[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 80 (Tuesday, June 4, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5715-S5738]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996--MOTION TO PROCEED

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of 
the motion to proceed to S. 1635. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A motion to proceed to the consideration of the bill (S. 
     1635) to establish a United States policy for the deployment 
     of a national missile defense system, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the motion to proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, there 
will be 2 hours allotted to this issue.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, the Dole star wars bill the Senate is 
debating is a reckless and expensive attempt to recreate the nostalgia 
of the cold war through the regrettable and unwarranted use of fear and 
fabrication. Over the last several years, the majority has resolutely 
turned a deaf ear to the objections of millions of men, women, and 
children at risk while it continually snips away at America's safety 
net. But in a conversion worthy of Jekyll and Hyde, the majority is 
passionately arguing that we throw open the Treasury doors to create a 
new defense safety net to take the place of the social safety net it is 
intent on unraveling. Multibillion-dollar missile launchers will 
replace school lunches in this new gilded net. Guns in the sky will 
replace efforts to remove guns from our school playgrounds. Money that 
used to help the poor buy heating fuel in winter will now heat lasers 
orbiting the Earth.
  The underlying premise of the Dole star wars bill is that the 
ballistic missile threat targeted toward the United States is so great, 
so urgent that nothing short of a crash program similar to the race to 
the Moon in the 1960's will do. No cost to the American taxpayers is 
too great. No arms control treaty is too valuable. The siren call 
behind the Dole star wars bill is a seductive one indeed: If you 
believe in a strong national defense, then you must be willing to 
shield America against missile attack--a missile attack anywhere, 
anytime--regardless of the consequences. But, like the sirens tempting 
Odysseus, to heed the call will bring catastrophe, not security.
  The packaging of the Dole star wars bill is slick and the rhetoric is 
packed with chest-thumping patriotism. But the issue of missile defense 
is much more complex than it may seem to some. A number of questions 
need to be asked and answered before the Senate can judge the need to 
embark on a crash program to field a national missile defense system in 
6 years.
  What is the threat of ballistic missile attack facing the United 
States today and in the near future?
  From where does this threat originate? And are there other less 
costly, more effective means of meeting this threat, whatever it is?
  What is meant when the bill requires a defense against a ``limited, 
unauthorized, and accidental attack'' What is the likelihood of such 
attacks occurring? And what type of missile defense is necessary in 
order to blunt such an attack if there is one?
  What type of attacks against the United States using weapons of mass 
destruction would the Dole star wars system be powerless to defend 
against? How are we as a nation addressing this terrorist threat and 
how would pursuing a star wars system affect the timeliness of these 
efforts?
  What is the cost of the mandate contained in the Dole star wars bill 
and how will it be paid for? Or to turn the question around, what 
social program or other defense priority will suffer as a result of 
this expensive undertaking.
  What are the consequences of fielding a missile defense system that 
violates the existing limitations of the ABM Treaty, as required by the 
Dole star wars bill?
  Will implementation of the START I Treaty be endangered?
  Will ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Duma be 
jeopardized if we renege on our ABM Treaty obligation?
  Will it affect other arms control agreements pending or in the future 
if America backs down and violates a treaty, such treaties as the 
Chemicals Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty?
  Will implementation of the Dole star wars system prompt an expensive 
and destabilizing arms race which would otherwise not occur?
  Is missile defense technology sufficiently mature to mandate a 2003 
deployment date? Of course not.
  Will the fly-before-you-buy principle be applied to this highly 
advanced and sophisticated technology through extensive testing and 
evaluation prior to the operational deployment?
  What has been the record of missile defense testing to date? That is 
an important question.
  Are we rushing to judgment on certain technologies which may be 
obsolete and marginally effective in order to meet an arbitrary date 
upon which there is no basis for its selection?
  Finally, what are the alleged shortcomings of the administration's 3-
plus-3 missile defense plan which the Dole star wars bill professes to 
correct?
  The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the 
service chiefs are in solid support of the two-step plan to develop the 
technology over the next 3 years and then--

[[Page S5716]]

and then, Mr. President, and then only--make a decision as to the 
wisdom of deploying in 3 years. Why is this unanimous opinion of the 
civilian and military leadership of this country in the Pentagon not 
sound?
  These are just a few of the questions relevant to the Dole star wars 
bill at 9\1/2\ pages in length. That is what that bill takes up. The 
bill is deceptively modest, but beyond the printed words are many 
consequences, both intended and perhaps unintended, which must be 
seriously considered, I suggest, before far-reaching legislation is 
voted upon.
  In a general sense, I am disappointed that the majority is insisting 
on raising the Dole star wars bill at this time. Why is that necessary? 
The issue is already intractably ensnarled in the web of Presidential 
politics, and I lament the unavoidable reality that support for the 
Dole star wars bill by Members of the majority party will be seen as 
some sort of test of party allegiance and debate concerning important 
national security issues, such as missile defenses, should be 
separated--should be separated--completely, Mr. President, from the 
game of Presidential chess playing.
  Senator Dole, in his May 23 opening statement on this bill, made it 
clear that the two shall be intertwined. Perhaps the most curious 
statement made by Senator Dole during his initial floor debate was when 
he disavowed forcing the Secretary of Defense to do anything, though 
the bill mandates the deployment of a highly effective multilayered 
missile defense system capable of intersecting dozens of warheads. 
Senator Dole is quoted in the Congressional Record as saying:

       The choice of what type of system is left up to the 
     Secretary of Defense . . . The decision on what is affordable 
     and effective is left up to the Secretary of Defense.
  Why is it that the distinguished majority leader professes to defer 
to the Secretary of Defense on such fundamental aspects of the program 
details but feels compelled to overturn his wisdom on the need--on the 
need--for and timing of the deployment of a national defense missile 
system?
  The Senate cannot have it both ways. If Congress forces the hand of 
the Pentagon contrary to its wishes to decide in 1996 that we shall 
deploy such a system by the year 2003, we cannot walk away from the 
cost of the decision, the limitation it places on the type of 
architecture to be used and the consequences such a preemptive breach 
of the ABM Treaty will have on other aspects of arms control treaties 
that are ongoing and also affects the future efforts to curb the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
  Mr. President, approval of the Dole star wars bill will have a 
definite anti effect and serious consequences, not the least of which 
are in the area of cost. In the last 34 years, the United States has 
spent $100 billion on missile defense programs. To proceed, as the Dole 
star wars bill would have us do, would cost the U.S. taxpayers, 
according to the Congressional Budget Office, $31 to $60 billion, not 
including operating and support costs associated with the system once 
it is deployed or the cost of buying and launching the satellites 
necessary to maintain the system as existing satellites begin to fail.
  According to CBO, the postdeployment costs would reach a few hundred 
million dollars annually by 2005 when ground-based systems and space-
based sensors would be in place. After 2010, though, operating and 
support costs would increase significantly because of the need to 
launch replacements for any space-based system which wear out over 
time.

  The CBO goes on to predict that at some point, new technology or 
reassessment of the defense situation could lead to changes in the 
system which could raise the costs even much higher. Overall costs to 
implement the Dole star wars bill could easily approach $70 to $80 
billion. This is in addition to the $100 billion our Nation has already 
spent on missile defense programs.
  Mr. President, a word of caution. Our Nation is also pursuing a 
multilayered theater missile defense system to protect our troops in 
the field against ballistic missile attack. I strongly support this, as 
does the President and the members of the Joint Chiefs. This Senator 
agrees with our uniform and civilian leaders that the theater missile 
defenses is our most immediate concern and deserves to be our top 
priority. But the pricetag for developing, producing, deploying, and 
operating these land-based and sea-based theater systems will add a 
minimum of $20 to $30 billion, increasing our running missile defense 
bill to nearly one-quarter of a trillion dollars before it is all over.
  Before we can commit to building a $60 billion national missile 
defense system, perhaps there should be a more involved discussion, Mr. 
President, of who or what are we defending against. Three of the four 
nations capable of launching a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic 
missile are American allies. And the fourth, China, possesses an 
arsenal that could easily overwhelm the sort of limited defense 
mandated by the Dole star wars bill, though why China would launch such 
a suicidal nuclear holocaust is difficult to imagine.
  The best national intelligence estimate we have is that the threat of 
a Third World nation possessing the capability to strike the United 
States is at least 50 years away. Furthermore, the nation most often 
mentioned as a rogue state and emerging threat to the United States is 
North Korea, though they have not ever developed or tested a missile 
anywhere near capable of striking a major U.S. population center.

  Furthermore, current reports are that North Korea is economically 
bankrupt and in the process of melting down internally. Unable to feed 
itself, the North Korean Army is reported to be eating grass and roots 
in order to survive. What chance does the North Korean Communist regime 
have to survive another 15 years, not to mention at the same time 
developing and deploying a nuclear weapon and a missile delivery system 
that could be successful in targeting the United States, at least in 
that timeframe?
  Most people in the United States understand that the United States 
must be more realistic, and the likely attack on American soil using a 
weapon of mass destruction would come in the form of a terrorist attack 
similar to what took place at the World Trade Center or in Oklahoma 
City.
  Terrorist groups have the means today to launch an attack that could 
kill thousands of Americans using chemical and biological weaponry. As 
an open society, we are as a nation at extremely high risk and 
vulnerable to such attack. Only through the fine work of our 
intelligence and law enforcement community have many of these plots 
been foiled.
  Why would a terrorist group or rogue nation spend 15 to 20 years and 
billions of dollars to manufacture a rudimentary----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator's time has expired.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for an additional 4 
minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. EXON. Why would a terrorist group or rogue nation spend 15 or 20 
years and billions of dollars to manufacture a rudimentary nuclear 
warhead and long-range ballistic missile delivery system which would 
lead a noticeable trail from where it was launched, when a weapon 
concealed in a suitcase or on the back of a rented truck can do the 
same job right now at a small fraction of the cost and with much 
greater anonymity?

  Not only is the Dole star wars system useless in defending America 
against such a threat, it would divert scarce resources from the 
immediate and pressing concerns of combating terrorism and protecting 
our troops in the field against theater ballistic missile attacks.
  Aside from the cost of the Dole Star Wars Program, Mr. President, the 
question of the need to pursue a crash program of a decision to deploy 
a system that is not in compliance with the ABM Treaty carries with it 
immense consequences, not only as to the reliability of the United 
States to uphold its treaty obligations, but also the future of ongoing 
arms control programs and policies. It would be sadly ironic from the 
standpoint of whether other nations would believe us if passage of the 
Dole star wars bill jeopardizes implementation of the START I and 
ratification of START II by the Russian Duma. That would be a tragedy, 
and we cannot accept that risk. These accords, if fully realized, would 
eliminate over 5,000 nuclear warheads designed to strike America.

[[Page S5717]]

  We cannot be frivolous about the future of START I and START II. 
These are the most significant arms reduction treaties in the history 
of mankind, major strides away from the prospect of nuclear holocaust 
and the lingering shadow of the cold war. Abrogation of the ABM Treaty 
in the pursuit of enhanced national security would be foolhardy if it 
halted the destruction of the very nuclear weapon delivery systems we 
are trying to defend against. Such a scenario, if played out, would 
likely endanger other concrete efforts, such as the Chemical Weapons 
Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to halt the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction.
  In short, our actions, if we go for and vote for the Dole star wars 
bill, should not be considered in a vacuum. Intended or not, 
implementation of the Dole star wars bill would have a far-reaching, 
chilling effect on the future of arms control.
  Often forgotten in the debate on the national missile defense is the 
question of whether technology is sufficiently mature enough to mandate 
the year 2003 as the deployment date. The record of missile interceptor 
testing to date and in the foreseeable future is one of more failure 
than success. In the rush to deploy a prototype system using highly 
advanced and sophisticated technology by the year 2003, we will be 
forsaking, Mr. President, the-fly-before-you-buy principle that has 
served us well in recent years.
  Not only will we be limiting the testing and evaluation of the system 
in a push to field a system at an earlier and unnecessary date, we will 
be locking ourselves into certain technologies which may become 
obsolete by the year 2003.
  Contrary to the claims of the proponents of this bill, the 
administration is pursuing a program to develop and deploy a 
continental missile system to meet the future threat. The so-called 3-
plus-3 Program is a two-step plan to develop the necessary technology 
over the next 3 years and then make a decision as to the wisdom of 
deploying a system in the subsequent 3 years. The Secretary of Defense, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Service Chiefs are in solid 
support of this reasonable and responsible approach. Our best war-
fighters and intelligence experts agree that approval of the Dole star 
wars plan would be folly in that the threat simply does not exist in 
the near term to justify jeopardizing the arms control treaties that 
will allow the military to fund other spending priorities within the 
military.
  The American people understand the folly of the Dole star wars bill 
as well. I have a collection of over three dozen newspaper editorials 
from around the country in opposition to this bill. I ask unanimous 
consent that excerpts of these editorials in opposition to the Dole 
star wars bill be printed in the Record so that my colleagues can 
better understand what the American public is saying about the Dole 
star wars bill before they cast their votes on this expensive, 
unnecessary, and destabilizing proposition.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              America's Editors Oppose New Star Wars Plans

       Now, here's Dole & Co., seeking another $20 billion for 
     that gold-plated rat hole, lest we become vulnerable to North 
     Korea or Libya, a truly screwball idea. Never mind that a few 
     well-placed cruise missile could erase both nations' military 
     capability.--``Resurrection of Star Wars,'' the Chattanooga 
     Times, Chattanooga, TN, May 15, 1996.
       The Clinton administration . . . takes the reasonable 
     position that Washington should be certain of the kind of 
     threat it is trying to protect against before committing to 
     such a system. . . . This new and unimproved proposal to 
     commit as much as $20 billion to an unproven, destabilizing 
     defense system is nothing more than a political ploy that 
     trivializes a deadly serious issue.--``Indefensible Then and 
     Now,'' St. Petersburg Times, St. Petersburg, FL, May 19, 
     1996.
       One of the most wasteful items (in the House defense 
     budget) is the $4 billion earmarked to construct a missile 
     defense system by 2003. This dubious ``Son of Star Wars'' 
     could wind up costing as much as $54 billion before it 
     finally could be deployed.--``Fort Pork Gets Reinforced,'' 
     the Miami Herald, Miami, FL, May 20, 1996.
       The Defend America Act is a transparent effort to 
     manufacture an issue to help resuscitate the Dole campaign. 
     Election-year pressures are no excuse for spending billions 
     of dollars to produce a missile defense system that is likely 
     to be out of date the day it is completed.--``Star Wars, the 
     Sequel,'' the New York Times, May 14, 1996.
       It doesn't make any sense to be cutting budgets for 
     students, the elderly, and low-income families so that the 
     Pentagon can have billions more to develop a missile defense 
     system that will be outdated by the time any nation poses a 
     threat.--``Costly Rush to Star Wars Weapons,'' Idaho Falls 
     Post-Register, Idaho Falls, ID, May 17, 1996.
       Clinton's approach to spend a few million dollars on 
     missile-defense research while monitoring hostile nations 
     makes eminently more sense.--``Errant Missile: Clinton Should 
     Challenge Defense Budget,'' Star Tribune, Minneapolis, MN, 
     May 24, 1996.
       Why waste billions on a system that will not work to defend 
     against a threat that does not exist? Congressional 
     Republicans are trying to buy an election issue with 
     taxpayers' money.--``If Missile-Defense Systems were 
     Horses,'' the Atlanta Constitution, Atlanta, GA, May 23, 
     1996.
       When lawmakers fixate on boosting defense industries in 
     their districts, when partisans demagogue a defend-America 
     issue. . . . you can bet there'll be precious little peace 
     dividend left to apply against America's mountain of debt.--
     ``Cold Warriors Spend On,'' the Atlanta Journal/The Atlanta 
     Constitution, Atlanta, GA, May 19, 1996.
       Call it the $60 billion campaign promise. . . . There is no 
     guarantee the new system will work. The United States spent 
     $35 billion on Reagan's Star Wars dream and built nothing.--
     ``Star Wars is an Awfully Expensive Republican Dream,'' the 
     Hartford Courant, May 25, 1996.
       And for all claims of defending America against any and all 
     attacks, the most sophisticated space-based defense system is 
     helpless in the face of a single, earth-bound terrorist hell-
     bent on destruction.--``Does U.S. Need New Defense System,'' 
     the Plain Dealer, Cleveland, OH, May 5, 1996.
       You do not place the fate of thousands of American lives on 
     unproven technology of uncertain proficiency. You eliminate 
     the threat before it eliminates you, a strategy that would 
     make deployment of a missile defense system pointless and 
     redundant.--``Offense is Best Missile Defense: America needs 
     a system to protect deployed troops, but should take out 
     attack capability of rogue nation,'' Patriot and Evening 
     News, Harrisburg, PA, May 13, 1996.
       If it makes sense to support Star Wars to defend our nation 
     from a possible future nuclear attack by North Korea and 
     Libya, doesn't it logically follow that we should discourage 
     nations from spreading nuclear weapons to Pakistan? If we 
     really want to protect our nation from nuclear attack, 
     doesn't it make sense to do as much as possible to dismantle 
     nuclear weapons that are already in place, able to reach the 
     United States?--``What's Riggs' Defense Stand?'' the Napa 
     Valley Register, Napa, CA, May 14, 1996.
       Actions taken by Congress last week suggest that federal 
     funding priorities remain as skewed as ever. . . . It is 
     difficult if not impossible to accurately estimate the costs 
     of Dole's ``Defend America Act.'' Costs could range from $5 
     billion. . . . to more than $44 billion. . . . This despite 
     the fact that only China and the former Soviet Union possess 
     ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States at 
     this time.--``How Much for Defense?'' Intelligencer-Journal, 
     Lancaster, PA, May 16, 1996.
       Political and budgetary considerations aside, a national 
     missile defense system should not be developed until the 
     proper technology is at hand.--``The Missile Flap,'' the 
     Boston Globe, May 23, 1996.
       Congress' worst-kept secret is out: Members are 
     acknowledging . . . that defense spending is driven in part 
     by its value as a local jobs program, not necessarily by the 
     nation's priority needs. . . . Most contentious is the 
     congressional stampede to rush new spending on a missile 
     defense program when the CIA says the threat remains highly 
     remove.--``Using Defense Budget as Jobs Program Robs 
     Public,'' USA Today, May 20, 1996.
       In the defense bills passed by the House and the Senate, 
     GOP lawmakers seem to think money is no object. The same 
     Congress that is shredding the safety net for the poor, 
     raising the cost of college for students and shrinking 
     Medicare is pushing on the Pentagon weapons the military 
     doesn't want or need. That kind of profigacy surely deserves 
     the veto president Clinton is weighing.--``The Defense Pork 
     Barrel,'' the Sacramento Bee, Sacramento, CA, September 15, 
     1995.
       The president must balance the true need for this 
     investment in preparedness against the pledge to balance the 
     budget in seven years and, more importantly, against the 
     level of preparedness potentially lost in such areas as 
     education, job training and health care if the money is to be 
     found for the military.--``Military Questions and Spending.'' 
     Bangor Daily News, Bangor, ME, May 16, 1996.
       The GOP revival of Star Wars, dubbed by its sponsors the 
     ``Defend America Act,'' looks more political than military in 
     intent. . . . If ``SDI-the Sequel'' passes, Mr. Clinton 
     should veto it, and remind Americans they need to be spending 
     scarce resources on ongoing social and economic, not 
     military, battles.--``Newt's War Toy,'' the Berkshire Eagle, 
     Pittsfield, MA, May 12, 1996.
       The administration's plan is realistic both in facing up to 
     a rogue-missile threat and in taking into account the 
     considered view of U.S. intelligence that the threat is more 
     than 15 years away.--``Prudent Steps on Missile Defense,'' 
     the Washington Post, May 14, 1996.

[[Page S5718]]

       Shorter-range missiles are an immediate danger to US forces 
     stationed overseas . . . Theater missile defenses thus make 
     more sense and should have a faster development rack, as in 
     fact they do. To try to invert these priorities and make a 
     pitch for quick development of a system for national defense 
     . . . is foolishness. It would divert money from more-
     important defense needs.--``Spacey on Defense,'' the 
     Christian Science Monitor, May 17, 1996.
       Those who oppose missile defense as destabilizing owe it to 
     this nation to conduct a thorough review. It is appropriate 
     to ask whether the U.S. should develop and deploy a more 
     modest system . . . A thoughtful analysis produces this 
     policy: robust research, yes, but no to setting an artificial 
     date for deployment before these questions are answered.--``A 
     Wise Pause on Missile Defense,'' Chicago Tribune, May 24, 
     1996.

  Mr. EXON. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I am standing in momentarily for Senator 
Dole. I will call on Senator Smith in just a moment.
  First, I ask unanimous consent that the executive summary, some three 
or four pages of a document entitled the ``National Missile Defense 
Options'' prepared in response to the House National Security Committee 
by the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, dated July 31, 1995, be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

           (From the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization)

                    National Missile Defense Options


                                abstract

       This document responds to a request from the House National 
     Security Committee to report on specific programmatic, 
     funding, and architecture options for the development and 
     deployment of national missile defenses. As requested, it 
     describes architecture options that contain only ground based 
     elements, those that contain only space-based elements, and 
     those with both. The architectures described in the report 
     build on the current BMDO program, including the legacy from 
     previous years. With adequate funding and streamlined 
     acquisition, initial operational capability of these options 
     ranges from FY2000 to 2007, preliminary cost estimates range 
     from $4,800M to $43,100M (FY 95 $), and relative risks range 
     from low to high. The architectures span a large range in the 
     threat levels against which they can protect, in their 
     estimated cost, and in their support to theater missile 
     defense. None of the architectures has been formally 
     evaluated for compliance with the ABM Treaty.


                           executive summary

       In response to a request from the House National Security 
     Committee, dated February 21, 1995, this report describes a 
     variety of architectures that could be deployed for National 
     Missile Defense. In keeping with the DOD thrust for 
     acquisition reform, the costs and schedules are predicated on 
     successful acquisition streamlining to reduce acquisition 
     costs and shorten schedules for an operational capability.
       Consistent with the specifics of the request, the report 
     describes example alternative architectures that are 
     compatible with technologies and prototypes being developed 
     by BMDO, and that could be made available for deployment. The 
     report provides estimates of their effectiveness, schedules, 
     relative risks, and requirements for acquisition and 
     deployment funding. The architecture options are meant to be 
     representative of general classes of national missile defense 
     systems. The performance levels, which are also meant to be 
     representative, are in fact dependent on many variables, such 
     as threat characteristics and operational procedures. The 
     examples presented are not ``tuned'' to any particular threat 
     or defense mission, so that modified weapon or sensor 
     inventories could provide different performance and could 
     handle different threats.
       BMDO does not advocate any one or another of these 
     architectures or architecture classes as end point systems. 
     Rather, our current program has adopted a strategy of 
     evolutionary defense. This strategy addresses the wide range 
     of threat possibilities existing in the uncertain and 
     unpredictable future. The range of such threats includes 
     events such as a third world nation acquiring and threatening 
     to use a few ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass 
     destruction, China using its ballistic missiles to prevent US 
     action in Korea, an unauthorized limited attack used to 
     instigate a conflict, or a return to a nuclear standoff with 
     a major nuclear power. The BMDO program addresses all of 
     these, consistent with the assessed likelihood of these 
     threats and within its allotted funds.
       With adequate annual budgets, all of the architectures 
     presented here can lead to an initial operational capability 
     between 2000 and 2007, but with varying risks. These dates 
     are, in some cases, earlier operational timeframes than have 
     been previously described for NMD options. These later dates 
     were valid because the programs were budget constrained, used 
     more traditional acquisition approaches, and risks were 
     limited to be low to moderate.
       Figure EX-1 \1\ identifies the four architecture classes 
     discussed in the report--each with a range of capabilities 
     and acquisition costs as illustrated. These architectures are 
     classified by where their sensors and weapons would be based. 
     Other concepts that include potentially promising sea-based 
     or Navy systems will be addressed in future reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Figure EX-1 not reproducible in the Record.
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       The costs reflected by this report are rough order of 
     magnitude (ROM) projections of the remaining development and 
     acquisition costs in FY95 dollars. They reflect anticipated 
     savings from acquisition streamlining and have been developed 
     using a standard set of assumptions, some of which might not 
     actually be implemented on any given program. The candidate 
     National Missile Defense elements discussed here are not now 
     in an acquisition program and have not been subjected to the 
     rigorous planning and costing reviews usually associated with 
     defense acquisition.
       Two measures of capability are reflected in the figure: the 
     threat levels to which the architecture can deny damage to 
     the United States with at least 50 percent probability, which 
     is equivalent to enforcing less than one leaker (on average), 
     and the area protected (i.e., US only or global). The use of 
     damage denial probability was chosen as the appropriate 
     measure of effectiveness for this report because it follows 
     from the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) established 
     for Ballistic Missile Defense and validated by the Joint 
     Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This requirement 
     specified the confidence level and the probability that no 
     warheads would penetrate a defense system in the face of a 
     ballistic missile attack.
       Threat levels considered in this report range from an 
     attack by four unsophisticated warheads, to an attack by 200 
     MIRV warheads with complex payloads launched nearly 
     simultaneously by 20 boosters. The largest attack used in 
     this report is consistent with the existing JROC-validated 
     operational requirement for National Missile Defense. This 
     requirement was previously shown, in the GPALS COEA and other 
     analyses, to require multilayer defenses with space based 
     elements for high effectiveness. Some degradation in 
     performance could arise due to the responses that threat 
     countries might take to the presence of any specific defense 
     we might deploy, but such responses can be offset by 
     straightforward upgrades to the defenses discussed in this 
     report. Threats containing greater than 200 warheads also 
     remain possible for the foreseeable future.
       The damage denial performance of an architecture is an 
     extremely stringent measure of effectiveness, demanding that, 
     on the average, leakage be reduced to one warhead or less. 
     Less perfect defense performance, such as the negation of 190 
     of 200 attacking warheads, would also be highly valuable both 
     as a defense and as a deterrent to the use of ballistic 
     missiles.
       Accordingly, in the body of this report, we also show how 
     well each of the architectural variants could negate the 
     warheads in the spectrum of representative attacks we 
     considered.
       Figure EX-2 provides a brief description and summary of the 
     four architecture classes in this report, which are all 
     supported by our NMD architecture strategy and modular 
     approach. Additional design, performance, and programmatic 
     details follow. None of the proposed systems has been 
     formally evaluated for compliance with the ABM Treaty.
       ``All Ground Based'' architectures have BM/C \3\, ground 
     based radars and ground based interceptors. The ground based 
     radars include early warning radars, other existing radars 
     and BMD radars. In common with the other architectures, DSP 
     or SBIRs (High) provide cueing to the BMD system. Entry level 
     defenses with 20 interceptors at Grand Forks could deny 
     damage against a few warheads, with moderate relative risk, 
     by FY 1999 to 2000 for an estimated $3,500M (the BMDO Tiger 
     Team ``2+2'' solution) or by late FY 2001 with low-moderate 
     relative risk for an estimated $4,800M. Expanding the systems 
     to multiple sites with more radars and interceptors, at costs 
     up to about $12,200M, could increase the defense 
     effectiveness. These expanded architectures could achieve 
     ``good'' damage denial performance against threats of up to 
     about 50 warheads.
       ``Ground Based/Space Sensor'' architectures contain BM/C 
     \3\, ground based radars, a space based sensor constellation, 
     Space and Missile Tracking System (SBIRs [low]), formerly 
     known as Brilliant Eyes), and ground based interceptors. The 
     space sensors improve this architecture's performance. It 
     could be operational by FY 2004 with moderate relative risk. 
     This is BMDO's ``objective architecture'' that is the focus 
     of the current NMD Technology Readiness Program. An initial 
     one-site, 100-GBI option, Case A, costing an estimated 
     $11,000M, could provide ``good'' performance for threats of 
     about 20 warheads. Expanded inventories and additional 
     interceptor/radar sites could achieve ``good'' performance 
     against threat levels of 70 warheads or more with costs up to 
     about $20,100M.
       ``All Space Based'' architectures would achieve a higher 
     capability against MIRV systems and provide coverage of 
     assets beyond the United States with costs starting at about 
     $20,000M. Two types of space based systems are considered in 
     this report, chemical lasers and rocket-boosted kinetic kill

[[Page S5719]]

     interceptors. Space based chemical lasers offer the 
     capability to intercept during boost phase against theater 
     threats as well as strategic threats. This capability greatly 
     enhances the performance of theater missile defense 
     architectures, especially against advanced threats. A space 
     based laser (SBL) system and associated BM/C \3\, with costs 
     of $20,000M to $23,000M, could potentially reach IOC by 2007 
     with relatively high risk. An enhanced laser system, 
     available at IOC two years later and with costs of $26,000M 
     to $29,000M, would provide robustness against certain 
     threats. The space based interceptor (SBI) system, including 
     SMTS and BM/C \3\, and costing $20,000M to $23,000M, could 
     reach IOC in 2004 at moderate to high relative risk.
       Combinations of the two types of space based systems 
     provide ``good'' or better damage denial performance at all 
     threat levels up to 200 warheads, at a cost of $37,100M to 
     $43,100M with IOC and relative risks as noted above.
       Finally, combined ``Space and Ground Based'' architectures, 
     which include BM/C\3\, weapons, and sensors on the ground 
     and in space, can achieve ``good'' or better damage denial 
     performance against all threat levels up to 200 warheads, 
     with estimated costs of $30,700M to $35,100M.
       The relative risks shown in Figure EX-2 are subjective 
     estimates for the funding and schedules we show and the 
     architecture's maturity. The adoption of more deliberate 
     programs, coupled with the infusion of additional funding 
     could clearly reduce risk in all areas. The time scale at 
     which risk could be reduced, and the cost incurred to achieve 
     the risk reduction, depend on the maturity of the programs 
     and their technical challenges. It is likely, for example, 
     that less time and funding could be required to reduce risks 
     from moderate to low in ground-based systems than would be 
     required to reduce risks for space based lasers from high to 
     moderate. However, definitive risk reduction timelines and 
     costs for all the architectures in this report have not yet 
     been developed.
       As shown in Figure EX-1 and EX-2, the architectures in this 
     report span a considerable range in performance and cost. 
     Ground based systems represent lowest-cost defense solutions 
     for denying damage against up to 20 warheads. Space sensors 
     would improve the cost effectiveness when threats approach 
     the performance limits of ground-based systems. For high 
     damage denial effectiveness and cost effectiveness against 
     larger attacks, above about 70 RVs, space based weapons 
     become essential. Finally, layered defense systems become 
     cost effective for denying damage against 200 warheads.

                                                                      FIGURE EX-2.                                                                      
   [Summary of the architecture options considered in this report including an estimate of dates for operational capabilities. The threat levels given  
represent an estimate of the maximum representative threat level for which each option could deny damage, with a probability of 50 percent or more (less
                                                            than one leaker on the average)]                                                            
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                                       Threat                           
            Architecture classes                      Deployment         Operational   ROM cost FY95  (in dollars)     level          Relative risk     
                                                                             date                                     warheads                          
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All ground based............................  20 GBI, 1 Site *.........         2001                        4,800M            4  Low-Mod.               
                                              100 GBI, 1 Site..........         2003                        6,500M           20  Low.                   
                                              300 GBI, 3 Sites.........         2004                       12,200M           50  Low.                   
Ground based with space sensors.............  100 GBI, 1 Site, 18 SMTS.         2005                       11,000M           20  Moderate.              
                                              300 GBI, 3 Sites, 24 SMTS         2006                       17,200M           60  Moderate.              
                                              630 GBI, 3 Sites, 24 SMTS         2006                       20,100M           70  Moderate.              
All space based.............................  20 SBL (8 meter).........         2008               20,000M-23,000M       60-100  High.                  
                                              20 SBL (enhanced)........         2010               26,000M-29,000M          200  High.                  
                                              500 SBI, 18 SMTS.........         2005               20,000M-23,000M       60-100  Mod-High.              
                                              1000 SBI, 18 SMTS........         2007               20,000M-23,000M          200  Mod-High.              
                                              20 SBL, 500 SBI..........         2008               37,100M-43,100M         >200  High.                  
Space and ground based......................  20 SBL, 100 GBI, 3 Sites.         2008               32,100M-35,100M         >200  High.                  
                                              500 SBI, 18 SMTS.........         2005               30,700M-33,700M         >200  Mod-High.              
                                              300 GBI, 3 Sites.........                                                                                 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* An emergency-response variant of this architectural option could be made available by early 2000, at moderate relative risk, and for an estimated cost
  of $3,500M (FY95). See discussion in Section 3.                                                                                                       

  Mr. KYL. Second, Mr. President, let me make three quick comments 
regarding the statements of the Senator from Nebraska. Then I am going 
to call on Senator Smith, a member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  There is an old saying that ``if you can't defeat something on the 
facts, then call it names.'' Of course, we are not debating something 
today called the Dole star wars bill. There is no such thing. We are 
debating something called the Defend America Act, which is a bill 
designed to provide a ballistic missile defense for the United States. 
To denigrate this as some kind of star wars concept is to totally 
misrepresent it, and that is not the way to try to debate an issue on 
the merits.
  Second, the Senator from Nebraska asked the question, why would the 
North Koreans want to develop a costly missile? Their troops are eating 
grass. Mr. President, it is hard to figure out why the North Koreans do 
what they do. But the fact is, our intelligence agencies report to us 
that they are indeed developing a missile. That is not contested by 
anyone. The only question is when that missile will be able to reach 
the United States. That is a fact.
  Third, there are questions about the cost and a lot of 
misrepresentations about the cost. As I discussed for about an hour 
last night, according to the CBO, the cost of the kind of system that 
we are talking about here is between $10 and $14 billion. So let us not 
be misrepresenting the cost.
  Finally, I think most startlingly, Mr. President, the Senator from 
Nebraska made the argument that the Russians might violate the START 
agreements if we go forward and, therefore, we should not go forward. I 
find this a truly remarkable statement. We are being held hostage to 
Russian blackmail that they might violate a treaty they have with us 
and, therefore, we do not provide for our national defense? That is 
startling. What do treaties mean?

  Treaties are important. But so is providing for our national security 
by the acquisition of weapons both offensive and defensive. It seems to 
me, Mr. President, that we cannot be subjected to blackmail. The 
Russians have not even made this threat. It is Members of the United 
States Senate who assume that the Russians might violate treaties that 
they have signed if we go forward with the development of a national 
ballistic missile defense system.
  So it seems to me that this really demonstrates the paucity of 
arguments that exist against this bill when we have to stoop to making 
the argument the Russians might violate a treaty they have entered into 
with us and, therefore, we better not go forward. If that is all the 
treaties mean to the Russians, then I suggest we need both treaties and 
a ballistic missile defense system.
  With that, Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New 
Hampshire, Senator Smith, who is on the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Campbell). The Senator from New Hampshire 
[Mr. Smith] is recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for 
yielding, and rise today, Mr. President, in very strong support of the 
Defend America Act.
  I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this legislation. I commend 
the majority leader, Senate Dole, for bringing this bill to the 
attention of the Senate and to the American people.
  Mr. President, our Nation is walking a very dangerous tightrope. For 
reasons that are unknown and certainly inconceivable to most Americans, 
President Clinton refuses to defend our country against ballistic 
missiles. That is exactly what he is doing by opposing this bill, even 
though the technology to do so is available today. The truth is, our 
Nation is absolutely, completely vulnerable to ballistic missiles.
  We have no defense--I repeat, no defense--whatever against a missile 
targeted on our territory, our people, our industry, or any of our 
national treasures--no defense. The Patriot missiles that everyone 
remembers from Desert Storm 5 years ago are not capable of stopping 
long-range missiles. In fact, they can only defend small areas against 
short-range missiles. The Patriot is what we call a point-defense 
system that we send along with our troops when we deploy them in harm's 
way.
  Here at home, we have no defenses of any kind. We have no defense 
against long-range missiles from China, from Russia, from North Korea. 
I differ from the Senator from Nebraska. I have no idea, no idea 
whatever what the national security meetings, classified and

[[Page S5720]]

confidential on North Korea, I have no idea what is going on in those 
meetings. Apparently, the Senator from Nebraska does. I do not know if 
he has somebody sitting in on them or where he gets his information, 
but I do not have such information, and I do not think the intelligence 
communities have it either. We have no defense against missiles that 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are vigorously seeking to acquire--
vigorously. That is the truth. This is not some star wars program. That 
is an outrageous statement, as the Senator from Arizona pointed out.
  In this Senator's view, it is unacceptable that we would refuse to 
defend ourselves from this kind of technology being spread around the 
world to these kinds of nations. When told of this situation, the vast 
majority of the American people not only become upset, they become 
enraged. They cannot understand why their elected representatives would 
be willing to leave them defenseless and then stand on the floor of the 
U.S. Senate and advocate leaving them defenseless against the likes of 
people like Saddam Hussein or Mu'ammar Qadhafi. Hardly reasonable, 
rational, leaders in the world today, let alone Kim Jong-il whom very 
few of us know much about at all. They cannot understand why the tax 
dollars that they sometimes so reluctantly, or willingly in reluctance 
give up, how can they not contribute for our national defense? That is 
what they are asking. That is what they are asking. They have a right 
to be upset. There is no excuse for not defending America against 
ballistic missiles.
  The Republican Congress agrees with the American people and took 
action last year to defend all Americans--all Americans; not certain 
Americans, all Americans--against ballistic missiles, whatever their 
source. In the defense bill last year, Congress established a program 
to develop and deploy a national missile defense system for the United 
States. This program is not some elaborate star wars concept, but 
rather a very modest yet capable ground-based system that would provide 
a limited defense of America against accidental, unauthorized or 
hostile missile attacks.
  I ask anybody out there listening, or anybody participating in the 
debate on the other side, are you certain, are you absolutely certain, 
that Qadhafi or Saddam Hussein, Iran or Kim Jong-il do not have the 
capability or will not have it in the very near future? If you are 
certain, you ought to vote for them. If you are not sure, you ought to 
be voting with us.
  President Clinton vetoed the defense bill specifically because of the 
requirement to defend America. That is the main reason he vetoed the 
defense bill, because he did not want us, did not want us, to put this 
requirement in. In fact, in his statement of policy the President 
called national missile defense ``unwarranted and unnecessary.'' It is 
one thing to say ``unnecessary,'' that might be an opinion, but 
``unwarranted''? This is a very insightful quote. It gets right to the 
heart of the differences between this President and this Congress. To 
President Clinton, providing for the common defense is ``unwarranted 
and unnecessary.'' That is what he says. To the Congress, it is the 
most fundamental of our constitutional responsibilities, the most 
fundamental. Simply put, it is a defining issue between the two of us. 
It is an issue that defines our Nation's character, right to the heart 
of character, a commitment to the American people. How could you not 
defend yourselves, your people, against the threat of an incoming 
missile? It does not have to be deliberate. It could be accidental. We 
have no defense.

  It is an issue that defines the difference between the two political 
parties in this country. There cannot be compromise on it. There are 
people here on the floor and in this Senate who are trying to work out 
some compromise to give on something else, and we will give a little 
bit of something else. There is no compromise, no compromise on 
defending ourselves against incoming ballistic missiles. It is an issue 
that defines the very basic difference between the two men who are 
seeking the Presidency, President Clinton, and Bob Dole, who is the 
author of this bill. It is a basic difference between the two men. It 
is an issue that history will undoubtedly look back on and pass 
judgment upon for better or for worse, an issue that will define our 
generation.
  Mr. President, if we fail to take action to defend America now while 
we still have the chance, we will regret it. At some point in the very 
near future we will have waited too long. What is that point? Are you 
sure, folks over there, sure that we have not reached that point? At 
some point in the near future we will have waited too long. The 
theoretical threat of a hostile ballistic missile launch will have 
become a reality and we will have no defense. Will we be ready when the 
theoretical becomes reality? Will be we ready? Not if we listen to this 
side of the debate. Not if we do what they are asking us to do, we will 
not be ready.
  What will it take for the President to recognize this? Must a missile 
equipped with a chemical, biological or perhaps a nuclear warhead, rain 
down upon the citizens of America before we act? Must tens of thousands 
of Americans die before we act? That does not have to happen. Let me 
tell you, had we not been far-sighted enough and thoughtful enough to 
provide the Patriot missile, we would have lost a lot more people in 
the Persian Gulf war. It is a good thing Saddam Hussein only has a Scud 
missile, or perhaps some of the families would be speaking here through 
us today.
  To those of us who are cosponsoring this legislation, the time to act 
is now. Not tomorrow, not the next day, now. We have the capability to 
do it. Our Nation is in jeopardy, ballistic missiles and weapons of 
mass destruction are spreading throughout the world. That is a fact. I 
have had hearings. I have heard information on it. We have heard the 
testimony. We cannot stop this. We have to protect ourselves against 
them. Mr. President, 30 nations currently possess or are actively 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the missiles to deliver 
them. They are not all friendly nations. Just recently, the United 
States admitted that Iran is covertly storing up to 16 ballistic 
missiles armed with chemical or biological warheads. Iraq is the most 
inspected and thoroughly monitored country in the world, yet they still 
have them. If we cannot find these missiles in the desert of Iraq, how 
are we going to track them in the valleys of China, North Korea, Iran, 
or Syria? The answer is, my colleagues, we cannot. We cannot track 
them. That is the point. Even if we could, we do not have the system to 
counter them. We cannot counter them even if we can find them.

  The only solution is to develop missile defenses. This bill does 
that. It would require that our Nation deploy a national missile 
defense system capable of protecting all Americans by the year 2003. 
This is not about politics. It is not about partisanship. It is about 
national security and keeping faith with those who elected us and 
depend upon us to safeguard their lives and property, yet this bill is 
being filibustered, that is the bottom line, by the other side of the 
aisle--filibustering a bill to defend America. What an outrage. If we 
ignore this obligation, we will have failed in our most fundamental 
constitutional responsibility. You do not filibuster the defense of the 
United States of America. We can filibuster a lot of things around 
here, and we do it all the time, but not the defense of America. It 
runs against every principle I have ever stood for, and it ought to run 
against every principle that others in here stand for.
  Mr. President, as we discuss and debate the merits of this 
legislation, I want to specifically address what I believe are some 
fundamental and extremely dangerous flaws in the administration's 
position. First off, the administration has continually emphasized that 
they see no long-range missile threat emerging within the next 15 years 
that could threaten the United States.
  I would note that when the administration is pressed to describe how 
they came up with the 15-year number, versus 10 years, or 20 years, 
there is no real methodology. Essentially, it appears to have been a 
nice round number that the administration came up with.
  The classified national intelligence estimate that the administration 
uses to support this assertion is anything but reassuring. And contrary 
to the assertions of the Clinton administration, it does not rule out a 
rogue nation acquiring ballistic missile capabilities that could 
threaten the United States.

[[Page S5721]]

Rather, it projects the view that it is unlikely that such a situation 
would arise.
  Essentially, it relies upon the perceived intentions of other 
countries rather than their actual technical capabilities. That is a 
very dangerous way of assessing the threat environment, and it runs in 
direct conflict with our historical experience.
  Our experience following World War II is very instructive. During 
1945 and 1946, the United States conducted operation paperclip in order 
to employ Dr. Werner von Braun and his team of German scientists. My 
colleagues may recall it was von Braun and his associates who had 
created the German V-2 rocket. The transfer of these experts and their 
equipment provided the United States with nearly instant ballistic 
missile capability. Under the Hermes project, with the infusion of 
german technical expertise, we soon began launching V-2 rockets.
  A year later, the development of a two-stage vehicle based on the V-2 
was begun. The so-called bumper vehicle went on to establish range, 
altitude, and speed records. By the late 1950's, frustrated by 
difficulties in the Atlas program, Gen. Bernard Schriever, a pioneer of 
the U.S. Ballistic Missile Program, ordered that our existing Thor 
ballistic missile be modified to include a new second stage. This 
second stage provided strategic range capability for our ballistic 
missiles within a year, increasing the range of the Thor missile from 
1,500 miles to approximately 5,000 miles.
  Mr. President, the lesson here is quite simple. The acquisition of 
key technical experts can dramatically accelerate the pace of 
development for a country seeking to field ballistic missiles. In 
addition, the range of existing systems can be rapidly increased by 
incorporating additional stages. In the 1940's, designing and building 
ballistic missiles was a new and challenging endeavor. But with focus, 
determination, and national level support, it was done very rapidly.
  By contrast, in the 1980's and 1990's, the schools and universities 
of the West teach advanced technology to students from all over the 
world. Missile designs are well understood, missile components are 
available on the world market, and whole missile systems can be bought 
and delivered, as in the case of the Soviet Scuds to China, the North 
Korean Scuds to Iraq, Chinese M-11 missiles to Pakistan, and Chinese 
CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia. Since most of today's ballistic 
missiles are mobile, training and launching by customer nation crews 
can take place in the missile's country of origin, so that the first 
actual launch of a missile from the customer country may occur without 
advance warning.
  Additionally, ballistic missiles do not need to have a long range to 
threaten the United States. In the 1950's, the United States launched 
several ballistic missiles from the deck of a ship, and sent them to 
high altitudes where their nuclear payloads were detonated. Most of the 
population of the United States live near the east and west coasts, and 
thus are highly vulnerable to a ship-launched missile that could be 
covertly deployed in merchant traffic several hundred miles off the 
coast at sea. The modifications to such a ship would not need to be 
obvious, a few test missile launches could be performed in remote 
locations to avoid detection.
  The problem with the administration program is that it seeks to wait 
until the last possible moment to deploy missile defense. But 
historically, we have proven very poor at making such intelligence 
estimates. Just look at Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological 
weapons program. The real challenge for the United States is to deploy 
theater and national missile defenses as rapidly as possible in order 
to discourage potential proliferators from developing, building, 
buying, or otherwise acquiring offensive ballistic missiles. That is 
what deterrence is all about. But you can't have deterrence without the 
capability to actually defeat or defend against a threat. Without 
missile defenses there is no deterrence.
  Perhaps most absurd is the administration's argument that the 
technology of the future will be more advanced than that of today, so 
we should wait for the future technology to be available before we 
begin formal acquisition of missile defenses. If we followed that model 
we would never procure any weapons systems because they would always be 
surpassed by future technology.
  What this argument fails to recognize is that real objectives and 
deadlines are the critical instruments for focusing the efforts of the 
management and technical communities in government and industry. The 
experience of operating a real system with real military personnel 
cannot be replaced by paper and pencil, or computer system designs. In 
addition, the longer we wait to commit to deploy a national missile 
defense, the more we will encourage our adversaries to pursue their own 
offensive ballistic missile programs. Without an actual system 
deployed, or at the very least a commitment to, and timetable for, 
deploying a system, there is no deterrent value.
  The Russians have now accumulated 30 years of experience in building 
and operating ballistic missile defense systems, including the nuclear-
tipped Moscow area defense and several mobile systems such as the SA-5, 
the SA-10, and the SA-12. This unique experience has been cited by our 
military as a major advantage for the Russians. It must be rectified.
  Mr. President, I also want to address the issue of how ballistic 
missile defense relates to strategic arms reduction. The administration 
and certain Members of Congress have falsely sought to link this 
legislation with Russian ratification of the START II Treaty. Simply 
put, it is bogus linkage.
  The truth is that no provision in the Defend America Act threatens 
Russia or undermines the deterrent value of its strategic offensive 
forces. Nothing in this bill would disadvantage Russian security in any 
way. The numbers of defensive systems the bill envisions to combat 
accidental or rogue nation attacks are simply too few to affect the 
deterrent value of Russia's strategic arsenal.
  The ABM Treaty was constructed during the cold war and is premised on 
mutual assured destruction. But the world is no longer bipolar, it is 
multipolar. Mutual assured destruction is not relevant in today's 
environment. It will not deter aggression by adversaries other than 
Russia.

  The truth is defenses threaten no one. If Russia and the United 
States are no longer targeting nuclear weapons on each other, how could 
the deployment of a limited defense against other potential adversaries 
threaten Russia in any way?
  We are providing billions in foreign aid to Russia to support them 
economically, politically, and to aid in dismantlement of their nuclear 
arsenal. When relations are this cooperative, how can anyone reasonably 
assert that we are provoking Russia or undermining the relationship by 
defending ourselves against the likes of Kim Jong-Il or Saddam Hussein.
  The truth is that any linkage between the Defend America Act and the 
START II Treaty is purely artificial. It is pure fear mongering by 
those who use it for political purposes here at home. Frankly, it is 
shameful.
  Those in Russia who are trying to link the two know full well that 
nothing in this bill threatens Russia in any way. They are merely 
trying to coerce further concessions. The truth is, we have 
consistently heard Russian officials seek to link START II to NATO 
expansion, compliance with the CFE Treaty, national missile defense, 
and virtually every other possible pressure point. Again, it is purely 
bogus linkage. And where I come from, it is called extortion. It should 
not be rewarded.
  If we do legitimize this fallacy, and pay the ransom that some are 
demanding, where will it end? What will the next hostage be? How many 
times will we allow Russia to exercise a veto over our defense policy? 
And at what cost to our security?
  Mr. President, let me close with one final observation. National 
defense should not be a partisan issue. As elected representatives, we 
have no more fundamental or important constitutional responsibility 
than to provide for the defense of this country. As it currently 
stands, this Nation, its people, treasures, and industry, are 
absolutely vulnerable to ballistic missile attack. The technology is 
here today, all that is lacking is the political will to do so. We 
cannot delay any longer. We must get on with the business of defending 
America.

[[Page S5722]]

  If we allow politics to prevail and we leave our citizens naked 
against aggression, I fear that the results will be catastrophic. If we 
wait for a ballistic missile to rain down upon our Nation, wreaking 
chaos and destruction, it will be too late. We will have failed our 
citizens. We will have failed the Constitution. We will have failed 
this sacred institution.
  I believe deep in my heart that history will look back upon this 
debate as a key point in our Nation's history. Let us consider the 
consequences of our actions very carefully. Let us keep faith with the 
American people who rely upon us to protect their security. They have 
no one else to turn to. It is our responsibility. It is our obligation.
  I urge my colleagues to support the Defend America Act as reported by 
the Senate Armed Services Committee.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time is remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has an 
additional 2 minutes.
  Mr. NUNN. How much time do I have?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. One hour.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have several people who would like to 
speak. Several people were down for 15 minutes, but I ask them if they 
can adjust that. Otherwise, we will not be able to get around on the 
requests. Senator Exon would like 2 minutes, which I will yield to him 
now.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 2 more 
minutes first.
  Mr. NUNN. Following that, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire is recognized.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, let me close with one final observation. I 
feel very strongly that this issue has become a partisan political 
issue. It should not be a partisan political issue. We have no more 
fundamental or important constitutional responsibility than to provide 
for the defense of this country. And to be on the floor filibustering a 
bill that defends America, protects America from incoming missiles is 
an outrage. We can disagree on the degree, we can disagree on the 
architecture, we can disagree on the timing. But we ought not to be 
filibustering it. We ought to be having an up-or-down vote on it. I 
think everybody ought to be on record today--not having it put off, but 
be on record today. Are you for it, or are you against it? We ought to 
be recorded so the American people can judge us when the time comes.
  This Nation's people, treasury, and industry are vulnerable to 
missile attack. The technology is here. All that is lacking is the 
political will. We cannot delay any longer. We have to get on with the 
business of defending America. History, I think, will look at this 
debate as a key point in our Nation's history. Let us consider the 
consequences of our actions carefully and keep faith with the American 
people, who rely upon us to protect their security. They do not have 
anybody else to turn to. It is our responsibility, our obligation. All 
we are asking is that we exercise it. All the Senator from Arizona is 
asking for is a vote. All the Republican leader is asking for is a 
vote. We are not asking for anything else. We are not even asking for a 
victory, we are asking for a vote so that we can be recorded.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to Senator Exon, and then 
10 minutes to Senator Dorgan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska has 2 minutes. 
Following that, Senator Dorgan has 10 minutes.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I was struck to hear the term that people on 
the other side were startled that we would oppose this, that we are 
being blackmailed by Russia, and that we are being held hostage by 
Russia. Nothing could be further from the truth.
  I simply say, Mr. President, that already the opposition is saying we 
are against missile defenses on this side. We are not against missile 
defenses. The talk was made about the Patriot, how important that was 
in the gulf war. This Senator and most of the Senators on this side 
were leaders, when we were in charge of the Senate, in developing the 
Patriot missile. What we are against is hastily moving, as the Dole 
star wars bill would do, to a missile defense that is untested, 
untried, with no assurance whatsoever that it will work.
  Go with us. We are with the experts at the Pentagon. We are with the 
President. We want a missile defense, but we want it in a timely 
fashion and not rush to violate treaties that the United States of 
America signed in good faith.
  I ask unanimous consent that two letters from CBO relating to the 
cost issue be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in 
the Record as follows:

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                     Washington, DC, May 15, 1996.
     Hon. Floyd Spence,
     Chairman, Committee on National Security, House of 
         Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
     reviewed H.R. 3144, the Defend America Act of 1996, as 
     ordered reported by the House Committee on National Security 
     on May 1, 1996. The bill calls for deployment by 2003 of a 
     system to defend the nation against an attack by ballistic 
     missiles, but does not specify how much funding would be 
     available for this purpose. Based on plans and estimates of 
     the Department of Defense, the costs of complying with the 
     bill would total $10 billion over the next five years, or 
     about $7 billion more than is currently programmed for 
     national missile defense.
       Through 2010, total acquisition costs would range from $31 
     billion to $60 billion for a layered defense that would 
     include both ground- and space-based weapons. The wide range 
     in the estimate reflects uncertainty about two factors--the 
     type and capability of a defensive system that would satisfy 
     the terms of the bill, and the costs of each component of 
     that system. These figures do not include the cost to operate 
     and support the defense after it is deployed. The attachment 
     provides additional details on these estimates.
       Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1996 
     excludes from the application of that bill legislative 
     provisions that are necessary for the national security or 
     the ratification or implementation of international treaty 
     obligations. CBO has determined that the provisions of H.R. 
     3144 fit within that exclusion.
       H.R. 3144 would not affect direct spending or receipts and 
     thus would not be subject to pay-as-you-go procedure under 
     section 252 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
     Control Act of 1985.
       If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Raymond 
     Hall and David Mosher.
           Sincerely,
                                                  June E. O'Neill,
                                                         Director.

  Budgetary Implications of H.R. 3144, the Defend America Act of 1996

       This document addresses the budgetary implications of H.R. 
     3144, as ordered reported by the House Committee on National 
     Security on May 1, 1996. The Defend America Act of 1996 would 
     require the United States to deploy a national missile 
     defense by the end of 2003 that provides ``a highly effective 
     defense of all 50 states against limited, unauthorized and 
     accidental attacks . . . [that would be] augmented over time 
     to provide a layered defense against larger and more 
     sophisticated ballistic missile threats as they emerge.'' 
     Those two requirements form the basis of CBO's estimate. 
     According to the bill, the initial defense must include 
     interceptors, ground-based radar, space-based sensor, 
     including the Space and Missile Tracking System (SMTS), and a 
     battle management and command and control system to tie the 
     components together. The interceptors can be ground-, sea-, 
     or space-based. The space-based weapons could be lasers or 
     kinetic energy interceptors (also known as Brilliant 
     Pebbles). The layered defense that would eventually follow, 
     according to the bill's second requirement, would likely be 
     achieved by adding space-based weapons to the ground-based 
     system.
       CBO estimates that H.R. 3144 would cost nearly $10 billion 
     over the next five years, or about $7 billion more than is 
     currently programmed for national missile defense. Through 
     2010, the system would cost between $31 billion and $60 
     billion. None of the estimates include the cost to operate 
     and support the defense after it is deployed. Our estimates 
     are derived from data provided by the military services and 
     the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). While we 
     have been unable to review many of the details behind those 
     estimates, we believe that they are the best that are 
     currently available. In some cases, though, we adjusted the 
     Department of Defense's (DoD) estimates to better reflect 
     procurement costs and potential risks. For example, we added 
     about $3 billion to hedge against technical and schedule 
     risks in the development programs. We also reduced the 
     estimated cost of deploying 500 space-based interceptors by 
     $4 billion. We did not, however, adjust the estimates to 
     reflect cost increases that typically occur in developing 
     systems that advance the state of the art.
       Minimum Requirements and Costs. The low end of the range of 
     estimates reflects what we believe would be the smallest 
     system that would meet both of the bill's principal 
     requirements. As proposed by the

[[Page S5723]]

     Army, the initial defense would consist of 100 interceptors 
     based at Grand Forks, South Dakota. Combined with SMTS, this 
     system would be able to defend all 50 states against an 
     unsophisticated attack of up to 20 warheads under many 
     scenarios, according to BMDO. The interceptors would be armed 
     with the Army's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). To track 
     incoming warheads, four new phased-array radars would be 
     deployed, one each in Grand Forks, Alaska, Hawaii, and New 
     England.
       This initial defense would cost $14 billion--about $8.5 
     billion for the ground-based system and $5 billion for the 
     SMTS space-based sensors. (The ground-based system could cost 
     roughly $4 billion less if the Air Force's proposal for a 
     Minuteman-based system was adopted.) The upper layer, which 
     would be added sometime after 2006, would employ 500 space-
     based interceptors similar to Brilliant Pebbles--the less 
     expensive of the two types of space-based weapons. It would 
     make the defense capable of protecting the United States from 
     a more sophisticated attack of up to 60 warheads according to 
     BMDO, and would cost an additional $14 billion. CBO adds 
     another $3 billion to these estimates to hedge against 
     potential risk associated with the development programs. 
     Thus, the total cost of the layered defense would be about 
     $31 billion.
       Potential Increases in Requirements and Costs. The bill 
     specifies that the defense shall protect the United States 
     against limited or unauthorized attacks, but does not specify 
     how big the attack might be. The high end of the range 
     reflects the costs of a system to protect the United States 
     against a more potent threat--for example, an attack that 
     could have 200 warheads accompanied by sophisticated 
     countermeasures. DoD bases its operational requirement for a 
     national missile defense on such a threat.
       CBO assumes that the ground-based layer would include 300 
     interceptors deployed at 3 sites and would cost $13 billion, 
     or about $4.5 billion more than the costs of meeting the 
     minimum requirements. SMTS satellites would be deployed at a 
     cost of $5 billion. The space-based layer would include a 
     combination of 500 space-based interceptors ($14 billion) and 
     20 space-based lasers ($25 billion) for maximum 
     effectiveness. Again, $3 billion is added in anticipation of 
     technological and integration problems. The total cost of 
     this high-end layered defense would be about $60 billion. 
     Except for the lasers, this system would be similar to the 
     Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system 
     proposed by past administrations.
       Cost Comparison. The estimate for the ground-based systems 
     described above is about two-thirds less than previous 
     estimates associated with earlier proposals, for example the 
     GPALS system. The earlier proposals focused on the 
     challenging threat of an unauthorized attack by the Soviet 
     Union. Today the focus is on smaller and less capable 
     threats--as a result, the defense's components may be 
     somewhat less capable. Past proposals also called for a 
     robust program that included substantial efforts to test the 
     systems and to reduce and manage the technical and schedule 
     risks associated with such an ambitious development effort. 
     It is unclear how much these efforts can be reduced without 
     increasing risk to unacceptable levels. But if current plans 
     must be revised to include more thorough testing and larger 
     efforts to reduce risks, and if the purpose of the defense 
     evolves into protecting against larger and more sophisticated 
     threats, costs of the ground-based systems could approach 
     those developed for systems like GPALS--thus, costs of the 
     high-end system could greatly exceed $60 billion by 2010.
                                                                    ____

                                                    U.S. Congress,


                                  Congressional Budget Office,

                                     Washington, DC, May 30, 1996.
     Hon. J. James Exon,
     Ranking Member, Committee on the Budget, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator: In your letter of April 4, 1996, you asked 
     about the cost of deploying the national missile defense 
     system proposed in the Defend America Act of 1996 (S. 1635). 
     I have attached the cost estimate that the Congressional 
     Budget Office (CBO) prepared for S. 1635, which should answer 
     your questions.
       At your request, CBO also examined the compliance issues 
     that the Defend America Act could raise with respect to the 
     Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Because the bill does 
     not specify a missile defense system in detail, it is 
     difficult to identify precisely the possible conflicts with 
     the treaty. But some fundamental issues would arise 
     regardless of the specific architecture of the defense. The 
     bill anticipates those conflicts by requiring that the 
     Secretary of Defense report to the Congress on the problems 
     with the treaty that he expects to encounter in the course of 
     developing and deploying the defense. The bill also urges the 
     President to negotiate amendments to the treaty with Russia 
     that would permit the United States to deploy its defense. If 
     an agreement cannot be reached within one year of the 
     enactment of the bill, however, it directs the President to 
     consider withdrawing from the treaty.
       In brief, our reading of the bill suggests that some 
     systems would violate the treaty in its current form, while 
     others may or may not. Space-based weapons would clearly 
     violate the treaty's prohibition on ABM components that are 
     based in space. Sea-based weapons are similarly prohibited. 
     Together, those prohibitions would make it difficult to 
     deploy a layered national missile defense that would comply 
     with the ABM treaty in its current form.
       Other issues are not as clear and are often debated. For 
     example, in Article I of the treaty, each side pledges ``not 
     to deploy ABM systems for defense of the territory of its 
     country.'' Critics argue that deploying any national missile 
     defense, no matter how capable, would violate that provision. 
     But, the Army and Air Force claim that the small, ground-
     based national missile defenses that they have proposed would 
     comply with the treaty.
       Issues of compliance could arise even for a ground-based 
     defense that complies with the numerical and geographic 
     limits specified in the ABM treaty (no more than 100 ground-
     based interceptors and one ABM radar, all located at Grand 
     Forks, North Dakota). The principal issue is whether the new 
     tracking radars that would be deployed in the Pacific and on 
     U.S. coasts would substitute for the ABM radar at Grand 
     Forks. Under many scenarios, particularly attacks on Alaska 
     and Hawaii, the Grand Forks radar would never see warheads or 
     intercepts because its view would be blocked by the Earth's 
     curvature. For the same reason, the radar could not be used 
     to send course corrections directly to an interceptor. 
     Instead, such a defense would use ground-based repeater 
     stations to communicate with an interceptor. According to 
     opponents, that would mean that forward-based tracking radars 
     would substitute for the ABM radar, a practice that the 
     treaty strictly prohibits. Supporters of the proposed 
     defenses counter that forward-based radars would not be 
     substitutes because the fire-control solutions and 
     instructions to an interceptor for correcting course would 
     still come from Grand Forks.
       The degree to which the Space and Missile Tracking System 
     (SMTS) conflicts with the treaty is also being debated. 
     Critics of space-based sensors argue that they could, in 
     effect, substitute for an ABM radar. The Russians have 
     reportedly expressed similar concerns about SMTS. The 
     argument is similar to that made against forward-based 
     tracking radars: if an entire intercept can occur out of view 
     of the ABM radar at Grand Forks, something must be 
     substituting for the radar. Supporters of SMTS contend that 
     the system would be an ``adjunct'' to the ABM system, much 
     like the space- and ground-based early warning sensors that 
     the United States deployed before the ABM treaty was signed 
     in 1972. (An adjunct is a device that could not, by itself, 
     substitute for or perform the functions of an ABM radar). 
     Those early warning sensors were not limited by the treaty 
     and advocates believe that SMTS should not be limited either. 
     According to press accounts, the U.S. government reported to 
     the Congress in 1995 that SMTS might, in some configurations, 
     comply with the treaty. This document reflects a U.S. 
     position and does not imply that Russia agrees with that 
     interpretation. Differences would have to be worked out in 
     negotiations.
       Finally, your staff asked that we examine operating and 
     support costs. We have not had time to analyze those costs 
     fully, but we can report that those costs would reach a few 
     hundred million dollars annually by 2005 when ground-based 
     systems and space-based sensors would be in place. After 
     2010, operating and support costs would increase 
     significantly because the Department of Defense would have to 
     launch replacements for any space-based systems, which wear 
     out over time. Of course, at some point new technology or a 
     reassessment of the defense situation could lead to changes 
     in the system, which could have a large impact on costs.
       If you wish further details on our analysis, we will be 
     pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are David 
     Mosher, who can be reached at 226-2900, and Raymond Hall, who 
     can be reached at 226-2840.
           Sincerely,
                                                  June E. O'Neill,
                                                         Director.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan] is 
recognized.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, surely the American people, who watch and 
listen, must think we have the attention of houseflies. We are having a 
debate here in the U.S. Senate about balancing the Federal budget, 
about amending the Constitution to require a balanced budget, about 
cutting spending, about being frugal, about dealing with this country's 
debt. And then immediately trotting on the floor of the Senate is a new 
proposal--by the same folks who say they lead in reducing the budget 
deficit, lead in reducing spending--they say to us now, ``We want to 
spend an additional up to $60 billion for, yes, a star wars program.''
  I want to correct some of the statements that have just been made. 
There is no filibuster. The petition to invoke cloture, to close off 
debate, was filed simultaneously with the bill coming to the floor. How 
can someone, without even smiling about it, file a cloture motion 
before debate even begins? There is no filibuster.
  We are going to have a debate on this. That is what we insist on. 
Those who want to initiate a $60 billion program without debate do no 
service to defense policy in this country, in my judgment.

[[Page S5724]]

  Second, this bill is star wars. Here is the bill, page 6: ``Ground-
based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, space-based kinetic energy 
interceptors, space-based directed energy systems.''
  Call it what you want. It is star wars; $14 billion, my eye. We have 
spent $96 billion on star wars and missile defenses. This chart was put 
together by the Congressional Research Service, and we have funded so 
many programs over the last 40 years that nobody can read this. It is a 
national missile defense family tree that is so complex you cannot read 
it. It is a bunch of boxes and lines tracing the development of dozens 
of programs. These are the things that we have funded. This is all the 
work done for missile defenses.
  What we have to show for all this in this country today is one 
abandoned antiballistic missile facility--it is in my State. Over $26 
billion in today's money was spent on it. It was declared mothballed 
the same year it was declared operational.
  Are there threats against this country? You bet. What are they? A 
glass vial of deadly biological agents to be brought in in someone's 
pocket, threatening a subway or a city is a threat. A truck bomb parked 
in front of a Federal building is a threat. A cruise missile armed with 
a nuclear warhead is a threat. An intercontinental ballistic missile is 
a threat. You can list a whole series of threats against this country.
  Have we ever had an effective system to knock down any missile coming 
in? No, we have not. Why? Any missile launched against this country 
will have a return address. We will know exactly where it was launched 
from, and this country will vaporize them. That is what our nuclear 
deterrent has prevented from happening to our country for many years. 
That has been our missile defense for 40 years.
  Now, do we need to research missile defenses? Yes, we are doing that. 
We are spending a great deal of money doing that. We spent $96 billion 
on all of this to date. But I want to talk about a number of different 
approaches to defending our country.
  The best way to defend America is to destroy an adversary's missile 
before it is launched. I have a piece of metal here in my hand that 
comes from silo number 110, in Pervomaysk, Ukraine. This silo had an 
SS-19 in it. That SS-19 had 6 warheads, each of them 550 kilotons: each 
warhead 20 times the explosive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. 
This twisted lump of metal was part of that silo with that missile. The 
silo does not exist anymore, because we helped to blow it up.
  Let me show you a picture of it. This is that silo blown up, with the 
missile gone. There is no missile there. The missile was destroyed. 
Here is a man sitting on the floor--Senator Nunn--who, along with 
Senator Lugar, with the Nunn-Lugar initiative, will, in my judgment, 
forever change the dimensions of this nuclear deterrent and these 
issues of nuclear threat by creating a program in which 212 submarine 
launchers are gone in the Soviet Union, 378 ICBM missile silos are 
eliminated, and 25 heavy bombers gone. Do you know what is indicated in 
this photo is today? This is silo 110. It just so happens--and it is a 
pure coincidence--that the Secretary of Defense is visiting silo 110 
today. The U.S. Secretary of Defense is visiting this site. Do you know 
what is here today? Sunflowers--not missiles, but sunflowers.
  What we have done is destroyed a missile in its silo by destroying 
the silo and moving the missile and warhead, and the missile is cut up 
and it is gone. That happens to be an effective missile defense. 
Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar and others who fought so valiantly for 
this program are reducing the nuclear threat in this country.
  I have a picture of the destruction of a heavy bomber. Here they are 
sawing off the wings. This picture shows Russians using American 
equipment to cut up a Russian bomber. That heavy bomber--it is a TU-95 
Bear bomber--could launch 16 cruise missiles against our country.

  Defending America means that you get the enemy, through arms 
agreements, to reduce these kinds of weapons. The fact is what the 
other side brings to the floor of this Senate--and they can protest 
forever about it, and they are wrong--is a proposal that will threaten 
the arms agreements by which missiles and bombers and other strategic 
weapons are being reduced now in other parts of the world. The fact is 
they want to abrogate the arms control treaties. In my judgment, that 
is shortsighted.
  The Ukrainian President on June 1st--a couple of days ago--certified 
that his country, which used to have 4,000 strategic and tactical 
nuclear warheads, now has zero--zero. The Cooperative Threat Reduction 
Program in the Defense Department, with the leadership of Senators 
Nunn, Lugar, and others, has done a remarkable job. Is this the only 
thing we ought to do? No. It is remarkably successful. We should do 
many additional things, but the last thing we ought to do is jump on 
this horse and ride off into the sunset to build a $60 billion program 
that threatens to undermine all of these arms agreements that have led 
to all of this progress. This makes no sense at all.
  I thought you all were conservatives. You keep coming to the floor 
talking about the deficit, and the first thing you do when we finish 
that discussion is come to the floor with a big, spanking new, gold-
plated weapons program that is going to cost $60 billion, a program we 
have already spent $96 billion on according to the Brookings 
Institution. I am telling you, it does not add up.
  Do those who oppose the so-called Defend America Act, which is really 
a star wars program, believe Americans should not be defended? Of 
course not. There are dozen of ways of defending America. We ought to 
do research and deploy, and do a whole range of them, the most 
important of which, in my judgment, is the deployment and 
implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program initiated by 
Senators Nunn and Lugar. But there are others.
  President Clinton says, let us do the research necessary--several 
billion dollars. Let the system be available for deployment if we see 
that the threat exists. And I know we have all of these claims by 
others about Korea. Look, Korea spends from $2 to $5 billion a year on 
their entire defense program. We are a country that spends $270 billion 
a year. There is no credible evidence that Korea has tested anything 
close to a weapon that is going to deliver a nuclear warhead to parts 
of the United States. Worry about a suitcase bomb put in the trunk of a 
Yugo car parked at the dock of New York City. That is a threat. Worry 
about a biological agent. That is a threat. But this bill would put all 
of our eggs in this basket and say that the sky is the limit, even 
though it is the taxpayers' money. This bill would have us embark on a 
$60 billion spending program, and when we are finished we might have 
covered--unlikely, but maybe--one small slice of the range of threats 
that confront this country. I think if you talk about shortsightedness, 
this bill ranks up there with an Olympic performance.
  Our military leaders in the Department of Defense have told us that 
this bill would endanger our security. General Shalikashvili wrote to 
Senator Nunn to say that ``efforts which suggest changes, or 
withdrawal, from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of 
START II and could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I.''
  In other words, this bill could pull the rug out from under the very 
thing that is reducing the nuclear threat, the very thing that results 
in weapons being destroyed. A missile silo that used to hold a missile 
with six warheads aimed at American cities and American military 
targets now has sunflowers planted on top of it. The missile and its 
warheads are gone.

  This proposal pulls the rug out from under that kind of an approach. 
I just do not understand that proposal at this time being brought to 
the Senate.
  No matter what claims are made on the other side, this is not a 
debate between those who think Americans should be defended and those 
who believe Americans should not be defended. That is preposterous. 
That is an absurd contention. All of us believe we ought to spend money 
wisely to defend this country's liberty. All of us believe we ought to 
make the investments necessary to guarantee the safety of the American 
people.
  Let me thank the Senator from Georgia for the time. We will have more 
to discuss about this subject later, and I

[[Page S5725]]

am anxious to engage in further debate when we get to debate on the 
bill.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Indiana, Senator Coats, a member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, following Senator Coats' remarks, I will 
yield 10 minutes to the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana is recognized.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, I appreciate the opportunity to add some 
words to this debate. Obviously, we all believe that while we can 
debate what the fundamental role of the Congress and the Government is, 
priorities ought to be established. This is true particularly in the 
domestic spending areas where there is no constitutional responsibility 
of the Federal Government. However, there is a clear constitutional 
responsibility for Congress to provide for the national defense. In 
that regard, we are addressing what I think is one of the most 
fundamental and most important decisions that this Congress is going to 
make in the next several days; that is, what kind of defense we will 
provide for the United States? To date, our country has enjoyed the 
benefit of its strategic location--surrounded by oceans east and west, 
and friendly neighbors to the north and south. Our strategic location 
has enabled us to ensure the defense of American soil. Today, however, 
the advance of technology, the development of long-range ballistic 
missiles, and the proliferation of those missiles among nations who 
have not had a history of responsible leadership poses a real threat to 
the United States. Over the last several years we have engaged in a 
debate over how to best address this emerging new threat.
  The Senator from North Dakota raised the issue of other compelling 
threats. Indeed, there are other threats Americans face from a 
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons delivered through ballistic 
missiles. A truck packed with explosives, a ship cargo container that 
sailed up into one of our ports, or any number of other means of 
delivering weapons of mass destruction are clearly threats we must take 
seriously. However, the fact that these threats exist does not mean we 
should ignore the very real threat posed to American citizens by 
proliferating ballistic missile technology. people.
  The Senator from North Dakota talked about other effective 
deterrents. He discussed the success that Americans had with a strategy 
of deterrence through mutual assured destruction. During that 
particular era, there were two superpowers engaged in a stand-off. 
Mutual assured destruction seemed the most feasible strategy to counter 
Soviet missile threats. But, in that era, there was no threat of 
missile proliferation such as we face today. There was a very serious, 
but very definable, cold war between the two superpowers, each 
possessing thousands of nuclear warheads that could be used in 
retaliation against the other should a first strike be launched. As we 
all know, the strategy of mutual destruction is no longer a viable 
means of deterrence.
  There is a also a moral imperative at issue with the concept of 
mutual assured destruction. Simply to say that our best protection 
against a missile attack that could injure or kill millions of 
Americans is our capability to respond in kind against the country that 
launched the attack, violates basic moral considerations our Nation 
could not support today.
  I found it interesting that the Senator from North Dakota spoke of 
sunflowers now growing over former missile sites. Most of us would like 
to see sunflowers growing over every missile site, not only in the 
former Soviet Union but in other countries around the world. 
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. More than 25 countries--
including China, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Iran, Pakistan, and India--
possess or are seeking to acquire ballistic missiles capable of 
carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. They are actively 
pursuing ballistic missile technology for their fields--not sunflowers. 
And, as we all know, we have had little success discouraging these 
nations from acquiring missile technology.
  North Korea has been developing ballistic missiles such as the Taepo 
Dong II, a missile with a range of up to 6,000 miles that can certainly 
target Alaska and Hawaii. North Korean President Kim Jong-Il has 
reportedly ordered the development and deployment of strategic long-
range ballistic missiles tipped with more powerful warheads. By many 
estimates, in less than 10 years, North Korea will be able to deploy an 
operational intercontinental ballistic missile force capable of hitting 
the American mainland.
  The administration is ignoring these very serious trends. Instead, it 
has adopted a wait-and-see strategy in its approach to the defense of 
our Nation. Much of the administration's position is derived from a 
recent national intelligence estimate report by U.S. intelligence 
agencies. The NIE claims that no country will be able to acquire 
ballistic missile technology capable of reaching the United States for 
at least 15 years. But NIE's choice of 15 years is based on 
calculations most Americans would hardly find reassuring. The 15-year 
estimate is based primarily on the indigenous development of missile 
systems, ignoring the rapid rate of ballistic missile technology 
proliferation so evident today.
  In addition, the NIE based its threat calculations without regard to 
Hawaii and Alaska. The report projects that no rogue nation will 
possess the technology capable of hitting the lower 48 States for 15 
years. In qualifying its estimate, the NIE discounts the more immediate 
threat of North Korea's Taepo Dong II missiles to these States. Yet, in 
August 1994, John Deutch, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, testified 
before Congress that ``If the North Koreans field the Taepo Dong 2 
missile, Guam, Alaska, and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at 
risk.'' At that time, the CIA estimated that this system would be 
deployed before the year 2000.
  It is unfortunate that the United States today has little control 
over the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. But, the time 
has come for us to recognize this fact and act accordingly. Mutual 
assured destruction and other strategies have come and gone. They are 
no longer appropriate for the era in which we live, nor the threats 
America might face in 21st century. The administration's position of 
adhering to a policy whose assumptions are based on the perceived 
intentions of countries rather than their emerging capabilities and the 
realities of the world today is a serious mistake.
  Even the NIE report warns that a future political crisis in Russia or 
China could lead to an unauthorized ICBM launch against the United 
States. Russia today is embroiled in political turmoil resulting from 
reform and the civil war in Chechnya, while China remains in the throes 
of uncertain changes in political leadership. Both China and Russia 
have also been actively selling technology to other nations. Indeed, 
recent reports indicate that China is attempting to buy SS-18 missile 
technology from Russia and the Ukraine--technology that would 
significantly enhance China's ability to target American soil. 
Technology transfers such as these give countries a major advantage in 
developing indigenous nuclear weapons and delivery systems, to include 
ballistic missiles. Libya and Iraq's leaders have made their desire to 
obtain such weapons quite clear, while North Korea has been willing to 
oblige by selling its missiles to interested parties.

  There are many other countries actively engaged in buying advanced 
technologies and missiles. If rogue nations are successful in buying 
systems already developed, or can acquire the technology to build their 
own indigenous systems, the United States may well face a threat even 
sooner than expected. In testifying before Congress earlier this year, 
Jim Woolsey--President Clinton's first Director of Central 
Intelligence--addressed the grave nature of ballistic missile 
technology, stating that:

       Ballistic missiles can, and in the future they increasingly 
     will, be used by hostile states for blackmail, terror, and to 
     drive wedges between us and our friends and allies. It is my 
     judgment that the administration is not currently giving this 
     vital problem the weight it deserves.

  Who is to say that the current intentions upon which the 
administration rationalizes its position may not quickly shift to the 
disadvantage of the

[[Page S5726]]

United States? Should one of these countries decide to target the 
United States--for the reasons Jim Woolsey cited--how will we defend 
America? Reassurances that a ballistic missile defense system is under 
development will do nothing to defend American citizens, just as it 
does nothing to deter future aggressors.
  Even if NIE's 15-year threat window were realistic, a strategy of 
waiting to deploy a defensive system until we are certain we will face 
an imminent attack fails to recognize the reality that deploying a new 
system with advanced technology will invariably require fine-tuning. 
This hedge strategy risks the welfare of American citizens in the face 
of a direct threat to our national security.
  Proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons and the means 
to deliver them is a dangerous game. While we must continue our efforts 
to prevent rogue nations from acquiring this technology and thus 
endangering us, we must also concede that ultimately we are powerless 
to deter the acquisition of this technology. If we cannot deter the 
proliferation of ballistic missile technology, we must at least 
diminish the incentive for attacking the United States and nullify the 
potential consequences of such an attack. We can do this by developing 
and deploying a national missile defense system. In the end, it is the 
only plausible strategy to protect American citizens from the future 
threat of a ballistic missile attack. As former British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher recently remarked:

       Acquiring an effective global defense against ballistic 
     missiles is . . . a matter of the greatest importance and 
     urgency. But the risk is that thousands of people may be 
     killed by an attack which forethought and wise preparations 
     might have prevented.

  It is the reality of the proliferation of ballistic missile 
technology, the capability of providing nuclear, chemical or biological 
destruction through the delivery on ballistic missiles, and the 
proliferation of those missiles that demands we give serious 
consideration to a national missile defense system. We are making 
positive strides in providing theater missile defense protection for 
our troops abroad. But, in my opinion, we are not taking the steps that 
we need to take to provide that same kind of protection to Americans 
here at home.
  It is a risky strategy to continue to postpone the basic decisions 
that need to be made relative to deployment of a national missile 
defense system. We can argue over timing. We can argue over the 
deployment. We can argue over the cost that is appropriate in 
relationship to our budget each year. But we must not deny our citizens 
protection from the grave potential of a future ballistic missile 
attack on the United States.
  There is a little doubt that the cloture vote which will take place 
at 2:15 will succeed. The previous speaker has challenged us to get to 
the debate. We will need his help in order to get to that debate. 
Indeed, we are going to need help from those who have opposed the 
proposal before us in order to get to the heart of the critical issues 
addressed in the Defend America Act.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico has 10 minutes.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I also rise in opposition to the motion 
to proceed on this bill, this so-called Defend America Act. The bill is 
bad policy for many reasons. Several of my colleagues have already 
mentioned some of those.
  First, the bill would undermine Russia's ratification of the START II 
Treaty, and undermine the implementation of the START I Treaty. These 
treaties will destroy vastly more Russian nuclear weapons than any 
missile defense program that is being proposed in this legislation.
  A second reason the bill is bad policy is that the bill would mandate 
the premature deployment of a national missile defense that we do not 
know today how to deploy, whatever the proponents of the bill may 
argue.
  A third very significant reason why this bill is bad public policy is 
that it would divert many billions of dollars--the estimate is about 
$60 billion--from higher Pentagon priorities, particularly around the 
turn of the century when the Republican defense budgets fall below the 
President's defense budgets.
  I do think we need to ask where the money is coming from. As the 
Senator from North Dakota said a few moments ago, it is ironic that the 
effort is being made to move ahead on this legislation the same week 
the Senate is being asked to once again vote on whether or not to 
embrace a balanced budget constitutional amendment. We also need to ask 
at what expense to our other defense capabilities would we be adopting 
this kind of legislation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe those other 
defense capabilities are more important. We need to heed their advice 
on this.
  The proponents of this bill do not know what system they are 
demanding to deploy. They do not know what it will cost. They seem at 
best indifferent to the reaction that we would find in Russia, and at 
worst they seem to rush to embrace the demise of the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty as a welcome consequence of this bill.
  We need to ask ourselves why is this not the position of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff? Why do the Joint Chiefs put higher priority on 
preserving START I and going forward with START II and on developing 
other defense capabilities, including theater missile defenses? The 
proponents of this legislation have no answers to those questions.
  Let me spend a few minutes talking about some of the reasons I am 
deeply skeptical of our ability to develop highly effective national 
missile defenses, as called for in this bill, in the timeframe that is 
set out and required by this bill. I have followed this debate fairly 
closely since March 1983, shortly after I came to the Senate and 
President Reagan gave his famous star wars speech. We now know, many 
years later, that President Reagan had essentially been sold a bill of 
goods by the proponents of star wars. He was told that an x-ray laser, 
driven by a nuclear explosion in space, could wipe out a whole swarm of 
attacking Soviet ICBM's. But the x-ray laser proved to be neither 
technically sound nor politically viable. The nuclear component of the 
SDI program was gone within a couple of years. Instead, the goal became 
a nonnuclear national missile defense composed of a wide range of 
kinetic-kill and directed-energy weapons coupled with advanced space 
and ground sensors that could provide some sort of astrodome-like, 
leak-proof protection for the American people against all ballistic 
missile attacks.
  Mr. President, there was almost no one in the technical community at 
the time who thought that it was possible to develop what I just 
described. I distinctly remember being briefed at Sandia National 
Laboratories in the mid-1980's on their red team analyses of the 
various proposals being put forward as part of the strategic defense 
initiative [SDI] by contractors. The red team always won. Nevertheless, 
we spent billions of dollars in pursuit of this goal that not even the 
proponents of this bill support today.
  It was not until Senator Shelby and I offered an amendment in 1989 
that Congress even tried to look at the component parts of the SDI 
Program and put some priority on those that made sense, at the same 
time scaling back those that did not. That amendment, which was debated 
on the eve of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, put first priority on 
developing theater missile defenses, and it called for sharp cutbacks 
in the more exotic space-based SDI systems, such as the system that was 
then known as Brilliant Pebbles.
  The Persian Gulf war heightened the consensus that our first priority 
should be theater defenses, if we could come up with some type of 
theater defenses that, in fact, were effective. The Patriot interceptor 
clearly had been ineffective against the Iraqi Scud attacks during the 
war, as the Senator from Arizona noted yesterday. So in 1990, under 
Senator Nunn's amendment, priority was once again given to theater 
defenses.
  Why has it been so hard for us to come up with effective theater 
missile defense systems? Since 1989, we have spent over $10 billion on 
developing theater missile defenses. The President proposed another $2 
billion in fiscal year 1997, the budget that we are still working on. 
Some of these systems, such as THAAD, are now entering testing, but, 
thus far, they have not had great success in the way of hitting 
targets.
  Why is that, Mr. President? It is true because hitting a bullet with 
a bullet is

[[Page S5727]]

a very, very difficult thing to accomplish. A theater ballistic missile 
will be moving at up to 5 kilometers per second or 3 miles per second 
as it approaches its target. Think about that. Three miles per second. 
An interceptor missile sent up to intercept it travels at approximately 
the same speed and it has to maneuver so that it ends up in the same 
breadbasket-sized space at precisely the right moment as the two 
missiles approach each other at up to 6 miles per second. That is a 
pretty good trick.
  The Congress has been calling for highly effective theater missile 
defenses for at least 7 years now. We have been supporting research for 
far longer. And yet, as I said, we have not hit very much. We all hope 
that our investments in THAAD and Navy Lower Tier and improved Patriot 
and MEADS and Navy Upper Tier will eventually result in a reasonably 
effective theater defense capability. We know that that is a capability 
our military commanders want because finding and destroying small 
truck-mounted Scud-sized missiles before they were launched proved very 
difficult in the Persian Gulf war.
  However, after 7 years, in which Congress consistently approved the 
requests for theater missile defense system funding--in fact, added 
funds during several of those years--we still do not have a highly 
effective theater missile defense, although we, hopefully, have some 
promising candidates. Anyone who told us that theater missile defenses 
would be easy back in the 1980's should have conceded their mistake by 
now. Anyone who promised astrodomes for national missile defense should 
have lost credibility with Congress and the American people a long time 
ago.
  Yet, it is that same crowd who is pushing this legislation. They are 
much more careful about promising astrodomes now. Instead, this bill 
calls for deployment ``by the end of 2003'' of ``a National Missile 
Defense system that--

       (1) Is capable of providing a highly-effective defense of 
     the territory of the United States against limited, 
     unauthorized or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and
       (2) Will be augmented over time to provide a layered 
     defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic 
     missile threats as they emerge.''

  Seven years from now, according to this bill, we are supposed to have 
solved a harder problem than theater defenses, namely national missile 
defense, and deployed a system. The proponents totally disregard the 
lessons of how hard it has been to develop theater defenses over the 
past 7 years. These technological developments can-not be made on a 
congressionally mandated time schedule.
  We also need to ask what the threat is that is conjured up to justify 
spending this $60 billion contemplated in this bill. Is it a real 
threat like the mobile Scuds that our troops faced in the Persian Gulf? 
The intelligence community does not think so. Yet, the threat you hear 
the most about from the proponents of this bill is the potential threat 
that North Korea could develop a missile, the Taepo Dong II, capable of 
attacking the Aleutian Islands sometime soon. The proponents attack the 
intelligence community for not leaping to the conclusion that this 
threat justifies deployment of a national missile defense now.
  Let me put a few facts on the table about this potential threat.
  North Korea's total gross national product is about $25 billion. That 
is less than one-third of 1 percent of the U.S. gross national product. 
In fact, that country is bankrupt, Mr. President. Its people are 
malnourished, if not starving. Its total defense budget is less than $6 
billion, which is approximately one-fortieth of our own, and yet those 
who want to pursue a crash national missile defense system criticize 
the intelligence community for unanimously judging that it might be 
difficult for North Korea to develop a long-range missile in the next 
15 years.
  If North Korea's Taepo Dong II--a missile that does not today exist--
is the justification for this bill, it is a pretty thin justification 
indeed. But let us take this argument further. Let us give the 
proponents of this bill the benefit of the doubt. Let us say that this 
bankrupt country actually started building such an intercontinental 
ballistic missile tomorrow. Are we a pitiful helpless giant incapable 
of responding? Does our $267 billion defense budget provide our 
President and our military leaders no options to deal with this threat? 
Should we sue for peace? Of course not.
  The Taepo Dong II, if it ever exists, would be a large immobile 
missile. We would know about its development immediately through our 
intelligence capabilities. And we would be able to destroy it by a 
preemptive strike long before it was ready to be launched, just as 
Israel once dealt with the Iraqi nuclear complex.
  If the threat is a rogue nation, like North Korea, Iraq, Iran, or 
Libya, developing an ICBM, then clearly preemption with our existing 
military capabilities would clearly handle such a threat with very high 
confidence. It is a far higher confidence level than we are ever likely 
to achieve with a national missile defense system. The American people 
would support such a preemptive strike, just as they support today the 
threat of preemption which Secretary Perry has made to the underground 
Libyan complex should it begin to manufacture chemical weapons.
  There is an editorial, which I want to cite on this point, that was 
in the May 13, 1996 edition of the Patriot & Evening News out of 
Harrisburg, PA. This is an article called ``Offense is Best Missile 
Defense.''
  The author makes the obvious point about the threat from rogue 
states. He says:

       If a nation hostile to the United States should acquire the 
     capability to send a missile our way, dare we wait until it 
     is fired to see if our missile defense system actually works? 
     Or would we in fact use other military means to go in and put 
     it out of commission before it was fired?
       The answer surely is that you do not place the fate 
     of thousands of American lives on unproven technology of 
     uncertain proficiency. You eliminate the threat before it 
     eliminates you, a strategy that would make deployment of a 
     missile defense system pointless and redundant.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this 
article appear at the end of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  [See exhibit 1.]
  Mr. BINGAMAN. So, Mr. President, the threat of a rogue nation really 
cannot and should not be the justification for this bill and the 
expenditure of tens of billions of dollars.
  But let us also look at the technical side of national missile 
defense. As the senior Senator from Ohio, Senator Glenn, has said many 
times on this floor, we do not today know how to do this, whatever a 
contractor may claim. With ICBM's we are talking about bullets 
intercepting bullets with closing velocities of up to 10 miles per 
second. The President and Secretary Perry propose to continue research 
in this area at the rate of half a billion dollars per year to see if 
we can solve the technical problems. That is an adequate amount in my 
judgment, given how little has been delivered thus far after the 
expenditure of many tens of billions of dollars. I am from Missouri 
like Harry Truman when I hear any promises about how close we are to 
solving the technical problems of national missile defense. Someone is 
going to have to show me with real test results. I have heard such 
promises before. The American people have heard such promises before.
  Mr. President, if the threat from rogue states is remote and capable 
of being handled by other means, as I believe it is, if we have no 
technical solution in hand, if we risk undermining the benefits of 
START I and the START II Treaty as well, then why on Earth should we 
move ahead to pass this bill? The proponents threaten us with some 
variation of the astrodome 30-second political spot. They feel the 
American people will be outraged that we do not have a national missile 
defense system. But it is much more likely that the American people 
will see this legislation for what it is, a fiscally, technically, and 
strategically unsound bill that will damage both our Treasury and our 
security.
  Mr. President, I believe it would be folly for us to proceed to enact 
it and the American people will not be fooled into believing otherwise. 
I appreciate the time and yield the floor.

[[Page S5728]]

                               Exhibit 1

    [From the Harrisburg (PA) Patriot & Evening News, May 13, 1996]

                    Offense Is Best Missile Defense


america needs a system to protect deployed troops, but should take out 
                   attack capability of rogue nation

       Should the United States develop and deploy a system to 
     destroy incoming missiles fired by a rogue state, such as 
     Iran or North Korea?
       That is the issue in what the House leadership has dubbed 
     ``Defend America Week,'' as it considers legislation that 
     would deploy a missile defense system by the year 2003.
       At stake, Republicans argue, is the nation's security in a 
     world where all sorts of nations are equipping themselves 
     with or seeking weapons of mass destruction.
       Also at stake are billions of dollars, and perhaps the 
     ability of our military forces to carry out more conventional 
     missions, for the defense pot isn't likely to get much bigger 
     even if Congress votes for deployment of expensive defensive 
     missiles.
       Is such a deployment necessary? The Clinton administration 
     proposes to spend $600 million annually for five years to 
     develop a system, but not deploy it unless a clear threat 
     emerges. No nation that might pose such a threat has the 
     capability to launch a missile that can reach American 
     shores. And the best intelligence estimate is that such 
     capability is at least 15 years away.
       It should be noted that the administration does propose to 
     fund the development and deployment of a theater anti-missile 
     system to protect American military forces overseas from 
     attacks such as those by Scud missiles we saw during the 
     Persian Gulf War.
       Not only is there no immediate threat that would require 
     deployment of a national missile-defense system, the so-
     called ``Defend America Act'' doesn't even define the type of 
     system that would be developed or deployed. That suggests a 
     considerable gap between the idea and an actual system 
     capable of picking off a missile before it inflicts harm on 
     this country.
       Indeed, one of the arguments against early deployment is 
     that the pace of technology could well render such a system 
     obsolete in the estimated three years required for it to 
     become operational.
       The costs are not inconsequential. Deployment of even a 
     modest, single site, ground-based system could amount to $5 
     billion, though it would be of doubtful worth. A more 
     ambitious system would cost on the order of $25 billion. A 
     multi-site system could run $44 billion or more, but would 
     also violate the ABM treaty with Russia, which limits each 
     country to one ABM site.
       More to the point, if a nation hostile to the United States 
     should acquire the capability to send a missile our way, dare 
     we wait until it is fired and see if our missile defense 
     system actually works? Or would we in fact use other military 
     means to go in and put it out of commission before it was 
     fired?
       The answer surely is that you do not place the fate of 
     thousands of American lives on unproven technology of 
     uncertain proficiency. You eliminate the threat before it 
     eliminates you, a strategy that would make deployment of a 
     missile defense system pointless and redundant.

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from 
Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe, a member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oklahoma, Mr. Inhofe, is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for yielding.
  We are in the middle of a debate we have heard over and over. I do 
not think I have heard anything today or yesterday that I have not 
heard already and we have not discussed at some length.
  The Senator from New Mexico mis-characterizes the threat that exists 
out there. I hope we can go back and recall some of that debate because 
it started, in characterizing the threat, 2 years ago, when James 
Woolsey, who has already been identified as the CIA Director under 
President Clinton, who has stated that we know of between 20 and 25 
nations that have or are in the final stages of developing weapons of 
mass destruction, either biological, chemical, or nuclear, and are 
developing the missile means in delivering those weapons. He said this 
2 years ago.
  I suggest that those who look wistfully back and say, ``Isn't it 
wonderful that the cold war is over,'' that the threat could very 
easily be, and I think it is, greater than it was during the cold war. 
During the cold war, we had the U.S.S.R. and the United States as two 
superpowers. So it made some sense to some people to come up with 
agreements to downgrade nuclear capability because there were only two 
nuclear superpowers out there. But if we are talking about 25 to 30 
nations now and we establish some type of relationship with Russia, 
since the U.S.S.R. is no longer in existence, then we still have 25 or 
30 other nations that are building up their nuclear capability at the 
same time we are tearing ours down.
  Is the threat out there? The Russians have the SS-25, the SS-18, 
which is a MIRV'd missile, I think, with 10 warheads. They have the 
capability of launching. And North Korea's Taepo Dong II missile that 
the Senator from New Mexico talked about, that is something that the 
experts say is within 5 years--and I have heard lower figures than 
that--of being able to reach the United States. We are talking about 
technology that exists. We are talking about missiles that can reach 
long distances and can reach the United States from such places as 
China, Russia, and North Korea.
  I also suggest that we do not need to talk about the gross national 
product of North Korea. That should not enter into this debate. I do 
not care what their gross national product is. If they have a Taepo 
Dong II missile that can reach the United States, it only takes one. 
Coming from Oklahoma, I can tell you, one bomb is enough.
  So when you look at the threat, I think you need to consult the 
individuals who are the experts and the ones who said we know what 
capability is there.
  We have had this debate already. We had this debate in 1991. We 
decided we would protect ourselves against the threat of a missile 
attack by the year 1996. Here it is 1996.
  We are having this debate again. Technology has improved. As far as 
the Senator from New Mexico's statement about hitting a bullet with a 
bullet--yes, that is a difficult thing, but there is not a person in 
the United States who was not watching CNN during the Persian Gulf war, 
and we all saw Patriot bullets hitting Scud bullets. That was 5 years 
ago. Mr. President, we can hit a bullet with a bullet.
  When you are talking about the proper function of Government, I 
cannot think of any function that is more significant than protecting 
the citizens of the United States.
  We had a lot of discussion about the cost of this. I hear these 
figures being batted around, $30 and $60 billion. The fact is we 
already have somewhere between $44 and $50 billion invested in our 
Aegis ships. We have 22 cruisers and destroyers already floating out 
there with launching capability.
  We want to get them upgraded so they can reach up into the upper tier 
and defend us against missile attack. I do not see anything un-American 
about that. That money has already been spent. We have that investment. 
We are down now to a very small amount of money that could bring us to 
the reality of being able to defend ourselves.
  Here is Team B of the Heritage Foundation, which is made up of a lot 
of very knowledgeable people, such as Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, former 
SDIO Director and Associate NASA Administrator, and Lt. Gen. Daniel 
Graham, the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
  We have all of these people sitting down determining the cost of 
actually coming up with a system that will protect America using the 
Navy's Aegis system. They say it is going to be somewhere in the 
neighborhood of $3 billion, plus $5 billion if we are going to field 
the satellites we need to be able to detect where one of these missiles 
is launched.
  To be able to use our satellites to detect a missile that is coming 
toward the United States will cost, according to the Heritage experts, 
approximately $5 billion. If you take the CBO report and look at what 
it really says--and they talk about the figures $31 to $60 billion--
what they are talking about is if you want to buy every available 
missile defense technology there is.
  What we are suggesting in this bill right here is that the President 
and the Secretary of Defense look at all the technology, look at the 
land-launched missiles, look at the Navy's Aegis system and space 
systems and pick the right combination that will defend America.
  What the CBO did was to add up the cost as if we adopted everything. 
It is like going into a used car lot and buying every car in the lot, 
not just the one that is going to take care of our needs.
  So the cost is not that much. If the CBO is right, and if it is 
between the $30 and $60 billion--let us assume it is $40 billion--that 
is the total cost from 1997 to the year 2010. That is 14 years.

[[Page S5729]]

 So we would be taking approximately $3 billion a year.
  The Senator from North Dakota talked about the fact that there was 
not any real threat from North Korea. I suggest that the Senator go 
back and reread what Gen. Gary Luck, the United States commander in 
South Korea, came out and stated this year before the Armed Services 
Committee. He said we have very serious threats. Granted, we are 
talking about more of a theater missile problem there in Korea. But he 
said: With 37,000 Americans in South Korea, we need to start working on 
this system right now because we know what the Taepo Dong II missile is 
advancing and we know what kind of threat it will be not just to South 
Korea but to the United States.
  So I would like, rather than to listen to someone who has very little 
knowledge about the technology that is available out there, to listen 
to those who are the experts. I also add that the experts--I was very 
proud of the four chiefs of the four services the other day coming out 
and saying that out military procurement is underfunded by $20 billion 
underfunded--recognizing we in America are not paying proper attention 
to defending America. It took a lot of courage for them to say that.

  The Senator from North Dakota goes on and on talking about $60 
billion, $90 billion, large sums of money, as if none of that has 
already been spent. I suggest, Mr. President, that the vast majority of 
what we need for missile defense has been spent, that we could take the 
amount of money that has been spent and spend about 10 percent more and 
have a system in place that would be able to shoot down an ICBM missile 
if it came toward the United States.
  Coming from Oklahoma, I think I am probably a little more sensitive 
to what kind of a disaster can take place. I was there the day after 
the bombing of the Federal building in Oklahoma City. It is easy to sit 
here, read the accounts in the paper, maybe watch TV and not be too 
impressed with how personal this is. When you have a close friend whose 
son and daughter were in that building, were killed in that building, 
and they did not know it for 3 days; when you see the disaster, the 
millions of dollars that were lost, the half billion dollars that was 
identified in property damage, the 168 lives; and then you realize that 
the explosive power of the bomb that went off in Oklahoma City was 
equal to a ton of TNT, while the smallest nuclear warhead that we know 
about today that our intelligence community can document is 1 kiloton, 
a thousand times the size of the bomb that wiped out the Murrah Federal 
office building in Oklahoma City--I just say to those who like to keep 
their head in the sand, those who like to believe that there is no 
threat out there, a lot of the experts disagree with you. And what if 
you are wrong?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time has expired. Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Michigan, Senator 
Levin, had been on the floor and would like to speak. But he is not 
here now.
  Mr. KYL. If he is not here, Mr. President, I will yield 5 minutes to 
the Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi, Senator Cochran, 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from 
Arizona for yielding time to me.
  The most often heard criticisms of this legislation that have come to 
my attention and that I have read in the op-ed pieces and the 
newspapers consist generally of three main arguments: First, the system 
costs too much; second, we will violate the ABM Treaty; third, this is 
not the real threat we are dealing with right now, that it is more of a 
terrorism threat, that people could bring a nuclear weapon in a 
suitcase and put it anywhere in the United States, and that this is 
what we have to concentrate our attention on.
  Let me take those arguments and just say that on the basis of the 
facts--not the rhetoric, not the eye wash, not the double-talk, but the 
facts--before our Committee on Defense Appropriations, we have heard of 
a system that, using a sea-based system, we can deploy a missile 
defense system with existing ships, cruisers, that are now in the 
inventory of the U.S. Navy and at sea around the world that have a 
firing system that is capable of being used for launching interceptors. 
This can be deployed over a 5-year period at a cost of between $2 and 
$3 billion.
  Think about that. That is within the budget request being submitted 
by the President of the United States for missile defense. Other 
testimony came from the Air Force. The highest ranking officers of the 
Air Force described before our committee a ground-based system, the 
technology for which already exists and is proven to be very promising 
in this area. The cost? $2 to $2.5 billion. Now, come on.
  There was testimony from the Army, the highest ranking officials in 
the Army, about a ground-based system for missile defense. One estimate 
was from $5 to $7 billion over a period of years to deploy this system.
  The reason those costs are so low is because we have already invested 
substantial sums of money. Those investments are not wasted if we will 
go ahead and deploy a system in an orderly way, using the technology 
that is there.
  Second, opponents of national missile defense say we will violate the 
ABM Treaty. The Defend America Act, which I am cosponsoring, along with 
a number of other Senators, specifically provides that the President 
pursue high-level discussions with the Russian federation to achieve an 
agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of the National 
Missile Defense System being developed for deployment under section 4. 
It does not say violate the treaty. It suggests that if there is a need 
to amend the treaty to keep from violating it, the President should 
work to accomplish that objective. We do not know what the Russians 
would say to that kind of proposal, but we ought to at least explore 
it. But to say that the Defend America Act violates the ABM Treaty is 
just not true.

  Third, opponents of national missile defense say that the kind of 
threat that we are confronting right now isn't that serious. Well, it 
is. There are some 20 countries, maybe more, who either have or are in 
the process of acquiring missile technology capable of delivering 
lethal warheads, nuclear, biological, and other types of lethal 
warheads over long distances that could create mass destruction, 
putting at risk, right now, our troops in South Korea, those deployed 
in other regions of the world. Our interests everywhere are threatened.
  Now, of course, we are worried about terrorism. That is why we passed 
the antiterrorism bill the other day. Of course, we are worried about 
doing enough in terms of surveillance and keeping up with what is going 
on and what kind of threats exist against the United States and its 
citizens. That is why we have intelligence-gathering agencies. That is 
why we are urging that the President submit a request for more funds 
for these things rather than less. So we are fighting that battle. We 
are dealing with that threat. To use as an excuse that we should not 
have a missile defense system because there are other threats that may 
be more obvious, does not argue, in any way, against the passage of 
this bill. That is the point.
  I am tired of hearing these same old arguments, dredged up, reused 
and rephrased, in the New York Times editorial page and by others 
contributing their information through that source to this debate. I 
think they are wrong. They are certainly not accurate.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Cochran). The Senator has 36 minutes and 7 
seconds.
  Mr. NUNN. I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Michigan.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized for 10 
minutes.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Senate bill 1635, the so-called Defend 
America Act, is really misnamed. It should more appropriately be called 
the Reducing America's Security Act, because it would reduce our 
security by jeopardizing the massive reductions of former Soviet 
nuclear weapons that are scheduled to take place under START I and 
START II.
  Those reductions are not going to take place, we have been so 
informed, if we unilaterally commit to deploy a system which violates 
the agreement between ourselves and Russia, the ABM

[[Page S5730]]

Treaty. That is the bottom line. Everybody can try to wriggle away from 
that and try to avoid that issue if they want, but we have an agreement 
with Russia. That agreement prohibits or precludes the kind of systems 
which the Senator from Mississippi just described. Sea-based ABM 
systems are not allowed under that agreement. We have been told if we 
commit to deploy systems which violate that agreement with Russia that 
they will not proceed to dismantle weapons under START I and they will 
not ratify START II.
  That is the issue which we face. Which course of action is more in 
our security interest: proceeding with huge reductions in Russian 
nuclear weapons or violating an agreement with Russia and keeping those 
weapons in place?
  It is not whether there is a potential threat. There is a potential 
threat. The question is whether or not we address that threat in a 
rational, reasonable way, which does not create greater dangers to 
ourselves. If we address a potential threat in a way which causes 
Russia to say, ``OK, you are committing now to violate an agreement 
which you have worked out with us, and we are, therefore, going to stop 
dismantling our nuclear weapons under START I and we are not going to 
ratify START II,'' we have not only cut off our nose to spite our face, 
but we have produced a far more threatening situation involving 
thousands of nuclear weapons which will continue to exist, which 
otherwise will be dismantled.
  Now, that is not just Democrats in the Congress talking, and that is 
not just the administration talking. That is the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. That is the Chiefs of Staff themselves. That is our 
regional CINC's around the world. They are telling us it is not in our 
interest to proceed down the line of threatening an agreement which 
will result in Russia, saying, ``OK, if you are going to have 
prohibited defenses, then, folks, we are not going to dismantle the 
weapons that we otherwise were willing to dismantle.''

  Of course we want to defend against potential threats. But we do not 
want to do so in a way which creates worse threats for ourselves. That 
is what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is telling us. That 
is in a letter to Senator Nunn, in which he tells us that the Chairman, 
the Chiefs, the CINC's, do not approve a course of action which 
threatens to undermine an agreement that we have with Russia.
  His letter to Senator Nunn reads:

       In response to the recent letter on the Defend America Act 
     of 1996, I share congressional concern with regard to the 
     proliferation of ballistic missiles and the potential threat 
     that these missiles may present to the United States and our 
     allies.

  Then he says:

       Efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM 
     Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II and, 
     as articulated in the Soviet statement to the United States 
     of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from START 
     I.

  Continuing:

       I am concerned that failure of either START initiative will 
     result in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands 
     more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and 
     the risks that we may face.

  We have our highest uniformed military authority, not just the 
civilian heads of the Department of Defense, but our highest uniformed 
military authorities who have said they do not want us to commit now to 
deploy a system by a year certain, as this bill requires. That 
unilateral commitment to deploy a system which would violate the ABM 
Treaty, as would the system which my good friend from Mississippi just 
outlined, the sea-based ABM system, that will lead Russia to withdraw 
from START I and not ratify START II, leaving us in a much more 
threatening situation than the one which we would otherwise face.
  What the Defense Department wants us to do instead is put ourselves 
in a position where we can deploy, should the threat warrant it and 
should the costs make it cost-effective and the technology make it 
militarily effective. That is the so-called 3-plus-3 approach. It gets 
us to a position where we can decide within 3 years to have a deployed 
system within 3 additional years. But it would not commit us now, 
prematurely, to such a deployment both for the reason which I just 
gave, which is that it threatens the ABM agreement with Russia which 
has allowed them to dismantle thousands of weapons and would cause them 
to stop dismantling more, but also from the Defense Department 
perspective, it prematurely commits us to technologies before we know 
what are the best technologies in order to meet this potential threat.
  So the question is not whether we want to defend America. Of course, 
we want to defend America. The question is how best to defend America, 
how best to defend against potential threats, and how best to do so 
without creating a worse situation for ourselves. I want to emphasize 
this fact so this does not appear to be Senator Dole and Speaker 
Gingrich on the one side and the administration on the other side. This 
is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Joint Chiefs themselves.
  At the end of his letter, as he emphasized, ``I have discussed the 
above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate CINC's, and 
all are in agreement.'' What they are in agreement with is the danger 
of ruining our chances for continuing massive reductions of former 
Soviet nuclear weapons by threatening the ABM Treaty, and also in 
agreement on the administration's approach which I have just outlined, 
the so-called 3-plus-3 approach.
  There are other threats, as my good friend from Mississippi has 
pointed out. There are lots of threats, lots of terrorist threats we 
face, including threats that could come in a suitcase, threats that 
could come in trucks, threats of chemical weapons, threats of 
biological agents, and we must spend a lot more time and more resources 
addressing terrorist threats. We have to rate these threats in terms of 
likelihood.
  The head of the CIA, John Deutch, has ranked threats, and when he 
ranked the threat of terrorists using weapons of weapons of mass 
destruction, whether chemical or biological weapons or nuclear weapons, 
with the threat of ballistic missiles delivering nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction by rogue states, he listed the 
missiles delivering the weapons as a far distant third. And so we, too, 
must make decisions on allocations of resources, based on the 
likelihood of the threat. That is part of our job in Congress.
  Now, the CBO has estimated this Dole-Gingrich missile defense system 
could cost $60 billion, roughly. The CBO estimate apparently is not 
accepted by the folks who insist that we accept CBO estimates on 
everything else. I think it is obvious why there is the inconsistency 
here, and it is an inconsistency. If there is an estimate of a certain 
amount by CBO, it seems to me that we ought to be consistent and say, 
OK, if we are going to accept the CBO numbers in terms of budget 
deliberations, the estimates should be given some kind of a prima facie 
credibility in terms of other areas as well.
  So there is a significant cost here. Is it worth it? We do not know 
yet. The answer is that it may be, but may not be. If it creates a 
system which can effectively defend us from in-coming missiles, and if 
there is a real threat of those missiles coming in, and that system 
will not create worse threats than the ones we are considering, it may 
well be. So we have to weigh the likelihood of the threat.
  When is the threat likely to emerge? The CIA estimate is not in the 
next 15 years, in terms of any new states having the capability to hit 
the continental United States, other than Russia and China. And so we 
have to weigh the likelihood of those threats and the cost of defending 
against those threats against all the other aspects that go into this 
kind of a decision.
  We have other ways to defend ourselves. We have arms control and 
threat reduction efforts, like the START I and START II treaties and 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program that are leading to 
massive reductions of former Soviet nuclear weapons. We have 
deterrence, which is a very critical way of defending ourselves--
frequently not even considered anymore, but still it was the heart of 
the ABM Treaty. So there are other ways in which we can and want to and 
must defend ourselves, in addition to having some kind of an 
antiballistic missile system, as we clearly see in the case of Russia.
  There are two nations that already have such ballistic missiles: 
Russia and China. The Russians are now reducing their nuclear weapons 
under the

[[Page S5731]]

START I Treaty, and once the START II Treaty enters into force Russia 
will make even greater reductions. These two treaties will result in 
the reduction of two-thirds of the nuclear weapons that the Soviet 
Union deployed at the end of the cold war. That is a huge increase to 
our security--a two-thirds reduction in nuclear weapons. Mr. President, 
I want to emphasize that the reductions we expect from START I and 
START II will be some 6,500 nuclear weapons that were deployed as 
recently as the end of 1991--far more nuclear weapons than those of all 
the other nations combined that possess nuclear weapons.
  In addition to these reductions, the United States and Russia have 
de-targeted their missiles. That means that if there were an accidental 
launch of a Russian missile--which the intelligence community estimates 
to be a very very remote possibility--the missiles would land in the 
ocean and not on each other's territory. So we have already taken the 
most important step to reduce the risk of an accidental launch of a 
Russian missile by detargeting our missiles.
  Mr. President, Americans are understandably far more concerned about 
the threat of terrorists bringing weapons into the United States. Here 
are some polling results: 67 percent believe that it is more likely 
that the United States will be attacked by terrorists bringing weapons 
into the country than being attacked by nuclear ballistic missiles. 
Only 3 percent of those polled thought the threat of ballistic missile 
attack was more likely than terrorist attack.
  Our intelligence community has the same assessment of the relative 
likelihood of threats to our Nation. It views the threat of a terrorist 
attack in the United States using chemical or biological weapons as 
more likely than a ballistic missile attack. In testimony before the 
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations earlier 
this year, Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch said that 
terrorists would be most likely to use chemical weapons to attack the 
United States, than biological agents, and finally nuclear weapons. 
Director Deutch said that ``chemicals are the weapon of choice for a 
terrorist group.'' Nothing in this Dole-Gingrich legislation would do 
anything to prevent a terrorist attack, such as the Tokyo subway gas 
attack. This bill focuses exclusively on the much less likely prospect 
of a ballistic missile attack against the United States
  And on the view of the threat and appropriate funding level, the 
senior military leadership believe there are higher priorities that 
should be funded ahead of unrequested missile defense funds. For 
example, at the beginning of this year the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council, which is made up of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and all the Vice Chiefs of Staff, sent a memorandum to the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology stating their views 
on prioritizing and funding missile defense programs. The memorandum 
states:

       This memorandum is to inform you of the Joint Requirement 
     Oversight Council's (JROC) position of prioritizing a Theater 
     Missile Defense (TMD) capability over a National Missile 
     Defense (NMD) capability.
       The JROC believes that with the current and projected 
     ballistic missile threat, which shows Russia and China as the 
     only countries able to field a threat against the U.S. 
     homeland, the funding level for NMD should be no more than 
     $500 million per year and TMD should be no more than $2.3 
     billion per year through the FYDP [Future Years Defense 
     Plan]. Those funding levels will allow us to continue to 
     field critical TMD/NMD systems to meet the projected threats 
     and, at the same time, save dollars that can be given back to 
     the Services to be used for critical recapitalization 
     programs.
       We believe the proposed TMD/NMD acquisition levels are 
     balanced and proportional and offer great potential for 
     achieving an affordable ballistic missile defense 
     architecture that meets our joint warfighting needs.

  So these are the views of the senior military leaders. They know the 
threat and they know what is a reasonable and prudent response to the 
threat. They also know that there are more pressing defense needs on 
which to spend our limited resources than committing to spend tens of 
billions on a missile defense system in carrying out a commitment to 
deploy a system by 2003, without even knowing the results of 
development and testing. That is why they recommended these more 
prudent levels of spending, which is consistent with what the Defense 
Department requested this year.
  The (DOD) plan is to develop our missile defense technology so that 
we can make a deployment decision in 3 years if needed, and then be 
able to deploy a system after 3 more years, as early as 2003, if there 
is a threat that warrants deployment and if it is cost-effective. This 
so-called ``3 plus 3'' plan makes no commitment now to deploy. It 
commits us to improve significantly our missile defense technology and 
capability so we could deploy if and when that makes sense in terms of 
threat and costs.
  By committing now to building a system that will be operational in 
2003, the Dole bill could lock in the least capable technology and 
provide us with what the Pentagon terms a very ``thin'' system. It 
would thus deny us the ability to pick the best technology available in 
case a serious threat does emerge. The Defense Department has testified 
to Congress that for each year beyond 2003 that we wait before 
deploying a system we will increase the capability of the system we 
might not prematurely commit, but develop it properly and eventually 
build. Since there is no threat now from rogue nations, we should take 
the time to get it right in case we need to deploy. That is the 
Pentagon's plan and we should support it and reject the Dole-Gingrich 
plan.
  Mr. President: Let me cite the provisions of this legislation that 
are of greatest concern:
  Section 3 states:

       It is the policy of the United States to deploy by the end 
     of 2003 a National Missile Defense system that --
       (1) is capable of providing a highly effective defense of 
     the territory of the United States against limited, 
     unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and
       (2) will be augmented over time to provide a layered 
     defense against larger and more sophisticated threats as they 
     emerge.

  Section 4 states:

       (a) To implement the policy established in section 3(a), 
     the Secretary of Defense shall develop for deployment an 
     affordable and operationally effective National Missile 
     Defense (NMD) system which shall achieve an initial 
     operational capability (IOC) by the end of 2003.
       (b) The system to be developed for deployment shall include 
     the following elements:
       (1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage 
     of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against 
     limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile 
     attacks and includes one or more of the following:
       (A) Ground-based interceptors.
       (B) Sea-based interceptors.
       (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
       (D) Space-based directed energy systems.
  I would point out, Mr. President, that all of the last three of these 
elements are strictly prohibited by the ABM Treaty.
  Finally, Section 7 states:

       . . . Congress urges the President to pursue high-level 
     discussions with the Russian Federation to achieve an 
     agreement to amend the ABM Treaty to allow deployment of the 
     national missile defense system being developed for 
     deployment under section 4.

  Mr. President, it seems clear to me that when the bill states that 
the President would need an amendment to the ABM Treaty ``to allow 
deployment of the national missile defense system being developed for 
deployment under section 4'', as this bill does, it is an abundantly 
clear indication that the bill envisions a system that would not be 
permitted by the ABM Treaty. That is exactly what this bill is about. 
The administration sent to Congress yesterday its statement of 
administration policy concerning this bill. I will quote the first 
sentence of this administration statement. ``If S. 1635 were presented 
to the President in its current form, the President would veto the 
bill.'' Mr. President, yesterday was a historic day for U.S. and 
international security. We learned that the last of the nuclear weapons 
left over from the former Soviet Union have been removed from Ukraine. 
So Ukraine is nuclear weapon-free, as it promised. When the Soviet 
Union collapsed it gave rise to four nations with nuclear weapons on 
their soil: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In addition to 
Russia, there were suddenly three new nuclear weapon states that had 
more nuclear weapons than the rest of the other nuclear weapon states--
Britain, France and China--combined. Through hard work and cooperation, 
we are on the path to making those three states nuclear weapon free. 
Ukraine is to be commended for this

[[Page S5732]]

action. But this kind of cooperative threat reduction is not possible 
when we threaten to unilaterally violate a key treaty with Russia, or 
take actions that will jeopardize the huge reductions in former Soviet 
nuclear weapons. If we want to increase America's security, we should 
support cooperative threat reduction efforts--not threaten them. The 
Senate should reject this Dole-Gingrich legislation that would reduce 
America's security.

  Mr. President, in closing, I ask unanimous consent that three 
documents be printed into the Record at this time. One is the letter 
which I have made reference to from General Shalikashvili, which I have 
quoted. Next is the document from the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council [JROC] which has prioritized and recommended an appropriate 
level of funding for the theater missile defense and national missile 
defense programs, and other aspects, which are relevant to this debate. 
Last is a statement of administration policy regarding the Dole-
Gingrich bill.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:
                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                      Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn. In response to your recent letter on the 
     Defend America Act of 1996. I share Congressional concern 
     with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
     the potential threat these missiles may present to the United 
     States and our allies. My staff, along with the CINCs, 
     Services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
     (BMDO), is actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we 
     are prepared to field the most technologically capable 
     systems available. We also need to take into account the 
     parallel initiatives ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile 
     threat.
       In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or 
     withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian 
     ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet 
     Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt 
     Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure 
     of either START initiative will result in Russian retention 
     of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby 
     increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the 
     ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment 
     Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM 
     treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic 
     relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks 
     from rogue countries.
       In closing let me reassure you, Senator Nunn, that I will 
     use my office to ensure a timely national missile defense 
     deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed 
     the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate 
     CINCs, and all are in agreement.
           Sincerely,
     John M. Shalikashvili.
                                                                    ____

                                              The Vice Chairman of


                                    the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                                   Washington, DC.
     Memorandum for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
         and Technology.
     Subject: National missile defense.

       1. This memorandum is to inform you of The Joint 
     Requirements Oversight Councils (JROC) position of 
     prioritizing a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) capability over 
     a National Missile Defense (NMD) capability.
       2. The JROC believes that with the current and projected 
     missile threat, which shows Russia and China as the only 
     countries able to field a threat against the US homeland, the 
     funding level for NMD should be no more than $500 million per 
     year and TMD should be no more than $2.3 billion per year 
     through the FYDP. These funding levels will allow us to 
     continue to field critical TMD/NMD systems to meet the 
     projected threats and, at the same time, save dollars that 
     can be given back to the Services to be used for critical 
     recapitalization programs.
       3. We believe the proposed TMD/NMD acquisition levels are 
     balanced and proportional and offer great potential for 
     achieving an affordable ballistic missile defense 
     architecture that meets our joint warfighting needs.
     W.A. Owens,
       Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
     Thomas S. Moorman, Jr.,
       General, USAF, Vice Chief of Staff.
     J.W. Prueher,
       Admiral, US Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
     F.D. Hearney,
       Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
     Ronald H. Griffith,
       General, US Army, Vice Chief of Staff.
                                                                    ____

         Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
           and Budget,
                                     Washington, DC, June 3, 1996.

                   Statement of Administration Policy


    [This statement has been coordinated by OMB with the concerned 
                               agencies.]

     S. 1635--Defend America Act of 1996--(Sen. Dole (R) KS and 23 
         cosponsors).
       If S. 1635 were presented to the President in its current 
     form, the President would veto the bill.
       S. 1635 would commit the United States now to deployment by 
     2003 of a costly system for national missile defense (NMD) to 
     defend the United States, inter alia, from a long-range 
     missile threat from countries other than the major declared 
     nuclear powers. For the reasons explained below, committing 
     the United States now to such a deployment is not only 
     unnecessary, but could be harmful to our broader national 
     defense interests.
       The costly deployments required by S. 1635 would divert 
     vital defense funds from other more pressing defense needs. 
     The bill encourages deployment of space-based laser 
     satellites that would cost billions and would violate the ABM 
     treaty. The CBO has estimated that such an NMD would cost 
     $31-$60 billion through 2010. These amounts do not even 
     include the costs of operating and supporting such a system. 
     Such unnecessary NMD spending--within the defense budget 
     levels proposed by the Administration through 2002--would 
     jeopardize modernization efforts for other, more pressing 
     defense missions. Moreover, the budget resolutions passed by 
     the House and Senate would provide $10 to $16 billion less in 
     2001 and 2002 for defense than the Administration's budget 
     plan. Proceeding with the NMD program envisioned by this 
     bill, under these defense budget levels, would cripple 
     modernization.
       The immediate commitment to a specific system to defend 
     against a threat that does not now exist is both imprudent 
     and dangerous. By mandating an NMD deployment decision now, 
     the bill would force the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
     commit prematurely to a technological option that may be 
     outdated when the threat emerges. The bill embraces much of 
     the failed ``Star Wars'' scheme, which depends on advances in 
     technology that are at least a decade away.
       The Administration's Deployment Readiness Program will 
     continue to develop national missile defense technology for 
     three years--the minimum time needed to develop a workable 
     defense--after which time the United States can make an 
     informed decision to deploy a system by 2003 if so warranted 
     by the threat. The Intelligence Community has estimated that 
     there will be sufficient warning time to make this timetable 
     possible. This ``3+3'' approach to national missile defense 
     ensures that a system will be fielded with the best 
     technology available if and when the threat emerges. The 
     Administration approach also preserves the correct priority 
     in the Ballistic Missile Defense program. This program fully 
     funds Theater Missile Defense to defeat a threat that is here 
     and now, and complements a comprehensive defense against 
     weapons of mass destruction that includes prevention, 
     deterrence, and defense.
       Finally, by setting U.S. policy on a collision course with 
     the ABM Treaty, S. 1635 would put at risk continued Russian 
     implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification 
     of START II. These two treaties together will reduce the 
     number of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads by two-
     thirds from Cold War levels, significantly lowering the 
     threat to U.S. national security.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Ashcroft). Who yields time?
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, and I ask 
unanimous consent that the time be equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the time during the quorum 
will be charged equally to both sides.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my strong support 
for the Defend America Act. I won't comment on every aspect of this 
important legislation, but there are certain issues which bear 
highlighting.
  Although we in Alaska may sometimes wish we were further away from 
Washington, DC, I think the citizens in my State would be shocked to 
learn that this administration apparently dismisses the strategic 
importance of Alaska, the other noncontiguous State, Hawaii, and U.S. 
territories. Have President Clinton and his advisers forgotten which 
State Japan chose to strike first, and what event drove us into World 
War II?

[[Page S5733]]

  President Clinton has said, ``The possibility of a long-range missile 
attack on American soil by a rogue state is more than a decade away.'' 
This statement ignores testimony in 1994 by John Deutch, then Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, ``If North Koreans field the Taepo Dong 2 
missile, Guam, Alaska and parts of Hawaii would potentially be at 
risk.'' Does the President really mean that Alaska is not American 
soil?
  As President Clinton's first Director of the CIA, James Woolsey, 
stated,

       [T]he contiguous 48' frame of reference for this NIE 
     (National Intelligence Estimate), if the document is used as 
     a basis for drawing general policy conclusions, can lead to 
     badly distorted and minimized perception of the serious 
     threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the very 
     near future--threats to our friends, our allies, our overseas 
     bases and military forces, our overseas territories, and some 
     of the 50 states.

  Very few of those in opposition to this bill give much thought to the 
actual nature of the threat that currently exists. As I've mentioned, 
the intelligence community has documented that the North Koreans are 
developing the capability to strike my State of Alaska with 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. That is not to mention those 
nations with adequate current capability such as Russia and China or 
those nations racing to gain such technology such as Iraq, Iran, and 
Libya.
  I have heard several of my colleagues dismiss the threat from North 
Korea because that country is on the verge of collapse. I would remind 
my colleagues of some historical facts. First, North Korea has a 
history of reckless, irrational acts. This is the country which 
launched the invasion of South Korea in 1950 resulting in the deaths of 
3 million of her countrymen and more than 33,000 American troops; a 
country whose agents detonated a bomb in Rangoon killing 16 South 
Korean officials; a country whose agents blew up a Korean Airlines 
flight killing 115 passengers and crew; and a country whose military 
hacked American personnel to death in the DMZ. Using missile blackmail 
may be just the type of desperate act North Korea might try to get the 
United States to start talking about a separate defense treaty, 
something that country has sought for years.
  Third, if anything, the United States is extending the life of the 
North Korean regime by providing vast sums of free oil and expensive 
nuclear reactor technology under the terms of the agreed framework.
  So I would not be so quick to dismiss North Korea as a threat.
  An extremely important aspect of this bill is that it would allow the 
United States to act in its best interests abroad without the fear of 
having U.S. cities held hostage by hostile nations possessing 
intercontinental missiles. For instance, during the recent series of 
Chinese missile tests off the coast of Taiwan, President Clinton 
rightly sent in United States warships to stabilize the situation. 
During the crisis, a high level Chinese diplomat stated in a thinly 
veiled threat of nuclear missile blackmail that the United States would 
not come to the aid of Taiwan because it was more worried about Los 
Angeles than Taipei.
  And although we are not debating this particular aspect of missile 
defense right now, I believe Majority Leader Bob Dole was exactly right 
in his recent speech on Asia when he called on President Clinton to 
begin to work with Japan, South Korea, and our other Asian allies in 
developing, testing, and deploying ballistic missile defenses--a 
Pacific democracy defense program. I believe this concept should be 
extended to Taiwan, which we know from the recent Chinese tests of 
missiles just off Taiwan's shores, is vulnerable to missile blackmail. 
The United States is committed by law to providing for Taiwan's 
defense, but thus far, we leave her defenseless to this significant 
threat.
   Mr. President, the United States is a global power with vested 
interests both politically and commercially all over the world. We 
simply cannot allow U.S. policy to be determined by those who would 
practice missile blackmail.
  It is a fact that today in 1996, with the Soviet Union and the 
specter of communism no longer casting a shadow over global peace, the 
world is in many ways even more dangerous than when the cold war raged.
  In place of a global struggle between the West and expansionist 
communism, we now have the proliferation of weapons and missile 
technology that has the potential to make every nation hostile to the 
United States and our allies a serious threat by virtue of simply 
buying what they need on the open market. Despite very detailed arms 
control treaties that are in place, we have seen time and again, that 
nations determined to get weapons technology usually do.
  Let's take a look at Iraq, the world's most heavily inspected 
country, where United Nation's teams have been on the ground for years, 
and where we are constantly surprised by new revelations of Iraqi 
efforts to rebuild their offensive capabilities.
  During the days of the cold war, the policy of both the United 
States, and the Soviet Union was called MAD, or mutually assured 
destruction. This policy was based on mutual fear. Should the Soviets 
launch an attack on the United States, our response would have been 
reciprocal in nature. Essentially, if you attack us, we will attack 
you. The Defend America Act seeks to move us away from such a hair 
trigger defensive posture. Indeed, according to the Washington Post 
``both countries have more to fear from rogue nations than each 
other.''
  Many of those wanting to acquire ballistic missiles today, not only 
lack the stability of our old nemesis, but have actually used weapons 
of mass destruction on their neighbors and their very own citizens. 
These same countries have also stated very publicly their desire to 
purchase weapons technology that would allow them to reach the United 
States. Libya's Mu'ammar Qadhafi has often spoken of his desire to 
``have missiles that can reach New York'' to serve as a deterrent to 
United States diplomatic action.
  Most Americans will remember watching Iraqi Scud missiles rain down 
on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the gulf war. In fact, the greatest 
single loss of American life in the gulf war occurred during a Scud 
missile attack.
  The situation is so dire that the Secretary of Defense, William 
Perry, recently issued a report declaring that the proliferation of 
missile technology ``presents a grave and urgent risk to the United 
States and our citizens, allies, and troops abroad.''
  The need for a missile defense system is obvious. It would provide a 
limited defensive capability to defend the United States against a 
limited attack by a rogue nation, accidental or unauthorized launch 
against the United States.
  Lastly, I would like to address the issue of cost. This is very 
important because the opponents of this bill are making claims that 
have little to do with reality. The Congressional Budget Office did 
indeed issue a report saying that a particular configuration of a 
missile defense system could cost upward of $30 to 60 billion. However, 
if one were to actually read the bill, it does not mandate any 
particular type of system configuration. In the letter accompanying the 
report, CBO Director June O'Neill stated that the costs for such a 
system ``would be $10 billion over the next five years, or about $7 
billion more than is currently programmed for national missile 
defense.''
  The Washington Times in an article last month wrote that the 
difference of $3 billion is a hedge amount used by the CBO against 
technical or schedule risks that are typically associated with such an 
undertaking. The $31 to 60 billion numbers are for something far more 
grandiose than the bill envisions.
  I would also like to pose one question to my friends in opposition to 
this bill: What price would they place on Anchorage? Or Los Angeles or 
New York or any American city? What is the price we are ready to pay to 
protect ourselves from some maniac who finds himself in charge of 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and the means to deliver them?
  I guarantee that, God forbid, should an American city ever be hit 
like the Israeli cities were during the gulf war, there would be a hue 
and cry across this land asking why we do not put up even a limited 
defense capability when we clearly had the know-how.
  To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, the opponents of this bill seem to know 
the price of everything and the value of nothing. This bill will give 
the United States a limited capability to defend itself at a modest 
cost in an increasingly unstable world and should be passed.

[[Page S5734]]

  Thank you Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, I rise today to speak in opposition to S. 
1635, the so-called Defend America Act. I know supporters call it the 
Defend America Act, but I'm going to call it what it is--the De-Fund 
America Act.
  Why do I call it that? Because its main effect will be to add tens of 
billions of dollars, if not more, to the deficit over the next 15 
years, without increasing the security of the United States one bit.
  As a strong supporter of a balanced budget amendment to the 
Constitution, I cannot support this bill. I do not know how anyone can 
bring this fiscal black hole to the floor, and with a straight face 
bring up consideration of the balanced budget amendment in the same 
week. Something is wrong with that picture.
  As an editorial in the Des Moines Register said on May 6, 1996, 
``[b]ackers [of this version of National Missile Defense] find it most 
profitable to start with a few billion, and when it's gone, point to 
the past expenditures as justification for future shovelings down the 
same rathole.''
  The same editorial says that De-Fund America Act booster, 
Representative Curt Weldon, told industrial supporters, ``[i]f you keep 
relying on the facts and logic, then we're going to lose this battle.'' 
I couldn't agree more.
  I ask unanimous consent that the editorial be printed in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HARKIN. According to the CBO, the ballistic missile shield 
mandated by the De-Fund America Act will cost between $30 and $60 
billion just to develop and deploy. Ironically, the very same people 
who insisted that President Clinton rely on the CBO in the budget 
negotiations are the ones now claiming that the CBO can't be trusted on 
the De-Fund America Act.
  The defunders think the CBO numbers are too high. I should state here 
that I don't necessarily trust the CBO numbers either--I think the 
numbers are way too low.
  For one thing, the CBO has not yet come out with specific numbers on 
how much this technology will cost to operate, but it has told my staff 
that the operational cost will be an additional ``hundred of millions 
dollars a year during the early stages.'' I suspect the total figure 
will exceed $100 billion once all of the costs are calculated.
  Mr. President, we've already spent about $100 billion in 1996 dollars 
to build a technological defense against ballistic missiles. During the 
Reagan star wars years alone, the United States taxpayers forked over 
$38 billion. Proponents of this act are quick to point out that it is 
not star wars. And I agree. It is not even star wars. Like most 
sequels, this one is not as good as the original, and the price of 
admission has increased. The proponents of the De-Fund America Act want 
the taxpayers to fritter away another $100 billion on a still 
unrealistic but wimpier version of President Reagan's fantasy.
  The defunders also claim we have no defense against intercontinental 
ballistic missiles. Mr. President, it is true that we do not have a way 
to shoot down intercontinental missiles after they have been launched. 
But we do have a demonstrated cost-effective means of eliminating them.
  Existing arms control agreements have already resulted in the 
destruction of over 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles and over 
800 ballistic missile launchers, and the removal of over 3,800 nuclear 
warheads from deployment. Furthermore, these agreements have persuaded 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus to give up nuclear weapons altogether. 
In fact, just yesterday President Clinton announced that the last 
nuclear warhead was removed from the Ukraine.
  The De-Fund America Act is like a million-dollar mansion consisting 
of a leaky roof but no walls. It may provide very expensive protection 
from sky-diving intruders, but it leaves the occupants unprotected from 
the more mundane threats. Mr. President, Americans know all too well 
that weapons of mass destruction are more likely to arrive by rented 
truck than ICBM. Wasting $60 to $100 billion on this not-even-star-wars 
program is fiscally irresponsible.
  I urge my colleagues to oppose S. 1635, the De-Fund America Act.

                               Exhibit 1

              [From the Des Moines Register, May 6, 1996]

                        ``Defraud America Week''

       Somebody forgot to tell Congress that the Cold War ended.
       Somebody also forgot to tell Congress that even if Russia 
     were still a superpower with the demonic intention of 
     destroying the United States, a ``Star Wars'' system would 
     offer little if any defense.
       Somebody forgot to tell Congress that the nation is trying 
     to face up to its deficit problems, trying to economize by 
     dumping wasteful, illogical, unworkable projects.
       But congressional Republicans are sailing blithely onward, 
     their vision apparently clouded by the same hypnotic hype 
     that put Star Wars on the drawing boards 12 years and 29 
     billion wasted dollars ago.
       They have launched an effort to deploy a national missile 
     defense system by 2003. A spending bill comes up for 
     consideration next week.
       Total cost is unknown. Backers find it most profitable to 
     start with a few billion, and when it's gone, point to past 
     expenditures as justification for future shovelings down the 
     same rat hole.
       Whose missiles will it defend us against? Questions like 
     that are out of order. According to a publication of the 
     Union of Concerned Scientists, Pennsylvania Congressman Curt 
     Weldon, organizer of the Congressional Missile Defense 
     Caucus, told industrial supporters last year, ``If you keep 
     relying on the facts and logic, then we're going to lose this 
     battle.''
       The Star Wars pushers are calling next week ``Defend 
     America Week.'' A wag suggests ``Defraud America Week.''
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Defend America Act would put the 
United States on the right track to defending Americans against the 
threat of ballistic missile attack.
  Despite the claims of the opponents of this bill, the threat to U.S. 
citizens from ballistic missiles today is real. China and Russia 
currently possess nuclear-tipped ICBM's which could strike major United 
States cities. Press reports indicate that China is also seeking to 
increase its ICBM force by acquiring some of Russia's SS-18 ICBM's. 
More than 25 countries have or are in the process of acquiring weapons 
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.
  Yet today, America has absolutely no means of protecting our citizens 
from a ballistic missile strike. Even after a high-ranking Chinese 
official voiced a veiled threat of nuclear attack on Los Angeles, no 
one seriously believes China, or any other nation, today intends to 
launch such an attack. But the fact remains that we cannot defend our 
population from the devastating effects of an accidental launch of a 
single ballistic missile from China or Russia.
  If we do not act now, we will have no capability to protect the 
citizens of Alaska and Hawaii if North Korea were to launch its newest 
missile, the Taepo-Dong II, which may be operational in 3 to 5 years. 
And we are not taking effective action to defend against the 
proliferation of missiles and technology to rogue nations who are 
actively seeking to acquire them, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, and 
Libya.
  Mr. President, ballistic missiles are the only offensive weapons in 
the world against which our country has deliberately chosen not to 
defend itself. Why do we have no defense against the most devastating 
offensive weapon in the world today?
  There are several good reasons for deploying defenses against 
ballistic missiles. The potential for an accidental ballistic missile 
strike on the continental United States exists today, and future 
threats are emerging. Providing a credible defense against missile 
attacks would serve as an additional deterrent against their 
intentional use. In addition, defenses would help stem proliferation by 
making ballistic missiles less attractive to potential adversaries.
  Senator Dole recently called on President Clinton to apply to East 
Asia what the President recently discovered about Israel: missile 
defense is essential to our allies' security. Senator Dole urged the 
formation of a new Pacific democracy defense program with Japan, South 
Korea, and our other Asian allies to develop, test, and deploy 
ballistic missile defenses. With American leadership and know-how, we 
can create an allied missile defense network that provides protection 
for people and territory from the Aleutians to Australia. The Defend 
America Act would provide the same protection for Americans at home.
  Mr. President, the Clinton administration has tried to downplay the

[[Page S5735]]

threats from ballistic missiles and the advantages of defenses by 
issuing intelligence estimates that conclude that no new missile 
threats will exist for 10 to 15 years. This is simply wishful thinking 
that ignores current reality.
  President Clinton has stymied every effort of the Republican-led 
Congress to build a missile defense system for our Nation. He vetoed 
last year's defense authorization bill which included a provision that 
would have focused the Defense Department's missile defense program on 
building a limited defensive capability for the United States as 
rapidly as possible. President Clinton has also refused to consider 
meaningful changes to the ABM Treaty of 1972 which would permit the 
deployment of effective missile defenses for America.
  Now, the Senate Democrats refuse to allow a full debate on Senator 
Dole's bill, the Defend America Act, which would put the United States 
on a rapid track toward deploying a system to defend the American 
people against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile 
attacks. The American people should hear a full debate on this matter.
  As a fiscal conservative, I believe we must balance the clear need 
for missile defenses with our ongoing efforts to balance the Federal 
budget. We must focus on deploying an effective missile defense system 
that is affordable within the constraints of a limited defense budget 
and which is balanced against other high-priority defense programs. But 
we must remember that being a day late and a dollar short in addressing 
the ballistic missile threat to this Nation could cost far more than 
money.
  Mr. President, the fact is that an effective defense against a 
limited missile attack is both feasible and affordable. Opponents of 
any type of national missile defense have purposely misconstrued a 
recent Congressional Budget Office cost estimate of the Defend America 
Act. They have chosen the highest figure contained in the CBO report 
and are claiming that it is the cost of the missile defense system 
supported by Senator Dole and Republicans in Congress. That is patently 
false.
  Senator Dole's Defend America bill says that the United States should 
have a highly effective system to defend against limited ballistic 
missile strikes. The bill does not specify all of the components of 
such a system; it leaves that to the experts at the Pentagon.
  The CBO estimated that the missile defense system required in the 
Defend America Act would cost less than $14 billion over the next 13 
years--or about a billion dollars a year. That is less than one-half of 
1 percent of the annual defense budget, now about $267 billion. 
Compared to the cost of the Seawolf submarine, $2.5 billion per 
submarine, or the B-2 bomber, over $1 billion per aircraft, $1 billion 
a year to defend all of America from the devastation of a ballistic 
missile strike is clearly affordable.
  The Pentagon has also proposed some very cost-effective initial 
missile defense systems. The Air Force has proposed a 20-interceptor 
system that would cost about $2.25 billion and could be deployed in 
just 4 years. The Army has a more extensive 100-interceptor system that 
would cost about $5 billion. Last year, the Clinton administration's 
Secretary of Defense said it could be done for about $5 billion.
  The Defend America Act does state that, as threats emerge in the 
future, the United States should have a more capable, layered missile 
defense system. CBO estimated the cost of a robust layered system at 
$31 to $60 billion. That estimate assumes we would decide to deploy 
space-based interceptors, space-based lasers, and just about every 
other possible technology. But nothing in the bill requires those 
technologies to be included in a missile defense system, unless the 
threat clearly justifies their deployment.
  Mr. President, the Clinton administration's false confidence that 
America is safe from missile attack jeopardizes the safety of all 
Americans. The Republican Congress, led by Senator Dole, is prepared to 
provide for America's common defense, a duty set forth in the 
Constitution. It is time we deployed a system that will defend 
Americans at home.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it is unfortunate that we need to vote on a 
motion to proceed to legislation dealing with an issue so critical to 
America's future as national missile defense. In his speech to the 
Coast Guard Academy, the President stated that he supports missile 
defense. Yet, today I expect that a majority of the other side of the 
aisle--at the Clinton administration's request--will vote against the 
motion to proceed to the Defend America Act. The fact is that the 
President speaks of his support for national missile defense, but acts 
in opposition to it. Last year the President vetoed the Defense 
authorization bill specifically citing the provision making it U.S. 
policy to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. Many of my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle also profess their support of 
missile defense but are quick to add that they cannot support this 
bill. It is hard to understand their reasons. They cite technological 
questions, mention costs, but ignore the fact that this bill puts the 
very decision of what system is chosen in the hands of President 
Clinton's own Secretary of Defense. That leads me to one conclusion: 
The Clinton administration and its allies seek to avoid debate on 
defending America. This is unfortunate and irresponsible. I believe 
that an open debate and discussion on this national security issue is 
vitally important because there are many misconceptions--about the 
threat our Nation faces, about the present state of our missile defense 
programs, about the cost of an effective national missile defense 
system.
  The greatest misconception held by a majority of the American people 
is that the United States can defend itself against ballistic missile 
attack. Most Americans think that if a ballistic missile is fired at 
the United States, we can shoot it down. The truth is, we cannot. We 
have no defense--I repeat--no defense against ballistic missiles.
  As we enter the 21st century, there is no greater threat to our 
Nation, than that posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them. The list of countries 
acquiring chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and ballistic 
missile technology numbers around 25 at present--and is steadily 
growing. President Clinton's former CIA Director, Jim Woolsey, 
testified at length to the Congress on the nature of the proliferation 
threat and was critical of recent intelligence estimates which were 
narrowly focused and based on questionable assumptions. You would not 
know from some of today's remarks by opponents of the Defend America 
Act that the cold war is over. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Yet, 
the Clinton administration, some on the other side of the aisle--and 
even some members of the press--are acting as if we are still in the 
1970's and 1980's. They speak of star wars, space shields, mutual 
assured destruction. But, the world has changed. We must look to the 
future, not the past.
  I would like to quote from one of the key Clinton administration arms 
control experts, Mr. Bob Bell. He is quoted in today's Washington Post 
defending changes being made to the Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] 
Treaty, saying ``* * * were we going to take account of this change in 
the stra- tegic situation over the last five years * * *?''
  That is what we are talking about here--taking account of the change 
in the strategic situation. This bill recognizes that the threat our 
country faces has changed and it seeks to respond to it in a measured 
and responsible fashion.
  The Defend America Act does not require abrogation of the ABM Treaty. 
It urges the President to negotiate with the Russians on changes to the 
ABM Treaty--just as the administration has been doing with other arms 
control treaties only at the Russians' request. Which makes me wonder 
if the Russians asked for changes to the ABM Treaty would the Clinton 
administration have a different position?
  As for our ability to defend America--there should be no doubt that 
we have the technological capability to effectively defend our citizens 
from the growing threat of ballistic missiles. What is needed is the 
will and leadership to deploy an effective national missile defense 
system by 2003. A national missile defense system cannot be built 
overnight. The development and production of new tanks, new

[[Page S5736]]

fighter planes takes years. And, when these new weapons systems, for 
example the Stealth fighter, are finally deployed they are not 
obsolete.
  Finally, on the matter of cost. The CBO estimates are so wide ranging 
that they are almost irrelevant as a guide to decisionmakers. We need 
to look at our defense needs and affordability. And an effective 
national missile defense system can be deployed affordably. One can add 
any number of unnecessary requirements to a number of weapons system 
thereby making them unaffordable. This is no different than building a 
house. A family of four probably needs a three bedroom home--not a 10-
bedroom mansion. This does not mean that a 10-bedroom house cannot be 
built--if one has the money.
  Mr. President, let us get past the distortions and the hollow 
rhetoric and move toward a serious debate on defending America. I would 
like to quote from a great western leader, former Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher:

       With the collapse of the Soviet Union there was also a 
     dispersal of weapons of mass destruction and of the 
     technologies to produce them. This has gone much further than 
     we envisaged; and it now constitutes quite simply the most 
     dangerous threat of our times. Yet there is still a 
     conspiracy of silence among Western governments and analysts 
     about it.

  Mr. President, let us end the conspiracy of silence. The American 
people deserve better. The most basic responsibility our Government has 
to its citizens is to protect them from harm. To ignore the changing 
world and cling to past thinking is inexcusable.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise today to present some brief remarks 
about the latest Republican missile defense proposal, the Defend 
America Act. Though I have spoken at some length on missile defense 
issues and the Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty--see Congressional 
Record, September 6, 1995, p. S-12659-12667, and August 3, 1995, p. 
11253-11255--I want to take this opportunity to explain how it is not 
only possible for a patriotic U.S. Senator to vote against a bill 
bearing such a proud title, but to do so without hesitation.
  In good conscience, I just do not believe that the national security 
interests of the United States would be advanced by this legislation 
and would like now to outline my reasons why I have come to this 
conclusion.


                             the abm treaty

  First, I believe the ABM Treaty is worth preserving. This bill sets a 
course that will lead inevitably to a U.S. departure from that treaty. 
this is reason enough to oppose this bill.
  The ABM Treaty has advanced U.S. security interests and it has done 
so without unilaterally restricting America's ability to defend itself, 
as some of the treaty's critics have suggested. Critics forget that the 
treaty is bilateral and has substantially restricted Russia's freedom 
both to deploy its own defenses against or strategic missiles and to 
proliferate strategic missile defense systems to other countries. The 
demise of the ABM Treaty would release Russia from those restrictions. 
The treaty has worked to help preserve and stabilize nuclear 
deterrence, which remains a vital element in maintaining our national 
security even in a post-cold-war world.
  I do not believe that the treaty has unduly restricted U.S. missile 
defense options. We have already spent a fortune on missile defense and 
have little to show for it. A recent study by the Brookings Institution 
has concluded that America has already spent some $99 billion dollars 
on missile defense since 1962. and contrary to the blanket claim by 
some of the proponents of the pending legislation, our Government is 
aggressively working to improve U.S. defenses against theater missile 
attacks. Indeed, it is the present administration that is spearheading 
our national effort to place theater missile defense at the forefront 
of our missile defense priorities. Because the ABM Treaty does not 
prohibit the United States from investing in theater missile defenses, 
the treaty is an inappropriate target of the repeated Republican 
attacks we have been seeing in recent years.
  The ABM Treaty is not unchangeable. It has specific provisions for 
consultations leading to amendments of the treaty. These provisions do 
not include, however, the freedom for one side to pass legislation 
unilaterally reinterpreting key provisions of the treaty. The current 
bill, however, accelerates the deployment of antiballistic missile 
systems that have capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles. It 
also specifically includes air-based, space-based, and all ground-based 
interceptors as elements of the national missile defense architecture, 
despite the requirement in the ABM Treaty that such systems shall not 
be developed, tested, or deployed. I believe that America's interests 
are best preserved by sticking to the consultative procedures provided 
in the ABM Treaty and for adapting the treaty to changing conditions 
only via this process of mutual agreement.


                                  cost

  Enough has been said and written about the sky-rocketing costs of 
missile defense. I will not add much to this discussion other than to 
echo the concerns that people across the Nation have been expressing 
about the staggering $99 billion that the Brookings Institution has 
estimated that the United States has already spent since 1962 on 
missile defense systems. This, coupled with the Congressional Budget 
Office's recent estimate that the Defend America Act will cost the U.S. 
taxpayer as much as another $60 billion--and this does not include 
operation costs--leads to a form of ``sticker shock'' that comes close 
to rivaling GAO's estimated $250 billion that will be needed to clean 
up our nuclear weapons complex.
  It is worth noting here that the current U.S. funding levels and 
priorities for missile defense have been solidly and consistently 
supported by both the military and intelligence communities.


                               the threat

  Thanks to the leadership of this administration, we are focusing our 
missile defense expenditures on real threats, that is to say, theater 
missile threats, rather than nonexistent ICBM threats from so-called 
rogue nations that our entire national security establishment continues 
to define as long-term in nature. This threat definition has the 
support of the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other top 
U.S. national security officials throughout the Government. 
Incidentally, it also has the overwhelming support of editorial opinion 
from newspapers from across the country.
  The Defend America Act, however, operates from a fundamentally 
different set of assumptions. It assumes the present existence of a 
grave missile threat to America's homeland and it presumes that the 
best way to address missile threats is via expensive taxpayer-funded 
missile defense projects.
  Nobody disputes that missile proliferation is a danger that America 
must take seriously in the years ahead, and indeed, it is a deep 
awareness of this threat that has driven a wide range of U.S. efforts 
aimed at the nonproliferation of ballistic missiles. Our approach is 
not driven narrowly by the dream of a technical fix--which will 
always remain out of reach--but a combination of technological, 
political, and diplomatic efforts not just to defend ourselves against 
imminent attacks, but more importantly, to prevent the acquisition of 
destabilization missile systems in the first place, to retard or 
reverse the growth of existing missile systems, and to eliminate 
outright missile systems via multilateral negotiations.

  With respect to dealing with the missile proliferation threat, let me 
put it this way: the best Defend America Act is one that would 
strengthen export controls, strengthen sanctions, strengthen 
multilateral regimes, strengthen transparency of missile projects 
around the world, eliminate destabilizing missile systems, and improve 
U.S. capabilities to collect and to analyze data about missile 
proliferation. Yet there is absolutely nothing in this bill that 
addresses this integrated, global approach to the problem. Instead, the 
present bill proposes to force the President to throw vast sums of 
money to deploy technical fixes that are neither fixes nor based on 
proven technology.
  Small wonder that proponents of the proposed legislation are finding 
themselves defending the Defend America Act rather than elaborating a 
new road map for addressing the missile threat in a more comprehensive 
manner. A legislatively mandated deployment of a

[[Page S5737]]

national missile defense system by the year 2003 would actually 
increase the threat to the United States--it would jeopardize the 
capabilities of our nuclear deterrent force, it would be accompanied by 
an expansion of the offensive nuclear arsenals of both Russia and the 
United States, it would probably mean the end of the START process of 
strategic arms reductions, it would eliminate all hopes of getting 
nuclear arsenals, and it could well jeopardize the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, as more and more countries come to realize that 
the nuclear weapon states are not serious about implementing their arms 
control disarmament responsibilities under the treaty. To this extent, 
the Defend America Act resembles more accurately an Attack America Act.
  America has many options available to address the missile threat 
aside from the nostrums offered by star wars. Diplomatically, we are 
working to reduce and to reverse the proliferation of all weapons of 
mass destruction. Militarily, we are investing in the finest 
conventional military capabilities that exist anywhere on Earth, and 
they are backed up by the finest global intelligence capabilities on 
Earth. Why must we continually denigrate or short change these 
capabilities in congressional debates on missile defense? Advocates of 
the pending legislation appear sometimes to believe that America just 
has no option to address missile threats other than buying missile 
defense hardware. I believe we should be voting here today to expand 
our effort on the diplomatic front to address these threats, while 
maintaining our conventional military and intelligence capabilities, 
but there is nothing in this bill that would justify such a vote.


                               technology

  It is an extremely difficult and often underestimated challenge to 
use a missile to shoot down another missile. As I have mentioned 
earlier, the $99 billion our country has already spent on missile 
defense has not yet produced any comprehensive or reliable defense 
against incoming strategic missiles. It is far easier to prevent 
missile attacks by eliminating missiles, preventing their 
proliferation, and developing multilateral sanctions and export 
controls, than it is to develop and deploy a magic missile shield that 
would span our vast country.

  Even the theater missile systems--including THAAD, Navy Lower Tier, 
Navy Theater-Wide, and MEADS--that are called for in this legislation 
require substantial additional research and testing before any 
responsible deployment would be possible. PAC-III is the only one of 
the many systems identified for deployment in this bill that will be 
ready for deployment anytime soon.
  The administration has its priorities straight and I believe these 
priorities are in line with what most Americans would regard as 
prudent--we must address current threats first and keep our powder dry 
in the event future threats arise. We must redouble our diplomatic 
efforts to ensure that those threats do not arise. The current bill 
would not only aggravate the foreign missile threat, for the reasons I 
have discussed earlier, but would compel the President to deploy 
expensive and unproven missile defense systems.


                               conclusion

  For all the reasons above, I cannot support this legislation. Yet the 
debate today and various foreign and defense policy debates in recent 
months has revealed not only some severe shortcomings in this 
legislation. The debate also reveals the apparent inability of the 
Republican Party to come up with a comprehensive, integrated plan of 
action to guide America's military and diplomatic priorities over the 
course of the last Presidential term of this millennium.
  Where does the Republican Party stand on nonproliferation? What does 
it have to offer to strengthen export controls?
  What is it doing to toughen U.S. sanctions and ensure their 
implementation? Where are the Republican votes when we need them when 
it comes to strengthening sanctions and export controls?
  What is it proposing to address proliferation threats arising from 
outside the narrow domain of Russia and the rogue regimes, a field of 
vision which features a blind eye as its prominent characteristic?
  What is it offering to strengthen international organizations and 
regimes to prevent proliferation or to increase its costs?
  While the administration proceeds with diplomatic efforts to curb 
North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, what besides SDI do the 
Republicans have to offer that stands a better chance of addressing 
these threats?
  What does it propose to do about the ongoing arms race in South Asia 
involving nuclear weapons and missiles, and how will its SDI schemes 
protect our allies, including Israel, against threats from weapons of 
mass destruction that are not delivered by missiles?
  What does it offer to address the grave threats posed from expanding 
international commercial uses of plutonium, one of the deadliest 
elements on Earth?
  The answer, unfortunately, is absolutely nothing. I stand ready to 
work closely with my fellow colleagues on the other side of the aisle 
to join in forging effective responses to these threats. I know such 
cooperation is possible; indeed, none of the nonproliferation 
legislation that I have authored over the years would have been 
possible without it. But I hardly believe that there is anything in the 
Defend America Act [DAA] that offers any basis whatsoever for forging a 
bipartisan consensus.
  Because of this, Mr. President, I believe that history will relabel 
the DAA as DOA.
  Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. President, just 2 weeks ago, the Congressional 
Budget Office issued a $60 billion cost estimate for the Defend America 
Act--an ill-advised Republican effort to resurrect the discredited star 
wars missile defense system. Several days later, House Republicans 
responded to this bloated price tag by doing the right thing. They 
pulled the bill from floor consideration, and a bad idea might have 
fallen by the wayside had not the majority leader picked up what his 
House colleagues rejected as imprudent and scheduled a Senate vote on 
it for today.
  One can only speculate about the motivation behind this vote. But 
whether it is election-year politics or simply misplaced priorities, 
the Senate's course should be clear. The Defend America Act threatens 
our national security and undermines essential efforts to balance the 
federal budget. The Senate should vote it down.
  The grossly misnamed Defend America Act would be more appropriately 
entitled the Jeopardize America Act. The bill would direct the 
Department of Defense to deploy by 2003 a national missile defense 
system that allegedly would defend the United States against limited, 
unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks. That system, 
according to its promoters, could be ``augmented over time to provide a 
layered defense against larger and more sophisticated threats as they 
emerge.''
  Sound familiar?
  The bill has a certain tinny ring about it. Look closely and you will 
see that the Defend America Act is really the fifth variant of Ronald 
Reagan's failed star wars experiment. To implement this proposal, the 
act calls for changing or withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in order to 
permit the deployment of a combination of ground-, sea-, and space-
based components--a clear revival of the star wars program that 
disappeared with the end of the cold war.
  All of this is particularly disturbing when you consider that 
enactment of this legislation is both harmful to United States-Russian 
relations and, according to our own military and intelligence experts, 
unnecessary to combat the threats we are likely to face in the next 
decade or more.
  The Russians have been very clear in their views on unilateral 
tampering with the ABM Treaty to facilitate the deployment of a 
national missile defense system. In a May 1 letter to Congress, General 
John Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said:

       Efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from the ABM 
     Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START II and . 
     . . could prompt Russia to withdraw from START I. I am 
     concerned that failure of either START initiative will result 
     in Russian retention of hundreds or even thousands more 
     nuclear weapons thereby increasing both costs and risks we 
     may face.

  Compounding the arms control concerns is the timing. The Senate vote 
on

[[Page S5738]]

Defend America is scheduled just 2 weeks before the Russian elections 
so crucial to that country's continued peaceful transition to 
democracy. We have to be concerned that the Defend America Act hands 
the Communists a pre-election gift with its distinctly unpropitious 
echo of cold war antagonisms.
  What is worse, our military and intelligence experts say such 
risktaking is not warranted. According to public accounts of the 
National Intelligence Estimate, a classified consensus report by all of 
our intelligence agencies, ``no country other than the major declared 
nuclear powers will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in 
the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and 
Canada.''

  The irony of a defense system that actually threatens our security is 
only part of the story. Immediately after the first vote on the Defend 
America Act, the Senate is scheduled to vote on the balanced budget 
amendment to the Constitution. That strikes many Senators on both sides 
of the aisle as an odd sequence of events. One moment we are voting on 
a constitutional amendment to balance the budget; the next we are 
raising the deficit by tens of billions of dollars.
  Since the mid-1980's, Congress has spent nearly $40 billion on 
ballistic missile defense, and all we have to show for it are canceled 
checks from defense contractors. The Congressional Budget Office 
estimate of an additional $60 billion for this latest version of a 
highly complex, interwoven system is charitable. It covers only the 
costs to acquire the system. It fails to include either the costs to 
operate this system or cost overruns. And, if history is any guide, 
cost overruns alone for a system of this complexity could easily double 
the estimate.
  Who will pay this tab?
  Of course, in the long run it will be the American taxpayers. In the 
short run, however, either the deficit will be increased, spending will 
be slashed on important domestic priorities such as education and the 
environment, or the Defense Department will have to juggle its own 
accounts. To accommodate such a huge expense, more conventional defense 
priorities such as readiness, procurement and force structure may 
suffer.
  There is a better, less expensive and more effective way to do the 
same job.
  The President's national missile defense policy also meets any threat 
by 2003 but in a much wiser and far more fiscally responsible manner. 
It beats the Republican plan hands down on three counts.
  First, it's superior common sense. The President believes that, as 
Senator Sam Nunn notes, we should ``fly before we buy.'' At a minimum, 
we should look before we buy. Under the President's plan, we would 
continue to develop the technologies for a national missile defense 
system, then assess the situation, and deploy it only if it is needed.
  Second, it's superior technologically. The President's policy would 
allow us to develop more capable and cost-effective defense systems 
that can meet the exact nature of the threat as it emerges.
  Third, it's superior diplomatically. The President's approach would 
give us time and latitude to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty 
with the Russians that allow us to continue on the path of reducing 
Moscow's nuclear arsenal. It would not rush us headlong into an 
international arms control crisis.
  Even the Republican revolutionaries in the House had the wisdom to 
see that this bill would commit our Nation to an unwise, unaffordable, 
and dangerous policy. They scrapped it because the Defend America Act 
is indefensible.

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