[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 74 (Thursday, May 23, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5628-S5631]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
DEFEND AMERICA ACT INCREASES NUCLEAR THREAT
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, while the stated intent of the so-called
Defend America Act is to reduce the threat of nuclear missiles to the
United States, in fact, the Defend America Act, so-called, will
actually increase that threat. Its passage would actually make us less
secure. It should be renamed the Make America Less Secure Act, rather
than the Defend America Act.
Do we want defenses? Of course. The issue is not do we want to
defend. The issue is, against what threats? What threats do we create
in the process of deploying defense? At what price? What resources do
we deny ourselves for other threats that may be more real?
This is not simply the Republican leadership of the Congress--Senator
Dole, Speaker Gingrich and others--versus President Clinton. In support
of President Clinton's position are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department.
Now, this is the letter which General Shalikashvili wrote to Senator
Nunn relative to this bill. He said in this regard:
. . . efforts which suggest changes to or withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian ratification of START
II and, as articulated in the Soviet Statement to the United
States of 13 June 1991, could prompt Russia to withdraw from
START I. I am concerned that failure of either START
initiative will result in Russian retention of hundreds or
even thousands more nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both
the costs and risks we may face.
He continues:
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
cost and risks by planning [a national missile defense]
system consistent with the ABM treaty. The current National
Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program, which is
consistent with the ABM treaty, will help provide stability
in our strategic relationship with Russia as well as reducing
future risks from rogue countries.
[[Page S5629]]
So the conflict that exists here is between the congressional
Republican leadership on the one hand and President Clinton, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department on the other hand. Of
course, there are supporters of each of those two leadership groups.
That is the contrast here. We have the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Defense Department that have adopted, with the administration's
support, a National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program. With
this so-called Three-plus-Three program, we would develop the system in
3 years and then, depending on the threat, depending on the cost,
depending on the situation that exists, we would then decide whether to
deploy, and could deploy within 3 years of that decision.
That is the Defense Department position. That is the Joint Chiefs of
Staff position. That is the administration position: not a commitment
now to deploy prematurely and unilaterally, which would jeopardize our
relationship with Russia and undermine our determination that they live
up to START I and START II. Such a position, as is in this bill, would
play right into the hands of those supernationalists and jingoists in
Russia who right now are running for President of that country.
This is the worst time to be introducing this kind of legislation.
This is not just me saying this. I am not alone in saying or suggesting
this. It is not just Senator Levin from Michigan who is doing it. It is
the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are saying: do not do anything
unilaterally to undermine the ABM Treaty, because by doing so Russia
has informed us that they will no longer comply with START I and will
not ratify START II. They tell us the result--and now I quote--``with
the result that Russia would retain hundreds or even thousands more
nuclear weapons, thereby increasing both the costs and risks we may
face.''
That is the issue before the Senate. Do we want to precipitate that
kind of action on the part of Russia by a premature, unilateral
decision that we are going to deploy a system which is inconsistent
with a critical security agreement between ourselves and Russia? It was
the wrong time to do it last year and, after much effort, we avoided
it. It is particularly the wrong time to do it this year because there
will be an election going on in Russia in the next few weeks. This bill
will be seized upon by people in Russia who do not believe in START I,
who do not want to ratify START II. It will be seized upon by them as
evidence for why they should not ratify START II. That is the fear that
General Shalikashvili has set forth.
Now, in addition, this legislation will threaten a number of
international security efforts besides the START treaties. The so-
called Nunn-Lugar, or cooperative threat reduction program, which helps
to secure, store, and dismantle former Soviet nuclear warheads so that
they cannot again threaten any nation, would also be put at risk.
Negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty to outlaw all nuclear
weapon tests and help prevent the development of new nuclear weapons
would be delayed. Russian ratification of the Chemical Weapons
Convention would be sidelined. So, instead of eliminating the world's
largest stockpile of chemical weapons, Russia could leave its chemical
weapons in place.
This bill could relegate other important cooperative security
arrangements with Russia to the scrap heap.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 2 minutes.
Mr. WARNER. I see no objection to that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. LEVIN. There are other important cooperative security
arrangements with Russia that we have built upon and we have created.
We have built, finally, some trust and some confidence between our two
militaries. Our Defense Department does not view Russia as an
adversary, but as a partner in cooperative security. Take a look at
what is happening in Bosnia, where we have Russian soldiers under U.S.
command in the implementation force. Take a look at what has happened
with the United States and Russian de-targeting of our nuclear
missiles, where no longer are missiles on either side targeted on the
other's nations.
If we threaten unilaterally to violate the ABM Treaty, as the Defend
America Act does, it could play right into the hands of those in Russia
who want to return to a hostile relationship. By committing to build
the system, by making that commitment now to build a system by the year
2003, the Defend America Act also locks us into possibly the least
capable technology.
That is another thing that the Pentagon is not agreeing with. They
want to develop the technology and, if and when a decision needs to be
made, to utilize the best technology that is available.
The Defense Department's missile defense program, which is also the
administration's missile defense program, the so-called three-plus-
three plan, will develop missile defense technology that will permit a
deployment decision as soon as 3 years, and then 3 years thereafter, if
there is a threat that warrants the deployment, and if the military
capability of that system is such that it is effective, and if the cost
is such that it justifies the advantage to us, then we can deploy the
system. And because the threat is estimated to be 15 years away, we can
continue to develop the technology to make it as effective as possible.
Mr. President, we have threats now with terrorists acquiring and
using chemical weapons. It happened in the Tokyo subway, and it could
happen here in this country. That is a real threat. And there have been
efforts to smuggle nuclear weapon materials from facilities in the
former Soviet Union. It is probably no harder to smuggle nuclear
materials or weapons into the United States than to smuggle drugs. We
have very few efforts underway to halt that deadly enterprise. Less
than 20 pounds of plutonium could make a bomb which could destroy an
American city. Mr. President, 20 pounds of very easily transportable
plutonium can destroy a city. Yet the proposal before us is to spend
tens of billions of dollars against threats which are uncertain, which
the intelligence experts say has not materialized and is unlikely to
materialize in the next 15 years, at the same time that we are
underfunding needed defenses against real threats such as the terrorist
threat using chemical weapons.
At best, the Dole-Gingrich crash program would only counter a handful
of foreign missiles--less than the number contained on a single Russian
submarine. Alternatively, some 50 Russian submarines and their missiles
would be eliminated outright if the START I and II treaties are
implemented. It is clear which approach is more reliable and cost-
effective.
By committing to build a system by 2003 the Defend America Act also
locks-in the least capable technology. The result would be a very
``thin'' system, according to the Pentagon. Why lock ourselves into
such technology prematurely when the threat may eventually demand
better technology? Our intelligence agencies estimate no new countries
will build missiles able to reach the continental United States for 15
years. The risk of a missile launched against the United States is
already drastically deterred by the guarantee of prompt and devastating
retaliation.
Let's look at the price tag. The ``Defend America Act'' says, in
essence, ``build a system by 2003, whatever the cost.'' When asked
about the system's cost, Senator Dole admitted ignorance. CBO estimates
that just buying this system will cost between $31-$60 billion. If the
Administration requested money for a new weapon system with no
blueprint and no idea of the cost, Congress would flatly reject it. It
should do so with the Dole-Gingrich bill.
If we pour money into premature missile defenses, resources will be
lacking for other defense efforts that improve our security. To deal
with security threats to the U.S. we must exercise cooperative threat
reduction, nonproliferation and arms control efforts. We must also
maintain our conventional military forces sufficient to dissuade any
nation from using weapons of mass destruction against us.
Our strategy to secure the U.S. against weapons of mass destruction
demands balance. Supporters of the Dole-Gingrich legislation are
looking backwards at a non-existent Soviet
[[Page S5630]]
Union instead of looking forward to meeting the real emerging threats
to our national security.
Finally, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the letter from
General Shalikashvili to Senator Nunn be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC, May 1, 1996.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Nunn: In response to your recent letter on the
Defend America Act of 1996, I share Congressional concern
with regard to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and
the potential threat these missiles may present to the United
States and our allies. My staff, along with the CINCs,
Services and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO), is actively reviewing proposed systems to ensure we
are prepared to field the most technologically capable
systems available. We also need to take into account the
parallel initiatives ongoing to reduce the ballistic missile
threat.
In this regard, efforts which suggest changes to or
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty may jeopardize Russian
ratification of START II and, as articulated in the Soviet
Statement to the United States of 13 June 1991, could prompt
Russia to withdraw from START I. I am concerned that failure
of either START initiative will result in Russian retention
of hundreds or even thousands more nuclear weapons thereby
increasing both the costs and risks we may face.
We can reduce the possibility of facing these increased
cost and risks by planning an NMD system consistent with the
ABM treaty. The current National Missile Defense Deployment
Readiness Program (NDRP), which is consistent with the ABM
treaty, will help provide stability in our strategic
relationship with Russia as well as reducing future risks
from rogue countries.
In closing let me reassure you, Senator Nunn, that I will
use my office to ensure a timely national missile defense
deployment decision is made when warranted. I have discussed
the above position with the Joint Chiefs and the appropriate
CINCs, and all are in agreement.
Sincerely,
John M. Shalikashvili,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. LEVIN. I close, finally, with the last line of General
Shalikashvili's letter: ``I have discussed the above position with the
Joint Chiefs and the appropriate CINCs, and all are in agreement.''
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee if I may have 5 minutes within which to proceed.
Mr. THURMOND. The able Senator from Virginia can have 25 minutes if
he wants to. I am very pleased to hear him speak.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I will inquire of my distinguished
colleague from Michigan, before he departs the floor. I ask my
colleague from Michigan this. The Senator's opening statement was that
we should call this bill ``less secure.''
Mr. President, my understanding is that we have absolutely no ability
in this country today to interdict an intercontinental ballistic
missile, or indeed a short-range ballistic missile. I ask my
distinguished colleague this. We have no security, so how can we be
less than what I view is zero today?
Mr. LEVIN. Well, we do have some missile defense against the short-
range missiles, as my good friend from Virginia knows. We are trying to
improve those defenses. That is an effort that I think almost all
Senators support, which is the defense against those short-range
missiles that provide the real threat that those rogue countries indeed
have. We have the Patriot missile capability, the anti-missile
capability, and are trying to improve that, for which our committee
funded the efforts. We are seeking defenses against those theater
short-range missiles that provide the real threats.
If I can complete my answer, on the long-range missile, the question
is twofold----
Mr. WARNER. If I can interrupt, I will first respond, and then I
would appreciate it if we could continue. I am fully aware of the
Patriot system. As a matter of fact, I am the chairman of the
subcommittee, and my distinguished colleague from Michigan is the
ranking member and, indeed, we work on that together. We recognize that
those short-range systems, the Patriot, have to be deployed to the
region. Theoretically, they cannot run all over the United States. So a
rogue attack, if it could be mounted, with a short-range theater
missile somehow against the continental units of the United States is
dependent on the ability to quickly deploy from what few locations we
have in that system to some other part of the United States.
To me, that is highly impractical. That is theoretical. Putting that
aside, let us agree, I hope, that the United States does not have any
indigenous ability to defend against an intercontinental missile,
albeit fired by mistake, fired by a terrorist organization, or perhaps
intentionally, against Alaska or Hawaii, from say, Russia or China. Am
I not correct on that?
Mr. LEVIN. The Senator's question raises the exact reason why the
Defense Department has adopted the National Missile Defense Deployment
Readiness Program, which will put us in a position, in 3 years,
hopefully, where we can make a decision as to whether or not--those are
the key words, ``whether or not''--to deploy the kind of defense which
the Senator has just described, without committing us now to do so for
two reasons. The two reasons are that we do not want to make a
commitment now, according to our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to
deploy a system which could undermine the ABM Treaty, which, in turn,
would then cause Russia not to reduce the number of warheads that she
has and could cause Russia not to ratify START II. It is in the
interest of this country that Russia ratify the START II Treaty. The
other reason given for the Defense Department's position in favor of
the National Missile Defense Readiness Program, which will address the
threat the Senator talks about, is that they will then be in a position
to use the best technology available and not commit themselves
prematurely to deploy a system that may be an inferior technology.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I listened carefully as my colleague from
Michigan recited his argument. But I come back to his opening statement
that this would make us ``less secure.'' We have nothing from which to
go to a lesser security today, in terms of our ability tomorrow or
tonight to interdict a stray, unintentional missile, or indeed one
fired by a terrorist at the United States. Can we agree on that point?
Mr. LEVIN. No. We can, I hope, agree on this. If, in fact, our
commitment to deploy a system now causes Russia not to ratify START II,
or to pull out from START I, leaving her with thousands of additional
warheads that she otherwise would have gotten rid of, it will indeed
make us less secure. That is why this bill should be called the Reduce
America's Security Act of 1996--because the commitment to deploy this
defense prematurely will, in the view of General Shalikashvili and the
Joint Chiefs, who share his view, cause Russia to pull out from START
I, not to ratify START II, and that will make us less secure.
Mr. WARNER. Now, Mr. President, it is obvious that we are not going
to come to closure on that point. But we have each made our positions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senators that under the
rules we are operating by, there are five minutes for morning business.
Does the Senator wish to ask for additional time?
Mr. WARNER. The chairman has put in a request that we have more time.
I ask unanimous consent that we may proceed for a period in the
colloquy of another 3 or 4 minutes, and then the Senator from Virginia
will close with a set of remarks of his own.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Virginia
is recognized to engage in a colloquy, following which the Senator from
Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes for morning business.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.
I say this to my good friend. I, with modesty, mention the fact that
in the period when the ABM Treaty was negotiated, I was privileged to
be serving in the Department of Defense and, more specifically, under
the Secretary of the Navy. I followed the preparations and the
negotiations for the ABM Treaty. Mr. President, it was my privilege to
accompany the President of the United States and the Secretary of State
and our chairman to Moscow in May of 1972. My principal responsibility
was to conclude the negotiation of the Incidents at Sea Treaty, on
which I have been the principal negotiator, and to be
[[Page S5631]]
the signatory on behalf of the United States on that Executive
agreement with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet Navy.
Mr. LEVIN. A landmark agreement it was.
Mr. WARNER. It is still in effect today, although modified. It is a
living Executive agreement, in a sense.
Departing from that and going back to the ABM Treaty, I remember
reviewing this at that time and in the past 2 or 3 years in the course
of the debates. Those that were present at that time were clearly of
one mind that that treaty was never designed to apply to the short-
range theater systems. I might ask, does my distinguished colleague
concur in that?
Mr. LEVIN. I do indeed, and that is why we are developing theater
systems.
Mr. WARNER. Fine. Well, that is my concern. This ABM treaty has
indeed, in my judgment, impeded the unfettered, unrestrained technical
knowledge that this country has available to devise means for a defense
of the short-range systems. I just wanted to put that point alongside
the points of my distinguished colleague from Michigan. That concludes
my inquiry.
Mr. LEVIN. If I could comment briefly on that, I do not think the
Defense Department or the Joint Chiefs would agree that we have been
constrained in the development of the short-range systems, the so-
called ``theater systems.'' We are proceeding apace with those systems,
and I think we have been assured by the Defense Department that not
only would we agree that the ABM Treaty does not cover the short-range
or theater systems, but that the Defense Department does not feel that
the ABM Treaty has constrained that development. Article 6 of the
treaty was written, however, very expressly to prevent each nation from
turning non-ABM systems into ABM systems. That was also part of the
treaty which was ratified.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would simply close this debate with the
observation that my criticism is not directed at President Clinton but,
indeed, to a succession of Presidents who have laid down, should we
say, a framework within which our scientists, research and development,
and others have been contained. And, if you look carefully at the
assertions by the chairman and others, yes, we have not limited them
within that framework. But I take the position that the framework
should never have been laid down in the first place predicated on the
ABM Treaty in the short-range missile defense systems. That never
should have applied to any of our research and development as
components for a defense against short-range attack.
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