[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 79 (Monday, June 3, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5672-S5690]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             DEFEND AMERICA ACT OF 1996--MOTION TO PROCEED

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will now resume consideration of 
the motion to proceed to S. 1635, which the clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       A motion to proceed to the consideration of S. 1635, a bill 
     to establish a United States policy for the deployment of a 
     national missile defense system, and for other purposes.

  The Senate resumed consideration of the motion to proceed.
  Mr. THURMOND addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, last Thursday the majority leader sought 
to proceed to the Defend America Act of 1996, but was blocked from 
doing so by those on the other side of the aisle who do not want the 
President to sign or be forced to veto this important legislation. 
These Senators may be able to block passage of the Defend America Act, 
but they will not be able to cover up the fact they and President 
Clinton have concluded that the American people should not be defended 
against ballistic missile attack.
  Of course, the President has said that he favors ballistic missile 
defense. But his actions contradict this words. Since elected, 
President Clinton has cut funding for ballistic missile defense every 
year. No program has been cut more drastically than the National 
Missile Defense Program. The Defend America Act seeks to reverse this 
disturbing trend and to set a measured course toward the deployment of 
an affordable national missile defense system to protect all Americans.
  In his recent speech to the Coast Guard Academy, President Clinton 
asserted that his fiscal year 1997 budget request includes $3 billion 
for national missile defense. In fact, it includes $2.8 billion for all 
ballistic missile defense technologies and programs and only $500 
million for national missile defense. This amount is insufficient to 
fulfill even the goals of the President's own 3-plus-3 development 
program. Ironically, if it were not for continued Republican pressure 
on the administration, the President would not have developed even this 
figleaf of a plan.
  The President and his allies in Congress have spent more time 
developing excuses for why we should not commit to a national missile 
defense deployment effort than they have in looking at the dire 
consequences of not going ahead with such a program. But like all such 
excuses, these ring hollow.
  The President and other opponents of national missile defense have 
asserted that there is no threat to justify a commitment at this time, 
that we should wait 3 years before we even begin to think about a 
deployment decision. But in 3 years, North Korea could be on the verge 
of deploying an intercontinental ballistic missile and other rogue 
countries could be well along this path.
  The opponents of national missile defense have also asserted that a 
commitment at this time could lead to technological obsolescence at the 
time the system becomes operational. If this argument were extended to 
other defense programs, we would never build another bomber, fighter, 
ship, or tank. Versions of this argument have been made time and again, 
each time opponents of a major defense program spin up the excuse 
making machine.
  A national missile defense system developed pursuant to the Defend 
America Act will be no more outdated than one developed under the 
Clinton administration's 3-plus-3 plan. In fact, it would likely be 
more modern and technologically sophisticated, given the robust testing 
and focused development called for in this legislation. Under the 
Clinton plan, technology development will languish and many companies 
will soon pull out of the business altogether. Ironically, the 
technologies that would be pursued under the Defend America Act are the 
same ones that the administration is also developing. The main 
difference is that the Defend America Act would require us to get 
serious rather than sitting on our hands as we have been doing for the 
last 3 years.

  The best way to ensure that we deploy a modern and operationally 
effective national missile defense system is to get an initial system 
fielded quickly, then upgrade and build upon this first piece as 
necessary. Contrary to what the President and his nay-saying supporters 
assert, readiness to respond to a threat does not come by keeping 
technology bottled up in a laboratory. Anyone familiar with 
manufacturing and technology development will confirm that the way to 
improve the state-of-the-art is to get started, gain operational 
knowledge, and then build on this experience in an incremental manner. 
This is the cost-effective, low-risk approach advocated in the Defend 
America Act.
  Perhaps the most telling argument made by the opponents of the Defend 
America Act is the assertion that it would threaten arms control. In 
fact, the only thing it threatens is the status quo with respect to the 
ABM Treaty. The Defend America Act does call on the President to seek 
amendments to the ABM Treaty, which most opponents do not want to see 
happen. But, since it is awkward for them to be seen as more interested 
in defending an outdated treaty than the American people, other excuses 
have to be found. Hence the argument that START II might be 
jeopardized.
  But there is no reason why the Defend America Act should in any way 
jeopardize START II or United States-Russian relations. Russia already 
has an operational national missile defense system, so obviously they 
cannot believe that such a deployment is destabilizing. More important, 
during past negotiations, Russia has demonstrated a clear willingness 
to amend the ABM Treaty. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration is 
only interested in making the ABM Treaty more restrictive rather than 
finding a way to loosen its grip on our missile defense programs. The 
fact that the United States and Russia were on the verge of agreeing to 
amend the ABM Treaty at the same time as START I was being concluded 
clearly illustrates that keeping the ABM Treaty is its current form is 
not a prerequisite for concluding strategic arms control agreements. We 
should remember that it was the Clinton administration and not the 
Russian Federation that ended the negotiations to expand our rights to 
deploy national missile defense.
  Mr. President, as I have said many times before, the Defend America 
Act is a balanced and responsible piece of legislation. I am very 
disappointed that the President is seeking to prevent the Senate from 
voting on this important bill. If he is opposed to it, it is his right 
to veto it. But the American people deserve to know the President's 
position. In my view, procedural maneuvers and misleading arguments 
will not cloak those who seek to keep America defenseless.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am going to yield to the able Senator 
from Arizona [Mr. Kyl] at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Craig). The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from South Carolina, the 
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, for yielding but also for his 
leadership in this area.
  I think two of the people who we have most to thank for bringing this 
matter to the attention of the Senate are our majority leader, Bob 
Dole, and the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator 
Thurmond. It is Senator Dole who wanted to ensure that before he left 
this body we had an opportunity to vote on and pass the Defend America 
Act. I agree with Senator Thurmond that our Senate colleagues ought to 
ensure that we

[[Page S5673]]

have an opportunity to vote on this important measure by ensuring that 
we vote for cloture tomorrow when we have that vote. So I appreciate 
Senator Thurmond's leadership on this matter.
  Mr. President, before I proceed, I ask unanimous consent that Dan 
Ciechnowski, who is a fellow in my office, be allowed floor privileges 
during the pendency of this matter.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, let me begin by discussing some of the 
details of this legislation because I think when our colleagues focus 
on precisely what it says, it is awfully hard to disagree with any of 
it. And in fact I cannot imagine that anyone would vote against the 
Defend America Act of 1996 except for purely political reasons. That 
would be most unfortunate because there is nothing more important that 
the Senate and the House and the President have as our responsibility 
than defending America. That is the first obligation of the U.S. 
Government. And to continue to allow the situation which currently 
exists, which is that the United States is totally vulnerable to a 
missile attack by any enemy in the future, is intolerable. We need to 
get about the business of ensuring that we can solve this problem, that 
we can deploy an effective system for defending against ballistic 
missiles, and the way to do that is to pass the Defend America Act. It 
is the necessary first step in this effort.
  Let me begin by noting the provisions of the act itself. And if 
anyone wants to disagree with any of these provisions, I invite them 
here to the floor to engage in that debate. I do not think anyone can 
logically disagree with the provisions of this act.
  Mr. President, people will disagree with other things. They will make 
up an argument about what we are really intending to achieve here, and 
they will argue against that. It is called red herrings. Or they will 
set up straw men which they will attempt to knock over. They will 
assert that we are trying to reestablish the Reagan administration's 
space shield to prevent a nuclear attack by the then Soviet Union. That 
is not what this is all about. They will argue about star wars. They 
will argue about $60 billion expenditures. None of that is what we are 
talking about here.
  So I am going to focus specifically on what this act says, and I 
would ask those who come to argue against it to confine their remarks 
to this act, not some perceived or imaginary piece of legislation that 
they may wish to defeat but rather that which is before us right now.

  It is called, as I said, the Defend America Act of 1996. Majority 
leader Bob Dole is the sponsor. I can think of no more fitting tribute 
to Bob Dole than for his Senate colleagues to allow us to vote on this 
important matter. They can then vote their consciences on whether they 
want to defend America or not but give the majority leader the right to 
vote on this important proposition.
  I guarantee you that if we do not have that right, Republican 
candidate Bob Dole is going to be talking to the American people 
throughout the length and the breadth of this country to remind them 
that today the United States has no ability to defend against a 
ballistic missile attack by another country.
  Mr. President, that does not have to come to China and Russia, the 
two countries that today have the capability of launching 
intercontinental ballistic missiles against the United States. It can 
come in the form of an accidental launch from one of those countries or 
another country. It can come in the form of a limited attack either 
against our troops stationed abroad, against our allies, or against 
parts of the United States that are within reach today or soon will be 
within the reach of ballistic missiles of other nations like North 
Korea, for example.
  It is interesting just parenthetically that one of the studies which 
said there was no threat to the United States in the near term, that 
is, before the end of the century, relied upon the notion that the 
definition of United States was the lower 48 States. Well, as I recall, 
Alaska and Hawaii have been States for some time now and the citizens 
of those States would be a bit surprised to learn that colleagues in 
the Senate do not think it important to defend that because they are 
not part of the lower 48.
  Mr. President, every veteran of World War II knows how the war in the 
Pacific started. It was an attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, not even 
then a State but obviously part of the United States in terms of our 
defense at risk, and we went to war over that. To suggest that because 
there is not a threat to the lower 48 States today, we should not begin 
to prepare against the contingency when that threat will exist or to 
prepare to defend other Americans who do not live in the lower 48 
States is irresponsible, and therefore I would urge my colleagues, as I 
said, to allow us to at least vote on this Defend America Act.
  Here are the findings in the act. First, that the United States has 
the technical capability to develop and deploy a national missile 
defense system.
  There is no disagreement about this. There is disagreement about 
exactly which system to deploy. The administration has its favorites. 
Others have their favorites. But there is no disagreement about the 
fact that the technology is here.
  Second, the threat posed to the United States by the proliferation of 
ballistic missiles is growing. The trend is toward longer-range 
missiles including those with intercontinental reach.
  Again, intelligence estimates make this point clear, and the 
President himself has declared an emergency based upon this threat of 
proliferation.
  Third, there are ways for determined countries to acquire 
intercontinental ballistic missiles by means other than indigenous 
development.

  Of course, that is true, and it is an important point to make because 
it is not the threat that a country beginning today will after a period 
of years figure out how to build one of these weapons, but it is also 
the case that countries around the world are trying very hard to buy 
components and even completed systems from other countries. This is why 
the sale by either Russia or China of part or whole of a missile system 
or a weapon of mass destruction is so disconcerting because countries 
do not have to develop them indigenously; they can buy them or buy the 
key components from other countries, and that is why the threat will 
occur sooner rather than later.
  Fourth, the deployment by the United States of an NMDS, National 
Missile Defense System, will help to deter countries from seeking long-
range missiles.
  That, too, should be obvious. It is clear that to the extent we have 
a defense against such weapons, it does not make sense for another 
country to expend a lot of resources to develop those kinds of systems. 
It is very much one of the reasons why the Soviet Union collapsed and 
why the Soviet Union decided at a certain point that it would not be 
able to defeat the United States militarily, notwithstanding its very 
strong intercontinental ballistic missile system, because Ronald Reagan 
was preparing to develop and eventually deploy the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, a system which would have been able to thwart such attack--
not defeat it completely but to preclude it from succeeding completely 
and therefore allowing the United States the opportunity to respond 
with our own offensive deterrent capability. And that potential for 
development of SDI, as it was then called, was enough to cause the 
Russians to throw in the towel with respect to that matter. And it was 
one of the reasons why the Soviet Union eventually collapsed.
  And that is not just me talking. There are several Russians who were 
in power at the time who confirmed the fact. The same thing is true of 
much less powerful and less wealthy nations than the Soviet Union of 
old, talking about countries like Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, 
countries that may well desire to develop these weapons today knowing 
that we have no defense against them but if we had such a defense would 
perhaps turn their attentions elsewhere.
  The next point of the bill is that the danger of an accidental 
missile launch has not disappeared and deployment of an NMD system will 
reduce concerns about this threat. That should be obvious and require 
no further explanation.
  Next. Deployment of an NMD system can enhance stability in the post-
cold-war era. The United States and Russia

[[Page S5674]]

should welcome the opportunity to reduce reliance on threats of nuclear 
retaliation as the sole basis of stability.
  This should be obvious, Mr. President, but it is interesting, and 
even paradoxical, I would say, that there are still some people in the 
Government and perhaps even here in the Congress who believe we are 
more stable in an unstable environment than we are in a stable 
environment.
  That may sound counterintuitive, but there used to be an argument 
that if we were very vulnerable to an attack and if our opponent at 
that time, the Soviet Union, was also very vulnerable to an attack, 
that neither one of us would dare to attack each other. It was called 
``mutual assured destruction.'' If they would attack us, then we would 
attack them, and we would both destroy each other. Some people believe 
that was one of the factors that precluded either country from 
attacking the other during the cold war, and it may have had some 
impact.
  But that is no longer the situation we face today, Mr. President. 
There is no longer a Soviet Union threatening to destroy the United 
States, and certainly we have no pretensions in that regard. There is a 
Russia with a lot of nuclear weapons, some of which could, by mistake, 
be launched against the United States; some of which could, by mistake, 
find their way to the hands of people who are not very friendly to us. 
Certainly the Chinese are developing weapons that they do not have a 
need to develop.
  But the real threat today is from countries arrayed around the world 
that would do us harm, that have foreign policy interests inimical to 
ours, and that would use these weapons as threats. They are weaker 
countries than ours. We do not have to worry about them attacking us 
with these missiles in order to defeat us militarily. That is not the 
point. The concern is they would use these missiles in order to thwart 
us from achieving our foreign policy goals.
  For example, we know 5 years ago during the time of the gulf war, the 
vote in Congress to try to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait was a very 
close vote in both the House and the Senate. Among the concerns people 
had was the threat of loss of life to the U.S. military in trying to 
repel Saddam Hussein. If we had known at that time that Saddam had a 
nuclear weapon capability and the missiles to deliver those weapons--
not just to the United States but, let us say, to Israel, to London, to 
Rome, to Paris, to Cairo, wherever--would the United States Congress, 
knowing that, have then decided to vote to use military force to repel 
Saddam Hussein? I think it is a very close question, and I am not 
certain what the answer would have been.
  Put it another way. Would the European allies who joined what was 
then called the ``grand coalition of nations'' to defeat Saddam 
Hussein, knowing he had weapons that could reach their capital cities, 
would they have been as willing to come to the aid of Kuwait in that 
instance? I think the answer is obvious.
  The point is that countries who would use these weapons today would 
use them, not in an all-out attack on the United States--nobody is 
suggesting that--but as a means, in effect, of blackmailing the United 
States. The most recent expression of this was a Chinese leader who 
said, with respect to the desire of the United States to come to the 
aid of Taiwan, ``You better think twice about this, because we really 
do not think that Taiwan is as important to you as the lives of the 
people in Los Angeles.'' Would the United States be willing to go to 
war to protect Taiwan if it knew that China would launch a missile 
against the people of Los Angeles?
  Well, it causes you to think. Any President of the United States 
would have to think very, very carefully about asking the Congress for 
authority to use force in a situation that did not directly involve the 
United States if the force that we were attempting to take action 
against, or might take action against, if that country had a nuclear 
weapon or a chemical or biological weapon that could be delivered to a 
United States city or to the city of an ally in Europe or some other 
place in the world. That is the threat that currently exists and that 
will exist in the near term before those missiles have the capability 
of hitting the United States.

  And, yes, Alaska and Hawaii are a part of the United States. The 
North Korean missile will be able to hit those States before it will be 
able to hit, I suppose, California or Arizona or Idaho. But that is 
still part of the United States, and therefore the threat is sooner and 
closer, not farther away.
  In any event, I think it is fairly clear that both the United States 
and Russia should welcome the opportunity to reduce the reliance on 
threats of nuclear retaliation as the sole basis of stability, because 
it is not realistic to expect that the United States would obliterate 
the people of Iraq, for example, with nuclear weapons if Saddam were to 
engage in some other act of aggression in the Middle East today. It is 
just not realistic to expect that the United States would do that.
  Finally, the authors of the ABM Treaty envisioned the need to change 
the treaty as circumstances changed, and they provide the mechanisms to 
do so in the treaty. We note that in the findings of the Defend America 
Act. Then we say the United States and Russia previously considered 
such changes and should do so again.
  As we note later on in the act, it may be necessary for us to 
approach the Russians to discuss questions of amending the ABM Treaty 
so that both of our nations will be free of the constraints currently 
imposed by that treaty that do not permit us to defend ourselves 
against missile attack, or at least adequately defend ourselves.
  Next we come to the National Missile Defense Policy. There are two 
specific policy goals stated in the act. The first is the deployment by 
the end of the year 2003--that is 8 years from now--of an NMD system--

       . . . capable of providing a highly-effective defense of 
     the territory of the United States against limited, 
     unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and
       (2) [which] will be augmented over time to provide a 
     layered defense against larger and more sophisticated 
     ballistic missile threats as they emerge.

  The second goal or policy is:

       . . . cooperative transition to a regime that does not 
     feature an offensive-only form of deterrence as the basis for 
     strategic stability.

  Let me take them in reverse order. The second is one I already 
discussed, cooperatively transitioning to a situation in which the 
powers of the world are not engaged in threats against each other as 
the method by which to deter an attack against them; the idea that if 
you attack us, we will attack you. There ought to be a more humane and 
logical way of keeping peace in the world, and that is to have the 
capability of defending ourselves as the best way of deterring an 
attack.
  That is so for an additional reason that should be obvious, but I 
will simply note it quickly. There are a lot of regimes in the world 
today that do not have the stability and the interest in peace that the 
United States and the Soviet Union had during the cold war. As 
belligerent as we believed the Soviet Union was, we recognized that it 
was led by rational people who understood the enormous power of nuclear 
weapons and the devastation and the tragedy that could be loosed on 
the world if they were ever to pull the trigger of those weapons. That 
is why they were not used.

  That same cannot be said for some of the leaders today. There are 
people in the world today, leaders who have already said that, if they 
had the ballistic missile capability, they would use it against the 
United States. Mu'ammar Qadhafi of Libya is one such person who has 
said precisely that. I think there is no doubt that countries led by 
the current leaders of Iraq, Iran, and perhaps other nations--North 
Korea is certainly not a stable nation today either and other countries 
could evolve in the future--do not have the same degree of stability 
that the United States and the Soviet Union had in the past. To rely 
upon the idea of deterrence without defense, given these kinds of 
regimes loose in the world today, is clearly not in the best interests 
of the people of the United States.
  Let me get to the first of the policy goals, because there is some 
disagreement about this goal. It has really three components to it. 
First of all, deployment by the end of the year 2003 of an NMD system. 
Opponents say 2003 is too specific, it is too soon, we really need more 
time. If we had more time we could develop an even better system.

[[Page S5675]]

  Mr. President, I am guilty of that same kind of logic when it comes 
to buying computers. There is going to be a better computer 6 months 
from now and a year from now. If we maintain that point of view, of 
course, we would never buy a computer. I know the same thing is true 
about cars. It is true about virtually everything in our technology 
area today. But when it comes to defending ourselves against ballistic 
missile attack, when the threat is here and now and certainly will be 
before us by the year 2003, I do not think it makes sense to say let us 
wait a little longer because better technology will come along in the 
future.
  Sure it will. That is why we say in the act that we should deploy a 
system by the year 2003 with the capability of adding additional layers 
and technology as time goes on and as threats evolve. That is precisely 
why we say let us start now with something that is relatively simple 
and have the capability of making it more robust as the threats further 
clarify and emerge and as we have the capability of doing so.
  What is the capability that people argue about? We say deployment by 
the end of 2003 of an NMD system capable of providing a highly 
effective defense of U.S. territory. Any argument about that, providing 
a highly effective defense of U.S. territory?

       . . . against limited, unauthorized or accidental ballistic 
     missile attacks;

  Is there any reason why we should not provide defense against those 
three things? Are they all three legitimate threats? Yes, any 
intelligence source will identify ``limited, unauthorized or accidental 
ballistic missile attacks'' threats in the near term.
  The third principle is:

       . . . and will be augmented over time to provide a layered 
     defense as larger and more sophisticated threats emerge.

  Precisely as I said before: The goal is to employ what we can at the 
time a limited threat is before us, to be able to meet that threat and 
then build on that system as our capabilities increase and as threats 
might later emerge. Those are the two policy goals in the bill.
  What do we call for in terms of architecture? There has been a lot of 
criticism of the bill on the ground it is going to cost too much. That 
is literally untrue, because the bill does not identify a particular 
system. It is like going to a broker, as Majority Leader Bob Dole has 
said. I go to a real estate broker and say, ``I would like to buy a 
house.'' The broker says, ``I can get you one for $40,000 or I can get 
you one for $4 million. Which do you want?''
  Obviously, there is a big range between $40,000 and $4 million in 
houses, just as there is a big range in the kind of thing we could buy 
here to defend ourselves, and it certainly depends on the kind of 
threat we see emerging, the degree of our technology we want to put in 
place at any given time and a variety of other factors.
  What we said is the President should decide. So if the President and 
his supporters claim it is going to cost too much, it is because they 
choose a system that is going to cost too much, because the bill allows 
the President to decide which system to buy and which system to deploy.
  You cannot have it both ways, Mr. President. You cannot say you want 
the ability to decide which system and then also say that it is going 
to cost too much. If it costs too much, it is only because you bought 
one that costs too much.
  But the reality is, we are all pretty much agreed on what we need, 
and it is not too expensive. My guess is it will be less than $2 
billion a year for the next 10 years out of a defense budget of $265 
billion each year. That is not too much to pay to protect the American 
people from attack.
  In any event, what we call for here is components which would be 
developed for deployment and would include the following things:

       (1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage 
     of the United States . . .

  Obviously, you want to optimize coverage. A single ground site would 
not optimize coverage. That is all that is allowed by the ABM Treaty, 
and that is why we have to deal with the ABM Treaty later on. We say it 
can be either ground based, sea based or space based, or any 
combination of these basing modes.
  Typically, the criticism of the Missile Defense Act is we are talking 
about star wars, a massive shield of space-based satellites that would 
protect the United States from any conceivable attack. That is what was 
contemplated back during the cold war when the threat from the Soviet 
Union required us to develop that degree of protection. That is no 
longer necessary. Nobody is talking about that, and that is why we 
say either ground based, sea based or space based, or any combination 
of these.

  Probably what would be developed first is a sea-based system or a 
ground-based system, and then later they would be integrated. The only 
components in space, at least to begin with, is the satellite that 
detects the launch. We already have that, and everyone agrees that we 
need to have a satellite in space that can detect a launch, wherever it 
might occur, and communicate the information about that launch to the 
system, whichever it is, sea-based or ground-based.
  Obviously, we need fixed-based ground radars. If we have a sea-based 
system, we also need radars on our Aegis cruisers. We already have 
them, so that is a zero-cost investment. We have 40-plus Aegis cruisers 
and destroyers out there with this radar already on there, and fixed 
ground-based radars already exist.
  We need space based, including a space and missile tracking system. 
This is a satellite that would be able to detect a launch and 
communicate that information as it tracks the adversary's missile 
through space.
  Finally, battle management, command, control, and communications. 
Everybody understands the need for that.
  Those are the components. Nothing new there, nothing wild, nothing 
exorbitant, no space shield, as some people have suggested.
  Section 5 of the bill talks about implementation of the National 
Missile Defense System and specifies certain actions that the Secretary 
of Defense must take in implementing the NMD policy. This is an area 
where there is some disagreement, because we say specifically the 
President should initiate actions necessary to meet the deployment 
goal. That includes conducting by the end of 1998 an integrated systems 
test. This is one of the milestones, one of the mileposts, along with 
actually deploying a system that would need to be achieved in order to 
achieve the deployment by the year 2003.
  We talk about using streamlined acquisition procedures. I do not know 
who can disagree with that. That will certainly save money and time.
  Finally, we talk about developing a follow-on NMD program. Some 
opponents find this, and say, ``Aha, we finally discovered the problem 
with your Defend America Act, because you require a follow-on NMD 
program.''
  All that means is we are not going to freeze everything in place and 
forget about the development of future threats. We are going to provide 
for the technology to meet those threats as they evolve. That is all 
that means.
  Section 6 of the bill requires a report on the plan for NMD 
development and deployment. It requires the Secretary of Defense to 
submit a report to Congress by March 15, 1997, which addresses the 
following matters:
  First, the Secretary's plan for implementing the NMD policy, 
including a description and discussion of the NMD architecture 
selected. That should not be any problem.
  Second, the Secretary's estimate of the cost associated with the NMD. 
Tell us how much the system you choose is going to cost.
  Third, an analysis of follow-on options. We need that to evaluate 
properly what we are going to have to spend and develop in the future.
  Finally, a point at which NMD development would conflict with the ABM 
Treaty. This is very important, because some people rightly say there 
is a point beyond which the United States could be in violation of the 
ABM Treaty if we deploy a system that is capable of defending us.

  That is true. Unfortunately, the irony is the only kind of system 
that is permitted under the treaty today probably would not defend the 
entire United States, at least very effectively, at least against much 
of a threat. That is why most everyone agrees we need more than a 
single site, land-based system. To do that, we have to reopen the ABM 
Treaty, and that gets us into section 7, policy regarding the ABM 
Treaty.

[[Page S5676]]

  Let me back up. The bill itself notes there is already in the ABM 
Treaty a policy established for amending and otherwise dealing with 
changes to the treaty. They include the following:
  We would urge the President to pursue high-level discussions with 
Russia to amend the ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty allows for its 
amendment.
  Second, any amendment must be submitted for advice and consent to the 
Senate. Everyone knows that.
  Third, the bill calls for the President and the Congress to withdraw 
from the treaty if amendments are not produced within 1 year. That, 
too, is called for in the ABM Treaty. If it is in the interest of the 
United States to withdraw from the treaty because we have not been able 
to amend it to our satisfaction, then we have that right under the 
treaty.
  What the bill calls for is a longer period of time, 1 year, than the 
treaty itself calls for, 6 months. So, Mr. President, I do not see how 
anyone could object to the language in the Defend America Act that says 
we tried to amend the treaty, if we need to, and if we cannot, then 
after a year withdraw from it. Frankly, I would be in favor withdrawing 
earlier than a year, but we provide that much leeway to the President 
of the United States.
  I have now described the act, Mr. President. What is there to 
disagree with here? The only thing, as I said, I think a reasonable 
person could disagree with is the specifying of the year 2003 for the 
actual deployment of a system, and on that reasonable people could 
differ.
  Should it be 2003? Should it be the year 2000? Should it be the year 
2005? Or should it be a flexible date? Reasonable people can differ 
about that.
  As to everything else in here, I fail to see how any reasonable 
person interested in the defense of the United States could find 
disagreement with the words of this act. I really challenge my 
colleagues to come down here and point out what they would disagree 
with except for this date of 2003.

  Let me address that again just a little bit. As I said before, one of 
the arguments is if we lock that date in we will be locking in 
technology. That is true with any system that we ever have purchased on 
defense. But sometimes threats are upon us and we have to go with what 
we have.
  We have been working on missile defense for a long time. In fact, one 
of the criticisms of the missile defense program is we have been 
spending $30 billion on this for well over a decade. That is true. And 
critics say we do not have anything to show for it. That is not true. 
We have a lot to show for it.
  We have a lot of technology that is just ready to be developed and 
deployed if somebody will just let us do it. That is what this act 
finally says: You have been critical of us for spending the money and 
not developing or deploying it. All right. Agree with us that we are 
going to get on with the job.
  The only way to do that is to specify a date, because if we do not, 
Mr. President, we will continue to go on and on and on and on without 
ever deploying, always saying, ``Well, there's something just right 
around the corner that is even better.'' It is a Catch-22 for those of 
us who support missile defense. We say, ``OK, we'll wait for something 
better.'' And our critics say, ``You haven't deployed any, and you've 
gone at it for 15 years and spent $30 billion.''
  Mr. President, my point is, let us set a date, take the technology we 
have in hand, which is very good, and plenty good to defeat the kind of 
missile technology that would be used against us in the foreseeable 
future, and deploy a system that we know we can deploy. We have done 
this with weapons systems that we have acquired throughout the last 
several decades.
  Many of the systems we have acquired have the built-in capability of 
being upgraded to more robust or sophisticated systems as time goes on. 
That is precisely what we call for in the Missile Defense Act. Let us 
start with what we can build by the year 2003, and, as we say, as 
technology improves and the threat evolves, we will have follow-on 
systems.
  Some opponents of the act have objected to the act because it allows 
us to do that or calls upon the Congress and the President to do that. 
But it clearly is nothing more than good sense. And it is really the 
same argument that opponents have used against us saying, well, there 
will be better technology later on. That is right. So let us make sure 
the system we deploy has the capability of taking advantage of that 
technology as we develop it.
  Mr. President, there is another advantage to actually getting a 
deadline in the statute. It focuses the planning efforts. It breeds 
efficiency because it gives the defense planners a specific time line 
for developing and for doing the research, for doing the testing and 
then for acquiring, actually bending the metal, as they say, for 
acquiring the systems and for getting them deployed.
  If you do not have a specific deadline, you never have this kind of 
efficiency, you never have the certainty of the schedule that is 
required for the researchers and the contractors to get along with the 
job, let alone the procurement officers in the Department of Defense. 
So you need a deadline. We have this with every other weapons system 
that we procure. We have specific dates, specific time lines and we 
achieve our goal by developing those time lines with a certainty at the 
end. If you do not have a specific date, you are never going to get 
there, at least not in any efficient way.

  Finally, I argue that specifying a date for development, and 
selecting the date of 2003, is probably the best way for us to prevent 
the development and deployment of ballistic missiles by these rogue 
nations that we fear, nations that cannot ever defeat us militarily, 
but certainly nations who can thwart our conduct of foreign policy and 
can do us great harm and do harm to our allies and forces deployed 
abroad.
  If we actually make it clear that we are committed to deploying a 
system, let us say by the year 2003, then I think that nations that are 
not very wealthy and that have a hard time acquiring the components or 
the completed systems will perhaps turn their attention to other 
methods for trying to throw their weight around. But as long as they 
know that nobody in the world is committed to deploying a system by any 
particular time, there is no reason for them not to proceed with their 
plans to buy the missiles or to develop the missiles and to develop the 
warheads that go on them, whether they be nuclear, biological, or 
chemical. And that is why we want to specify this date of 2003.
  There has been recently an argument about the cost. And it is too bad 
that this argument had to come at the time that it did because it is a 
totally bogus argument, yet I know some of our opponents will use it 
against us. It is the Congressional Budget Office analysis of the cost 
of such a system.
  But if you read the analysis carefully, rather than just spouting the 
rhetoric of those who oppose a ballistic missile defense system, if you 
read the analysis carefully, you realize that CBO did not say that the 
system would cost somewhere between $40 and $60 billion or $14 and $40 
billion or whatever the figures people like to throw around. What the 
CBO said was, well, it all depends on what you buy. If you buy 
everything that has ever been talked about, something that nobody is 
proposing, you could even spend up to $60 billion. My guess is you 
could spend more than that if you really wanted to buy everything that 
anybody had ever talked about.
  But the cold war is over. We are not talking about that anymore. I 
read you the Missile Defense Act. We are not suggesting a space shield, 
so we are not talking about the system that could cost that kind of 
money.
  Instead, what the CBO said with respect to what we are really talking 
about is this. I want to quote from the CBO analysis. We are talking 
about an initial defense. I will quote.

       This initial defense would cost $14 billion, about $8.5 
     billion for the ground-based system and $5 billion for the 
     SMTS space-based sensors. The ground-based system could cost 
     roughly $4 billion less if the Air Force's proposal for a 
     Minuteman-based system was adopted.

  They should have said ``were adopted.'' Then they go on to discuss 
other kinds of options.
  The point is, that it all depends which house you choose to buy, as 
the majority leader analogized here. Do you want to buy the $40,000 
house, the $80,000 house, the $150,000 house? Do you want to buy five 
houses at $4 million each?

[[Page S5677]]

  What the CBO said was, well, if you bought everybody's idea of a neat 
house, it would cost a lot of money, might cost $60 billion. We are not 
talking about that. Let us not have any rhetoric from the opponents of 
this bill that it could cost up to $60 billion. CBO itself says what we 
are talking about would cost $14 billion. Mr. President, actually the 
administration has said that it would be less than that. The Secretary 
of Defense has said the system that they like would cost $5 billion.

  I do not know whether it is $5 billion or $14 billion or something in 
between. In fact, they note it actually could be $4 billion less if the 
Minuteman-based system was adopted. That would be $10 billion. I do not 
know which of these figures is correct. But we are talking about 
deploying a system over the next 8 years or so.
  If you divide $10 billion into 8 years, that is a little over $1 
billion a year. That is hardly something that we cannot afford in the 
$265 billion defense budget when we are talking about protecting the 
lives of Americans and conducting our foreign policy without being 
blackmailed by these tinhorn dictators around the world.
  So I think with respect to cost we should understand that we are 
talking about a system that is probably in the neighborhood of $5 to 
$10 billion, maybe $14 billion, maybe $20 billion at the most to do it 
the right way, but $14 billion according to the CBO's suggestion of an 
initial deployment.
  I also note that CBO, in its estimates, apparently included O&M 
costs, operations and maintenance costs for a period of 10 years in 
some of their estimates. That is not ordinarily used to calculate the 
cost of acquiring any weapon systems. You understand both the 
acquisition cost and you understand the cost of acquiring it and 
operating it for 10 years; but ordinarily you do not describe as the 
acquisition cost the additional costs of O&M for another 10 years, 
which is what apparently CBO did. So one better be very careful about 
throwing these numbers of the CBO estimate around, Mr. President. They 
do not support the argument that this is too expensive.
  Anybody that wants to make that argument is going to have to answer 
to the American people the first time that Americans are killed because 
somebody has launched a missile against them, and answer the question 
what price their lives were worth.
  As a matter of fact, let us just stop and think for a moment, Mr. 
President. It was only 5 years ago that 28 Americans were killed by a 
ballistic missile launched by Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf 
war. The largest number of Americans killed in a single attack, 28 
Americans died because we could not defend against a ballistic missile.
  That was in a theater that was far away. That was in a war that we 
were fighting. But let us move it just a little bit further out. We 
could not protect our own military. We could not protect the people of 
Israel who took scud hit after scud hit because the Patriots could not 
knock them down. In the future we are not going to protect the people 
in Rome or London or Paris or Moscow or Anchorage or Honolulu or in 
South Korea or Japan or any number of places around the world that we 
will want to defend and will not have the capability of defending. Now, 
what price are those lives worth?

  Let me proceed just a little bit more with respect to the cost item, 
since I am informed Senator Nunn will be here in about 15 minutes and 
he will have some comments to make on this act. I will proceed to 
discuss some of the arguments that have been raised against it that I 
was going to refer to later.
  One of the arguments is that the language in the bill that discusses 
the ABM Treaty is really tantamount to an anticipatory breach of the 
treaty. This concerns some people greatly because they also believe if 
we proceed to defend ourselves, people in Russia will begin acting very 
irresponsibly with respect to START I and START II, and they may not 
even ratify START II. It has been predicted they will begin violating 
the START I treaty that both countries are already bound by.
  Mr. President, I have two basic things to say about this. First, this 
kind of argument is reminiscent of the cold war. It was the argument 
between those who wanted appeasement on the one hand and those who 
believed in peace through strength on the other hand. Appeasement was 
no stranger at the time of the cold war, but I thought everyone learned 
the lesson of Munich. Neville Chamberlain, who believed in his heart he 
had won peace in our time after he came back from Munich, we now know 
that the concessions that were made by the allies at that time to Adolf 
Hitler, the appeasement of Hitler was what created the appetite for him 
to take even more and finally go beyond the point that the allies could 
endure. That is how World War II began.
  There were then those in the cold war era who felt if we just gave 
the Soviets what they wanted, if we appeased them, everything would be 
right. What we found, every act of appeasement led to another act of 
aggression, and it was only when we began to confront aggression with 
strength, with resolve, with courage, with willpower, with defense, 
that the aggressor said, ``OK, we did not really want that after all.''
  Finally, through the development of our defense forces in the early 
1980's, the focus on developing a defense against ballistic missiles, 
the resolve demonstrated through President Reagan's famous peace 
through strength, our adversary realized it could not defeat us 
militarily. President Gorbachev, to his credit, knew he could not 
defeat us economically, that the political system they developed, 
combined with the economics of that system, were insufficient to 
sustain the kind of effort that would be needed to bury us, as 
Khrushchev said.
  That is why the Soviet Union fell. Appeasement never worked. Strength 
did. The argument that if we do not do what the Russians want, 
everything will be bad, goes back to that old idea, that old philosophy 
of appeasement. It has been said if we even talk about amending the ABM 
Treaty, the Russians will violate START I, they will not destroy all 
the missiles they promised to destroy, that the Russian Duma will not 
ratify START II.
  We will take each of those things. First of all, the United States 
has already suggested the possibility of amending the ABM Treaty to the 
Russians, and we had conversations with them about it. They did not 
walk away and say, ``This is absolutely nuts. We will never do that.'' 
This was done during the Bush administration.
  Second, there are ongoing discussions today about changes to the 
meaning of the ABM Treaty as circumstances have changed. In fact, there 
are ongoing discussions in Geneva and elsewhere about the exact 
definition of strategic missiles that can be defended against under the 
ABM Treaty. It is not as if this thing was written in stone, never to 
be changed or even considered for modification. The cold war is over. 
Circumstances have changed. It is going to have to be changed, if not 
scrapped altogether, as threats and circumstances change. That is only 
right. Only those who do not understand the cold war is over would 
argue the ABM Treaty should never be changed.

  The next point, that the Russians actually will violate the START I 
Treaty if we talk about changing the ABM Treaty, Mr. President, the 
Russians have, in fact, already violated several treaties. They do not 
need us to talk about amending the ABM Treaty to do that. I think we 
need to separate the two. There is no direct linkage, and there should 
not be.
  The point is, the Russians will do what they think is in their best 
interest. If the United States makes it clear to the Russians it is in 
their best interest to continue to comply with START I and to talk to 
us about making changes in the ABM Treaty, they will do that. As a 
responsible country, I believe that Russia will be responsible in 
pursuing that course of action with us. If the Russians decide not to 
ratify the START II Treaty because they do not think it is in their 
national interest, there is nothing we can do to stop them from that.
  I do not think by stopping any discussion of defending ourselves 
against ballistic missile attack it will make one bit of difference. I 
could quote numerous Russians who made the statement the reason that 
the Duma would not proceed to ratify START II does not have anything to 
do with the START II Treaty but has to do with what they perceive the 
costs to be and what they perceive their national interests to be. 
Therefore, I think it is

[[Page S5678]]

foolish for us to believe we have that much control over what the 
Russian Duma does, that if we begin talking about changing the ABM 
Treaty, it will cause them to change their plans. I do not think that 
is correct. In any event, if it were, what that would argue for is the 
United States could never do anything in our national interest to 
protect our citizens because it might cause some irresponsible Russians 
to act in a way inimical both to their interests and ours. I do not 
think that is logical.
  In addition to this, Mr. President, it is not as if we are breaching 
the ABM Treaty. As I noted, the ABM Treaty allows for amendment. It is 
like the Constitution. We all say we should be very careful about 
amending the Constitution. It is a pretty sacred document, true. But we 
have amended it because it has within it the means of amending it. Our 
Founding Fathers knew it was not a perfect document for all time, that 
we might want to make changes to it. Who were the first group to make 
changes? Our Founding Fathers. They adopted the Bill of Rights.
  The ABM Treaty, which has existed now for over 20 years, I daresay is 
not as sacrosanct as the U.S. Constitution. It could be amended, and 
therefore it provides within its terms for amendment as time goes on.
  Many would argue that actually the treaty no longer exists because 
the country with whom it was negotiated no longer exists; namely, the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the U.S.S.R., no longer is. Some 
say Russia acceded to interests. That may or may not be under 
international law. But it is a change, an amendment, to reflect changed 
circumstances. You cannot deny that.
  In addition to that, in addition to allowing for amendment, the 
treaty allows for withdrawal if it is in the United States' interest. 
All we have to do under the treaty is give notice that 6 months later 
we will withdraw, and we can walk away from the treaty. That is what 
the treaty itself provides for.

  Why would people be critical of the Defend America Act, which 
specifically says, in order not to cause a violation of the ABM Treaty, 
we should begin discussion with the Russians now, telling them of our 
desire to develop a ballistic missile defense, of the fact that there 
may be circumstances under which it would run counter to the terms of 
the ABM Treaty, and therefore suggesting we sit down and talk with the 
Russians about ways to modify the treaty to accommodate the kind of 
defenses both of our countries are going to need in the future. What is 
wrong with that? That is not an anticipatory breach. That is not saying 
we will violate the law sometime in the future and have a cause of 
action against us today. That is a real, genuine effort on our part to 
be totally upfront and say we will have to make some changes sooner or 
later, probably, so will you not sit down with us and talk about what 
the changes might be.
  If, for some reason, the Russians absolutely will not talk to us, the 
act says that the President still has a year--not 6 months, as the 
treaty provides, but an entire year--within which to seek these 
negotiations and withdraw at the end of that year if the Russians have 
not been willing to talk to us, that withdrawal being based upon the 
provisions of the treaty itself, allowing withdrawal in the national 
interests of the United States.
  The President of the United States, Bill Clinton, has already 
declared a national emergency based upon the ballistic missile threat. 
If there is a national emergency, then certainly the conditions exist 
under which we could withdraw from the treaty if we desire to. No one 
is suggesting that at this point. My point is, simply, that it is not 
an anticipatory breach for us to pass this law. Anyone who argues to 
the contrary, really seriously, Mr. President, has not read the 
language of the Defend America Act. It does not call for anticipatory 
breach.
  I have already dealt with the argument that this is just a straw 
horse from the Reagan era of the star wars system. That is not what we 
are talking about. I had to read the language of the act to make the 
point. I do not doubt there will be some who have not bothered to read 
it and who will come here and talk of star wars and space shield and 
the rest. Remember what I said, Mr. President, they are simply setting 
up a straw man to knock down. It is not what we are talking about here.
  There has been some question about the threat and when the threat 
will actually evolve. There is much that could be said about this, some 
of which I will reserve for a little bit later on. I do not think that 
anyone would credibly deny that by the year 2003, there is a 
significant probability that threats will exist beyond the acknowledged 
threat that exists today from either Russia or China.
  Now, there is a question about when the North Koreans will actually 
be able to reach the continental United States and whether 
``continental'' means the lower 48, or Alaska, or Hawaii. I really do 
not think it matters much. Clearly, by about the year 2003, the North 
Koreans will have a missile that is able to reach South Korea, Japan, 
the Philippines and, possibly, Alaska and Hawaii. That ought to be 
enough, Mr. President. For those who say, ``Well, let us wait until the 
threat is there to develop the system,'' I say, at that point it will 
be a little too late. Until you can develop and deploy a system, you 
are susceptible to the blackmail that a regime like that could visit 
upon you.
  I do not doubt that if the same leaders who control North Korea today 
are in power at that point, it could create great mischief if we did 
not have a means of defending ourselves.
  With respect to that threat, many things can be said. I have to begin 
by saying that the year 2003 being 7 years down the road is certainly a 
point at which we ought to be prepared to defend against a threat from 
countries like North Korea, even if we are not concerned about a threat 
from Russia or China today--particularly an accidental launch from one 
of those countries. The national intelligence estimate, which is touted 
by some, suggesting that the threat will not occur for 10 or 15 years 
does not support that proposition. It only supports the proposition 
that if a country started today and began to indigenously develop a 
weapon, that it might take that long before they could do it. As we 
know, that is not the way most nations acquire the weapons. They buy 
them, for instance, from Russia, China, or North Korea. If they cannot 
buy a complete system, they buy components from whomever, and they put 
them together. The Iraqi scuds were done like that. So if you calculate 
the time it takes a country to buy a space-launch capability, which is 
just as effective as a ballistic missile war fighting capability, or 
components of a system to put it together, it is clear that numerous 
nations do not mean us any good in the world, and they could develop 
the systems before the year 2003.
  I also make the point that the United States has a history--an 
unfortunate history--of turning a blind eye to reality and the facts 
because we are a peace-loving Nation. We do not like to assume others 
would do us harm, at least in a sneaky fashion. But Pearl Harbor is the 
best example of where intelligence pointed the way directly and 
specifically to a threat. If we had been more suspicious or cynical of 
the Japanese at that time, we would have probably understood that that 
was a very real threat and would have been better prepared to deal with 
it. But we were not. It was our own fault, in many respects.
  That same thing could be said about the situation today. It will be 
our own fault if some nation decides to be very sneaky about the way it 
develops a weapon and deploys that weapon against us. Iraq, we know, 
was much more capable than we ever had any reason to expect 5 years 
ago. We now know that. We know that other countries are seeking to 
acquire this technology, such as North Korea, the Iranians, and so on. 
Yet, somehow we just try to delude ourselves into thinking that maybe 
everything will be all right, that we really will not have to worry 
about it, so let us not bother to worry about it until we are sure the 
threat is there.
  Well, Mr. President, at that point it is too late; the horse is out 
of the barn. The unfortunate thing about that analogy is that it does 
not begin to describe the horrors that could be visited upon people if 
we wait until it is literally too late. I would rather be a year too 
early and maybe spend a little bit more money than we had to, and maybe 
lock in technology a little bit earlier, than

[[Page S5679]]

I would be to be a year too late because, frankly, at that point, no 
one knows what the harm would be, whether it would be an actual attack, 
or whether it would be simply thwarting important foreign policy goals 
of the Western alliance because we did not have the weapons to stop a 
ballistic missile attack.

  As I said, Mr. President, I will defer discussion of this threat 
because I really do not think that reasonable opponents to the Defend 
America Act will argue that there is no potential threat there. They 
may argue that it may not be as serious by the year 2003 as I think it 
might be, but I do not think anybody could credibly argue that the 
threat is not there. We can quote the former CIA Directors. Jim Woolsey 
made the point very clear. I will note, Mr. President, that as recently 
as May 31, the Washington Times carried two stories that I thought 
were, frankly, very distressing. The lower story said, ``Woolsey 
Disputes Clinton Missile Threat Assessment.'' He was President 
Clinton's first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. This 
article from the Associated Press points out in numerous ways the areas 
in which former CIA Director Jim Woolsey believes that the Clinton 
administration is underestimating this missile threat in an effort not 
to go forward with the Ballistic Missile Defense Act.
  The other headline is, ``White House Misled Joint Chiefs on ABM 
Treaty Talks.'' I understand there was a letter written around May 1 by 
one or more of the Joint Chiefs that says, ``We really do not need this 
Defend America Act.'' Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this 
newspaper article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my 
remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, this makes the point that the Joint Chiefs 
were misled. They were basically told that the administration was not 
going to go forward with certain plans, that there were not changes 
being contemplated to the ABM Treaty that, in fact, were being 
contemplated, that there were not limitations being placed upon certain 
of our systems. And as a result, they could clearly have been lulled 
into the belief that we did not need the kind of Missile Defense Act we 
are talking about now. I suggest that if all of the information is 
known to all of the people concerned, we will be much more serious 
about going forward with a missile defense plan.
  Finally with respect to this point, I note that the President himself 
has recently begun to talk about the need for missile defense. Some say 
that this is a political reaction to Bob Dole's leadership on the 
issue. It may be. But I will acknowledge that the President, as well as 
the rest of us, is interested in defending the American people. 
Whichever is the case, the President has acknowledged the threat. So we 
are only arguing about exactly when the threat will materialize. The 
President's position is that we might be able to wait a little longer 
and deploy a system a little after 2003 and still get by. He may be 
right. But my point is, is it worth the risk?
  When we have the technology, we have spent the money and--as a matter 
of fact, if we talk about a sea-based system, we have the aegis 
cruisers, and they have the radars, and they already have the 
satellites in space which can detect a launch, and we have basically 
half of the standard missile on these ships. We simply have to put the 
second part of the missile on with the components on the tip of it to 
enable us to hone in and guide the missile to be intercepted. That is 
all we are talking about developing with respect to that system. We 
have proceeded significantly along with the development of the THAAD 
program.

  No, Mr. President, the problem is that if there is a problem with 
deploying these systems, it is, as Senator Thurmond said earlier, that 
the administration, year after year after year--all 4 years--has 
submitted budgets where the administration has sought to reduce the 
amount of expenditure for missile defense, and specifically for the 
national missile defense. They have been willing to go forward with the 
tactical missile defense, to a degree, but not to the degree called for 
in the legislation we have passed and the President has signed. He does 
not want to go forward with a national missile defense.
  That is perplexing. I do not understand how it is all right to help 
our friends, like the Israelis, defend themselves--and there has been 
money there in the last several years to help the Israelis build the 
Arrow Missile Defense System to protect their homeland and people. So I 
do not understand why U.S. tax dollars should be spent on that system 
and not on a similar system to protect the United States. I am all for 
the development of the Arrow. I have been to Israel and have seen the 
threat they live under from their neighbors that would do them harm. 
They understand the need for a missile defense, and we have been 
willing to support their national missile defense system.
  Why is the President of the United States willing to spend money so 
that the people of Israel will not be killed in a missile attack, and 
he is not willing to spend money so that the people of the United 
States are free from missile attack? I do not understand that.
  Mr. President, as I said, reasonable people can differ about whether 
the threat will occur in the year 2003, 2007, or in the year 2000. But 
you cannot argue about the fact that the threat will be there, and, in 
some respects, it already is.
  So if we are willing to spend that money and to make that commitment 
to defend the people of other countries, why are we not willing to make 
that commitment to defend the people of the United States?
  Let me make this point. When pollsters ask Americans around the 
country how we would defend ourselves against a missile attack, 
Americans answer with a variety of very innovative responses. ``Well, 
we will shoot them down.'' How? ``Well, we have airplanes with missiles 
that will shoot them down. Well, we will shoot them down with our own 
missiles. Well, we have lasers in space. I am not sure how, but we will 
shoot them down.''
  The fact is that we do not have any way of shooting them down. We are 
totally vulnerable to an attack.
  Do you know what about 80 percent of the Americans who respond to 
these surveys say? They say that is absolutely irresponsible and we 
have to do something about it today to turn this situation around--
today. They are shocked to know that we are vulnerable to missile 
attack.
  I guess it is our own fault for not making the point to people that 
we do not have a defense. It is particularly shocking, I guess, for not 
correcting this deficiency given the fact that the Persian Gulf war was 
5 years ago and we have let 5 years go by without making very much 
progress toward the development and deployment of these defenses. I 
would have thought that after 28 Americans were killed in one Scud 
attack and after Israel was attacked by Iraq that the United States 
would finally have committed itself to building missile defenses to 
protect the United States and the people of the United States. We kind 
of frittered away our money and time. Now we have other nations in 
addition to Iraq that are very aggressively and very actively 
developing these weapons. Yet, we do not seem to be any further down 
the road toward making a commitment to develop and deploy the system.
  As I said, if you look at every other weapons system that we bought, 
let us say the F-15, or the F-16, or the carrier, the Trident 
submarine, you name it, the only way we have of being able to get it 
done is say we want to buy this weapon, we want to have it done by x 
date, therefore, we are going to appropriate the money necessary to 
achieve deployment by that date, and we ask the administration to come 
forward with a plan which lays out the specific deadlines for a 
specific timetable by which the tests are going to be conducted, and 
eventually we will get to the point of deployment. Usually it takes a 
little longer than we predicted, but we try to set those dates up so 
that we actually achieve the objective.
  That is what we are asking for in this legislation by setting a 
specific date. We are saying, we know we will never get there if we 
keep moving the goalposts and if we never set an actual date for 
deployment, so let us set the day and let us get on with it. If we do 
not do that, we will never get there. That is why I say it really is a 
bogus argument to talk about the threat, because everyone acknowledges 
there is a threat. They simply argue about when

[[Page S5680]]

it will really surface. I submit that it is not worth playing around 
with that question, particularly since we know that 5 years have 
elapsed since Americans have been killed by a ballistic missile.
  There is another subargument here that I really want to deal with 
very briefly, and since Senator Nunn is not here I am going to go 
forward. This is the argument that deterrence is sufficient and we 
already have the ability to retaliate against someone who launches a 
missile, and that ought to be enough to deter them from ever doing so.

  I ask the question again. Given the fact that the United States 
pulled out of Iraq and did not use any kind of weapon of mass 
destruction against Saddam Hussein, did not even destroy his palace 
guard at the conclusion of that war, and given the fact that President 
Bush himself made the point on several occasions that we mean no harm 
to the Iraqi people, we only wish that the regime of Saddam Hussein 
would not act irresponsibly and that we would try to defeat it--given 
those facts, is it credible to assume that the United States in the 
future will use a nuclear weapon or a chemical or biological weapon on 
the people of a country whose leaders attack us, or who threaten to 
attack us, or who threaten to attack, say, the French, the British, the 
Israelis, or the Russians? Is that a credible deterrent? Are we going 
to deter Mu'ammar Qadhafi, or the leaders of Korea, or some other 
country? I do not think so.
  I think that deterrence argument, if it did work in the cold war--
there is some dispute about it--is not the kind of argument that is 
going to work today against countries that frankly do not think we will 
use the deterrent and do not care, in any event. The risk of failure on 
relying on deterrence is simply too great to rely on that doctrine 
today. It will not work against the kind of nations that mean us harm 
today. It is not credible.
  I note the fact that Secretary Perry himself, in the Nuclear Posture 
Review on September 20, 1994, made the following comment, with which I 
totally agree.

       We now have an opportunity to create a new relationship, 
     based not on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but 
     rather on another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.

  What he was talking about was the ability to deter aggressor nations 
based upon the fact that we can defend ourselves, and, therefore, there 
was no point in their developing the means to attack us, or initiating 
such an attack; that because we had the ability to defend ourselves, it 
would make it impossible for them to succeed, and, therefore, there 
would be no point in their expending the funds to do so. That is the 
theory of defensive deterrence, and it really is the only kind of 
defense that will exist against the kind of threat that we face today. 
When we were arrayed against the Soviet Union, it might have been a 
different matter, though that is questionable. But it is certainly not 
the case today.
  I had indicated when we talked about the START II Treaty that there 
were some people I would quote. Let me do that since I have the time, 
because this is the final argument, and that is, we are kind of playing 
with fire. We do not want to do anything that would disturb the 
Russians, and it could be that they would take actions that we would be 
sorry for if we did anything to anger them.
  Clearly, at this point in time, only 3 weeks or so away from the 
Russian elections, our eyes are turned toward Russia because we 
understand that some very irresponsible people could be elected and 
lead the Russian State. That would be a real shame. None of us want to 
do that. All of us are hoping for the election of very responsible 
people to lead the Russian nation, people with whom we can work in the 
future and continue to work on defense matters together, because we 
mean no harm to them. They should know that. We wish them well, and we 
hope they share that feeling and, therefore, engage with us in those 
kind of agreements that demonstrate the desire for peaceful nations to 
proceed along the path of peace and eliminate the kind of weapons of 
mass destruction that populate the world today.

  That is why we hope very much that they continue to abide by treaties 
like the START I Treaty and that they would ratify the START II Treaty 
to further bring down the number of dangerous weapons in the world. But 
here is what some of the Russians themselves have said with respect to 
the probability of their actions with respect to the ABM Treaty.
  Alexi Arbatov, Deputy Chair of the Russian State Duma Defense 
Committee, complained that the loss of MIRV'd missile capability 
resulting from START II was a critical reason for them to be concerned 
with the START II Treaty. He stated that the Russians ``cannot 
economically fill the gap with single warheads; it's too costly.'' He 
proposed developing a protocol that lowered START II warhead ceilings 
to relieve their economic difficulties with the treaty.
  In other words, what he was saying was that ``it is going to be 
awfully expensive for us to bring down our warheads to the level called 
for in the START II Treaty. You all may be able to afford it in the 
United States. We can't. So let us not bring them down quite so far.''
  Well, it may be that they will have a hard time doing that, but if 
they do not adopt the START II Treaty, it will be for reasons of 
economics, as he pointed out, not because the United States has 
suggested the need to look at an outmoded ABM Treaty which previous 
Russian Governments have been willing to look at themselves.
  U.S. Ambassador Brooks predicted the Russians will be forced to go 
well below START I levels with or without START II for economic 
reasons. He was actually proposing a slightly different argument 
related to economics. He was saying the Russians are going to have to 
proceed with START I and maybe even START II limits in the long run 
because it is so expensive to maintain them, and while in the short run 
our thought may have been correct, Ambassador Brooks is probably 
correct with respect to the long run.
  It is in both of our interests in the long run to save money by not 
having to maintain these expensive stockpiles. It costs money to 
dismantle them initially. That is why people like Senator Nunn and 
others have been responsible for proposing U.S. assistance to enable 
the Russians to bring down their stockpiles. It is for economic reasons 
that the Russians will find it impossible to continue to maintain this 
high level of stockpile. It does not have anything to do with the ABM 
Treaty.
  Neither the United States nor Russia will have the capacity to enter 
into another arms race, I suspect, whether or not we made modifications 
to the ABM Treaty.
  Clearly, with respect to other nations like China, the START I and 
START II Treaties do not even apply here. So though some say we should 
not even begin to change the ABM Treaty because of the Russian 
response, I would counter by saying: What about the Chinese? What about 
other countries that are not even involved in the START I or START II 
Treaty?
  Clearly, deploying this, or beginning to talk about amending the ABM 
Treaty so we deploy an effective defense system is in the national 
defense interest of the United States and we should not be deterred 
from proceeding with that step simply because there may be some who 
contend that the Russians will be unhappy and therefore there would be 
a reaction against us.
  Mr. President, since I have other time, let me proceed with one final 
point, and then I would be happy to yield to anybody else who would 
like to speak.
  What we are talking about here, for those who might not have been 
with us at the very beginning, is a very modest--very modest--first 
step. It is called the Defend America Act. It was brought to the Senate 
floor by Majority Leader Bob Dole. It is true that he has made a 
political issue of this but only because the American people have been 
shocked to find out that the United States is undefended against a 
ballistic missile attack.
  That is why Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, the Republican 
Presidential nominee, has said it is important for us to get on with 
the job of ultimately developing and deploying a system that could 
defend the United States, at least in a modest way, against certain 
kinds of limited attack. So the Defend America Act that we have before 
us is a very modest first step toward that end.
  It is not the space shield that some people would like to talk about. 
It is

[[Page S5681]]

not a hugely expensive kind of project that CBO has said we could 
develop. Yes, we could, but that is not what this is. It is really a 
very modest attempt, and it is important for the Senate, I think, to 
begin this debate and, hopefully, to have a vote on this act in the 
relatively near future.
  The House of Representatives was scheduled to take this up just 
before the Memorial Day recess and did not do so at that time, passing 
the budget instead. But I am hopeful, too, that the House of 
Representatives will take up the Defend America Act very soon. The 
important thing for the American people to know is that the Senate will 
not be able to vote on this act unless 60 Members of the Senate agree, 
because of a procedure that we have here which says that anybody can 
object to bringing up a bill and, if they do, it takes 60 Senators then 
to have a vote on it--60 Senators have to agree. That is called 
invoking cloture. Tomorrow afternoon at 2:15, we are going to have a 
vote to invoke cloture, that is to say, to stop this debate that has 
been going on and to have a vote on proceeding with a vote on the bill. 
There will still be an opportunity to further debate the bill after 
that, but then we would have a vote before the end of the week on the 
Defend America Act.
  This will be the last chance that Majority Leader Bob Dole has to 
bring this act up during his time in the Senate. I think it is 
important even for those people who do not necessarily agree with the 
Defend America Act, who for some reason want to support the President 
of the United States in his opposition to it. Maybe for political 
reasons they want to vote against it because it would hurt Bob Dole and 
help Bill Clinton. I can understand all of those things even though I 
think it would be irrational to vote against it for purely political 
reasons. But whatever reasons my colleagues might have for ultimately 
voting against it, I find it hard to understand why any of them would 
oppose having a vote on it.
  What are they afraid of? Mr. President, what are they afraid of? Why 
would Members of this body--and specifically now I am talking about 
Democrats, since I believe all the Republicans will support the cloture 
vote, will support taking a vote on the Defend America Act. Not all 
Republicans probably will vote for it in the end, although most will. 
But why would Democrats almost to a person oppose even taking a vote on 
this bill? Why? I can think of only one reason, and it is not a 
pleasant thought. That one reason is politics.

  I read the Defend America Act. There is nothing in there that every 
one of us does not believe, with the possible exception of the actual 
deployment by the year 2003. I have discussed the reasons why I think 
2003 is a good date. Now, others may disagree. They have the right to 
express that disagreement by voting against the bill. Even though they 
may agree with everything else in it, they might not like that, so they 
want to vote against it. They have the right to vote against it. We 
would still be debating for another day or day and a half after we 
invoke cloture, so by the end of this week we could have a vote on this 
bill.
  Now, why would colleagues not even let us vote on the bill? Why would 
they say: No; Bob Dole, you cannot have a vote? Is it because they do 
not want Americans to be free from ballistic missile attack? I do not 
think so. I do not think there is a person here who believes that.
  I can only think of one reason, Mr. President, and that is to deny 
Bob Dole the right to have a vote on his bill. Now, I urge my 
colleagues, Republicans and Democrats alike, who have stood in this 
Chamber and who have stood in receptions and dinners and other fora to 
laud Bob Dole and pay tribute to him for the long service that he has 
given to our country, most recently in the Senate, but before that in 
the House and, of course, serving in our military, I appeal to all of 
my colleagues who have genuinely expressed their appreciation for Bob 
Dole's service, Democrats and Republicans alike, recognizing that 
whether he is to be the President of the United States or not, he is to 
be respected as a strong national leader who for years has done a lot 
of good things for this country--and nobody believes more strongly in 
the defense of the United States than Bob Dole--I would urge those 
colleagues of mine, Democrats and Republicans alike, to just stop and 
think and see if it is not within their heart to at least give him a 
vote on his bill. They can then vote against it, and he will understand 
those who have legitimate reasons for voting against it. But I think 
what he would find very hard to believe is that his colleagues would 
not even let him have a vote on this important matter that, after all, 
is not that important to him personally or politically but is very 
important to the American people. Bob Dole knows how important it is 
that we provide for our national defense.
  I will just conclude with this point. I have mentioned the Persian 
Gulf war many times, Mr. President. But after that Persian Gulf war was 
over and Dick Cheney and President Bush and Colin Powell and Norm 
Schwarzkopf were all given great kudos for winning the Persian Gulf 
war, what did they say? Well, most of them said it was not us that did 
it, obviously; it was the men and women we had trained so well that did 
the job. Of course, they were right. But Dick Cheney said one 
additional thing, and I will never forget it because he is a very 
reflective person. He said that it was not me, it was not us that won 
this war. It was the people 10 and 15 years ago who made the decision 
then to invest in the kind of weaponry and training that enabled our 
people to win today. They could not have foreseen the uses to which 
these weapons would be put. They had to fight those who said that they 
were a waste of money at the time, that they cost too much, that they 
might not work, that they were not necessary, that there was no threat. 
They had to stand up in the face of all of those arguments and have the 
courage of their conviction that someday, somewhere the United States 
might need that kind of weaponry to defend itself and its interests and 
it would be important for the men and women that we ask to go in harm's 
way that we give them the very best to protect themselves. Dick Cheney 
said we really owe this victory of the Persian Gulf war to the people 
who were in the Congress and who were in the administrations at that 
time, who made the tough decisions to make the investment to build 
these things so that when we needed them they would be there, even 
though no one could predict when or where or under what circumstances 
that would be.

  Mr. President, I am saying the same thing today. We will hear all of 
the arguments: Well, it may not work. Well, we do not know even who it 
is going to be used against. Well, we are not sure that the threat is 
here yet or even when there is going to be a threat. Well, we know 
there will be a threat, but it probably will not be for a while yet. We 
can take a chance.
  We have to stand up today just like those people did 10 and 15 years 
before Dick Cheney was Secretary of Defense and be courageous enough to 
make the investment to protect not only the American people but also 
our forces deployed abroad and our allies, but most specifically the 
American people. That is what the Defend America Act is all about, so 
that 10 or 15 years from now, or 7 or 8 or 9 years from now when we 
have been able to thwart some kind of attack by an aggressor and people 
are patting everyone on the back saying job well done, those people 
will look back on the Congress of today and say, well, actually, they 
were the ones, those people back in 1996 who had the courage to go 
forward with the system, they were the ones to whom we owe our 
appreciation and perhaps our lives.
  Do we have the courage to make that kind of commitment today, at a 
very small, relative, expense, $1 or $2 billion a year out of a $265 
billion defense budget, for maybe 10 years? That is not too high a 
price to pay for the lives of American people.
  So I ask my colleagues when we have this cloture vote tomorrow at 
2:15, think about your children or grandchildren and your lives and the 
lives of those we will put in harm's way 10 or 15 years from now. Think 
about the legacy we want to leave. Think about the people we want to 
protect, about the interests that we want to project in the world. 
Think about what that takes.
  Also, think about the unfairness of not even allowing this bill to 
come to a vote, and think about the final tribute that you can pay to a 
great man, whether you agree with him politically or not, Bob Dole, 
who, after all, has

[[Page S5682]]

asked nothing more than to be allowed to have a vote on this piece of 
legislation.
  For those reasons, I hope my colleagues will join us in voting for 
cloture so we can have a vote on the Missile Defense Act sometime this 
week.


                               exhibit 1

               [From the Washington Times, May 31, 1996]

          White House Misled Joint Chiefs on ABM Treaty Talks

                            (By Bill Gertz)

       Clinton administration officials misled the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff about efforts to reach an agreement with Russia at last 
     month's summit on the complex issue of clarifying the Anti-
     Ballastic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Pentagon officials said.
       To prevent details from being disclosed to the press, the 
     military service chiefs were not told in advance of the 
     Moscow summit about a White House plan to hold detailed talks 
     between the two presidents aimed at reaching a partial 
     agreement on what short-range anti-missile defense systems 
     are legal under the 1972 ABM Treaty, according to officials 
     who spoke on the condition of anonymity.
       Several days before the April 22 summit in Moscow, a 
     Pentagon briefer, explaining the White House summit agenda 
     for defense issues, told a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of 
     Staff that the issue of ABM theater missile defense (TMD) 
     demarcation would not be brought up at meetings between 
     President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, or 
     other defense officials, they said.
       ``At the [Joint Chiefs] meeting, the chiefs were told ABM-
     TMD demarcation will not be discussed at the summit,'' one 
     official said. ``In fact that briefing was part of a 
     deliberate deception plan on the part of the White House.''
       The postsummit realization that some officials acted 
     dishonestly with the military chiefs upset many in the 
     Pentagon, particularly officials charged with developing 
     missile defenses.
       ``Everybody was outraged,'' one official said. ``The only 
     conclusion we could come to was that the White House 
     negotiated with the Russians against its own military.''
       A second official said a senior general who took part in 
     the briefing, held in the secure Pentagon room known as ``the 
     tank,'' specifically asked the briefer to clarify whether the 
     issue would be raised. The general, concerned over Russian 
     backtracking at earlier arms talks, was told missile defense 
     would not be discussed at all, the official said.
       ``That conversation did occur, and that answer was 
     received,'' a spokesman for the general said, asking that his 
     name and service not be identified.
       The briefer, an aide to Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, explained that the only defense 
     topics to be discussed at the summit would be the 
     Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, efforts to reach a 
     nuclear test ban treaty, and chemical and biological weapons.
       Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin said during a postsummit 
     news conference on April 22 that they had discussed the ABM 
     issue extensively.
       Mr. Clinton told reporters ``real progress'' was made on 
     the ABM-TMD issue during five hours of talks. ``I'm convinced 
     that if we do this in an open way that has a lot of 
     integrity, I think we'll all be just fine on this and I think 
     it will work out very well,'' Mr. Clinton said.
       A new round of ABM talks with Moscow on missile demarcation 
     began May 20 at the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in 
     Geneva. The White House official said the Russians presented 
     proposals at the session with ``wrinkles''--positions--
     opposed by U.S. negotiators.
       An earlier round of SCC talks broke off after they were 
     deadlocked over Russian insistence on reversing agreements 
     reached earlier by U.S. and Russian officials outside the 
     formal talks.
       Russia announced in the earlier meeting that any Pentagon 
     work on higher-speed regional missile defenses would be 
     regarded by Moscow as illegal under the ABM Treaty until a 
     second agreement is reached, a classified State Department 
     cable said.
       Pentagon officials said a political agreement reached by 
     U.S. and Russian officials at the summit will limit U.S. use 
     of space-based sensors with advanced missile defenses, such 
     as the Navy's wide-area system known as Upper Tier. It also 
     would bar work on the Air Force's airborne laser gun, which 
     will be capable of knocking down missiles shortly after 
     takeoff.
                                                                    ____


          Woolsey Disputes Clinton, Missile-Threat Assessment

       President Clinton's former CIA director yesterday accused 
     the administration of playing down the threat of missile 
     attack from Russia, China or elsewhere.
       R. James Woolsey, who headed the nation's spy apparatus 
     during the first two years of the Clinton administration, 
     told a House committee that the administration has 
     understated the missile threat on multiple fronts.
       In particular, Mr. Woolsey criticized a frequently quoted 
     National Intelligence Estimate that found little threat of a 
     missile attack on the contiguous 48 states until well into 
     the next century.
       ``I believe that the `contiguous 48' reference . . . can 
     lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of the 
     serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in 
     the very near future--threats to our friends, our allies, our 
     overseas bases and military forces, our overseas territories 
     and some of the 50 states,'' Mr. Woolsey told the House 
     Government Reform and Oversight Committee.
       A White House official, who spoke on the condition of 
     anonymity, said the United States has theater missile 
     defenses that could be rushed into place to protect Alaska 
     and Hawaii should a threat arise.
       He said the administration was ``absolutely in agreement'' 
     that the threat of terrorism must be met, but said Mr. 
     Clinton opposes rushing a system into place when a slower 
     pace might result in a better defense.
       In his testimony, Mr. Woolsey said the chances of missile 
     terrorism increase as potentially hostile states improve 
     their technology.
       ``It is quite reasonable to believe that within a few years 
     [Iraqi leader] Saddam Hussein or the Chinese rulers will be 
     able to threaten something far more troubling than firings of 
     relatively inaccurate ballistic missiles,'' Mr. Woolsey said. 
     ``They may quite plausibly be able to threaten to destroy, 
     say, the Knesset [Israel's parliament], or threaten to 
     create, in effect, an international Chernobyl incident at a 
     Taiwanese nuclear power plant.''
       Mr. Woolsey, now practicing law in Washington, has been 
     embraced by Republicans seeking funding to deploy a national 
     missile-defense system by 2003: Mr. Woolsey said after the 
     hearing that he supports legislation sponsored by Senate 
     Majority Leader Bob Dole, the presumptive Republican 
     presidential nominee, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich to 
     deploy the missile-defense system.
       In an apparent endorsement of current administration 
     priorities, Mr. Woolsey said the Pentagon should place 
     ``primary importance'' on developing theater missile defenses 
     while pursuing ``a sound program to move toward some type of 
     national defense.'' But Mr. Woolsey criticized several 
     aspects of administration policy. Specifically, Mr. Woolsey:
       Criticized the administration for trimming funding for some 
     theater-defense systems.
       Questioned the administration decision to make highly 
     accurate global-positioning-system technology available 
     commercially, a move that enemies could use to make their 
     missiles even more accurate.
       Disputed Mr. Clinton's assertion that U.S. intelligence 
     does not foresee an emerging ballistic-missile threat in the 
     coming decade.
  Mr. KEMPTHORNE. Mr. President, I am pleased to rise today in support 
of the Defend America Act of 1996 currently before the Senate which 
establishes, by the year 2003, a national missile-defense [NMD] system 
to protect the United States against limited, unauthorized or 
accidental missile attacks. The deployment of an NMD system as 
articulated by the author of the bill--Senator Dole--will not only 
defend, it will deter--by reducing the incentive of rogue regimes to 
acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
  I am deeply concerned, as are other Members of Congress, about 
increased interest by several countries hostile to this great Nation to 
acquire ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. As 
recently as last month, Clinton administration officials, to include 
the former Director of Central Intelligence [DCI]--R. James Woolsey--
testified before Congress that the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] 
used by the President to veto earlier proposals to deploy a NMD system 
was flawed. Mr. Woolsey challenged the conclusion made by the NIE 
report that no long-range missiles will threaten the 48 contiguous 
States for at least 15 years. Former DCI Woolsey further stated that 
limiting the estimate's focus on the missile threat to the 48 States 
``can lead to a badly distorted and minimized perception of very 
serious threats we face from ballistic missiles now and in the very 
near future.''
  The Intelligence Community [IC] of the United States has confirmed 
that North Korea is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile 
that will be capable of reaching Alaska or beyond once deployed. In 
April, Kim Myong Chol--a North Korean reported by the Washington Post 
to have close contacts to the government in Pyongyang--stated that 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has ordered the development and 
deployment of strategic long-range ballistic missiles tipped with a 
super-powerful warhead. The purpose of this missile, according to Chol, 
is to provide North Korea with the capability to destroy major 
metropolitan centers. This system is likely to be deployed in less than 
10 years and be part operational intercontinental ballistic missile 
force capable of hitting the American mainland.
  Additionally, the threat posed to the United States by the 
proliferation of

[[Page S5683]]

ballistic missiles is growing at an ever faster pace. Other rogue 
nations such as Iran, Iraq and Libya are also pursuing the development 
of longer range missiles to include those with an intercontinental 
capability. According to the CIA, Iran is seeking to supplement its 
existing ballistic missile inventories with the purchase from North 
Korea of the 1,000-1,300 kilometer (No Dong) ballistic missile. Iran--
with help from China and North Korea--is seeking to develop and produce 
its own ballistic missiles with the objective of producing a medium-
range ballistic missile to threaten targets to a distance of 3,000 
kilometers. Foreshadowing future successes, Iranian President 
Rafsanjani said as recently as August 1995 that: ``An incredible thing 
has happened in defense so that we [Iranians] are making everything 
from rockets to the smallest military equipment. We are also exporters 
and could export to countries which we wish. You should know that we 
are one of the main centers for construction of defense equipment. Of 
course we cannot advertise much in this sector and we do not wish to 
advertise because it is a defense sphere, but we are getting on with 
the job.''
  It should be mentioned that Iran is also aggressively pursuing a 
nuclear weapons capability and, if significant foreign assistance were 
provided (e.g., from China or Russia), could produce a nuclear device 
as early as the end of the decade. Moreover, Iranian leaders have in 
the past and continue to make numerous statements before cheering 
crowds along the lines of ``The United States still remains the Great 
Satan'' and ``Mankind should not think the White House will remain 
forever. No, it will be destroyed.''
  I would like to stress that the Defend America Act emphasizes that 
the goal of defending Americans against ballistic missile attack must 
be accomplished in an affordable manner. Senator Dole's bill focuses on 
a $14 billion limited national missile defense [NMD] system. The Defend 
America Act calls for the use of programs currently in development to 
serve as the building blocks for a system that will meet the missile 
threat as it emerges and has the flexibility to adapt to new 
development in ballistic missile technology by rogue states. In 
contrast, the Congressional Budget Office [CBO] highly inflated 
estimate of $31-$60 billion reflects the cost of a more robust defense 
that includes every option that might be done and could be done in the 
next 20 years in order to protect the United States from an unrealistic 
attack of up to 200 warheads accompanied by sophisticated 
countermeasures.
  It must be made clear and in very specific terms that the United 
States is firmly committed to a National Missile Defense system. And, 
therefore I urge Senators to support the Defend America Act of 1996. 
This measure will ensure that future generations of Americans remain 
secure from long-range ballistic missile attack.
  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, last year the subject of national missile 
defense proved to be one of the most difficult issues we faced during 
the consideration of the defense authorization bill for fiscal year 
1996. This year, we may face similar challenges as a result of 
provisions in S. 1635, the proposed Defend America Act, which was 
introduced by Senator Dole and others on March 21, 1996, as well as 
certain provisions in S. 1745, the Defense Authorization Act reported 
by the Armed Services Committee.
  In my judgment, it would be relatively easy to develop a consensus in 
the Congress as to what measures we should authorize in fiscal year 
1997 to address the requirements of a sound national missile defense 
program. Difficulties arise, however, when we focus on decisions which 
do not need to be resolved at this time, but which assume a great 
symbolic importance to a number of Senators and a number of 
commentators.
  Today, I would like to review last year's actions on missile defense, 
discuss the proposals that have been introduced to date, and set forth 
at least my own views as to how the Nation should proceed in both the 
short term and long term on the subject of missile defenses.
  Last year's bill, as reported by the Armed Services Committee, 
proposed to legislate a requirement that the United States deploy by 
the year 1999 a prototype national missile defense system which, 
because of the compressed time, would have necessarily had a very 
limited capability. The bill further required the United States to 
deploy a multiple-site ABM system with an initial operational 
capability by the year 2003.

  The bill also proposed the system would be augmented to provide a 
layered defense against a larger and more sophisticated type attack. In 
addition, the proposed language would have established in permanent law 
a specific demarcation between what we call theater missile defense and 
strategic missile defense or national missile defense, as the term is 
used in this debate. It also prohibited negotiations, or other 
executive branch actions concerning clarification or interpretation of 
the ABM Treaty and the line between theater and strategic defenses.
  In my judgment, and that of many other Senators and of the 
administration, the language in last year's bill was unacceptable. The 
requirement for a multiple-site system was clearly inconsistent with 
the ABM Treaty which limits parties to a single site. The mandate for a 
layered system, which would require deployment of space-based systems, 
also was inconsistent with the treaty. The statutory demarcation 
between theater and national missile defense systems, and the 
prohibition on negotiations by the administration, also raised 
difficult constitutional questions about the authority of the Congress 
to impinge on the President's negotiating authority, as well as his 
role as Commander in Chief.
  When it became clear during the debate that there was insufficient 
support for the bill as passed by the committee to also pass the 
Senate, the majority leader, Senator Dole, and the minority leader, 
Senator Daschle, designated Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and myself--
two Democrats, two Republicans--to attempt to develop a bipartisan 
substitute, and that we did. The result was a bipartisan amendment 
which provided extensive guidance to ensure that the United States 
would develop a more focused Missile Defense Program than the 
administration's then-current National Missile Defense Program.
  Mr. President, if any of our colleagues would like to look at a sound 
proposal that was negotiated--every word of it was negotiated--they 
will do well to review that in reviewing this debate before we vote on 
these matters.
  The bipartisan amendment stated that it, ``is the policy of the 
United States to develop for deployment a multiple-site national 
missile defense system that: First, is affordable and operationally 
effective against limited, accidental, and unauthorized ballistic 
missile attacks on the territory of the United States, and second, can 
be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered 
defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile 
threats.''
  The bipartisan amendment required the Secretary of Defense to: 
``develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile 
defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of attaining initial 
operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.''
  The bipartisan amendment also set forth the understanding of the 
Senate as to the demarcation between theater and ballistic missile 
defense systems, and established a prohibition against the use of 
funds: ``to implement an agreement with any of the independent states 
of the former Soviet Union entered into after January 1, 1995. that 
would establish a demarcation between theater missile defense systems 
and antiballistic missile systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty or 
that would restrict the performance, operation, or deployment of United 
States theater missile defense systems except: First, to the extent 
provided in an act enacted subsequent to this act; second, to implement 
that portion of any such agreement that implements the criteria in 
subsection (b)(1); or third, to

[[Page S5684]]

implement any such agreement that is entered into pursuant to the 
treaty making power of the President under the Constitution.''
  That amendment, developed by two Democrats and two Republicans, was 
approved overwhelmingly in the Senate by a vote of 85 to 13 and, 
interestingly enough, only one Republican voted against the amendment. 
Most of the votes against the amendment were on the Democratic side by 
people who felt the amendment went too far toward a national missile 
defense. Only one Republican, as I recall, voted against it.
  Despite this overwhelming approval, the bipartisan amendment was 
abandoned in conference, which was puzzling to me at the time and 
remains puzzling, to say the least, since it would clearly define our 
national missile defense goals and give renewed bipartisan emphasis to 
the importance of national missile defenses.
  The bipartisan amendment also had the added advantage that it would 
have been signed into law by President Clinton, not an insignificant 
step if your motive is to get something done. Instead, the majority 
conferees decided to mandate a specific requirement to deploy a 
national missile defense system by the year 2003. There is a difference 
here between ``develop for development'' and ``deploy.''
  ``Develop for deployment,'' which was in the bipartisan agreement 
that passed the Senate, is a different term than ``deploy,'' because 
``develop for deployment'' indicates a further decision has to be made 
after the development has taken place before you decide to deploy, 
whereas ``deploy,'' as used then and as used in the act before us--that 
will perhaps be before us that is now the subject of debate--``deploy'' 
means deploy. It means you are making a decision now to deploy a system 
that will be developed over a period of time and be, hopefully, ready 
in 2003.
  The Clinton administration expressed strong opposition to the 
conference report, particularly in terms of its impact on Russian 
consideration of the START II Treaty, which has not been ratified in 
Russia, which is designed to produce a second major reduction in United 
States and Russian nuclear weapons, including, I might state, Mr. 
President, getting rid of MIRV'd weapons which has been the goal, to 
get rid of multiple warhead missiles aimed at the United States which 
has been the goal of Democratic and Republican Presidents for many 
years.
  The administration also expressed concern that the language could 
lead the Russians to abandon other arms control agreements if they 
conclude that it is United States policy to take unilateral action to 
abandon the ABM Treaty. And reading the act as it was proposed last 
year, I find it inescapable that that is what the Russians would 
conclude.
  In a letter to Senator Daschle dated December 15, Secretary of 
Defense Bill Perry stated, and I quote from that letter:

       [B]y directing the NMD [National Missile Defense] be 
     ``operationally effective'' in defending all 50 States 
     (including Hawaii and Alaska), the bill would likely require 
     a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated 
     within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting 
     U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the 
     bill puts at risk continued implementation of the START I 
     Treaty and ratification of the START II, two treaties which 
     together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic 
     warheads by two-thirds from Cold War levels, significantly 
     lowering the threat to U.S. national security.

  Ending the quote from Secretary Perry.
  As a result of those concerns, and other considerations, the 
President vetoed the bill. That was the main defense authorization bill 
that was vetoed.

  When the conferees reconvened, the majority decided to drop all 
language dealing with missile defense. Again, from my perspective, a 
very curious position, because we had already shown overwhelming 
bipartisan support, including every Republican, but one, in the U.S. 
Senate for what I would call the Nunn-Levin-Cohen-Warner amendment 
which passed the Senate. So why we did not go back to that as a 
substitute after the vetoed bill is still puzzling to me.
  If the motive was to accelerate national missile defense, why would 
the majority not choose to insert the bipartisan amendment passed 
overwhelmingly in the Senate and agreed to by the President? I still 
have that question today. We could have passed that. We would be 1 year 
further along with a national consensus on where we go with national 
missile defense. But here we are, again, fighting over this issue. It 
seems to me some would rather fight over the issue than resolve it. 
Nevertheless, that is from my perspective.
  The Dole-Gingrich bill let me just address briefly.
  On March 21, 1996, Senator Dole introduced S. 1635, entitled Defend 
America Act of 1996, on behalf of himself and 19 other Senators. I 
might stipulate at the beginning that I agree in defending America and 
I think my record indicates that over the years. So the title of the 
bill is not my problem.
  Speaker Gingrich and others introduced an identical version in the 
House. The Dole-Gingrich bill would mandate deployment of a national 
missile defense system by 2003 and selection of a particular 
architecture for that system a few months from now. I believe the date 
is March of next year. It gives the President 1 year from its enactment 
in which to negotiate modifications to the ABM Treaty to permit the 
chosen architecture to be developed and deployed.
  So this is a very compressed timeframe, based on all technical 
assessments from the program managers, as to where we are now, 
particularly the items of selecting the architecture and in terms of 
negotiating an ABM Treaty amendment, which is not going to be a quick, 
easy matter, as everyone who has ever negotiated with the Russians 
knows.
  A critique of the Dole-Gingrich bill is set forth in a recent speech 
by Robert Bell, the Senior Director of Defense Policy and Arms Control 
on the National Security Council. Mr. Bell takes the Dole-Gingrich 
proposal to task on several particular points.
  First, he notes that the Dole-Gingrich bill requires a deployment 
decision today well before we have a system to deploy.
  Second, he suggests that the Dole-Gingrich bill appears to be a 
``stalking-horse'' for the resurrection of the old SDI program intended 
to defend against much larger scale attacks than a limited national 
defense could cope with.
  Incidentally, the threat has changed immensely since those days 
because of START I and START II, at least the prospect of START II, in 
reducing the number of warheads, if these amendments go through, 
reducing them very substantially from what existed in the 1980's when 
President Reagan proposed the original so-called star wars program, 
which was an accelerated program of larger scope than we had in 
existence in terms of research and development.
  Third, Mr. Bell indicates that the Dole-Gingrich bill would 
constitute an ``anticipatory breach'' of the ABM Treaty.
  Finally, Mr. Bell suggests strong Russian opposition to the 1-year 
deadline in the Dole-Gingrich bill for negotiating changes in the ABM 
Treaty acceptable to the United States.
  Mr. President, I agree with many of Mr. Bell's criticisms of the 
Dole-Gingrich bill. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that speech 
be printed in the Record following my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office 
was asked to estimate the acquisition cost for the NMD system required 
by the Dole-Gingrich bill. On May 17, 1996, the Congressional Budget 
Office provided the Armed Services Committee with that cost estimate. 
CBO estimates that the total acquisition cost for the Dole-Gingrich 
bill through the year 2010 would range from $31 billion to as much as 
$60 billion.
  As the CBO report notes:

       The wide range in the estimate reflects uncertainty about 
     two factors--the type and capability of a defensive system 
     that would satisfy the terms of the bill, and the cost of 
     each component of that system.

  Mr. President, CBO is right. There is a huge range because no one 
knows the system that we in this bill, if we pass this bill, would be 
by law saying had to be deployed. So if we pass this bill as is, we 
would be making a deployment

[[Page S5685]]

decision on a system that is not developed, that will cost, according 
to CBO, anywhere from $30 to $60 billion. In a period of time where we 
are trying to get our budget under control, to pass into law something 
that mandates the deployment of a system that could range in cost from 
$30 to $60 billion is, to say the least, puzzling for a Senate that has 
talked about fiscal prudence. Just a little $30 billion swing there in 
terms of what we are talking about.

  In its present form, Mr. President, I believe there is no question 
that the Dole-Gingrich bill, if and when passed by the Congress and 
sent to the President, will be vetoed just under the speed of light on 
both cost and arms control grounds.
  I emphasize, however--and I think certainly this is important, from 
my perspective--that I support a number of the concepts underlying the 
Dole-Gingrich bill, concepts that I believe are imperfectly presented 
in its text, in other words, flawed.
  Like the sponsors of that bill, I do not believe we can assume that 
no ballistic missile threat for the United States will emerge over the 
next 15 years.
  Like the sponsors, I believe there is some preemptive and deterrent 
value to deploying a national missile defense system to defend against 
limited--I emphasize ``limited''--missile attacks even before the 
threat, certainly the rogue nation threat, has fully emerged.
  To understand the unwarranted cost of delay in deploying a limited 
national missile defense system, I think we need only look at the 
difficult situation today in the theater missile defense area. Our 
theater missile defense systems arrived well after the short-range 
missile threat in the Middle East had emerged. When the Persian Gulf 
war began, Iraq had hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles at its 
disposal, while we had a very limited antimissile capability 
essentially grafted onto the Patriot air defense system. We were 
grateful for what we had. The results from Patriot defenses are still 
in some dispute--and certainly psychologically there was a big plus in 
having that system, and also militarily--but it is clear that the 
Patriot's performance did not resemble the ``astrodome'' defense that 
many missile defense enthusiasts envision. We are still playing catchup 
ball in the theater missile defense area, and we continue to do so 
today.
  Mr. President, there are three parts to the threat that encourage us, 
from my perspective, to move forward on a prudent basis on a national 
missile defense system.
  First, there is a potential at some future time for deliberate, long-
range missile attacks from rogue nations. You can debate whether that 
is going to be in 5 years, 10 years, 2 years, 4 years. We all know that 
if certain powers in the world decided they wanted a rogue nation to 
have a missile and a nuclear warhead, it could happen overnight. I do 
not think that is likely because I do not think it is to Russia's 
benefit or China's benefit, or anyone else that is a nuclear power, to 
deliver a missile delivery system or a nuclear warhead to a rogue 
nation.
  The second threat is the threat of accidental launch from existing 
nuclear powers. That accidental is exactly what we are talking about 
here. We are not talking about deliberate in the second threat, but 
accidental.
  There is a threat of unauthorized launch from existing nuclear 
powers.
  Since the threat of accidental and unauthorized launches of long-
range missiles from both China and Russia exist today, I have no qualms 
about advocating the development and deployment of an accelerated but 
sensible--and I underscore both words, ``accelerated but sensible''--
basis of a limited national defense capability.
  The cost of that deployment can be viewed as a very reasonable 
insurance premium, if it is a prudent program against the catastrophic 
damage, the unimaginable loss of life that would result from even a 
single accidental or unauthorized nuclear missile aimed at an American 
city. I must add, however, the caution that everyone contemplating an 
insurance policy has to weigh the cost of the insurance premium against 
the risk of loss. Then you have to decide whether the risk warrants the 
premium. That is the way you have to decide a number of things, both in 
everyday life as well as in the defense arena.

  Today, as the CBO report makes plain, the cost of the Dole-Gingrich 
bill's insurance premium for national missile defense is quite high. 
Therefore, these have to be weighed carefully, each, in my view, 
separately but also collectively.
  For all of these reasons, Mr. President, I have some sympathy for 
some of the underlying concepts of the Dole-Gingrich bill. 
Unfortunately, as drafted, the demerits of the Dole-Gingrich bill far 
outweigh its good features.
  Once again, as with last year's abortive national missile defense 
provisions, the Dole-Gingrich bill contains a series of egregious 
provisions that have nothing to do with getting on with the deployment 
of this national defense system to defend America from limited attacks 
and much to do with the implied hopes of a few in this body that the 
entire thrust of arms control and cooperation with the Russian 
federation can be reversed.
  I certainly do not attribute that to everyone who supports this bill. 
But I think there are some who believe we would be better off--and they 
believe this sincerely--if we tossed out START I, tossed out START II 
and simply went all out to provide defenses that would certainly have 
to be much more comprehensive, because the threat would grow greatly in 
comparison to what would happen if we do carry out these arms control 
agreements that are underway.
  Mr. President, I do not understand the logic that finds any advantage 
accrued to the United States from our acting to destroy the START II 
Treaty well before it enters into force and take down with it the ABM 
Treaty and probably the START I Treaty as well. I do not understand 
that logic.
  Before START, the former Soviet Union had over 13,000 strategic 
nuclear warheads aimed at us; once START II enters into force, that 
total will be reduced to only 3,000 to 3,500 warheads.
  Mr. President, as I have already mentioned, the threat that we are 
talking about has three prongs. One is, rogue nation. That is the 
debating point about where that will develop. The other two prongs are 
already here--accidental and unauthorized launch.
  Does it not stand to reason there is much less chance of having an 
accidental or unauthorized launch if the Russians have moved down from 
13,000 warheads to 3,000 or to 3,500, even with a military that is 
demoralized to some extent? Managing 3,000 to 3,500 warheads, if START 
II goes into effect and is implemented, is certainly a much more 
manageable situation than managing 13,000 and greatly reduces the 
threat that this national missile defense is aimed to prevent.
  There is a direct connection between the START agreements being 
implemented and the reduction of threat that the National Missile 
Defense Act is aimed at. If we can get a major reduction in threat by 
carrying out arms control agreements, why would we want to disrupt that 
pattern? These agreements were negotiated and signed not by President 
Clinton or by President Carter but by President Reagan and by President 
Bush.
  Mr. President, does the Senate believe our defense budget will be 
smaller if START II fails? Does the Senate believe a U.S. national 
missile defense system sized to defend against START I force levels--
which will be the levels if we disrupt the reduction; that will be what 
we will be left with--do we believe missile defense systems sized to 
defend against the force levels will be paid for by the Congress and 
the American people? If so, it will be far bigger than any $30 to $60 
billion. That is for a limited system. That is for a limited system.
  If we go back to START I levels or START II levels you can take that 
figure and you can put a multiple on it. Does the Senate think the way 
to deploy limited missile defense capability is to pass, on a party-
line vote, a bill that is certain to be vetoed? Is that somebody's idea 
of how you sustain a long-term program that will cost $30 to $60 
billion? In my opinion, that is not the way you proceed. Primarily, 
what we will do if we pass this bill and it is vetoed, we will be in a 
posture where a number of people can issue press releases, while yet 
another legislative year passes. How many ballistic missiles can press 
releases defend against? Not many.
  Even if all the egregious language were removed from the Dole-
Gingrich

[[Page S5686]]

bill, we would still be left with another fundamental problem. The 
Dole-Gingrich bill violates most precepts of sound acquisition policy. 
The Dole-Gingrich bill says we are going to decide today to deploy 
``something'' that can perhaps shoot down enemy long-range ballistic 
missiles that might be launched at U.S. territory by the year 2003. The 
preferred NMD system is not even defined in the Dole-Gingrich bill. No 
prototype hardware exists. There is no test data to support a cost and 
effectiveness analysis. We have, at best, back-of-the-envelope cost and 
``schedule'' estimates provided by NMD developers to the ballistic 
missile defense organization. These developers' cost estimates are much 
lower than those provided by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget 
Office. I have seen a lot of weapons procured, and I have never seen a 
weapons developer overestimate the cost of the weapon. Just the 
reverse. I have seen almost every developer underestimate what it will 
cost. Of course that is their incentive.
  Let me ask my colleagues, would we rely on defense contractors to 
tell us the cost of a new aircraft program, a new submarine program, or 
a new armored vehicle program? Would we rely on contractors, unchecked, 
solely, to tell us how soon the system would be operational? Would we 
legislate procurement of aircraft, ships, or armored vehicles, without 
knowing the outcome of research, development, testing, and evaluation? 
Would we commit to deployment without independent review of the testing 
done by the developer? Of course not. Of course we use the information 
a developer gives us, but we do enough testing and evaluation so we get 
an independent analysis.
  That is the only sound, prudent way to buy any system, let alone a 
system that has this kind of revolutionary technology. Yet many of our 
colleagues appear ready to buy the Dole-Gingrich bill's proverbial pig 
in a poke, based on the back-of-the-envelope calculations, with no test 
data on any aspect of the system in hand today.

  Mr. President, it would be a sad day for this body if we abandon our 
commitment to fly before we buy. Why would the Senate abandon its 
requirement that it will commit major funding to deploy complex major 
weapon systems only after adequate test and evaluation has been 
conducted? I do not understand how anyone can argue that the deployment 
mandate in the Dole--Gingrich bill constitutes responsible oversight 
and stewardship of the taxpayer dollars.
  Mr. President, I also would like to address the administration's NMD 
Program which may be offered as a substitute to the Dole-Gingrich bill. 
Despite all the sound and fury that will accompany the debate over the 
Dole-Gingrich bill, the fact is that the end points of it and the 
administration's ``3-plus-3'' --3 years of development followed by 3 
years of deployment--these programs are really quite similar. Both 
support extensive R&D on national missile defenses. Both provide the 
prospect of a deployed national missile defense system by the end of 
the year 2003. The main differences are that the administration plans 
to carry out the development and testing of the components of an NMD 
system for 3 more years while complying with the ABM Treaty and then 
consider whether or not to deploy that system, while the Dole-Gingrich 
bill commits us by law to a deployment decision on a noncompliant 
system today. By ``noncompliant'' I mean with existing treaty 
obligations of the countries.
  While I am in agreement with much of the administration's program, I 
find that there are several omissions that, were they included, would 
materially strengthen the proposal. My major concern with the 
administration's proposal is the absence of any real criteria for 
evaluating 3 years hence whether or not the time has come to end 
development and start deployment. Significant among the considerations 
of that point should be, it seems to me, whether the threat--and by 
this, I mean one-third of the threat, the rogue nation threat--has 
matured as rapidly as we expected it would. Certainly we will know more 
as the years unfold. We recognize additional time spent in development 
usually leads to improved system performance, but it can also lead in 
many cases to much cheaper ways of achieving the desired objectives. 
For example, the administration's program also does not portray how 
much more effective or how much cheaper an NMD system might be if we 
were to defer deployment for an additional finite period, say 3 more 
years, if they were to conclude that the severity of the threat--in my 
view, the rogue nation threat, although the administration, which is 
where I differ significantly, they define the threat as only the rogue 
nation threat; I define that as one of the threats, the other two being 
accidental and unauthorized, and that threat is already here--if they 
were to conclude the severity of the rogue nation threat does not 
require an immediate deployment.
  Mr. President, we have to consider all of these threats in assessing 
whether the risk is worth the premium or whether there are other ways 
we could spend the premium money to enhance our security more than will 
enhance it with this type system. That is the balance that is missing 
in this bill.
  Mr. President, earlier I used the analogy of buying insurance in 
discussing the threat to the United States from attack by nuclear 
weapons delivered by long-range missiles. I noted that one must 
consider the cost of the insurance premium and the risk of loss. Many 
view the creation of nuclear weapons a half-century ago as the event 
that cracked open Pandora's box, allowing evils to escape, namely 
nuclear weapons. Increasingly, however, we are recognizing that the end 
of the cold war has ripped the lid off the box.

  We have seen an attempt to use chemical weapons during the World 
Trade Center bombing, we have seen actual use of sarin gas in the Tokyo 
subway. In our subcommittee, Senator Roth and I had a substantial 
number of hearings on that subject. We have seen the ugly face of 
domestic terrorism in the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal 
Building in Oklahoma City and the tragedy that ensued from that, the 
Chechen rebels in Russia conceal deadly radiological sources in a 
Moscow park, in effect, making a very clear and visible threat of using 
radiological weapons. That is, nuclear weapon materials being dispersed 
without an explosion. We have seen a sharply growing number of arrests 
of shady characters bringing fissionable materials out of Russia and 
other member States of the former Soviet Union.
  In summary, Mr. President, America's citizens today face an array of 
potential and actual threats from many kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction, not simply being delivered by ballistic missile. Some of 
these threats can emerge at home, others can come from abroad, by a 
variety of means and in many guises. This Nation, today, is singularly 
unprepared for any sort of terrorist threat employing chemical, 
biological or radiological weapons of mass destruction. We have all 
sorts of vulnerabilities that we are just beginning to pay some 
attention to.
  Mr. President, this raises, again, the question of what risks America 
can afford to pay to insure against, and how much America can afford to 
pay for insurance of all kinds. What are the priorities we should 
attach to improving our capabilities to defend against each of these 
threats, including but not limited to the threat of long-range missiles 
armed with nuclear weapons? Are we providing funding to deal with each 
of these different threats in accordance with our level of preparedness 
and the imminence of the threats, or are we overfunding some of the 
threats while starving and completely ignoring others? Does the Dole 
bill represent the equivalent of an expensive life insurance policy 
that only ensures against death from shark attacks and lightning 
strikes, but does not provide coverage against more fundamental 
problems, such as heart attack and cancer?

  Since we are spending so little and are so unprepared for terrorist 
attacks on our cities, using chemical, biological, or radiological 
weapons, should we not be checking out the costs of a more 
comprehensive and less expensive insurance policy than the Dole-
Gingrich bill?
  In fact, Mr. President, Senator Lugar, Senator Domenici, and I have 
spent a great deal of time in recent months and years, and we plan to 
introduce an amendment on the fiscal year 1997 defense authorization 
bill when it is brought up on the floor later this month to address 
many of these areas of America's unpreparedness in a

[[Page S5687]]

comprehensive way, dealing particularly with the domestic threat of 
chemical and biological weapons being used against our cities and 
against our citizens.
  Mr. President, also--and this is a separate matter that Senator Lugar 
and Senator Domenici are not involved in, and I want to make that 
clear--I intend to offer a substitute during this debate if the Dole-
Gingrich bill is considered by the Senate. My substitute will include a 
number of modifications and omissions I have previously noted in this 
presentation today, including--and this is just the highlights or the 
fundamental parts of this substitute--No. 1, the specification of a 
treaty-compliant national missile defense system to be developed for 
deployment at Grand Forks, consistent with an additional operation 
capacity in 2003.
  Again, the words ``developed for deployment'' is different from 
deployment, and that is a fundamental difference. It means develop so 
we can be prepared, with logical reasoning, to decide whether and when 
to deploy--after we know whether it will work, after we know how much 
it is going to cost.
  By the way, that would be, as I said, a treaty-compliant system 
because, under the ABM Treaty, we are allowed to have a missile defense 
system at Grand Forks, and, of course, the Russians have had one around 
Moscow for some time.
  No. 2, a statement of the criteria to be considered in any future 
deployment decision, including the threat, the cost and effectiveness 
of the deployed system against that threat based on demonstrated test 
results, the cost differential and gain and effectiveness of the 
deployed system, if it were to continue to be developed an additional 
period of 1 to 3 years. In other words, can we make quantum leaps in 
effectiveness and in reducing costs if we take another year or two to 
develop it? That has to be measured against a threat at the appropriate 
time. We cannot make that judgment now.
  Also, the effect on deployment of reducing the threat against the 
United States through arms control measures: Should we not consider the 
effect on START I and START II? Should we think about that? And also 
including our relative preparedness for other contingencies involving 
the threat and use of weapons of mass destruction, including, as I 
mentioned, chemical and biological attacks against American cities.
  The third part of this substitute will be an inclusion of a provision 
establishing a procedure to permit a vote by both Houses of the 106th 
Congress on the deployment of the treaty-compliant national missile 
defense system described in my proposal, with that vote constructed as 
a privileged motion under expedited procedures. Mr. President, this 
would say that at a time certain we will vote, we will decide, but we 
will do it on a time scale where we have the information before we make 
the decision, not after we make the decision.

  No. 4, a provision urging that the President seek, cooperatively with 
Russia, to rescind the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty and make modest 
conforming changes to allow both sides 2 national defense sites and up 
to 200 interceptors. Mr. President, that was the original ABM Treaty, 
and the protocol cut 2 sites and 200 interceptors to 1 site and 100 
interceptors. This would be saying to those who believe that the ABM 
Treaty and everything about it is sacred--and I do not--we will go back 
to the original ABM Treaty, which permitted 2 sites and 200 
interceptors. This would greatly improve the effectiveness of the 
United States and Russia against limited attacks by long-range 
ballistic missiles, without threatening either side's deterrent 
capabilities or either side's perception of having deterrence to a 
first-strike by the other side.
  Mr. President, the fifth provision is a provision urging continued 
cooperation with Russia and other States on the full spectrum of 
threats involving weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, we have 
just received word that the last nuclear warhead has been taken out of 
the Ukraine and moved to Russia. This is the best example of reducing 
the threat against the United States by means other than military 
hardware. We are using the so-called unn-Lugar money to reduce the 
threat. If anybody thinks it is easier to deal with four nuclear 
States, four different hands on the nuclear trigger, four different 
command and controls, four different sets of officers, all aiming 
missiles at the United States or at other allies in the world, then I 
think they need to rethink their position.
  What we have been able to do in the last 2 or 3 years, with stalwart 
work by Secretary Perry and others in the Department of Defense, we 
have been able to get three of the former parts of the Soviet Union 
that ended up with nuclear weapons--Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--
to give up all their nuclear weapons. The Ukraine's last warhead has 
just moved out. I think that demonstrates the comprehensive kind of 
approach that we have to have in dealing with this problem.
  Finally, Mr. President, a sixth component, and a very important part 
of this overall substitute, would be calling for greater United States-
Russian cooperation in such areas as sharing improved missile detection 
and warning data. If successful, this cooperation, particularly joined 
with the amendments to the ABM Treaty, which should be mutually agreed 
on--we always have the right to basically serve notice that we are 
getting out from under the treaties if Russia will not negotiate in 
good faith--but, if successful, the combination of having the ability 
to go back to the original ABM Treaty and have two sites, and also 
joint development programs for advanced theater missile defense 
systems, since we and Russia face similar theater missile defense 
threats--Russia probably greater than we face that kind of threat--that 
kind of combination could put us on the road to a different kind of 
relationship with Russia. Obviously, the extent of such cooperation may 
well be dependent upon the outcome of the Russian elections and the 
future direction of the Russian Government. At this point, that is 
unknown.
  Mr. President, in summary, I believe my amendment, when it is 
introduced, can provide the basis for a strong, bipartisan bill, 
allowing us to move forward with the national missile defense 
capability against limited attack. I have no doubt that some in this 
body will not support this approach because it does not have enough of 
a flavor of immediate deployment before we know cost affordability, 
technical systems, and how they work. So some people will not favor it 
because of that and also because it does not lead to necessarily 
abandoning the ABM Treaty. Others will dismiss, from the other point of 
view, all threats of missile attack on the United States, and they will 
oppose it because this substitute is too forward leaning. We could end 
up, on this substitute, with only one vote, and that might be mine. It 
may be one of those classic squeezes where everybody is opposed to it 
for different reasons.

  I hope that is not accurate. I hope that many in the coalition that 
supported last year's bipartisan amendment, by a vote of 85 to 13, will 
be able to support this amendment, which I think can provide us the 
right road to reduce the overall threat against the United States, to 
provide for an orderly and logical sequence of decisionmaking in the 
national missile defense area, and also provide for a method of 
retaining the constructive parts of the ABM Treaty, by having modest 
amendments to that treaty in a cooperative way, and also providing for 
increased cooperation between the United States and Russia, in 
recognizing that we both, to some extent, face the same kind of threat. 
It would behoove both of us to work together in protecting our people 
and our citizens.
  Mr. President, for a long time to come, the Russians, even if we get 
START I and START II, are still going to have enough capacity, in 30 
minutes to an hour's time, to destroy most of the United States.
  I think in considering that equation--and that is even if we pass the 
Dole-Gingrich bill, and even if everything works out and it is 
affordable, even if it is technically feasible and even if we begin 
deploying it in 2003, we are going to have a period of many years while 
we remain vulnerable to an attack by the Russians against the United 
States.
  For that reason I think everybody better pay careful attention to the 
way we go about reducing this overall threat of rogue nations and 
accidental

[[Page S5688]]

unauthorized launch. The way we go about it can produce a much safer 
America. But it can also, if we go about it in the wrong way, cause a 
great deal of increased risk to our citizens because of the continuing 
threat of existing nuclear powers, and, even if we have arms control 
and if it works perfectly, that threat is going to remain for a long 
time to come.
  Mr. President, many people do not realize it. But, if we were to 
agree right now with the Russians, the Chinese, the French, the 
British, and everybody else in the world to abolish all nuclear weapons 
from the face of the Earth, it would take years and years and years to 
be able to negotiate something that would be verifiable. And then it 
would take years and years to reduce the number of warheads and 
missiles. It would take a long, long time.
  So we are going to be living with this nuclear equation for a long 
number of years to come, even under the best of circumstances. And I 
think it is in our interest to proceed in a very logical and a very 
prudent fashion as to how we go about protecting America's national 
security and protecting the land that we love.

                              [Exhibit 1]

                     Defending America Against WMD

               (By Robert G. Bell, Senior Director, NSC)

       It is always a pleasure for me to come back to the Hill, 
     and a special pleasure to be here only a week or so before 
     ``Defend America Week'' in the House and Senate. The 
     Administration is delighted that both Houses are going to 
     take time out of their busy schedules to focus on the state 
     of our Nation's defenses. But I want to make it clear that 
     for the Administration, defending America is not something we 
     concentrate on one week out of the year. Defending America is 
     what we're about day in and day out.
       This morning I would like to address one important aspect 
     of our strategy for defending America, and that is defense 
     against the growing danger of weapons of mass destruction 
     (WMD). On April 25th the Secretary of Defense addressed this 
     topic in a comprehensive fashion in a speech at George 
     Washington University, and I recommend that speech to you. As 
     he noted, the Administration has erected three lines of 
     defense against weapons of mass destruction. I agree with the 
     point Senator Cochran makes in his Post op-ed today that 
     there should not be an ``either/or'' choice between these 
     three lines of defense: we need all three.
       The first line of defense is prevention--or what Secretary 
     Perry has called ``defense by other means.'' This line of 
     defense includes ratifying and entering into force START I 
     and START II, which together will remove from active 
     inventories two-thirds of the strategic nuclear weapons that 
     threatened us at the height of the Cold War.
       It includes ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
     which we look forward to seeing on the Senate floor in the 
     near future now that it has been overwhelmingly approved by 
     the Foreign Relations Committee.
       It includes achieving the indefinite and unconditional 
     extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, strengthening the 
     IAEA and MTCR, negotiating the nuclear framework accord with 
     North Korea, and signing two nuclear-free zone treaties 
     which, together with the Antarctica and South American 
     agreements, now mean that over half the land area of the 
     earth is denuclearized.
       These agreements, in tandem with the ``true-zero'' 
     Comprehensive Test Ban treaty we intend to have ready for 
     signature by September, establish strict restrictions on the 
     further proliferation of nuclear weapons.
       It includes the US/Russian detargeting agreement the 
     President reached with President Yeltsin, which ensures that 
     if--God forbid--a nuclear missile should ever be launched 
     accidentally, it would cause no harm. And it includes the 
     invaluable Nunn-Lugar program for directly removing nuclear 
     capabilities.
       As Michael Krepon has underscored in testimony and in his 
     published writings, it is unfortunate that while Congress is 
     increasing budget accounts for missile defense by hundreds of 
     millions, many on the Hill have restricted or even cut 
     funding for these preventive programs, and some have 
     staunchly opposed the arms control treaties I mentioned.
       The second line of defense against weapons of mass 
     destruction is deterrence, both at the conventional and 
     nuclear level. Any rogue nation foolish enough to contemplate 
     using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against the 
     United States, its Armed Forces or our allies must not be 
     confused about how we would respond. As Secretary Perry 
     stated, it would be ``devastating'' and ``absolutely 
     overwhelming.''
       The President has made clear in three successive annual 
     National Security Strategy Reports the plain fact that this 
     Administration believes, fundamentally, in maintaining a 
     robust and credible nuclear deterrent. Not because we believe 
     Russia is going to attack us today, tomorrow, next week, next 
     month, next year. But because we face an uncertain future and 
     an uncertain world, and keeping our nuclear forces strong is 
     a prudent hedge. That is why we decided to maintain the 
     triad. That is why we decided to backfit the D-5 SLBM into 
     our Trident submarines. And that is why the President 
     recently decided that we are not going to go below START I 
     levels until Russia ratifies the START II treaty.
       The third line of defense is compromised by our theater and 
     national missile defense programs, on which the Defense 
     Department is spending $3 billion a year. As Secretary 
     Perry stated, our ballistic missile defense program starts 
     with a sober and clear-eyed look at the missile threat. 
     What is that threat?
       First, there is the short-range missile threat, which is 
     here and now. That threat includes SCUDs and other missiles 
     with ranges below 1000 kilometers. To defend against such 
     attacks we have deployed upgraded Patriots in various 
     theaters around the world and are poised to deploy in the 
     next few years more advanced PAC-3 and Navy Lower Tier TMDs.
       Second is the emerging threat of more advanced, longer-
     range theater ballistic missiles. To counter these expected 
     threats we are developing the Army THAAD and the Navy Upper 
     Tier TMDs, with deployment planned after the end of the 
     decade and, in the case of THAAD, a contingency deployment of 
     40 prototype interceptors available as soon as two years from 
     now.
       As this audience well knows, Congress and the 
     Administration have disagreed over the pace of these two 
     programs and our approach to the arms control dimension of 
     both systems. Congress wants to go faster; we say we have the 
     time to get it right. We say we should not build so much 
     concurrency into the programs that we increase technical risk 
     inordinately. On the arms control front, we are trying, in a 
     cooperative fashion with Russia, to make clear that the ABM 
     Treaty does not restrict TMD systems that have a hypothetical 
     capability under certain scenarios to intercept certain 
     strategic ballistic missiles. In this regard, we were 
     encouraged by the understandings on ABM/TMD demarcation 
     reached at last month's summit in Moscow. But as Secretary 
     Perry emphasized, ``our bottom line is that we will not give 
     up the right to defend our troops from attack by theater 
     ballistic missiles.''
       The third threat is the prospect that a rogue state will 
     obtain a strategic ballistic missile that could threaten our 
     homeland. When do we expect that could occur? This brings us 
     to the recent National Intelligence Estimate--the now-famous 
     NIE. That NIE says, as has been stated in open testimony, 
     that the intelligence community does not believe it is likely 
     that we will face an ICBM or SLBM threat from a rogue nation 
     to the continental United States (CONUS) within the next 15 
     years. In the special case of Alaska and Hawaii--which we 
     obviously recognize as full partners in this union of fifty 
     states--the CIA has said, in a public letter to Senators 
     Levin and Bumpers, that the intelligence community does not 
     think that the North Korean Taepo Dong II, which might have 
     the range to reach western Hawaii or parts of Alaska, will be 
     operational within the next 5 years. Let me take each of 
     those cases in turn.
       First, why ``15 years'' in terms of a threat to CONUS? It 
     is important to understand that this was not a case of 
     building the threat from the bottom up, of starting now and 
     going out in time year by year to see how far you could go 
     before everyone agreed a threat was likely to emerge. Rather, 
     the analysts decided that the 15 year mark was the most 
     relevant point in time in terms of being useful to the policy 
     and acquisition communities. They could have picked the 10 
     year mark, but since weapons systems have a 12-15 year 
     acquisition period, that would have been too soon. And they 
     could have picked 20 or 25 years, but that would have been 
     too speculative. So they decided to ask themselves what they 
     thought the situation would look like in 15 years.
       Did the NIE ignore possible short-cuts that a country might 
     pursue as an alternative to an indigenous, bottom-up ICBM or 
     SLBM development, test and acquisition process? No. It looked 
     at such alternatives as a rogue state buying, stealing or 
     otherwise getting possession of a complete missile. They did 
     not say it could not happen; that it was impossible. But they 
     did judge that possibility to be remote or very low.
       Did the Administration take comfort from the 15 year 
     estimate and conclude we did not need to do anything before 
     then? No. We are developing an NMD deployment option that 
     could be fielded by 2003, eight years--I repeat, eight years, 
     in advance of the estimate. I will have more to say about our 
     program in a minute.
       Did the NIE ignore the Alaska/Hawaii threats? No. That 
     analysis is in there. In this case, the picture is less 
     clear. But both the Air Force and the Army have on their own 
     initiative put together quick response, treaty-complaint, 
     relatively low cost deployment options that could defend 
     Alaska and Hawaii against an attack involving just a few 
     warheads. These options would be uniquely effective, and I 
     would say exclusively effective, against just this kind of 
     scenario: a North Korea that acquires a handful of missiles 
     sooner than expected.
       Finally, was the NIE ``politicized'', as has been charged? 
     I will tell you categorically that the answer to that is 
     ``no.'' I say that for two reasons. First, the first I knew 
     that there was an NIE coming out on this issue was when I 
     came to work one morning and found it in my in-box. Anyone 
     who thinks that someone at the White House could call up the 
     CIA and order them to produce a

[[Page S5689]]

     ``helpful'' NIE without the NSC knowing about it knows 
     nothing about how the Executive Branch works. The second 
     reason is that the 15 year estimate was a unanimous judgment 
     among the various elements of the intelligence community. 
     This was not a case of a ``footnoted'' estimate, where some 
     organizations said one thing and others said another and the 
     Administration decided to pick the most favorable view. 
     Rather, all organizations that participated in the NIE 
     were in agreement, and it was not a close call.
       So, that it is our plan and our program. But our critics 
     are supporting another approach, embodied now in the bill 
     introduced by the Majority Leader and the Speaker, and we are 
     about to engage in a great debate on this issue.
       I want to be clear about the critical differences between 
     the Dole-Gingrich bill and the substitute that Mr. Spratt 
     offered that lost narrowly in committee and will be voted on 
     again on the floor, and the substitute bill that I understand 
     Senator Nunn is preparing for introduction in the Senate.
       The first critical difference, as Secretary Perry 
     emphasized in his speech at GW, is a question of timing. The 
     Dole-Gingrich bill says choose the NMD architecture now and 
     deploy it independent of what happens with the threat. Our 
     plan is to develop a deployment option, assess the threat in 
     three years, and examine the deployment requirement on a 
     year-by-year basis starting in 2000. Either approach would 
     allow a system to be fielded by 2003. But ours offers the 
     prospect, if the threat does not materialize sooner than we 
     expect, of saving the large sums now and across the Future 
     Years Defense Plan (FYDP) that would be required to build and 
     deploy a national missile defense.
       How much would we save? Frankly, it is hard to say. Senator 
     Dole said he did not know how much his plan would cost. That 
     is because the Dole-Gingrich bill embraces such a wide range 
     of possible architectures that it is impossible to estimate 
     what the bill would cost. But if you take the most 
     conservative option--that is, a two-site land-based ABM 
     defense--that would cost on the order of $20 billion in 
     acquisition and operating and support costs. That is $20 
     billion that is not in the FYDP or the Military Services' 
     outyear budgets. That is $20 billion that would compete with 
     Service procurement requirements that we and the Chiefs agree 
     have a higher priority. That is why the Chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs oppose any significant 
     increase in spending on ballistic missile defenses and have 
     recommended that current levels be maintained.
       I think it is interesting that some Members have held up 
     copies of leaked memos from General Shali and read from those 
     portions in which he and the Chiefs made recommendations with 
     regard to procurement levels, but then have not gone on to 
     read those portions in which the Chairman and the Chiefs 
     recommend against spending more on missile defenses.
       The second critical difference, quite frankly, is that, at 
     least for some of its backers the Dole-Gingrich bill is a 
     stalking horse for a return to a Reagan-era SDI, and our 
     program is not. Let me illustrate that with five points.
       Point One: The bill specifically embraces much of the 
     Reagan-era ``Star Wars'' scheme.
       The bill would direct the Secretary of Defense to deploy a 
     national missile defense (NMD) by 2003 that includes one or 
     more of four ABM interceptor options, three of which involve 
     putting ABM weapons or sensors in space in violation of the 
     ABM Treaty:
       The bill recommends that the Secretary consider an NMD 
     based on space-based laser (SBLs). To ``defend America'' with 
     SBLs would require, at a minimum, a constellation of 17 
     orbiting weapons platforms, at a cost of tens of billions of 
     dollars that is not in the FYDP. In addition, there is at 
     present no launcher in the U.S. inventory capable of placing 
     a platform of this size and weight in orbit, thus billions 
     more would be required to develop and produce such rockets. 
     Although the SASC plussed up the SBL line in its version of 
     the FY 1997 defense authorization act by $101 million, BMDO 
     believes that even if money were unlimited, the SBL 
     technology is currently so immature that we could not expect 
     to be ready to carry out the first test of a full-scale 
     prototype for a decade. Yet the Dole-Gingrich bill suggests 
     we would conduct a first ``integrated systems test'' of the 
     entire system in two years and complete the deployment of the 
     whole constellation in seven.
       A second option the bill recommends to the Secretary is 
     space-based kinetic-kill interceptors. To ``defend America'' 
     with such orbiting rocket launchers would require 
     resurrection of the SDI-era ``Brilliant Pebbles'' program, 
     which was terminated several years ago. As with SBLs, an NMD 
     that provided nationwide coverage from Hawaii to Maine would 
     require deployment of a large constellation of orbiting 
     weapons platforms that would cost tens of billions of 
     dollars. If the ``Brilliant Pebbles'' program was reactivated 
     today, BMDO believes the first interceptors would not be 
     tested for three years and deployment would take much longer, 
     yet the bill suggests there is a viable option to have a 
     complete space-based kinetic kill NMD defense in place by 
     2003.
       Sea-based ABMs: This third option would also violate the 
     ABM Treaty. The bill recommends the Secretary deploy such a 
     defense by 2003, yet we do not even have such an NMD program 
     in R&D. Navy Upper Tier is a TMD, and upgrading it is an ABM 
     would require development and deployment of space-based 
     ABM battle management satellites that could replace the 
     radars on the Aegis-clear ships. Such ABM ``components''--
     which were a central element of Reagan-era SDI 
     architectures--would violate the ABM Treaty.
       Point Two: Ignoring the space-based options in the bill 
     requires a willing suspension of disbelief.
       The only one of the four options recommended to the 
     Secretary for deployment by 2003 that is allowed under the 
     ABM Treaty and coincides with current DoD NMD development 
     programs is ground-based interceptors. Deployment of 100 such 
     interceptors at a single site is permitted. But if a ground-
     based ABM is what the sponsors of the bill want the Secretary 
     to develop, why doesn't the bill just say so? Why does it 
     also endorse the other three options? The answer is that 
     there are influential defense experts backing this bill who 
     fervently believe that land-based ABMs would be a mistake and 
     that putting weapons in space is the only way to go. For 
     these experts, the original Reagan plan was right, and 
     everything that has happened since, including President 
     Bush's downgrading of SDI to a limited-defense oriented 
     ``GPALS'' has been a mistake.
       Point Three: The bill requires that the initial NMD 
     deployment ``will be augmented over time to provide a layered 
     defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic 
     missile threats''.
       The reference to a ``layered'' defense against ``larger'' 
     threats is code for a return to the original Reagan-era 
     ``astrodome'' SDI concept for stopping even an all-out 
     Russian nuclear strike.
       Point Four: The bill would state that ``it is the policy of 
     the United States to seek a cooperative transition to a 
     regime that does not feature an offense-only form of 
     deterrence as the basis for strategic stability.''
       This text restates vintage Reagan-era SDI ideology: the 
     idea, often articulated by the former President, that Mutual 
     Assured Destruction (MAD) is ``immoral'' and that we should 
     replace it with an impenetrable missile shield that would 
     allow us to dramatically reduce strategic offensive arms. In 
     its most extreme form, we would ``give'' SDI to the Russians 
     so we could both erect such shields in space and eliminate 
     all our nuclear weapons.
       Point Five: The bill concedes that the NMD that it requires 
     be deployed by 2003 requires amendment of the ABM Treaty, but 
     it mandates that if Russia does not agree to such amendments 
     ``within one year'' we consider withdrawing from the Treaty:
       The bill requires a ``highly effective'' defense that 
     ``optimizes'' protection of CONUS, Alaska and Hawaii against 
     limited missile attacks, including accidental or unauthorized 
     launches. Acknowledging that these criteria cannot be 
     satisfied within the Treaty as now constituted, the bill 
     directs the President to obtain amendments that would allow 
     an NMD of this level of effectiveness to be deployed.
       The one-year deadline in the bill to achieve these 
     amendments is not arbitrary, since, as noted, the bill 
     requires a full-up systems integration test in two years of 
     the NMD system that is to be deployed by 2003, and such tests 
     could only take place after we had entered the development 
     phase of the acquisition process. Any development or test of 
     a space-based laser, space-based kinetic kill interceptor, 
     sea-based ABM or multiple-site ground-based ABM system would 
     violate the Treaty. Thus the time-lines established in the 
     bill could, in the case of at least three of the NMD options 
     it recommends the Secretary consider, only be met if the U.S. 
     obtained the necessary treaty relief within a year.
       In light of clear Russia opposition to any such amendments, 
     the bill would be seen by Russia as tantamount to an 
     ``anticipatory breach'' of the Treaty, thereby putting at 
     immediate risk Russia reductions of strategic offensive arms 
     under START I and START II. By holding a gun to the Russians' 
     heads and demanding amendments within a year, the bill 
     reflects an antipathy to the ABM Treaty reminiscent of 
     Reagan-era ``Star Wars'' thinking. But in so doing, we stand 
     to forfeit what otherwise would be a two-thirds reduction in 
     Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.
       In conclusion, let me say that I spent eighteen years on 
     the Hill: six at CRS working for both parties, four on the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee working for a Republican 
     majority, and eight on the Senate Armed Services Committee 
     working first for a Democratic minority and then a Democratic 
     majority. And the hallmark of those years was a spirit of 
     bipartisanship and compromise when it came to important 
     issues affecting our national security. I know that that 
     spirit was still alive on the Hill as recently as last 
     August, when Senator Nunn and Senator Warner, joined by 
     Senator Levin and Senator Cohen, worked out a bipartisan 
     compromise on missile defense policy that was supported by 
     the Administration. That compromise passed the Senate with 86 
     Senator voting ``aye.''
       As we begin Defend America week, I hope we will not be 
     debating a bumper sticker slogan. Rather I hope we will have 
     an honest and objective debate on missile defense policy and 
     that a spirit of bipartisanship and compromise will again be 
     evident.
       Thank you.
  Mr. KYL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

[[Page S5690]]

  Mr. KYL. Mr. President, I appreciate the comments by the Senator from 
Georgia, and will not attempt to discuss them this evening since the 
hour is late except to note one thing; that is, that while reasonable 
people can differ about some of the elements of the bill, as I noted in 
my remarks and the Senator from Georgia noted to the point that maybe 
some people are more interested in a press release or the issue than 
actually getting it passed, I just ask our colleagues tomorrow when the 
cloture vote comes to put us to the test and allow us to at least have 
a vote on the bill. We would like to get it passed. I would much rather 
move forward with the bill, get it to the President so he can sign it, 
or veto it as the case may be, but at least to try to move forward with 
the issue. If the cloture vote is supported, and if the bill is 
defeated, then at least the body will have worked its way. But at least 
I would like to have people take yes for an answer, and yes in this 
case meaning that we are serious about moving forward and we would like 
to try to get something passed.
  So again I urge my colleagues to support the cloture motion tomorrow.
  Mr. NUNN. Will my friend yield briefly?
  Mr. KYL. Absolutely. I am happy to.
  Mr. NUNN. I hope the Senator from Arizona will not exclude the 
possibility of continuing to have a dialog in this area to see if we 
can reach something that can be signed by the President this year. That 
is my goal. I think that is possible. But it is not likely the way we 
are going at this point in time.
  I also add that, as the Senator may know, there has been an offer at 
least from some of us on this side. I will be careful how I word this. 
I am not sure who has signed off on it. That is at the leadership level 
now--an offer to have a vote on this bill so we do as the Senator 
indicated and come to some conclusion even if it goes to the White 
House and is later vetoed; but also to get a similar agreement on the 
chemical weapons treaty which has come out of the Foreign Relations 
Committee by a bipartisan vote. I think there are substantial numbers 
of Republican Senators who support that treaty. It is of enormous 
importance to a number of people in this body.

  I think myself it will enhance our ability to deal with the growing 
threat of chemical weapons. And there is certainly a willingness by 
many people on this side of the aisle--certainly I speak for myself--to 
make sure that we get a vote on both of these bills this year; that is, 
the missile defense and the chemical weapons treaties.
  I might add though that if there is no movement on the chemical 
weapons treaty and getting some time certain to deal with that, I think 
it is unlikely that there is going to be much movement by a number of 
our colleagues to have a vote on the National Missile Defense Act and 
substitutes thereto. I would like to get it up myself because I would 
like to debate the substitute as I have outlined here today. There may 
be another substitute that is pretty much identical to the 
administration's proposal. My substitute will differ in certain 
respects from the administration's preposition.
  So it is my hope that we can get both of these matters--both the 
National Missile Defense Act, as well as the chemical weapons treaty, 
up. I hope the Senator will work toward that end also.
  Mr. KYL. In response, I hope the Senator from Georgia is not 
suggesting that the National Missile Defense Act is being held hostage 
to bringing up the chemical weapons treaty because the two are not 
linked, and there are a lot of us who believe that whether or not we 
could pass the chemical weapons treaty this year--and there is still 
more work to be done to that in the Judiciary Committee on which I sit 
which has not held hearings yet, given the fact we do not have a lot of 
legislative time in this session, that there is more to be done on that 
bill--I hope the Senator from Georgia is not suggesting that until we 
act on that we cannot act on this important matter of national missile 
defense.
  Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Georgia is suggesting that there are a 
number of people in this body--and I am sure, whether it is 36, or 40, 
or 25, or 15--who want to make sure that we pass the chemical weapons 
treaty, or at least vote on it. It requires a two-thirds vote. If there 
is a one-third part against it, it will not pass anyway. And I say 
there are a number of people who would indeed tie those two together 
since both are deemed by a number of people with different reasons and 
different perspectives as important to national security.
  Mr. KYL. It would be unfortunate if the two were required to be tied 
together and we could not act on the National Missile Defense Act, in 
my view anyway.

                          ____________________