[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 74 (Thursday, May 23, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Page S5611]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                         ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

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                  REFORM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I would like to briefly discuss the 
need for reform of our intelligence agencies. This is a subject that 
has occupied the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at least since 
I was vice chairman during the mid-1980's, and I am encouraged that the 
Congress and the administration are making progress on this. I applaud 
the work of Chairman Specter and Vice Chairman Kerrey for their efforts 
in this area.
  I do not think there is any longer a serious question that our 
intelligence agencies need reform. The issue is what kind of reform, 
and how much.
  For over 40 years, the CIA, the DIA, the State Department's 
Intelligence and Research Bureau, and every other agency or department 
that has ever had any pretensions of playing a role in national 
security or foreign policy, geared their intelligence activities to the 
necessities of the cold war. The entire structure, which was poorly 
coordinated, duplicative, inefficient, and often ineffective, was set 
up to respond to the Soviet threat.
  Billions of dollars were spent on activities which today have little 
relevance to our intelligence needs or budgetary realities and more 
importantly, failed to even predict the greatest event since World War 
II--the disintegration of the former Soviet Union.
  Appalling lapses have only recently come to light, the Aldrich Ames 
case being the most notorious example. The CIA's payment of thousands 
of dollars to a Guatemalan colonel who it had reason to believe had 
been involved in the murder of an American citizen, is another. 
Unfortunately, there are others.
  But beyond these widely publicized lapses in judgment and 
intelligence analysis, a culture developed within the intelligence 
community that at times resulted in intelligence officials withholding 
crucial information from other officials in the administration and 
Congress who were formulating and implementing policy. There are 
examples of station chiefs failing to disclose information to our 
ambassadors about a matter of grave importance. In Guatemala, the CIA 
station chief reportedly failed to inform our Ambassador of information 
relating to the murder of an American citizen by Guatemalan soldiers. 
The Ambassador, left in the dark, told the victim's family that the 
Embassy had no information about this crime.
  I did not rise today simply to point out the failures of the 
intelligence community. Our intelligence agencies are comprised of hard 
working, dedicated people who often provide critical and accurate 
information to the Congress and the executive branch. However, since 
the end of the cold war our intelligence needs have changed 
dramatically while our intelligence agencies have not.
  The U.S. intelligence community must reinvent itself to address more 
effectively the growing threats to our national security, including 
regional conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
international organized crime, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. In 
order to do so effectively, the intelligence community must reduce 
duplication between agencies, increase efficiency, create a greater 
accountability for the Director of Central Intelligence, and increase 
the role of oversight to ensure that the reforms are cost effective.
  In response to the changing role of U.S. intelligence, in 1994, 
former Senator Dennis DeConcini and the senior Senator from Virginia, 
Senator John Warner, proposed the creation of a bipartisan commission 
made up of Members of Congress, the administration, and the private 
sector to review the current condition of the intelligence community 
and propose ideas for how best to make lasting reforms. The 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 created the 
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community chaired by former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. 
Unfortunately, Les passed away several months after his appointment, 
but his enthusiasm and hard work were not lost on the 
Commission's members or its staff.

  The Commission's goal was to review the role of the U.S. intelligence 
community in the post-cold war world. After almost a year's work, the 
Commission issued its findings and recommendations on March 1, 1996.
  The Commission recommended that U.S. intelligence agencies should 
integrate intelligence into the policy community, expand cooperation 
between agencies and the Congress and create greater efficiency in 
order to meet the intelligence requirements of the 21st century. I 
strongly support these goals.
  But the Commission did not go far enough. I am convinced that 
substantive reforms will not take root unless the Director of Central 
Intelligence is given more authority and control over the entire 
intelligence budget.
  I have no doubt that Director Deutch is one of the CIA's finest 
Directors. However, he does not have sufficient resources at his 
disposal to fully reform the many different intelligence agencies 
throughout the Federal Government.
  Although Director Deutch is responsible for approving the annual 
budget for our national intelligence agencies, over 95 percent of the 
intelligence budget is funded through the Department of Defense and 85 
percent of the intelligence budget is utilized by agencies not under 
his control. This must change.
  I am encouraged that the Senate Intelligence Committee recently took 
a step toward providing the DCI with greater control over the 
intelligence budget. On April 24, the committee supported the Clinton 
administration's proposal to declassify the amount spent on the 
intelligence budget. More importantly, the committee supported 
proposals to give the DCI a role in appointing the heads of all the 
intelligence agencies and greater control over the entire intelligence 
budget, including those intelligence agencies within the Pentagon. I 
applaud the committee's actions and while I hope the Senate will debate 
this further, I urge the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
to support the Intelligence Committee's goals.
  In addition to providing the DCI with more control over the 
intelligence budget, I believe that the cloak of secrecy should be 
removed from the intelligence community to as great an extent as 
possible. As a government that prides itself on its openness, the 
United States should not restrict access to information that does not 
jeopardize national security.
  Mr. President, I have the greatest respect for the senior Senator 
from New York, Senator Moynihan, the former vice chair of the 
Intelligence Committee. Senator Moynihan's knowledge of history and his 
experience both before and during his service in the U.S. Senate give 
him tremendous insight into how the intelligence community should be 
reformed.
  I agree with Senator Moynihan's concern about secrecy in the 
intelligence community. The extraordinary and excessive efforts to 
classify harmless information wastes money, discourages informed 
debate, and leads to inaccurate information treated as fact by the 
people who are responsible for crafting U.S. foreign policy. In 
reality, much of what is deemed to be secret can be found by picking up 
the morning paper or watching CNN.
  I hope that the Congress and the executive branch will work together 
to reform the U.S. intelligence community. The report on the Commission 
on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence 
Community is a good place to start, but its proposals should not be the 
only reforms discussed. We must continue to work to ensure that the 
intelligence community becomes cost effective and addresses the 
intelligence needs of the 21st century.

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