[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 75 (Friday, May 24, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E899-E918]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




IN PURSUIT OF FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF 
                      VIETNAM, JUNE 1994-JUNE 1995

                                 ______


                     HON. DOUGLAS ``PETE'' PETERSON

                               of florida

                    in the house of representatives

                         Thursday, May 23, 1996

  Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, today I want to enter into the 
Record a very valuable, insightful personal experience monograph, 
titled, ``In Pursuit of Fullest Possible Accounting in the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, June 1994-June 1995,'' prepared by Lt. Col. Melvin 
E. Richmond, Jr. This paper captures Colonel Richmond's unique 
experience while assigned as commander of Detachment 2, Joint Task 
Force--Full Accounting [JTF-FA], in Hanoi, Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam.
  Colonel Richmond's account of his year of duty in Vietnam not only 
contains a factual record of the activities of his command, but also 
takes the reader on a historical review of America's efforts to reach 
fullest possible accounting of our missing servicemen in Vietnam. Woven 
throughout his monograph is an authentic description of the level of 
cooperation his unit experienced while working with the Vietnamese on a 
daily basis.
  A sensitive review of this impressive paper will help many to better 
understand America's commitment to fullest possible accounting and to 
see first hand the rigors associated with our efforts to reach that 
goal.

                                Abstract

       Author: Melvin E. Richmond, Jr. (LTC), USA
       Title: In Pursuit of the Fullest Possible Accounting in the 
     Socialist Republic of Vietnam, June 1994-June 1995
       Format: Personal Experience Monograph
       Date: 5 April 1996
       Pages: 118
       Classification: Unclassified
       Some 2,157 Americans remain unaccounted-for as a result of 
     the United States's involvement in the war in Indochina; 
     1,610 in Vietnam. In January 1992, the Department of Defense 
     organized Joint Task Force--Full Accounting and began an 
     intensive effort unprecedented in the history of warfare to 
     account for its missing warriors. I was privileged to 
     participate in this effort as the Commander of Detachment 2, 
     JTF-FA from 10 June 1994 until 28 June 1995. The purpose of 
     this paper is to describe the full accounting effort in 
     Vietnam and my experiences during my tenure as Commander. The 
     monograph provides sufficient background and historical 
     information to acquaint readers with the issue. Most 
     importantly though, it describes the progress the U.S. 
     Government made in resolving the issue while I was there. 
     Finally, I presented a number of lessons I learned as the 
     Commander of Detachment 2, especially regarding hosting high 
     level delegations, dealing with the media, cooperating with 
     U.S. veteran organizations, interacting with the Department 
     of State, and working with the Vietnamese Government and 
     people.
       When a soldier was injured and could not get back to 
     safety, his buddy went out to get him, against his officer's 
     orders. He returned mortally wounded and his friend, who he 
     had carried back, was dead. The officer was angry. ``I told 
     you not to go,'' he said. ``Now I've lost both of you. It was 
     not worth it.'' The dying man replied, ``But it was, Sir, 
     because when I got to him he said, `Jim, I knew you'd come.' 
     '' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Footnotes at end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       ``I knew you'd come.'' If I were to summarize the efforts 
     of the United States to recover, identify and repatriate to 
     the United States its missing servicemen, these four words 
     describe them best. Today there remain more than 78,000 
     Americans still unaccounted-for from World War II and over 
     8,100 from the Korean War. As of February 27, 1996, there 
     were 2,157 Americans still unaccounted-for as a result of the 
     United States involvement in the war in Indochina. Quite 
     naturally, most of those losses are in the Socialist Republic 
     of Vietnam, but there are also Americans unaccounted-for in 
     the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, the Kingdom of Cambodia, 
     and the People's Republic of China.\2\ \3\
       In January 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) organized 
     Joint Task Force--Full Accounting (JTF-FA) and assigned it 
     the mission to ``resolve the cases of Americans still 
     unaccounted-for as a result of the Southeast Asian conflict 
     through investigation, archival research and remains-recovery 
     operations.'' \4\ Thus began an intensive effort 
     unprecedented in the history of warfare to account for a 
     nation's unaccounted-for warriors.\5\
       I was privileged to participate in this effort as the 
     Commander of Detachment 2, JTF-FA from June 10, 1994 until 
     June 28, 1995. The purpose of this paper is to describe the 
     full accounting effort in Vietnam during my tenure as 
     Commander. I have begun with a very brief history of the 
     United States Government's (USG) effort to resolve this issue 
     and a description of how the USG officially accounts for its 
     missing. I will then outline the preparations I undertook to 
     assume my duties, and describe the organization of JTF-FA in 
     general, and Detachment 2 in detail. The final two sections 
     of the body of the paper, contain an examination of the 
     aspects of progress we made in resolving the unaccounted-for 
     issue, and close with lessons I learned during my tenure that 
     may be of use to other military officers as they prepare for 
     duties in similar circumstances. The lessons concentrate on 
     issues involving hosting high level delegations, dealing with 
     the media, cooperating with U.S. veterans organizations, 
     interacting with the Department of State, and working with 
     the Vietnamese Government and people. For those who are 
     unfamiliar with this issue, the annexes and the glossary 
     contain information that explains the terminology associated 
     with this issue.
       To set the stage for the remainder of this paper, it is 
     important to emphasize that as the Commander of Detachment 2, 
     I was an operator, not a policy-maker. President Clinton 
     ``normalized'' diplomatic relations with Vietnam in July 
     1995, because Vietnam had cooperated sufficiently in 
     resolving the issue of Americans still missing in Vietnam. 
     There are still many steps yet to be taken, however, before 
     relations will be ``normal.'' These steps are contingent upon 
     continued progress by the Vietnamese toward resolving the 
     issue of unaccounted-for Americans. The President and 
     Congress will determine when the Vietnamese have progressed 
     sufficiently to continue to move forward in our relations 
     with Vietnam.
       Any inferences you may draw regarding policy issues as you 
     read this monograph are your own. I will lay out the 
     developments as I saw them, but will try not to draw any 
     conclusions regarding the level of progress. Where I state 
     something as my opinion, it is exactly that. It does not 
     reflect the official or unofficial positions of the United 
     States Government, Joint Task Force--Full Accounting, the 
     Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO), or any other agency or 
     individual.
       Finally, participating in this effort is a tremendously 
     emotional experience. Never before have I had such a strong 
     sense of contributing to something so important. To a person, 
     every member of JTF-FA has a single-minded purpose; to get 
     the families the answers they so richly deserve. I cannot 
     even begin to describe the flood of emotion we felt whenever 
     we found a tooth during an excavation, because we knew that 
     it would, in all likelihood, lead to an identification. I 
     cannot explain the sense of satisfaction we got when we 
     unearthed two gold wedding bands and human remains when 
     excavating an aircraft crash site thought to be that of two 
     missing Americans.
       I believe Leslie Weatherhead's passage at the opening of 
     this paper best describes why those of us in JTF-FA felt our 
     mission was so important. I normally recited her quote 
     privately to our participants before every repatriation 
     ceremony to remind everyone of why we were there. Being in 
     Hanoi and working this issue day in and day out, it was easy 
     to become somewhat hardened to the importance of our mission. 
     I believe the repatriation ceremonies were the heart and soul 
     of what we did, and thought it was a good time to reflect on 
     our mission. Each ceremony culminated years of work to find 
     and recover each set of remains. And now, more than 20 years 
     after making the ultimate sacrifice for their country, these 
     soldiers, airmen, marines, and sailors--some of God's noblest 
     people--were going home.
       ``War is always and will ever be obscene, but faced with a 
     greater obscenity--slavery, I would fight. While war is 
     obscene, those who go forward, who charge the machine guns, 
     who bleed, who go down to the aid stations and are put in 
     body bags--they are not obscene, their sacrifices have no 
     measure--theirs has a purity where mankind shines and is 
     beyond corruption. I am not blasphemous when I say that in 
     the brutality and evil of war, soldiers who have offered 
     themselves up so that their buddies may live, have in them 
     the likeness and image of God. And damn those who debunk 
     courage, valor, fidelity, love of country, love of home, 
     family, hopes and dreams for a better tomorrow. Our soldiers 
     give up much--that others

[[Page E900]]

     may live, not only in freedom but even luxury. They deserve 
     our great, great gratitude and affection because they are 
     willing to serve. They are some of God's noblest people.''
                                                --General Cavazos.

                   Evolution of Accounting Operations

       The United States Government (USG) efforts to account for 
     Americans still missing as a result of its participation in 
     the conflict in Southeast Asia have changed dramatically 
     since initial operations began under the auspices of the 
     Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). JCRC and its 
     subsequent field activities came to being as a result of a 
     joint agreement between President Reagan's Presidential 
     Emissary for Humanitarian Affairs, General John Vessey (USA 
     Retired), and SRV Acting Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co. 
     General Vessey helped establish the ground rules for joint 
     investigations, surveys, and excavations with the Vietnamese.
       Joint field activities (JFAs) began rather humbly.\6\ JFA 1 
     lasted ten days, from September 25, 1988 until October 4, 
     1988. The Vietnamese permitted only enough American personnel 
     in-country to man two very small teams and restricted the 
     duration of operations to only ten days. The team arrived at 
     Noi Bai Airfield outside Hanoi aboard a single USAF C-141 and 
     brought all their equipment with them, including four Jeep 
     Cherokees. The conditions were spartan to say the least. With 
     no helicopter support and only four Jeeps, travel overland 
     was agonizingly slow, and travel time was included in the 
     ten-day operations plan. The roads were poor, there were 
     virtually no telephones and the teams were not allowed to 
     bring radios into country. Each team included a Team Leader 
     (civilian linguist), a team analyst (Military Intelligence 
     specialist), and a Search and Rescue specialist. They had no 
     permanent base of operations in Vietnam, limited non-
     temporary storage (one small room in the basement of the 
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] Reception Hall), and they 
     carried everything with them. The first JFA required 
     approximately three days' travel just to reach the first 
     investigation sites north and northwest of Hanoi. The teams 
     had only about four days of intensive investigations for a 
     total of six cases. They then needed three days to return to 
     Hanoi where they prepared to redeploy on Day 10. Needless to 
     say, compared to today's JFAs, not much investigating took 
     place.
       Gradually, JCRC expanded the amount and type of equipment 
     they maintained in Vietnam. On July 7, 1991, JCRC and the 
     Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI), opened 
     what was known as the U.S. MIA Office on the third floor of 
     the Boss Hotel in downtown Hanoi. After the 15th JFA in 
     January 1992, JCRC stood down. JTF-FA, the parent 
     organization of Detachment 2 in Hanoi, replaced it. JTF-FA, 
     under the direction of its initial commander, Major General 
     Thomas H. Needham, expanded investigative and recovery 
     operations exponentially.
       By April 1993, teams were operating in numerous provinces 
     simultaneously with virtually unrestricted access to travel 
     between provinces as necessary. By the time of my arrival in 
     June 1994, we were deploying well over 100 personnel into the 
     country for each JFA using multiple military and civilian 
     aircraft sorties into three airports: Noi Bai International 
     Airport in Hanoi (northern operations), the Da Nang 
     International Airport in Da Nang (central operations), and 
     Tan Son Nhut in Ho Chi Minh City (southern operations). JTF-
     FA had expanded operations from JCRC's initial two teams in 
     country for ten days, to up to eight teams in-country for 30 
     or more days. We had over 100 Mitsubishi Pajero 4-wheel-drive 
     vehicles pre-positioned throughout the country, three 
     helicopters (2 MI-8s and 1 MI-17) available for movement of 
     personnel and equipment to sites inaccessible by vehicle, and 
     had built three storage buildings in the Ranch for team 
     equipment.
       During the period 1988-1991, both the U.S. and SRV sides 
     went through a mutual and rapid education on the capabilities 
     and intentions of the other. The ``learning curve'' was 
     steep. In the beginning, investigations and excavations 
     proceeded at a crawl. Today, Vietnamese team leaders are 
     active participants in planning and preparing for each JFA. 
     During my tenure, at the suggestion of the VNOSMP, my 
     specialists and Operations Officer met with the Vietnamese 
     team leaders prior to each JFA to fully coordinate every 
     aspect of the operation. Instead of halting operations in the 
     middle of a JFA because an unexpected problem arose, the 
     Vietnamese were now trying to anticipate problems and resolve 
     them prior to the onset of operations.
       Some have been critical of the rapid tempo of operations of 
     JTF-FA, characterizing it as ``steam-rolling through 
     Vietnam.'' They described the investigations as rushed and 
     incomplete, with IEs concentrating on the number of cases 
     they could close rather than the quality of their 
     investigations. This is an unfair description of early JTF 
     operations and current operations verify this. During its 
     existence, JCRC-CILHI teams completed as few as 13 JFAs, 200 
     investigations, and 37 excavations. By the end of my tenure 
     as Commander, Detachment 2, in approximately the same amount 
     of time as JCRC had operated, JTF-FA had completed nearly 
     1,400 investigations and approximately 200 excavations. We 
     did find that some of the early investigations could have 
     been performed better, and we reinvestigated them; some 
     numerous times.
       The fast pace in the early days of JTF-FA allowed 
     investigators and analysts to gather as much information as 
     possible, about as many cases as possible, as quickly as 
     possible. This is not testament to an ineffective JCRC. 
     Rather, it clearly demonstrates the increased priority this 
     issue had accrued with both the U.S. and SRV governments. 
     Time is one of the JTF-FA's greatest enemies; witnesses get 
     older and many pass away, and the effects of the environment 
     continue to degrade the evidence it possesses. The fast pace 
     allowed us to complete the less difficult cases, assess our 
     position, and then concentrate on other more difficult cases.

                         Accounting Procedures

       The USG accounts for missing Americans in one of three 
     ways. The first, and most obvious method is to discover a 
     live American. A live unaccounted-for-American has surfaced 
     since Operations Homecoming in 1973.\7\ The second method is 
     through positive and legally sufficient identification of 
     remains. The last method of accounting for missing Americans 
     is by presenting compelling evidence that indicates the USG 
     will not be able to meet either of the first two criteria.
       CILHI is responsible for identifying the remains returned 
     to its facility. Today, its primary means of identifying 
     remains is by matching dental remains to the dental records 
     of unaccounted-for Americans. CILHI also has the capability 
     to identify remains through DNA matching. It is currently 
     doing this through the Armed Forces DNA Identification 
     Laboratory in Maryland. DNA matching also has some practical 
     difficulties in that it usually requires a piece of bone 
     (approximately five grams) larger than the fragments teams 
     normally recover at the excavation sites.
       The third means of accounting for missing Americans is much 
     less conclusive than the first two methods and to date, the 
     USG has not used it to account for unaccounted-for Americans. 
     Over-water losses are the classic example of cases that might 
     fall into this category. In Vietnam alone, there are 449 
     unaccounted-for Americans believed to be lost over-water. The 
     likelihood of finding a live American or identifiable remains 
     (or even aircraft wreckage for that matter) in these over-
     water cases is extremely small. They would be prohibitively 
     expensive to pursue as a matter of policy.
       There are also numerous cases where identifiable remains 
     are unlikely to be found. Today there are numerous sets of 
     remains stored at CILHI that are associated with specific 
     cases (i.e., teams excavated these remains from sites 
     positively correlated to a specific loss, or the remains came 
     to CILHI through unilateral refugee/turnovers that associated 
     them with a specific individual), but the remains are 
     insufficient for legal identification. At some point, the USG 
     must determine whether further efforts, either joint or 
     unilateral, to resolve the cases correlated to these sets of 
     remains are likely to bear fruit. If not, accounting for 
     these individuals using the third means of accounting may be 
     the only reasonable option.
       On November 13, 1995, the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) 
     published the results of its comprehensive review of cases. 
     The purpose of the study was to review all unresolved cases 
     so as to: ``(1) focus our (the USG) understanding on 
     individual cases, (2) provide the basis for a sound 
     investigations strategy, and (3) define next steps for 
     achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans 
     missing in Southeast Asia.'' \8\ DPMO assessed ``each case, 
     weighing all related information, including data collected 
     through recent on-site American investigation and research in 
     Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. We (DPMO) found that for any 
     case it is exceedingly difficult to predict the extent to 
     which evidence of knowledgeability by Vietnam, Laos, or 
     Cambodia about some aspect of a U.S. loss could lead to an 
     accounting of the individual.'' \9\ The report recommends the 
     ``next steps'' for the remaining cases as listed below.\10\
       1. Further Pursuit--The review identified further leads 
     requiring investigation for 1,476 individuals still 
     unaccounted-for. 942 of these individuals were lost in 
     Vietnam.
       2. Deferred--The review identified 159 individuals for whom 
     the USG has exhausted all investigative leads, ``and no 
     further avenues of pursuit can be identified. Although the 
     investigation of these cases is not complete; we (the USG) 
     require additional information to develop new leads.'' \11\
       3. No Further Pursuit--The review identified 567 
     individuals still unaccounted-for whom, ``regardless of any 
     future effort by the U.S. Government and the governments of 
     Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, their cases cannot be resolved 
     through the repatriation of remains.'' \12\

                    Preparation for Assuming Command

       At the time of my selection for JTF-FA, I was commanding 
     1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, a basic combat training 
     battalion at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. Detachment 2 had 
     two previous commanders prior to me, Jack Donovan and John 
     Cray. All three of us were coming out of battalion command at 
     the time of our selection. Additionally, each had been 
     selected to attend Senior Service College which we had to 
     defer for one year to command Detachment 2. I was not 
     scheduled to give up command of 1-26 Infantry until June 10, 
     1994, but because John had to return to CONUS to attend the 
     United States Army War College, I had my change of command on 
     May 10, 1994. Since command of the Detachment is like no 
     other job I had ever had,

[[Page E901]]

     time was of essence to assure a good overlap between John and 
     me. I changed command at 0900 on May 10 and flew to 
     Washington, D.C. at 1900 that evening. Luckily, my wife and I 
     were able to spend some time together during two weeks of 
     leave a couple of weeks before my change of command.
       In Washington, my orientations included briefings by the 
     Army Service Casualty Office,\13\ the Defense POW/MIA Office 
     (DPMO), and the Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia Office of the East Asia 
     Pacific Office at the Department of State. I also spent half 
     a day with a public affairs orientation team from the USAF at 
     the Pentagon. My time with the USAF and USA Casualty Offices 
     was extremely useful. The PAO orientation proved to be 
     invaluable to me throughout my tenure.\14\ The other offices 
     I visited appeared unprepared for my arrival and provided 
     very little information about the issue or my duties.
       John Cray attended about six weeks of Vietnamese language 
     training in Washington prior to departing CONUS. Because of 
     the limited time available, however, I did not have the same 
     opportunity. It was not absolutely necessary that the 
     commander receive language training, but it would have been 
     useful. Once I had my feet on the ground in Vietnam and had 
     achieved a sufficient level of proficiency in my duties, I 
     hired a tutor to teach Vietnamese to me. I met with him about 
     twice a week for an hour and a half each day. It was amazing 
     how much my Vietnamese counterparts appreciated the fact that 
     I was trying to learn their language. Though I never became 
     very proficient, I believe the very fact that I tried meant a 
     lot to the Vietnamese.
       After Washington, I flew to Honolulu, Hawaii for JTF-FA in-
     processing at Camp Smith. This included briefings from the 
     PACOM staff and in-depth briefings by the JTF-FA staff. At 
     the time of my arrival, Major General Thomas H. Needham was 
     the Commander, JTF-FA. I had served as a company commander 
     for 30 months under then LTC Needham in the 1st Battalion 
     (Airborne), 509th Infantry in Vicenza, Italy, so we knew each 
     other well. His in-briefing to me was characteristically 
     brief and easy to remember. Despite the fact that General 
     Needham gave up command on July 27, 1994 to Brigadier General 
     Charles Viale, I found his guidance worthwhile to heed 
     throughout my tenure. His guidance included:
       1. If it ain't broke, don't fix it.
       2. There can always be improvement in the quality of 
     reports.
       3. Work on the quality of chow at the Ranch.
       4. Know the helicopter contract. When and what triggers 
     increased costs?
       5. Dealing with the press. Tone down the adjectives; i.e. 
     ``Continue high level of support consistent with pre-embargo 
     lifting.''
       6. Read SOPs and Policy Letters, Command Letters and Trip 
     Notes.
       7. There is a folder for every past JFA--Read them.
       8. Look at deficit repairs for the Ranch. See if they are 
     really necessary.
       9. Keep the boss informed.
       Though I worked on all of these, there were three I tried 
     to always keep uppermost in my mind and were instrumental in 
     whatever success I may have had; keep the boss informed, 
     watch my adjectives, and keep the boss informed.
       After an intense schedule in Hawaii, I flew to Southeast 
     Asia. My first stop was Bangkok, Thailand. I checked into 
     what would become my ``home away from the Ranch,'' the 
     Imperial Hotel. The Imperial staff had hosted JTF-FA teams 
     for years and treated us all very well.
       While in Bangkok, I had to in-process at the embassy and 
     then received the Detachment 1 in-briefing from LTC Dave 
     Geraldson (USAF), the Commander of Detachment 1. Because the 
     Detachment 1 position was a three-year assignment, Dave had 
     been with the JTF since its inception. He had a wealth of 
     knowledge about the issue and was a good friend throughout my 
     tour. While I was in Bangkok, the 29th JFA was redeploying 
     out of Vietnam into Thailand. JFA report writing always 
     occurred in Bangkok, so I was able to watch John go through 
     the entire report writing sequence.
       From Bangkok, I accompanied General Needham to Phnom Penh, 
     Cambodia. We stayed there only three days (two nights), and 
     Major Tony Lowe (USAF), the Detachment 4 Commander, briefed 
     me on his operation. Things were pretty slow in Cambodia at 
     that time. Two of our helicopters had been shot at and hit 
     some months earlier (possibly by local bandits) and the Khmer 
     Rouge had been active, so the CJTF-FA had suspended field 
     operations in Cambodia out of security concerns. The last 
     thing any of us wanted to do was to hurt or kill an American 
     today while recovering the remains of an American who died 
     over 20 years ago. Field operations in Cambodia did not 
     resume until late-fall 1994.
       With my in-briefings complete, I flew into Hanoi with 
     General Needham and began 10 days of overlap with John Gray. 
     I was able to do almost everything related to JFAs once with 
     John prior to having to do it on my own after his departure. 
     The only exception was deploying the teams into Vietnam from 
     Pattaya, Thailand. I attended a Technical Talk with the 
     VNOSMP, attended Provincial Coordination Conferences in Ho 
     Chi Minh City, Da Nang and Hanoi, observed a Joint Forensics 
     Review and a Repatriation Ceremony, and helped plan the next 
     JFA that I would implement. The time with John was extremely 
     valuable to me. Most importantly, John introduced me to most 
     of the Vietnamese I would work with during my tour. In 
     Vietnam, it is always better to have someone the Vietnamese 
     knew well available to introduce you.
       On June 10, 1994, after a month of in-briefings and travel, 
     I assumed command of Detachment 2. The goodbyes were very 
     emotional for John. He had become very close to the members 
     of Detachment 2 during his tenure. I was extremely grateful 
     to John Cray for his kindness as I tried to learn the ropes.
       In July 1995, during my out-briefing with Lieutenant 
     General David Bramlett, Deputy Commander in Chief, Pacific 
     Command (DCINC), I credited much of my success to my 
     predecessors; Jack Donovan and John Cray. I did not do that 
     out of false humility, but out of the reality that it was 
     their efforts that laid the groundwork for the progress we 
     made during my tenure. They built the organization and set 
     the systems in place. All I had to do was sustain their 
     systems, tweak them here and there, take care of the troops, 
     and continue to nurture our relationships with the 
     Vietnamese. It was primarily John Cray though who positioned 
     me well for success and I will always be grateful to him for 
     the unselfish manner in which he prepared me to assume my 
     duties.

                          Command and Control

       The command and control scheme for JTF-FA is, by design, 
     very clean. There are very few intervening headquarters 
     between the troops in the field and the highest level of the 
     government. One very important ``agency'' not included in the 
     command and control structure is the families of the 
     unaccounted-for, but it is the families that are always 
     uppermost in the mind of every member of the JTF. Although 
     there is no direct contact between the families and the JTF 
     personnel in the field, everything we did, everything we 
     discovered, was shared with the families. The conduit between 
     the JTF and the families is the respective Service Casualty 
     Branches.
       The CJTF-FA works directly for the CINCPAC. Despite having 
     a very close relationship with the Defense POW/MIA Office 
     (DPMO) and always being very conscious of their operations 
     and influence, we were not in their chain of command. The 
     CJTF seemed to take it as his and his staff's responsibility 
     to shield the Detachments in the field from inquiries and 
     directives from anyone except JTF-FA Headquarters and they 
     did this extremely well. I rarely spoke directly with anyone 
     involved with this issue who was not in my chain of command, 
     and when I did, I always cleared it with the CJTF or DCJTF 
     first.
       Until about December 1994, our primary means of 
     communication with JTF-FA Headquarters was via telephone 
     conversations and fax. This was extremely expensive. In 
     December, JTF-FA established an E-mail network between it and 
     all the Detachments in the field. This cut costs dramatically 
     and also made it easier to send correspondence between 
     elements of the JTF.
       As depicted in Figure 3, JTF-FA is organized into a 
     headquarters element stationed at United States Pacific 
     Command (USPACOM) Headquarters, Camp Smith, Hawaii, and 
     Detachments 1 through 4 posted in Bangkok, Thailand; Hanoi, 
     Vietnam; Vientianne, Laos; and Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 
     respectively. Deteachment 1 is the administrative and 
     logistical hub for the remaining three Detachments in 
     Southeast Asia. Because we did not have a U.S. embassy in 
     Vietnam, Detachment 1 was our link to the rest of the world. 
     They purchased many of our groceries from the U.S. embassy 
     commissary in Bangkok, and we flew them into Hanoi once or 
     twice a month on a space available basis. Detachment 1 was 
     also our postal connection. All mail for Detachment 2 went to 
     Detachment 1, and they held it until someone came to Hanoi. 
     Mail was extremely important to us, and the standing JTF rule 
     was that nobody left Bangkok for Detachment 2 without picking 
     up the mail. Even the CJTF helped us out in this regard by 
     always picking up the mail when he passed through Bangkok en 
     route to Hanoi. Likewise, nobody left Hanoi for Bangkok 
     without taking our mail out.
       The only other Detachment I had regular contact with was 
     Detachment 3 in Laos. There was a lot of coordination 
     involved with trilateral operations, and LTC John Twohig (my 
     counterpart in Laos) and I spoke frequently to coordinate 
     them.
       The mission of Detachment 2 is to ``coordinate all United 
     States Department of Defense efforts in Vietnam to achieve 
     the fullest possible accounting for Americans still 
     unaccounted-for as a result of the war in Indochina.'' The 
     USG knows that it will never resolve every case, thus the 
     requirement to provide the fullest rather than a full 
     accounting. Detachments 3 in Laos and 4 in Cambodia have 
     missions similar to Detachment 2 with the additional 
     requirement of supporting the Ambassador's country team. 
     During my tenure as Commander of Detachment 2, the United 
     States and Vietnam did not have diplomatic relations. As a 
     result, I did not have this requirement.
       Work at Detachment 2 was essentially a seven-day-a-week 
     proposition, but I endeavored to be as flexible as possible 
     regarding individual schedules. Because the intensity of our 
     work varied from time to time and section to section, I 
     tried not to watch the clock. I expected Detachment 
     personnel to work when they needed to work, but to take

[[Page E902]]

     some time off when their responsibilities allowed it. I 
     did require them, however, to inform their supervisor of 
     their whereabouts if they were not in their office in the 
     event an issue arose. The high quality personnel assigned 
     to the Detachment allowed me to exercise this level of 
     flexibility without worrying about the quality of work 
     degrading. As much as possible, I tried to give the 
     Detachment Sundays off, but there was always some work 
     members of the Detachment had to accomplish on Sunday, 
     especially during JFAs. Since Monday in Vietnam was Sunday 
     in Hawaii, we did not receive many calls from the 
     Headquarters on Monday. This enabled me to give the 
     Detachment Monday mornings off, thus giving them two 
     evenings a week when they knew they would not have to work 
     the next morning.
       Much of our work schedule revolved around the time 
     difference between JTF-FA Headquarters in Hawaii and our 
     office in Vietnam. We were about 19 hours ahead of Hawaii. 
     The CJTF prohibited the JTF-FA staff from telephoning us 
     prior to 0730 Vietnam time unless it was an absolute 
     emergency. This precluded us from being hounded at all hours 
     of the very early morning about issues that were not urgent. 
     Our work day began between 0700 and 0730 Tuesday through 
     Saturday, and at 1130 on Mondays, and continued until our 
     work was complete. During a JFA., we normally worked until 
     about 2100 everyday.
       Other than the normal day-to-day operation of the 
     Detachment, we undertook seven basic tasks: 1) investigate 
     live sighting reports, 2) conduct joint investigations and 
     recoveries, 3) conduct historical and archival research, 4) 
     interview witnesses and officials and analyze information and 
     ``leads'' in the field, 5) coordinate and support teams in 
     the field, 6) participate in technical meetings, and 7) 
     represent the USG in repatriation ceremonies. To effectively 
     accomplish each of these tasks, we organized the Detachment.
       Historically, the Commander of the Detachment has been a 
     combat arms lieutenant colonel who had successfully commanded 
     at the battalion level, and was either a Senior Service 
     College selectee or graduate. Some have argued that the 
     commander should be a foreign area or intelligence 
     specialist. The fact is, however, that the Commander is 
     primarily an ``operator.'' The skills normally associated 
     with a combat arms officer are the skills required of the 
     Detachment Commander; i.e., motivate personnel, deal 
     effectively with people, manage resources and people over 
     vast distances, coordinate aviation assets, and resupply 
     activities, etc.
       The Commander serves in this position for 12-13 months. 
     Once again, some believe that the turbulence associated with 
     a one-year tour for the Commander is detrimental to the 
     effort. I believe maintaining it as a one year tour is one of 
     the keys to preserving the credibility of the organization. 
     The unaccounted-for issue is a very emotional one, not only 
     for the families, but also for those of us who worked so hard 
     to resolve it as fully as possible. As one works the issue, 
     it is very easy to develop strong personal opinions about it, 
     and those associated with it. It is also not difficult to 
     develop relationships, either positive or negative, with the 
     Vietnamese officials with whom you work and this could effect 
     negotiations. The bottom line is that individuals who work 
     this issue for an extended period of time begin to develop an 
     ``agenda.'' As soon as this happens you are likely to lose 
     your credibility with the families.
       One of the Commander's primary responsibilities is to 
     ensure that personal opinions and agendas do not develop to 
     such an extent that they cloud the facts. When a new officer 
     assumes duties as the Commander, he views the issue with a 
     new set of eyes, and this is desirable. For those who believe 
     that a one year tour for the Commander is detrimental in 
     terms of continuity, I must add that there are numerous 
     experts available to the Commander who provide advice and 
     expertise that more than compensate for this lack of 
     experience.
       Besides the Commander, there were normally five other long-
     term members of the Detachment (i.e., longer than one year). 
     The Air Force provides the Detachment's Executive Officer/
     Operations Officer. This individual is normally a relatively 
     senior, experienced and successful Air Force Major who had 
     extensive experience in operational duties. I screened 
     numerous files to identify a successor for the incumbent 
     while I was there. When examining records, I focused on 
     several professional attributes. First, was he/she capable of 
     assuming full command of the Detachment? In the 13 months I 
     commanded, I went on TDY over 40 times. During my R&R period 
     at Christmas, I was away from the Detachment for two weeks. 
     The Deputy had to be fully capable of assuming command of the 
     Detachment in my absence. Second, I looked for operations 
     experience. Operations at the Detachment run at a fast pace 
     and the Deputy must be able to coordinate field activities, 
     manage aviation resources, and coordinate and execute 
     logistical resupply of the teams, with very little or no 
     supervision.
       Several of the officers the Air Force nominated for the 
     Deputy position had intelligence backgrounds. I was very 
     leery of accepting an officer whose record reflected this, as 
     I was concerned that the Vietnamese might look at this 
     assignment suspiciously. We worked very hard to convince the 
     Vietnamese that our only purpose for being in Vietnam was to 
     resolve the unaccounted-for issue, and that we had no 
     interest in gathering other types of information. Mr. Le Mai, 
     the Vietnamese Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, remarked 
     to my Detachment Historian during a dinner toward the end of 
     my tenure, that they had initially thought we had ``other 
     purposes'' for being in Vietnam, but that now they knew that 
     we were there for only one purpose, to resolve the issue of 
     unaccounted-for Americans. I worked extremely hard not to 
     violate that trust as I thought it would be extremely 
     detrimental to the issue if the Vietnamese ever perceived 
     that I was violating that trust. Assigning an officer with an 
     intelligence background to the Detachment could have given 
     that perception to the Vietnamese.
       The Detachment had the normal administration, operations 
     and logistic sections of any military organization. A long-
     term member of the Detachment directed each; Administration--
     an Army Staff Sergeant or Sergeant First Class, Logistics--a 
     DA civilian under a two-year renewable contract, and 
     Operations--an Air Force Major and Air Force Technical 
     Sergeant or Master Sergeant.
       The final section organic to the Detachment was the 
     Casualty Resolution Section (CRS), Mr. Gary Flanagan, a 
     retired USAF linguist/analyst, directed the operations of the 
     CRS. Gary has been working this issue since October 1987, 
     initially with the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and then 
     with the JTF. Gary is one of those threads of continuity I 
     spoke of earlier. For a new commander coming into the 
     Detachment, much of what occurs doesn't always make sense, 
     and dealing with such a different culture is often 
     frustrating. Gary was extremely skillful in explaining the 
     historical basis for various methods, and often kept me out 
     of trouble by recommending techniques for getting things done 
     with the Vietnamese.
       Gary directed the efforts of the Research & Investigation 
     Team (RIT). The RIT is a six-person team that deploys to 
     Vietnam for a period of four months. the JTF manned the RIT 
     with the most skillful Vietnamese linguists and analysts 
     assigned to the JTF, and the team works its most difficult 
     cases. It is responsible for archival research, oral history 
     interviews, special remains and priority case investigations, 
     and walk-in interviews.\15\ As we near the ``fullest possible 
     accounting'' and large-scale Joint Field Activities become 
     less productive, the RIT will provide the organizational and 
     operational design for continued efforts well into the 
     future.
       Though he returned to Washington, D.C. toward the end of my 
     tour, Mr. Bob Destatte was an invaluable asset to me 
     throughout my tenure. He was the Detachment's Research 
     Historian, assigned to DPMO, but attached to Detachment 2 as 
     DPMO's in-country analyst. I don't think there are many who 
     are familiar with this issue who would argue against me when 
     I say Bob is the most knowledgeable individual involved with 
     this issue today. He is a fluent Vietnamese linguist and can 
     totally immerse himself in the Vietnamese culture as 
     required. He accompanied me to most meetings during 
     delegation visits as he was one of the few people who both 
     understood the issue and understood Vietnamese. He was able 
     to convey some of the nuances of what the Vietnamese said 
     during the meeting that others would miss. Bob was amongst 
     the first Americans in-country in the early 1960's and has 
     been in and out of Vietnam ever since. He was the single most 
     important person to me as I was beginning to learn the issue. 
     If Bob had a fault, it was that he is a perfectionist and 
     sometimes got mired in the details of a particular issue. 
     This said, his reports were always extremely detailed, 
     complete, and authoritative. Bob knew the background of every 
     aspect of this issue, and willingly shared it with anyone 
     interested. It was a great loss to the Detachment when he 
     returned to the United States. I always took great comfort in 
     being able to walk downstairs to his office whenever I needed 
     assistance.
       At various times, additional personnel come under the 
     command and control of Detachment 2. Whenever there is a 
     live-sighting to investigate, Stony Beach, the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency office in Bangkok, Thailand, dispatches 
     an investigator to investigate the report. Though this 
     investigator works directly for DIA, as soon as he enters 
     Vietnam, he comes under Detachment 2 for the duration of 
     his investigation in Vietnam.
       The largest group of ``temporary'' personnel directed by 
     Detachment 2 is the Investigation/Recovery Team (IRT) that 
     enters the country every other month for Joint Field 
     Activities. Each IRT consists of well over 100 specialists 
     who fan out across the country to investigate leads and 
     interview witnesses, and conduct recovery operations. For 
     most of my tenure, the IRT consisted of two Investigation 
     Elements (IE) and six Recovery Elements (RE).
       The mix of IEs and REs varies depending upon constraints 
     the Vietnamese impose and the work-load we had to accomplish. 
     In the early days of the JTF, the Vietnamese limited the 
     number of personnel it permitted into the country, however, 
     they became much more flexible in adjusting these numbers to 
     the needs of the mission. The JTF has investigated every case 
     at least once, many numerous times. As such, in early 1994 it 
     changed the IE/RE mix from three IEs and five REs to the 
     current ration. The JTF has between 40 and 50 cases scheduled 
     for recovery in Vietnam, and on average, an RE can complete 
     two recoveries each JFA. To facilitate the backlog of 
     recoveries, JTF-FA increased the number of REs to six.

[[Page E903]]

       During most JFAs, the IEs and REs were dispersed throughout 
     Vietnam. The primary means of contact with them was 
     telephone, if that was available, and HF radio when the teams 
     were operating in remote sites. The Detachments in Laos and 
     Cambodia communicated with their teams in the field via 
     SATCOM radio, which was much more reliable than the HF. This 
     was a major issue between the USG and the Vietnamese. We 
     requested permission to use SATCOM continuously. We felt it 
     was a safety issue with the teams (U.S. and Vietnamese) in 
     the field. There were times when I was out to touch with 
     teams by radio for up to four consecutive days. 
     Communications between the Detachment and two teams in the 
     field became so bad during one JFA that I had a helicopter 
     fly to the site every other day to check on the team. This 
     was a very expensive proposition, but work at remote sites 
     can be very hazardous and I could not risk not knowing their 
     situation. Every visiting delegation raised the SATCOM issue 
     at the highest levels of the Vietnamese Government, but they 
     never acceded to our request. Admiral Macke, CINCPAC, even 
     assured the Vietnamese that we would use only unencrypted 
     systems and went so far as to offer to provide the Vietnamese 
     a SATCOM station to enable them to monitor our 
     communications. We had nothing the hide. Their reasoning for 
     denying our requests was that they did not have the 
     regulations in place to control satellite communications. 
     They posited that granting us the authorization opened the 
     door for others to use it. While I never quite understood 
     their position, I never made any progress in changing it.
       I had a very direct and close relationship with the 
     Vietnamese Government. Until the opening of the United States 
     Liaison Office (USLO) in Hanoi, I was the senior USG 
     representative in Vietnam. Even after it opened, I remained 
     the primary point of contact in Vietnam concerning the issue 
     of missing Americans. My direct counterpart in the Vietnamese 
     Government was the Director of the Vietnamese Office Seeking 
     Missing Persons (VNOSMP). During most of my tenure, this was 
     Mr. Vu Chi Cong. The VNOSMP contained representatives of the 
     Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA), National Defense (MND), 
     and Interior (MOI). The MFA coordinated the operation for the 
     Vietnamese as they are the ministry responsible for dealing 
     with officials from other countries. The MND and MOI had 
     representatives in the VNOSMP because they are the two 
     ministries who would have collected and stored information 
     during the war regarding U.S. service men; MND for obvious 
     reasons, and MOI because they were responsible for the 
     administration of POW camps and the prison system.
       I found the VNOSMP to be very helpful and open to our 
     effort. I had easy access to the VNOSMP. Mr. Cong even gave 
     me his home telephone number in the event an emergency arose 
     after normal duty hours.
       In sum, the organization and command and control structure 
     I worked under was very effective. I had one boss, the CJTF, 
     and he and his staff never hesitated to run interference for 
     me as necessary to keep other agencies from distracting our 
     efforts. The CJTF never micro-managed my operations and 
     allowed me great leverage in how I accomplished the 
     Detachment's mission. This flexibility was very important to 
     my credibility with the Vietnamese, as they knew that I was 
     entrusted to make decisions and to follow through on those 
     decisions. Despite the freedom of action he allowed us, the 
     CJTF was always there to support us when necessary. I was 
     well staffed with some of the best soldiers, sailors, airmen, 
     marines and civilians I have ever worked with. The Vietnamese 
     ensured that I had direct access to the necessary agencies in 
     their government whenever necessary. The command climate 
     truly provided an environment that ensured our success.

            Progress Toward the Fullest Possible Accounting

       In March 1992, President Clinton validated former President 
     Bush's four areas requiring tangible evidence of progress by 
     the Vietnamese as a precondition to normalizing relations: 
     (1) repatriation and identification of remains, (2) access to 
     documents, (3) trilateral cooperation, and (4) progress in 
     resolving priority cases and live sighting investigations, 
     and support for joint field activities (JFAs). The President 
     has continued to stress these areas even as the United States 
     begins to engage Vietnam in other issues of concern.
       I considered sufficient progress in the President's four 
     areas our end state, despite the fact that tangible evidence 
     of progress is a difficult end state to define. Although as a 
     military officer I am much more comfortable when I have an 
     end state that I can clearly enunciate, I soon discovered 
     that when dealing with emotional that have great political 
     consequences at the highest levels of the government, clarity 
     of the ultimate objective is often difficult to define more 
     precisely.
       The press often asked the question; ``When will all this 
     end?'' My answer to this was always that their question was 
     one for the policy-makers; i.e. President Clinton, members of 
     Congress, the Secretary of State, etc. I was merely an 
     operator in the field. It is, however, my opinion that the 
     effort will never end. ``End'' connotes finality, a ceasing 
     of all efforts. Today, we are still finding remains of 
     unaccounted-for-soldiers from World Wars I and II, and the 
     Cold War. Task Force--Russia is searching the archives and 
     records of the former Soviet Union in an effort to resolve 
     losses from the Cold War era. We have yet to search the areas 
     in North Korea where we lost America soldiers, and last year, 
     a group in Canada even unearthed the remains of an American 
     lost during the War of 1812. As long as we have Americans 
     unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia, I do not believe our 
     efforts will ever entirely cease. Rather, if at some point 
     our efforts become less productive (i.e., a significant 
     diminution in successful investigations and excavations) the 
     means by which we seek to achieve our ends, the fullest 
     possible accounting, may evolve.
       By definition, JTFs are temporary. At some point in the 
     future, it is reasonable to envision an organization such as 
     CILHI controlling the entire accounting effort in Southeast 
     Asia. There might be a small team of investigators such as 
     the current RIT that remains in Vietnam to pursue leads as 
     they develop. As the small in-country team discovers likely 
     sites for excavation, an RE from CILHI could deploy to 
     Vietnam to excavate that location. Whenever we have 
     information that leads us toward resolving a case, I believe 
     we will follow it.
       The USG hinges future relations with the Vietnamese on 
     progress toward the accounting effort. It is also critical to 
     understand how the Vietnamese view their assistance in this 
     endeavor. When negotiating with the Vietnamese and when 
     speaking with the press, it is important to keep in mind the 
     Vietnamese Government's official premise for cooperating. 
     Vietnamese officials repeatedly reminded visiting delegations 
     that they consider this issue a ``humanitarian'' issue and 
     that they cooperate because it is the right thing to do. 
     Their cooperation does not depend on closer relations, 
     financial assistance, etc. This seemed to me to be a very 
     important point with the Vietnamese. I felt it was the basis 
     for their position that their cooperation would continue 
     until we resolve the issue to the satisfaction of the USG.
       As I said earlier, it was not my responsibility to assess 
     the amount of progress we made; those were policy decisions. 
     It was my job to identify means of effectiveness of joint and 
     unilateral efforts. I endeavored to provide relevant facts 
     pertinent to each of the President's four areas, and then 
     left the assessment to the policy-makers. The discussions 
     that follow are the elements of progress I deemed significant 
     during my tenure. This was the information I presented to 
     visiting USG officials.


                  recovery and repatriation of remains

       Since the end of our involvement in the conflict in 
     Indochina in 1975, the remains of 428 individuals have been 
     repatriated to the United States and positively identified.
       Recovery and repatriation of remains showed strong progress 
     during my tenure. On the surface, this indicator of progress 
     is relatively easy to measure. Ostensibly, all that should be 
     necessary is to count the numbers of remains we recover in 
     the field and subsequently repatriate to the United States. 
     Nevertheless in just about every aspect of this issue, you 
     can look at the results in two ways. Executives of the 
     National League of Families (NLF) \17\ contend that the only 
     meaningful way to measure progress in this area is by the 
     number of unaccounted-for Americans that have been identified 
     positively. Since January 1992 when the JTF began operations, 
     CILHI has identified 110 previously unaccounted-for 
     Americans. The NLF points to this relatively low figure when 
     compared with the total number of unaccounted-for as evidence 
     of slow progress in recovering and repatriating remains and a 
     lack of cooperation by the Vietnamese. On the other hand, you 
     can look at the number of remains that have been repatriated 
     in that same period, consider that more than 20 years have 
     passed the losses occurred, and develop entirely different 
     conclusions regarding the success of JTF operations. I 
     contend that the JTF and CILHI have been highly successful in 
     recovering and repatriating remains.
       The difficulty of locating remains was clarified for me 
     when teams excavated the former Lang Vei Special Forces Camp 
     in Quang Tri Province to search for five unaccounted-for 
     Americans. The JTF had excavated this site twice previously 
     without success. IN February 1995, we brought Major (Retired) 
     Frank C. Willoughby to Vietnam to assist us in our efforts. 
     Mr. Willoughby had designed and built the camp, and commanded 
     it at the time of the incident in 1968. Upon his arrival at 
     the recovery site, MAJ Willoughby reconnoitered the area our 
     teams had excavated during previous JFAs as they tried to 
     find the camp's Tactical Operations Center (TOC). It was in 
     the TOC where one of the five missing Americans had been seen 
     last.
       Mr. Willoughby thought that given the old maps and 
     descriptions of the area, the areas where we excavated were 
     reasonable locations to dig. However, after a couple of days 
     to orient himself on the ground, Mr. Willoughby suggested 
     excavating for the TOC some 50 yards from the previous 
     locations. He also confirmed the location of the camp's 
     Observation Post (OP) and a 4.2-inch mortar pit where the 
     four remaining service members were last known to be. After 
     several days of excavating, we found the remnants of the TOC, 
     one bone fragment and one possible bone fragment. Still 
     visible on the concrete floor of the TOC were the scars made 
     by hand grenades the attackers threw down the bunker's air 
     vents.
       Since the war, the local Vietnamese had used the site of 
     the camp as a ``quary'' for

[[Page E904]]

     materials to build Highway 9, and dramatically changed the 
     nature of the terrain. Mr. Willoughby thought that the 
     remains of his soldiers had most likely been in the area of 
     where the Vietnamese had quarried, and were thus 
     irretrievably lost. I firmly believe that without Mr. 
     Willoughby's on-site knowledge we would not have found the 
     site.
       During one of my visits to the site, Mr. Willoughby and I 
     sat on a hill in the middle of the old camp and he recounted 
     the day of the battle for me. As we looked west from the 
     hill, we could see Laos which the attacking Vietnamese had 
     used as a sanctuary. This battle was the first of the war 
     when the Vietnamese used tanks to attack the American 
     positions, and is the subject of a book by David Stockwell 
     entitled, Tanks in the Wire.\18\ We could probably see 
     about two miles distant, and he said that at the time of 
     the war, all that we were now surveying was triple canopy 
     jungle. Today, the view encompassed only rice paddies 
     between the camp and the Laotian mountains. He said that 
     the hill we were sitting on was a good ten to 12 feet 
     taller during the war, and that the bulldozing of the hill 
     for road materials had changed its appearance 
     dramatically.
       This story clearly demonstrates the problems associated 
     with time. More than 20 years passed since the incident of 
     loss. Not only was it likely that the environment had eroded 
     whatever remains the ground held, but it was obvious that 
     ``man'' had changed the terrain. The terrain changes and the 
     memories of witnesses fade. There is an element of luck 
     involved every time we find remains. To be able to then 
     identify the remains is even more fortuitous.
       I need to digress from the subject of repatriation of 
     remains to further elaborate on Mr. Willoughby's trip. Though 
     I barely got to know him, Mr. Willoughby will always be one 
     of my heroes. It was a very emotional trip back for him, but 
     one which I think helped him close an open chapter in his 
     life. During one of my visits to Lang Vei, I brought a 
     television crew from KCRA television in Sacramento, 
     California. While interviewing Mr. Willoughby, the 
     commentator asked him why he returned to Vietnam to help us. 
     Although I do not remember the exact wording, Mr. Willoughby 
     replied by saying that he was the Commander at the time they 
     evacuated the camp, forced by enemy action to leave five of 
     his soldiers behind. During the war, he always felt it his 
     duty to do everything he could to bring his soldiers home. 
     The passage of time had not relieved him of his duty, for he 
     was still their commander. Over 25 years passed since the 
     incident, but duty to his soldiers still drove this great 
     American--one of God's noblest people.
       I also had the opportunity during this visit to learn about 
     another aspect of this issue. After the television crew 
     interviewed Mr. Willoughby, they turned to one of my VNOSMP 
     counterparts, Senior Colonel Bien \19\ asking him for his 
     impressions of our efforts. SRCol Bien said that he had lost 
     four brothers during their ``war for independence,'' one of 
     whom was lost in the same area near Highway 9. Unfortunately, 
     this brother is still missing. SRCol Bien said that many 
     members of his family criticized his efforts to help the USG 
     account for its missing, when he cannot even account for his 
     own brother. The commentator then asked how he answered their 
     reproaches. SRCol Bien replied very curtly, ``I tell them 
     that I help because it is the right thing to do.''
     Unilateral Activities by the Vietnamese to Recover Remains
       During my tenure, delegations continually stressed that the 
     Vietnamese needed to work more unilaterally to resolve this 
     issue. Some stress unilateral action because they believe 
     that the Vietnamese Government is withholding remains and 
     information concerning missing Americans. Thus, they reason 
     that only the Vietnamese can resolve these cases and they 
     could do so by simply handing over the information or remains 
     they possess. I am not in a position to conclusively state 
     where the truth in this matter lies. I do know, however, that 
     unilateral operations are a poor substitute for joint 
     investigations and research. Unilateral operations do not 
     result in near the quality of work joint operations do.
       Another aspect of our requests for more unilateral efforts 
     on the part of the Vietnamese that I felt was important was 
     the lack of credence we sometimes attached to their results. 
     Time and time again, I saw individuals both inside and 
     outside the USG criticize the results of Vietnamese 
     unilateral efforts simply (in my opinion) because their 
     results did not coincide with the results they expected. In 
     my opinion, if we ask the Vietnamese to investigate cases 
     unilaterally, then when they do we have a certain obligation 
     to accept the results of their efforts. I am not saying that 
     we should unconditionally accept every report just because 
     the Vietnamese say it is accurate. What I am saying is that 
     if we are unwilling to accept their results whatever they 
     might be, then maybe we should reconsider the value of 
     requesting the unilateral activity in the first place.
       We should keep in mind that unilateral work by the 
     Vietnamese precedes everything we do. There is no way we 
     could find witnesses to interview, documents to analyze or 
     sites to excavate without prior work by the Vietnamese; never 
     have--never will. Approximately ten days before every JFA, 
     the Vietnamese team leaders begin to coordinate with 
     provincial officials, reconnoiter sites, search for 
     witnesses, and arrange for their presence. Thanks to their 
     preliminary efforts, when American team members arrive, we 
     can maximize the time in-country. Additionally, the 
     Vietnamese provide unilaterally almost half of all remains 
     that we obtain.
       In June 1994, a Vietnamese citizen from Son La Province 
     contacted Detachment 2 officials stating someone he knew in 
     Son La had remains of an American service man. During the 
     interview, he produced a dog-tag impression correlating to 
     Case 0954 to the Casualty Resolution Section at Detachment 2. 
     We sent an official from our office and one from the VNOSMP 
     to Son La to meet the individual who allegedly had the 
     remains. Although the individual in Son La denied having any 
     remains, the witness who gave us the information in Hanoi 
     insisted that this was the correct individual. At that time, 
     we were unable to obtain the remains, but the Commander of 
     the local Border Defense Forces pledged that he would 
     continue to investigate this case and recover any available 
     remains. In January 1995, we received the remains from the 
     VNOSMP and in February 1995, we repatriated the remains to 
     the United States.
       This was an important lesson for me in dealing with 
     Vietnamese authorities. When the Vietnamese citizen initially 
     refused to give us the remains, I felt that the SRV officials 
     should have searched his home and belongings and confiscated 
     the remains. After all, it is against the law in Vietnam to 
     hoard remains or demand compensation for them. I soon 
     learned, however, that the Vietnamese continually stress that 
     they prefer persuasion rather than force to entice Vietnamese 
     citizens to turn remains over to U.S. or Vietnamese 
     officials. They are concerned that force would discourage 
     other citizens from coming forth with remains or information. 
     Besides, the remains could have been anywhere, and if he had 
     hidden them, the likelihood of finding them would have been 
     very slim. Case 0954 is an example where the Vietnamese 
     process of patient persuasion seems to have worked.
       Nevertheless, I did get the impression that when persuasion 
     failed, SRV officials were not hesitant to enforce the law. 
     During the 32d JFA, SRV officials confiscated remains from an 
     SRV citizen who demanded compensation for them. The officials 
     later provided them to our team members. Seeking compensation 
     for remains is not an uncommon occurrence. Vietnamese 
     citizens will often approach team members in the field, or 
     they will even come to ``The Ranch'' to offer remains or 
     information in exchange for money, gold, or a visa to the 
     United States for themselves or a relative. In all cases, our 
     answer was that under no circumstances would we compensate 
     them for remains or information. Rather, we encouraged them 
     to provide the remains for information as an ``act of 
     compassion to help resolve this humanitarian issue.'' In most 
     cases, the citizen, seeing he was not going to receive 
     anything in return, handed over the remains or provided the 
     information anyway.
       Refusing to ``buy'' remains or information was an important 
     position for the Vietnamese Government as well as ours. 
     Vietnam is an extremely poor country. If word spread that the 
     USG was ``paying'' for remains, some Vietnamese, not 
     realizing that we can differentiate between remains belonging 
     to a Southeast Asian Mongoloid and an American, would begin 
     ``robbing graves'' throughout Vietnam in hopes of earning 
     money. Rather than helping our efforts, this would likely 
     cause many Vietnamese to resent the results of our efforts.
       During my tenure, there were several cases of individuals 
     absolutely refusing to hand over remains they had without 
     some type of reward. In some instances the Vietnamese were 
     able to document repeated attempts by the same individuals to 
     sell remains. I know of at least two successful prosecutions 
     of ``remains dealers'' while I was in Vietnam.
       The Vietnamese also appeared to act unilaterally in cases 
     that might involve some sensitivity with the Vietnamese 
     populace. During the 34th JFA, Vietnamese authorities in Ben 
     Tre Province unilaterally excavated a site in a War Heroes 
     Cemetery. Past investigations of this case led us to believe 
     that the Vietnamese had buried an unaccounted-for American 
     in the cemetery inadvertently. Provincial officials were 
     very sensitive about the possibility of angering the 
     villagers if they saw Americans excavating in their War 
     Heroes Cemetery. The provincial officials disinterred 
     several graves during the evening when they would not be 
     observed by the villagers, and presented the remains to a 
     JTF-FA anthropologist waiting nearby for examination. 
     Unfortunately, he determined all the remains to be of 
     Southeast Asian origin. The importance of this episode, 
     however, is the level of cooperation it demonstrates. 
     Could this have occurred in Arlington National Cemetery, 
     the final resting place of many of our war heroes?
       In another development regarding unilateral efforts by the 
     Vietnamese to develop ``leads'' concerning unaccounted-for 
     Americans, the Vietnamese government unilaterally tasked the 
     Ministry of War Invalids, Social Welfare and Labor 
     (responsible for accounting for the over 300,000 missing 
     Vietnamese from the war) to coordinate their efforts with 
     those of the VNOSMP. Now, before their investigators travel 
     to the various provinces, they take with them a list of 
     unaccounted-for Americans possibly lost in those areas. When 
     they interview witnesses regarding Vietnamese missing, they 
     also ask about our unaccounted-for individuals.

[[Page E905]]

     Amnesty Program
       The Vietnamese Government actively publicizes their remains 
     amnesty program \20\ and the U.S. MIA Office. They allowed 
     Detachment 2 to place an advertisement in the Hanoi Yellow 
     Pages inviting Vietnamese citizens who might have information 
     about unaccounted-for Americans to contact the VNOSMP or the 
     U.S. MIA office in Hanoi. They also televised advertisements 
     requesting information on specific cases and placed the U.S. 
     MIA Office on tourist maps. Additionally, many of the remains 
     we receive from Vietnamese citizens originate from remote 
     areas of the country, thus indicating widespread word of the 
     amnesty program.
       One such case occurred during the 34th JFA. The VNOSMP 
     notified us that villagers in Quy Nhon Town had discovered 
     what they believed were remains of an American. A family in 
     Quy Nhon found these remains while looking for the remains of 
     one of their children in a local cemetery. When they removed 
     the bones from the ground, they realized that they were much 
     too large to be Vietnamese. They placed them back into the 
     grave and notified local officials of their discovery. The 
     local official called the VNOSMP offering to excavate the 
     site unilaterally, and the VNOSMP then called me to request 
     that I send an anthropologist to Quy Nhon Town to examine the 
     remains. On March 7 and 8, 1995, a JTF-FA anthropologist 
     reviewed the remains. The remains consisted of nearly three-
     quarters of an entire skeleton and 21 (possibly 22) teeth, 
     five with restorations. The anthropologist determined the 
     remains to be from a large male, over 40 years old, over six 
     feet tall, and not Southeast Asian Mongoloid. We repatriated 
     these remains to the United States.
     ``Dog Tag'' Investigations
       Since 1979, the USG has received literally thousands of 
     reports of remains associated with a set of ``dog tags'' in 
     the hands of private citizens. About 97% of the Americans 
     named in these reports were never unaccounted-for, while 
     somewhat more than 100 Americans named in the reports are 
     still missing. You must consider two facts regarding ``dog 
     tag'' cases. First, during the war, many Americans lost their 
     dog tags, gave them to their ``girl friends,'' traded them, 
     etc. Second, when we evacuated the embassy in 1975, the 
     machines used to manufacture dog tags remained behind. 
     Budding ``entrepreneurs'' have been cranking out 
     counterfeit tags ever since. The end result is that, 
     whether real or counterfeit, a glut of dog tags is 
     available throughout Vietnam, especially in stores and 
     street corners catering to tourists.
       Shortly after my arrival in Vietnam, a U.S. citizen 
     visiting Vietnam contacted one of our EIs working in the 
     vicinity of Ho Chi Minh City to tell them that she had 1,444 
     dog tags of missing Americans and a set of remains. She said 
     that Vietnamese secret police and even the CIA were following 
     her, and she feared for her life. The IE team leader agreed 
     to meet with her and she related a fantastic story of 
     intrigue. She said that a very ``reliable'' Vietnamese man 
     had contacted her and offered to lead her to where he knew 
     there were a number of dog tags and remains of missing 
     Americans. She knew he was reliable because he did not ask 
     for any money for the items, only some compensation for the 
     time and travel. She recounted an escapade involving 
     nighttime motorcycle rides disguised as a Vietnamese peasant 
     to various locations. She further described crawling into a 
     ``previously unknown'' tunnel in Marble Mountain, Da Nang 
     (one of the most famous tourist sites in all Vietnam), and 
     there, on top of the ground, lay 1,444 previously 
     undiscovered dog tags. Then he took her by motorcycle to a 
     cemetery where a small bag containing bones laid on top of 
     the ground.
       She believed she had solved the entire issue of 
     unaccounted-for Americans, and told us that she planned to 
     call a press conference as soon as she landed in Los Angeles 
     (she claimed to be a journalist). Knowing that it is easier 
     to discredit an inaccurate story before it comes out than to 
     react to one after it hits the media, we thought it was 
     critical to determine the veracity of her claims. Our first 
     step was to send CILHI's best anthropologist to HCMC to 
     examine the remains. He found them to be from a Southeast 
     Asian Mongoloid. It was obvious to him that they were not 
     American. For two days, analysts in Detachment 2 searched our 
     database of missing Americans comparing it to the names on 
     the dog tags. Not a single one correlated to an unaccounted-
     for American. As soon as we confirmed our findings, I 
     immediately called the JTF-FA Public Affairs Officer (PAO) in 
     Hawaii to inform him of the results of our investigation. I 
     never heard of any news report or press conferences regarding 
     this incident.
       JTF-FA cannot afford to dismiss any of these claims without 
     fully investigating them. Though the odds are slim, the 
     possible benefit of discovering new leads far outweigh the 
     amount of work involved chasing dead-ends. The Archival 
     Research Team (ART) began investigating dog-tag leads during 
     my tenure and the RIT continues this effort today. In October 
     1994, the ART received partial human remains and a set of dog 
     tags that we tentatively correlated to two cases of 
     unaccounted-for Americans. One set of remains contained teeth 
     with restorations. A CILHI anthropologist confirmed that the 
     remains were likely to be those of an American, and we 
     repatriated these remains to the United States.


                          access to documents

       The USG believes that museum artifacts and archives, 
     tradition houses (local museums), military historical files, 
     prison records, etc., might contain information pertaining to 
     Americans still unaccounted-for. Since its January 1992, 
     members of JTF-FA have examined over 30,000 items correlating 
     to over 820 unresolved cases. These include more than 2,000 
     photographs of former POWs, remains, crew gear, personal 
     identification items, aircraft wreckage, sketches, maps, etc. 
     During its existence, the ART had unrestricted access to 
     museums and tradition houses throughout Vietnam, and 
     interviewed many of the past museum curators. USG 
     investigators, including DIA analysts, have visited several 
     prisons throughout Vietnam and have discovered no evidence 
     that the Vietnamese held U.S. prisoners after 1973. 
     Additionally, the Vietnamese established the Joint Document 
     Center (JDC) in a wing of their Central Army Museum in Hanoi. 
     The JDC serves as a permanent location dedicated to the joint 
     review of any artifacts or documents researchers might 
     discover. Detachment 2 and VNOSMP analysts man the JDC on a 
     daily basis.
       Providing archival information to the USG presents an 
     interesting dilemma to the Vietnamese. Prior to the arrival 
     of CODEL Bond in the Fall of 1994, I attended a 
     meeting between Mr. Jim Hall and Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong, 
     Director of the Americas Department, Ministry of Foreign 
     Affairs.\21\ During the meeting, Mr. Hall encouraged Mr. 
     Phong to present any documents they may have uncovered 
     during their unilateral research to the visiting 
     delegation. Mr. Phong responded that they no longer 
     thought it wise to hold documents they find to present to 
     delegations. Rather, they preferred to hand them over to 
     the Detachment immediately upon discovering and reviewing 
     them. The Vietnamese were in an interesting Catch-22. If a 
     delegation visited and the Vietnamese did not give them a 
     document of some type, critics of their level of 
     cooperation quickly claimed that the Vietnamese were 
     withholding information. On the other hand, if they 
     provided documents to visiting delegations, these same 
     critics claimed that the Vietnamese had all the documents 
     we were looking for and provided tid-bits to visitors to 
     try to convince us of their cooperation. I could not argue 
     Mr. Phong's logic because I saw it happen.
       Although the number of items investigators have examined is 
     large, access to documents and other items of archival 
     research was one of the toughest areas for us to note 
     significant and tangible progress during my tenure. Only late 
     in my tour did our efforts begin to show concrete headway. 
     One of our primary goals was to ``coach'' the Vietnamese to 
     report their activities more effectively. We stressed that it 
     was not good enough to simply perform research and then tell 
     us that they did not find anything. We suggested to them that 
     if they looked for documents in the archives of the Air 
     Defense units in Military Region 4, for example, they needed 
     to provide us the specifics of their efforts; what files did 
     they look at, what time period did the records cover, where 
     did they perform the research, when, who were the 
     investigators, etc.?
       During one of our Technical Conferences, General Viale, 
     CJTF-FA, requested our counterparts improve the detail of 
     their reports. In response, Mr. Cong, Director of the VNOSMP, 
     tried to explain their problem. He said that when Vietnamese 
     investigate a case, and find nothing, no report is necessary. 
     Partly in jest, I told him that the American Government can 
     write reams about what we don't find. Nonetheless, on a more 
     serious note I explained that knowing the circumstances 
     around which investigators found nothing may often be as 
     valuable to an analyst as actually finding something. Mr. 
     Cong concluded by saying that it was taking a ``cultural 
     change'' for them to realize what we wanted, but pledged his 
     support to continue to try.
       Ms. Virginia Foote, the President of the US/Vietnam Trade 
     Council and frequent visitor to Vietnam, offered another 
     consideration regarding the detail of Vietnamese reporting. 
     In mid-1995, the DASD for POW/MIA Affairs, General Wold, 
     asked Ms. Foote to intervene with the Vietnamese to encourage 
     them to improve the detail of their reporting. During a 
     meeting with the Ministry of Interior official in charge of 
     the U.S. MIA work by the MOI, Ms. Foote encouraged him to 
     improve their reporting procedures. She received a ``very 
     firm, and rather angry, answer that such reporting would 
     expose their military intelligence filing and personnel 
     system which they will not do.'' Ms. Foote advised General 
     Wold and Ambassador Winston Lord that ``they might have set 
     too high a reporting standard and that the Vietnamese are 
     never going to issue reports explaining in depth their 
     process for unilateral searches for the reasons given by MOI. 
     In my view (Ms. Foote's), it is not reasonable for the USG to 
     push this too far.''
       At least annually, President Clinton sent a delegation 
     representing him to Vietnam to assess the level of progress 
     we were making and the level of Vietnamese cooperation. The 
     delegations normally thanked the Vietnamese for their past 
     cooperation and encouraged more effort in various areas. The 
     delegations often brought specific requests for information 
     regarding specific cases of particular interest to the USG, 
     and suggested ways of improving cooperation.
       At the request of the July 1994 Presidential Delegation, 
     the MOI and MND each formed a

[[Page E906]]

     small team to unilaterally research historical files and 
     interview Vietnamese officials who may have information 
     concerning missing Americans. They submitted an initial 
     ``work-plan'' and asked for our ideas concerning the plan. 
     The VNOSMP provided the teams' initial report to us in March 
     1995, and on May 15, 1995, Mr. Phong gave additional reports 
     from the MOI and MND to me. On May 30, 1995, Mr. Tran Van 
     Tu, Acting Director, VNOSMP, provided a report from the 
     MOI to me detailing their research efforts in seven 
     northern provinces.
       At the time of my departure, Detachment 2 was receiving on 
     a regular basis, reports from the VNOSMP and the special 
     teams formed by the MND and MOI for unilateral research. In 
     total, I received five written reports of progress from the 
     VNOSMP. Though I did not see the final assessments of these 
     reports prior to my departure, they did appear to have useful 
     and previously unavailable information.
     Personal Dairies and Artifacts
       Though we have not received a large number of personal 
     records, we did receive some, and it appeared that the 
     Vietnamese Veterans Association was encouraging its member to 
     provide more to us. Shortly after President Clinton lifted 
     the trade embargo, a retired PAVN \22\ Senior Colonel 
     voluntarily shared information about unaccounted-for 
     Americans that he had recorded in his personal wartime diary. 
     In one instance, his diary confirmed that one aircraft and a 
     crew of eight men who disappeared while on a mission in Laos 
     nearly 30 years ago, crashed more than 140 km (nearly 100 
     miles) from the last known location noted in U.S. records. 
     ``The Vietnamese Veterans Association, headed by General 
     Quang, started an aggressive campaign to encourage Vietnamese 
     veterans to come forward with information that might help 
     account for Americans killed during the war. Materials have 
     been coming in greater quantity since diplomatic relations 
     were established.'' \23\


                      trilateral cooperation \24\

       The most important aspect of Trilateral Field Activities is 
     that the Vietnamese Government considered this an issue 
     between the U.S., Laos and Cambodia, not Vietnam. This is 
     important because Vietnam continually stated that they would 
     support whatever requests the U.S. made regarding these 
     operations so long as they were able to locate the witnesses 
     and persuade them to participate. Their actions supported 
     their promises. On December 1, 1994, U.S., Vietnamese, and 
     Laotian officials met in Hanoi to lend structure to the way 
     we conducted trilateral operations. All participants agreed 
     that Vietnamese and JTF-FA investigators would continue to 
     identify and then interview Vietnamese citizens who might 
     possess information pertaining to unaccounted-for Americans 
     in Laos. If, after the interview, Vietnamese and U.S. 
     investigators concluded that the witness had pertinent 
     information, Laotian investigators would travel to Vietnam to 
     interview the witness. If, subsequent to their interview, the 
     Laotians agreed that the witness possessed reliable 
     information that could help resolve a case, they authorized 
     their travel to Laos and participation in a JFA in Laos.
       From this conference forward, it was apparent that the 
     VNOSMP was working diligently to identify Vietnamese 
     witnesses who could assist in resolving cases in Laos. During 
     the first three JFAs following the trilateral agreement in 
     December, the VNOSMP provided eight Vietnamese witnesses to 
     assist investigations in Laos. The VNOSMP located all the 
     witnesses unilaterally, made them available for the Laotians 
     to interview, and escorted them to Laos. All this is in spite 
     of several witnesses living in remote locations, short 
     notices for passports and visas, and frequently difficult 
     transportation and communication problems with local 
     officials and witnesses. In one instance, the witnesses did 
     not want to travel to Laos citing health and business. They 
     did agree, however, to travel to Hanoi on short notice and 
     spent hours studying maps with our specialists and describing 
     their recollections of the incident.
       Two cases exemplifying trilateral cooperation stand out 
     most. The first trilateral case we investigated under the new 
     guidelines involved the loss of 11 Americans at Phou Pha Thi 
     in northern Laos. Phou Pha Thi was a ``secret'' radar site 
     that vectored U.S. aircraft into targets over northern 
     Vietnam during the conflict. During the war, a PAVN sapper 
     unit scaled sheer cliffs in the middle of the night, 
     surprised the defenders, and overran the site. 11 Americans 
     remain unaccounted-for. After weeks of unilateral work, the 
     Vietnamese located the best witness for the Phou Pha Thi 
     site, Mr. Muc, a retired PAVN Colonel, who led the PAVN 
     attack on the site. Our most experienced linguist and 
     analyst, Mr. Bob Destatte, interviewed Mr. Muc and found that 
     his recollection of the events that transpired the night of 
     the attack confirmed that he had in fact led the attack. We 
     nominated Mr. Muc to travel to Laos to help with the 
     trilateral field activity.
       In December 1994, Mr. Muc went to Phou Pha Thi and assisted 
     U.S. and Lao investigators on site. Though their efforts were 
     in vain, both the Vietnamese and Laotian governments had 
     cooperated fully on the agreed upon trilateral procedures, 
     and the process worked. We continued to use this model during 
     all future trilateral operations.
       The second case occurred shortly after our first trilateral 
     operation. The Vietnamese unilaterally located a witness to a 
     C-47 crash in Laos. The Vietnamese made him available for a 
     joint interview on very short notice, and he provided three 
     sketches of the area surrounding the crash site. These 
     sketches included the relative locations of three mass graves 
     and a mass burial site of eight U.S. air crew members. We 
     nominated him to travel to Laos, and in January 1995 he and 
     two other Vietnamese witnesses whom the Vietnamese located 
     unilaterally traveled to Laos to help investigators on site.
       Trilateral operations between the U.S., Vietnam and Laos 
     progressed from being something out of the ordinary to being 
     normal operations. Detachments 2 and 3, the Vietnamese 
     representatives, and Laotian specialists all appeared to 
     regard this as an integral aspect of operations in Laos and 
     treated it as such.


  priority cases, live sighting investigations, joint field activities

     Priority Cases
       Priority ``Last Known Alive'' Cases.\25\ These cases 
     involve some of the USG's most sensitive cases in that they 
     include cases where the USG has been unable to conclusively 
     determine if the individual is dead or alive. Of the 196 
     individuals in this category, one is a foreign national, we 
     have completely resolved and identified the remains of 27 
     individuals, and determined the fate of all but 50 of the 
     individuals. Investigators have investigated each of the 
     remaining Priority Cases at least once, some as many as seven 
     or eight times.\26\
       One priority case we investigated while I was in Vietnam 
     was Case 0644. The last known location for 0644 was in a 
     militarily sensitive area. The Vietnamese denied access to 
     the site to us because they claimed that no aircraft ever 
     crashed there. They would not allow our teams into that 
     sensitive area unless there was a reasonable expectation that 
     it would lead to success. We continued to request access to 
     the site. The Vietnamese sent LTC Pham Teo, one of their most 
     experienced investigators, to the site to unilaterally 
     investigate the case. He found several witnesses who 
     confirmed that the crash occurred outside the sensitive area 
     in a neighboring province. LTC Pham Teo traveled to the 
     location the witnesses identified to investigate their 
     claims. He recovered a small amount of remains and some 
     identification media. A joint U.S./SRV team investigated the 
     new crash site during the October-November 1994 JFA. They 
     found the crash site LTC Pham Teo identified and recovered 
     small pieces of wreckage. The Joint Forensics Review in 
     September 1994 accepted the remains LTC Pham Teo unilaterally 
     recovered and we repatriated them to the U.S. in September 
     1994 for further analysis. CILHI's forensic analysis 
     determined these remains were of an adult male, however, 
     the remains were insufficient to permit determination of 
     race. JIT-FA rescheduled this case for reinvestigation.
       Special Remains Cases.\27\ During my tenure, the 30th 
     through 35th JFAs, we excavated sites associated with 13 
     special remains cases. We recovered remains from five sites 
     and CILHI was able to resolve two of the cases through 
     positive identification of remains (Cases 0951 and 1910).
       Another case, Case 0037, was resolved after our 
     investigation led to confirmation that the remains had been 
     interred at Arlington Cemetery since the mid-1960s. This was 
     a ``remains reportedly recovered but not repatriated'' case 
     and proved very interesting. Case 0037 involves remains of an 
     American civilian who was killed in Vietnam during the war. 
     The Vietnamese claimed that they had recovered the remains 
     and returned them directly to the widow during the war. Our 
     government, however, did not have a record of the 
     repatriation. Despite a unilateral investigation by 
     Vietnamese authorities and two field investigations by US 
     investigators, both of whom concluded the remains had been 
     returned, our government continued to press the Vietnamese. 
     Finally, DOS contacted the widow who confirmed the Vietnamese 
     claims.
       We have investigated every SRT case jointly with Vietnamese 
     specialists at least once. JTF-FA and CILHI have resolved 
     five cases fully. The field investigation teams have found no 
     evidence that could sustain the belief that Vietnamese 
     authorities have recovered remains for the Special Remains 
     Cases that they have not yet repatriated which is the basic 
     premise for the SRT list. Discussed below are a few cases we 
     investigated from each category of SRT cases. The point I am 
     trying to make by relating the circumstances of these 
     investigations is that the results of these investigations 
     led me to believe that our assumption that the Vietnamese 
     still control these remains is not entirely valid. Our 
     investigators determined through exhaustive investigations 
     that there are at least 30 cases for which the remains are 
     non-recoverable. There are another 14 cases for which we have 
     evidence to believe that remains we have recovered and 
     repatriated to CILHI are those of the unaccounted-for 
     individual, but have been unable to conclusively identify 
     them.
       Case 0951 (Died in Captivity List). This case involved the 
     loss of one American who the Vietnamese reported as having 
     died on January 2, 1969 while in a jungle POW camp in what is 
     now Quang Nam Da Nang Province. Six prisoners died in the 
     camp. The Vietnamese claimed to have excavated and 
     repatriated five sets of remains from the camp location 
     following the war and that they were unable to find the 
     sixth. Joint teams

[[Page E907]]

     investigating Case 0951 confirmed the Vietnamese claim. The 
     sixth remained unaccounted-for.
       The VNOSMP helped us find the old camp site. There, we 
     found eight holes indicating that as the Vietnamese claimed, 
     they had successfully found five graves, and had tried three 
     times unsuccessfully to find the last American. In January 
     1994, CSM Davis, a former POW still on active duty in the 
     Army, accompanied a joint investigation element to the site. 
     He identified where he personally buried the unaccounted-for 
     American associated with this case. After excavating the site 
     for three weeks in August 1994, a joint team found a nearly 
     complete skeleton, including 31 teeth (10 with restorations) 
     at the site. CILHI confirmed the identification of this 
     individual in April 1995. This demonstrates, at least in this 
     case, that the Vietnamese never recovered this set of 
     remains--contrary to what some might claim.
       Case 1910 (Graves Registry Case). A joint team excavated 
     the crash site on the side of a karst in October-November 
     1994.\28\ It recovered material evidence and remains, 
     including hundreds of possible human bone fragments, 16 
     teeth, eight with restorations, that led to a successful 
     identification for this case. It is puzzling as to why the 
     individual's name appeared on a graves registry unless 
     villagers had buried the remains they found and left the 
     majority at the crash site.
       Case 0853 (Graves Registry Case). A joint team excavated 
     this site in January 1995. We recovered material evidence and 
     remains (including two teeth, one with restoration) that we 
     were hopeful would lead to a successful identification for 
     this case.
       Case 0215 (Photo and Graves Register Case). Our 
     investigators found a photograph of the unaccounted-for 
     American, apparently severely injured, receiving medical care 
     at a hospital. Vietnamese authorities helped us locate and 
     interview the doctor and three of the four nurses in the 
     photograph. Their information led us to other witnesses who 
     confirmed the American died shortly after he arrived at the 
     Quang Ninh Province Hospital, and was buried in the public 
     cemetery behind the hospital. Notwithstanding that the only 
     known firsthand witness to the burial died several years ago, 
     Vietnamese authorities allowed us to excavate parts of that 
     public cemetery to search for the remains of this American 
     during the October-November 1994 JFA. Though the excavation 
     inadvertently disturbed a few graves of local residents, 
     local officials and citizens volunteered their support for 
     the team's work. The team did not find the remains, however, 
     local citizens volunteered new information that might lead us 
     to a person who left the area years ago, but who helped bury 
     this American.
       Excavating this case also exemplified the compassion of our 
     team members. While excavating a site at the cemetery, the RE 
     unearthed the remains of a small child. Apparently, at the 
     time of the burial the family did not have enough money to 
     purchase a casket for the child. They simply wrapped the dead 
     child in cloth and interred the body. Our team members went 
     to the local village and purchased with their personal money 
     a small casket in which they placed the child's remains. The 
     RE then ceased their work and allowed the villagers time to 
     reinter the child with the appropriate ceremonies. Our 
     soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen are truly our best 
     ambassadors.
     Live Sighting Investigations \29\
       Since the commencement of JTF operations in January 1992, 
     the USG has investigated over 90 live-sighting reports. None 
     reflected the presence of live unaccounted-for Americans. The 
     USG has no evidence that live Americans are being held 
     against their will in Vietnam. Neither does the USG have any 
     evidence proving there are not--it is almost impossible to 
     prove a negative. As such, we always devoted the necessary 
     time, manpower, and resources to fully investigate each and 
     every live-sighting as completely as possible.
       The Vietnamese have been very forthcoming in granting 
     access to sites we need to investigate as a part of an LSI. 
     Later in this paper (beginning on page 51), I explain the 
     manner in which we investigated normal cases in militarily 
     sensitive areas. These procedures did not, however, apply to 
     LSIs. Normal investigations during JFAs do not entail the 
     sense of urgency and immediacy that LSIs do. When we 
     investigate the incident site for an aircraft crash that 
     occurred 20 to 30 years ago, it is unlikely that the site 
     will change much more than it already has. However, the very 
     nature of an LSI demands that we receive immediate access or 
     the integrity of the investigation would be in jeopardy. The 
     Vietnamese understand this. To my knowledge, and to that of 
     the primary Stony Beach live sighting investigator, the 
     Vietnamese have never denied JTF-FA or Stony Beach personnel 
     access to any place we asked to enter as a part of an LSI.
       The USG must take care not to endanger the unrestricted 
     access the Vietnamese have allowed for LSIs. Many live 
     sighting reports are credible, but some are not. The USG 
     should take care not to allow ridiculous live sighting 
     reports such as those by former Congressman Billy Hendon (see 
     Annex A) to jeopardize Vietnam's support for the serious work 
     U.S. and Vietnamese teams are conducting.
     Joint Field Activities
       JTF-FA has sent more than 11,700 notices of progress 
     regarding their cases to over 2,200 families.
       I always tried to stress to visitors and journalists that 
     it is necessary to look beyond the ``statistics,'' and look 
     at the overall progress. It would be easy to look at the 
     number of provinces we operated in during the 35th JFA and 
     compare that to the number in any of the other JFAs. Or, you 
     could look at the number of cases we investigated and 
     excavated during the 35th JFA and compare those numbers to 
     the activities of the 28th JFA, immediately following 
     President Clinton's decision to lift the trade embargo. By 
     only looking at raw statistics, one could very easily 
     conclude that the Vietnamese felt they had achieved their 
     goal with the lifting of the embargo and that they now saw no 
     reason to continue to cooperate with our efforts. Simply 
     looking at the statistics could lead you to conclude there 
     had been a diminution of cooperation. Nothing could be 
     farther from the truth.
       It is true we have operated in significantly fewer 
     provinces during recent JFAs, but we consciously decided to 
     concentrate our efforts in the central part of the country. 
     This allowed us to maximize work-time and minimize travel 
     time. In the early days, an IE could check into a hotel in Da 
     Nang and fully investigate all its cases from that single 
     location. Today, on the other hand, an IE may interview one 
     witness in Da Nang one day, drive for two days to another 
     province to interview another witness for the same case, and 
     continue in this manner for a number of days. Several cases 
     during my tenure involved treks by IEs through the jungle for 
     two to three days just to investigate a single ``last known 
     location.'' There was even a case in Song Be Province for 
     which we contracted elephants to transport the IE to and from 
     the site because the terrain was so treacherous and wild 
     animals (tigers and snakes) were so prevalent. In the end, we 
     were able to find a helicopter landing zone near the site, 
     and did not need to use the elephants.
       Like the investigations, excavations have become much more 
     complex. Today, it is not unusual for a case to take two JFAs 
     to complete. Once again in Song Be Province, we had a case 
     that required three JFAs. During the 34th JFA, two cases, 
     Case 0927 and 0911, were extremely difficult to excavate 
     because of the clayey soil, mud and water. Though scheduled 
     to be completed during the JFA, the excavation teams could 
     not complete them in the allotted time. It was very important 
     to finish them as soon as possible since the approching 
     monsoons would likely destroy the work we had already 
     accomplished and preclude further excavations. At our 
     request, the Vietnamese extended the two excavation teams in-
     country an extra two weeks. This was a significant decision, 
     and one that required approval from the highest level of the 
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
       During the 35th JFA, local officials in two provinces 
     demanded exorbitant land compensation fees for alterations 
     our excavation teams made to the terrain around two of our 
     recovery sites. They made these demands after the recoveries 
     were complete, despite repeated requests by us that they 
     identify valid compensation fees prior to the start of the 
     operation.\30\ When Detachment personnel could not resolve 
     the issue satisfactorily with the local officials, the Acting 
     Director, VNOSMP, sent one of his most experienced 
     specialists to assist in negotiations with local officials. 
     Within one day, we had resolved the differing positions and 
     agreed on a suitable level of compensation. Provincial 
     officials also agreed to try to do better at identifying 
     costs up front in the future.
     Investigations in Militarily Sensitive Areas
       One requirement of JTF-FA is to visit the last known 
     location noted in U.S. records for each unaccounted-for 
     American. Occasionally, this site falls within a sensitive 
     military installation or area. Vietnamese authorities have 
     worked with us to develop a method of investigating these 
     cases that meets their security concerns and our need to try 
     to achieve the ``fullest possible'' accounting.
       First, Vietnamese specialists unilaterally investigate the 
     case to try to confirm the facts of the case. If they find 
     that the incident occurred outside the sensitive area, we 
     follow with a joint investigation of the area outside the 
     militarily sensitive area. If the joint investigation 
     confirms the Vietnamese findings, there is no longer any need 
     for U.S. investigators to seek access to the area.
       If the Vietnamese determine the incident did occur inside 
     the sensitive area, they unilaterally seek witnesses who can 
     clarify the facts of the case, and then arrange for U.S. 
     investigators to interview the witnesses outside the 
     sensitive area. If they are unable to resolve the case 
     through unilateral investigation, and if they confirm the 
     incident occurred in the militarily sensitive area, 
     Vietnamese authorities work with us to devise a ``case-
     specific'' resolution that has sometimes included giving 
     American investigators access to the area. In short, the 
     Vietnamese required that we follow every lead possible before 
     requesting access to a militarily sensitive site. If the case 
     was still unresolved and the only viable leads led us back to 
     the restricted area, the Vietnamese were willing to 
     negotiate a suitable solution.
       During the 30th JFA the Vietnamese granted us access to 
     three of five militarily sensitive areas vicinity the Cam 
     Ranh Bay naval facility for which they had previously denied 
     access. For the two remaining cases, they brought witnesses 
     outside the sensitive area for our investigators to 
     interview.

[[Page E908]]

       One of the remaining cases involved a drowning. The missing 
     American had been on R&R and was swimming in the ocean. 
     Witness reports at the time of the incident indicate that the 
     individual was swept underwater and not seen again. As I said 
     earlier, JTF-FA procedures require that we visit the ``last 
     known location'' which, in this case, was within a secure 
     area vicinity Cam Ranh Bay. The Vietnamese denied our teams 
     access to the site, reasoning that we had controlled the 
     naval facility for some years after the incident--if we did 
     not find the body then, what made us think a visit to the 
     site today would result in finding the remains?
       During the 34th JFA, joint teams investigated two cases 
     that occurred in militarily sensitive areas, Cases 0272 and 
     1895. Though the Vietnamese would not grant us access to the 
     last known location as it was in the sensitive areas, they 
     did investigate the case unilaterally and made several 
     witnesses available for our interview.


                  miscellaneous indicators of progress

     Oral History Program (OHP)\31\
       The OHP has been a very productive program for JTF-FA. It 
     amassed a large body of knowledge that helped us understand 
     many aspects of Vietnamese operations during the conflict, 
     most importantly the POW camp procedures. Numerous interviews 
     with present and former high ranking Vietnamese officials 
     have provided many insights into what might have happened to 
     some of our missing.
       The MND OHP cell unilaterally researches the information we 
     provide to them for each OHP interview we request. Due to the 
     limited communications and transportation capabilities 
     throughout Vietnam, the VNOSMP two-man cell then travels to 
     each potential location nationwide to locate each witness. 
     Most witness searches require the VNOSMP members to 
     coordinate with the province, district, village, and hamlet 
     authorities consecutively. In some cases, when OHP leads are 
     unclear, the VNOSMP spends days and weeks tracking down 
     individuals. They might interview hundreds of people for 
     leads before ever finding the individual in question.
       One such case involved our request to speak to a Mr. Phap. 
     Since May 1993, the MND cell of the VNOSMP has searched for 
     Mr. Phap, a possible witness for a priority case. This 
     continuing search spanned several provinces and included 
     searches of the PAVN officers' registry, visits to local 
     veterans groups, and queries with province officials. Despite 
     the negative results so far, the VNOSMP continues to search 
     for Mr. Phap even though the search is the equivalent of 
     searching for some named ``Bill'' in Texas while only knowing 
     that ``Bill'' served in a company during the war. This is 
     only one example of unilateral efforts to find witnesses when 
     the U.S. has very limited identification or location data for 
     a witness.
       During more difficult searches, the VNOSMP members seek 
     members of local veterans groups, officials of the Ministry 
     of Labor, War Invalids, and Social Affairs, local family 
     registers, and public security agencies. Without these 
     efforts prior to each OHP interview, the joint OHP team could 
     spend several days on the road in order to conduct each 
     interview. Their preliminary efforts save the joint OHP team 
     a lot of time.
       While I was in Vietnam, the VNOSMP produced two OHP 
     unilateral reports of interview. Although these reports 
     lacked the details we desired, they were full-page documents 
     with far more details than the standard VNOSMP reports of the 
     past. The VNOSMP has also produced reports on each round of 
     joint OHP activities. The latest reports included a section 
     on unilateral VNOSMP activities during the investigative 
     phase.
       The Vietnamese have worked diligently to assist us in the 
     OHP. They dedicated some of their most experienced 
     investigators to the effort and participate in all joint 
     interviews with our analysts. They have also interviewed 
     numerous officials unilaterally.
       On January 20, 1995, a joint U.S./Vietnam Oral History team 
     interviewed active duty PAVN Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra 
     at the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans Association Office in Ho Chi 
     Minh City. In addition to other duties, General Tra is the 
     director of the Vietnam Veterans Association, Ho Chi Minh 
     City Chapter. General Tra had refused several interview 
     requests previously. His only requirement in granting this 
     interview was for a ``high ranking American official to 
     attend the interview.'' As I was then the highest ranking 
     American in-country, I went to the interview along with 
     Detachment linguists and analysts.
       The interview began as a lecture with General Tra telling 
     me that further progress in resolving this ``humanitarian' 
     issue rested with the will of the people. If the USG could 
     rally the Vietnamese people behind our effort, he said, we 
     could make great progress. ``After all,'' said General Tra, 
     ``we know what great obstacles can be overcome when the 
     people are behind the effort.'' (I thought that was a fairly 
     obvious reference to the ``Vietnam War.'') General Tra 
     continued by emphasizing that we should show more compassion 
     for the Vietnamese people's loss of over one million killed 
     during their ``War for Independence,'' and the more than 
     300,000 Vietnamese still missing.
       At this point, I spoke telling General Tra about the 
     Vietnam Veterans of American Veterans Initiative.\32\ I told 
     him that the VVA's information led Vietnamese investigators 
     to a mass grave containing the remains of approximately 95 
     missing Vietnamese. From this point forward, the entire tone 
     of our meeting changed. Rather than a one way lecture from 
     General Tra to me, the interview became a discussion of what 
     measures the Vietnamese veterans organization could take to 
     assist our work.
       During the interview, General Tra also provided general 
     information on PAVN channels that managed U.S. POWs during 
     the war. He also stated his firm conviction that the 
     Provisional Revolutionary Government's (PRG) delegation to 
     the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) ensured the 
     release of all U.S. prisoners held in the South during the 
     conflict. Pursuant to this interview, General Tra pledged 
     that his organization would unilaterally collect information 
     on unaccounted-for Americans.
       As a result of our initial interview, General Tra's Chief 
     of Staff, Brigadier General Nguyen Van Si, met with our 
     VNOSMP counterpart Colonel Le Ky on January 22, 1995 to 
     discuss specifics of how the Ho Chi Minh City Veterans 
     Association Chapter could assist in the U.S. MIA effort. They 
     decided Vietnamese veterans might provide the following types 
     of information and he pledged his commitment to the effort: 
     personal accounts of wartime incidents involving U.S. losses, 
     POWs, and unaccounted-for personnel; personal wartime 
     journals with information on U.S. losses, POWs, and 
     unaccounted-for personnel; information on where POW/MIA 
     related archival documents might be today; and names of other 
     individuals with possible POW/MIA related information.
     Technical Conferences
       Prior to each JFA, we held joint meetings between JTF-FA 
     and VNOSMP to coordinate our operations. General Viale was 
     the senior U.S. representative and Mr. Vu Chi Cong, Director, 
     VNOSMP, was the senior SRV representative. During these 
     meetings, we assessed progress to date, reviewed the results 
     of the most recent JFA, discussed our requirements for the 
     upcoming JFA, and discussed any other issues pertinent to our 
     efforts. In 1990, these technical meetings routinely lasted 
     three or more days. The Vietnamese side deliberated and often 
     contested each talking point. Today, the meetings last only 
     two to three hours. The Vietnamese representatives come to 
     the meetings well prepared and work with us to ensure well 
     planned, efficient and effective JFAs.
     Vietnamese Veterans Assistance
       A Vietnam Veterans Organization delegation from Ho Chi Minh 
     City Chapter accompanied visiting American VVA members to Tay 
     Ninh in February 1995. In Tay Ninh, the Vietnamese host, BG 
     Nguyen Van Si, introduced a retired PAVN colonel to the VAA 
     group. The colonel gave his account of the 1972 shoot down of 
     a U.S. jet. We received this information on February 26, 
     1995, and confirmed that Brigadier General Si was the same 
     General Si who was General Tran Van Tra's chief of staff. We 
     felt that the fact that General Si attended our Oral History 
     interview in January and later introduced a retired officer 
     with specific case information was a very positive sign that 
     the Vietnamese veterans can locate witnesses for unresolved 
     cases, and that General Tra was sincere in his pledge to help 
     mobilize Vietnamese veterans to our aid.
       Detachment 2 analysts tentatively correlated the veteran's 
     account with that of a still unaccounted-for American. A 
     joint team excavated a site they believed to be associated 
     with this case in May 1993. They recovered a small amount of 
     possible human remains, but CILHI was unable to identify 
     them.
       On May 29, 1995, the VNOSMP provided Commander, Detachment 
     2, with three letters from Vietnamese veterans groups 
     providing information concerning cases within Laos. At the 
     time of my departure, analysts were reviewing these letters.

                            Lessons Learned


                           official visitors

       Every Detachment Commander had to host numerous official 
     visitors from the USG and I was no exception. During my 
     predecessor's tour, the President considered lifting the U.S. 
     trade embargo against Vietnam. This resulted in innumerable 
     ``fact-finding'' trips to Vietnam, especially by 
     representatives of Congress. During my tenure, President 
     Clinton considered normalizing relations with Vietnam, and 
     likewise numerous visits ensued.\33\ Many have asked me about 
     the utility of these visits expecting that their primary 
     purpose was as a boondoggle by the various visitors. I must 
     emphasize that it was my experience that virtually every 
     visit by a USG official was tightly scheduled with official 
     functions. Any sightseeing on the part of the visitors was 
     normally en route to another Ministry or while driving to and 
     from the airport. Meetings with Vietnamese Government 
     officials began early in the morning and lasted until late 
     afternoon. The only break they normally took was a working 
     lunch hosted by one of the Vietnamese ministries, usually the 
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs. An official reception or supper 
     normally ended each day and lasted until about 2130 
     (Vietnamese official dinners were very predictable in their 
     duration--two hours).
       Throughout all the visits that occurred while I commanded 
     the Detachment, only one, the visit of Congressman Dana 
     Rohrabacher (R-CA) did not leave me with a thoroughly 
     positive impression of the purpose and accomplishments of the 
     trip. Mr.

[[Page E909]]

     Rohrabacher is a member of the International Relations (Asian 
     & the Pacific) Committee and an outspoken critic of JTF-FA 
     operations in Vietnam and U.S. policy toward Vietnam. He 
     visited Vietnam at the same time as CODEL Spence, but did 
     not join them in any of their meetings except to arrive 
     uninvited at a working lunch at the Ministry of Foreign 
     Affairs. The only reason he joined CODEL Spence here was 
     that he needed a ride to the airport with the CODEL 
     immediately following the luncheon. Despite our mission 
     being the driving force behind relations between the U.S. 
     and Vietnam, and despite his criticisms of our operations, 
     I never met Mr. Rohrabacher. He refused our offer to 
     update him on our operations. Whether or not he agrees 
     with U.S. policy or JTF-FA operations, it seems to me he 
     would want to gather information from every source 
     possible in order to draw an informed conclusion.
       Since the issue of unaccounted-for Americans was, and 
     remains, the most important issue between the U.S. and 
     Vietnam, official visitors normally began their visits with a 
     visit to the Ranch. Here, we updated them on our current 
     operations, and when asked, provided our assessment of 
     progress to date. When assessing progress, I cited 
     developments in each of the President's four areas requiring 
     progress. I tried not to draw conclusions from these 
     developments, but rather attempted to lay out the facts as I 
     saw them, and let them draw their own conclusions. However, 
     if asked point blank for my opinions, I was obligated to 
     answer with my opinion.
       During the CODEL Bond visit in late 1994, Senator John 
     Kerry (D-Mass.) joined the CODEL for the Ranch briefing. 
     Senator Kerry has been a driving force behind normalizing 
     relations with Vietnam and he wanted to ensure the CODEL left 
     the briefing fully aware of our operations and the level of 
     Vietnamese cooperation. He asked me several questions during 
     the briefing to emphasize points he wanted the CODEL to take 
     away from the briefing. At one point, he asked for my opinion 
     of how normalizing relations with Vietnam would improve the 
     Vietnamese Government's cooperation in our efforts. I think 
     he expected me to say that it would greatly improve 
     cooperation.
       I responded instead by saying that I did not believe it 
     would affect the Vietnamese Government's cooperation very 
     much, because I thought they were already cooperating at a 
     very high level and there was not much more they could do. 
     Where I thought the benefits of normalizing relations would 
     make their greatest mark was on the level of cooperation we 
     received from individual Vietnamese citizens. I thought this 
     would be of significant benefit to our efforts. I said that 
     as the U.S. and Vietnam increase contacts, and to the extent 
     those contacts were positive, we would progress more quickly 
     because we would receive even more grass-roots support. I am 
     a firm believer that Vietnamese veterans and average citizens 
     possess information that could be useful to us; they just 
     need some motivation to step forward.
       I do not think Senator Kerry was entirely pleased with my 
     answer and would have preferred for me to say that 
     normalization would greatly increase Government cooperation. 
     I knew that was what he wanted me to say, but it was not what 
     I really believed.
       Most delegations that visited Hanoi asked for issues we 
     would like to see them raise with the Vietnamese. They would 
     also tell us what they were going to discuss and asked for 
     our opinions on both the issue and the manner in which they 
     should approach the Vietnamese about the issue. They were 
     especially interested in Bob Destatte's and Gary Flanagan's 
     perspectives as they had worked with the Vietnamese the 
     longest.
       I would only ask them to raise an issue with the Vietnamese 
     if both the CJTF-FA and I had been unsuccessful in resolving 
     it at our respective levels. I cleared all issues with the 
     CJTF-FA prior to recommending the delegation raise it to the 
     highest levels of government. In Vietnam, as in many other 
     countries, it is very dangerous to raise an issue above your 
     counterpart's head without first giving him the opportunity 
     to solve it. Then if it is still unresolved, telling your 
     counterpart that you are going to recommend a high-level 
     delegation raise the issue is normally a good idea. ``Face'' 
     is very important to the Vietnamese and cooperation on 
     difficult issues that may arise in the future often depends 
     on how respectful you are of your counterpart's position. In 
     short, there is nothing new here. Attempt to solve problems 
     at the lowest possible level. Never ``back door'' your 
     counterpart.
       Many visitors also asked us how best to discuss issues with 
     the Vietnamese. When Admiral Macke visited, I recommended 
     that he begin discussions with the MND by talking about his 
     experiences as a pilot during the war. I found that the 
     Vietnamese senior military officials seemed to enjoy 
     exchanging ``war stories'' with American veterans. This 
     ``ice breaker'' often led to a cordial and informal 
     discussion of issues following the introductory 
     discussions. Admiral Macke began his discussions at the 
     MND by remarking how much more pleasant his flight over 
     Hanoi was that day than it had been some 25 years earlier. 
     This led to a very friendly exchange between him and the 
     Vice Minister of National Defense, General Bun.
       We prepared visitors as best we could so that they would 
     not be surprised by events during their visit. We provided 
     each visitor with a folder containing the schedule of events, 
     a tourist map of Hanoi, biographies of the Vietnamese hosts, 
     as available, and sketches of meeting areas as best as we 
     could determine. Biographies were often very difficult to 
     get. We never wanted to give the Vietnamese the impression 
     that we were ``gathering intelligence,'' so trying to collect 
     biographical information about their government's leaders was 
     a very sensitive proposition. We depended on public 
     information and past encounters with the individuals to 
     orient the visitors to their hosts.
       Each folder also contained our ``best guess'' \34\ of what 
     the physical layout of the meeting rooms would be, where to 
     sit, where the interpreters would be, etc. Because we could 
     not usually see the rooms prior to the actual meetings, we 
     based our sketches on what we had seen in the past. Providing 
     a sketch precluded awkward uncertainty in the beginning of 
     the meetings as delegates tried to figure out where to sit. 
     The beginnings of meetings were the times when photographers 
     and other members of the media were present, so we did not 
     want our representatives to appear hesitant or uncertain.
       At the first meeting I attended with the July 1994 
     Presidential Delegation (my first high level visit), I 
     entered the room after the visiting U.S. delegation had taken 
     their seats. The only remaining seat at the table was on the 
     Vietnamese side. The Vietnamese, always very gracious hosts, 
     quickly ushered me to the empty seat. I soon learned that 
     this was not a very good idea. Had I been aware of the 
     protocol, I would have declined their offer and sat somewhere 
     else, however, nobody had told me what to expect. This was a 
     good lesson for me. We tried to prevent this kind of awkward 
     moment for visitors by briefing them ahead of time.
       We endeavored to do the same for receptions, luncheons and 
     suppers. Most official dinners were held in the Ministry of 
     Foreign Affairs guest house, the Le Thach Government Guest 
     House, and they all followed a similar pattern. Items I 
     always tried to verify before the delegates arrived were; 
     which door should we enter through (there were two), the menu 
     (if possible), the seating arrangement, and the English 
     language proficiency of the host. If I could not determine 
     the seating arrangement prior to arrival, I tried to slip 
     into the dining area during the initial welcome at the door 
     to at least determine which side of the table the key 
     delegates would sit. I did not want them wandering around the 
     table searching for their name plate.
       Many of the Vietnamese officials spoke English extremely 
     well, but would rarely speak anything except Vietnamese 
     during official meetings. During receptions, however, they 
     would often speak English. When Congressman Solomon Ortiz (D-
     Texas) visited, we told him that many of the officials from 
     the MFA's America's Department spoke Spanish fluently. Within 
     minutes at the luncheon, Congressman Ortiz and the Director 
     of the Americas Department, Mr. Phong, were deeply engaged in 
     conversation using Spanish. Mr. Phong, who had graduated from 
     the University of La Havana and had been posted in Cuba in 
     the past, also speaks English fluently, but I think he really 
     enjoyed talking with Congressman Ortiz in Spanish.
       At General Viale's direction, we also prepared folders that 
     we gave to the delegation's principal(s) en route to each 
     meeting location. This contained only information pertaining 
     to the next meeting. Though the initial folder at the hotel 
     was useful, we found the second folder ensured that the 
     pertinent information for the next meeting was fresh in the 
     visitor's mind and helped focus his thoughts.
     Translator Support to Delegations
       There were several linguists assigned to Detachment 2. We 
     did not possess any interpreters, and I quickly learned that 
     there is a huge difference between an interpreter and a 
     linguist. Interpreters undergo specific training to become 
     proficient in their skill and we simply did not have 
     personnel trained in that manner assigned to the Detachment. 
     TSgt Ron Ward, USAF, did, however, fill this void extremely 
     well. When visitors came to Vietnam, we always linked-up Ron 
     Ward and the visitors the evening before the initial meetings 
     so they could discuss issues the visitors planned to raise 
     during the meetings. If the visitors sent talking points to 
     us ahead of their visit or provided them upon their arrival, 
     Ron was always responsible for translating them to ensure he 
     understood not only the literal meaning, but also the intent. 
     Ron stayed ``glued'' to the visitors throughout their visit, 
     including riding with them between meetings to explain 
     nuances of discussions or to discuss any changes the visitor 
     wanted to make for the next meeting. If space in vehicles 
     when driving between visits was limited, I always deferred to 
     Ron to ensure the visitor was comfortable with the 
     translation.
       Translating with the Vietnamese was not always an easy 
     task. I believe it was a cultural trait of the Vietnamese to 
     speak very softly. This made it very difficult at times for 
     the interpreter to hear the principal. The Vietnamese 
     officials always provided an interpreter, but we still tried 
     to have Vietnamese linguists in every meeting to ensure our 
     interpretation of the translation was the same as the 
     interpreters. If necessary, our interpreter would interrupt 
     the proceedings to either clarify a point or ask for an 
     explanation. The Vietnamese did the same to us.
       One rather comical instance occurred during our Trilateral 
     Conference with Vietnamese and Laotian officials on December 
     1, 1994 in Hanoi. Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Binh was 
     the senior Vietnamese official

[[Page E910]]

     present, and his interpreter was a Vietnamese VNOSMP team 
     leader who spoke English excellently.\35\ Vice Minister Binh 
     made some introductory welcoming remarks in Vietnamese to the 
     conference that lasted two to three minutes. The interpreter 
     translated in the following manner, ``I would like to welcome 
     the delegates to this very important conference, and all that 
     welcoming stuff.'' The point here is that there is a huge 
     difference between someone who fluently speaks another 
     language and one who is a trained interpreter. Understand the 
     difference, and accept the handicaps you bear when an 
     interpreter is unavailable. I was always very comfortable 
     with Ron Ward as an interpreter. He took his job seriously, 
     understood the ramifications of his duties, and studied hard. 
     He also understood the issue thereby ensuring the proper 
     translation of our positions.


                       interaction with the media

       ``Watch your adjectives!'' As I said earlier, the CJTF's 
     cautionary words stuck with me throughout my tenure. This 
     forewarning came to mind on numerous occasions as I operated 
     in what the media described as the ``center of a political 
     typhoon. On one side are Americans who believe the U.S. 
     government and military have been duped by the Vietnamese 
     into spending millions of dollars on a wild-goose chase for 
     remains that Hanoi already controls and cynically 
     manipulates. On the other side are compatriots who accuse the 
     first group of exploiting the families of MIAs by holding out 
     false hope of information, or even survival of their loved 
     ones in Southeast Asian jungles.'' \36\
       Before even leaving CONUS, I quickly became aware of the 
     media challenges I would face as the Commander of Detachment 
     2. During my orientations at the Defense POW/MIA Office in 
     Arlington, Virginia, I had a chance meeting with Ms Ann 
     Mills Griffith \37\, the Executive Director of the 
     National League of Families, and a strident critic of U.S. 
     policy toward Vietnam. When I was introduced to her, her 
     only words were, ``Well, I hope we hear less from you in 
     the press than we have your predecessor. He's the most 
     quoted Army officer in the country. But * * * maybe we can 
     get together prior to your departure and talk about the 
     issue.'' I did not meet with her again until she came to 
     Vietnam as part of the July 1994 Presidential Delegation.
       When the Commander of Detachment 2 assumes his duties, he 
     is immediately thrust into a position with great political 
     sensitivity and media interest. There was an interesting 
     discrepancy with the manner in which the Department of 
     Defense (DOD) handles media access versus the way the 
     Department of State (DOS) handles it. As I understood it, DOS 
     personnel were not authorized to ``go on the record'' with 
     the media unless they have prior DOS approval or have 
     achieved a certain level of responsibility in the Department. 
     When Mr. Jim Hall first arrived in Hanoi in January 1995 as 
     the Chief of the United States Liaison Office, he did not 
     have this authorization despite his years of experience in 
     Asian and Vietnamese issues. Conversely, from Day 1 as the 
     Commander, I was not only authorized, but encouraged to speak 
     to the media. During his in-briefing to me, General Viale 
     directed that I ``tell the JTF's story and include the media 
     where and when appropriate.''
       President Clinton's apparent desire to normalize relations 
     with Vietnam was looming in the near future during most of my 
     tenure. His decision hinged on Vietnamese cooperation on the 
     issue I was responsible for coordinating in Vietnam, so the 
     media was always keenly interested in our activities. 
     Interaction seemed to run the gamut of media forums. The 
     print media was in Hanoi in force. Permanently posted in 
     Hanoi from the print and television media were John Rogers of 
     Reuters, George Esper, Bruce Stanley and Kathy Wilhelm of 
     Associated Press, Kristin Huckshorn of the San Jose Mercury 
     News, Adam Schwarz of Far Eastern Economic Review, Jason 
     Bleibtreu of Worldwide Television News, and Philippe Agret of 
     Agence France--Presse. Ron Moreau, Newsweek's Southeast Asia 
     correspondent, and Tom Mintier, Cable News Network's Bureau 
     Chief in Bangkok also visit Hanoi frequently. There were also 
     several foreign and American ``local'' television affiliates 
     who visited including ``Der Speigel'' who produced an 
     extensive documentary on Vietnam which included our efforts, 
     and KCRA television from Sacramento, California. Though they 
     never actually came in person, the British Broadcasting 
     System called me several times and interviewed me twice on 
     live radio while I was in Hanoi.
       The 30th anniversary of the ``fall of Saigon'' also 
     precipitated numerous press visits to Vietnam. Neil Sheehan 
     \38\ came to Hanoi to research an article published in the 
     April 24, 1995 edition of The New Yorker magazine. Also from 
     the print media came Steven Butler, U.S. News and World 
     Report, and Frank Gibney of Time. From the television media 
     came Jim Vance of WRC-TV in Washington, DC, Robin Smith \39\ 
     and her husband Bill Plant for a piece for ``Eye to Eye,'' 
     and the crew of ``Larry King Live.''
       The purpose of identifying all of these journalists and 
     correspondents in this paper is not to impress anyone with 
     our ``15 minutes of fame,'' but instead to display the 
     magnitude of the problem. My preparation for working with the 
     media consisted of one morning in the catacombs of the 
     Pentagon where Air Force Public Affairs officers ran me 
     through a number of scenarios I might face. These scenarios 
     included an interview with a print journalist, an on-camera 
     interview where the commentator was sitting in the room 
     with me, an on-camera interview where the interviewer was 
     in another location and I had only the camera to speak to, 
     and a chance interview by a ``mob'' of journalists, both 
     print and video. There was not a single scenario they 
     presented me that I did not face several times as the 
     Commander in Hanoi. Their preparations kept me out of 
     trouble on several occasions.
       Thanks in large measure to their efforts and advice from 
     those at other agencies, to include the CJTF-FA, I deployed 
     to Vietnam with a few ``rules of thumb,'' for dealing with 
     the media:
       Always tell the truth.
       Watch the adjectives.
       Talk only about what I know--don't speculate or guess.
       Know the two or three most important things I want to get 
     across and keep coming back to them--no matter what the 
     question is; i.e., have an agenda--the press will.
       Never assume video cameras or tape recorders are ``off.''
       There is no such thing as a casual conversation with a 
     member of the press.
       Invite the press along on visits to the field.
       When dealing with complex emotional issues (such as this) 
     don't grant quick interviews with members of the press who I 
     was not confident fully understand the issue.
       Whenever possible, lean heavily on the organization's 
     Public Affairs Officer.
     Always tell the truth
       Often, there were times when certain information was not 
     ``releasable'' to the press, and I had to decline comment. 
     This always seemed a better option than trying to mislead the 
     press or give them an incomplete answer just to appease them. 
     I developed a rapport with the Hanoi press such that when I 
     declined comment, they understood that I would give them the 
     information as soon as possible. That did not, however, 
     always preclude them from continuing to press in hopes that I 
     might slip up and divulge the information. In my opinion, 
     George Esper and Bruce Stanley were the most skilled at 
     asking the same question several different ways. The press 
     always tried to get information concerning the success of our 
     JFAs prior to the end of the JFA. We never wanted to provide 
     that information until the Repatriation Ceremony, because it 
     was not until then that we were certain about the number of 
     remains our forensics specialists had agreed to repatriate. 
     We did not want to publicize inaccurate information. The 
     media also knew that I attended meetings between the 
     Vietnamese and all visiting U.S. delegations. They often 
     tried to get me to tell them what occurred during the 
     meeting, but I felt that was an issue the leader of the 
     delegation should provide, if he desired to do so. I always 
     declined comment.
     Watch the adjectives
       The political sensitivity of this issue meant that 
     individuals on all sides of the issue would likely dissect my 
     comments to try to find any ``hidden'' meaning. Calling 
     cooperation ``strong'' was much different than saying it was 
     ``outstanding.'' I tried to measure my comments such that I 
     was presenting facts, not speculation or opinion.
     Talk only about what I know
       Although operations in Vietnam were the focus of media 
     coverage of the issue of unaccounted-for Americans, it was 
     only one facet of the entire operation. Often, the media 
     asked questions concerning operations in Laos or Cambodia and 
     I would fend these off by simply saying that I stayed too 
     busy in Vietnam to try to remain current with operations 
     elsewhere. I normally referred them to the Detachment 
     Commanders in those countries. Referring media to the JTF-PAO 
     was also a very effective means of ``staying in my lane,'' 
     and not talking about something in somebody else's realm.
     Know the two or three most important things you want to get 
         across and keep coming back to them
       The first four issues listed below were recurrent themes 
     with the press throughout my tenure. For on-camera 
     interviews, the USAF PAO team at the Pentagon recommended a 
     ``trick of the trade'' to get my themes across as forcefully 
     as possible. Normally, the start of the interview began with 
     the commentator welcoming me and saying hello. This proved to 
     be a great time to strike first, by acknowledging the 
     greeting and then beginning to hit at least the first two 
     themes listed below before even being asked a question. 
     The same technique worked at the close of most interviews, 
     where I had the opportunity to close with key words such 
     as ``highest national priority'' and ``committed to 
     finding answers for the families.'' The themes I tried to 
     emphasize were:
       President Clinton made resolving this issue a matter of the 
     ``highest national priority'' and was devoting the necessary 
     personnel, resources, and funding appropriate to that level 
     priority.
       There were hundreds of dedicated young Americans working 
     arduously in the field with one objective in mind--to find 
     the answers the families of the unaccounted-for so richly 
     deserve.
       We were enjoying the continued support of the Vietnamese 
     Government and people to resolve this issue.
       Regarding what the U.S. policy toward Vietnam should be, I 
     always stressed that I

[[Page E911]]

     was an ``operator'' in the field, not a policy-maker and was 
     not qualified to make policy recommendations or comments.
       Regarding the issue of live Americans still being held 
     against their will in Vietnam, I continually emphasized that 
     the USG had no evidence to support the contention that live 
     Americans are being held against their will, however, we also 
     do not have any evidence to be sure there are not. Therefore, 
     we devote the necessary time, people and resources to fully 
     investigate each and every live-sighting report.
       This last issue hit its apex when former Congressman Billy 
     Hendon visited Hanoi in May 1995.\40\ During his visit, 
     another ``media theme'' I continually emphasized was that 
     despite Mr. Hendon's claims, the Vietnamese had never denied 
     U.S. investigators access to any location it requested to 
     visit in conjunction with a live-sighting investigation.
     Video cameras and tape recorders are never ``off''
       One of the scenarios the USAF PAO instructional team 
     covered during my orientation at the Pentagon involved an on-
     camera interview. At the conclusion of the interview, the 
     commentator made some closing remarks and thanked me for the 
     interview. The cameraman then walked away from the camera as 
     the commentator began idle chit-chat. Unknown to me, the 
     cameraman left the camera on and running. The commentator's 
     seemingly innocent conversation regarding the issue we had 
     been discussing on-camera was actually an attempt to draw me 
     into saying things I did not want to say on-camera. I never 
     noticed this occurring during my tenure in Hanoi, but I was 
     always cognizant of its possibility.
     Invite the press along on visits to the field
       One advantage I had with the media in Hanoi that others may 
     not enjoy in other assignments is that the media was very 
     dependent on me for access to sites and information. I 
     developed strong relationships with many of the 
     correspondents and when an investigation or excavation was 
     taking place that I thought might interest them, I invited 
     them to ``hitch a ride'' with me when I visited the site. 
     Many of our sites were inaccessible except by helicopter, so 
     if they did not go with me, they did not go at all. I never 
     used this advantage as a threat, but was able to pick and 
     choose who I would invite to go along with me.
     No casual conversations with the media
       Though I did develop an excellent rapport with most of the 
     Hanoi media representatives, I always kept in mind LTG 
     Bramlett's \41\ advice to me during a previous assignment 
     that there are ``no casual conversations with a general 
     officer,'' and applied that to the press. There were 
     occasions where I went ``off the record,'' but these 
     instances were only with journalists who I knew very well and 
     trusted. During my entire tenure, I cannot think of a single 
     instance where anyone in the media violated that trust, 
     but I must emphasize that going ``off the record'' can 
     entail great risk (and sometimes great stupidity).
     Ensure the media member understands the issue
       As is probably apparent by now, the unaccounted-for issue 
     is very complex and emotional. I tried never to grant an 
     interview with a new journalist/correspondent unless they 
     would take the time for me to brief them on the issue. As I 
     became more and more familiar with the issue, this became a 
     very arduous requirement, with discussions lasting as long as 
     three hours, but it paid off. To my knowledge, I was only 
     misquoted once during my tenure, and even that was not a very 
     serious case.
     Lean heavily on the PAO
       LTC Dave Fredrikson, the JTF-FA PAO was often the most 
     valuable JTF-FA staff member for me. He deployed to Vietnam 
     often, and whenever he did, he lifted a great load off my 
     shoulders. He had been assigned to the JTF since its 
     inception, and fully undertood the issue and its history. He 
     had developed a personal relationship with the Hanoi press 
     corps and understood their strengths and weaknesses. Often, 
     Often, however, there were times when the press wanted to 
     talk to the Commander, not a staff officer from Hawaii. In 
     those instances, Dave became a close listener to both the 
     press and me to ensure I did not inadvertently say something 
     incorrectly. Prior to events when we knew a lot of press 
     would be present, Dave also helped prepare and rehearse me 
     for their issues.
       When Dave wasn't in Hanoi, I sent information regarding all 
     press contacts, no matter how insignificant, to him by fax or 
     E-mail. In that way, he knew which media to watch to ensure 
     they ``got the story right.'' The PAO cannot help unless he 
     is up to speed on the issues. To be effective, the PAO needed 
     to know everything that went on in the JTF, and the 
     Commanders in the field were his best source of information 
     for operations in their respective countries.
       The only time I had difficulty with the press was when I 
     tried to handle a ``press pool'' rather than giving the 
     problem to the PAO and letting him handle it. This occurred 
     during Mr. Hendon's visit. Once it came time to visit the 
     ``live-sighting'' location, the Vietnamese allowed us to take 
     along one member of the press. After consulting with Dave 
     Fredrikson, I informed the press that because we could only 
     take one member of the media with us, we would use the 
     ``press pool'' technique, and that individual must agree to 
     share his/her report with the others. My mistake was in 
     designating the specific member that would accompany us. I 
     chose John Rogers of Reuters who was the senior member of the 
     Hanoi press corps. He was extremely knowledgeable of the 
     issue, but was also what I would best characterize as 
     ``quietly competent.'' His familiarity with the subject was 
     the real selling point for me, but I also thought that John's 
     low-key approach with the Vietnamese would best serve 
     thorough and objective coverage of a very sensitive 
     investigation. The Vietnamese never before allowed a member 
     of the media to accompany an LSI. I did not want to betray 
     their trust.
       To make a long story short, Kathy Wilhelm (AP) did not 
     agree with my decision, stating that it is the press who 
     should decide who would represent them in the pool. In the 
     end, and after much heated discussion and aggravation with 
     Kathy, I referred her to Dave Fredriskson. I told her that I 
     would defer to whatever he advised. After all was said and 
     done, Dave recommended that I allow the press corps to 
     decide. I did. Kathy Wilhelm represented the media, and she 
     did a good job of covering the investigation.
       In retrospect, it would have been a lot easier if I had 
     deferred to the JTF-FA PAO from the outset. I was clearly 
     delving into an area where I was unfamiliar, I was extremely 
     tired (and short-tempered) after a week of responding to Mr. 
     Hendon's shenanigans, and I had lost patience with many in 
     the press corps who I felt were giving Mr. Hendon and his 
     ridiculous accusations much too much coverage. I was also 
     annoyed at their telephone calls at all hours of the day and 
     night for the latest information. I had lost my objectivity, 
     and hindsight has shown me that passing the ball to someone 
     separated from the difficulties in Hanoi, i.e. Dave 
     Fredrikson in Hawaii, would have relieved me of much needless 
     aggravation.


                 interaction with u.s. veterans groups

       During my tenure as the Commander of Detachment 2, 
     delegations from several veterans groups visited Vietnam and 
     requested a briefing at the Ranch. We always granted their 
     requests as we felt strongly that their consitiuency needed 
     to understand the extent of our efforts. I must admit that I 
     was usually more nervous prior to briefing veterans groups 
     than I was prior to Congressional delegations. For some 
     reasons, I always expected a confrontation, but in fact, 
     never had one. I found every veterans group delegation that 
     visited us to be genuinely concerned about unraveling the 
     truth surrounding the issue, fully supportive of our efforts, 
     and absolutely devoted to taking home the facts to their 
     members. This is not to say that all veterans agreed with 
     U.S. policy decisions toward normalizing relations with 
     Vietnam. Most did not, but that was not an issue that was of 
     concern to me. My job was to convey to them the extent of 
     JTF-FA's efforts in Vietnam, our dedication to finding 
     answers for the families, and our commitment to achieving the 
     fullest possible accounting. In their dealings with those of 
     us in the field, my experience with the veterans 
     organizations was uniformly positive.
       The U.S. veterans program that was of most help to us in 
     the field was the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) Veterans 
     Initiative. As I said earlier, the Vietnamese claim to have 
     over 300,000 of their own people still missing from their 
     ``war for independence.'' The VVA has requested that their 
     membership forward to the VVA any war memorabilia, artifacts, 
     photographs, maps, etc.,that may help the Vietnamese resolve 
     instances of their missing. Semi-annually, officials from the 
     VVA travel to Vietnam to provide the items they receive to 
     the Vietnamese veterans organization. This is a veterans-to-
     veterans program, not government-to-government, and the VVA 
     closely guard this relationship. We helped them on occasion, 
     but only by assisting them interpret maps or make sense of 
     one document or another.
       In the summer of 1994, the VVA visited Vietnam and one of 
     the items they provided was a map indicating the location of 
     a mass grave of Vietnamese. The map indicated that 
     approximately 100 Vietnamese had been buried at the location 
     marked on the map. Gary Flanagan, our CRS, helped the VVA 
     officials refine the location on current maps, and the VVA 
     traveled with Vietnamese veterans to find the site. The 
     Vietnamese excavated the site and found the remains of 
     approximately 95 individuals.
       This program encouraged Vietnamese veterans to provide the 
     same type of support to our operations. By us showing 
     compassion for their loss, I believe the Vietnamese veterans 
     who have diaries, photographs or other items in their private 
     possession will be more likely to provide those items to us.


                  interaction with department of state

       The primary mission of the United States Liaison Office 
     (USLO) was to promote additional progress in securing the 
     fullest possible accounting on the issue of unaccounted-for 
     Americans. In addition to their primary mission, the USLO 
     performed several secondary tasks on behalf of the USG and 
     provided other services similar to those other liaison 
     offices, consular offices and embassies provide. These tasks 
     included: assuring the protection and welfare of U.S. 
     citizens, conducting human rights dialogue with the 
     Vietnamese Government, promoting increased bilateral and 
     multilateral ties with Vietnam, and promoting U.S. business 
     and economic interests.
       Although during my tenure we never had an ``officially 
     sanctioned'' relationship, I clearly saw myself as part of 
     the USLO

[[Page E912]]

     ``Country Team,'' and, therefore, subordinate to the USLO 
     Chief. However, I was the senior DOD official in Vietnam 
     representing the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command 
     (CINCPAC), who was directly responsible to the President for 
     all matters pertaining to the issue of unaccounted-for 
     Americans. I was entirely responsible for coordinating the 
     full-accounting mission in Vietnam, and had only one boss, 
     the CJTF-FA. Whereas we recognized the DOS commitment to the 
     issue of accounting or missing American service-men as its 
     first priority, we insisted that the USLO and all Vietnamese 
     Government agencies coordinate all POW/MIA business, 
     correspondence, and reports with me as the Commander of 
     Detachment 2.
       I always tried to keep the Chief, USLO, Mr. Jim Hall 
     appraised of all our official activities and provided him 
     copies of all requests, correspondence and reports. Mr. Hall 
     directed that his relationship with me be direct; I did not 
     have to work through his deputy or anyone else in the USLO. I 
     understood the importance of working with Mr. Hall to ensure 
     he was fully abreast of all matters pertaining to the issue. 
     Likewise, I always felt that Mr. Hall understood that CJTF-FA 
     and CINCPAC were totally responsible for all aspects of our 
     efforts, and that they held me responsible for in-country 
     activities. Mr. Hall went to great lengths to support and 
     facilitate our operations.
       As a result of a statement by Secretary Christopher that 
     promised Congress that a member of the USLO would have full-
     time responsibilities as the POW/MIA officer, my work was 
     made somewhat more difficult. I felt this was unnecessary and 
     counter-productive as the issue of accounting for missing 
     Americans was my primary job. I worked on it all day every 
     day. The DOS in Washington, D.C. insisted that Mr. Hall 
     assign this duty to one of his personnel as, in my opinion, a 
     political gesture--a decision somebody made without fully 
     understanding the role of the Detachment Commander. It was 
     not based on the realities in Vietnam. Albeit well 
     intentioned, there was simply no way that anyone in the USLO 
     would know as much about the issue as I did.
       Because we worked in separate buildings, did not mean we 
     did not talk. Mr. Hall and I had a very close professional 
     relationship based on trust and mutual respect. He knew that 
     I worked this issue everyday, all day, and that if he needed 
     information on the issue, all he had to do was ask. Likewise, 
     I was fully aware that Washington expected him to be fully 
     knowledgeable of our issue, and I always tried to keep him 
     appraised of everything we did.
       I tried to ameliorate this directive from Washington by 
     working mornings at the USLO and afternoons in my office, but 
     this did not work well. I found it very difficult to work in 
     two offices, especially when I had to carry my work from 
     office to office. I continued to check-in with Mr. Hall 
     daily, but gradually stopped going to the USLO in the 
     mornings to work. I don't think anyone really minded, and I 
     accomplished a lot more in my own office at the Ranch. Mr. 
     Hall was very understanding of my predicament and chose to 
     allow me to do what I thought best.
       Overall, the establishment of the USLO was a very positive 
     step. It was especially helpful during VIP visits. 
     Previously, the entire Detachment's work would grind to a 
     halt as we supported the visits with baggage handlers, 
     escorts, etc. Now, the only one whose time is monopolized 
     during these visits is that of the Detachment Commander, and 
     there was no way to change that as I could not delegate that 
     responsibility.
       As I said, prior to the arrival of the USLO we were 
     responsible for all aspects of VIP visits. Once the USLO 
     opened, it assumed the responsibility of coordinating 
     itineraries, providing transportation and lodging, customs/
     immigration clearance, baggage handling, etc., for all non-
     DOD officials visiting SRV. As previously, I continued to 
     attend all meetings and other activities involving the 
     visitors. I thought this was extremely important as the USG 
     began to engage the Vietnamese on issues other than the POW/
     MIA issue. The Detachment Commander's presence in meetings 
     served as a reminder to the Vietnamese that though we were 
     talking about other issues, the issue of missing Americans 
     was still the number one priority of the USG. I also provided 
     all necessary briefings and reports concerning JTF-FA 
     opeations, as requested by Mr. Hall or the visiting 
     officials.
       Regarding VIP schedules, I did not think some of the action 
     officers at the USLO were as aggressive with the Vietnamese 
     as experience had taught us we could be. When we coordinated 
     a schedule for visitors, we always fenced the time the 
     Detachment needed to brief the delegation (normally two 
     hours) as their first order of priority. This ensured that 
     they were as current as possible on our operations and 
     progress. We then provided the remaining time to the 
     Vietnamese for them to schedule the rest of the visit. It was 
     my impression that action officers at the USLO took the 
     opposite approach; give the Vietnamese the schedule, let them 
     fill it in with the requested meetings, and then fill in the 
     remaining time with our briefing. As a result, we never had 
     quite the time available to prebrief incoming delegations 
     that we had in the pre-USLO days.
       I also learned that DOS and DOD cultures simply have 
     different briefing ``styles.'' Some months later, this 
     informal ``style'' was later confirmed to me as the normal 
     operating procedure for DOS during a lecture by Ambassador 
     Marc Baas to a War College seminar.\42\ Once the USLO was 
     established, we normally briefed visitors over lunch while we 
     all sat on couches in Mr. Hall's office. It was my experience 
     that DOS personnel rarely use briefing slides and brief in a 
     much more informal fashion than does the military. In my 
     opinion, nothing beat coming to the Ranch and sitting at the 
     table for a formal briefing, but I also have come to realize 
     that is very much a part of the military culture and not 
     necessarily characteristic of other agencies. In support of 
     that, I had several Congressional Staff delegations comment 
     to me that it is always refreshing to have an Army officer 
     brief them; they always get a hand-out, the briefing is 
     normally to the point and clear, and we don't tend to dodge 
     the tough issues. To this day, I believe it is much more 
     difficult to do this when everyone is sitting in easy chairs 
     eating sandwiches and drinking cokes.
       My greatest concern about the USLO role in Vietnam came 
     when Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Counter-
     Narcotics, Mr. Gelbard, visited Southeast Asia. A red flag 
     went up for me during his visit. I concluded from his visit 
     that with the opening of the USLO, other governmental 
     agencies were rushing to push their agenda with the 
     Vietnamese and either downplay, or pay lip-service to the 
     POW/MIA issue. I felt that these competing agendas would 
     confuse the Vietnamese, and that they might lose focus on the 
     issue. I must add that I was pleased that we were beginning 
     to engage the Vietnamese on issues other than the issue of 
     unaccounted-for Americans and knew that the Vietnamese also 
     felt it a refreshing development. My only concern was one of 
     emphasis and a fear that the our issue would lose its 
     priority with the Vietnamese before President Clinton had 
     determined that sufficient progress had been achieved to 
     warrant improved relations.\43\


              impressions of vietnamese people and culture

       Living in Vietnam was like nothing I ever expected. Prior 
     to arriving in Vietnam, my only experience in a ``communist'' 
     led country was in then East Berlin in 1982. I will never 
     forget crossing from West to East Berlin. I can best 
     characterize it as going from color to black and white. To 
     me, East Berlin appeared cold, grey, and depressing. The 
     people did not appear happy, merchandise in stores was 
     shabby, and the store shelves were not well stocked. I 
     expected much the same atmosphere in Vietnam and was 
     therefore shocked by the environment I found. Hanoi, Ho Chi 
     Minh City, and Da Nang (the only major urban centers in 
     Vietnam) are vibrant cities. Construction is occurring 
     everywhere, store shelves are well stocked (new American 
     products were arriving on the shelves almost daily), the 
     people appeared happy, and color was everywhere. Not 
     everything is ``rosy'' in Vietnam, however. The people are 
     very poor, the infrastructure is almost non-existent, and it 
     is obvious that the country is struggling as it opens to the 
     international community and moves toward a market economy. 
     Through my readings and attendance at various meetings during 
     the visits of U.S. delegations, I know that the Vietnamese 
     have a long way to go to abide by United Nations standards 
     regarding human rights, but it is not evident on a daily 
     basis.
       In short, I did not find the atmosphere oppressive as I did 
     in East Berlin 12 years earlier. Most significantly to me was 
     that the Vietnamese people appeared hopeful about the future 
     and that their quality of life was destined to improve. I 
     felt an atmosphere of optimism almost everywhere I went in 
     Vietnam.
       The most surprising thing to me was the friendliness of the 
     Vietnamese, most especially toward Americans. Even in Hanoi, 
     the people seemed to thoroughly enjoy talking to Americans 
     and saw America as the land of everything good. My impression 
     was that given the opportunity to choose, Vietnamese would 
     much rather attend American universities, buy American goods, 
     and model their future after the United States. It was 
     interesting to find that if Vietnamese children called you a 
     Russian, they normally meant it as an insult, not a 
     compliment.
       Vietnamese are probably the hardest working people I have 
     ever encountered. Most Vietnamese work at least six days a 
     week, many seven, with their only real vacation coming during 
     Tet.\44\ Our Vietnamese employees were extremely loyal, 
     rarely complained, and always willing to go the extra mile 
     for us.
       The family appears to be the most significant aspect of 
     everyday Vietnamese life. As I tried to learn Vietnamese, I 
     found that the most valuable phrases to learn revolved around 
     being able to talk about your own family and ask about 
     theirs. Young unmarried Vietnamese usually still live with 
     their family, and once married, the children will also often 
     take in one or both parents. I found that beginning a 
     negotiation with my counterpart normally got off to a better 
     start if I began with small talk about his or my family.
       I cannot remember a single instance of a Vietnamese talking 
     derisively to me about someone else. I do not believe it is 
     in their nature to talk badly about anyone else. Anyone 
     dealing with the Vietnamese, whether officially or 
     unofficially, should keep this in mind. I truly believe that 
     the Vietnamese do not trust someone who speaks badly of 
     others in public. It is probably a trait we could stand to 
     emulate.
       It was also a rare event for a Vietnamese official to 
     flatly refuse a request of ours.

[[Page E913]]

     Now, this by no means meant that we always got what we asked 
     for. Rather than saying ``No,'' I found that the Vietnamese 
     used phrases such as, ``That would be very difficult,'' or 
     ``We will have to study that issue more,'' or ``We would like 
     to do that but we will have great difficulty getting the 
     other ministries to support it.'' I soon learned that these 
     phrases normally meant ``No.''
       As I said earlier in this paper, ``Face,'' as some people 
     call it is very important in Vietnam as it is in most Asian 
     countries. I took every opportunity possible to publicly 
     praise my counterpart during visiting delegations, and always 
     tried to compliment lower level officials in the presence of 
     their superiors. Praise goes a long way in Vietnam, as it 
     does everywhere. Conversely, when I was having difficulty 
     with someone, I would never criticize them in public or speak 
     to their superior without first informing them of what I 
     would do if we were unable to progress at that level. 
     Vietnamese do not mind you going over their head, just don't 
     do it behind their backs.
       One of my goals upon assuming command of Detachment 2 was 
     to improve the personal relationships between the Detachment 
     and our Vietnamese workers and counterparts. Since my days as 
     a lieutenant, I have always felt that it is helpful to 
     nurture relationships with those with whom you work. I have 
     found that it is much more difficult to decline a request 
     from a friend, than it is to refuse a casual acquaintance. I 
     have also found that subordinates work much harder for those 
     whom they respect and ``like'' than for those who just pay 
     their salary and do not care for them as an individual.
       As I said earlier, we had several Vietnamese local hires 
     who worked at the Ranch. Whether these individuals were our 
     secretaries, our cook, our maids, drivers, guards or 
     gardeners, I tried to make them feel a part of the 
     Detachment. After all, without their efforts, we would not 
     have been able to concentrate on our own duties. I began 
     inviting them to Detachment social events such as 
     Thanksgiving supper and though very shy in the beginning, 
     they soon opened up to us and became lasting friends. We even 
     had a farewell of sorts for one of our retiring guards. This 
     elderly gentleman had guarded our compound since we first 
     leased it, so we had a luncheon on the Ranch for him and 
     presented him with a JTF-FA Certificate of Appreciation 
     signed by me. I can almost guarantee that he has that 
     certificate proudly displayed in his home. I am just as 
     certain that when he speaks to his Vietnamese friends and 
     family, his reflections on Americans will be positive.
       We tried to do the same for our counterparts in the VNOSMP. 
     Not too long after my arrival, we hosted a small party at the 
     Ranch for Detachment 2 and the VNOSMP. It was a very relaxed 
     atmosphere that included American and Vietnamese food. I 
     believe this was the first time many of our VNOSMP 
     counterparts had even been on the Ranch other than at the 
     main office building.
       I knew we had made great strides in developing trust and 
     friendship when the VNOSMP invited us to a Tet party at the 
     Le Tach Government Guest House. Like our invitation to them 
     earlier in my tour, they included the entire Detachment. This 
     was also a first in our relationship.
       In the Spring of 1995, we decided to host a party at the 
     Ranch for our counterparts. I asked Mr. Hall if the USLO 
     would like to co-host it with us and he quickly agreed to 
     help us. We wanted to make this an American event complete 
     with hamburgers, hot dogs, potato salad, country music and 
     rock-and-roll. Guests at the party ran the gamut from our 
     guards and maids, to the Vietnamese Vice Minister of 
     Interior, the Director of the Vietnamese Veterans 
     Organization, senior officials in the Ministries of Foreign 
     Affairs and National Defense, the Hanoi press corps (on the 
     agreement that everything was ``off the record'' that 
     evening), and a couple of American businessmen. Vietnamese 
     officials rarely showed themselves to us in a casual 
     atmosphere, but everyone seemed to relax and enjoy 
     themselves. I think we spread a lot of good will during this 
     party and gained much more than we gave.
       These few instances of shared camaraderie served a very 
     important purpose--they built trust between our organizations 
     and between individuals. Becoming friends did not mean that I 
     would always agree with my counterparts or them with me. 
     Neither did it mean that I would push any less vigorously for 
     issues I thought were important to achieving the fullest 
     possible accounting. What I do believe it meant was that I 
     understood the Vietnamese perspective and could usually find 
     a way to honor their position while still accomplishing the 
     mission I was bound to do. It meant that I was better able to 
     read body language and recognize intent versus literal 
     meanings of spoken words. It meant that I could better time 
     my requests or frame them in such a way as to maximize my 
     opportunities for success. In short, I think our friendships 
     developed trust. Trust led to greater access an enhanced 
     cooperation. And better cooperation led to progress.


                               conclusion

       When Sergeant Major of the Army Richard Kidd visited our 
     troops in the field in Vietnam in January 1995, he asked me 
     what message I would like him to take back to the United 
     States. I wanted to repeat my reply to him here in my 
     concluding comments, because I hope you have come to the same 
     conclusions.
       The President of the United States considers this issue one 
     of the highest national priority and is resourcing it 
     appropriately.
       There are hundreds of great Americans working tirelessly 
     under arduous conditions with only one purpose in mind--to 
     provide the families the answers they so richly deserve.
       There are hundreds of Vietnamese citizens working side-by-
     side with our specialists to help us find the answers, and 
     the Vietnamese government is cooperating strongly in our 
     efforts.
       We are finding many of the answers we are seeking. No, we 
     aren't finding all the answers, but we are making significant 
     progress toward the fullest possible accounting.
       Finally, I asked him to tell all the soldiers, sailors, 
     airmen, and marines that he can that 20 years after the 
     conflict in Vietnam, the United States is still trying to 
     bring home its fallen warriors. Through all the reports of 
     the circumstances of loss I read, I did not see a single case 
     of our soldiers being ``abandoned'' on the battlefield. Our 
     service men and women should continue their Service, knowing 
     that we will come for them too.
       One of the most important findings of DOD's ``Zero-Based 
     Comprehensive Review of Cases'' is that if found ``no 
     evidence that information is being deliberately withheld'' by 
     the governments of Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.\46\ Could the 
     Vietnamese Government do more? In my opinion, they probably 
     could, but I also look at all the other difficulties they 
     face as they try to rebuild their country. I believe they are 
     providing a level of cooperation far exceeding what might be 
     reasonable to expect of them, and that the Vietnamese 
     Government is committed to continuing their current level 
     of cooperation indefinitely. During a visit by one of the 
     Congressional delegations to Vietnam, the Vice Foreign 
     Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Le Mai, said that he did 
     not expect the USG to stop pressuring Vietnam for 
     assistance in achieving the fullest possible accounting. 
     He simply hoped that it could soon become just one issue 
     of importance amongst many other issues discussed between 
     two countries with normal relations. Though the issue of 
     missing Americans is still one of America's ``highest 
     National priorities,'' and it correctly remains the 
     primary issue of discussion between Vietnam and the United 
     States, Mr. Le Mai's expectations are being realized today 
     albeit slowly.
       During my tour in Vietnam, I received much more than I 
     gave. The men and women of Joint Task Force--Full Accounting 
     are an inspiration to us all as they endure the long hours, 
     the elements, the heat, the humidity, the snakes, the 
     unexploded ordnance, and numerous other hardships to do their 
     job--and do so happily. The leadership of JTF-FA, Generals 
     Needham and Viale and Colonel Frizell, provided the guidance 
     and resources I needed to accomplish the mission, but allowed 
     me the flexibility and authority I needed to operate 
     confidently and effectively. I had the best command 
     environment I could have possibly hoped for.
       The JTF-FA staff worked tirelessly behind the scenes to 
     make those of us in the field successful, and they did so 
     without receiving many of the accolades and fanfare those of 
     us who were in the field received. I also must acknowledge 
     the efforts of those who went before me, Colonel Jack 
     Donovan, Colonel John Cray and all those who served with 
     them. It was their efforts that created the conditions under 
     which I was able to operate, and they set the stage well. If 
     at any point in this monograph I gave the impression that the 
     accomplishments I cited were mine, it was unintentional and 
     false. Progress on this issue was a team effort that included 
     the Detachments in the filed, the JTF-FA and PACOM 
     Headquarters and staffs, and the Defense POW/MIA Office. I 
     privileged to be a small part of a great team.
       There are other groups contributing to the fullest possible 
     accounting that I believe also need a lot of the credit for 
     the success of the operators in the field. The Vietnam 
     Veterans of America, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the 
     American Legion, the National League of Families and many 
     other groups are faithfully representing their constituency 
     to get the answers they deserve. They too contribute to the 
     overall effort. I also appreciated the open-minded approach 
     the Congressional and Congressional Staff delegations took 
     during their visits. Without the not always politically 
     popular efforts of Senators John McCain, John Kerry, Kit 
     Bond, and Sam Nunn, I do not believe we would be making the 
     progress we are today.
       I always enjoy talking about our nation's efforts in 
     Vietnam, because I do not feel the American people or, more 
     importantly, the men and women of America's Armed Forces are 
     aware of the extent of our nation's commitment to resolving 
     the very emotional issue of Americans still missing in 
     Southeast Asia. This monograph has given me the opportunity 
     to reflect on the most rewarding year of my 22 year career, 
     and to offer some thoughts as to how we approached our 
     duties. I hope this paper will be of some use to those who 
     may follow in similar situations, and that it serves as a 
     record of the impression of just one member of a very large 
     team dedicated to pursuing and achieving the fullest possible 
     accounting for Americans still unaccounted-for in Indochina.
       I opened this paper with a quote describing why I think 
     JTF-FA's mission is important. I will close with another 
     quote. How can the contributions of JTF-FA best be 
     summarized? I think Admiral Richard Macke, CINCPAC, said it 
     best on February 10, 1995

[[Page E914]]

     when he presented the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to JTF-FA:
       ``What will be the legacy of Joint Task Force-Full 
     Accounting? It won't be the sites searched, the witnesses 
     interviewed, the tons of soil sifted. Your legacy will be the 
     relief of the families of those we are able to account for. 
     And your legacy will be the iron-clad faith that the men and 
     women of our armed services have in each other. When we are 
     next called upon to put ourselves in harms way, we can do so 
     without hesitation, because we know you'll come. I can think 
     of no greater legacy to leave to those who come after us.''
       God's noblest people and their families must always know 
     that we'll come--no matter how long it takes.

                 Live-Sighting Report--Mr. Billy Hendon

       One of the most difficult periods of my tenure occurred in 
     April 1995. Mr. Billy Hendon arrived in my office claiming to 
     have information concerning live Americans being held by the 
     Vietnamese.\47\ He said that he had ``irrefutable proof'' 
     that the Vietnamese were holding Americans in an underground 
     facility beneath a mountain in a militarily sensitive area in 
     Vinh Phu Province (northwest of Hanoi). Furthermore, he 
     claimed that the Vietnamese had denied JTF-FA investigators 
     access to this sensitive area for the purpose of live-
     sighting investigations.
       I told him that if he would provide his ``intelligence'' to 
     me, I would forward it to the necessary agency immediately, 
     and we would investigate it. He said that he did not trust me 
     to investigate it without first ``tipping-off'' the 
     Vietnamese and would not give me the information. Rather, he 
     suggested we gather all the press we could and all go 
     investigate the case together.
       While I was speaking with Mr. Hendon, I directed my 
     Detachment NCOIC to contact the United States Liaison Office 
     (USLO), as I thought they should be involved in this. The 
     Deputy Chief of the USLO and the Regional Security Officer 
     soon arrived at my office to assist me in my actions with Mr. 
     Hendon. Once they arrived, I excused myself so that I could 
     call JTF-FA Headquarters to inform them of the situation. I 
     spoke at length with Colonel Frizell, the Deputy Commander, 
     and received specific guidance regarding my interactions with 
     Mr. Hendon. After our discussions, I returned to convey 
     Colonel Frizell's guidance to Mr. Hendon. In Hawaii, Colonel 
     Frizell immediately notified the Deputy CINCPAC, DPMO and 
     other necessary agencies of our situation and actions.
       Once back in my office, I told Mr. Hendon that I would not 
     make a ``media circus'' of any live-sighting investigation as 
     it would be inappropriate. Colonel Frizell also spoke to Mr. 
     Hendon telephonically twice. He explained our position to him 
     in what I am sure were much less politically correct terms 
     than I had used. A distinguished career in the United States 
     Marine Corps, which included his aircraft being shot down 
     over northern Vietnam during the conflict and three years as 
     the Deputy CJTF-FA, did not exactly endear the likes of Mr. 
     Hendon to Colonel Frizell.
       Mr. Hendon responded that he would not give me the 
     information until his conditions were met. We reached an 
     impasse that neither of us was willing to skirt.
       We concluded our meeting when Mr. Hendon asked if he could 
     stay on the Ranch as he feared for his life. He claimed that 
     Mr. Nguyen Xuan Phong (Director of the Americas Department) 
     and Mr. Vu Chi Cong (my counterpart in the VNOSMP) had 
     threatened his life. After speaking with Colonel Frizell, I 
     denied Mr. Hendon's request for the following reasons; the 
     Ranch was not U.S. property (as embassy property is) and 
     therefore cannot provide the protection to U.S. citizens that 
     embassies can, we did not have facilities to support such 
     requests, and finally, we were confident that his claims 
     regarding the threat to his life was baseless and ridiculous. 
     I did, however, make arrangements for him to stay in a room 
     in a small six-room hotel immediately adjacent to the Ranch. 
     Several of my personnel were also living in the hotel for a 
     short time, so I thought that would ease his concerns for his 
     safety (if he really had any). As I walked Mr. Hendon from my 
     office building, he asked what would happen if he refused to 
     leave. I did not directly answer his question, but made it 
     clear that I would not allow him to stay on the Ranch.
       As Mr. Hendon left the Ranch, he locked himself to the 
     outside metal gate of our driveway with a set of handcuffs. 
     Since it was cloudy, beginning to sprinkle, and threatening 
     thunder and lightning, I got some bolt cutters to free Mr. 
     Hendon from his handcuffs. I also did not want the press to 
     arrive with Mr. Hendon chained to my gate. As I was cutting 
     the handcuffs (from the inside of the gate with Mr. Hendon on 
     the outside), Mr. Hendon was taking pictures of me. In any 
     event, Mr. Hendon had another pair of handcuffs and re-locked 
     himself to the gate a little later.
       As we watched Mr. Hendon throughout the day, we found that 
     his efforts lacked a certain amount of integrity and 
     sincerity. Locked to the gate, he entertained members of the 
     press with his intent to remain locked to the gate until such 
     time as I was willing to investigate his claims of live 
     Americans. Yet, after the departure of the press, and as 
     necessary, he unlocked himself from the gate to return to his 
     hotel room to use the bathroom, or he would pay young 
     Vietnamese children to bring him food and sodas and even 
     managed to get a chair to sit on outside the gate. Needless 
     to say, however, in the heat and humidity of Vietnam, Mr. 
     Hendon soon decided that chaining himself to the gate would 
     not bring him much progress compared to the discomfort he was 
     experiencing. Soon he was only appealing at the gate during 
     selected press intervals.
       Later, I called the DFCJTF to ask permission to call Stony 
     Beach in Bangkok and request they send a live-sighting 
     investigator to Hanoi. In this manner we would be immediately 
     ready to respond to any valid information we might receive 
     from Mr. Hendon. He agreed, and the Vietnamese approved his 
     visa within a few hours of our request. This quick approval 
     was extremely rare in Vietnam. It normally took ten days for 
     a routine request and two to three days for an emergency 
     request. This told me the Vietnamese understood the urgency 
     of our request.
       I reviewed our actions with Mr. Jim Hall, the Chief, United 
     States Liaison Office, Hanoi, and the DCJTF in Hawaii several 
     times each day during this ordeal to: 1) keep them informed 
     of the situation, and 2) receive their guidance. I continued 
     to refuse to meet with Mr. Hendon again unless it was at the 
     USLO with Mr. Hall. I also continued to deny Mr. Hendon 
     further access to the Ranch. We remained willing to meet with 
     Mr. Hendon whenever he decided to provide his information to 
     us in the proper environment; i.e., in a relatively secure 
     environment on U.S. property such as the USLO and not in the 
     middle of a press conference.
       As time went on, Mr. Hendon decided to hold a press 
     conference to give the press the details of his 
     ``intelligence.'' During this conference he claimed that we 
     refused to meet with him (we did not--we only insisted that 
     we meet in the proper forum), that we refused to investigate 
     this case (we did not--we were awaiting his information) and 
     that the Vietnamese had denied us access to this site for 
     investigation. He said that I had lied when I said the 
     Vietnamese had never denied us access to any site for the 
     purpose of a LSI.
       Mr. Hendon did a skillful job with the press of mixing 
     apples and oranges regarding access to the site. His claims 
     of being denied access to the Vinh Phu military reservation 
     implied that the Vietnamese had denied access to the site for 
     the purpose of investigating a live-sighting. We had not. As 
     I discussed earlier in this monograph, the Vietnamese did 
     deny us access to the reservation, but that was during our 
     investigation of Case 0644, not an LSI. It is important to 
     stress that to my knowledge, and to the knowledge of the 
     primary Stony Beach live sighting investigator, JTF-FA and 
     Stony Beach investigators have never been denied access to 
     any location anywhere in Vietnam as a part of a live sighting 
     investigation. I clarified this point with the press on 
     several occasions, but I do not think this was ever made 
     completely clear in the articles I saw.
       For almost two weeks, Mr. Hendon lived in the hotel next 
     door to the Ranch, occasionally sending a fax to me imploring 
     me to meet his conditions so he could provide his 
     ``intelligence'' to me. He was also in obvious contact with 
     his associates back in the United States. We soon became the 
     object of several ``National Vietnam P.O.W. Strike Force'' 
     newsletters written by Mr. Joe L. Jordan, the Strike Force 
     Commander. Mr. Jordan is one of the more vocal critics of 
     U.S. policy in Vietnam regarding POW/MIA efforts. His 
     newsletters made statements about me such as:
       ``Not only does Richmond refuse to go, he demands that 
     Hendon give him the data so he can turn it over to the 
     communists.\48\
       ``Will some other U.S. Army scumbag like LTC Richmond help 
     the communists hide his [future U.S. POWs] whereabouts [sic] 
     30 years from now after he has been captured?\46\
       ``Your little panty-waisted, snot-nosed faggot commander of 
     the ranch, U.S. Army Lt Col Melvin Richmond whined, `We might 
     be out there for months looking in each and every little 
     cave.\50\' ''
       But my favorite passage was when Mr. Jordan described Mr. 
     Hendon's situation:
       ``He [Mr. Hendon] was last seen running down a dark alley 
     in the red light and bar district near Le Nam De street with 
     the KGB in hot pursuit. A caucasion [sic] American of 6\1/2\ 
     feet in height like Hendon will not go un-noticed for long 
     and he is believed to already be in secret captivity, his 
     exact whereabouts unknown.\51\''
       Mr. Hendon was in a very comfortable, but conditioned hotel 
     room next door to the Ranch, meeting with the press everyday. 
     The only hardship I noticed with Mr. Hendon was that the top 
     of his head became very sunburned.
       Finally, Mr. Hendon's visa expired and the Vietnamese 
     refused to renew it. Before leaving, Mr. Hendon gave is the 
     information he had via a fax, and we began the LSI process. 
     He left Vietnam proclaiming victory.
       When we finally investigated Mr. Hendon's information, the 
     results were as we suspected they would be. The location he 
     provided was some 50 kilometers outside the Vinh Phu military 
     reservation. It was in the middle of expansive rice paddies--
     not a mountain in view. And there was no evidence of live 
     Americans ever having been held in that area. As a matter of 
     fact, Mr. Hendon had been to that very location a couple of 
     years previous.
       It is unfortunate that individuals such as Mr. Hendon are 
     able to manipulate the press and manipulate the hopes of 
     families the way he does. At one point I told Bruce Stanley 
     of AP that I thought they were giving Mr. Hendon entirely too 
     much attention. I said that they were allowing Mr. Hendon to 
     build a story where none exists. Bruce agreed

[[Page E915]]

     with my assessment, but said that they had to follow him . . 
     . just in case he did something newsworthy.
       There are hundreds of great Americans working tirelessly, 
     often in very inhospitable conditions, to try to resolve this 
     issue. There are other organizations such as the National 
     League of Families and U.S. veterans groups who disagree with 
     U.S. policies concerning Vietnam, but I always felt that 
     their motives were pure and their intentions the same as 
     ours--to find the truth for the families of the missing. I 
     strongly resented individuals such as Mr. Hendon and Mr. 
     Jordan who manipulated the press, manipulated the truth, 
     misrepresented me, and misrepresented those devoted to 
     finding the truth. I believe they cloud the issue, develop 
     distrust amongst the families of the missing, and Americans 
     in general, and do so for (in my opinion) personal gain.

                                Glossary

       Americas Department: The department of the Vietnamese 
     Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsible for relations between 
     Vietnam and the Americas (including Cuba). During my tenure, 
     the Director of the Americas Department was Mr. Nguyen Xuan 
     Phong.
       Amnesty Program: The Vietnamese established the Amnesty 
     Program to encourage Vietnamese citizens to provide any 
     remains and information they possess concerning unaccounted-
     for Americas to the Central Government without fear of 
     punishment. My experience indicated that the Vietnamese 
     Government was genuine in this offer. The only instances I 
     knew of where the Government prosecuted Vietnamese citizens 
     regarding remains involved ``remains trading.''
       Archival Research Team (ART): The Archival Research Team 
     worked with the VNOSMP to find SRV records containing 
     information about unaccounted-for Americans, and jointly 
     researched and investigated reports that private citizens had 
     remains of unaccounted-for Americans. SRV records included 
     war-time film footage, military and government records, and 
     national museum and library holdings. Established in October 
     1992, the ARTs had access to all civilian and military 
     museums, public security houses, tradition houses and 
     newspaper and magazine offices in Vietnam. In May 1993, the 
     VNOSMP and JTF-FA established the Joint Document Center (JDC) 
     in the Central Army Museum in Hanoi. The JDC served as a 
     repository for all documents, books, and reports that 
     Vietnamese and U.S. investigators uncovered. Three ARTs 
     deployed to Vietnam organizing their efforts along the lines 
     of already established Vietnamese Military Regions (MRs); ART 
     1 operated in MR1, MR2, and MR3, all in northern Vietnam. ART 
     2 operated in MR4 and MR5 in central Vietnam, and ART 3 
     operated in MR7 and MR9 in southern Vietnam. In February 
     1995, the RIT assumed the duties of the ART as it was no 
     longer necessary to have a single team dedicated entirely to 
     this effort.
       Anthropologist/Archeologist: Each RE has an anthropologist 
     assigned to it. The anthropologist/archeologist provides the 
     scientific control for the recovery site and ensures that 
     every aspect of the recovery operation conforms with 
     scientific standards that can withstand the closest legal and 
     scientific scrutiny. Most anthropologists/archeologists 
     assigned to CILHI are under contract to the Army Corps of 
     Engineers. The anthropologists/archeologists working in the 
     field are highly respected and among the world's most 
     accomplished scientists of their fields. Within the elite 
     group, CILHI certifies certain anthropologists/archeologists 
     as being able to turn away remains. If a team recovers what 
     they suspect to be a bone at a recovery site they cannot 
     dispose of that piece of remains (even if it has a beak on it 
     or is an obvious animal bone) unless a certified 
     anthropologist/archeologist authorizes the team to do so.
       Died-in-Captivity Cases (DIC): Of the 84 SRT cases, 27 
     cases representing 29 individuals are DIC cases. Since these 
     cases involve individuals who died while in Vietnamese 
     captivity, U.S. Government officials believed it reasonable 
     to assume that the Vietnamese should have control of the 
     individuals' remains or know of their whereabouts.
       Discrepancy Cases: Another name for Priority Cases.
       Dog Tag Reports: Since 1979, the United States Government 
     has received thousands of reports of remains associated with 
     dog tags in the hands of private citizens. About 97% of the 
     Americans named in these reports were never unaccounted for. 
     A little more than 100 Americans named in the reports are 
     still unaccounted-for. The Archival Research Team began 
     investigating these cases in July 1994.
       Excavate: If an IE discovers credible information (i.e.; 
     witness testimony, wreckage, etc.) that allows it to narrow 
     the scope of work at a location to a reasonable size 
     location, it will recommend that an RE excavate the site to 
     try to find remains.
       Explosive Ordnance Specialist: An EOD specialist is 
     assigned to each IE and RE. It is a common occurrence for our 
     teams to encounter live ordnance remaining from the conflict 
     in Vietnam. The EOD specialist ensures the safety of the team 
     during its operations.
       Fate Determined: A normal IE team can make three 
     recommendations after investigating a case; reinvestigate, 
     excavate, or pending. In the case of Priority Case 
     Investigations, the team may make one other recommendation, 
     fate determined. This means that although the case is still 
     unresolved, the team did conclude that the unaccounted-for 
     American died, thus his ``fate has been determined.'' Further 
     investigations will continue as necessary or until the case 
     is resolved.
       Graves Registry Cases: Of the 84 SRT cases, 39 cases 
     representing 46 individuals are SRV Graves Registry cases. 
     The names of these 46 individuals appeared on provincial 
     graves registries, therefore the USG position is that since 
     the registries reflect that the Vietnamese knew of the burial 
     location during the war, they should still know the 
     whereabouts of the remains.
       Incident Location: Site where the unaccounted-for American 
     was last seen or thought to have been; e.g., crash site, 
     burial site, site of an ambush, etc.
       Investigation Element (IE): Each IE is composed of a Team 
     Chief, an Assistant Team Chief, two analysts/linguists, two 
     Mortuary Affairs Specialists, a medic and an EOD Specialist.
       Investigation/Recovery Team (IRT): The IRT includes all 
     members of IEs, REs and any other support personnel deployed 
     to Vietnam for approximately 30 days to conduct a single 
     Joint Field Activity.
       Joint Document Center (JDC): The Vietnamese established the 
     JDC in a wing of their Central Army Museum in Hanoi. It 
     serves as a location for U.S. and Vietnamese specialists to 
     examine and store archival information such as films, 
     photographs, artifacts, documents, etc.
       Joint Field Activity (JFA): JTF-FA conducts six JFAs 
     annually in Vietnam. Teams deploy by U.S. C-130 and 
     commercial aircraft into Vietnam from U'Tapao Air Base, 
     Thailand into Noi Bai International Airport, Hanoi (for teams 
     operating in northern Vietnam), Da Nang International 
     Airport, Da Nang (for teams operating in central Vietnam), 
     and Tan Son Nhat International Airport (for teams operating 
     in southern Vietnam). From these initial staging areas, IEs 
     and REs deploy by ground or helicopter to their initial 
     operating location. Each JFA lasts approximately 30 days.
       Joint Forensics Review: At the close of each JFA Vietnamese 
     and U.S. forensics specialists examine all remains the joint 
     IRT obtained during the JFA and any Detachment 2 may have 
     obtained since the last review. They study the remains to 
     scientifically ensure they are likely to be remains of a 
     missing American.
       Last Know Alive Cases: Another name for Priority Cases.
       Last Known Location: The last known location is very 
     similar to the incident location; the site where the 
     unaccounted-for American was last seen or thought to have 
     been (e.g., crash site, burial site, site of an ambush, 
     etc.). IEs are always required to visit the last known 
     location (unless during the course of their investigation 
     they find evidence that categorically refutes the last known 
     location). Even for over-water cases, the IE will go up to 
     ten miles out to sea to investigate the last known location.
       Life Support Technician (LST): An LST is assigned to every 
     RE. He has two primary missions; (1) confirm that the 
     aircraft wreckage at the site correlates to the aircraft of 
     loss, and (2) determine if the crew members were aboard the 
     aircraft at the time of impact. They did this by analyzing 
     the wreckage, identification media, crew member life support 
     equipment, etc.
       Live Sighting: Contrary to popular opinion, this does not 
     always mean a current report of a live American either living 
     freely or being held against his will in Vietnam, though this 
     could be the case. Every day, analysts in Hawaii and 
     Washington, DC pore over historical documents and reports 
     searching for information pertaining to an unaccounted-for 
     American. Should they uncover a report of a live American 
     during their research (e.g., an analyst finds a previously 
     undiscovered notation indicating a captured live American was 
     being led through a village in South Vietnam in 1967), this 
     discovery could result in the initiation of a live sighting 
     investigation.
       Live Sighting Investigation (LSI): These receive the 
     highest priority of any other operation involved with 
     resolving this issue. Investigators from the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency (DIA) office in Bangkok, Thailand, Stony 
     Beach, investigate all live sightings. JTF-FA, DPMO, JTF-FA 
     and the VNOSMP go to great lengths to assure the integrity of 
     each LSI. DPMO receives all live sighting reports either from 
     the field, their analysts, or any other source. They analyze 
     each report, and prepare draft requirements before tasking 
     Stony Beach to investigate the sighting. Though DPMO can 
     notify Stony Beach of the requirement via secure means of 
     communications, Detachment 2 has no such capability. To 
     minimize the opportunity for anyone to accuse the Vietnamese 
     of ``rigging'' the investigation or ``rehearse'' witnesses, 
     the only information that passes to the Detachment is that 
     DPMO has initiated an LSI and a Stony Beach investigator 
     needs an entry visa into Vietnam. It is not until the 
     investigator arrives in Vietnam and sits down with the 
     Commander of Detachment 2 and VNOSMP officials that anyone in 
     Vietnam knows the specifics of the case. There have been many 
     instances where immediately following the initial meeting 
     with his Vietnamese counterpart, the Stony Beach investigator 
     and his counterpart depart immediately for the site. The 
     Vietnamese have never denied access by the Stony Beach 
     investigator to any site involving an LSI. Once the 
     investigator completes his investigation, he debriefs the 
     Commander, Detachment 2 and returns to Bangkok, where

[[Page E916]]

     he files his report with DIA. An interagency board in 
     Washington, DC reviews the report and votes to resolve, 
     reinvestigate, or develop additional information for the 
     case.
       Mortuary Affairs Specialist: Specialists assigned to 
     USACILHI whose Military Occupational Skill (MOS) involves 
     proficiency and knowledge in wartime/combat burials.
       Oral History Program (OHP): The Oral History Program began 
     in 1979, when analysts from the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     (DIA) began interviewing refugees from Vietnam to try to 
     uncover information regarding unaccounted-for Americans in 
     Vietnam. From 1988 to 1992, Vietnam allowed limited access to 
     Vietnam for OHP analysts. In May 1993, JTF-FA presented what 
     became known as the ``List of 83'' to the 
     Vietnamese Government. This list contained the names of 83 
     former and current PAVN officers and government officials 
     who the USB believed could have information regarding 
     unaccounted-for Americans. Between May and December 1993, 
     OHP team members from Detachment 2 interviewed 74 of the 
     individuals from the ``List of 83.'' This included 14 flag 
     officers and 36 field grade officers and led to the 
     accumulation of information concerning over 40 cases 
     involving 21 unaccounted-for Americans. Between January 
     and June 1994, JTF-FA continued to press the Vietnamese 
     for access to the remaining nine individuals, but for a 
     variety of reasons, could not gain access to them, and the 
     OHP essentially ground to a halt. Some inside and outside 
     the USG felt the program had failed because we were denied 
     access to the remaining nine individuals despite our 
     success in interviewing 89% of those we requested to 
     interview. In July 1994 we proposed to the VNOSMP that we 
     reinvigorate the OHP by approaching the program 
     differently. We recommended that we get away from 
     concentrating on a ``List of 83'' and instead concentrate 
     on the product we gain through the program's interviews. 
     The Vietnamese agreed and we began providing the 
     Vietnamese with a list of individuals we would like to 
     interview during a specified ``investigation period'' 
     (normally concurrent with a JFA; 30 day period), and then 
     interviewed all they made available. For those who we felt 
     strongly that we needed to interview, but were not agreed 
     to by the Vietnamese, we continued to resubmit the names. 
     The bottom line is that in August 1994, we began a new 
     interview phase. In September 1994 we reinterviewed 
     Military Region 4 Graves Registry compilers and in October 
     1994 held a series of interviews in Quang Nam-Da Nang 
     Province. The OHP continues a strong program today.
       Over-Water Case: 470 unaccounted-for Americans are known to 
     have been lost at sea. Most of these cases involve aircraft 
     that were hit and tried to escape to the relative safety of 
     the ocean before crashing. Other include losses of 
     individuals when their vessels sank, or who were swept 
     overboard. In Vietnam alone, over-water cases account for 449 
     of the more than 1600 unaccounted-for.
       Pending: If an IE investigates a case and exhausts all 
     leads without finding enough information to recommend a site 
     to excavate, the team leader recommends placing the case in 
     the pending category. This does not mean the case is closed 
     as many contend. Instead, pending means that there are no 
     further leads to pursue, and until such time as someone 
     develops a credible lead, the JTF will not actively 
     investigate the case. However, should an analyst uncover new 
     information or questions regarding the pending case, JTF-FA 
     will reactivate the case and schedule it for reinvestigation. 
     This has occurred on several occasions.
       Photo Cases: of the 84 SRT cases, 11 cases representing 12 
     individuals are Photo cases. In many instances, either for 
     historical or propaganda purposes, the Vietnamese 
     photographed bodies and body parts of dead Americans. We have 
     correlated several such photographs to 11 cases, 12 
     individuals who are still unaccounted-for. The USG position 
     is that since the Vietnamese photographed the bodies or 
     remains, they should still control or know the whereabouts of 
     these remains.
       Priority Case: Also known as Discrepancy Cases, Last Known 
     Alive Cases, or even Priority Last Known Alive Discrepancy 
     Cases. When General Vessey became the President's Special 
     Envoy to resolve the issue of Americans still unaccounted-for 
     in Southeast Asia, one of his first steps was to direct 
     analysts to review all existing cases and determine the cases 
     where the individual is thought to have survived his incident 
     of loss and may still be alive. (Hypothetical Example: Two 
     aircraft were attacking a target and a surface-to-air missile 
     impacts one of the aircraft. That aircraft's wing man sees 
     the pilot eject, and descend to the ground under a good 
     parachute. The wing man might even have observed the pilot 
     being captured and led away. This is one type of Priority 
     Case. We know the individual survived his incident of 
     loss, he did not return to the United States during 
     Operation Homecoming, and it is possible that he is still 
     alive.) JTF-FA and the VNOSMP formed a joint Priority Case 
     Investigation Team to make a focused effort to determine 
     the fate of the Priority Cases in Vietnam. Operations 
     began on 11 June 1993 to determine the fate of 92 
     individuals associated with 73 cases. Eventually, this 
     list grew to 196 cases. To date, teams have investigated 
     every Priority Case at least once, some seven to eight 
     times. Of the 196 individuals, one is a foreign national, 
     and 27 have been resolved completely. There remain 50 
     individuals whose fate has not yet been determined.
       Priority Case Investigation Team (PCIT): The U.S. and 
     Vietnamese governments deemed investigating the Priority 
     Cases to be so important that they formed a special team 
     dedicated solely to investigating these cases. The U.S. 
     manned the team with a DIA/Stony Beach investigator to ensure 
     the highest quality investigation.
       ``The Ranch'': The Ranch is the small compound located in 
     the northwestern corner of Hanoi that houses Detachment 2, 
     JTF-FA. It has three buildings, a team house, a TDY building, 
     and an office building. JTF-FA leases this facility from the 
     Vietnamese. The original Detachment 2 tenants named it the 
     Ranch as it was a truly American name.
       Recovery Element (RE): Each RE is composed of a Team Chief, 
     a Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC), an 
     anthropologist or archeologist, a photographer, four Mortuary 
     Affairs Specialists, two analysts/linguists, an EOD 
     Specialist, a Life Support Technician (LST), and a medic. The 
     Team Chief is normally an Army Quartermaster Corps Captain. 
     Most of the RE comes from USACILHI. The analysts/linguists 
     and LST are assigned to JTF-FA. The EOD Specialist and medic 
     can come from any Service, normally from a unit assigned to 
     PACOM.
       Reinvestigate: If, after the end of a JFA or investigation 
     period, the investigators have not completed investigating 
     the leads they were assigned or have developed new leads that 
     they were unable to pursue, they recommend a team 
     reinvestigate the case in the future.
       Remains Not Recoverable: IE teams can recommend three 
     categories for cases they investigate, excavate, 
     reinvestigate, or pending. PCIT and SRT investigators can 
     also recommend ``Remains Not Recoverable.'' This 
     recommendation means that the investigator has fully 
     investigated the case and is confident that the remains of 
     the unaccounted-for American have either decayed beyond hope 
     for ever being found, been destroyed, or otherwise beyond the 
     capability of ever being recovered. Example--In one SRT case 
     we found a Vietnamese villager who had actually buried an 
     unaccounted-for American. When he led investigators to the 
     site, he saw that what had been a small stream during the 
     war, had swollen to be much wider. He pointed to where he had 
     buried the American in what he described as a shallow grave, 
     but it was now completely submerged. The investigators 
     classified this case as ``Remains Not Recoverable'' as the 
     remains had certainly washed away over time, and the 
     likelihood of recovering them was very remote.
       Remains Obtained: Obtaining remains includes receiving and 
     recovering remains.
       Remains Received: To receive remains means to gain 
     possession of them when a Vietnamese citizen or official 
     gives them to a U.S. official.
       Remains Recovered: To recover remains means to gain 
     possession of them through an excavation.
       Remains Recovered But Not Repatriated Cases: Of the 84 SRT 
     cases, seven cases representing 11 individuals are Remains 
     Recovered But Not Repatriated cases. IAW the terms of the 
     Paris Peace Accords ending our involvement in the conflict in 
     Vietnam, the Vietnamese provided a list of remains they had 
     recovered and were repatriating to the United States. These 
     11 individuals correlate to remains the Vietnamese reported 
     that they had recovered, but that the USG claims it did not 
     officially receive.
       Remains Trading: Selling or trading remains or information. 
     We know that many Vietnamese citizens possess remains; every 
     JFA the IRT receives remains from Vietnamese citizens. It is 
     not uncommon for a Vietnamese to offer to provide the 
     information/remains in exchange for monetary compensation or 
     a visa to the United States. In a few cases, what we called 
     ``remains dealers'' approached our investigators. These 
     ``remains traders'' differed from the average citizen 
     requesting ``compensation'' in that they made their living 
     from this endeavor. Neither U.S. or Vietnamese officials will 
     pay for remains or information.
       Repatriation: To return remains to the United States. In 
     the case of Vietnam, teams must provide all remains obtained 
     to their Vietnamese counterparts. At the end of the JFA, 
     Vietnamese and U.S. forensics specialists from USACILHI 
     examine all remains obtained to assure they are likely to be 
     those of an American. If they conclude they are not America, 
     the U.S. specialists do not accept them for repatriation to 
     the United States.
       Repatriation Ceremony: Ceremony at Noi Bai International 
     Airport, Hanoi, SRV, where the Commander, Detachment 2, on 
     behalf of the United States Government officially accepts 
     remains from officials of the VNOSMP, and loads them on a 
     U.S. aircraft for return to the United States.
       Research & Investigation Team (RIT): The RIT is a six-
     person team that deploys to Vietnam for a period of four 
     months. It is manned with the most skillful Vietnamese 
     linguists and analysts assigned to the JTF and works its most 
     difficult cases. It is responsible for archival research, 
     oral history interviews, special remains and priority case 
     investigations, an walk-in interviews.
       Resolved: To legally identify the remains as being those of 
     an unaccounted-for American.
       Scope Loss (or Off-the-Scope Losses): In many instances 
     during the conflict, American aircraft simply disappeared 
     from the ``radar scopes'' of ground monitoring stations, or 
     the individuals were ``never heard

[[Page E917]]

     from again after embarking on long-range ground or air 
     reconnaissance missions or after their aircraft were last 
     seen visually on radar heading toward a given target.'' In 
     these instances, IEs use the point at which the aircraft or 
     patrol went ``off the scope'' as the last known location, or 
     they will extrapolate from that point using the direction and 
     speed of travel to try to determine possible location of the 
     loss. Scope losses involve the loss of 308 individuals. DPMO 
     has determined that it cannot resolve the cases of 54 of 
     these individuals.\52\
       Special Remains Case: Unlike the Priority Cases where the 
     USG believes the unaccounted-for individual might have 
     survived, we know that the individuals associated with 
     Special Remains Cases died. However, because of photographic 
     evidence, names appearing on graves registries, POW camp 
     records, or other Vietnamese records it is reasonable to 
     assume that at one point the Vietnamese had control of the 
     individual's remains, and should now be able to produce those 
     remains. There were originally 84 Special Remains cases.
       Special Remains Case Team (SRT): This team's mission was to 
     work with the VNOSMP to resolve the 84 SRT cases for which 
     the United States Government had reason to believe the 
     Vietnamese should be able to provide a full accounting.
       Stony Beach: Stony Beach is the Defense Intelligence Agency 
     (DIA) office in Bangkok, Thailand. Stony Beach analysts 
     investigate all live sightings and provided the primary 
     investigator on the PCIT.
       Tri-Lateral Operations: During the war in Indochina, the 
     Vietnamese controlled major portions of Laos and Cambodia. As 
     such, when we investigate cases in Laos and Cambodia, it is 
     very likely that Vietnamese citizens (former PAVAN or VC) 
     would have more information concerning the incidents of loss 
     than any Laotian or Cambodian citizens. If we can identify a 
     Vietnamese citizen who possesses such information, we will 
     coordinate between Vietnam and the third country (Cambodia or 
     Laos) to bring that witness into their country to visit the 
     site during a JFA in that country. These are called Tri-
     Lateral Operations as they are joint U.S./SRV/KOC or U.S./
     SRV/Laos operations.
       Unilateral Research & Investigations: Many people both 
     inside and outside the USG believe that the only way we can 
     resolve this issue fully and rapidly is for the Vietnamese 
     Government to increase their unilateral research and 
     investigations. It is my opinion that some emphasize 
     unilateral research because they believe the Vietnamese are 
     purposely withholding archival information and even remains. 
     They stress ``unilateral'' research in a round-about way of 
     demanding the Vietnamese release these items. My experience 
     does not lead me to believe the Vietnamese are withholding 
     anything, and that as they find documents and remains, they 
     are submitting them to Detachment 2. I believe our 
     investigations are most fruitful when performed jointly with 
     the Vietnamese; the investigations are always more thorough 
     and the reports of investigation are uniformly more detailed. 
     For those instances where the Vietnamese deny access to an 
     American, and unilateral research/investigation by Vietnamese 
     officials is the only other option, then, and only then, 
     should we accept unilateral research as a viable option.
       United States Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii 
     (USACILHI or more commonly CILHI): CILHI has a world-wide 
     mission to search for, recover and identify U.S. service men 
     missing from all conflicts.
       Vietnamese Office Seeking Missing Persons (VNOSMP): The 
     VNOSMP is Detachment 2's counterpart organization in the 
     Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is responsible for 
     coordinating Vietnamese efforts to resolve the issue of 
     unaccounted-for Americans. It is not involved with Vietnamese 
     efforts to seek its own missing from the war. My direct 
     counterpart during my tenure was Mr. Vu Chi Cong.
       Walk-In Interviews: We always kept a skilled linguist at 
     the Ranch in case a Vietnamese citizen arrived offering to 
     provide some information, remains, artifacts, etc., to us. As 
     noted earlier, our office was depicted on tourist maps and an 
     advertisement for our office was in the Hanoi Yellow Pages. 
     We normally had a couple of walk-in interviews each week.

                         Abbreviations/Acronyms

       AP: Associated Press.
       ART: Archival Research Team.
       CILHI: More common reference to the United States Army 
     Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii than the more 
     accurate USACILHI.
       CINCPAC: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command. 
     Admiral Macke was the CINCPAC during my tenure.
       CJTF-FA: Commander, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting. Major 
     General Thomas H. Needham was the initial CJTF-FA. His 
     command extended into the first month of my command at which 
     time Brigadier General Charles Viale assumed command (27 July 
     1994).
       CODEL: Congressional Delegation.
       DIC: Died-in-Captivity.
       DPMO: Defense POW/MIA Office.
       EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal.
       IE: Investigation Element.
       IRT: Investigation & Recovery Team.
       JCRC: Joint Casualty Resolution Center.
       JDC: Joint Document Center.
       JFA: Joint Field Activity.
       JTF-FA Joint Task Force--Full Accounting.
       KOC: Kingdom of Cambodia. Normally referred to only as 
     Cambodia.
       LSI: Live Sighting Investigation.
       LST: Life Support Technician.
       MFA: Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
       MND: Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense.
       MOI: Vietnamese Ministry of the Interior.
       OHP: Oral History Program.
       PACOM: More common reference to the United States Pacific 
     Command than the more accurate USPACOM.
       PCIT: Priority Case Investigation Team.
       RE: Recovery Element.
       SRT: Special Remains Team.
       SRV: Socialist Republic of Vietnam.
       STAFFDEL: Congressional Staff Delegation.
       UPI: United Press International.
       USACILHI: United States Army Central Identification 
     Laboratory, Hawaii.
       USLO: United States Liaison Office.
       USPACOM; United States Pacific Command.
       VNOSMP: Vietnamese Office Seeking Missing Persons.


                               footnotes

     \1\ Leslie Weatherhead, ``Comradeship,'' quoted by Admiral 
     Richard Macke, CINCPAC, in a speech awarding the Joint 
     Meritorious Unit Award to JTF-FA, February 10, 1995.
     \2\ NOTE: Other names I will use for these countries 
     throughout the text are Vietnam or SRV, Laos, Cambodia or 
     KOC, and China or PRC, respectively.
     \3\ Unless otherwise noted, statistics used throughout this 
     monograph are current as of February 27, 1996 and were 
     provided to the author by the Public Affairs Office, JTF-FA, 
     Camp Smith, Hawaii.
     \4\ JTF-FA mission statement.
     \5\ Unaccounted-for or missing are the correct terms when 
     referring to the individuals we were searching for. POW, MIA 
     and KIA are legal terms DOD uses to classify wartime losses 
     and help determine benefits for the next-of-kin and the 
     actual service member. There are no remaining POWs or MIAs 
     from the conflict in Southeast Asia. Colonel Charles Shelton 
     was the last service member carried as a POW. The USG 
     continued to carry him as POW after it had reclassified all 
     other missing service men so that he might serve as a 
     national symbol that the unaccounted-for ``would not be 
     forgotten.'' Colonel Shelton's family recently requested that 
     the USG change his status to killed in action, body not 
     recovered, and DOD concurred with their request.
     \6\ See Glossary for a complete explanation of the nature of 
     today's Joint Field Activities.
     \7\ Bobby Garwood's return does not count in this first 
     category as he was never ``unaccounted-for.''
     \8\ Department of Defense, ``A Zero-Based Comprehensive 
     Review of Cases involving Unaccounted for Americans in 
     Southeast Asia,'' (November 13, 1995), p. 1.
     \9\ Ibid.
     \10\ Ibid, pp. 4-7.
     \11\ Ibid, p. 6.
     \12\ Ibid.
     \13\ I met with the USAF Casualty Office in San Antonio, 
     Texas prior to changing command. I was scheduled to meet with 
     the USN Casualty Office, but nobody from their office showed 
     up for the appointment they scheduled with me.
     \14\ See Interaction with the Media for a discussion of the 
     training I received.
     \15\ See the Glossary for explanations of these terms.
     \16\ Table 1 reflects the number of remains repatriated 
     during this period. Not all have been identified.
     \17\ The National League of Families is very active in trying 
     to resolve this issue. Though I believe they, like all 
     members of JTF-FA, are committed to achieving the fullest 
     possible accouting, the NLF and its Executive Director are 
     often critical of USG policy toward Vietnam. The NLF did not 
     support either President Clinton's decision to lift the trade 
     embargo against Vietnam, or his decision to normalize 
     relations between the United States and Vietnam.
     \18\ Just as a note of interest, Mr. Willoughby did not think 
     very highly of the accuracy of this book.
     \19\ SRCol Bien was a 45 year PAVN veteran. He fought the 
     Japanese, the French, the Americans, and the Cambodians. He 
     is the MND representative to the VNOSMP.
     \20\ See Glossary.
     \21\ At the time, the USLO had not yet opened. Mr. Hall was 
     the Chief of the Vietnam/Laos/Cambodia desk, East Asian & 
     Pacific Affairs, DOS.
     \22\ Peoples Army of Vietnam.
     \23\ Virginia Foote, President, U.S./Vietnam Trade Council, 
     ``Progress, Problems and Suggestions to MIA accounting,'' 
     memorandum for the March 1996 Presidential Delegation to 
     Vietnam, 29 February 1996.
     \24\ See Glossary for an explanation of trilateral 
     operations.
     \25\ See Glossary.
     \26\ See Glossary for an explanation of ``Fate Determined.''
     \27\ See Glossary.
     \28\ A karst is a relatively small peak jutting straight out 
     of the ground. They are extremely steep, sometimes with sheer 
     faces, and are normally a few hundred feet tall.
     \29\ See Glossary.
     \30\ We do not pay for remains or cooperation, however, we do 
     pay landowners for alterations we inflict on their property; 
     e.g. if we excavate a site in the middle of a farmer's rice 
     paddy, it is only right that we compensate him for his lost 
     crop.
     \31\ See Glossary.
     \32\ See page 72 for an explanation of this program.
     \33\ From June 1994 until June 1995, the following 
     delegations visited Hanoi; two Presidential delegations 
     headed by Ambassador Winston Lord and DSD for Veteran Affairs 
     Herschel Gober, CODEL Bond (Senators Kit Bond, Sam Nunn, John 
     Glenn, David Pryor, William Cohen, and Barbara Mikulski), 
     CODEL Kerry (Senator John Kerry), CODEL Spence (Congressman 
     Floyd Spence), CODEL McCain (Senator John McCain), CODEL 
     Simon/Murkowski, STAFFDEL Record, STAFFDEL Stetson, CODEL 
     Rohrabacher, DASD for POW/MIA Affairs James Wold, DASS Peter 
     Tomsen (2), Admiral Zumwalt, and Sergeant Major of the Army 
     Richard Kidd.
     \34\ We based our assumptions on what we had seen in the 
     past. Each ministry had a normal way of operating, and seldom 
     deviated from it.
     \35\ He had worked with JTF-FA teams for several years, 
     understood American slang as well as most Americans, and was 
     very comfortable in the presence of Americans. He is 
     currently attending American University in Washington, DC on 
     a Ford Foundation grant.
     \36\ Steven Butler, ``A painful search for the missing,'' 
     U.S. News and World Report, 118, no. 17 (May 1, 1995); 62.

[[Page E918]]

     \37\ Ms. Griffith's brother is still unaccounted-for as a 
     result of his aircraft crashing. In her role as the Executive 
     Director of the NLF, Ms. Griffith is an ardent supporter for 
     the families of the unaccounted-for. Her knowledge of the 
     totality of the issue is, in my opinion, second to none. 
     Though I strongly disagree with her on many of her 
     interpretations of the facts, I have never disputed her 
     strong desire to fully resolve this very difficult and 
     emotional issue.
     \38\ Author of A Bright Shining Lie.
     \39\ Ms. Smith is the daughter of a pilot still unaccounted-
     for at the time of my departure. She came to Vietnam to try 
     to find the crash site of her father and to bring some type 
     of closure to her loss. Ms. Smith was able to visit the site 
     we had identified during past JFAs and seemed satisfied with 
     her findings. Shortly after her visit we excavated her 
     father's crash site (the excavation was scheduled prior to 
     her visit, and was not a result of her visit). Excavators 
     found what they believed to be her father's Naval Academy 
     ring in the excavation.
     \40\ See Annex A for a complete explanation of the Mr. Hendon 
     live-sighting claims.
     \41\ I had worked for then BG David Bramlett in the 25th 
     Infantry Division (Light). During most of my tenure in 
     Vietnam, LTG Bramlett was the DCINCPAC.
     \42\ Discussion led by Ambassador Marc Baas to the Asia-
     Pacific Regional Strategic Assessment class on 23 February 
     1996.
     \43\ In his actual meetings with the Vietnamese, by the way, 
     Mr. Gelbard fully supported the issue of missing Americans as 
     the USG's highest priorities, so my concerns regarding that 
     particular visit were possibly somewhat unwarranted. Overall, 
     however, I think the concern was (and may still be) a valid 
     one.
     \44\ Oriental New Year.
     \46\ ``A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving 
     Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia.''
     \47\ Personal Opinion--Mr. Hendon is a former Congressman 
     from North Carolina. I believe that he makes unsubstantiated 
     claims concerning the POW/MIA issue to fan the emotions of 
     families and veterans in America. It is my opinion that he 
     manipulates this issue to win support for election activities 
     and to earn a living.
     \48\ Joe L. Jordan, ``National Vietnam P.O.W. Strike Force'' 
     Newsletter. June 4, 1995.
     \49\ Ibid.
     \50\ Joe L. Jordan, ``National Vietnam P.O.W. Strike Force'' 
     Newsletter. June 9, 1995.
     \51\ Joe L. Jordan, ``National Vietnam P.O.W. Strike Force'' 
     Newsletter. June 4, 1995.
     \52\ ``A Zero-Based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving 
     Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia.'' p. 10.

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