Iran diplomacy.
       Did the United States have discussions regarding these 
     deliveries only with the Croatian and Bosnian authorities, or 
     did the United States also have discussions directly with 
     third countries supplying or financing these arms deliveries?
       The United States had no communications with Iran regarding 
     arms for Bosnia, nor are we aware of any occasion on which 
     U.S. officials, in any discussions with other countries, 
     requested them to transfer arms to Bosnia or Croatia.
       What countries besides Iran were involved in the financing 
     and delivery of arms to Bosnia? Were Malaysia, Pakistan, 
     Saudi Arabia, or Egypt involved?
       We have provided classified documents which address this 
     question to the Senate Intelligence Committee and we will 
     provide these same materials to appropriate Congressional 
     committees that request them.
       If there was a change of policy, why was there a change of 
     policy, and who was informed of it? Was Congress informed, 
     were Allies informed, and were all appropriate officials of 
     the United States informed about a change in policy that 
     affected stated, public policy? If not, why not?
       In order to succeed, the thrust of our diplomatic activity 
     both before and after April 1994--adhering to our obligations 
     under UN resolutions, maintaining the cohesion of the Western 
     Alliance, while not taking action to prevent the Bosnians 
     from receiving weapons--required great discretion. That is 
     why the Administration kept the April 1994 discussions with 
     the Croatian government closely held within its own ranks.
       It should be noted, however, that the Congressional 
     leadership and relevant committees were made aware of the 
     existence of Iranian arms shipments both from Administration-
     provided intelligence briefings and press reports. 
     Furthermore, the U.S. decision not to object to such 
     shipments was not inconsistent with the will of Congress as 
     expressed in a June 1994 vote in the House of Representatives 
     to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. In October 1994, the 
     full Congress voted to cut off funds for U.S. enforcement of 
     the arms embargo. No exception for Iranian arms was contained 
     in the legislation, nor was any such exception proposed 
     during the debate.
       I trust this information will be helpful to you. The 
     Administration is cooperating fully with the current 
     Congressional investigations and welcomes opportunities like 
     this one to explain its policy decisions. Secretary 
     Christopher and I value greatly the close cooperation on 
     Bosnia policy that we have enjoyed with you and your staff 
     over the last three-plus years and we look forward to a

[[Page E1056]]

     continuing productive relationship in this regard.
           Sincerely,

                                               Barbara Larkin,

                                       Acting Assistant Secretary,
     Legislative Affairs.

                          ____________________