[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 81 (Wednesday, June 5, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5781-S5785]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                   UNCONDITIONAL MFN STATUS FOR CHINA

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise to talk about why I believe every 
Member of this Chamber should support the unconditional extension of 
most-favored-nation trading status to the People's Republic of China. 
As we are all aware, Senator Dole declared his support for 
unconditional extension of MFN for China sometime ago. More recently, 
the President announced he would renew China's MFN status 
unconditionally for another year.
  Now the matter comes before the Congress. We have to decide whether 
or not Senator Dole's position and the President's decision deserve our 
support. The Chinese, of course, have not made this issue easy for us. 
Their destabilizing nuclear, chemical, and missile sales, their 
continued nuclear testing, their assertiveness in the South China Sea, 
their growing trade surplus with the United States, their piracy of our 
intellectual property, their military threats against Taiwan, their 
moves to undermine democratic reforms in Hong Kong, and their abuses of 
human rights, these all demand a stern reply.
  That is why it is tempting to revoke China's MFN status. But it would 
be a huge mistake to do so. I say this for four reasons.

  First, revoking MFN would put at risk hundreds of thousands of 
American jobs, and billions of dollars worth of American exports and 
investments.
  Second, revoking MFN is an ineffective weapon that would not solve 
any of the problems we have with China. Indeed, revocation may make 
them worse.
  Third, more proportional, targeted measures currently available 
permit a more effective response to these problems.
  Finally, extending MFN is fundamental to developing a coherent China 
policy--one that sets priorities and provides a strategic framework for 
the conduct of our relations with that important country. Mr. 
President, the United States, East Asia, and the entire world have much 
to gain from a positive relationship between Washington and Beijing and 
much to lose from an unnecessarily confrontational one.
  Before going into more detail about these four points, I believe it 
necessary to clarify the meaning of the term, ``most-favored-nation 
trading status.'' That's because the term gives the false impression 
that MFN is some sort of special privilege or reward.
  The term even confuses our most prestigious newspapers. In their 
stories on the President's announcement to renew China's MFN status, 
the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post,

[[Page S5782]]

the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times all incorrectly described 
MFN as a ``privilege'' or in some way preferential or favorable.
  In fact, MFN is not a special privilege or reward. It designates the 
most ordinary, most normal trading relationship among countries. 
Specifically, MFN refers to the uniform tariff treatment that the 
United States applies to virtually every country in the world.
  For example, if the U.S. tariff on imported clock radios is 5 
percent, all clock radios imported from countries with MFN status are 
subject to a 5-percent tariff. Imports from countries that do not have 
MFN status--and there are only six countries that fall into this 
category--are subject to far higher duty rates.
  Another important point about MFN is that it is not a one-way street. 
When we give MFN status to a particular country, that country, in 
return, gives the United States most-favored-nation status.
  Therefore, because we give Singapore MFN status, the clock radios we 
import from that country are subject to the same tariff rates as clock 
radios from Thailand, Spain, or any other country to which we extend 
MFN.
  In return, when Singapore imports our computer chips, it imposes the 
same tariff on United States chips as those imported from Japan, Korea, 
Great Britain, or any other country to which it extends MFN.
  What does the United States get out of all this? American companies 
get to compete on fair and equal terms with their foreign rivals.
  Let me emphasize again: MFN status does not confer--let alone imply--
special treatment.
  In fact, when we decide to give special treatment to imports from 
other countries--as Congress has expressly chosen to do for certain 
products from over 130 nations--those imports are subject to tariff 
rates substantially below the MFN rate. Sometimes we even allow 
specified countries to export products to the United States duty free.
  In short, MFN status denotes the standard, not the exceptional, 
trading relationship. Ending this standard trading relationship by 
revoking MFN is an extreme measure. In fact, because MFN is so 
fundamental to trade relations among countries, some correctly liken 
its withdrawal to a declaration of economic war.
  These are the facts about MFN. Anyone who maintains that we do China 
a special favor when we renew its MFN status is either misinformed or 
disingenuous.
  Because of the confusion created by the phrase, ``most-favored-nation 
trading status,'' I am working with Senator Moynihan to replace the 
phrase in U.S. statute with a more suitable term, one that underscores 
the unexceptional nature of the MFN concept. I believe that if we adopt 
such a change in terminology, we will all better understand the issue, 
and our debate will be more constructive.
  Now, I want to stress that those who favor MFN renewal, such as 
myself, share most, if not all, of the same goals as those opposed to 
MFN renewal.
  We, too, want Beijing to cease its destabilizing nuclear, chemical, 
and missile sales. We, too, want China to end its nuclear testing. We, 
too, want China to resolve peacefully its territorial disagreements in 
the South China Sea. We, too, want China to lower barriers to U.S. 
exports and reduce its trade surplus with the United States. We, too, 
want China to end its piracy of our intellectual property. We, too, 
want China to end its military threats against Taiwan and resolve its 
differences with Taipei peacefully. We, too, want China to follow 
faithfully the dictates of the Sino-British Declaration on Hong Kong. 
We also want China to cooperate with us in addressing serious global 
concerns such as environmental degradation, transnational crime, and 
narcotics trafficking. And we, too, want China to respect the basic 
human rights of its citizens.
  Where we differ from the opponents of MFN is on how to achieve these 
goals.
  The simple fact is that there is absolutely no evidence that the 
drastic action of withdrawing MFN will force China to satisfy any of 
our objectives. Indeed, sanctioning China by withdrawing MFN runs the 
great risk of making that country more belligerent and less cooperative 
on these and other issues.
  Keep in mind that experience shows that unilateral trade sanctions 
generally don't work. The chances of success only improve when 
sanctions are applied in cooperation with our major allies. However, 
not one of these allies--not Canada, not the European Union, not Japan, 
not Australia--is debating whether to withdraw MFN status from China. 
That's because they all know withdrawal is neither a constructive nor 
effective option for inducing the Chinese to change their behavior. In 
addition, they understand the tremendous cost of withdrawing MFN 
status, a cost we ignore at our peril.
  Let's be clear on this point. If we revoke MFN for China, Beijing 
would certainly be hurt, but so, too, would the United States.
  As a result of withdrawing MFN, United States duties on goods 
imported from China would immediately rise to the tariff rates 
established under the highly protectionist, Depression-era Smoot-Hawley 
tariff law. Chinese imports, which currently face an average tariff 
rate of 6 to 8 percent, will be subject to an average tariff rate of 40 
to 50 percent, with the tariff rates for certain items exceeding 100 
percent.
  Because MFN is provided on a reciprocoal basis, China would respond 
to higher tariffs on its goods by slapping higher tariffs on United 
States goods. Such a move will slam the door shut on United States 
exports to the Chinese market--the fastest growing market in the world. 
These U.S. exports totaled almost $12 billion in 1995 and supported 
approximately 200,000 high-skilled, high-wage American jobs in critical 
sectors such as the aircraft, telecommunications, and automotive 
equipment industries.
  Business conducted by United States companies in China will go 
instead to the Europeans, the Japanese, the Canadians, and firms from 
all the other countries in the world which continue normal commerical 
relations with China.
  In addition to severely damaging United States exporters, the small 
and large American firms that have invested billions of dollars to 
penetrate the Chinese market would see their efforts and investments 
gravely jeopardized.
  Some claim, of course, that in the event China's MFN status is 
withdrawn, those billions of dollars of United States investments in 
China will be brought back to the United States. The reality is, 
however, that United States companies forced out of China are far more 
likely to move those investments to other developing countries in Asia 
or Latin America.
  The economic fallout from withdrawing China's MFN status is not only 
going to hit American companies, but also American consumers. Our 
lowest income citizens, in particular, would suffer from the 
dramatically higher prices they will have to pay for a variety of basic 
goods as a direct result of the imposition of substantially higher 
duties on Chinese imports.
  Mr. President, some claim that pricing Chinese goods out of our 
market through higher duties would be beneficial. They maintain that we 
would eliminate our trade deficit with Beijing because the products we 
now import from China would be produced in the United States.
  Let us be realistic. It is a mistake to think that most of what we 
import from China would be produced in the United States. The truth is 
that in most cases imports from other developing countries would be 
substituted for imports from China.
  Moreover, it does not make any sense to try to reduce the trade 
deficit by ending all trade, as would likely happen if we revoke 
China's MFN status. You may get a balance of trade--zero imports and 
zero exports--but at a cost of hundreds of thousands of good, high-
paying U.S. jobs and billions of dollars of U.S. exports.
  The only way to reduce the trade deficit and retain American jobs and 
exports is to ensure that United States products have the same access 
to the Chinese market that Chinese products have to ours. This is not 
an easy task. But revoking normal trade relations with China would make 
it impossible.
  While I believe the threat to United States jobs and exports alone 
provides a convicing reason to support renewal of China's MFN status, 
there are other

[[Page S5783]]

compelling arguments for unconditional renewal.
  In particular, cutting ourselves off from China by withdrawing its 
MFN status will end any ability the United States has to directly 
influence developments in China, including how China treats its 
citizens and whether it permits the development of a freer society and 
more democratic political system.
  United States businesses help advance human rights and civil society 
in China by being there, not by leaving or by being shut out. United 
States companies operating in China observe basic worker rights in 
dealings with their local employees. United States companies provide 
Chinese citizens with opportunities unheard of before China began to 
open its economy and society to the outside world in 1978. United 
States companies teach their Chinese employees the valuable lessons of 
American business culture, including independent decisionmaking and 
enterpreneurial skills.
  Among other reasons, that's why Martin Lee, the Hong Kong legislator 
and human rights advocate; Hong Kong Gov. Chris Patten and Wei 
Jingsheng, the prominent Chinese dissident who has suffered for so long 
from state persecution, all support renewal of MFN for China.
  Moreover, that is why the Taiwanese--who are not shy about voicing 
their opinions on China to Members of Congress--have not advocated 
revoking MFN. And that's why the countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations, four of whose members have territorial 
disputes with China, have not come to Capitol Hill to press the United 
States to revoke China's MFN status.
  Mr. President, I think that it is the height of arrogance for 
opponents of MFN to assert that they know better than Martin Lee, Wei 
Jingsheng, the Taiwanese, and the countries of ASEAN, how to change 
China's behavior.
  Indeed, as they know, there is ample evidence that the mere threat of 
revoking MFN will make China less cooperative and more confrontational.
  For example, several weeks ago, China announced for the first time 
that it would buy several billion dollars worth of passenger jets from 
the European consortium, Airbus. This action was a deliberate 
repudiation of Boeing, meant to send us the message that revocation of 
MFN will result in costly economic retaliation.
  Shortly thereafter, in an action designed to send us a signal on the 
security implications of recklessly confronting Beijing, China struck a 
deal with Russia to develop a long-term strategic partnership.
  These actions indicate some of the problems and consequences we would 
face if we use the sledge-hammer approach of revoking MFN.
  Keep in mind that the President already has specific, measured and 
targeted tools at his disposal that allow him to address our problems 
with China without resorting to the indiscriminate and destructive 
approach of revoking MFN.
  For example, we are currently preparing to hit China with trade 
sanctions on $2 billion worth of specified Chinese imports because of 
Beijing's failure to honor its agreement with the United States to 
crack down on Chinese companies making pirated knock-offs of American 
music, movies, and computer software.
  Similarly, we can invoke targeted section 301 sanctions for other 
discrete discriminatory and unreasonable Chinese trade practices.
  When China illegally sells nuclear technology, we can apply sanctions 
which are specified by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act.
  We can counter China's threats to Taiwan by considering sales of 
upgraded defensive weaponry to Taipei, as well as by reaffirming our 
unwavering commitment to a peaceful resolution of the dispute between 
Taiwan and China in the context of our one-China policy, a policy which 
has been supported by each of our last six Presidents.
  We can rely on international law and the shared interests of the 
countries of Southeast Asia to counter aggressive Chinese territorial 
claims.
  And we can continue to expose and condemn China's repressive human 
rights record in this Chamber and in organizations around the world.
  The range of tools available to respond to specific problems with 
China is considerable. At the same time, however, their breadth reveals 
a fundamental weakness in our overall approach to our relations with 
Beijing--the absence of an effective, broadly based, clearly 
articulated and carefully coordinated China policy that sets priorities 
and guides our use of these tools.
  I agree with those who say that the rise of China presents us with a 
serious foreign policy challenge. But it also presents us with enormous 
opportunities. We can only respond to that challenge adequately and 
seize those opportunities through a sensible overall China policy, one 
that enhances the chance of creating a positive bilateral relationship. 
The clear objective of that policy should be to encourage China's 
constructive and responsible behavior and discourage aggressiveness and 
irresponsibility.
  The absence of a coherent China policy results in large measure from 
short-sighted political considerations. For example, the 1992 Clinton 
campaign rhetoric about coddling dictators in Beijing left the Clinton 
administration little room to maneuver on China policy. Early on, the 
President indicated he would link human rights issues to the MFN 
decision. The following year, however, he was forced to reverse himself 
and announced the two issues would not be linked.
  Similarly, in 1994, the Clinton administration refused Taiwan 
President Li the ability to play a round of golf in Hawaii while in 
transit to Costa Rica. But in 1995, the administration granted him a 
visa to visit Cornell University immediately after telling the Chinese 
it would not do so because such an act would violate our one-China 
policy.
  These and other mixed signals from the administration, as well as the 
cacophony of voices from Capitol Hill on how to deal with China, have 
left the United States with a dangerously muddled China policy.
  Without question, if the United States had a better sense of its 
priorities and aims in the United States-China relationship, and a 
clearly articulated China policy that reflects those priorities, we 
would be better able to influence Chinese behavior. Moreover, the tools 
we currently have available to respond to Chinese misconduct would be 
more effective when used in the context of a coherent China policy.
  In brief, I believe such a policy must have four central elements. 
First, we must expand our economic relationship with Beijing, because a 
China integrated into the global economy is more likely to behave in 
ways more compatible with American interests and international norms. 
Thus, we should seek to encourage China's development and participate 
in its economic growth. That's why I assign importance to China gaining 
entry into the World Trade Organization based on commercial 
considerations and GATT principles.
  The more China is integrated into the international economy, the more 
subject Beijing is to the harsh realities of the marketplace. Should 
China choose a path toward blatant aggression and destabilizing 
domestic repression, foreign investment will dry up and firms will move 
to other countries where the risks are lower and the returns are 
higher.
  Moreover, we have a better opportunity to influence China to act in 
ways we prefer when we enmesh it in the sort of economic relationships 
fostered by most-favored-nation trade status. Renewing MFN thus is 
absolutely central to an effective China policy.
  In addition, the economic growth fostered by participation in the 
global economy almost inevitably leads to greater demands for 
democratic reforms. Other Asian countries, such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Thailand, have amply demonstrated the political evolution that 
accompanies economic development.
  The second element of a coherent China policy is the resumption of 
high-level, regular dialog with China. I was delighted to see that in 
his speech on China 2 weeks ago, Secretary Christopher accepted Senator 
Dole's suggestions on this matter. After all it has been 7 years since 
an American President went to Beijing for summit talks, and 8 years 
since a Chinese leader has been in this country for a summit. Mistrust 
is bound to grow when we do not

[[Page S5784]]

meet, particularly when the list of critical bilateral, regional, and 
global issues requiring discussion is so long.
  Third, we must nurture aspects of the relationship where we share 
interests and can cooperate for our common good. For example, China 
played a useful role in bringing relative peace and stability to 
Cambodia. Moreover, China has the potential to play a key role in 
settling the serious threat posed by North Korea to the South, as well 
as the 47,000 American troops we have on the ground there. I cannot 
envision Beijing cooperating with us on North Korea if we revoke 
China's most-favored-nation trade status. Indeed, I cannot imagine the 
Chinese playing a constructive role on any matter of mutual 
importance--from protecting the environment to controlling 
transnational crime and narcotics trafficking--if we simply continue to 
threaten and sanction them.

  The fourth element of any coherent China policy must include 
preparedness to deal with China if its participation in world affairs 
proves disruptive. Strengthening our current array of bilateral 
security ties in Asia is thus essential. In addition, I believe we must 
look more closely at the possibility of creating effective regional 
security arrangements.
  Closer cooperation on security and diplomatic initiatives with 
nations in the Asia Pacific that share our interests on China would 
serve to prod Beijing to accept the moderating influence of global 
economic integration. It would also provide a hedge in the event 
Beijing instead chooses a more aggressive path.
  In sum, continued economic relations with China, high-level dialog, 
cooperation with China on matters of mutual concern, and strengthened 
security and diplomatic ties with the rest of Asia should, in my 
opinion, form the basis of any effective China policy.
  Mr. President, some claim that the decision we face on renewing MFN 
can be reduced to a question of whether ``our lust for trade exceed(s) 
our loathing of tyranny.''
  This argument is disingenuous and the question is simply wrong. The 
right question is whether taking the draconian step of revoking China's 
MFN status is worth the potentially huge cost to the United States, 
especially when this action has an extremely remote chance of achieving 
its aims. I await a response to this question from the opponents of 
China's MFN renewal.
  Mr. President, I must stress again that the United States, East Asia, 
and the entire world have much to gain from Washington and Beijing 
achieving a positive relationship, and much to lose should bilateral 
relations further deteriorate unnecessarily. Renewing MFN for China is 
only a step--but an extraordinarily important one--toward building a 
fruitful bilateral relationship. Therefore, Mr. President, I urge my 
colleagues in the strongest possible terms to support unconditional 
renewal of MFN for China.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, as the distinguished chairman of the 
Finance Committee has so clearly stated, discussions of American 
foreign trade policy are increasingly bedeviled by the use of an 18th 
century term, most favored nation, to describe trade agreements reached 
with other nations. The most favored nation involved is not the nation 
with which we are negotiating, but rather a third nation altogether 
which happens to have the lowest tariff, or whatever, with respect to 
some product or other. The United States agrees to give to country X 
whatever terms are the best terms it gives to some third country. 
Whichever that might be.
  This issue arises for the simple reason that the last tariff schedule 
enacted by statute was the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, with the 
highest tariff rates, overall, in American history. In response to the 
disaster that followed the Roosevelt administration began a series of 
trade treaties entered into as executive agreements. This arrangement 
continues to this day. As a result, nations entering the Western 
trading regime, which is to say, in the main, former or current 
Communist nations, must receive the treatment accorded under the GATT 
or the WTO, or else Smoot-Hawley. Granting the former status is no sign 
of favor, simply of normal trade relations.
  For more than two centuries this has been our practice, but only 
recently has the term caused public misunderstanding. What we mean is 
that we will confer on country X normal trading relations. The time has 
come, then, to say so. We grant country X normal trade relations (NTR) 
in return for country X treating us in the same manner. Which is to 
say, NTR.
  Just last month the Finance Committee acted on legislation to grant 
permanent most-favored-nation treatment to Bulgaria and Cambodia. 
Yesterday, the Trade Subcommittee held a hearing regarding Romania's 
MFN status, and tomorrow the committee will hear witnesses speak to 
questions surrounding the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to 
China. If one read the headlines, one might believe these four 
countries to be the most important in all of American trade policy.
  But not at all. As the chairman has just said, MFN treatment is not 
special treatment. Countries to which we grant this supposed most 
favored treatment are not, in fact, the most preferred in our trade 
relations. When we undertake an obligation to provide most-favored-
nation treatment to another country, we simply agree to give that 
country the same treatment that we give the great majority of our 
trading partners. The rationale is that, if every country observes this 
principle, all countries will benefit in the long run through the 
resulting more efficient use of resources.
  Indeed, there is no single most favored nation in our trade policy. 
As noted in a 1919 report to the Congress by the U.S. Tariff 
Commission, now the U.S. International Trade Commission,

       It is neither the purpose nor the effect of the most-
     favored-nation clause to establish a ``most-favored nation;'' 
     on the contrary its use implies the intention that the 
     maximum of advantages which either of the parties to a treaty 
     has extended or shall extend to any third State--for the 
     moment the ``most-favored''--shall be given or be made 
     accessible to the other party. . . . ``Reciprocity and 
     Commercial Agreements,'' United States Tariff Commission, 
     1919.

  In fact, over time, we have developed a great variety of relations 
with our trading partners. We have agreed to free trade with Canada, 
Israel, and Mexico. We offer special benefits to countries of the 
Caribbean and Andean regions. We have a longstanding policy of duty-
free treatment for imports from developing countries under the 
Generalized System of Preferences. If one really wants to identify a 
most favored country, one certainly must take note of these 
relationships, which are all more advantageous than general most-
favored-nation treatment.
  MFN is a principle from the past. The concept has been traced to 12th 
century arrangements between trading cities of the Mediterranean and 
the Arab princes of North Africa, although the phrase most-favored-
nation did not appear until the end of the 17th century. In United 
States law, the principle was first recognized in the 1778 commercial 
treaty between the United States and France, stating:

       The Most Christian King and the United States engage 
     mutually not to grant any particular favor to other nations, 
     in respect of commerce and navigation, which shall not 
     immediately become common to the other party. . . .

  Thereafter, an MFN clause became a standard element of treaties of 
friendship, commerce, and navigation, the early formal bilateral 
economic treaties of the United States. In essence, this was our 
mechanism for assuring fair and equal treatment for the trade of the 
United States. Over time, an ever-lengthening chain of commercial 
agreements, incorporating the MFN obligation, reduced barriers and 
increased trade. Ultimately, this basic principle was adopted in 1947 
as the central obligation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade--article I, part I of the ``GATT 1947''. It continues central to 
the World Trade Organization created in 1994--article I, part I of the 
``GATT 1994''.
  But, as the GATT has been succeeded by the WTO, so it is time to 
consider a successor term to MFN. A term that recognizes that, in the 
modern world, it is the norm, not the exception, to treat our trading 
partners equally. Senator Roth and I, along with Senator Chafee, would 
propose for the Senate's consideration a more accurate term--``normal 
trade relations.'' Shortly, we will introduce legislation changing U.S. 
law, as necessary and appropriate.

[[Page S5785]]



             THE NATO ENLARGEMENT FACILITATION ACT OF 1996

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I have long been a supporter of the 
transatlantic community of nations and its cornerstone institution, 
NATO. And today I wish to express my support for the NATO Enlargement 
Facilitation Act of 1996--extremely important legislation which I also 
cosponsor.
  This bill is designed specifically to support and foster the careful, 
gradual extension of NATO membership to the nations of Central and 
Eastern Europe. If passed, this bill would direct tangible assistance 
to the efforts of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to join the 
alliance. These nations are the most prepared of their region for the 
responsibilities and burdens of NATO membership.
  Equally important, it is the intent of the authors of this bill to 
assist other Central and Eastern European countries whose economies and 
democracies have sufficiently progressed to move forward toward 
eventual NATO membership.
  Such a policy is absolutely necessary to ensure that NATO's 
acceptance of Polish, Czech, and Hungarian applications for membership 
not create new divisions in Europe, but is instead part of an inclusive 
and on-going process that will extend to the entire community of 
European nations.
  Extending the alliance's membership to Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, will help transform Central and Eastern Europe into a 
cornerstone of enduring peace and stability in post-cold-war Europe. It 
would do so for the following reasons:
  First, the NATO enlargement would project security into a region that 
has long suffered as a security vacuum in European affairs. History has 
repeatedly shown us that the strategic vulnerability of Central and 
Eastern Europe has produced catastrophic consequences--consequences 
that drew the United States twice this century into world war.
  Second, NATO enlargement would help facilitate the economic and 
political integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the 
transatlantic community of nations. Passage of our NATO enlargement 
legislation would demonstrate America's commitment to consolidating an 
enlarged Europe. This would give more incentive to all the nations of 
the region to continue their political and economic reforms by 
demonstrating that these reforms do result in tangible geopolitical 
gains.
  By projecting stability into Central and Eastern Europe, NATO 
enlargement would reinforce the regional stability necessary for 
nations to focus on internal political and economic reform. Mr. 
President, security is not an alternative to reform, but it is 
essential for reform to occur.
  Third, two great European powers, Germany and Russia, are now 
undergoing very complex and sensitive transformations. Their futures 
will be significantly shaped by the future of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Extending NATO membership to nations of this region will 
reinforce the positive evolutions of these two great powers.
  In the case of Germany, NATO enlargement would further lock German 
interests into a transatlantic security structure and further 
consolidate the extremely positive role Bonn now plays in European 
affairs.
  The extension of NATO membership to Central and East European nations 
would also be of great benefit to Russia. By enhancing and reinforcing 
stability and peace in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO enlargement 
would make unrealistic calls by Russia's extremists for the 
revitalization of the former Soviet Union or the westward expansion of 
Russian hegemony. Greater stability along Russia frontiers will enable 
Moscow to direct more of its energy toward the internal challenges of 
political and economic reform.
  This point is too often forgotten in this debate. There has been too 
strong a tendency in United States policy to overreact to outdated 
Russian sensitivities. This overreaction comes at the expense of 
strategic realities and objectives central to the interests of the 
alliance, as well as to the United States.
  I would also like to note that this NATO enlargement legislation 
reflects the attitudes of many of our parliamentary counterparts in 
Europe. The North Atlantic Assembly, a gathering of legislators from 
the 16 nations of NATO, adopted at the end of 1994, my resolution 
calling for the extension of membership in the alliance to Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary.
  Mr. President, America's defense and security must be structured to 
shape a strategic landscape that enhances economic, political, and 
military stability all across Europe. Careful and gradual extension of 
NATO membership to nations of Central and Eastern Europe is a critical 
step toward this end. This is in our national interest. It is action 
long overdue, and it is the intent of the NATO Enlargement Facilitation 
Act of 1996.
  For these reasons, I call upon my colleagues in the Senate, as well 
as President Clinton and his administration, to embrace this 
legislation.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. BRADLEY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey [Mr. Bradley] is 
recognized to speak for up to 40 minutes.

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