[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 74 (Thursday, May 23, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S5621-S5622]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




             ON THE EVE OF RUSSIA'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

 Mr. PELL. Mr. President, since the Soviet Union broke up in 
December 1991, Russians have undergone five very painful years of 
political and economic transition. Life is difficult and uncertain for 
many average Russians. In Russia's most recent elections, held last 
December, Communists gained control of the Russian legislature and pro-
reform parties were marginalized. Earlier this year, that Parliament 
voted to abrogate the treaty which disbanded the Soviet Union. While 
rejecting the Parliament's vote, President Yeltsin is nevertheless 
pursuing closer ties with its former Soviet neighbors. President Boris 
Yeltsin has also made several key personnel changes in the last few 
months, dismissing some of the key reformers. War continues to rage in 
Chechnya. At the same time, Russia has agreed to adhere to stringent 
economic requirements to continue to receive funding from International 
Monetary Fund.
  Against this backdrop, on June 16, in less than a month, Russians 
will go to the polls to elect a President. Whatever the outcome, this 
election will have profound implications for the course of reform in 
Russia, the future of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union, the development of United States-Russian 
relations, and in fact, global stability.
  I fear that we are not giving enough thought and attention to what is 
taking place in Russia and particularly to how the impending election 
might affect United States-Russian relations. Accordingly, majority and 
minority staff members of the Foreign Relations Committee were recently 
tasked with visiting Russia to get a sense of the issues and the 
candidates in the lead-up to the elections. They have prepared a report 
based upon their visit which I would commend to my colleagues.
  The report makes no predictions about the outcome of the election. 
Rather, it presents some of the issues confronting the candidates and 
the electorate, including economic and key foreign policy issues. I 
would ask that the report summary be placed in the Record at the end of 
my remarks.
  The bottom line is that no one can predict what will happen in Russia 
in the coming weeks and months. I believe, however, that it is 
important to be as informed as possible about developments in Russia so 
as to avoid uninformed or knee-jerk reactions to events there. I 
believe the committee staff report makes a useful contribution to the 
discussion.
  I am pleased to note that the staff trip was conducted and the report 
was written on a bipartisan basis. I would like to thank Senator Helms 
and his staff for the high level of cooperation they have offered on 
this venture. I know that we share the goal of supporting continued 
reform in Russia, and as Russia heads into a period of uncertainty, I 
am hopeful that we can continue to work together to promote that goal.


                        summary of key findings

  On June 16, 1996, the Russian Federation will hold Presidential 
elections. By any estimation, this election--just over a month away--
will have profound implications for the course of reform in Russia, the 
future of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, the development of United States-Russian relations, and in fact, 
global stability. No clear favorite candidate has yet emerged.
  The Russian presidential election comes in the wake of five very 
painful years of political and economic transition. Ironically, just as 
the Russian economy shows evidence of imminent growth, the Russian 
electorate's hostility to reform and pro-reform candidates is peaking.
  The Russian people appear to fear change more than they dislike 
President Boris Yeltsin. However, voter discontent runs deep and 
nostalgia for the better, more stable and predictable times, whether 
based on reality or not, is the order of the day. Many equate

[[Page S5622]]

democracy with a breakdown of order, rampant crime and corruption, and 
oppression by the mafia.
  At this point, it appears that the Communist candidate, Gennadiy 
Zyuganov, has the largest amount of support among the electorate. 
Zyuganov has a chameleon-like ability to tailor his message to a 
particular audience. It is, therefore, difficult to distinguish his 
true beliefs from his campaign rhetoric, and by extension to predict 
how the Communist Party, if it captures the Presidency, would manage 
the Russian economy, political system, and foreign policy.
  Many in Russia conclude that an electoral victory by the Communists 
would inevitably result in dictatorship. Such fears may not be 
overblown: anecdotal information indicates that some reformers are 
keeping their exit visas current through the presidential election. The 
gloomier analysts even predict a prompt reopening of the gulags and the 
reemergence of political trials.
  Two trends in the Russian economy may serve to sustain market reforms 
in Russia even if an anti-market candidate is elected President. The 
first is the growing base of small businesses. The second is the 
increasing flow of economic power to the regions.
  President Yeltsin has predicted that he will prevail in the first 
round of the June 16 election, gathering enough of the vote to win the 
election outright. While such an outcome is nearly impossible, Yeltsin 
is widely viewed as a likely second place finisher--which is sufficient 
to get him into the run-off.
  While President Yeltsin's core supporters within the electorate are 
outnumbered by those committed to the Communists, it is widely believed 
that he has much more opportunity to broaden his support as the 
campaign wears on.
  Vladimir Zhirinovsky must be considered a serious contender if for no 
other reason than that he has consistently exceeded the expectations of 
most analysts. While he is reviled by most opponents, Zhirinovsky has a 
loyal, if somewhat fractious electoral base. His high negative rating 
makes his chances of victory near impossible. A widely split vote among 
pro-reform candidates, however, could propel him into the second round, 
thereby creating the nightmare scenario for Russia's democratic 
reformers: a runoff between Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky.

  Grigory Yavlinsky considers himself to be the last, true democratic 
reform leader in Russia. Certainly, he is the last democrat with 
anything resembling a popular constituency in Russia today, although 
many question whether his popularity extends much beyond Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.
  The key to Yavlinsky's electoral strategy is to build a coalition--
the so-called ``third force''--with fellow candidates Svyatoslav 
Fyodorov and General Alexandr Lebed. The three--all of whom have 
collected the necessary one million signatures to be listed on the 
ballot--have tentatively agreed to support the most popular among them. 
The problem is that each of the three believes himself to be that 
person.
  Aside from the campaign performance of the various candidates for the 
Presidential election, other factors which may influence the outcome 
include voter turnout and the ever present threat of fraud. Even if the 
June election is relatively fair, charges of fraud will likely be made 
by those who fail to make the second round.
  Russian politicians readily admit that foreign policy will not play a 
major role in the upcoming presidential election campaign. That being 
said, Russia's identity and role in the world is a theme that all 
candidates are exploiting--and to which voters seem to be responding.
  Given the resonance that nationalist themes have among the 
electorate, it is not surprising that the current government is 
emphasizing Russian integration with other countries of the former 
Soviet Union, rethinking its relationship with the United States, and 
opposing NATO expansion.
  Russian officials go to great lengths to emphasize that the 
government is pursuing integration with its neighbors as distinct from 
reintegration. According to these officials, the distinction is that 
reintegration would imply a reimposition of a command economy and 
reestablishment of the Soviet Union, while integration implies a 
voluntary relationship on the model of the European Union.
  After the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, there was 
general euphoria in Washington and Moscow about the prospects for a 
United States--Russian partnership on a wide range of foreign policy, 
arms control, and other issues. By 1994, however, several events had 
occurred which collectively served to dampen enthusiasm in both 
capitals about the prospects for close United States-Russian 
cooperation.
  Both Washington and Moscow had unrealistic expectations about the 
possibilities for United States-Russian relations. Still, many 
Russians, while readily admitting that things had changed, are 
reluctant to abandon the notion of a Russian-United States 
partnership--particularly on issues of mutual interest such as arms 
control and the fight against organized crime and terrorism.
  Even those who admit to a cooling in relations with the United States 
point to United States-Russian collaboration in Bosnia as a success 
story and a model for future cooperation. Given previous United States-
Russian divisions over Bosnia--with the Russians traditionally taking 
positions sympathetic to the Serbs--Russian satisfaction with the 
current IFOR arrangement is particularly noteworthy.
  While Russian officials continue to voice their opposition to NATO 
expansion, their arguments are often contradictory and muddled. It is 
difficult to gauge whether apparent Russian apprehensions are genuine 
or calculated.
  Russian officials offer an unapologetic though naive defense of 
Russia's relationship with Iran. They regard Russia's relations with 
Iran as normal, and perceive Iran neither as enemy nor ally. Russian 
officials completely dismiss suggestions that Iran may use technology 
acquired from Russia to develop a nuclear weapons program.
  Russian foreign policy analysts are divided over whether close 
relations can be forged with the People's Republic of China. 
Nonetheless, despite this skepticism, many endorse expanded cooperation 
with China as a useful counterbalance to the United States on issues 
such as NATO expansion.

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