[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 75 (Friday, May 24, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E919-E921]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
WAITING TO HEAR FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
______
HON. JOHN CONYERS
of michigan
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 23, 1996
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the United States has the best intentions
in Haiti but right now it is engaged in an obstruction of justice of
the most egregious kind. When a multinational force restored democracy
to Haiti the United States Military seized thousands of documents from
the Haitian Military headquarters and from the headquarters of FRAPH, a
violent paramilitary organization. Over a year and a half after they
were taken, the Department of Defense still has not returned them, and
the State Department is still supposedly negotiating their return. The
seized documents are desperately needed today to collect information
about human rights violations that took place while the elected
president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was in forced exile.
On December 1, 40 Members of Congress wrote the following letter to
President Clinton, calling for the release of the documents:
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, December 1, 1995.
President William Jefferson Clinton,
The White House.
Dear Mr. President: Just over a year ago, we celebrated the
restoration of democracy to Haiti with the return of its duly
elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Your role as
president was crucial to this occurring. The re-establishment
of the legitimate government of Haiti followed three years of
a murderous military regime. Recent press accounts have
discussed how the Pentagon is now holding tens of thousands
of pages of documents taken during the restoration of
government, and has yet to return them. We seek a complete
account of all documents and their immediate return to the
Haitian government. This is not only normal and appropriate,
but expected in the relations between the two friendly
nations. The documents should include any and all that may
pertain to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, or any other part of the United States
Government.
There is absolutely no justification why these materials
should be in the hands of our government now that the
legitimate government of Haiti has been restored. The fact
that these documents have been withheld obviously raises
questions about the level of collaboration between elements
of the American government and the former military regime.
These documents are necessary to the government of Haiti if
it is to make sense of
[[Page E920]]
what happened during the three years of President Aristide's
forced exile. We should be comforted by President Aristide's
enlightened policy of reconciliation that has been the
hallmark of his new government. Nevertheless, Haitian
investigators must have full knowledge about the sources and
causes of the pain and bloodshed during the rule of the
military junta if Haiti is to be reconciled and to move
forward.
The United States must satisfy its responsibility to meet
the Haitian government's right to the ownership of these
documents. To deny President Aristide the official documents
of his insubordinate military is an insult to this new
democratic nation. Anything short of a complete return of all
documents also undermines our policy's goals of supporting a
thriving, stable, and peaceful democracy in Haiti. It would
also undermine the integrity of open democracy in our nation.
We might add that history has taught us repeatedly that
democracy is not strengthened by concealing what may be
embarrassing or what may be inconvenient.
We expect that you will facilitate the immediate return of
all the aforementioned documents.
Sincerely,
John Conyers, Jr., Carrie Meek, Julian Dixon, Alan
Mollohan, Jim Traficant, Marcy Kaptur, Nancy Pelosi,
Eva Clayton, Kweisi Mfume, Barney Frank, Ron Dellums,
Joe Moakley, Paul Kanjoriski, Cardiss Collins, Dave
Bonior, Sheila Jackson-Lee, George Brown, John Lewis,
Louis Stokes, George Miller, Maurice Hinchey, Bennie
Thompson, Martin Sabo, Peter DeFazio, Joe Kennedy,
Henry Gonzalez, Victor Frazer, Neil Abercrombie, Bobby
Rush, Eliot Engel, Major Owens, Eddie Bernice Johnson,
Earl Hilliard, Ed Towns, Donald Payne, Sam Gibbons,
Chaka Fattah, Bernard Sanders, Vic Fazio, Nita Lowey.
A few days later, Members of the Congressional Black Caucus had a
meeting with the Haitian Ambassador Jean Casimir. Then we met with the
State Department Haiti Coordinator, Ambassador James Dobbins, who has
since moved on to the National Security Council. At both briefings, we
learned that the administration intended to return the documents and
materials. Soon thereafter, the U.S. government offered the Haitian
Government incredibly onerous terms for return which the Haitian
Government rejected.
On January 30, two dozen members of Congress joined me in writing to
President Clinton again and demanding the release of these documents.
That letter follows:
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, January 30, 1996.
The President,
The White House.
Dear Mr. President: We are writing to you regarding the
Haitian documents and materials still in possession of the
United States Government. The restoration of democracy in
Haiti has been a hallmark of your foreign policy success and
we are enthusiastic supporters of this policy and your
ongoing attention towards Haiti. We applaud the release of
some of the documents, but the continued retention of those
remaining troubles us because it is frustrating the judicial
process in Haiti. Therefore, we urgently request a meeting
with you as soon as possible.
Many of us first wrote to you about this matter on December
1, 1995, and were encouraged by your administration's
announcement that the documents would be released. Nearly two
months later, they still have not been returned. Surely this
is far longer than is required to resolve any logistical
requirements necessary for the secure transfer of such
materials. The Government of Haiti needs these documents if
it is to understand what happened during the years of
President Aristide's forced exile, to continue the process of
disarmament, and to fully investigate the crimes of
paramilitary groups such as FRAPH. Return of the documents is
especially urgent in light of the pending extradition of
FRAPH's leader, Emmanuel Constant.
In your eloquently delivered State of the Union address,
you pointed out that ``in Haiti the dictators are gone,
democracy has a new day.'' The inauguration of a new
president in Haiti on February 7 promises a new era of
peaceful transition of power. However, the challenges of
disarmament and judicial inquiry remain. An important way of
assuring that these processes continue is to return the
Haitian documents and materials. There is no excuse for the
intransigence of elements of the United States Government who
are obstructing the rule of law the United States and the
Multinational Force helped restore to Haiti. Doing so
interferes with the young spirit of democracy and
reconciliation in Haiti and contradicts the old tradition of
democracy and openness in America. We look forward to meet
with you to discuss these matters in full detail.
Sincerely,
John Conyers, Major Owens, Cynthia McKinney, Harold Ford,
Barbara-Rose Collins, Bennie Thompson, Ronald Dellums,
Louis Stokes, Carrie Meek, Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Donald Payne, Alcee Hastings, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Earl
Hillard, Sanford Bishop, Albert Wynn, Corrine Brown,
Bernie Sanders, Victor Frazer, Jim Clyburn, George
Miller, Xavier Becerra, Peter DeFazio, George Brown,
Barney Frank, Luis Gutierrez.
But the seizure of the documents took on a whole new meaning when the
New York Times reported on February 6 that during the invasion American
troops were told by superiors that FRAPH was a legitimate opposition
group. They were told this despite the fact that Pentagon and State
Department officials knew that FRAPH was a group of bloodthirsty thugs,
and that it had been linked to thousands of murders.
This raised a number of troubling questions. For example, why were US
troops deliberately misinformed? Why was there such a stark contrast
between stated policy and action? Why were the documents taken in the
first place? If the documents were taken to protect our troops, why
haven't they been returned since, and why weren't they shared with
other troops? I decided to put some of these questions to my good
friend, the Honorable Togo West, the Secretary of the Army. I am
submitting my letter to Secretary West for the Record.
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, April 12, 1996.
Hon. Togo D. West, Jr.,
Secretary of the U.S. Army, The Pentagon, Washington, DC.
Dear Togo: I know you are aware that our relations with
haiti are of great concern to me. I have traveled there many
times over the years, most recently with Ambassador Madeleine
Albright to witness that nation's first peaceful transfer of
power as the democratically elected Rene Preval was sworn in
as president. While this was cause for celebration, difficult
challenges for Haiti remain.
One of the most pressing issues facing Haiti is to
establish security among the people and confidence in the new
justice system by investigating human rights crimes and
continuing the disarmament process. I am concerned that the
United States is not doing everything it could to advance
these goals. While the Republican Congress is preoccupied
with a few select murder cases, new gangs and paramilitary
organizations threaten a new surge of vigilante violence
because their weapons have not been taken away. News reports
from Haiti indicate as many as ten armed anti-democratic
gangs are currently operating.
During the restoration of democracy to Haiti in the fall of
1994, the U.S. military seized photographs, thousands of
pages of documents, and other materials from the Haitian Army
(the FAH'd), the headquarters of the Front for Advancement
and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and other locations. I am well
aware of the ongoing discussions between the United States
Government and the Government of Haiti to arrange for the
return of the Haitian documents.\1\ I have written two
letters to President Clinton about this matter, signed by a
cumulative total of 50 members of Congress. I believe that a
return of these materials could make an important
contribution to the establishment of peace and justice in
Haiti.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ I commissioned a Congressional Research Service study by
the American Law Division which determined that according to
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States and
international law as interpreted by the United States, the
seized documents clearly belong to the legitimate government
of Haiti. The opinion also noted that their seizure and
retention is a departure from these norms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This letter, however, is a request for information about
the directives that were given prior to the seizure of the
documents and materials and what happened in the period after
they were taken. Since the U.S. Army constituted a large
proportion of American involvement in the multinational
operation in Haiti, I thought you would be able to provide me
with some details about the actual seizure of the documents
and the decisions leading up to that action. Specifically, I
would like to know (1) generally what troops were told to
look for by commanding officers before the searches; (2)
which locations were searched and if a complete list of these
sites is available; (3) if SALUTE forms or other inventories
are available describing everything that was found; and most
importantly, (4) what the established priority intelligence
requirements and information requirements were.
I understand that captured enemy material is an important
element of intelligence, and that seizure of CEM is vital to
gaining information about the adversary. In meeting that
requirement, it seems to me that the armed forces involved in
the seizures did an admirable job. The seizures in Haiti are
a special case because they occurred during a multinational
operation. The ``Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to
Operations'' (Joint Pub. 2-0) notes in its chapter on
multilateral operations that ``. . . nations should share all
relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and
the adversary to attain the best possible common
understanding of the threatened interests, determine relevant
and attainable objectives, and achieve unified efforts
against the adversary.'' I am a strong supporter of the
United Nations and the UN is of course facing increased
skepticism in the United States. Therefore my fifth and final
request is to hear--from the Army's perspective--how
information contained in the seized materials was shared with
other
[[Page E921]]
members of the multilateral forces and how that contributed
to the successful prosection of the overall mission.
The restoration of Haiti's legitimate government was a
great success for the cause of democracy in general and the
foreign policy of President Clinton in particular. UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who I met with
yesterday, agrees with me and I know you do too. For that
reason, I hope you will assist me in my effort to learn more
about our operation in Haiti. I look forward to hearing from
you, and I hope you will personally contact me if you have
any questions.
Sincerely,
John Conyers, Jr.,
Member of Congress.
I will have a copy of today's Congressional Record for May 24, 1996,
delivered to his office in case my letter was lost before. I look
forward to my good friend's response.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 6, 1996]
Cables Show U.S. Deception on Haitian Violence
(By Larry Rohter)
Port-au-Prince, Haiti, February 5.--In the months after the
United States invasion of Haiti, American officers repeatedly
told their troops that the country's most dreaded
paramilitary group was actually a legitimate opposition
political party. ``They're no different from Democrats or
Republicans,'' soldiers in Haiti dutifully echoed when asked
about their instructions.
But a review of classified cables sent by the American
Embassy in Haiti to the Defense and State Departments shows
that for a year before the invasion in September 1994 the
Pentagon knew that the official version was not true.
Within weeks of the founding of the Front for the
Advancement and Progress of Haiti, the papers indicate,
American intelligence agencies had concluded the group was a
gang of ``gun-carrying crazies'' eager to ``use violence
against all who oppose it.''
``All over the country, Fraph is evolving into a sort of
Mafia,'' a cable from the office of the American military
attache in Port-au-Prince warned in the spring of 1994, using
the group's acronym. ``Its use of force to intimidate and
coerce is sanctioned by the local military, which derives
both political and especially material benefits from their
relationship.''
With United States troops now in Bosnia pursuing some of
the same objectives as in Haiti, the documents raise
questions about the soliders' mission, the information they
are given by superiors and the action they take in the field.
Human rights observers and others who have seen the papers
say they also raise the question whether the military ordered
American troops to ignore human rights abuses committed
before they arrived.
What remains uncertain is why the Pentagon took a public
stance clearly at odds with the classified information it had
collected in Haiti.
A Pentagon official denied today that there was any
conflict between the official position and the inside
information: ``If daylight is perceived between our public
and private perceptions, that's wrong. We agreed on what
Fraph was. Fraph was a political movement, but clearly a
political movement with a substantial thug element to it. It
was clear to us that Fraph represented a potential threat.
That didn't change. There were efforts, clearly, in the
initial weeks of the intervention to calm the rhetoric and
reduce the likelihood that there would be violent
confrontations--and that was relatively successful.''
Ira Kurzban, an American lawyer who has reviewed the cables
on behalf of the Haitian Government, said, ``There is
absolutely no ambiguity in these documents with respect to
the fact that Fraph was an instrument of repression under the
control of the Haitian military.''
In a telephone interview from the Maryland jail where he is
being held for deporatation, Emmanuel Constant, the founder
of Fraph, said that from the moment American troops landed he
was under pressure from the United States military to help it
maintain ``a form of balance in Haiti'' between groups
supporting President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and those
opposing him.
Mr. Constant said he was told by the American military
early in October 1994 that ``I should ease up the tension and
avoid confrontation'' by ``giving a speech in which I
promised to be a constructive opposition to Aristide.'' That
speech was delivered soon afterward, and Mr. Constant
maintained it ``was approved by the U.S. Government, by the
embassy people'' in advance.
In the interview, Mr. Constant acknowledged that he had
been an informant of the Central Intelligence Agency before
the American invasion but said he now feels betrayed ``They
have the wrong man in jail,'' he said.
Haitian Government officials and foreign diplomats here
said it appeared the Defense Department and American
intelligence agencies were acting to weaken Mr. Aristide,
whom they had long distrusted. These officials suggested that
United States Government agencies may also have been trying
to protect Haitian informants who might be useful in the
future but had been discredited by the collapse of the
military dictatorship that overthrew Mr. Aristide.
In separate raids on the headquarters of Fraph and the
Haitian armed forces after the invasion, American troops
seized more than 150,000 pages of official documents, which
were taken to the United States. Haiti has demanded their
return.
Several hundred pages of United States documents relating
to Fraph were obtained last year by the Center for
Constitutional Rights for a suit filed in Federal Court in
Brooklyn by Alerte Belance, an Aristide supporter now living
in New Jersey. She says the group abducted her in Haiti in
1993 and attacked her with a machete, cutting off one of her
arms, an ear, and parts of her nose and tongue before leaving
her for dead.
Human rights groups say such brutality was typical of
Fraph, which they hold responsible for many of the more than
3,000 deaths during Mr. Aristide's exile, from 1991 to 1994.
The Center for Constitutional Rights has filed a motion for
a default judgment against Fraph, which has failed to respond
to the suit. But Ms. Belance's lawyers have asked the
presiding judge to delay any award of damages until their
client obtains additional documents, including tens of
thousands of the pages seized by American troops from Fraph's
headquarters.
``These documents are relevant to establish that Fraph was
acting under color of official authority when it carried out
the torture of Alerte Belance, and therefore violated
international law,'' the Center for Constitutional Rights
contended in court papers filed last month.
Cables that have already been declassified by the Defense
Intelligence Agency as part of the suit indicate that
American intelligence agencies had a broad network of
informants both within the Haitian armed forces and Fraph. In
public, however, all parties denied that they were connected.
Soon after Fraph was formed, a State Department cable on
Oct. 28, 1993, concluded, ``Their effectiveness is a function
of the willingness of their patrons'' in the Haitian Armed
Forces ``to use intimidation and violence (carried out by
armed civilian attaches) to `enforce' their political
initiatives.''
By December, the military attache in Port-au-Prince was
warning the Pentagon that repression by Fraph in Haiti's
southern peninsula ``has increased considerably.''
When in the spring of 1994 American officials began
interviewing refugees who had fled by sea, they obtained an
even clearer picture of Fraph's violent methods. Some
testimony came from Fraph members who said they had fled in
disgust.
``When they kill and rape people, we (new members) are
forced to sit and watch,'' a cable quoted a former Fraph
operative as saying, adding, ``He also related that later in
the initiation process you are forced to participate in the
killings and rapes.''
But that information was apparently withheld from American
troops after they intervened on Sept. 19, 1994, to restore
President Aristide and his Lavalas movement. Radio broadcasts
to Special Forces units in the Haitian countryside, for
example, described Lavalas and Fraph as competing political
parties equally dedicated to the country's well-being.
The documents suggests that the American military's
willingness to work with Fraph began to diminish only after a
radio conversation between Mr. Constant and other leaders of
the group was intercepted. According to a cable sent on Oct.
3, 1994, they were ``threatening to break out weapons and
begin an all-out war against the foreigners'' and ``named an
American official as their first target.''
By January 1995, the State Department was denying that the
United States had ever treated Fraph as anything but thugs.
The Secretary of State's office said of Fraph in a cable to
the American Embassy in Haiti, ``We viewed it as basically a
rent-a-mob group financed by the military for recruiting
purposes and dependent upon the military leaders' ability to
punish/reward.'' In addition, the unclassified cable said,
``we appreciate the embassy's consistent hard line on Fraph
and strongly endorse the embassy's latest clarification of
our position.''
____________________