[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 84 (Monday, June 10, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E1042-E1043]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




        GEORGE SOROS MAKES CASE FOR POSTPONING BOSNIAN ELECTION

                                 ______


                            HON. TOM LANTOS

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                         Monday, June 10, 1996

  Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, George Soros, my good friend and the 
chairman of one of the largest and most widely praised philanthropic 
organizations in the world, put forth a very strong argument for 
postponing the Bosnian elections until there is stronger evidence that 
the goals set by the Dayton Accords for free and fair elections have 
been met. His op-ed, which appeared in the Wall Street Journal, makes a 
well-reasoned case for delaying the elections until indicted war 
criminals are arrested, freedom of movement is established, a free 
press exists, and lines of communication are opened between and within 
ethnic groups.
  The Soros foundation/Open Society Foundation is one of the primary 
philanthropic organization dedicated to promoting free societies 
throughout the world. George Soros has demonstrated his commitment to 
making the peace process work in Bosnia by pledging $15 million for TV 
broadcasting prior to the elections. These funds, in conjunction with 
the commitment of the United States and the world community, will be of 
enormous help in executing free and fair elections once preconditions 
are set.

[[Page E1043]]

  I urge my colleagues to read and consider Mr. Soros' insightful 
comments on this difficult issue that we must debate as the time for 
elections and the withdrawal of the implementation force troops draws 
near.

              [From the Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1996]

                  Postpone the Bosnian Elections . . .

                           (By George Soros)

       I am deeply committed to making the Dayton peace process 
     work. My foundation, among its many projects, has prepared a 
     $15 million plan for providing pluralistic TV broadcasting to 
     most of Bosnia prior to the elections, and the U.S. and 
     European governments have pledged substantial funds to turn 
     the plan into reality. Yet I feel compelled to voice a 
     protest against the impending decision of the Organization 
     for Security and Cooperation in Europe to certify that 
     conditions are suitable for holding ``free and fair'' 
     elections in Bosnia by Sept. 14.


                            immense pressure

       The OSCE head of mission in Bosnia, career U.S. diplomat 
     Robert Frowick, has been under immense pressure from the U.S. 
     government to issue the certification required under the 
     Dayton agreement; two of his top aides have resigned in 
     protest. The International Helsinki Federation issued a 
     report on May 23 documenting that virtually none of the 
     conditions spelled out in the Dayton agreement has been met:
       Indicted war criminals have not been arrested. Gen. Ratko 
     Mladic is in charge of the Bosnian Serbe army, issues all 
     orders and communicates with the NATO Implementation Force 
     (IFOR) commander through an interpreter. Radovan Karadzic 
     continues to dominate the political scene, sacking the prime 
     minister of Republika Srpska, Rajko Kasagic, who was willing 
     to cooperate with U.N. representative Carl Bildt, but as a 
     sop to Mr. Bildt, Mr. Karadzic has now promised not to make 
     any further public appearances.
       Freedom of movement remains severely restricted. Although 
     official boundary checkpoints have been turned over to IFOR, 
     they have been effectively replaced by mobile checkpoints, 
     where the authorities representing all three ethnic factions 
     routinely refuse to accept documents issued by the others. 
     Signatures required to register political parties cannot be 
     gathered across ethnic lines, hindering opposition parties 
     seeking to attract a multiethnic constituency. For instance, 
     the Liberal Democratic Party based in Sarajevo and the Social 
     Liberal Party based in Banja Luka, which were united before 
     the war and which are trying to form a common platform, 
     cannot meet or even speak by telephone because of a lack of 
     phone lines.
       Freedom of expression and independent broadcast and print 
     media are virtually nonexistent in so-called Herzeg Bosna (a 
     Croatian ethnic enclave within the Bosnian-Croatian 
     Federation) and in Republika Srpska. The situation is 
     somewhat better in Bosnian territory, with an independent 
     press in cities such as Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica and with 
     some independent local TV and radio stations. Under present 
     conditions the three nationalist parties that rule their 
     separate entities control the relevant media, giving them an 
     unfair advantage. The media under their control continue to 
     foment ethnic and religious hatred, in contradiction of the 
     Dayton agreement.
       Freedom of association is severely repressed, leaving 
     little chance for opposition parties to solidify support. The 
     Helsinki Federation report cities specific instances.
       The failure of the international community to secure the 
     return of refugees (only about 60,000 out of the estimated 
     2.4 million have returned), coupled with election rules that 
     allow people to vote where they now live, will legitimize the 
     results of ethnic cleansing.
       It is easy to understand what drives U.S. policy, but it is 
     less easy to condone it. The timetable for the Bosnian 
     elections is determined by the timetable for the withdrawal 
     of IFOR troops, which is governed by the U.S. presidential 
     election. President Clinton has of course made a commitment 
     that U.S. troops would begin returning home by the end of the 
     year. U.S. voters, who are so far removed from the problems 
     of Bosnia and not well informed about the issues at stake, 
     are primarily interested in whether the president will keep 
     his word.
       To conduct early elections in Bosnia, it would have been 
     necessary to arrest the indicted war criminals before the 
     momentum of Dayton dissipated. But the military has been 
     traumatized by its experience in Somalia, and the Pentagon 
     refused to accept the mission. The Clinton administration put 
     its faith in Slobodian Milosevic, but he could not or would 
     not deliver. To order IFOR into action against the advice of 
     the military would expose President Clinton to a pre-election 
     risk that he is determined to avoid.
       But to persevere in the present course entails even bigger 
     risks. Bosnia will set a precedent for the post-Cold War 
     world. By insisting on going through with the elections we 
     would breech the conditions of the Dayton peace plan we 
     engineered, provide a blueprint for legitimating ethnic 
     cleansing and undermine the principles of international law 
     we sought to establish by creating the War Crimes Tribunal.


                            further conflict

       Bosnia cannot be split into separate ethnic entities 
     without further conflict. The Serbs have carved out a 
     contiguous territory for themselves (although the area around 
     Breko remains contested), and the Croat nationalists of 
     Herzeg Bosna aim at no less. Even the military concedes that 
     it would be easier to maintain its presence than to 
     reintroduce troops after fighting has erupted again.
       The failure of the international community in Bosnia is 
     already affecting the behavior of neighboring Yugoslavia and 
     Croatia, and it will be a source of never-ending 
     recrimination between the U.S. and Europe. President Clinton 
     may be able to avoid Bosnia becoming an election issue, but 
     it would surely haunt his second term in office.

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