[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 74 (Thursday, May 23, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5628-S5631]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




              DEFEND AMERICA ACT INCREASES NUCLEAR THREAT

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, while the stated intent of the so-called 
Defend America Act is to reduce the threat of nuclear missiles to the 
United States, in fact, the Defend America Act, so-called, will 
actually increase that threat. Its passage would actually make us less 
secure. It should be renamed the Make America Less Secure Act, rather 
than the Defend America Act.
  Do we want defenses? Of course. The issue is not do we want to 
defend. The issue is, against what threats? What threats do we create 
in the process of deploying defense? At what price? What resources do 
we deny ourselves for other threats that may be more real?
  This is not simply the Republican leadership of the Congress--Senator 
Dole, Speaker Gingrich and others--versus President Clinton. In support 
of President Clinton's position are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department.
  Now, this is the letter which General Shalikashvili wrote to Senator 
Nunn relative to this bill. He said in this regard:

       . . . efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from 
     the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START 
     II and, as articulated in the Soviet Statement to the United 
     States of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from 
     START I. I am concerned that failure of either START 
     initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or 
     even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both 
     the costs and risks we may face.

  He continues:

       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     cost and risks by planning [a national missile defense] 
     system consistent with the ABM treaty. The current National 
     Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is 
     consistent with the ABM treaty, will help provide stability 
     in our strategic relationship with Russia as well as reducing 
     future risks from rogue countries.


[[Page S5629]]


  So the conflict that exists here is between the congressional 
Republican leadership on the one hand and President Clinton, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department on the other hand. Of 
course, there are supporters of each of those two leadership groups. 
That is the contrast here. We have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Defense Department that have adopted, with the administration's 
support, a National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program. With 
this so-called Three-plus-Three program, we would develop the system in 
3 years and then, depending on the threat, depending on the cost, 
depending on the situation that exists, we would then decide whether to 
deploy, and could deploy within 3 years of that decision.
  That is the Defense Department position. That is the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff position. That is the administration position: not a commitment 
now to deploy prematurely and unilaterally, which would jeopardize our 
relationship with Russia and undermine our determination that they live 
up to START I and START II. Such a position, as is in this bill, would 
play right into the hands of those supernationalists and jingoists in 
Russia who right now are running for President of that country.
  This is the worst time to be introducing this kind of legislation. 
This is not just me saying this. I am not alone in saying or suggesting 
this. It is not just Senator Levin from Michigan who is doing it. It is 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are saying: do not do anything 
unilaterally to undermine the ABM Treaty, because by doing so Russia 
has informed us that they will no longer comply with START I and will 
not ratify START II. They tell us the result--and now I quote--``with 
the result that Russia would retain hundreds or even thousands more 
nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may 
face.''
  That is the issue before the Senate. Do we want to precipitate that 
kind of action on the part of Russia by a premature, unilateral 
decision that we are going to deploy a system which is inconsistent 
with a critical security agreement between ourselves and Russia? It was 
the wrong time to do it last year and, after much effort, we avoided 
it. It is particularly the wrong time to do it this year because there 
will be an election going on in Russia in the next few weeks. This bill 
will be seized upon by people in Russia who do not believe in START I, 
who do not want to ratify START II. It will be seized upon by them as 
evidence for why they should not ratify START II. That is the fear that 
General Shalikashvili has set forth.

  Now, in addition, this legislation will threaten a number of 
international security efforts besides the START treaties. The so-
called Nunn-Lugar, or cooperative threat reduction program, which helps 
to secure, store, and dismantle former Soviet nuclear warheads so that 
they cannot again threaten any nation, would also be put at risk. 
Negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty to outlaw all nuclear 
weapon tests and help prevent the development of new nuclear weapons 
would be delayed. Russian ratification of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention would be sidelined. So, instead of eliminating the world's 
largest stockpile of chemical weapons, Russia could leave its chemical 
weapons in place.
  This bill could relegate other important cooperative security 
arrangements with Russia to the scrap heap.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
  Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.
  Mr. WARNER. I see no objection to that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LEVIN. There are other important cooperative security 
arrangements with Russia that we have built upon and we have created. 
We have built, finally, some trust and some confidence between our two 
militaries. Our Defense Department does not view Russia as an 
adversary, but as a partner in cooperative security. Take a look at 
what is happening in Bosnia, where we have Russian soldiers under U.S. 
command in the implementation force. Take a look at what has happened 
with the United States and Russian de-targeting of our nuclear 
missiles, where no longer are missiles on either side targeted on the 
other's nations.
  If we threaten unilaterally to violate the ABM Treaty, as the Defend 
America Act does, it could play right into the hands of those in Russia 
who want to return to a hostile relationship. By committing to build 
the system, by making that commitment now to build a system by the year 
2003, the Defend America Act also locks us into possibly the least 
capable technology.
  That is another thing that the Pentagon is not agreeing with. They 
want to develop the technology and, if and when a decision needs to be 
made, to utilize the best technology that is available.
  The Defense Department's missile defense program, which is also the 
administration's missile defense program, the so-called three-plus-
three plan, will develop missile defense technology that will permit a 
deployment decision as soon as 3 years, and then 3 years thereafter, if 
there is a threat that warrants the deployment, and if the military 
capability of that system is such that it is effective, and if the cost 
is such that it justifies the advantage to us, then we can deploy the 
system. And because the threat is estimated to be 15 years away, we can 
continue to develop the technology to make it as effective as possible.
  Mr. President, we have threats now with terrorists acquiring and 
using chemical weapons. It happened in the Tokyo subway, and it could 
happen here in this country. That is a real threat. And there have been 
efforts to smuggle nuclear weapon materials from facilities in the 
former Soviet Union. It is probably no harder to smuggle nuclear 
materials or weapons into the United States than to smuggle drugs. We 
have very few efforts underway to halt that deadly enterprise. Less 
than 20 pounds of plutonium could make a bomb which could destroy an 
American city. Mr. President, 20 pounds of very easily transportable 
plutonium can destroy a city. Yet the proposal before us is to spend 
tens of billions of dollars against threats which are uncertain, which 
the intelligence experts say has not materialized and is unlikely to 
materialize in the next 15 years, at the same time that we are 
underfunding needed defenses against real threats such as the terrorist 
threat using chemical weapons.
  At best, the Dole-Gingrich crash program would only counter a handful 
of foreign missiles--less than the number contained on a single Russian 
submarine. Alternatively, some 50 Russian submarines and their missiles 
would be eliminated outright if the START I and II treaties are 
implemented. It is clear which approach is more reliable and cost-
effective.
  By committing to build a system by 2003 the Defend America Act also 
locks-in the least capable technology. The result would be a very 
``thin'' system, according to the Pentagon. Why lock ourselves into 
such technology prematurely when the threat may eventually demand 
better technology? Our intelligence agencies estimate no new countries 
will build missiles able to reach the continental United States for 15 
years. The risk of a missile launched against the United States is 
already drastically deterred by the guarantee of prompt and devastating 
retaliation.
  Let's look at the price tag. The ``Defend America Act'' says, in 
essence, ``build a system by 2003, whatever the cost.'' When asked 
about the system's cost, Senator Dole admitted ignorance. CBO estimates 
that just buying this system will cost between $31-$60 billion. If the 
Administration requested money for a new weapon system with no 
blueprint and no idea of the cost, Congress would flatly reject it. It 
should do so with the Dole-Gingrich bill.
  If we pour money into premature missile defenses, resources will be 
lacking for other defense efforts that improve our security. To deal 
with security threats to the U.S. we must exercise cooperative threat 
reduction, nonproliferation and arms control efforts. We must also 
maintain our conventional military forces sufficient to dissuade any 
nation from using weapons of mass destruction against us.
  Our strategy to secure the U.S. against weapons of mass destruction 
demands balance. Supporters of the Dole-Gingrich legislation are 
looking backwards at a non-existent Soviet

[[Page S5630]]

Union instead of looking forward to meeting the real emerging threats 
to our national security.
  Finally, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the letter from 
General Shalikashvili to Senator Nunn be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                                   Chairman of the


                                        Joint Chiefs of Staff,

                                      Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Nunn: In response to your recent letter on the 
     Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern 
     with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and 
     the potential threat these missiles may present to the United 
     States and our allies. My staff, along with the CINCs, 
     Services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization 
     (BMDO), is actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we 
     are prepared to field the most technologically capable 
     systems available. We also need to take into account the 
     parallel initiatives ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile 
     threat.
       In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or 
     withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian 
     ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet 
     Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt 
     Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure 
     of either START initiative will result in Russian retention 
     of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby 
     increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
       We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased 
     cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the 
     ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment 
     Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM 
     treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic 
     relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks 
     from rogue countries.
       In closing let me reassure you, Senator Nunn, that I will 
     use my office to ensure a timely national missile defense 
     deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed 
     the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate 
     CINCs, and all are in agreement.
           Sincerely,
                                            John M. Shalikashvili,

                            Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

  Mr. LEVIN. I close, finally, with the last line of General 
Shalikashvili's letter: ``I have discussed the above position with the 
Joint Chiefs and the appropriate CINCs, and all are in agreement.''
  I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the chairman of the Armed Services 
Committee if I may have 5 minutes within which to proceed.
  Mr. THURMOND. The able Senator from Virginia can have 25 minutes if 
he wants to. I am very pleased to hear him speak.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will inquire of my distinguished 
colleague from Michigan, before he departs the floor. I ask my 
colleague from Michigan this. The Senator's opening statement was that 
we should call this bill ``less secure.''
  Mr. President, my understanding is that we have absolutely no ability 
in this country today to interdict an intercontinental ballistic 
missile, or indeed a short-range ballistic missile. I ask my 
distinguished colleague this. We have no security, so how can we be 
less than what I view is zero today?
  Mr. LEVIN. Well, we do have some missile defense against the short-
range missiles, as my good friend from Virginia knows. We are trying to 
improve those defenses. That is an effort that I think almost all 
Senators support, which is the defense against those short-range 
missiles that provide the real threat that those rogue countries indeed 
have. We have the Patriot missile capability, the anti-missile 
capability, and are trying to improve that, for which our committee 
funded the efforts. We are seeking defenses against those theater 
short-range missiles that provide the real threats.
  If I can complete my answer, on the long-range missile, the question 
is twofold----
  Mr. WARNER. If I can interrupt, I will first respond, and then I 
would appreciate it if we could continue. I am fully aware of the 
Patriot system. As a matter of fact, I am the chairman of the 
subcommittee, and my distinguished colleague from Michigan is the 
ranking member and, indeed, we work on that together. We recognize that 
those short-range systems, the Patriot, have to be deployed to the 
region. Theoretically, they cannot run all over the United States. So a 
rogue attack, if it could be mounted, with a short-range theater 
missile somehow against the continental units of the United States is 
dependent on the ability to quickly deploy from what few locations we 
have in that system to some other part of the United States.
  To me, that is highly impractical. That is theoretical. Putting that 
aside, let us agree, I hope, that the United States does not have any 
indigenous ability to defend against an intercontinental missile, 
albeit fired by mistake, fired by a terrorist organization, or perhaps 
intentionally, against Alaska or Hawaii, from say, Russia or China. Am 
I not correct on that?
  Mr. LEVIN. The Senator's question raises the exact reason why the 
Defense Department has adopted the National Missile Defense Deployment 
Readiness Program, which will put us in a position, in 3 years, 
hopefully, where we can make a decision as to whether or not--those are 
the key words, ``whether or not''--to deploy the kind of defense which 
the Senator has just described, without committing us now to do so for 
two reasons. The two reasons are that we do not want to make a 
commitment now, according to our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to 
deploy a system which could undermine the ABM Treaty, which, in turn, 
would then cause Russia not to reduce the number of warheads that she 
has and could cause Russia not to ratify START II. It is in the 
interest of this country that Russia ratify the START II Treaty. The 
other reason given for the Defense Department's position in favor of 
the National Missile Defense Readiness Program, which will address the 
threat the Senator talks about, is that they will then be in a position 
to use the best technology available and not commit themselves 
prematurely to deploy a system that may be an inferior technology.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I listened carefully as my colleague from 
Michigan recited his argument. But I come back to his opening statement 
that this would make us ``less secure.'' We have nothing from which to 
go to a lesser security today, in terms of our ability tomorrow or 
tonight to interdict a stray, unintentional missile, or indeed one 
fired by a terrorist at the United States. Can we agree on that point?
  Mr. LEVIN. No. We can, I hope, agree on this. If, in fact, our 
commitment to deploy a system now causes Russia not to ratify START II, 
or to pull out from START I, leaving her with thousands of additional 
warheads that she otherwise would have gotten rid of, it will indeed 
make us less secure. That is why this bill should be called the Reduce 
America's Security Act of 1996--because the commitment to deploy this 
defense prematurely will, in the view of General Shalikashvili and the 
Joint Chiefs, who share his view, cause Russia to pull out from START 
I, not to ratify START II, and that will make us less secure.
  Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, it is obvious that we are not going 
to come to closure on that point. But we have each made our positions.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senators that under the 
rules we are operating by, there are five minutes for morning business. 
Does the Senator wish to ask for additional time?
  Mr. WARNER. The chairman has put in a request that we have more time. 
I ask unanimous consent that we may proceed for a period in the 
colloquy of another 3 or 4 minutes, and then the Senator from Virginia 
will close with a set of remarks of his own.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Virginia 
is recognized to engage in a colloquy, following which the Senator from 
Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes for morning business.
  Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
  I say this to my good friend. I, with modesty, mention the fact that 
in the period when the ABM Treaty was negotiated, I was privileged to 
be serving in the Department of Defense and, more specifically, under 
the Secretary of the Navy. I followed the preparations and the 
negotiations for the ABM Treaty. Mr. President, it was my privilege to 
accompany the President of the United States and the Secretary of State 
and our chairman to Moscow in May of 1972. My principal responsibility 
was to conclude the negotiation of the Incidents at Sea Treaty, on 
which I have been the principal negotiator, and to be

[[Page S5631]]

the signatory on behalf of the United States on that Executive 
agreement with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet Navy.
  Mr. LEVIN. A landmark agreement it was.
  Mr. WARNER. It is still in effect today, although modified. It is a 
living Executive agreement, in a sense.
  Departing from that and going back to the ABM Treaty, I remember 
reviewing this at that time and in the past 2 or 3 years in the course 
of the debates. Those that were present at that time were clearly of 
one mind that that treaty was never designed to apply to the short-
range theater systems. I might ask, does my distinguished colleague 
concur in that?
  Mr. LEVIN. I do indeed, and that is why we are developing theater 
systems.
  Mr. WARNER. Fine. Well, that is my concern. This ABM treaty has 
indeed, in my judgment, impeded the unfettered, unrestrained technical 
knowledge that this country has available to devise means for a defense 
of the short-range systems. I just wanted to put that point alongside 
the points of my distinguished colleague from Michigan. That concludes 
my inquiry.
  Mr. LEVIN. If I could comment briefly on that, I do not think the 
Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs would agree that we have been 
constrained in the development of the short-range systems, the so-
called ``theater systems.'' We are proceeding apace with those systems, 
and I think we have been assured by the Defense Department that not 
only would we agree that the ABM Treaty does not cover the short-range 
or theater systems, but that the Defense Department does not feel that 
the ABM Treaty has constrained that development. Article 6 of the 
treaty was written, however, very expressly to prevent each nation from 
turning non-ABM systems into ABM systems. That was also part of the 
treaty which was ratified.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would simply close this debate with the 
observation that my criticism is not directed at President Clinton but, 
indeed, to a succession of Presidents who have laid down, should we 
say, a framework within which our scientists, research and development, 
and others have been contained. And, if you look carefully at the 
assertions by the chairman and others, yes, we have not limited them 
within that framework. But I take the position that the framework 
should never have been laid down in the first place predicated on the 
ABM Treaty in the short-range missile defense systems. That never 
should have applied to any of our research and development as 
components for a defense against short-range attack.

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