[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 73 (Wednesday, May 22, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H5389-H5424]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 437 and rule 
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House 
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3259.

                              {time}  1045


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
3259) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, 
the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with Mr. 
Dickey in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] and the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] will each control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to bring H.R. 3259, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 1997, before my colleagues for 
consideration and, I trust, approval.
  Before I turn to the contents of the bill, I would like to thank the 
staff of the committee for their hard work. We marked up two bills in 1 
week and brought this bill to the floor in half the time that we have 
taken in the past. None of this would be possible without our staff's 
diligence and very long hours.
  Five short months ago, I spoke on the floor about the conference 
report for the fiscal year 1996 authorization. I noted at that time 
that we had been disappointed in the President's budget submission on 
intelligence for fiscal year 1996 because it did not show the forward 
thinking and vision I think our intelligence policy needs. Instead of a 
blueprint, we got a snapshot of 1 year's needs. I also noted that 
another such submission would not be acceptable. I had been assured by 
both the Vice President and the Director of Central Intelligence that 
the fiscal year 1997 intelligence budget would show vision and 
foresight.
  Unfortunately, this has not been the case. The budget we received was 
more of the same, another status quo budget. To say that we have been 
disappointed would be an understatement. That is why the committee has 
made more substantial changes in the intelligence budget than last 
year. The details of those changes are in the classified annex, which I 
hope Members have taken the time to read.
  Our changes were made only after the most careful consideration. We 
held 6 full committee hearings, 15 member briefings, and more than 100 
staff briefings. I might add that we expect to have further briefings 
between now and conference on issues that are still undergoing changes.
  Overall, this bill increases the amount requested by the President by 
an additional 3.9 percent. It is money well spent. As always, our 
ability to talk in detail on this subject is limited, but as many of my 
colleagues know, U.S. intelligence continues to provide crucial support 
for sensitive negotiations and for U.S. forces deployed overseas, and 
in combating terrorism, narcotics, and proliferation.
  I would like to spend a few moments highlighting some of the major 
aspects of this bill.
  Our most important intelligence asset is the people who are the 
intelligence community. Downsizing, more drastic than we had first 
assumed, has taken its toll and yet we are still faced with the problem 
of the proper skills mix in each NFIP agency. There are also a number 
of quality of life issues that are of fundamental importance. I give 
DCI Deutch full credit for making personnel reform his highest priority 
issue. Unfortunately, he did not provide the committee with the kinds 
of detail we require in order for us to commit the sums of money he 
needs. Section 403 of our bill denies authorization for the expenditure 
of funds for personnel reforms until the committee is briefed. Some may 
argue that we are taking the DCI to task with this provision. We are 
not. Our colleagues in the other body have no provisions at all in 
their bill that deal with personnel reform. Section 403 is a good-faith 
pledge on the part of our committee that we will address this important 
issue when we have a detailed proposal.
  Some of our most important changes to the President's budget are in 
the National Reconnaissance Program. Last year we began to force the 
NRO to give more thought to alternative means of intelligence 
collection, with satellites that are smaller and cheaper, yet no less 
capable. Many attacked this vision. I am happy to report that it has 
been confirmed by experts and that we will continue to push the NRO 
along these lines. We are coming up to a crucial moment of generational 
change in our satellite systems. Unless we begin planning for that now, 
we will face a future when we will pay more to know less in a more 
complex world.
  As we did last year, we are limiting the amount of money that can be 
spent on declassification under President Clinton's Executive Order 
12958. We favor more open government. Some of the recent 
declassifications of such programs as CORONA and VENONA underscore the 
achievements and importance of intelligence. But we do take exception 
to having annual expenditures mandated by an Executive order for a 
program that has yet to prove it can declassify without revealing 
secrets.
  H.R. 3237 helps put us on the path toward the intelligence community 
we will need in the 21st century. I despair that this President will 
ever give us the kind of intelligence budget that will move us in the 
right direction by bold and large steps, rather than hesitant ones. I 
look forward to the next President doing so, soon. Until then, I know 
that my colleagues will support this bill so that we can move the 
intelligence community in a positive direction.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the legislation now before the 
House.
  I want to begin by commending Chairman Combest for the manner in 
which he has presided over the committee's activities this year. He has 
been solicitous of the views of the Democratic members and has sought 
to address our concerns when he felt it possible to do so. We do not 
agree on every issue, although we do agree on many, but I have always 
felt that he was willing to give us the opportunity to make our case, 
particularly on matters concerning the intelligence budget.
  We are, of course, waiting to have a couple of additional hearings, 
Mr. Chairman, on some of the issues that we discussed in our markup.
  At a time when most programs are feeling the effects of a constrained 
budget environment, H.R. 3259 provides a significant increase--nearly 5 
percent over the amount authorized for the current fiscal year and 
about 6.5 percent over the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1996. 
While some of this increase is the result of the substantially higher 
defense budget approved by the House, a major portion reflects 
decisions by the committee that a number

[[Page H5390]]

of intelligence systems need to be modernized to respond to future 
requirements. These improvements to highly complex systems are 
expensive, but they are necessary if the United States is to retain the 
world's preeminent intelligence capability--a capability that will be 
of increasing importance as a source of early warning to policymakers 
and military commanders in the years ahead. I urge the House not to 
adopt amendments which would make across-the-board reductions in the 
authorization level in this bill. While I understand the sincerity of 
the views which motivate those amendments, I believe they would 
substantially impair the ability of the intelligence community to make 
investments in several systems that will be of great value in the 
future.
  In spite of the positive aspects of this bill, committee Democrats 
have, as we did last year, several fundamental disagreements with the 
majority over programs administered by the National Reconnaissance 
Office [NRO]. The bill would terminate or delay a number of programs 
designed either to address intelligence shortcomings noted in the 
Persian Gulf war or in other ways to improve the provision of timely 
support to intelligence customers, particularly the battlefield 
commander. Military operations, and the sophisticated weapons systems 
which are used in them, place an increasingly high premium on accurate 
intelligence.
  On March 6 of this year, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and 
former Senator Warren Rudman appeared before the committee in open 
session to report on the work of a commission they led, and on which I 
served, to examine the roles and capabilities of U.S. intelligence. At 
the March 6 hearing, Secretary Brown noted that ``if it were not for 
the existence of the Department of Defense, the intelligence budget 
would, in my judgment, be maybe 10 percent of what it is.'' I agree 
with Secretary Brown about the priority of military requirements within 
those assigned to the intelligence community. I further believe that we 
should proceed very carefully when we decide to alter a satellite 
architecture which Defense Department officials, both civilian and 
uniformed, have indicated is essential to ensuring that future military 
operations can be conducted successfully without unnecessarily 
endangering American personnel.
  Regrettably, the committee has embarked on a course, with respect to 
NRO programs, which will leave important military intelligence 
requirements unmet. That is not a good result in a bill which 
establishes authorization levels that in the aggregate can only be 
justified on national security grounds. Before we finally endorse 
decisions which may place at risk the ability of the Department of 
Defense to fulfill its mission, we need to clearly understand what 
capabilities we are being asked to forgo and the consequences of those 
actions. To his credit, Chairman Combest has promised that, before we 
get to conference on this legislation, hearings will be held on these 
matters. I hope those sessions will provide a firmer basis than we now 
have for making judgments in these critical areas.
  Mr. Chairman, despite the reservations just expressed, I believe the 
bill before us is, in balance, a sound one and should be approved. I 
look forward to working with Mr. Combest to improve it in conference, 
but I urge its adoption today.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. 
Richardson], a distinguished member of our committee.
  (Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding 
time to me.
  Mr. Chairman, let me first express my most heartfelt appreciation to 
Chairman Combest for his support in allowing me to undertake several 
initiatives in the intelligence and foreign policy arena. Mr. Combest 
has been very accommodating since assuming the chairmanship of the 
Intelligence Committee and I want to commend him for his stewardship.
  Second, I would like to congratulate the chairman for crafting a bill 
in a nonpartisan fashion that catapults our intelligence community into 
the future armed with the necessary tools to perform an ever changing 
and diverse mission. In past years, the focus of our intelligence 
operations and efforts were rightfully targeted predominately at the 
former Soviet Union. With the demise of the cold war and the 
splintering into several independent states of the Soviet Union, new 
and different requirements have been leveled on the intelligence 
community. No longer can we concentrate solely on issues concerning 
Soviet force strength and military concept of operations. Today's 
policy makers need accurate intelligence information on global issues 
such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, 
terrorism and world economies. I am confident that the bill crafted by 
the chairman and ranking democratic member Norm Dicks, prepares the 
community to meet the challenges posed by their new missions and 
requirements.
  When Director Deutch testified at his confirmation hearing before the 
Senate Intelligence Committee he stated that his No. 1 priority was to 
replace an arcane and ancient personnel system with a system that 
responded to the dynamics of todays working men and women. I am 
concerned with the committees action in not fully supporting the 
Director in his personnel initiative and fear the action that the 
committee has taken is simply not in the best interests of the 
dedicated men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency. These 
individuals perform very difficult tasks and it is in large part 
because of the tireless work they do that Americans across our great 
Nation are able to sleep peacefully at night without fear of a foreign 
threat. In the coming weeks I hope that the committee will not lose 
sight that people are the CIA's most valuable asset and that the 
necessary funds should be authorized if we are to maintain an 
intelligence agency second to none in the world. The DCI has put a 
tremendous amount of thought and work into this effort and we should 
support the employees of CIA by throwing the weight of this committee 
and the Congress behind the personnel proposal.

  Mr. Chairman, when I was first appointed to serve on this important 
committee I was struck by the dearth of minorities employed in the 
intelligence community. The percentages of minorities represented in 
the various intelligence agencies lagged so far behind the civilian 
labor force that it was quite frankly embarrassing. Since that time, 
significant progress has been achieved and I congratulate the directors 
of intelligence community agencies for their attention to this very 
important issue. Women and minorities have always been and shall 
continue to be significant contributors to our society. Their talent, 
commitment, and patriotism is as evident as anybody's and they should 
have the same opportunities as any American. I encourage the leaders of 
the intelligence community to continue to tap into the vast resources 
of our minority and female population. Additionally, I want to praise 
Chairman Combest for his commitment in continuing this committee's 
resolve to discharge our oversight responsibility in this critical 
area.
  Mr. Chairman, throughout my tenure on the Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence I have been a constant proponent of covert action. When 
used properly in support of foreign policy, covert action is an 
effective weapon in a diplomats arsenal. To ensure our capability to 
conduct successful covert action activities, an infrastructure must be 
maintained that will permit the CIA to undertake covert action 
activities on short notice yet with the necessary support base required 
for successful operations. I believe that the bill before us today 
satisfies my concern that such a capability be sustained at an 
appropriate level. While the need for engaging in covert activities may 
be minimal today, nobody can predict the future. Therefor, maintaining 
a prudent infrastructure acts as an insurance policy for our Nation and 
I am pleased to recognize that our bill provides our citizens with the 
necessary coverage.
  In closing Mr. Chairman, I would like to express one final concern. 
While I support this bill I am somewhat troubled by the funding level. 
The measure before us today is 3.9 percent above the administration's 
request and 4.9 percent over last year's authorized level. In a period 
of Government downsizing

[[Page H5391]]

every effort should be made to ensure that no agency is getting more 
money than it needs. In fact, we in Congress should do everything in 
our power to ensure that the Federal Government operates on an astute 
budget. I am fully aware of the importance intelligence plays in our 
Nation's security and of the argument that as our defense establishment 
downsizes the role of the intelligence community increases if for no 
other reason than for indications and warning purposes. However, we 
must not exempt intelligence agencies from sharing their fair burden in 
downsizing the Federal Government. That being said, let me point out 
that I have full and complete confidence in the chairman and ranking 
Democratic members ability to formulate an intelligence budget that 
accurately reflects the needs of our country. I just wanted to raise 
this issue as a concern of mine because I don't want to send a signal 
that there is a bottomless reservoir of funds available for 
intelligence purposes. My concerns about funding levels and commitment 
to maintaining a lean yet sufficient intelligence budget is in no way 
reflective of the high regard in which I hold intelligence community 
personnel. I appreciate the fine work intelligence employees do, the 
Nation appreciates the duties they perform.

                              {time}  1100

  Mr. Chairman, at a later time in this amendment process I will be 
offering an amendment that I believe makes sense, that is supported by 
the Nation's journalists and media, that basically states, which is 
already a policy of the agency, that no intelligence assets will be 
used with journalists. I will be offering this amendment later. I urge 
support for this provision.
  Again, my thanks to Chairman Combest for his support of my activities 
and for crafting a good bill, not a perfect bill, but still a bill that 
deserves our support.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes to say I 
appreciate the kind remarks of both the ranking member, Mr. Dicks, and 
the gentleman from New Mexico, Mr. Richardson. It is a pleasure working 
with all members of this committee. While we may have some 
philosophical differences, we, I think as well as any committee, have 
always tried to make certain that every member was heard.
  Let me just make two quick comments, one on the issue of the comments 
by the gentleman from New Mexico on the overall amount of the budget. I 
would remind Members that in real numbers this budget is 14 percent 
below fiscal year 1990 in terms of expenditures.
  The issue of personnel, I would just want to state for the record 
that this committee has always had, No. 1, a keen respect and 
admiration for the individuals who put their lives on the line and for 
the intelligence community. We initiated on this committee in the past 
major personnel reforms. I might add last year we did that, as well, 
and found both the administration and other committees of the Congress 
in objection to those, and subsequently those were removed from the 
bill.
  As explained to the Members in the personnel hearing, we will be 
moving forward on the DCI's recommendations for personnel reform, only 
wanting to look at those in a much more detailed fashion than we have 
been able to do up to this point. I would be remiss if I did not 
indicate we do have great admiration for those people who are involved 
in the community.
  In the area of overall funding, without getting into those areas that 
make it difficult to discuss, I am sure the gentleman from New Mexico 
is aware, following a discussion of the National Reconnaissance 
Organization's carry-forward account last year, which was discussed 
quite publicly, and even more so recently, there were substantial 
reductions taken in last year's level. When we compare our this year's 
bill to the last year's level, we are accommodating a request of the 
administration to replace some of those funds that were taken out last 
year, to the tune of several hundreds of millions of dollars and, 
consequently, that is reflected in the overall.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
[Mr. Shuster], a very valued member who is in his second term or 
sentence on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, however one 
might put that, and at one time served as ranking member, who I had the 
fortune of sitting next to.
  Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Combest for yielding me 
the time. I certainly rise in strong support of this legislation. This 
act funds a wide range of extremely important intelligence activities 
which are vital to our national security.
  One of the areas in which I paid particular attention when I did 
serve as the ranking member of the committee, and have continued to 
focus on, is the area of illegal drugs coming into this country. 
Indeed, in 1989 I was very supportive, along with others, in creating 
the counternarcotics center at the CIA.
  Since the creation of that center and in large measure because of the 
creation of that center, extraordinary successes have been realized in 
bringing down key elements of the Colombian drug cartel. While the 
specific examples remain classified, one can say quite positively, 
forcefully, and enthusiastically that our country and our intelligence 
community has made very substantial contributions and great successes 
in weakening the Colombian drug cartel.
  Sadly, however, in the last 3 years we have not seen the same robust 
effort with this administration that we witnessed during President 
Bush's tenure, when he really revitalized our counternarcotics 
intelligence programs and announced for the first time a national drug 
control strategy in August 1989.
  Many people do not realize that in America, from 1980 to 1992, our 
country witnessed a steady decline in drug use. Let me emphasize that. 
From the beginning of the Reagan administration through the Bush 
administration, our Nation witnessed a steady decline in drug use. This 
was in large measure because both President Reagan and President Bush 
and their administrations were very serious about targeting the drug 
flow into the United States.
  Sadly, since 1993 drugs have once again been on the upsurge. 
According to Donna Shalala, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
marijuana use in our most vulnerable youth, ages 12 through 17, doubled 
between 1992 and 1994, and virtually every hard-core user once started 
as a casual user. It usually starts with marijuana, amphetamines, or 
other so-called soft drugs that are attractive to our youth.
  We indeed need to revitalize at the very top levels of this 
administration our counterdrug programs, and the dramatic rise in 
marijuana use is a wake-up call to all of us.
  Now, as Chairman Combest and the committee considered what can be 
done about this problem this year, an important opportunity presented 
itself, which was the transfer of the National Drug Intelligence Center 
to the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This drug intelligence 
center, which was first chartered in 1991, provides strategic 
intelligence for all sources, including the national foreign 
intelligence community, collates it and provides information to law 
enforcement entities to assist their activities in the United States.
  They are able to provide critical intelligence to chosen links to 
foreign narcotics organizations and indeed their arms in the United 
States. This enables law enforcement here, both DIA, FBI and others, to 
reach out and strike against narcotics traffickers in the United States 
as well as those abroad. The Drug Intelligence Center can draw on a 
pool of highly talented and motivated professionals.
  Congressman Jack Murtha deserves tremendous credit for really being 
the father of this program, and I am very pleased to continue the 
support of that effort. Moreover, I pledge as a member of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence to ensure that the national foreign 
intelligence community provides all the support it can to the Drug 
Intelligence Center consistent with existing law.
  For all those reasons, Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge the passage of 
this legislation.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Skaggs], a very valued member of our 
committee.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.

[[Page H5392]]

  Mr. Chairman, first of all, I also want to thank our chairman, who 
has been very responsive and accommodating, as well as our ranking 
member, the gentleman from Washington, and the terrific staff that this 
select committee is privileged to rely on.
  I want to support this bill because I believe on balance it does meet 
vital national security needs. However, I do have some serious concerns 
about it.
  It is obviously essential to support the activities of the 
intelligence community as we seek to understand and confront a whole 
range of post-cold-war challenges, whether terrorism or weapons of mass 
destruction, environmental degradation, many other things. This bill 
provides budget authority for these important responsibilities. And we 
should also be under no illusion that, just because the cold war is 
over, that this country faces no traditional threats to our national 
security, at which intelligence capabilities need to be directed.
  I do have concern about the overall authorization level, as has 
already been pointed out. It exceeds substantially the amount requested 
by the President, the amount authorized and the amount appropriated for 
this fiscal year. In a time of tight budgets, when we are cutting 
environmental enforcement, education or any number of things, I would 
have preferred an authorization closer to the President's request. But 
authorizing more doesn't automatically translate into appropriations.
  Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of serious concerns that I would like 
to address, involving continued support for the declassification of 
documents, and funding for what is known as the Environmental 
Intelligence and Applications Program.
  The first of these relates to the President's Executive order 
establishing a uniform system for declassification, safeguarding and 
handling national security information and the implementation of that 
order. There are some statements in the committee's report on this bill 
that criticize the approach being taken under that order and the way 
reviewing agencies are handling document declassification.
  The statements suggest that the majority may be proposing the 
adoption of an extremely restrictive and, I fear, an extremely slow and 
expensive, risk elimination approach, rather than a risk management 
approach, to the handling of declassification. It remains a fact that 
there are documents that should be declassified, documents that remain 
classified for no other reason than inertia. Declassifying them should 
proceed, and I am convinced that this task can be managed at acceptable 
cost and without compromising sensitive information.
  The current risk management approach does not lead to any abdication 
of agency responsibility to protect sources and methods; it simply is a 
sensible acknowledgement that resources should be focused in areas of 
greatest risk. If Congress mandates a system of reviewing documents 
that is so cumbersome that there is virtually no chance of anything 
getting declassified, we will be right back where we started before 
this reform effort got underway.
  Mr. Chairman, the second area I would like to speak to has to do with 
the Environmental Intelligence Applications Program. The bill before 
the House right now would authorize only $6 million here, significantly 
below the President's request. I think this is a shortsighted cut and 
one that I hope can be addressed, either through Mr. Weldon's proposed 
amendment today or later in conference. Six million dollars is simply 
not sufficient to carry out the goals of the program.
  It would limit the use of intelligence products for environmental 
research and could jeopardize very important environmental information 
exchanges with Russia. This program is clearly responsive to the needs 
of national policymakers. It brings unique information to our 
understanding of global environmental challenges, and it has provided 
striking benefits to the intelligence community in improved technical 
capabilities of their collections systems. It is a low-cost, high-yield 
effort which is well supported among intelligence consumers, both in 
and out of intelligence agencies, and it should not be singled out for 
reduction from among all the analytic efforts of the intelligence 
community.
  I think Congress should continue to support the President's bold 
initiative to implement a safe and cost-effective means of 
declassifying documents, and I am also hopeful that we will be able to 
work in conference, or through the adoption of Mr. Weldon's amendment, 
to authorize adequate funding for the Environmental Intelligence and 
Applications Program.
  With those points in mind, Mr. Chairman, I urge the passage of the 
bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I support this intelligence authorization bill because 
I believe that on balance it meets vital national security needs. 
However, I do have several serious concerns.
  It is essential to support the activities of the intelligence 
community as we seek to understand and confront such post-cold-war 
challenges as ethnic conflict, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, and global environmental degradation. This bill 
provides authority for these important functions. We should also be 
under no illusion that we face no traditional threats to our national 
security, at which intelligence capabilities need to be directed.
  I do have a concern about the overall authorization level. This bill 
authorizes an intelligence funding 3.9 percent above the amounts 
requested by the President, 4.9 percent above the amounts authorized 
last year, and 6.9 percent above the amounts appropriated last year. In 
a time of tight budgets, when funding for education and the environment 
is being slashed, I would have preferred an authorization level closer 
to the President's request. But authorizing more does not automatically 
mean we will appropriate all that's authorized.
  I also have serious concerns about two specific matters: continued 
support for declassification of documents; and funding for the 
Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program [EIAP].
  My first of these relates to implementation of President Clinton's 
Executive order that establishes a uniform system to classify, 
safeguard, and declassify national security information. There are some 
statements in the committee report on this bill that criticize the risk 
management approach that Government agencies have adopted in reviewing 
documents to be declassified under that Executive order. These 
statements suggest that the majority may be proposing the adoption of 
an extremely restrictive, and extremely slow and expensive, risk-
elimination approach to handle the review of classified documents.
  It remains a fact that there are documents that should be 
declassified, documents that have remained classified for no reason 
other than inertia. Declassifying them should proceed, and I'm 
convinced that this task can be managed, at acceptable costs and 
without compromising sensitive information.
  The current risk management philosophy does not lead to an abdication 
of the agencies' responsibility to protect sources and methods; it is 
simply a sensible acknowledgement that resources should be focused on 
areas of greatest risk. If Congress mandates a system of reviewing 
documents that is so cumbersome that there is virtually no chance of 
anything getting declassified, we will be right back where we started 
before efforts began to rationalize the system.
  In a democratic and free society, the people are entitled to be 
informed about the activities of their government. State secrets are a 
necessary exception to that general principle, but an exception that 
should be limited.
  When I joined the Intelligence Committee in 1993, I was astonished to 
learn that agency heads couldn't say even roughly how much of their 
budget was spent on document classification and security. Millions of 
documents that posed no real threat to national security were 
nonetheless being held under lock and key at tremendous cost to U.S. 
taxpayers. Some of the most astonishing examples included documents 
about U.S. troop movements in Europe during the First World War, and 
documents concerning POW/MIA's in the Korean war. Despite sweeping 
changes in the international arena, the classification bureaucracy was 
still stuck on autopilot, stamping ``secret'' on nearly 7 million new 
documents each year and marking 95 percent of these papers for 
indefinite restrictions.
  I decided to do something about this. The result was the first ever 
accounting of the costs and number of personnel involved in classifying 
and maintaining Government secrets. These reports revealed that keeping 
millions and millions of accumulated documents secret was keeping 
32,400 workers employed and consuming $2.28 billion worth of agency 
budgets.
  The next year, I took the reform effort one step further, by 
requiring agencies to come up with suggestions about how to cut 
spending on classification and secrecy. This initiative led to a 
government-wide program of cost accounting and expenditure reduction 
efforts involving all the agencies that make up the intelligence 
community.

[[Page H5393]]

  The President consolidated the reform effort with the issuance of 
Executive Order 12958 on April 17, 1995. Section 3.4 of the order 
requires that, unless grounds for an exemption exist, classified 
information contained in records over 25 years old and of permanent 
historical value, shall automatically be declassified within 5 years. 
Information is exempt from declassification if, among other reasons, 
its release likely would: reveal the identity of human sources; impair 
U.S. cryptological systems or activities; undermine ongoing diplomatic 
activities; or, assist in the development of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Congress should work with the administration so that the agencies can 
continue to implement classification reform in a cost-effective manner. 
Let's not cripple agency efforts to reform just as we're beginning to 
turn the tide on the costly sea of secret paper.
  My second specific area of concern is the reduction contained in this 
bill for the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program 
[EIAP].
  The bill would authorize only $6 million for the program, 
significantly below the President's request. I think this is a 
shortsighted cut, and one that I hope can be addressed either through 
Mr. Weldon's proposed amendment today or later in conference. Six 
million dollars is not sufficient to carry out the goals of the program 
in fiscal year 1997. It would limit the use of intelligence products 
for environmental research and could jeopardize environmental 
information exchanges with Russia.
  The EIAP is clearly responsive to the needs of national policymakers. 
It brings unique information to our understanding of global 
environmental challenges. And it has provided striking benefits to the 
intelligence community in improved technical capabilities of collection 
systems. This is a low-cost, high-yield effort which is well supported 
among intelligence consumers, both in and out of intelligence agencies. 
It should not be singled out for reduction from among all the 
analytical efforts of the intelligence community.
  One of the main purposes of the EIAP is to ensure that a select group 
of the Nation's leading scientists in hydrology, geology, oceanography, 
and other earth sciences, are fully briefed on the capabilities and 
information resources of the U.S. intelligence agencies. These 
scientists, through what is known as the MEDEA Program, in turn bring 
their insights and expertise to bear on environmental questions--both 
in the civil and national security arenas.
  For example, the MEDEA scientists found that imagery from the Corona, 
Argon, and Lanyard systems would have particular value to the 
environmental sciences, and this contributed to the President's 
decision to declassify these images.
  The scientists also have worked on experiments to understand how our 
intelligence systems can be useful in addressing environmental 
questions. With the many billions that have been invested in these 
systems, it makes good common sense to use them for additional purposes 
that won't detract from their intelligence missions.
  In addition, this program has been of particular benefit to the Navy. 
The MEDEA group has worked with the Navy's operational and research 
oceanographers to address problems in Naval oceanography.
  The program also was the catalyst for a cooperative arrangement with 
a similar group of scientists from the civil and military sector 
established in Russia. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Environmental 
Working Group led to the Navy's reaching an agreement with its Russian 
counterpart to conduct a survey in the Sea of Okhotsk, an area closer 
to continental Russia than has ever before been surveyed by the Navy. 
It will lead to the collection of twice the data that could have been 
collected unilaterally.
  We cannot develop national policies to deal with national and 
international environmental threats like decertification, the 
destruction of rain forests, global climate degradation, and unsafe 
dumping of environmental and nuclear waste, unless our policymakers and 
scientists have access to data that identifies where threats are coming 
from. The best technology for obtaining this data is already available. 
We just need to put it to use.
  I think Congress should continue to support the President's bold 
initiative to implement a safe and cost effective means of 
declassifying documents. And I'm hopeful that we will be able to work 
in conference to authorize adequate funding for the Environmental 
Intelligence and Applications Program.
  I urge passage of the bill.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I would inquire of the Chair of the time 
remaining in general debate.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has 18\1/2\ 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] has 16 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank my distinguished 
chairman and friend for yielding me the time, and I want to commend 
both the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] and the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. Dicks] for their outstanding leadership on intelligence 
matters.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise as the chairman of the Committee on National 
Security's Subcommittee on Military Research and Development. My 
subcommittee has joint jurisdiction over at least $9 billion of funding 
in this intelligence effort, and so I have a real and genuine interest 
in the fine work that is being carried forth by this committee. I 
applaud both Members for their bipartisan efforts to support and 
enhance the intelligence operations that are so vital to decisions that 
we make in the defense community, especially as they relate to missile 
to missile technology and those new R&D initiatives that are so 
important to allow America to maintain its leadership role.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be, however, offering an amendment under title I 
today dealing with a shortfall in terms of the funding amount in the 
bill for the Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program, 
formerly known as the Environmental Task Force.

                              {time}  1115

  This funding has been cut to about one-third to only $6 million. 
Several of our colleagues have spoken to the issue. I had been 
intimately involved in a firsthand way with this program and think it 
would be an absolute travesty if we were to allow this program to be 
cut to this level.
  In December of last year, Mr. Chairman, my subcommittee held a 
hearing, where I had as one of my witnesses Alexei Yablakov. Mr. 
Yablakov is a member of the Yeltsin National Security Council for 
Environmental Issues. He is a recognized world expert on the 30-year 
historical track record of the Soviet Union illegally dumping its 
nuclear waste in the Bering Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the Arctic 
Ocean. Only because of Yablakov's openness and his advocacy have we in 
the West been able to deal with this environmental tragedy.
  When Mr. Yablakov came before my subcommittee last December, he in 
great detail outlined the specifics of what occurred. Much of the 
efforts of Mr. Yablakov and numerous other scientists of the same 
caliber is directly attributable to this program, established under the 
guise of the Environmental Task Force.
  This program has been supported by the administration, specifically 
by Vice President Al Gore, who sees it as a top priority, and a cut of 
this magnitude in this bill would be devastating.
  This program also allows us to pursue an initiative known as MEDEA, 
the Measurement of Earth Data for Environmental Assessment, an 
extremely important program. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
enter into the Record pages 41 and 42 of the document dealing with the 
scientific utility of naval environmental data, which goes into great 
detail with the kinds of initiatives and projects currently funded 
through the MEDEA Program. It has the highest support of Navy and in 
fact helped lay the foundation for a major new initiative we were able 
to place in this year's Defense Authorization Act which passed last 
week, a $30 million initiative calling for new partnerships and 
oceanographic efforts with the Navy in the lead role. This partnership 
effort will also allow us to share technology where available with 
other nations, and in particular Russia.
  Mr. Chairman, this an important amendment. I would hope that our 
colleagues would in fact support the amendment to restore the funding.
  Mr. Chairman, one important point of this amendment is that it pays 
for itself. In fact, we cut another account, and that is the $25 
million for declassifying documents, we cut that by 50 percent. I know 
there will be some objections to that cut, Mr. Chairman, but I stand 
before this body offering to pay for the increase that in fact I think 
is so important and the administration thinks is so important.
  I also in the end will have to oppose an effort to not have the 
decrease in the declassification program, because if we do not have a 
bill payer, that

[[Page H5394]]

means another $12.5 million will have to come someplace out of my 
overall R&D budget, which passed on the House floor last week. I have 
no idea where that money would come from. I have not been given any 
indications as to where those who oppose the decrease in the 
declassification accounts would take that money. Therefore, I have to 
oppose that as the chairman of the R&D subcommittee.
  Even though that is not my main fight, it is critically important 
that we not establish this increase which has bipartisan support for 
the environmental initiative that is so vitally important, at the same 
time decreasing or not having a bill payer, a way to pay for that. My 
amendment will have a bill payer, it will have a method for paying for 
this initiative, and I would hope that our colleagues will in fact 
support the amendment and also would support the bill paying mechanism 
that I have identified with the committee staff as an appropriate way 
to pay for this initiative.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank both my distinguished chairman and ranking 
member, and include for the Record the data referred to earlier.

             TABLE 8. FIRST TIER OF SCIENTIFIC SIGNIFICANCE             
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Data                    Description     Scientific utility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Marine gravity..................  Relational          Classified marine 
                                   database of point   gravity data     
                                   observations with   provide a view   
                                   latitude,           into the         
                                   longitude,          underlying       
                                   observation time,   geological       
                                   free air anomaly,   structure at very
                                   and gravity         short spatial    
                                   values, supported   wavelengths      
                                   with survey, data   currently        
                                   processing, and     inaccessible to  
                                   statistical         public data.     
                                   information.       Classified gravity
                                  Includes Lacoste     data could be    
                                   and Romberg Air-    used to address  
                                   Sea Gravity Meter   three problem    
                                   measurements from   areas: (1)       
                                   1966 to 1983.       spatial          
                                   Bell Aerospace      variations in    
                                   BGM-3 and BGM-5     gravity at mid-  
                                   gravimeters were    ocean ridges, (2)
                                   introduced in       mapping of       
                                   1969.               crustal          
                                                       thickness, and   
                                                       (3) the structure
                                                       of fracture      
                                                       zones.           
                                                      Classified gravity
                                                       data would       
                                                       provide the      
                                                       information      
                                                       needed for the   
                                                       Northern         
                                                       Hemisphere to    
                                                       facilitate       
                                                       research into the
                                                       genesis of       
                                                       Earth's surface. 
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Entirely classified; no public access.                              
                                                                        
Geomagnetics....................  Consists of both    Magnetic surveys  
                                   aircraft (Project   could be used to 
                                   Magnet) and         constrain the age
                                   satellite vector    of the age of the
                                   data.               seafloor         
                                  Ship collected       accurately, to   
                                   data; consists of   calculate more   
                                   scalar point data   accurate plate   
                                   by latitude and     reconstruction   
                                   longitude.          rotation         
                                                       parameters, to   
                                                       analyze the      
                                                       Jurassic and     
                                                       Cretaceous Quiet 
                                                       Zones, and to    
                                                       determine the    
                                                       origin of        
                                                       intermediate     
                                                       wavelength       
                                                       crustal          
                                                       anomalies.       
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Ship data are classified; no public access; aircraft data are       
     unclassified.                                                      
    Classified largely because of association with specific ship tracks 
     and ship track densities.                                          
                                                                        
Ice keel depth acoustic data....  Measures ice        Data are          
                                   roughness, ridge    significant in   
                                   frequency, and      their own right, 
                                   ice depth (ice      and as           
                                   draft) below the    calibration for  
                                   sea surface.        satellite-borne  
                                  Data are collected   instruments.     
                                   using upward-      Knowledge of the  
                                   looking sonar       mechanical       
                                   starting with the   redistribution of
                                   Arctic journey of   ice thickness    
                                   SNN Nautilus in     categories would 
                                   1957.               improve our      
                                  Approximately 50     ability to       
                                   data sets exist.    forecast ice     
                                                       conditions for   
                                                       navigation.      
                                                      Submarine sonar   
                                                       profiles might   
                                                       settle the       
                                                       question of      
                                                       whether or not   
                                                       ice thickness has
                                                       undergone a      
                                                       secular trend.   
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Classified; no public access.                                       
    Classified primarily because of the association with specific       
     submarine tracks and dates.                                        
                                                                        
Marine bathymetry...............  A large collection  The accuracy of   
                                   of ocean undersea   current          
                                   topography          representations  
                                   databases.          of the seafloor  
                                  Gridded digital      is not sufficient
                                   databases           for many studies.
                                   resulting from      The scientific   
                                   survey              uses of more     
                                   measurements,       accurate data    
                                   many using          include          
                                   multibeam           evaluating the   
                                   profilometers.      square root      
                                  Data as fine as      relationship     
                                   0.1 arc minute      between age and  
                                   are available for   depth of the     
                                   some areas.         seafloor.        
                                                      Availability of   
                                                       these finely     
                                                       sampled data     
                                                       would allow for a
                                                       detailed study of
                                                       the spatial      
                                                       variations in    
                                                       this important   
                                                       evolutionary     
                                                       process.         
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Most data having a resolution as high as 1 arc minute are           
     unclassified.                                                      
    Data at 0.5 arc minute resolution may be declassified as part of the
     classification review of bathymetric data.                         
    That data chosen for release would then be made part of DBDB-V.     
                                                                        
Geosat altimetry................  Geosat altimetry    Provides important
                                   measures sea        reconnaissance   
                                   height with world   information over 
                                   coverage of  72 degrees   uncharted areas  
                                   latitude and 3.4    such as the      
                                   km spacing (1.7     Southern Ocean   
                                   km footprint).      and Antarctic    
                                  3 km track spacing   margins.         
                                   at the equator.    If declassified it
                                  3.5 cm sea height    could be used    
                                   precision.          with the ERS-1   
                                                       data to improve  
                                                       the resolving    
                                                       power beyond the 
                                                       capabilities of  
                                                       either data set  
                                                       alone.           
                                                      Large bathymetric 
                                                       features can be  
                                                       inferred from    
                                                       altimetry sea    
                                                       height data.     
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Classified north of 30 S; no public access.                         
------------------------------------------------------------------------


             TABLE 9. SECOND TIER OF SCIENTIFIC SIGNIFICANCE            
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Data                    Description     Scientific utility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ice morphology..................  Describes sea ice   Data would be of  
                                   conditions and      considerable use 
                                   extent over the     to               
                                   Arctic Outer        climatologists;  
                                   Continental Shelf.  to scientists    
                                  Contains             studying the near-
                                   information         shore transfer of
                                   describing ice      pollutants; and  
                                   drift and           to individuals   
                                   movement and        studying near-   
                                   includes ice edge   coastal sea ice  
                                   boundary data in    dynamics.        
                                   hand-drawn charts. Data set would    
                                                       also be of       
                                                       particular use to
                                                       a variety of U.S.
                                                       companies who are
                                                       currently faced  
                                                       with difficult   
                                                       offshore design  
                                                       problems for     
                                                       sites in the     
                                                       marine Arctic    
                                                       region.          
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Classified; no public access.                                       
    Includes a synthesis of classified and unclassified data.           
                                                                        
Seafloor sediment properties....  Consists of a       Having these data 
                                   collection of       available        
                                   ocean basin wide    digitally is a   
                                   sediment            starting point   
                                   thickness and       for additional   
                                   sediment type.      studies.         
                                  Is the first        Availability of an
                                   (only) global       existing global  
                                   seafloor sediment   estimate of      
                                   thickness           sediment         
                                   database for        thickness and    
                                   geological          approximate      
                                   studies.            sediment types   
                                                       would provide a  
                                                       background       
                                                       against which the
                                                       quality of future
                                                       data could be    
                                                       assessed and     
                                                       upgraded.        
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Many of these data are unclassified.                                
    Sediment type and sediment thickness is largely unavailable.        
    Some sediments data are restricted because of bilateral             
     international agreements.                                          
                                                                        
Realtime salinity and             GOODS contains a    Ship observations 
 temperature fields (GOODS).       wide variety of     could be adapted 
                                   ocean               based on the     
                                   measurements        state of the     
                                   collected from      ocean, greatly   
                                   drifting buoys,     increasing the   
                                   moorings, ships,    efficiency of    
                                   and aircraft.       costly civilian  
                                  These data are       sampling         
                                   assimilated into    resources.       
                                   a near realtime    Would allow       
                                   view of the         testing of       
                                   oceans.             satellite        
                                  GOODS contains       algorithms for   
                                   approximately       either sensor    
                                   four months of      calibration or   
                                   global              validation.      
                                   temperature and    As in weather     
                                   salinity fields.    forecasting,     
                                                       ocean models     
                                                       could incorporate
                                                       GOODS data into  
                                                       the nowcast      
                                                       system.          
                                                      Techniques could  
                                                       migrate into     
                                                       civil systems to 
                                                       support          
                                                       commercial and   
                                                       regulatory needs.
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Most data incorporated into GOODS are unclassified.                 
    A small fraction are classified data because of locations of        
     platforms providing the data, rendering the entire database        
     inaccessible.                                                      
                                                                        
Archival temperature and          Contains a variety  Public domain     
 salinity fields (MOODS).          of ocean            transfer         
                                   measurements from   capability       
                                   drifting buoys,     already in place 
                                   moorings, ships,    (NAVOCEANO to    
                                   and aircraft.       NODC).           
                                  Data include        Can ensure timely 
                                   salinity and        progression of   
                                   temperature         data.            
                                   profiles.          Availability to   
                                  MOODS is the Navy    ocean science    
                                   archive location    community would  
                                   for GOODS.          increase ocean   
                                                       data             
                                                       explorations.    
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Majority of MOODS data are unclassified and eventually enter NODC.  
    The classified fraction, primarily in the Arctic region, classified 
     because of platform locations.                                     
                                                                        
Ocean optics and bioluminescence  Contains ocean      Next-generation   
                                   clarity in          satellite ocean  
                                   specific            color sensors    
                                   measurement         will provide much
                                   locations.          better           
                                  Bioluminescence      measurements in  
                                   data more           complex coastal  
                                   prevalent at        waters. Access to
                                   selected            both civilian and
                                   measurement sites.  operational      
                                  Observations         databases of in  
                                   include both        situ observations
                                   underway and on-    would            
                                   station             significantly    
                                   measurements.       improve the      
                                                       quality of these 
                                                       satellite        
                                                       retrievals.      
                                                      Could enhance the 
                                                       usage of less    
                                                       capable sensors  
                                                       (less expensive) 
                                                       in greater       
                                                       densities or in  
                                                       areas where loss 
                                                       of sensors is    
                                                       likely.          
                                                                        
Current accessibility:                                                  
    Many of these date are classified.                                  
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Dornan], a member of the committee.
  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, much of what I intended to say in my 
remarks has already been stated. Some of it might be well restated.
  First of all, I want to pass out some compliments that I did not tell 
anybody I was going to do. But the prior speaker, the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] has developed into a national treasure. I am 
talking about you, Mr. Weldon, a national treasure on the way he tracks 
the Soviet Union. He is the only Member I know that has been over there 
more than the 10 or 11 trips I have made. He leaves me in the dust. 
When he speaks on the House floor on problems with all the nations that 
were prior Soviet Union nations, Americans had better listen.
  I also wanted to thank my chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
Combest]. I just do not know a chairman that has taken the helm of a 
full committee and has steered it on such a straight and critically 
important course as my colleague from the great State of Texas.
  I do not have time to mention all the staff, but our senior chief of 
staff of the professional staff, Mark Lowenthal, is also a national 
treasure when it comes to intelligence.
  I watched the ``60 Minutes'' show Sunday night. In the open world of 
intelligence, the story on Russia was absolutely stunning. It just took 
your breath away. We claim to have won the cold war, but that country 
is melting down from 2 or 3 abortions to every live birth, to pollution 
that waters your eyes from afar; it puts our pollution problems into a 
totally different universe.

[[Page H5395]]

  The country is just coming apart at the seams, but that does not mean 
we should not have a strong intelligence budget, because China, as I 
have said many times on this House floor, is still a Communist 
dictatorship. It is five times larger than the United States in 
population, it is a 6,000-year-old culture, captured by the raw evil of 
communism, and they have a mercantile heritage that makes anything the 
Soviet Union did look like child's play. They are going to own the next 
century, for good or for evil, and our intelligence budget should be 
larger than it is.
  What the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has done is amazing. This 
year's request was in fact only slightly higher than last year's 
request. I think it should have been a lot higher. Some people have 
spoken on the floor on the other side of the aisle that they thought we 
added too much.
  Actually, the request in tactical intelligence-related activities, 
joint military intelligence programs, my area as a subcommittee 
chairman, there is still too much of a decline in that area. The 
request had a large decline, we plussed it up about 10 percent, and all 
of these intelligence support activities around the world that support 
our men and women, it should be a much larger increase. We did the best 
we could to keep the bill bipartisan.
  Just one other thing I would like to mention in my prepared remarks, 
I wanted to talk about the Bosnian crisis, where I went over with Mike 
Meermans last August, evaluated secret programs. On manned systems, we 
have added one more J-STARS aircraft, EP-3 Aries 2, and U-2, keeping 
that great legendary program alive, RC-135 rivet joint, where Mr. 
Meermans has actually active duty experience in the Air Force, all the 
less glamorous things. We worked hard on this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, I submit 3 pages of proper pride in this excellent 
bill. I hope we get a unanimous vote out of this.
  Mr. Chairman, in preparation for this bill: we held six full 
committee hearings, I chaired a Technical and Tactical Subcommittee 
hearing specifically on airborne reconnaissance issues; we received 15 
member briefings and our staff received over 200 staff briefings.
  This is a bipartisan bill that provides critical intelligence 
collection, analysis and reporting support to national and military 
decision makers. I would like to point out that this bill provides 
specific emphasis in support to military operations: by increasing 
funding for airborne reconnaissance development and operations; by 
increasing funding for unmanned aerial vehicles to augment current and 
future operations; and providing unique, not duplicative, information.
  Trend had been a 2-3 percent yearly reduction in intelligence 
spending over the 4 years prior to the 1996 authorization. The House 
bill reversed that downward trend by increasing the funding over the 
President's request by a mere 1.3 percent.
  This year's request was, in fact, only slightly higher than last 
year's request.
  However this request had a large decline, over 5 percent in the 
intelligence support activities that directly support our men and women 
serving around the world in the U.S. Armed Forces--the intelligence 
support provided by the tactical intelligence and related activities 
and joint military intelligence programs.
  This bill adds funding for many underfunded tactical intelligence 
programs critical to keeping our Armed Forces--young men and women--
supplied with the best information this country can supply. In this 
intelligence bill, and in concert with the House National Security 
Committee's bill which this body approved last week, we have added over 
$800M for these purposes.
  Bill re-looks the Nations' intelligence needs in the post cold war 
era. It has a long term vision to take us well into the 21st century: 
Focuses on ``right sizing,'' not ``down sizing,'' the intelligence 
collection and analysis capabilities; realizes that the world is not 
necessarily a safe place. U.S. interests around the world are changing, 
but not decreasing; and the world-wide threat environment is changing. 
As is evidenced by our troops being deployed in many areas around the 
world: Intelligence operations in continuous use around the globe. For 
example: Bosnian crisis; Iraq aggression; and Korean Peninsula.
  Focuses on the elimination of expensive one of a kind systems for 
more cost effective commercial off-the-shelf systems where possible, 
and provides significant funding for improving our manned airborne 
reconnaissance platforms, some of which have not realized technical 
upgrades in this fast-paced highly technical world since 1992.
  On manned systems: RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2, EP-3 Aries 2; and J-STARS 
one extra.
  Provides a emphasis on unmanned platforms to decrease the necessity 
to put U.S. forces into harms way.
  Provides additional funding for the less glamorous and often 
overlooked intelligence support systems critical to supporting soldiers 
at the individual platoon or squad level: balances collection, 
processing operations; emphasizes dissemination of critical information 
at the right time, to the right place, in the right quantity, and in 
the right form for decision makers.
  For basic themes to the bill:
  First, evaluate each budgetary line item in the President's request 
solely on the program's merits, not a given funding level;
  Second, the committee did not work to a specific budget number. That 
is, the committee did not specifically fund some programs and then make 
offsetting cuts in other programs in order to meet an arbitrary total 
dollar figure.
  The committee believes the Congress will accept an intelligence 
authorization consisting of properly funded programs--even if that 
amount is an increase to the intelligence budget.
  Third, focused on the production, exploitation and dissemination 
functions of intelligence stated above.
  Fourth, avoided short-term thinking about intelligence priorities, 
needs and capabilities and to look longer range at these issues into 
the 21st century.
  The numbers in this bill are right sized. This bill provides the 
Nation a strong, but not bloated, intelligence community. It makes some 
fundamental decisions necessary to take us into the next century. I 
urge my colleagues to pass this bill.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered under the 5-minute 
rule by titles, and the first section and each title shall be 
considered read.
  No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute 
is in order except those printed in the designated place in the 
Congressional Record.
  The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time 
during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request 
for a recorded vote on any amendment and may reduce to not less than 5 
minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed 
question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device 
without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by 
electronic device on the first in any series of question shall not be 
less than 15 minutes.
  The Clerk will designate section 1.
  The text of section 1 is as follows:

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization 
     Act for Fiscal Year 1997''.

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute 
be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  The text of the remainder of the committee amendment in the nature of 
a substitute is as follows:
                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal 
     year 1997 for the conduct of the intelligence and 
     intelligence-related activities of the following elements of 
     the United States Government:

[[Page H5396]]

       (1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
       (2) The Department of Defense.
       (3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
       (4) The National Security Agency.
       (5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
     and the Department of the Air Force.
       (6) The Department of State.
       (7) The Department of the Treasury.
       (8) The Department of Energy.
       (9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
       (10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
       (11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
       (12) The Central Imagery Office.

     SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The 
     amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and 
     the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1997, 
     for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related 
     activities of the elements listed in such section, are those 
     specified in the Classified Schedule of Authorizations 
     prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3259 of the 104th 
     Congress.
       (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made 
     available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
     and House of Representatives and to the President. The 
     President shall provide for suitable distribution of the 
     Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within 
     the executive branch.

     SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

       (a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the 
     Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director 
     of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian 
     personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 
     1997 under section 102 when the Director of Central 
     Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the 
     performance of important intelligence functions, except that 
     the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
     authorized under such section may not, for any element of 
     the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the 
     number of civilian personnel authorized under such section 
     for such element.
       (b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
     Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by 
     this section.

     SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

       (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized 
     to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management 
     Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal 
     year 1997 the sum of $93,616,000. Within such amounts 
     authorized, funds identified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced 
     Research and Development Committee shall remain available 
     until September 30, 1998.
       (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The Community Management 
     Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 
     273 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1997. Such 
     personnel of the Community Management Staff may be permanent 
     employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel 
     detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
       (c) Reimbursement.--During fiscal year 1997, any officer or 
     employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces 
     who is detailed to the Community Management Staff from 
     another element of the United States Government shall be 
     detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such 
     officer, employee or member may be detailed on a 
     nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for 
     the performance of temporary functions as required by the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       (d) Declassification.--In addition to amounts otherwise 
     authorized to be appropriated by this Act, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated $25,000,000 for the National 
     Foreign Intelligence Program for the purposes of carrying out 
     the provisions of section 3.4 of Executive Order 12958, dated 
     April 17, 1995.
       (e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--In addition to 
     amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated by this Act, 
     there is authorized to be appropriated $32,076,000 for the 
     National Drug Intelligence Center located in Johnstown, 
     Pennsylvania. Amounts appropriated for such center may not be 
     used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)). 
     The National Drug Intelligence Center is authorized 35 full-
     time personnel as of September 30, 1997.
       (f) Environmental Programs.--In addition to amounts 
     otherwise authorized to be appropriated by this Act, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated $6,000,000 for the 
     Environmental Intelligence and Applications Program, formerly 
     known as the Environmental Task Force, to remain available 
     until September 30, 1998.
 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

     SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal 
     year 1997 the sum of $194,400,000.
                     TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

     SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS 
                   AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

       Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, 
     retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be 
     increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may 
     be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

       The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not 
     be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any 
     intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by 
     the Constitution or the laws of the United States.

     SEC. 303. LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR AUTOMATIC 
                   DECLASSIFICATION OF RECORDS OVER 25 YEARS OLD.

       Section 307 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for 
     Fiscal Year 1996 (109 Stat. 966) is amended by striking out 
     ``fiscal year 1996 by this Act'' in subsection (a) and 
     inserting in lieu thereof ``any of the fiscal years 1996 
     through 2000''.

     SEC. 304. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE 
                   ACTIVITIES.

       (a) Extension.--Section 905 of the National Security Act of 
     1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking out ``on the 
     date which is one year after the date of the enactment of 
     this title'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``on January 6, 
     1998''.
       (b) Format Amendments.--Section 904 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
     441c) is amended by striking out ``required to be imposed 
     by'' and all that follows and inserting in lieu thereof 
     ``required to be imposed by any of the following provisions 
     of law:
       ``(1) The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and 
     Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (title III of Public Law 102-
     182).
       ``(2) The Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994 
     (title VIII of Public Law 103-236).
       ``(3) Section 11B of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
     (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b).
       ``(4) Chapter 7 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
     2797 et seq.).
       ``(5) The Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 
     (title XVI of Public Law 102-484).
       ``(6) The following provisions of annual appropriations 
     Acts:
       ``(A) Section 573 of the Foreign Operations, Export 
     Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1994 
     (Public Law 103-87; 107 Stat. 972).
       ``(B) Section 563 of the Foreign Operations, Export 
     Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1995 
     (Public Law 103-306; 108 Stat. 1649).
       ``(C) Section 552 of the Foreign Operations, Export 
     Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996 
     (Public Law 104-107; 110 Stat. 741).
       ``(7) Comparable provisions.''.

     SEC. 305. EXPEDITED NATURALIZATION.

       (a) In General.--With the approval of the Director of 
     Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the 
     Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, an applicant 
     described in subsection (b) and otherwise eligible for 
     naturalization may be naturalized without regard to the 
     residence and physical presence requirements of section 
     316(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or to the 
     prohibitions of section 313 of such Act, and no residence 
     within a particular State or district of the Immigration and 
     Naturalization Service in the United States shall be 
     required: Provided, That the applicant has resided 
     continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent 
     residence, within the United States for at least one year 
     prior to naturalization: Provided further, That the 
     provisions of this section shall not apply to any alien 
     described in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of section 
     243(h)(2) of such Act.
       (b) Eligible Applicant.--An applicant eligible for 
     naturalization under this section is the spouse or child of a 
     deceased alien whose death resulted from the intentional and 
     unauthorized disclosure of classified information regarding 
     the alien's participation in the conduct of United States 
     intelligence activities.
       (c) Administration of Oath.--An applicant for 
     naturalization under this section may be administered the 
     oath of allegiance under section 337(a) of the Immigration 
     and Nationality Act by the Attorney General or any district 
     court of the United States, without regard to the residence 
     of the applicant. Proceedings under this subsection shall be 
     conducted in a manner consistent with the protection of 
     intelligence sources, methods, and activities.
       (d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term ``child'' means a child as defined in 
     subparagraphs (A) through (E) of section 101(b)(1) of the 
     Immigration and Nationality Act, without regard to age or 
     marital status; and
       (2) the term ``spouse'' means the wife or husband of a 
     deceased alien referred to in subsection (b) who was married 
     to such alien during the time the alien participated in the 
     conduct of United States intelligence activities.
                 TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

     SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.

       Section 5(e) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 
     (50 U.S.C. 403f(e)) is amended to read as follows:
       ``(e) Make alterations, improvements, and repairs on 
     premises rented by the Agency and, for the purpose of 
     furthering the cost-efficient acquisition of Agency 
     facilities, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years 
     that are not otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of 
     this Act; and''.

     SEC. 402. REPEAL OF ADDITIONAL SURCHARGE RELATING TO 
                   EMPLOYEES WHO RETIRE OR RESIGN IN FISCAL YEARS 
                   1998 OR 1999 AND WHO RECEIVE VOLUNTARY 
                   SEPARATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS.

       Section 2 of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
     Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended by 
     striking out subsection (i).

     SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL 
                   REFORMS.

       None of the amounts authorized to be appropriated by this 
     Act may be used to implement

[[Page H5397]]

     any Intelligence Community personnel reform until the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate are fully briefed on such personnel reform.
         TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

     SEC. 501. STANDARDIZATION FOR CERTAIN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF EXEMPTIONS FROM 
                   DISCLOSURE OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL 
                   INFORMATION.

       (a) Consolidation and Standardization.--Chapter 21 of title 
     10, United States Code, is amended by striking out sections 
     424 and 425 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

     ``Sec. 424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel 
       information: exemption for the Defense Intelligence Agency 
       and National Reconnaissance Office

       ``(a) Exemption From Disclosure.--Except as required by the 
     President or as provided in subsection (b), no provision of 
     law shall be construed to require the disclosure of--
       ``(1) the organization or any function of the Defense 
     Intelligence Agency or the National Reconnaissance Office; or
       ``(2) the number of persons employed by or assigned or 
     detailed to that Agency or Office or the name, official 
     title, occupational series, grade, or salary of any such 
     person.
       ``(b) Provision of Information to Congress.--Subsection (a) 
     does not apply with respect to the provision of information 
     to Congress.''.
       (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the 
     beginning of subchapter I of such chapter is amended by 
     striking out the items relating to sections 424 and 425 and 
     inserting in lieu thereof the following:

``424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information: 
              exemption for the Defense Intelligence Agency and 
              National Reconnaissance Office.''.

               amendment no. 16 offered by mr. mc collum

  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 16 offered by Mr. McCollum:
       At the end of title III, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT 
                   THE IDENTITIES OF UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE 
                   OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES.

       It is the sense of the Congress that title VI of the 
     National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421 et seq.) 
     (relating to protection of the identities of undercover 
     intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources) 
     should be enforced by the appropriate law enforcement 
     agencies.

  Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that the gentleman 
from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] plans shortly to offer an amendment 
that would apparently expand the rights of journalists and protect some 
of their interests under this act. I am at the same time of the belief, 
which is why I am offering this amendment, that we should have a 
reminder in this bill that with constitutional rights also comes some 
serious responsibilities, not only for journalists but for all public 
officials.
  Mr. Chairman, simply stated, my amendment seeks to remind Members of 
this body as well as senior law enforcement officials in the executive 
branch that the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which has been 
in effect for nearly 14 years, demands more aggressive enforcement 
measures.
  In the 1970's, former CIA officer Philip Agee and others opposed to 
U.S. intelligence activities embarked on a campaign to expose the 
identities of CIA officers. In publications such as ``Counterspy'' and 
``Covert Action Information Bulletin'' they revealed not only the 
methodologies employed by the CIA to establish cover but also 
identities of scores of officers serving overseas.
  The Congressional response to this problem was the enactment in 1982 
of the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, 50 U.S.C. 421 et seq. 
sections 421(a) and 421(b) of the act make it an offense for persons 
who have had authorized access to classified information that either 
identifies a covert officer or through which such activities can be 
learned to disclose identifying information to an individual not 
authorized to receive classified information. The Government must prove 
that the disclosure was made with the knowledge that the information 
identifies the covert officer and that the United States is taking 
affirmative measures to conceal the covert officer's intelligence 
relationship.
  Section 421(c) does not require that the offender had authorized 
access to classified information. It is aimed at the Agee-style 
exposure of covert identities and proves as follows:

       Whoever in the course of a pattern of activities intended 
     to identify and expose covert agents and with reason to 
     believe that such activities would impair or impede the 
     foreign intelligence activities of the United States 
     discloses any information that identifies an individual as a 
     covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive 
     classified information knowing that the information disclosed 
     so identifies such individual and that the United States is 
     taking affirmative measures to conceal such individual's 
     classified intelligence relationship to the United States 
     shall be fined not more than $150,000 or imprisoned not more 
     than three years or both * * *

  Section 421(c) places particular emphasis on a discloser's ``pattern 
of activities'' which could include seeking unauthorized access to 
classified information counterintelligence activities such as physical 
or electronic surveillance or the systematic collection of information 
``for the purpose of identifying the names of agents.'' Section 421(c) 
also requires that the government prove that the discloser had reason 
to believe that the activities in which he was engaged would impair 
U.S. foreign intelligence activities.
  Having summarized the relevant provisions of the act, I wanted to 
take this opportunity to express my concern about the apparent 
unwillingness of the Justice Department to enforce this particular law 
in several recent cases involving public officials and journalists. 
Because of the obvious sensitivity involved in naming names of 
intelligence officers, I will refrain from providing details on the 
security investigations and potential cases that have been set aside 
for a variety of reasons by the Justice Department. Nevertheless, I am 
most concerned that a significant number of unauthorized disclosures of 
U.S. intelligence agents and assets in the U.S. media during the past 
year or so have resulted in significant and measurable damage to our 
intelligence capabilities in Latin America and Europe. A more 
aggressive enforcement posture by the Department of Justice would do 
much to reassure our allies and restore the confidence of our public 
servants who are serving as intelligence officers in often hazardous 
assignments.
  Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge a ``yes'' vote in favor of this 
amendment as a signal from the House that enforcement of this act will 
be a national security priority, and that we intend to oversee in that 
the Justice Department vigorously enforce this act. It must be 
enforced, and I urge a yes vote on the sense of the Congress resolution 
that is encompassed in this amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to rise and say the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. McCollum] is a very valuable member of the Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence as well as the Committee on the 
Judiciary. I wholeheartedly endorse this effort in a consent of 
Congress, and would certainly be willing to accept the amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to compliment the chairman and the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. I believe that all of our laws 
should be properly enforced, and in that spirit we will accept the 
amendment.

                              {time}  1130

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                  amendment no. 7 offered by mr. dicks

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment No. 7 offered by Mr. Dicks:
       At the end of title V, add the following:

     SEC. 502. TIER III MINUS UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.

       In addition to the amounts authorized to be appropriated by 
     title I, there is authorized to be appropriated an additional 
     $22,000,000 for the tier III minus unmanned aerial vehicle.

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has a 
perfecting amendment to my amendment.
  My amendment would authorize an additional $22 million for the 
endurance unmanned aerial vehicle known as Darkstar. This funding is 
needed to recover from the loss of the first vehicle during flight 
testing, which took place

[[Page H5398]]

just before we marked up this bill in committee. At that time, we did 
not have good information from the Department of Defense on the impact 
of the crash, so the report accompanying the bill includes language 
which reserved the committee's right to revisit this issue as better 
information became available. While the accident investigation is still 
not quite completed, DOD has been able to provide a good estimate of 
what the cost impact is likely to be. DOD has determined that there 
will be a delay in getting the second aircraft ready for flight, and in 
carrying out the necessary set of flight tests once testing is resumed. 
During this period, a substantial engineering team must be sustained 
and the amendment will provide the funds necessary to do that. I urge 
the adoption of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.


 amendment offered by mr. combest to the amendment offered by mr. dicks

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Combest to the amendment offered 
     by Mr. Dicks: In proposed section 502, add at the end the 
     following: ``The Secretary of Defense may not obligate or 
     expend any of these funds until after the Secretary submits 
     to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate a detailed cost analysis and 
     report on specifically how these funds will be used.''

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, the perfecting amendment to the Dicks 
amendment would simply indicate that the Secretary of Defense may not 
obligate or spend any of the funds until the Secretary has submitted to 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House and Select 
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a detailed cost analysis and 
report on specifically how the funding would be used.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last work.
   Mr. Chairman, I want to tell the gentleman I will be glad to accept 
his amendment. I want to say I have no problem at all with the 
additional language proposed by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest]. 
In fact, I hope DOD would respond even before the conference on this 
bill.
  I want to stress that nothing in this amendment inhibits DOD in any 
way from recommending again that a replacement air vehicle be made a 
high priority in the coming fiscal year. Report language already 
accompanying the bill, as I noted previously, serves notice the 
committee will continue to examine this program's need carefully prior 
to conference.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the gentleman that, as 
amended, I would be very willing to accept the amendment of the 
gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am willing to accept my amendment, as 
amended by the chairman.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] to the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


            amendment offered by mr. weldon of pennsylvania

  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania: In section 
     104--
       (1) in subsection (d), strike ``$25,000,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$12,500,000''; and
       (2) in subsection (f), strike ``$6,000,000'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof ``$18,500,000''.

  (Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished 
chairman of the committee and the subcommittee, the ranking member, for 
agreeing to work with me on this amendment, which is an extremely 
important amendment that has been discussed by Members of both sides of 
the aisle.
  The amendment would restore significant cuts that were made in the 
bill to the Environmental Intelligence Applications Program, formerly 
known as the Environmental Task Force. The funding level in the bill 
has been cut to about one-third of the request, or only $6 million, 
and, to me, that is really totally unacceptable for a program that is 
providing not only information for the public good but having 
tremendous benefits for our national security as well.
  I mentioned during earlier discussion, Mr. Chairman, that last year I 
had a leading scientist from Boris Yeltsin's National Security Council 
come to America to testify on the problem of the Russian nuclear waste 
disposal. I have worked with Mr. Yablakov over the past 2 years, and he 
is one of the outstanding scientists who has been very candid in 
helping us assess the environmental problems and security implications 
of those problems and how we can address them.
  In fact, because of the revelations of Mr. Yablakov and the Yablakov 
report that was produced for Mr. Yeltsin 3 years ago, we were able to 
put money into DOD's bill to actually work with the Russians up in the 
North Sea and the Bering Sea to help them find ways to deal with their 
nuclear waste storage and disposal problem.
  So this program is of vital interest for our security as well as our 
relationship with Russia. It has tremendous environmental implications.
  This program, which is operated by the intelligence community, has 
also been the leading driving force behind the MEDEA Program, which is 
a program that has paid tremendous dividends to our defense 
establishment in understanding data relative to the oceans of the 
world, but also allowing us to take information that up until now has 
been classified and use that for environmental purposes.
  In fact, we have a group of some 60 leading scientists who have been 
working both with the Russian side and with our side on some of the 
environmental problems relative to the oceans; and we have also, 
through the MEDEA Program, we have allowed American scientists access 
to high level information which not only protects our national security 
but has paid tremendous dividends in helping us more fully understand 
the environmental implications of those decisions that we make. These 
programs are vital.
  Mr. Chairman, I will submit for the Record the President's message on 
this bill, the paragraph that refers specifically to the 
administration's concern with the reduction in this program.
  I appreciate the support of my friend and colleague, the gentleman 
from Washington [Mr. Dicks] and the comments of the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Skaggs]. I understand there is some concern about the 
bill paying portion of this. My understanding is that the two leaders 
of this committee have agreed to work this out. I have no problem with 
that.
  As chairman of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee, I 
am concerned about an action that we take that would have a negative 
impact on the R&D overall budget, but I am certainly willing to let 
these gentlemen work that issue out and have confidence that the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] and the gentleman from Washington 
[Mr. Dicks] can work the funding issue out in a way that would not 
disrupt our R&D portion of the defense bill that we passed last week.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I would encourage our colleagues to support this 
amendment. It is vital. And I want to thank the chairman of the 
committee and the ranking member, as well as the gentleman from 
Colorado [Mr. Skaggs] and everyone else for their support of this 
important environmental initiative. I think it is vital not just for 
our national security but it is also vital for a better understanding 
of environmental implications relative to classified data.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and I want 
to commend the gentleman for his amendment.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

[[Page H5399]]

  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I echo the comments of the gentleman from 
Washington. I appreciate the gentleman from Pennsylvania's very helpful 
efforts to plus up the Environmental Intelligence Applications Program 
account. In discussions that we have just had on the floor, I think 
there is an understanding that there may be some unintended 
consequences in the offset that the gentleman proposes, an 
understanding that we can, I think, reach satisfactory resolution to 
this problem between now and conference, or in conference.
  One ironic consequence, I think, flows from the fact that these two 
programs are positively linked, not negatively linked. That is, if we 
cut the declassification efforts, it could get in the way of 
declassifying some of the Corona product that, under the MEDEA Program, 
we want to make available.
  So I appreciate the efforts on the part of all concerned to both deal 
with the gentleman's very commendable efforts to augment the 
environmental effort and not have it negatively affect the 
declassification efforts.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my colleague from 
Pennsylvania that the one thing I worry about with regard to 
declassifying, and why it is such an important issue, if we do not do 
the job of looking through all these documents, we might inadvertently 
declassify some information that could be harmful to the country. That 
is why having this process is important.
  I do not want to cloud the issue here today. We are prepared to 
accept the gentleman's amendment. We compliment him on it. This is a 
very important program to the director and to the vice president, and I 
want to commend the gentleman for his amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to say we will be very happy to work in 
getting this amendment cleared up. I do rise in strong support of the 
amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania and recognize the 
significance and importance of both the declass and the environmental 
funding to certain members of our committee and will try to make 
certain that that concern is accommodated.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                  Amendment Offered by Mr. RICHARDSON

  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Richardson: At the end of title 
     III, insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. PROHIBITION ON USING JOURNALISTS AS AGENTS OR 
                   ASSETS.

       An element of the Intelligence Community may not use as an 
     agent or asset for the purposes of collecting intelligence 
     any individual who--
       (1) is authorized by contract or by the issuance of press 
     credentials to represent himself or herself, either in the 
     United States or abroad, as a correspondent of a United 
     States news media organization; or
       (2) is officially recognized by a foreign government as a 
     representative of a United States media organization.

  Mr. RICHARDSON (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
New Mexico?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, on April 28 of this year the Tampa, FL, 
Tribune published an editorial entitled ``Don't Recruit Journalists As 
Spies.'' The editorial argued forcefully that only a blanket 
prohibition against their use as intelligence agents or assets was 
likely to minimize the risk to American journalists or representatives 
of American media organizations who are suspected of being spies by 
governments or individuals with whom they must deal in dangerous parts 
of the world. Describing the circumstances in which foreign 
correspondents must work the Tribune said, ``They die in combat. They 
are killed by governments intent on silencing them. And they are 
imprisoned and sometimes killed when they are suspected of being spies. 
That is what happened to our colleague, Tampa Tribune reporter Todd 
Smith, who was kidnapped and murdered in 1989 while on a working 
vacation in Peru. Shining Path guerrillas killed him because they 
didn't believe he was a journalist and thought he was a spy.''
  No amendment can guarantee the safety of Americans traveling or 
working abroad, especially when their work puts them in contact with 
terrorist groups or representatives of despotic regimes. The amendment 
I am offering, however, can enhance the safety of American journalists 
by removing the suspicion that rather than being reporters gathering 
information for their newspapers, they are operatives of American 
intelligence.

  Under current CIA regulations, journalists are not to be used as 
intelligence agents or assets. The regulations do, however, permit the 
prohibition to be waived when the Director of Central Intelligence 
determines that national security interests compel that result. My 
amendment would codify the prohibition without providing the waiver 
authority. Adoption of the amendment will ensure that neither the 
independence guaranteed to the press by the Constitution nor the lives 
of journalists are endangered by blurring the distinction between 
reporters as commentators on government and reporters as instruments of 
government. As the New York Times editorialized on March 18, ``If the 
United States Government does not honor that distinction, who anywhere 
will believe that it really exists?''
  Mr. Chairman, current CIA regulations prohibit the use of active 
Peace Corps volunteers and members of the clergy as intelligence 
agents. The prohibitions are absolute. They cannot be waived. The 
prohibitions recognize the risk to the lives of Peace Corps volunteers 
in some countries if they were believed to be working for the CIA and 
the constitutional separation of church and state in our country which 
would be endangered if members of the clergy were seen as Government 
agents.
  Current CIA regulations prohibit the use of journalists as 
intelligence agents but that prohibition is waivable.

                              {time}  1145

  Reporters working overseas are in every bit as much danger, perhaps 
even more, as Peace Corps volunteers, if they are suspected of being 
spies.
  Mr. Chairman, every journalist, every journalist entity, and 
editorial board supports this amendment. It is my judgment that the DCI 
and the intelligence community can use it usefully. I am a strong 
supporter of the DCI and the CIA. But I think that when it comes to 
this issue, it is important that we have some clear distinctions.
  Why then is there a distinction in CIA regulations between 
journalists on the one hand and Peace Corps volunteers and members of 
the clergy on the other? Intelligence officials claim that, while they 
do not want to use journalists as agents, they need to retain the 
option for situations so extraordinary that they cannot be described.
  A better way to promote the safety of American journalists and 
preserve their independence is to prohibit their being employed as 
intelligence agents. Mr. Chairman, at some point I will be prepared to 
entertain an amendment that I believe achieves our mutual objectives 
and would enable this provision to be accepted.
  Mr. Chairman, this is a good amendment. It is supported by every 
journalist, every newspaper, every reporter. It is within our 
constitutional prerogatives. It makes sense. I do not think it would 
hamper our intelligence objectives overseas.

                [From the Tampa Tribune, Apr. 28, 1996]

                   Don't Recruit Journalists As Spies

       CIA Director John Deutch has done it again. In February he 
     was questioned by the Senate Intelligence Committee about 
     whether he would recruit journalists as spies, and he refused 
     to say flatly that his agency would not.
       He has repeated that position again in a letter to news 
     executives in response to widespread complaints by the press 
     and electronic media, who fear that his stance puts their 
     foreign correspondents in danger. Deutch wrote that he had no 
     intention of using journalists or news credentials as a 
     cover, but then qualified his position by saying he reserved 
     the right to do so and would consider it under ``genuinely 
     extraordinary'' circumstances.

[[Page H5400]]

       Unfortunately, nothing short of a blanket prohibition is 
     likely to work in the dangerous circumstances encountered by 
     reporters traveling and working abroad. The CIA has an 
     unshakable prohibition against using the Peace Corps as a 
     cloak for its undercover missions. That is done for the 
     obvious reason that Peace Corps volunteers would be in grave 
     danger if their host nations or partisans in some foreign 
     conflict suspected them of being spies. According to Quill 
     magazine, a presidential order issued in 1977 prohibited the 
     use of journalists and members of the clergy as spies, but 
     apparently there are loopholes in that restriction.
       The news media should be put in that same restricted 
     category as the Peace Corps. Under the best of circumstances, 
     international reporting is a dangerous endeavor. At least 50 
     journalists died in 1995 while covering conflicts in such 
     places as Algeria and Chechnya; the year before, the number 
     killed was 103.
       They die in combat. They are killed by governments intent 
     on silencing them. And they are imprisoned and sometimes 
     killed when they are suspected of being spies.
       That is what happened to our colleague, Tampa Tribune 
     reporter Todd Smith, who was kidnapped and murdered in 1989 
     while on a working vacation in Peru. Shinning Path guerrillas 
     killed him because they didn't believe he was a journalist 
     and thought he was a spy.
       On the surface, the desire for a blanket statement from 
     Deutch ruling out the use of journalists and news 
     organizations may strike some as unpatriotic. After all, why 
     shouldn't reporters help their country gather intelligence 
     about a potential foe?
       It is not that reporters, editors, publishers and 
     broadcasters are any less patriotic than other Americans. It 
     is a question of national priorities.
       The information provided by journalists is vitally 
     important to the health of the nation. U.S. citizens depend 
     upon a steady, reliable supply of news about foreign affairs. 
     That continued relationship far outweighs the significance of 
     whatever intelligence might be uncovered by a reporter 
     working as a spy or a spy pretending to be a journalist.
       The government has numerous alternative means of gathering 
     information. But journalists need only slip up once and it 
     will ruin their reputation for independence. After that, they 
     will never be trusted and will be in grave danger in many 
     nations.
       American citizens need to know the truth about what is 
     taking place around the world. Often their tax dollars are 
     involved, their international export markets affected, and 
     sometimes their lives and those of their children are on the 
     line. People cannot make sound judgments without solid 
     information from independent news media.
                                                                    ____


              [From the Indianapolis News, Apr. 23, 1996]

                        Spies (Who Act) Like Us

       The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency continues to cling to 
     a policy that both contradicts its own regulations and 
     clearly puts the lives of American journalists in danger.
       Last week, reports from the Associated Press revealed that 
     CIA Director John Deutch made the agency's intentions clear 
     in a letter to Louis D. Boccardi, president and chief 
     executive officer of The Associated Press, and W. Thomas 
     Johnson, president of Cable News Network.
       Deutch wrote. ``We do not use American journalists as 
     agents or American news organizations for cover, nor do I 
     have any intention of doing so.
       ``As you know, past DCI's (directors of central 
     intelligence) have reserved the right to make exceptions to 
     this policy. The circumstances under which I--or, I believe, 
     any DCI--would make an exception to this policy would have to 
     be genuinely extraordinary.''
       In other words, if the CIA wants to use the media as cover 
     for its secret agents or recruit journalists to be spies, it 
     will.
       Such a policy and the suspicion it breeds not only 
     endangers the lives of journalists but greatly hinders them 
     from doing their jobs of news gathering, particularly in 
     foreign lands.
       The CIA's justification for keeping its ``extraordinary'' 
     exception contradicts its mission of protecting American's 
     security and American lives.
       In February, when Deutch appeared before the Senate 
     Intelligence Committee, he sympathized with the journalistic 
     community. But he maintained that ``directors of central 
     intelligence have to also concern themselves with perhaps 
     very unique and special threats to national security where 
     American lives are at risk.''
       If Deutch and other top CIA officials cannot bring 
     themselves to retract these statements and make a clear, firm 
     commitment to the contrary, then President Bill Clinton 
     should step in and do so himself.
       Already journalists, and particularly journalists working 
     in foreign countries, face enough threats. They don't need 
     the CIA to continue to saddle them with unnecessary risk.
       Many journalists taken hostage have suffered unjustly 
     because their captors thought they might be part of the CIA.
       Last November, for instance, when Bosnian Serb rebels held 
     Christian Science Monitor reporter David Rohde hostage for 
     almost two weeks, they continually asked him if he was a CIA 
     agent.
       And don't forget Terry Anderson, an Associated Press 
     correspondent held in Lebanon for seven years. He said his 
     captors asked him who his CIA contact was within the AP.
       The CIA must reverse itself on the issue of using 
     journalists as cover or as agents. And if it won't, the 
     president should intervene.
                                                                    ____


             [From the St. Petersburg Times, Mar. 25, 1996]

                          Dangerous Deceptions

       Terry Anderson, the Associated Press correspondent who was 
     held hostage in Lebanon for almost seven years, says his 
     captors never believed that he was simply a journalist. 
     Anderson says the Muslim terrorists who imprisoned him 
     ``believe all Americans are spies, particularly those who go 
     around asking questions.''
       That common belief in much of the rest of the world creates 
     obvious dangers for journalists and other Americans traveling 
     abroad. It certainly made life even more unpleasant for 
     Anderson during his harsh confinement. Unfortunately, the 
     CIA's own rules unnecessarily feed such suspicions about the 
     integrity and credibility of American journalists working in 
     foreign countries.
       CIA Director John Deutch continues to defend rules that 
     give him and his deputy the discretion to employ American 
     journalists as spies, or to allow CIA agents to pose as 
     journalists. Deutch and his predecessors have said they would 
     use such tactics only in cases involving extraordinary 
     threats to national security. However, the CIA's insistence 
     on those exceptions creates unacceptable risk for innocent 
     American citizens and does violence to one of our most 
     revered constitutional principles.
       The American press' clear independence from government is 
     fundamental to a truly free society, but the CIA's rules blur 
     those lines. Journalists can't do their jobs properly if 
     sources have reason to believe that they might really be 
     speaking to a government agent.
       This is not an issue that concerns only journalists. Every 
     American who travels abroad is endangered by the CIA policy. 
     Business executives, Peace Corps workers and ordinary 
     tourists come under suspicion from governments and groups who 
     fear the influence of American intelligence. Most such fears 
     are unfounded, but the CIA policy feeds paranoia in other 
     countries.
       The policy is a vestige of the Cold War, when government 
     routinely recruited journalists and other citizens for 
     intelligence work. Many former journalists bear 
     responsibility for willingly participating in such schemes. 
     However, representatives of national press organizations are 
     now unanimous in their opposition to the CIA's policy.
       The CIA should not be allowed to recruit journalists for 
     spying activity, nor should it permit agents to pose as 
     journalists. Period. Otherwise, the safety of American 
     citizens abroad and the integrity of the Constitution at home 
     are left to the whim of the CIA director and his deputy.
                                                                    ____


                [From the New York Times, Mar. 21, 1996]

             Journalists Aren't the Only Risky C.I.A. Cover

                                       Washington, March 19, 1996.
     Re ``No Press Card for Spies'' (editorial, March 18).
       To The Editor: Do you think it wrong if journalists are 
     used as cover by the Central Intelligence Agency, but all 
     right for others to have integrity and lives put in question?
       Members of the clergy and Peace Corps volunteers were also 
     singled out by the Council on Foreign Relations' Intelligence 
     Task Force project director as potential candidates for 
     C.I.A. cover, but you say nothing in their defense.
       They and others--for example, human rights monitors and 
     relief workers--work abroad in dangerous areas.
       The mere suspicion of association with the C.I.A. will make 
     them as vulnerable as journalists to arrest and questioning 
     and, much worse, will call into question the integrity of the 
     institutions they represent.
       Not a few members of the Council on Foreign Relations, 
     myself included, were deeply disturbed by the task force's 
     proposal. Our concern was not just for its impact on 
     journalists.
     Roberta Cohen.
                                                                    ____


                [From the New York Times, Mar. 18, 1996]

                        No Press Cards for Spies

       An old debate has been needlessly revived in a report on 
     intelligence sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. 
     The report, prepared under the guidance of the project's 
     director, Richard Haass, a former Government official, calls 
     for reviewing ``a number of legal and policy constraints'' on 
     clandestine operations dating to the 1970's. Those 
     constraints chiefly concern the use of spies posing as 
     reporters and the employment of bona fide reporters for 
     intelligence missions. Both practices were all but banned 
     then, and should be prohibited now.
       During the cold war, a pattern of informal collaboration 
     developed between some journalists and the Central 
     Intelligence Agency. Foreign correspondents and C.I.A. 
     station chiefs sometimes swapped information In 1976, a 
     Senate committee headed by Frank Church learned that this 
     practice had gotten out of hand. Fifty journalists at various 
     times had been paid by the C.I.A., and many more were used as 
     ``unwitting sources.''
       There is no record of New York Times correspondents having 
     financial relationships with the C.I.A., and the newspaper, 
     along with other news organizations, has taken steps to 
     eliminate the kind of informal information-sharing that went 
     on early in the cold war.

[[Page H5401]]

       The Church committee disclosure caused a justifiable 
     uproar, resulting in a statement by George Bush, then 
     Director of Central Intelligence, that the agency would not 
     enter into any paid relationship with any full- or part-time 
     correspondent accredited to a United States news 
     organization. In November 1977, his successor, Adm. 
     Stansfield Turner, put this prohibition in writing. The 
     Turner regulation provided that the C.I.A. would not employ 
     journalists for intelligence work but unwisely said 
     exceptions could be made with the specific approval of the 
     C.I.A. director.
       Admiral Turner says that during the 1980 Iranian crisis, 
     the agency considered making such an exception but that it 
     did not prove necessary. No waivers have been approved by the 
     current Director, according to the C.I.A. There is no 
     information on waivers during the intervening years.
       The prohibition on paying accredited journalists for 
     intelligence work should be absolute. The same applies to 
     issuing bogus press credentials to a covert agent. Such a 
     firewall is essential, first of all, to protect foreign 
     correspondents, whose job of questioning and probing makes 
     them especially vulnerable to arrest by hostile regimes.
       But more broadly, using reporters as agents offends and 
     confounds the principles of American democracy. Under 
     constitutional protections, the press is the chronicler of 
     and check on government, not its instrument. If the United 
     States Government does not honor that distinction, who 
     anywhere will believe that it really exists?
                                                                    ____


               [From the Chicago Tribune, Mar. 11, 1996]

                  Journalists Cannot Be Used As Spies

       It long has been debated whether the second-oldest 
     profession is journalism or espionage, and the two do have 
     many purposes in common: to gather great heaps of 
     information, often in hostile environments or from 
     antagonistic sources; to synthesize the key elements of the 
     data; to present the information to an audience that relies 
     on it in making critical decisions.
       But there the similarities end. Journalists file their 
     reports for anybody in the world willing to part with the 
     price of their product, while spies practice their art solely 
     in service of their presidents and potentates.
       Journalists are held to high standards of professional 
     conduct; only in the movies can a reporter build a reputation 
     on stealing documents from the mayor's desk, seducing a 
     secretary for the inside corporate dope or pouring whiskey 
     down a nosy building superintendent who keeps his eye to the 
     keyhole. Contrast that to the world of espionage, with its 
     vast array of space-age eavesdropping equipment and its slush 
     funds for passing around bribes, buying information outright 
     and setting up honey traps.
       Great nations have legitimate national interests that 
     warrant the use of secret services. And the citizens of great 
     nations like the United States have the constitutional right 
     to a free press that serves the national interest by 
     contributing to a well-informed electorate.
       That's why recent comments by John Deutch, the director of 
     central intelligence, are so worrisome. In testimony before 
     Congress, Deutch disclosed that the CIA retains the right to 
     solicit U.S. journalists as spies and to give his own 
     operatives forged press passes to pose as working journalists 
     to conduct surreptitious investigations and undertake covert 
     activities.
       Although the use of journalists, clergy and Peace Corps 
     workers as spies is banned by federal law, Deutch said 
     ``unique and special threats to national security'' might 
     make it necessary to ``consider the use of a journalist in an 
     intelligence operation.''
       Deutch is wrong and should immediately announce a blanket 
     ban on using journalists as spies. American journalists can 
     and should serve but one master: the American public. Any 
     blurring of that line by intelligence services jeopardizes 
     the lives of real journalists and their ability to inform 
     their readers and viewers.
       Every reporter stopped by armed thugs at a military 
     checkpoint knows the inherent personal danger posed by 
     Deutch's announcement; citing Deutch's own statements, mad 
     militiamen will feel freer to interrogate, incarcerate--and 
     even execute--bona fide reporters with the verve and nerve to 
     cover combat.
       Likewise, inquisitive reporters who are ``invited in for a 
     chat'' after filing accurate reports on a dictatorial regime 
     know the first question asked by the despot's henchmen is: 
     ``Who is your CIA master?''
       Journalists can and do swap rumors, fact and analysis with 
     intelligence officers, whether dining in a Paris bistro, 
     walking in Gorky Park or chatting on the line to Langley. 
     These relationships are built upon trust and a shared desire 
     to get the best information.
       That is a far cry from enlisting journalists to carry out 
     CIA jobs or by passing off agency operatives as working 
     backs. Journalists cannot be used as spies.
                                                                    ____


                [From the Sacramento Bee, Mar. 8, 1996]

              Spy Vs. Spy, With Journalists in the Middle

                            (Anna Husarska)

       My nonassociation with the CIA started 12 years ago. It was 
     in the war-emptied ghost town of Tenancingo, El Salvador, 
     that I was accused of being a CIA spy by local guerrillas who 
     I visited as administrator of a French humanitarian mission.
       My first journalistic nonassociation with the CIA dates 
     from Christmas week of 1991, which I spent in detention in 
     Cuba, mostly in a squalid interrogation room where I was 
     repeatedly asked by a major from the interior ministry why I 
     wouldn't simply confess to spying for the CIA. I told him 
     that he must be crazy, that the agency's own regulations had 
     forbidden employing or posing as journalists since 1977, 
     following a scandal involving CIA use of reporters.
       I repeated the same arguments in 1993, after I was stopped 
     at gunpoint with several other hacks in Pale, the so-called 
     Bosnian Serb capital. We were all accused of being on a spy 
     mission. Earlier that year, the Haitian supporters of then-
     exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide accused me of being 
     on the CIA payroll; I told them that the opinion article that 
     so infuriated them was my own idea.
       In 1994, I was accused of being a CIA spy because, with two 
     other journalists, both Russian, I crossed the Abkhazia/
     Georgia border when there was some fighting going on. What 
     would I be doing there if not spying for the CIA? My two 
     fellow travelers had a bottle of vodka and--there is no limit 
     to Russian resourcefulness--an open can of sardines in tomato 
     sauce for an appetizer. In pouring rain, we carried these 
     goodies into the checkpoint and suspicion disappeared with 
     the sardines.
       Then, in October 1995, while I was taking photographs of 
     paramilitary formations in Serbia at the invitation of the 
     Serb commanders, the press secretary of a local warlord 
     accused me of gathering material for the CIA.
       Every time, I countered in good faith that the CIA did not 
     employ journalists, nor did it have spies pretending to be 
     journalists. So two weeks ago when I heard CIA Director John 
     M. Deutch defend a long-standing policy allowing clandstine 
     officers, under ``extraordinary circumstances,'' to waive 
     regulations and pose as reporters or to use reporters as 
     informers. I felt kind of outspooked.
       Henceforth, I will not be able to laugh off thugs, warlords 
     and police officers in totalitarian states when they accuse 
     me of being a CIA spy. Nor can I be confident in pointing out 
     my two non-U.S. passports and protesting that I have no 
     loyalty links to the United States and even less with the 
     CIA. The Washington Post reported that whatever prohibitions 
     existed against recruiting journalists ``have never applied 
     to foreign journalists, whom the CIA still looks to recruit, 
     according to sources familiar with the matter.''
       If the stain of suspicion is on all journalists, then those 
     foreign sources (official or not) who want to deny access to 
     media will have an excuse to do so. And the truth is, policy-
     makers can ill afford to lose any reporting from the honest 
     news media. God forbid they should have to depend only on 
     what the spies know.
       After many interviews with Western military and civilian 
     intelligence personnel in Haiti and then in Bosnia, I 
     realized that they often pooh-pooh journalism as unclassified 
     information not worthy of their attention. In Haiti, for 
     instance, the press reported consistently that the 
     paramilitary organiaztion called FRAPH were murderous thugs, 
     a direct heir to the feared Tontons Macoutes. The CIA 
     maintained that they were just another political party, and 
     told that to the U.S. forces arriving there as peacekeepers 
     in 1994. As a result, the Americans saw no need to neutralize 
     FRAPH, tainting their democratic image with the locals.
       I was not too surprised either when a U.S. Marine 
     intelligence captain and a civilian intelligence expert from 
     the Defense Department with whom I flew from Tuzla to 
     Sarajevo in February assured me that the shuttle that they 
     were taking from the airport would be stopping ``right in 
     front of the Hotel Serbia'' in central Sarajevo. Now, to have 
     a Hotel Serbia in the center of Sarajevo these days is about 
     as likely as a Hotel Hanoi in Saigon in 1972. Stupidity is 
     the most charitable interpretation on these large and small 
     idiocies.
       One can only hope that the intelligence community will make 
     an intelligent decision and start using journalists' work, 
     not their identities.
                                                                    ____


                 [From the Baltimore Sun, Mar. 5, 1996]

           One Boundary Too Dangerous for the Press to Cross

                           (By Clarence Page)

       Washington--I was appalled to discover the Central 
     Intelligence Agency can secretly recruit journalists and 
     clergy as spies. People all over the planet already have 
     enough reasons to hate us journalists. Why add another one?
       Too many people have too hard of a time telling the 
     difference between journalists and spies as it is: our jobs 
     are so similar.
       Both are assigned to get information the government or the 
     organization that is being reported on or spied on doesn't 
     want them to know.
       Of course, there are significant differences. The sort of 
     information that can get you a Pulitzer Prize in this country 
     can get you shot in someone else's. That is why, if we are to 
     spread the blessings of liberty with any success, we must be 
     scrupulous in the way we distinguish independent journalists 
     from government employers.
       That's not an easy distinction for much of the world to 
     grasp. Freedom of the press, like brokered political 
     conventions or the designated hitter, is a concept that is 
     not

[[Page H5402]]

     easily understood by those who did not grow up with it.
       Consider the difficulty I had trying to explain my role to 
     some university intellectuals in Tanzania while I was 
     traveling around Africa as a reporter for the Chicago Tribune 
     in the mid-1970s.
       ``Is your newspaper a government newspaper or a party 
     newspaper?'' one professor asked. He appeared to be genuinely 
     curious.
       Neither, I said. It is a big independent newspaper.
       ``Big?'' said the other. ``It is a government newspaper?''
       No, I said. It is a big private newspaper.
       ``But what party publishes it?''
       Parties don't publish major newspapers in America. In 
     America, I explained, quoting A.J. Liebling, the press is 
     free to whoever owns one.
       ``But what party do the owners of your newspaper belong 
     to,'' one said.
       That's not supposed to matter, I said. The only bias that 
     is supposed to matter is the bias in favor of a good story.
       They looked at me incredulously. I have grown accustomed to 
     that look from Americans. How, I wondered, could I ever 
     persuade Tanzanians that America's press was not beholden to 
     some higher political power when I could not always persuade 
     my fellow Americans?
       After all, I already had become accustomed to assuming that 
     any ``journalist'' was a spy (and, at the same time, an 
     unofficial government spokesperson) if he or she carried 
     credentials from the Soviet Union, mainland China or any 
     similar totalitarian regime.
       Rare exceptions.
       Regulations passed in 1977 in the wake of Watergate 
     prohibit the practice of using journalists as spies for the 
     United States. But current CIA Director John M. Deutch 
     revealed a loophole during recent Senate hearings. That 
     loophole allows the CIA to secretly waive the regulations in 
     ``extraordinarily rate'' circumstances and use journalistic 
     or media cover for intelligence activities.
       It's a terrible idea. Even with Senate oversight, the 
     practice of recruiting journalists or clergy casts a 
     dangerous shadow of suspicion over all American journalists 
     who operate overseas.
       Yet, Mr. Deutch defended the practice. Since 1977, he said, 
     according to the Associated Press, the agency has been 
     operating under rules that ``will not use journalists except 
     under--American journalists--except under very, very rare 
     circumstances.''
       How, asked Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., chairman of the 
     Senate Intelligence Committee, would he define those ``rare 
     circumstances?''
       Mr. Deutch offered two hypothetical examples: ``One would 
     be where you had a journalist involved in a situation where 
     terrorists were holding U.S. hostages . . . journalists might 
     have tremendously unique access in such a situation . . . or 
     where there was a particular access to a nation or a group 
     who had an ability to use weapons of mass destruction against 
     the U.S.''
       Well, you have to wonder how much access journalists will 
     have, once outlaw governments or terrorist groups get the 
     idea that the journalist may very well be an informant for an 
     agency that has undermined governments throughout the world.
       Arnett's example
       Let us not forget CNN's Peter Arnett, who reported live 
     daily from Baghdad during the Persian Gulf war. Despite the 
     worry warts back home who criticized Mr. Arnett every time he 
     reported the Baghdad's government point of view, Pentagon 
     officials said afterward that Mr. Arnett's live pictures 
     actually helped Defense Department assess the effectiveness 
     of their bombing.
       That's how it is supposed to work.
       In the course of doing their job, journalists can help the 
     efforts of their host government, but that is not their 
     primary purpose.
       Some people have trouble telling the difference between 
     spies and reporters. But there is a difference. Let's not 
     fuzz it up.


    amendment offered by mr. murtha to the amendment offered by mr. 
                               richardson

  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Murtha to the amendment offered by 
     Mr. Richardson:
       In the matter proposed to be added by the amendment--
       (1) strike ``An element of'' and insert ``(a) Policy.--It 
     is the policy of the United States that an element of''; and
       (2) add at the end the following:
       (b) Waiver.--The President may waive subsection (a) in the 
     case of an individual if the President certifies in writing 
     that the waiver is necessary to address the overriding 
     national security interest of the United States. The 
     certification shall be made to the Permanent Select Committee 
     on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
       (c) Voluntary Cooperation.--Subsection (a) shall not be 
     construed to prohibit the voluntary cooperation of any person 
     who is aware that the cooperation is being provided to an 
     element of the United States Intelligence Community.

  Mr. MURTHA (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment to the amendment be considered as read and 
printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, what I am doing here is trying to make sure 
that in extreme, rare circumstances the President could waive the rules 
or waive the law so that a journalist in acts of terrorism or something 
like that would be able to allow a journalist to be used in the best 
interests of the country. It is a remote possibility. The DCI does not 
want to completely foreclose the option, if the national security 
interest cannot be furthered in any other way.
  I just think this is what we need in order to be able to pursue this 
amendment. There is widespread support for the amendment, but I think 
we need a clause which would allow the President of the United States 
to decide that something like this can be used in the best interest of 
the country.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MURTHA. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would be prepared to accept this 
amendment. I think this is important. It is the President that we are 
giving this waiver to, not the DCI. The President would have to notify 
the committees of the Congress of such an action. It is under the most 
extreme of all circumstances. I suspect that we want to preserve that 
ultimate option. I think it is important that, in accepting this 
amendment, we approve my amendment, which basically states the policy 
of the intelligence community not to recruit journalists as spies.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MURTHA. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I want to say I strongly support the Murtha 
amendment to the Richardson amendment. I think it was carefully 
crafted. It makes clear that a voluntary effort could be undertaken. In 
addition, a journalist could be used only if the President certifies to 
Congress as to why it is necessary to do so. I think it gives us a very 
good safeguard. I think it is a good compromise, and I applaud the 
gentleman from New Mexico for accepting the Murtha amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. MURTHA. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me. 
I rise in strong support of the gentleman from Pennsylvania's 
amendment. I completely understand the concerns of the gentleman from 
New Mexico in offering the amendment. I would like to insert in the 
Record a letter addressed to me as chairman of the committee from the 
Director of Central Intelligence outlining his concerns but indicating 
the fact that he would have no intention of using anyone within the 
media but wanting to protect the right and in dire circumstances or 
extreme circumstances, particularly as the case may affect the ability 
to save lives, that they would like the option. The amendment of the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania does preserve that right. I do rise in 
strong support of it.
  I include for the Record the letter to which I referred:

                                  Central Intelligence Agency,

                                       Washington, DC 21 May 1996.
     Hon. Larry Combest,
     Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House 
         of Representatives, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to express opposition to an 
     amendment to be offered by Mr. Richardson of New Mexico to 
     H.R. 3259, the Intelligence Authorization act for Fiscal Year 
     1997. Mr. Richardson's amendment seeks to prohibit any use of 
     a U.S. journalist or U.S. journalistic organization for 
     intelligence collection.
       I empathize with the sentiment behind the amendment. My 
     personal view as well as the official policy of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency is that we should not use American 
     journalists as agents or American news organizations for 
     cover. As Director of Central Intelligence, I have no 
     intention of doing either.
       As Director of Central Intelligence, however, I am also 
     wary of categorically ruling out means to collect 
     intelligence that might, under extraordinary circumstances, 
     make the difference in saving American lives. That is why CIA 
     policy for the past twenty years has reserved the right to 
     make rare exceptions to that policy. I have not encountered 
     any set of circumstances that would lead me to consider that 
     possibility during my service, but I do not believe that we 
     should forever foreclose my or my successor's future 
     consideration of such a course.

[[Page H5403]]

       I join all Americans in my respect for the independence and 
     credibility of our press. When I recently reviewed CIA's 
     policy on intelligence use of American journalists at the 
     direction of Congress, I put into place very stringent 
     guidelines that prohibit any intelligence use of American 
     journalists except under the most extraordinary 
     circumstances. I found that I was unable to assure the 
     President or the Congress that it would never be essential to 
     ask the assistance of a journalist to discover secret 
     information of supreme importance to the security of this 
     country or its citizens. Unfortunately, I can envision 
     circumstances where such cooperation might mean the 
     difference between life and death, possibly in a terrorist 
     situation involving a threat to many Americans. That is why I 
     am compelled to oppose the Richardson amendment as an 
     unnecessary and overly restrictive limitation on intelligence 
     activity.
       I urge the Committee to provide me an opportunity to 
     explain in closed session the new guidelines I have adopted 
     and I urge the House to reject the Richardson amendment.
       An original of this letter is also being sent to Ranking 
     Minority member Dicks.
           Sincerely,
                                                      John Deutch,
                                 Director of Central Intelligence.

  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha] to the amendment offered by 
the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].
  The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson] as amended.
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and, pending 
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, further proceedings on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson], as 
amended, will be postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.


                         parliamentary inquiry

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.
  Mr. DICKS. Does the gentleman have to restate his request for a 
recorded vote at a later time, or is it going to be an automatic 
recorded vote?
  The CHAIRMAN. The request for a recorded vote will be pending at that 
time. The vote is not automatically ordered.
  Mr. DICKS. I thank the Chair.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                    AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. SANDERS

  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Sanders: At the end of title I, 
     add the following new section:

     SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE 
                   APPROPRIATED.

       (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), 
     notwithstanding the total amount of the individual 
     authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, 
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, there is 
     authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 to carry 
     out this Act not more than 90 percent of the total amount 
     authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence 
     Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
     Agency Retirement and Disability Fund by section 201.

  Mr. SANDERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Vermont?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, this amendment is simple. It is 
straightforward and, in fact, it should be supported by every Member of 
this House, especially those who are concerned about our national debt 
and the deficit situation.
  This amendment is about honesty. It is about consistency, and it is 
about national priorities. It is about whether the Members of this 
body, many of whom have voted to cut programs which will be very 
negative, which will have a lot of pain, cause a lot of pain for some 
of the weakest and most vulnerable people in this country, programs for 
our kids, programs for our senior citizens, programs for our young 
people, whether the Members who have voted to cut those programs now 
have the courage to take on the very powerful intelligence community 
and to say that with a $5 trillion national debt, we should not be 
increasing funding for intelligence when we cut back on so many 
programs that tens of millions of Americans depend upon.
  Mr. Chairman, this amendment cuts the intelligence budget by 10 
percent from the level authorized for fiscal year 1996, and that is 
approximately a $3 billion cut.
  Mr. Chairman, there are three basic reasons why this amendment should 
be supported.

  First, major sections of the intelligence community are fiscally 
irresponsible and need to be held accountable for their hugely 
inaccurate reports to Congress and for their wasteful habits.
  Second, like every other agency of Government, the intelligence 
community must bear its burden in balancing the budget. We cannot say 
to pregnant women, we do not have the funds to provide health insurance 
for you, we cannot say to senior citizens, we do not have the money to 
make sure you get your prescription drugs, we cannot say to young 
working-class families, we do not have the money to make sure that your 
kids can go to college, we do not have the money to adequately fund 
Medicaid or Medicare, but, yes, we have more than enough money to put 
into the intelligence agencies despite the fact that the cold war has 
ended.
  Mr. Chairman, let me read for my colleagues an article that appeared 
in the May 16 New York Times. I am going to read this slowly, because I 
want the Members to appreciate what we are talking about today and why 
it is totally irresponsible for any Member to be talking about a 4.9 
increase in funding.
  Let me quote for the article: ``In a complete collapse of 
accountability, the government agency that builds spy satellites 
accumulated about $4 billion in uncounted secret money, nearly twice 
the amount previously reported to Congress, intelligence officials 
acknowledge today.''
  Mr. Chairman, let us repeat what was in the New York Times so that 
every Member understands what this debate is about. I quote from the 
New York Times; ``In a complete collapse of accountability, the 
government agency that builds spy satellites accumulated about $4 
billion in uncounted secret money, nearly twice the amount previously 
reported to Congress.''
  Let me continue from the New York Times: ``The agency, the highly 
secretive national reconnaissance office, said last year that the 
surplus money totaled no more than about $1 billion. Congressional 
intelligence overseers in December said the amount was about $2 
billion. They were misinformed. The secret agency was unaware until 
very recently exactly how much money it had accumulated in its 
classified compartments.''
  Listen to this, to put the $4 billion in perspective, still quoting 
New York Times, ``what the national reconnaissance office did was to 
lose track of a sum roughly equal to the annual budgets for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation and the State Department combined.''
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. SANDERS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I support the gentleman, 
but I begin to get second thoughts because maybe we have found a way to 
really cut the deficit. This hidden money that we lost track of started 
out at a billion. Then within a couple of months it was $2 billion. Now 
it is $4 billion. There is not revenue source in the Federal Government 
growing at so rapid a rate. Maybe we ought to leave these people alone, 
because at the rate these people salt away money and have it increase, 
pretty soon we will get rid of the deficit.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Sanders was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, let me continue reading from the New York 
Times:

       John Nelson, appointed last year as the reconnaissance 
     office top financial manager

[[Page H5404]]

     and given the task of cleaning up the problem, said in an 
     interview published today in a special edition of Defense 
     Week that the secret agency had undergone, quoting from Mr. 
     Nelson, fundamental financial meltdown.

  The article continues:

       The financial incompetence of the reconnaissance office 
     meant that one of the Nation's biggest intelligence agencies 
     misinformed Congress, the director of the Central 
     Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense about how 
     much money it had.

  Continuing the New York Times:

       The agency's secrecy made congressional oversight next to 
     impossible, intelligence officials said. Thus the 
     congressional intelligence committees kept appropriating 
     money for the secret agency unaware that it was building up a 
     surplus of billions of dollars.

End of quote from the New York Times.
  Mr. Chairman, how are we going to have credibility with the American 
people when we say to hungry kids, we have got to cut back on nutrition 
programs, when we say to homeless people, there is not enough money 
available for affordable housing, when we say to elderly people, the 
Congress cannot help you pay for the prescription drugs you desperately 
need, when we say there is not enough money for education and have got 
to cut back and then, after this horrendous financial irresponsibility 
on the part of an intelligence community, we say, hey, no problem, you 
need more money, we are there to help you out.
  This is wrong. This is not what deficit reduction is about. This is a 
horrendous sense of national priorities.
  For all of those Members who have been cutting, cutting, cutting, who 
have been coming up here every day talking about the national debt, I 
ask you to support my amendment, a 10-percent cut in the intelligence 
budget.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, While I disagree strongly with the amendment of the 
gentleman from Vermont, I do respect his interest and his position and 
his tenacity in his annual concern about the spending of intelligence. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to discuss all of the aspects of the 
bill. Let me just make some general comments.

                              {time}  1200

  The gentleman mentioned that there are tens of millions of people, 
Americans, dependent upon other programs which are not sufficiently 
funded. I would agree with that. I would contend that every American 
depends upon and receives equally the positive results of a strong 
national defense, which a vital part of that is intelligence and the 
ability to determine intentions of other countries, particularly as we 
enter into wartime situations. The reduction of our capabilities abroad 
in the areas of defense, I think, heighten the magnification of the 
need for strong intelligence to make for certain we do not send 
Americans into harm's way. That is on the international front.
  On the domestic front, concerns of terrorism, concerns of narcotics, 
concerns of crime are also very important to the American people, and 
the abilities of intelligence organizations to counter and to be aware 
of intentions many times go unnoticed, unheralded and, most of the 
time, unspoken because we simply cannot discuss them.
  I share the gentleman's concern on the primary subject that he 
mentioned, and that was the carry-forward account in the NRO, and he is 
correct in the $4 billion figure that was recently announced by the 
newly appointed financial manager of the NRO who was brought in after 
the carry-forward account was discovered. Some have accused the 
majority in this year's authorization bill of micromanaging the NRO, 
and the NRP, National Reconnaissance Program.

  I made a commitment to the members of this committee that the 
committee that was brought under task in the New York Times editorial 
of last year when the NRO account, carried-forward account, was first 
mentioned, and the committees of Congress with oversight were chastised 
for inadequate oversight that, as long as I had the luxury and the 
ability to serve as chairman of this committee, I would make every 
effort that I would not subject the committee to that type of criticism 
in the future, and it is with great interest and looking at all of the 
programs of the NRO that the mark that we have brought to the committee 
in our authorization bill this year is being questioned by so many 
people.
  We want to be able to assure, those of us who have been given the 
ability to serve on this committee and basically have to ask Members of 
the Congress to trust us, that we are scrutinizing the expenditures of 
those funds, and while I do not agree that the accounting was done well 
at all, and in fact I think it was shoddy at best, that those moneys 
were appropriated and expended for, authorized and appropriated for, 
programs over the years of which the expenditure did not need to take 
place because the programs that they were to replace in our 
architecture had worked so well.
  There was not a loss of the funds, there was not a squandering of the 
funds. We are continuing to demand an actual and exact accounting of 
those funds and the purposes for which they were initially authorized 
and appropriated, not money which was wasted. It is not money which was 
wasted, it is money which I will be the first to admit was done very 
shoddily in reporting to Congress, even to the director of Central 
Intelligence, that those funds existed.
  We do not intend to allow that to happen again and are very concerned 
about that.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Combest was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. COMBEST. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from 
Texas for yielding, I thank him for his graciousness with which he is 
managing this debate, but I do have concern about the $4 billion. My 
question is:
  When we discovered that there was $4 billion that was unspent 
because, as he said, it turned out that they did not need to spend it, 
did we recapture that for the U.S. Treasury and use it to reduce the 
deficit?
  My problem is that my information is, no, the people who in fact were 
responsible for the overspending and no accounting essentially were 
allowed to spend it for other purposes or give it to the Defense 
Department, which means they have been given them zero incentive not to 
do this again. And if, in fact, it was unneeded spending, why did we 
not recapture it and apply it to reducing the deficit?
  Mr. COMBEST. The gentleman does make a point, and he is correct in 
the fact that it was not taken and it was not used toward the deficit.
  Let me mention to the gentleman from Massachusetts the $4 billion 
only is recently. We are still looking to find the fact amount.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Is there more? Maybe can we hope?
  Mr. COMBEST. Well, hopefully not, but it did begin at 1, and, as we 
know, went to 2. The committee has been kept informed of this, of the 
additional amounts that continue to be uncovered, but of the amount 
last year, over $2 billion has been taken. Some of that was taken by 
other committees. Some of it was taken by the Director of Central 
Intelligence and expended for----
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. If the gentleman will yield. How much? Of 
the $2 billion that he saved and did not spend, or his predecessor, how 
much of a reward did he get of that to spend on other things?
  Mr. COMBEST. I guess the reward was the fact that there was no 
punitive action taken. But we have taken $400 million out of the 
account, more than we had in our authorized bill. We are below some 
$400 million below the authorization from, $800 million below the 
authorization for 1996.
  I do not want to make light of, and I do not make light of, the 
concerns that are raised. I will assure the gentleman that the 
committee shares those concerns.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has 
again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Combest was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

[[Page H5405]]

  Mr. COMBEST. Let me just finish this, and I will be happy to yield.
  Mr. Chairman, the committee is extremely concerned about the 
accountability because of all those good things that are there that do 
happen. It is this type of problem that arises that obviously makes, 
stretches the credibility of many of these agencies of Government.
  I would only want to try to assure the gentleman that we are looking 
at this very carefully, very closely, and we intend for there to be 
complete and thorough accountability.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the difficulty of the 
gentleman's job as chairman of the committee, but let me ask the 
gentleman this:
  To put $4 billion into perspective that the National Reconnaissance 
Office, quote unquote, lost track of, I would mention to my friend I 
know he is from Texas and it is a little bit bigger State than Vermont; 
our entire annual budget for the State of Vermont for 1 year is $1.5 
billion. In other words, they lost track of an amount of money 
equivalent to 3 years of the budget of the State of Vermont.
  Last year, I was on the floor of the House, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] was on the floor of the House, other Members, 
and we opposed an increase in the intelligence budget. We were 
concerned about exactly what we are talking about today, and we were 
told, ``No problem. They need every dime.''
  Somehow or other they lost $4 billion, and I would suggest that the 
problem that I have with my friend's argument is that I fear next year 
we are going to be in the same position again.
  When some agency is so irresponsible, I think we have got to say 
enough is enough.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I understand the gentleman's concern. Let 
me say first of all it was not lost. The money is there and accounted 
for. These were programs that were authorized and appropriated and 
programs for which commitments have been made, and I would just simply 
say to the gentleman, in comparing with the State of Vermont's budget, 
fortunately the State of Vermont does not have to fund national defense 
for all Americans.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to try to see if I can provide some 
clarification.
  On most of the major weapons systems that we fund in the Defense 
Department, like an aircraft carrier or the F-22, which is still an R&D 
program, we authorize all of the budget authority at one time. 
Therefore we have each year tremendous amounts of unobligated funds for 
those programs. If we looked at the Department of Defense, we would see 
there are a lot of unobligated funds.
  In this area there was adopted a procedure when George McMahon was 
chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. There was a concern that 
at the end of the fiscal year if Congress did not pass the budget, that 
some of these programs would be adversely affected.
  These are the crown jewels of our national technical means. We have a 
series of satellite programs that are funded on an incremental basis. 
One of the things we do not want to do is have them do what some 
agencies do, and that is rush at the end of the fiscal year to spend 
all the money. We have somewhere between 7 and 12 programs that have 
had various levels of unspent funds which added up to this total.

  We have no evidence whatsoever that any of this money was wrongly 
spent. The money would have ultimately been spent for each of these 
programs. The mistake of the NRO was not keeping Congress properly 
informed about the total of those carryforward funds. That is what we 
objected to, and we were very upset about it. The Director of Central 
Intelligence, Mr. Deutsch, was very upset about it. He has taken steps 
to appoint a chief financial officer to get these accounts in order.
  The money is no longer there, I want to point out to my colleagues. 
Some of it was used in Bosnia, some of it was used for other defense 
purposes, the administration took part of it in terms of their budget 
request. So that balance has been reduced to a much smaller level, and 
again there is some management reason to have modest reserves in each 
of these line items.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I would like to just also mention that in 
the authorization of last year our committee, and I am sorry in the 
conference report, which finally became the law, this committee and the 
Senate Intelligence Committee put a limit of 1-month carryforward money 
so that those could be substantial so that we can make for certain that 
it does not grow into the amounts. But it is written into law that 
there is a 1-month carryforward, no more than an 1-month carryover.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I must tell my friend from Texas I am 
less reassured by that than I might have been, given the fact that 
after we passed that conference report and it was signed into law, the 
unobligated, unaccounted for secret surplus went from $2 billion to $4 
billion. So this restriction on them did not appear to lay a glove on 
them because they passed this tough restriction, and then we find out 
months after they pass the restriction that it was $4 billion instead 
of $2 billion. Maybe our colleagues should stop trying to restrict 
them, because they are not doing too well.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman from Massachusetts will let 
me have my time back, I would appreciate that. I want to point out to 
the gentleman that when we named the chief financial officer, he had to 
go back in and go through all these accounts. I admit and agree with 
the gentleman that the amount here was totally out of proportion to 
what is needed to properly take care of these contingency purposes. 
What I am trying to point out is that the money has not been 
squandered, has not been used for unauthorized purposes; there is no 
waste, fraud, or abuse. What we had is lousy bookkeeping on the part of 
the NRO.
  Let me just say one thing further. The NRO has been one of the 
premier organizations in this Government. They are great engineers. 
They build incredible satellites. They may be lousy accountants, and in 
this case they certainly were. We should always remember what they have 
done. They have created the best capabilities that anybody has in the 
world and we should remember that this agency has been very effective 
for the American people.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. My point was, and I must say I am again 
unreassured that these crack intelligence people who are so terrific 
cannot keep track of the money.
  I will say, in fairness to them, I do not think this was lousy 
accounting, I think this was cleverness on their part, knowing that 
they can build this up and those guys are going to spend it.
  But the point I want to make is this: The chairman said, ``You came 
up with a way to prevent this from happening last year, and what 
happened? It got worse after you presented it.'' So I am saying it is--
--
  Mr. DICKS. That is for this year's budget.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Oh, I see. So what is the excuse going to 
be next year?
  Mr. DICKS. Well, we hope there will not be one, I would say to my 
colleague.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 2 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, my friend from Washington will recall that 
last year, same time, same place, we had the same debate. The gentleman 
from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] and myself and others said we think we 
are spending too much on the intelligence, and we had leaders from both 
political parties coming forward saying they

[[Page H5406]]

need every single nickel. And what we are hearing today is, in fact, 
that there was an unaccounted-for slush fund of $4 billion that, in 
fact, was not needed.
  We were right on the debate last time, and in due respect to my 
friend from Washington, his position was wrong.
  So the question now comes before us this year. I am not here to pass 
blame on any Member of the Congress.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I take back my time, and I say to my friend, 
first of all, I would not characterize this as a slush fund. I would 
characterize it as a management reserve for each of these important 
programs, and the money that Congress appropriated and authorized is 
needed at some point for these programs.
  We have taken the money away. That means at some point in the future 
we have to restore it.
  I would also say to the gentleman that we are going through a period 
where we are reducing the number of programs that we have, we are 
trying to change the architecture, we are trying to, in essence, invest 
in more capable systems for the future so that we will be able to save 
some money.

                              {time}  1215

  I would argue that all of the money would have been legally spent on 
the programs as required, eventually, and there is no indication of 
waste, fraud, or abuse.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the 
requisite number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, we have never had a clearer demonstration of the 
importance of an amendment. We are constrained by one of the dumber 
laws in the United States from telling the American people what the 
overall intelligence budget is. If we cannot tell people what the 
overall intelligence budget is, we cannot tell them the percentage, 
because even the accountants at the National Reconnaissance Office 
could figure out what that meant the total was.
  But I can say this, Mr. Chairman. The $4 billion that has hidden away 
and spent for purposes other than was legally authorized, and let us be 
very clear, there is no doubt about that; what the gentleman from Texas 
said was it turned out they did not need to spend that.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman, I know, is not intending to 
say that. There was no evidence whatsoever that funds were spent for 
anything that was unauthorized.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. That is not my point. I did not say it 
was unauthorized, I said they spent clearly more----
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman wants to read the Record 
back, that is exactly what he said.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Yes, and I will explain what I said to 
the gentleman. I am sorry the gentleman and his colleagues have done, 
frankly, such a lousy job in letting these people put $4 billion away, 
and it was $1 billion and then $2 billion, and now it is $4 billion. 
Every time, they come up with more money. You explained to us how you 
had it under control.
  What happened, Mr. Chairman, was this: They were allowed to spend 
almost all of that on other purposes, not things that were not 
authorized, but they were allowed to spend more, because the accounts 
were added to. They were given that $4 billion, they were given a 
limit: You can spend so much on this and so much on that and so much 
there. And because they underspent here, they were allowed to reuse 
that.
  You have provided them with every incentive to keep fooling you, and 
fooling you they have been doing. You have not penalized them at all. 
If any other agency of the Federal Government got caught with a surplus 
of this percentage, there would be calls for resignations and 
impeachments and denunciations.
  Mr. Chairman, the $4 billion that was found, that was spent in 
addition to what was authorized in these purposes, that $4 billion is 
more than the amendment of the gentleman from Vermont would cut. You 
lost track of more money than we want to cut, so that is how, I think, 
unfounded it is for you to claim that this in any way jeopardizes it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Massachusetts is on the 
Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity of the Committee on 
Banking and Financial Services with me. He will remember a few weeks 
ago, there was a photograph and great discussions about mismanagement 
of public housing. Does the gentleman recall that?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Yes, I do.
  Mr. SANDERS. How terrible it was; how could we continue to have 
covered, how would we continue to fund the HUD agencies when they are 
going mismanagement like that? Does the gentleman not a see a little 
bit of a discrepancy in judgment, in opinion, in terms of the gross 
mismanagement of billions of dollars through the National 
Reconnaissance Office and what we heard about HUD and the running of 
public housing?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I would make this 
distinction, and in the case of HUD, I am more critical, because we had 
for 8 years a Secretary of HUD, appointed by Ronald Reagan, who was 
dishonest and incompetent, in combination. I do not think that is the 
case here. I do not think people had the kind of abuses and criminality 
here. I know they did not. But what we had was they gamed the system 
very effectively. They were able to not have to spend it.
  Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Texas said it turned out they did 
not need to spend it. They were able to save $4 billion. And they got 
the ability, after authorizations, to reprogram that and reuse it so 
they were able to spend more in other areas, since they did not have to 
spend as much in the first area.
  Given the commitment we hear about deficit reduction, it is striking 
that almost none of that undiscovered, unspent money went for deficit 
reduction.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman was a little more 
accurate in his latter phrases. I want to make sure that what we did, 
what the Defense Department did, was take some of the excess money and 
use it for Bosnia. Then they did not have to come to Congress, and we 
approved that.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. How much for Bosnia, I would ask the 
gentleman?
  Mr. DICKS. The sum of $200 million was used.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. That is $200 million out of $4 billion.
  Mr. Chairman, let me take back my time to say, here is the point: 
Yes, $200 million, maybe a couple hundred more, was used for Bosnia. 
Billions of dollars were unspent. I am making two points. First of all, 
I am wholly skeptical of the toughness of your oversight, since no one 
was penalized at all. As a matter of fact, they are rewarded by this. 
They are rewarded when they overspend, by being allowed then to spend 
more than was authorized.
  My point is this: If you authorize correctly in the first place, then 
you must admit you overspent, because if in fact they were able to make 
savings to the tune of $4 billion in one set of programs, then we 
should have been able to get at least some of the benefit of that $4 
billion, instead of your rewarding them by putting it elsewhere.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank] has expired.
  (On request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Frank of 
Massachusetts was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I would say to my friend, the gentleman from 
Massachusetts, first of all, this was not without penalty. The Director 
and the Deputy Director of the NRO were replaced by the administration 
and a new head was brought in.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. When?

[[Page H5407]]

  Mr. DICKS. Several months ago, in February or March of this year, so 
there was direct action taken. I take some umbrage at this, because it 
was the staff on our committee, and the minority staff in particular, 
that were at the forefront of discovering this problem and bringing it 
to the administration's attention.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, 
where did it get to $4 billion.
  Mr. DICKS. Last year.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. You were telling us $2 billion.
  Mr. DICKS. At the time they discovered it.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. They hid $2 billion from you.
  Mr. DICKS. They did not know what the total was.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Who did not know?
  Mr. DICKS. The NRO did not.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. They just lost $2 billion? With their 
satellites they could not find $2 billion?

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just would say we tried our very best to 
ensure that. We supported Mr. Deutsch's steps to reform the NRO such as 
appointing a chief financial officer. We found the money in the first 
instance, and we now have a more accurate figure.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. I will take back my time to say this, Mr. 
Chairman; the record is clear. As the gentleman from Vermont said, you 
always have an explanation of how everything is fine. I understand this 
is difficult. They are very sophisticated things they are doing. I do 
not believe it was an honest error. I believe they figured out a game.
  The central point I want to make is this, and I am not for hanging 
anyone, but the fact that an agency was able to accumulate a surplus 
greater than 10 percent of the total authorization here is an 
indication that you are giving them more money than they need for the 
purposes you say you are giving it to them for.
  In fact, what you were doing, that $4 billion, that is the entire 
Community Development Block Grant Program for the United States. It was 
twice the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program for the United 
States. You are talking about the deficit, and people should 
understand, because we are going to get to a zero deficit.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. 
Frank] has again expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Frank of Massachusetts was allowed to 
proceed for 30 additional seconds.)
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I say to the gentleman, 
continue this trend of ever-increasing appropriations and 
authorizations for this agency, even when they have shown it is 
excessive by building up these surpluses, and you mandate deeper cuts 
in the environment and law enforcement and college education and public 
safety and everything else, because we are in a zero-sum situation. The 
$4 billion they accumulated without the knowledge of this committee is 
taken out of other important programs. We would be gravely mistaken if 
we did not try to recapture that for other purposes.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
   Mr. Chairman, this is a stealth cut. Technically, the American 
people do not know what the budget is in the first place. I think it is 
very important today that we pass the Conyers amendment and once and 
for all bring some fiscal responsibility to the Central Intelligence 
Agency.
  I have voted for cuts in this bill nearly every year I have been in 
Congress. It is amazing for me to announce here now that I am not going 
to vote to cut this budget by 10 percent. I am not going to do that 
because I believe that John Deutch, his word is good. He is doing a 
good job. We have an opportunity here to put this department, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence units in order.
  But we wonder why the American people are so upset with our 
Government. I would like to make this statement, because I do trust the 
chairman and the ranking member, two of our finer members, but I think 
it is very unusual when the American people learn about an invasion of 
Kuwait on CNN news. There must be an aggressive congressional oversight 
to ensure that these intelligence agencies are not just operating in a 
stealth vacuum, doing absolutely nothing. This will be the one chance 
this Member will give.
   Mr. Chairman, I would like to say one other thing. Unless we pass 
the Conyers amendment, we would not know what the Sanders amendment 
would cut if we were not a Member of the Congress of the United States. 
I think the American people are paying for the freight coming down the 
track and should know what our intelligence community is doing.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I want the gentleman to know 
that I have supported Chairman Glickman, I am supporting and 
cosponsoring the amendment of the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers, 
and the President supports, as does the Aspin-Brown Commission, making 
the aggregate dollar number known to the American public.
  I would only say one thing to the gentleman about his statement about 
Kuwait. George Bush, as President, the first thing he stated after the 
invasion was that it was not an intelligence failure. We knew several 
days ahead of time, but again, it is always hard for the American 
Government, the national command authority, when it is getting 
differing opinions from government heads in the area that, well, 
Saddham will not do this, to take action. It was not a failure of 
intelligence. We did have 2 or 3 days of warning. It is acting on that 
warning that is always difficult under our form of government.
  So I do not want to disparage the intelligence agencies here. They 
gave them the information. The leadership could not make a decision 
that quickly.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Chairman, I will not support 
this cutting amendment. I will give John Deutch a hand. But I will say 
this next year, if we continue to find ourselves in this big sinkhole 
without passing a Conyers amendment, I would recommend we hire Ted 
Turner and Rush Limbaugh and let the CIA stay home, and other defense 
intelligence agencies, because they are not getting too much done, 
folks.
   Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment, but I want to 
commend the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Sanders. I think he may help 
pass the Conyers amendment, and that may be the best thing we do here 
in this Congress today.
  Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence who 
has served on the committee now for a couple of years, I cannot help 
but rise at this point to first express my deep appreciation for the 
work of both the chairman, the gentleman from Texas, Larry Combest, and 
my colleague, the gentleman from Washington, Mr. Dicks, for the very, 
very fine job they are doing on an extremely difficult subject area, 
developing and bringing the intelligence budget to this House floor.
  Mr. Chairman, it is a very, very popular thing to rise and oppose the 
intelligence community and presume that lightly we can, using 
essentially a machete approach, cut 10 percent across the board in this 
program. Since the end of the cold war, we have progressively been 
reducing a very significant portion of our budget; that is, the defense 
budget. Defense has come down by approximately $100 billion. It is the 
presumption of many that since the cold war is over and since we are 
reducing our defense budget, that lightly we can just wipe out our 
intelligence needs. To suggest that that is the case would suggest to 
me that not very much light has been applied to the intelligence that 
is involved here.
  The reality is that we are living in a very, very complex and very 
dangerous world. At the very time that we have been reducing defense 
spending, it is the very moment that the President and the appropriate 
committees need more and better intelligence around here.
  The heart of the discussion relative to this proposed 10-percent cut 
has been that of the expenditures of the

[[Page H5408]]

NRO. The NRO is that agency which develops and deploys our satellite 
systems, a source of information, intelligence information, that is 
most critical and one of the more important sources.

                              {time}  1230

  To suggest that we can blithely reduce the entire intelligence budget 
because of problems that have developed in the NRO is to not understand 
the need for intelligence at all. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that 
the very people who are making this proposal are the same people who 
for all of their careers here have opposed our national defense, have 
not supported expanding the national defense when we truly needed to 
expand those budgets. To not understand the significance of these 
information flows to the President at this critical time is to ignore 
the reality of this changing world.
  This budget is within 3.9 percent of the President's request. It is 
not an excessive budget. Indeed, there is a need for oversight and 
review. I suggest to my colleagues that absolutely we support not just 
the chairman and the ranking member in this budget, but support the 
President as well.
  Mr. DeFAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, in response to the last gentleman, they are within 3.9 
percent of the President's budget, but of course it erred on the side 
of increasing the rather generous allotment that the President has 
already made for these agencies, as though a fiscal crisis did not 
exist here in Washington.
  This is an extraordinary debate, and I think the burden goes to those 
who are defending against a 10-percent cut in a secret number that we 
cannot know. Now, a case can of course be made that it is a dangerous 
world and we need these various organizations, and they need and can 
spend productively every penny which has been allocated, even a 4-
percent increase over and above the generous allotment requested by the 
President.
  But the burden does rest with the members of the Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence because they are overseers, they are the 
monitors, they are the protectors of the Constitution that says only 
Congress should appropriate funds and that it should know how much it 
is appropriating.
  I do not know. I have not gone to look at the secret number, because 
if I go and look at the secret number, then I cannot tell people what 
the secret number is, which I can read in the New York Times. But this 
is somehow protecting us against the threats of our enemies. What it is 
protecting us against is fiscal responsibility at these agencies.

  Now, wait a minute, the National Reconnaissance Agency, well, they 
did have a little problem. They built a building for some $300 or $400 
million out at a shopping center, and Congress did not know about it. 
Perhaps the agency itself did not know about it or most parts of the 
agency did not know about it, because it keeps secrets from itself.
  This is the agency that monitors everything that goes on on Earth at 
all times. At this moment they are recording my conversation, if not by 
supersecret satellite, from CNN, where they get a good deal of their 
information.
  Now they are saying that they have found an extra $4 billion in their 
budget. Not to worry, $4 billion. We kill on the floor of the House of 
Congress, for a couple hundred thousand crummy dollars over here, and 
talk about welfare cheats and food stamp fraud and all that, and 
amounts of 10 or 20 or 30 thousands of dollars.
  But here is an agency that had $4 billion, more than the total 
appropriation of the FBI and the State Department for their general 
operations, and they just did not know it, and that does not need that. 
Never too much money. No; an extra $4 billion. I mean given the 
magnitude of their annual budget, secret number, we cannot know how 
much that is, they needed this $4 billion. They just did not know they 
had it and they did not know how to spend it.
  Now, there is something very, very wrong with this picture. They know 
everything that is going on. They are monitoring my speech on the 
floor, but they do not know how much money they have because they are 
so awash in funds, they cannot even be bothered to go out and buy a $39 
software program to keep track of it.
  Now, that is absurd, absolutely absured, and to say that that agency 
cannot withstand a cut of 10 percent is indefensible. The burden lies 
on those who would defend it. They get $4 billion they have not been 
able to spend, they did not know they had, and now they cannot 
withstand a 10-percent cut of their annual budget, secret number, no 
one can know it.
  The Soviet Union might learn something from knowing how much we are 
spending on that agency. They will learn that we are spending more on 
these agencies than they are spending on their entire military budget, 
is what they will find. They will shake their head and wonder.
  Of course the Soviet Union does not exist anymore, and that has 
almost percolated down to some of these agencies. They have found that 
fact out and we will be getting a report on that soon.
  So I would rise in support of this amendment and say that the burden 
lies with those who would say an agency, just one of many, we do not 
know how much the others have lost or have an account that they have 
not spent. That is secret, too.
  But just one of our supersecret agencies had $4 billion it did not 
know it had, that it has not spent, and we are being told now it was a 
management reserve. If that was a management reserve there, how much is 
reserved at the other agencies? Do they really need this year's budget? 
Because maybe they should spend down the reserve a little bit, because 
they might be at an imprudent level.
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. The CIA is out of 
control. It is not just the $4 billion that they had lying around that 
they did not know that they had. There are many other ways that the CIA 
is out of control, and the CIA would greatly benefit from some 
downsizing and some streamlining. The CIA would greatly benefit from a 
cut in the funds that they have while they reorganize and regroup.
  This is the CIA that did not predict the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. This is the CIA that could not predict the most momentous event 
of our century. This is the CIA that could not see a dinosaur event, 
like the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is something radically 
wrong with the CIA. It has been wrong for a long time.
  It is amazing that people would come to this floor and defend an 
agency which has lost track of $4 billion, lost track of $4 billion, 
and to talk about them as if they are heroes now because they are going 
to let some of that $4 billion be spent taking care of the war in 
Bosnia, somewhere else. They are not heroes. And do not talk about the 
fact that this is just mismanagement. It is more than mismanagement. We 
do not know.
  Anybody here who has ever been the head of any kind of organization, 
if they have ever been an administrator of a public agency or they are 
the owner, the administrator of a private sector business, they know 
that when money cannot be accounted for, if it is lying loosely around 
and the head of the department did not know it, the head of the CIA did 
not know it, the President did not know it, somebody did steal money. 
We can assume there is a lot of stealing going on, because if we do not 
have any accountability, human beings always will steal.
  This is the CIA that for a number of reasons should be downsizing, 
reorganizing, and streamlining. Nobody has mentioned Aldrich Ames here. 
We have discussed the $4 billion, although the $4 billion is something 
that the administration has admitted. They fired two people. It was on 
the front page of the New York Times. Some people did not know it. They 
fired two people, so mismanagement was occurring.
  For the first time they fired the people, openly stated their names, 
so we know it took place, and it upset the administration a great deal 
because, they publicly fired the people. That is a well-documented 
example of great waste, monumental waste and probably corruption also.
  But what we do not know, what is not talked about more is Aldrich 
Ames,

[[Page H5409]]

the implication of the fact that Aldrich Ames was the head of 
intelligence for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and he was the 
biggest spy of the century for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Aldrich Ames was there for numerous years, and they never detected him 
and finally announced it was the FBI which really trapped Aldrich Ames.
  Out of control, something is radically wrong there. It is a welfare 
agency, in that they have a lot of incompetent people there who are not 
doing their job, or not doing a job which is going to benefit the 
welfare and protect the security of the United States. Something is 
radically wrong. Incompetence must be monumental in that agency.
  This is the agency that paid the salary of Emanuel Comstonce, who was 
the man who led the demonstration on the docks in Haiti when we were 
sending ships down there. We sent ships down there with a peacekeeping 
mission which had police, engineers, et cetera. They led a 
demonstration where they were shooting guns, intimidating the Charge 
d'Affaires of the U.S. Embassy. It was led by a man named Emanuel 
Comstonce, who was on the payroll of the CIA.
  Emanuel Comstonce is right now in prison here in this country. They 
want to keep him here. They want to keep him isolated and quiet because 
he has confessed and he is telling: ``I was on the payroll of the 
CIA.''
  This is an agency that is obviously out of control. It needs to be 
reexamined, downsized, streamlined. In modern society, any institution 
that operates in secrecy is in danger. Our complex society is such that 
any complex institutions needs to be open, so that other folks from 
outside the decisionmaking circles can be able to look at what is going 
on and offer some objective criticisms.
  The Soviet Union collapsed because its whole society was a closed 
circle of decisionmaking, and they made monumental errors which we are 
still discovering and still suffering from. Chernobyl, they did not 
have a nuclear commission that was open and people could talk to. They 
did not have a environmental movement. They would suppress anybody who 
tried to have a movement critical of anything, so they ruined their 
environment.
  The CIA is a closed circle of decisionmaking. The secrecy in the CIA 
guarantees that is always going to be a big problem. We need to open up 
as much as possible, not tell everything, but we can have a discussion 
of the budget. We should know the full amount of the budget. The New 
York Times estimates it is between $28 and $30 billion. We are talking 
about a 10-percent cut on $28 to $30 billion. We are talking about a 
10-percent cut which will at the most amount to $3 billion.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens] has 
expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Owens was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, it has already been pointed out a 10-percent 
cut, which would amount to $3 billion, is less than the amount of money 
they lost track of. They lost track of $4 billion. They put a spin on 
it, they said it was $1 billion, then it became $2 billion. Now they 
are admitting $4 billion, and we do not know how honest they are 
because it keeps mounting. If they have lost track of that kind of 
money, they certainly can afford a 10-percent cut.
  We have been offering this amendment now for the last 4 years. If 
they accepted it in the first place, we might be much further along the 
way in terms of streamlining the CIA.
  I think we need the CIA. We certainly do not need the monster, the 
dinosaur that we have had so many years, that could not detect the 
changes of the Soviet Union, that gave us Aldrich Ames, that gave us 
Emanuel Comstonce, and then had $4 billion lying around while we are 
cutting the budget of Head Start, and cutting the budget of the school 
lunch program, and we are cutting the budget of title I, and we are 
cutting the budget of public housing.
  We are cutting all these budgets while they have $4 billion lying 
around unused. We need to get control of the CIA, Mr. Chairman. We need 
to get control of the CIA.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and, pending 
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, further proceedings on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] will be 
postponed.
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.


                   amendment offered by mr. traficant

  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: At the end of title 
     III, add the following:

     SEC. 306. COMPLIANCE WITH BUY AMERICAN ACT.

       No funds appropriated pursuant to this Act may be expended 
     by an entity unless the entity agrees that in expending the 
     assistance the entity will comply with sections 2 through 4 
     of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a-10c, popularly 
     known as the ``Buy American Act'').

     SEC. 307. SENSE OF CONGRESS; REQUIREMENT REGARDING NOTICE.

       (a) Purchase of American-Made Equipment and Products.--In 
     the case of any equipment or products that may be authorized 
     to be purchased with financial assistance provided under this 
     Act, it is the sense of the Congress that entities receiving 
     such assistance should, in expending the assistance, purchase 
     only American-made equipment and products.
       (b) Notice to Recipients of Assistance.--In providing 
     financial assistance under this Act, the head of the 
     appropriate element of the Intelligence Community shall 
     provide to each recipient of the assistance a notice 
     describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the 
     Congress.

     SEC. 308. PROHIBITION OF CONTRACTS.

       If it has been finally determined by a court or Federal 
     agency that any person intentionally affixed a fraudulent 
     label bearing a ``Made in America'' inscription, or any 
     inscription with the same meaning, to any product sold in or 
     shipped to the United States that was not made in the United 
     States, such person shall be ineligible to receive any 
     contract or subcontract made with funds provided pursuant to 
     this Act, pursuant to the debarment, suspension, and 
     ineligibility procedures described in sections 9.400 through 
     9.409 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.

  Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Ohio?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, we have the stealth budget. This could 
be a stealth Buy American type of program.
  Mr. Chairman, before I yield to the distinguished ranking member, I 
would just like to say this. I think it is important today that the 
Conyers amendment be passed. I think it is absolutely necessary, as 
indicated by previous debate.
  I am here pledging to work with the chairman and the ranking member 
in supporting this budget and to give John Deutsch a real chance. John 
Deutsch's word has always been good. I have dealt with many bureaucrats 
down here. I think he is top flight. He deserves a chance to bring this 
in order.
  My amendment, I think everybody understands it. I want to make sure 
that if we are going to be making these stealth purchases, that these 
stealth purchases take place in the United States of America.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to say to my friend from Ohio, he has offered a 
similar amendment in years past, with the goal of ensuring that the 
intelligence community maximizes its purchase of American-made 
products. As the gentleman knows, we are the leader in stealth 
technology. This is a goal I support.
  We have worked with the gentleman from Ohio on other occasions to 
preserve the spirit of his amendment in conference, even though the 
committee is aware that the record of the intelligence community on the 
procurement

[[Page H5410]]

of U.S. products is exemplary. We will do so again this year, and we 
are pleased, at least I am pleased for the minority, to accept the 
amendment. I yield to the chairman.

                              {time}  1345

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, as we traditionally have been on this 
bill, we are very happy to accept the gentleman's amendment, and 
appreciate his continued work on this for all of these 12 years.
  Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the only thing I can 
say is if the Conyers amendment passes, we will know the aggregate 
amount, we will not know the line items, the public will not, but I am 
going to go up and check to see if these intelligence agency sleuths 
are buying American.
  Mr. Chairman, with that, I urge an ``aye'' vote on the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                   amendment offered by mr. brownback

  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Brownback: At the end of title III 
     insert the following new section:

     SEC. 306. RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE 
                   UNITED NATIONS.

       (a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of title 
     I the following new section:


     ``restrictions on intelligence sharing with the united nations

       ``Sec. 110. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to 
     the United Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence 
     information may be provided to the United Nations or any 
     organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any 
     official or employee thereof, unless the President certifies 
     to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House of Representatives that the Director of Central 
     Intelligence (in this section referred to as the `DCT'), in 
     consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
     Defense, has required, and such organization has established 
     and implemented, procedures for protecting intelligence 
     sources and methods (including protection from release to 
     nations and foreign nationals that are otherwise not eligible 
     to receive such information) no less stringent than 
     procedures maintained by nations with which the United States 
     regularly shares similar types of intelligence information. 
     Such certification shall include a description of the 
     procedures in effect at such organization.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written 
     certification by the President to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress that providing such information to the United 
     Nations or an organization affiliated with the United 
     Nations, or to any official or employee thereof, is in the 
     national security interest of the United States and that all 
     possible measures protecting such information has been taken, 
     except that such waiver must be made for each instance such 
     information is provided, or for each such document provided.
       ``(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President 
     shall periodically report but not less frequently than 
     quarterly, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Committee on International Relations and the Permanent Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives on 
     the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United 
     Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the 
     period covered by the report. Such periodic reports shall be 
     submitted to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the House of Representatives with an annex containing a 
     counterintelligence and security assessment of all risks, 
     including an evaluation of any potential adverse impact on 
     national collection systems, of providing intelligence to the 
     United Nations, together with the information on how such 
     risks have been addressed.
       ``(2) The President shall submit a special report to the 
     Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on International 
     Relations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     of the House or Representatives within 15 days after the 
     United States Government becomes aware of any unauthorized 
     disclosure of intelligence provided to the United Nations by 
     the United States.
       ``(c) Limitation.--The restrictions of subsection (a) and 
     the requirement for periodic reports under paragraph (1) of 
     subsection (a) shall not apply to the provision of 
     intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, 
     appropriately cleared United States Government personnel 
     serving with the United Nations.
       ``(d) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate 
     or assign the duties of the President under subsection (a).
       ``(e) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to--
       ``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
     section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5)); or
       ``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title 
     V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et 
     seq.).''.
       (b) Clinical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 109 the following:

``Sec. 110. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United 
              Nations.''.

  Mr. BROWNBACK (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Kansas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in an attempt to restore 
sanity to our policy of sharing intelligence information with the 
United Nations.
  My amendment would amend the 1974 National Security Act to prohibit 
the sharing of U.S. intelligence information with the United Nations or 
any of its affiliated organizations unless the President certifies to 
Congress that the organization has implemented CIA, Defense, and State 
Department procedures to protect U.S. intelligence sources and methods.
  This provision is not intended to end U.S. intelligence sharing with 
the United Nations, nor does it mean to set unreasonable or impossible 
standards for the protection of critical U.S. sources and methods of 
intelligence gathering.
  The only purpose of this provision is to restore basic rationality to 
the administration's imprudent sharing of sensitive intelligence 
information with the United Nations.
  My provision establishes logical and reasonable standards for sharing 
intelligence information with the United Nations. All it says is that 
the United States should require the same level of protection of U.S. 
intelligence information from the United Nations that we require in our 
intelligence sharing arrangements with other states.
  If for some reason the United Nations is unwilling or incapable of 
providing that level of protections, my provision will still permit the 
sharing of U.S. intelligence with the United Nations on a case-by-case 
basis. In each of these cases, all that is required is a certification 
that the information shared advances U.S. national security interests.
  Protecting our sources and methods of intelligence gathering is not 
an academic subject. It is a matter of national security. It is a 
matter of protecting lives. It is a matter of protecting billions of 
dollars of investments that the American people have made in our 
country's vital national security interests.
  Mr. Chairman, the United Nations has acted like a sieve when it comes 
to safeguarding intelligence information to the same degree as the 
United States.
  Senator Olympia Snowe of Maine has identified four instances in which 
the United Nations has breached the security of classified documents 
provided by the United States. The most egregious violation occurred in 
Somalia where sensitive data was almost compromised due to the United 
Nation's carelessness.
  In addition, Senator Snowe has discovered that no agreement has been 
in place that requires the United Nations to provide for the protection 
of intelligence supplied by the United States.
  As a result of her findings, Senator Snowe drafted a provision 
included in the conference report of the State Department Authorization 
Act that mirrors the amendment I am offering today. The House has 
passed this provision twice. I simply ask now that my colleagues now 
act on it again.
  Mr. Chairman, the administration has failed to implement the 
safeguards needed to protect U.S. intelligence information from 
unauthorized disclosure.

[[Page H5411]]

  In fact, rather than further safeguarding our intelligence 
information, CIA Director Deutch has tried to institutionalize the 
widespread sharing of sensitive U.S. intelligence material by making it 
easier for foreign consumers to register complaints about the use of 
security markings, which protect the national security of the United 
States.
  Mr. Chairman, if my colleagues have any misgivings about this 
amendment, I simply want to point out to them that U.N. General 
Secretary Boutros-Ghali has appointed an Iraqi national, Ismat Kittani, 
to be the head of the United Nations' Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations. It is truly disturbing that a national from a country with 
which the United States has no diplomatic relations, which is on the 
U.S. State Department list of terrorist states, and with which the 
United States recently went to war could be appointed to such a 
sensitive position in the United Nations.
  This is wrong, and this is indicative of the recklessness with which 
the United Nations treats sensitive matters and sensitive information. 
The United States should not share our intelligence information with 
the United Nations unless it adopts the standards to which we hold our 
own agencies accountable.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise I opposition to the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, the Brownback amendment places new, unworkable 
restrictions on the United States sharing information with the United 
Nations--even when it is in the national interest to do so. It would 
make it extremely difficult to provide intelligence support to those 
U.N. activities which are supportive of U.S. foreign policy goals.
  The administration is opposed to the Brownback amendment. This 
amendment is identical to language contained in the conference report 
on H.R. 1561, the Overseas Interests Act, which was vetoed by the 
President. As the President noted in his veto message, this amendment 
would unconstitutionally infringe on the President's power to conduct 
diplomatic relations and limit Presidential control over the use of 
state secrets.
  The DCI has already established guidelines to protect intelligence 
sources and methods, when it is determined to be in the interest of the 
United States to provide information derived from U.S. intelligence to 
the United Nations. Furthermore, the United Nations is working with a 
senior delegation of State, Defense, and CIA officials to implement a 
number of improvements to its internal security procedures.
  The DCI's guidelines ensure that information is carefully reviewed 
and sanitized so that the least sensitive intelligence that satisfies a 
U.N. requirement is provided. Even if information that is provided to 
the United Nations fell into the wrong hands, it will have been 
sanitized so that it will not compromise U.S. intelligence sources and 
methods.
  The Brownback amendment would impede the ability of the United States 
to maintain a flexible and efficient information sharing arrangement 
with the United Nations, and may adversely impact the ability of the 
United States to achieve foreign policy successes.
  The waiver provided in the amendment is too burdensome to be 
effective. It requires the President to issue a waiver for each 
instance that information derived from intelligence is provided to the 
United Nations, or for each document that is provided. Furthermore, the 
President may not delegate this authority.
  The amendment also requires the President to personally report, at 
least quarterly, to Congress on the types and volume of intelligence 
provided to the United Nations and the purposes for which it was 
provided, and report to Congress within 15 days of any unauthorized 
disclosure. The President ought to be able to delegate this authority 
to the DCI.
  The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the committee of this 
Chamber with the greatest concern over the protection of sources and 
methods, considered legislation similar to the Brownback amendment at 
the beginning of the 104th Congress and rejected it on a bipartisan 
basis.
  The committee found several instances where the current intelligence 
sharing arrangement with the United Nations has yielded specific 
foreign policy successes. Information was shared with Security Council 
members on Iraqi troop build-ups, in support of a multilateral effort 
to prevent a repeat of Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait. Intelligence has 
also assisted United Nations Special Commission in Iraq [UNSCOM] 
inspectors in their attempts to enforce U.N. sanctions calling for the 
dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. 
imagery has helped U.N. relief agencies determine the magnitude and 
direction or refugee flows within and from Rwanda. Timely intelligence 
sharing has also helped save the lives of the United States Protection 
Force [UNPROFOR] peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.
  While I do not believe it is necessary to legislate in this area to 
restrict the President's ability to share intelligence information to 
promote U.S. foreign policy, a compromise amendment worked out by the 
Senate Intelligence and Foreign Relations Committees adopted by the 
Senate last year would be clearly preferable.
  I urge a no vote on the Brownback amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to say initially that I am in total agreement 
with the gentleman's intent, that I share his concerns and voted for 
provisions in H.R. 7 of last year that would have substantially 
improved the process by which intelligence could be shared with the 
United Nations.
  Unfortunately, those restrictions did not become law, and I still 
support the idea of requiring that to the appropriate committees of 
Congress, that any information which is shared with the United Nations 
commanders must be provided to the Congress for oversight.
  I am concerned, and our committee spent a good deal of time over the 
last year following some recognition of some problems in pursuing those 
to make certain that there was no loss of sources or methods in some of 
them mishandling of classified information, and we have a very strong 
concern.
  Let me mention two areas of concern that I have in regards to the 
gentleman's amendment that I certainly do not presume in any shape, 
form or fashion would be intentional. But let me mention two areas of 
real concern that I have, in which I am concerned that the amendment as 
offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback] in its current 
form would have.
  One is in the area of providing and sharing intelligence in which 
U.S. troops are involved. That would be that we would be prohibited in 
certain instances by a basic prenotification, that we could not share 
intelligence with NATO forces in any area in which U.S. troops were 
involved, and consequently could potentially put them into greater 
harm. In addition to that, in certain instances that would require 
prenotification that might not be possible in a timely fashion.
  I will give you an example in which Captain O'Grady was shot down. 
That information through the processes of determining the fact that 
there were surface to air missiles that were in a location that had not 
previously been determined, literally came down to a matter of minutes, 
in which we may have been able to be aware of that, but not been able 
to share that with U.N. forces in the area that they would have been 
able to get that information to Captain O'Grady.
  Those concerns in a real timely fashion I believe were legitimate, 
and I have an amendment to the Brownback amendment that I would submit, 
Mr. Chairman, that would in fact allow a broader authority for sharing 
of intelligence when it goes to support U.N. forces in which the United 
States is a participant, and, secondly, to allow a waiver for emergency 
situations involving imminent risk to U.S. lives, in which case the 
President would have to report to Congress as to the specific details 
of that waiver.


  amendment offered by mr. combest as a substitute for the amendment 
                        offered by mr. brownback

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for 
the amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Combest as a substitute for the 
     amendment offered by Mr. Brownback: At the end of title III, 
     the following new section:

[[Page H5412]]

     SEC. 306. RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE 
                   UNITED NATIONS.

       (a) In General.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end of title 
     I, the following new section:


     ``restrictions on intelligence sharing with the united nations

       ``Sec. 110. (a) Provision of Intelligence Information to 
     the United Nations.--(1) No United States intelligence 
     information may be provided to the United Nations or any 
     organization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any 
     officials or employees thereof, unless the President 
     certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that the 
     Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the 
     Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has 
     established and implemented procedures, and has worked with 
     the United Nations to ensure implementation of procedures, 
     for protecting from unauthorized disclosure United States 
     intelligence sources and methods connected to such 
     information.
       ``(2) Paragraph (1) may be waived upon written 
     certification by the President to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress that providing such information to the United 
     Nations or an organization affiliated with the United 
     Nations, or to any officials or employees thereof, is in the 
     national security interests of the United States.
       ``(b) Periodic and Special Reports.--(1) The President 
     shall report semiannually to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress on the types and volume of intelligence provided to 
     the United Nations and the purposes for which it was provided 
     during the period covered by the report. The President shall 
     also report to the appropriate committees of Congress within 
     15 days after it has become known to the United States 
     Government that there has been an unauthorized disclosure of 
     intelligence provided by the United States to the United 
     Nations.
       ``(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first 
     sentence of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the provision of 
     intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of, 
     appropriately cleared United States Government personnel 
     serving with the United Nations.
       ``(c) Delegation of Duties.--The President may not delegate 
     or assign the duties of the President under this section.
       ``(d) Relationship to Existing Law.--Nothing in this 
     section shall be construed to--
       ``(1) impair or otherwise affect the authority of the 
     Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence 
     sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 
     section 103(c)(5); or
       ``(2) supersede or otherwise affect the provisions of title 
     V.
       ``(e) Definition.--As used in this section, the term 
     `appropriate committees of Congress' means the Committee on 
     Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives.''
       ``(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents for the 
     National Security Act of 1947 is amended by inserting after 
     the item relating to section 109 the following:

``Sec. 110. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United 
              Nations.''.

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment be 
considered as read and printed in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I will only reiterate the substitute that 
I will be offering to the Brownback amendment would provide those two 
caveats, one for the allowance of intelligence sharing, broader 
authority for allowance of intelligence sharing when it goes to 
supporting U.N. forces in which the United States is a participant, and 
the second to allow a waiver for emergency situations that involve 
imminent risk to U.S. lives, in which case the President would have to 
report to Congress the details of that waiver.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in very strong support of the Combest 
substitute and urge its adoption.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, this is not specifically addressed to the amendment 
that is being offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest]. I want 
to speak in favor of the legislation because I am very concerned about 
how the United Nations has mismanaged not only classified information 
but other financial matters that they have gotten, and I am speaking 
specifically to Cambodia, where they lost some $20 million plus worth 
of equipment that has just disappeared.
  We are not just talking about hardware here, we are talking about 
classified information and the inability of the United Nations to 
handle that information in a prudent fashion.
  Before I came to the Congress, I worked for the Boeing company, and I 
worked in classified areas where top-secret documents were stored and 
handled and even developed. We were under very strict guidelines. And 
if I look at what has happened in Somalia, as pointed out by Senator 
Snowe, if similar occurrences had occurred in the work environment that 
I was working under, it would have resulted in a certain loss of job 
and a potential prosecution under U.S. law.
  Because we are giving classified information to the United Nations, 
they do not fall under the same guidelines, the same legal restrictions 
that we have here in the United States. This information can be passed 
on or lost or stolen and can fall into the wrong hands.
  I share the concerns of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] for 
situations where we have U.S. troops in critical situations and that 
there may be a sudden need to share locations of anti-aircraft missile 
sites, but when we look at the general trend that goes on in the United 
Nations when they handle information of this classified nature, they do 
not have the proper guidelines. They do not follow the common sense 
criteria that we have laid out in the United States.
  Mr. Chairman, I have risen in strong support of the amendment of the 
gentleman from Kansas, Representative Brownback, because I believe 
there needs to be some confidence on the part of the United States that 
when it does share information that was gained at a very high cost in 
terms of expensive satellite systems or in developmental hardware or in 
a high cost to taxpayers, that it not fall into the hands of people who 
could use it against the very people that paid for the information; 
that it could go against the best interests of this country, whether it 
is military purposes or social purposes or political purposes or 
whatever.
  I think it is important that this type of information be guarded; 
that there be a high degree of responsibility in making sure that it is 
only narrow in its scope; that it is directed specifically for an 
instance, and that broad-based intelligence, classified intelligence 
information is not shared for unnecessary purposes.
  Mr. Chairman, I do not see those guidelines around. So I think the 
Brownback amendment is certainly a step in the right direction and I 
would stand in support of the Brownback amendment.
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  (Mr. CHABOT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment 
offered by my good friend, fellow freshmen, and thoughtful colleague on 
the International Relations Committee the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. 
Brownback].
  This amendment would prohibit the sharing of U.S. intelligence 
information with the United Nations or any of its affiliates unless the 
President certifies to Congress that the U.N. organization has 
implemented the proper CIA, Defense Department, and State Department 
procedures to ensure that U.S. intelligence sources and methods are 
protected.
  It is a good amendment. It was passed by both Houses earlier this 
year as part of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act--a bill that 
was unfortunately, and I believe wisely, vetoed by President Clinton. 
We can rectify some of the damage done by that veto if we adopt the 
Brownback amendment today.
  Mr. Chairman, I can see no logical reason why anyone would want to 
oppose this amendment. The United Nations is not known for its sympathy 
to American interests. And when sharing our intelligence data, we must 
be extremely careful. The Brownback amendment protects that data, 
protects our intelligence sources, and protects our intelligence 
methods. I urge my colleagues to support it.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to engage, if I could, in a bit of a dialog with 
the

[[Page H5413]]

chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], on his amendment to my amendment.
  As I understand from his discussion of this amendment, he would 
maintain the majority of the bill that we have put forward, as far as 
the concerns that we have of the loose treatment of intelligence 
information by the United Nations of U.S. intelligence information.
  That is maintained; is that correct?
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BROWNBACK. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is correct.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the gentleman is 
attempting here to get at particularly the issue of when we are engaged 
in a particular theater that that information can be shared on that 
theater of operations, not just on a specific instance by instance?
  Mr. COMBEST. My concern would be, for example, we can take the 
UNPROFOR forces, where the United States is a part of that operation; 
requiring a prior approval on each case-by-case basis might not be able 
to be done in a timely fashion.
  If it is required that there be a waiver or that that be reported to 
Congress as a theater, the American forces involved with UNPROFOR in 
Bosnia, that would certainly be something I would support.
  It is the individual case, in which in a timely manner prior approval 
could not be given, just simply because there was not enough time that 
existed prior to the need to share that information for protection of 
American lives, either be it a single situation, such as Captain 
O'Grady, or U.S. forces that might be involved in a situation where we 
became aware of something that was fixing to happen or was going to 
happen in a very short order but there was not time for the President 
to actually get engaged and to grant the waiver prior to the time that 
action had to be taken.
  Those are the concerns I have. And in those instances, I would try to 
protect in my substitute that the appropriate committees of Congress 
would have to be notified that, in fact, that waiver was granted and 
could then make their own determination about whether or not it, in 
fact, qualified.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, our amendment had put forward particular 
safeguarding procedures to try to encourage there to be an agreement 
between the United States and the United Nations on any sort of sharing 
of information and that we tighten up that procedure.
  Those are maintained, as I understand it, in the amendment that the 
gentleman has put forward.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I support the idea of requiring an 
agreement to be made. That may not be true of every member of the 
committee, but I certainly do support that.
  Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, with that, I have no objections to the 
amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words. We accept the amendment. I commend the gentleman. I think he has 
made the right decision here. He is moving the ball forward, and we are 
just as concerned as he is about making sure that U.S. intelligence is 
secured properly. I think by accepting the Combest amendment we can 
make progress because of his initiative. I urge support for the 
amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] as a substitute for the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback].
  The amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was agreed 
to.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Brownback], as amended.
  The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. conyers

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Conyers:

     SEC. 306. ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF 
                   INTELLIGENCE EXPENDITURES FOR THE CURRENT AND 
                   SUCCEEDING FISCAL YEARS.

       At the time of submission of the budget of the United 
     States Government submitted for fiscal year 1998 under 
     section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, and for each 
     fiscal year thereafter, the President shall submit to 
     Congress a separate, unclassified statement of the 
     appropriations and proposed appropriations for the current 
     fiscal year, and the amount of appropriations requested for 
     the fiscal year for which the budget is submitted, for 
     national and tactical intelligence activities, including 
     activities carried out under the budget of the Department Of 
     Defense to collect, analyze, produce, disseminate, or support 
     the collection of intelligence.

  Mr. CONYERS (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I offer today a modest proposal that would 
do no more than provide the American people and the Congress with 
information they are entitled to. The amendment would essentially 
declassify the aggregate figure of the intelligence budget. It would 
make public the requested amount in the current fiscal year's 
appropriated amount beginning October 1996. It would not disclose any 
specific operation or department budgets, only the bottomline budget 
number.
  The amendment would conform to the recommendations of the Commission 
on Role and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community, chaired by the 
former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. This bipartisan commission 
proposed that the President or his designee disclose the total amount 
of money appropriated for intelligence activities during the current 
fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal 
year.
  Similarly, the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations report on 
intelligence reform likewise urged the opening of the intelligence 
budget.
  This amendment would also mirror the provisions contained in the 
intelligence authorization bill produced by the other body, which has 
passed in the Senate Intelligence Committee.
  Now, why? The reason is, first of all, constitutional, which in our 
Constitution, it is clearly stated that a regular statement and account 
of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published 
from time to time.
  It is simple, straightforward, and clear. The Framers of the 
Constitution, themselves fresh from secret military operations against 
the British, were no strangers to the need for secrecy. Yet, they 
decided they needed to be accountable to the taxpayers. As early as 
1790 and 1793, when the Congress created a secret fund for persons to 
serve the United States in foreign parts, the law provided for public 
disclosure of the aggregate amount. I think if Americans could have 
openness after the Revolutionary War, then we can certainly have the 
same openness after the cold war.
  Now, in my earlier service on the Government Operations Committee of 
this body, I had a number of decades of experience dealing with 
classified information and the procedures for handling that 
information. When the Government unnecessarily withholds information 
from the public, believe me, it undermines the legitimate secrecy of 
information that really should be protected. When we have an open 
secret, as we do presently, and let us make it public, like the 
intelligence budget, it creates a government by leaks, where 
information is controlled more by access than by policy.
  Withholding this kind of information from the public, in addition, 
undermines confidence in government. I think Americans support an 
intelligence system that provides accurate, timely information to our 
policymakers. When the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was 
asked in April what was the purpose of disclosure of the budget, he 
said that ``the importance here is to gain public support for 
intelligence.''
  I do not think it is asking too much for Congress to tell our 
citizens and constituents, in general terms, how many resources we are 
allocating for intelligence purposes.
  Mr. Chairman, I conclude by observing that it is time to stop 
withholding

[[Page H5414]]

this information. My amendment to make public the bottomline amount of 
the intelligence budget is a sensible step toward fiscal 
responsibility.
  I have a great deal of support both in and out of the Congress for 
this amendment and I urge that it be speedily approved.

                              {time}  1315

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I will not take the 5 minutes. I would just like to 
mention a few points that I have mentioned before and my objections to 
the concept of the gentleman's amendment. The ranking member of the 
committee is in support. In fact, I think a cosponsor, chairman of the 
committee in the previous Congress, our friend the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Mr. Glickman, supported the idea.
  I believe this is starting down a slippery slope. I think this is an 
inside-the-Beltway issue. I do not believe the American people are 
clamoring to know the intelligence budget. I believe that they 
understand the need for there to be national secrets. I believe that, 
and in fact the staff have begun to put extreme pressure on knowing the 
individual amounts of various programs, various agencies within the 
intelligence community. That information, I think, provides information 
to folks that we would rather not know what our plans and programs are; 
that, in fact, is harmful.
  Finally, I would just simply say that in the administration's support 
of this, of declassification of the topline figure, the President has 
the authority today, if he wished, to call a news conference and 
disclose the amount, he could do so. He does not need congressional 
approval.
  I think he is looking for congressional cover. I would suggest that, 
if the administration wishes to take this action, that they would move 
forward under the authority which they currently have. The President 
may so desire to do that. That is his decision. I simply do not feel 
comfortable with it. I have always opposed it, continue to oppose it 
and would not in fact be supportive, could not lend my support to a 
provision which in fact would cause him to, given that he has the 
authority now.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words and speak in favor of the amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to rise in support of the Conyers amendment as a 
cosponsor of it. The amendment will require the disclosure of the 
aggregate budget figure only, not the budgets of any intelligence 
agency, nor the budget for any program or activity. There is no threat 
to national security from the disclosure of only the aggregate figure. 
No potential adversary of the United States has the ability to thwart 
any intelligence collection activity as a result of knowing just the 
aggregate budget figure.
  The executive order on classification permits information to be 
classified only if its disclosure would be expected to cause damage to 
the national security. Classification of the aggregate intelligence 
budget figure does not meet that test.
  The Constitution requires a public statement and account of the 
expenditure of public funds. Disclosure of the aggregate budget figure 
is more consistent with that constitutional requirement than the 
current practice.
  I might just add I had the pleasure of serving on the Aspin-Brown 
Commission. The Commission endorsed disclosing the aggregate number. 
The current Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. John 
Deutch, has also come out in favor of it, as has the President. I think 
it would be totally appropriate for the Congress to take this step. 
That is why I was delighted to join with my colleague, the gentleman 
from Michigan [Mr. Conyers], in presenting this amendment today.

  I urge my colleagues to vote for it.
  Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite 
number of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment. This debate 
here is about national security. National security is about confidence, 
confidence in Government, trust in the Congress of the United States. 
How can we expect the public to trust the House of Representatives when 
we continue to keep budget information secret?
  Think about it. We are in the month of May. Every city council, every 
school board, every county government, every State government has to 
have their budgets adopted by the fiscal year July 1. That means right 
now throughout the United States these hearings on local budgets are 
going on. All publicized, the public knows every cent that comes in and 
every penny that is spent, except here in the House of Representatives, 
where we keep and have traditionally kept secret a portion of the 
national security budget. I think that is wrong. I think we need to 
have confidence in what we do here. We can only have that confidence if 
indeed we tell everybody where their money is going.
  Mr. Chairman, in light of the debate here today, it is interesting 
that the President says we should make this public. The Senate 
Intelligence Committee voted to make it public. The former and current 
CIA Directors agree that it ought to be public. The only way we can 
ensure that it will be made public is to vote for the Conyers 
amendment, help restore confidence in Congress. Support this amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 1 
additional minute.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe we have any further 
speakers on this side. I just wanted to make a point that emphasizes 
something I had said earlier. The White House press statement relative 
to the intelligence community budget of 1996 said, reflecting the 
President's determination to promote openness in the intelligence 
community, he has authorized Congress to make it public.
   Mr. Chairman, the President can make it public. I would state that 
the report of the Aspin-Brown commission says that the commission 
recommends that the President or his designee disclose the total amount 
of money appropriated for intelligence activities during the current 
fiscal year and the total amount being requested for the next fiscal 
year. That is my suggestion. In compliance with the Aspin-Brown 
commission, if the President wishes the budget to be disclosed, he or 
his designee should do it.
  Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Conyers 
amendment to H.R. 3259, the fiscal year 1997 intelligence authorization 
bill. The Conyers amendment would require the release of a separate, 
unclassified statement of budget outlays for intelligence activities.
  It is high time that this come under the same scrutiny as other 
Government spending. For many years during the cold war, the budget 
figures for intelligence were kept secret so that our enemies would not 
know our aggregate spending levels. Although I might question that 
justification, the point is now moot. The cold war is over, and any 
attempt to use it to justify the continuing secrecy of a large, 
expensive set of programs seems to be a cynical attempt to evade 
oversight and proper accounting.
  The need for public scrutiny is clear: from the press reports of the 
last few weeks, I learned that the National Reconnaissance Office, the 
agency that manages spy satellites, has accumulated a financial surplus 
of $3.8 billion. Let's assume that any other agency--one less popular 
with the majority party, perhaps--had stockpiled billions of dollars.
  Do you think, with a public viewing of their finances, that such an 
agency would have been allowed to continue stockpiling money? How do I 
explain to mother that the Federal Government has no money for well 
baby care but has billions for spies slush funds?
  As if the human costs of continued Government secrecy weren't bad 
enough, there is a clear constitutional mandate for public disclosure 
of intelligence spending. The Constitution states that ``No Money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made 
by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to 
time.'' Whey then do we continue to shroud intelligence spending, and 
keep our taxpayers in the dark?
  When the public receives the amount of money spent on intelligence by 
accident--the 1994 Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearings 
disclosed an aggregate of $28 billion dollars--or by press leaks, it 
merely contributes to the dangerous perception of Government as ``Big 
Brother''. We can help stop that perception today by adopting the 
Conyers amendment and proving that no arm of Government is immune to 
public scrutiny.

[[Page H5415]]

  It's time to bring the intelligence community in line with the rest 
of Government. No agency should be free from a public examination of 
its finances. It's common sense, it's constitutional, and it's 
responsible. I urge a ``yes'' vote on the Conyers amendment.
  Mr. FAZIO of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. His 
amendment to the fiscal year 1997 intelligence authorization bill would 
declassify the aggregate figure of the intelligence budget.
  I believe, as do many of my colleagues, that a classified 
intelligence budget is inconsistent with the accountability 
requirements of the Constitution, and that it inhibits the openness 
that must prevail in order to facilitate informed participation in our 
democracy.
  Moreover, as many fiscal watchdog organizations have pointed out, 
American taxpayers deserve fiscal accountability when it comes to the 
intelligence budget. If we continue to ask the taxpayers of this 
country to contribute billions of dollars to the intelligence budget, 
they deserve to know how much is being spent on their behalf. We need 
only look at the example of the National Reconnaissance Office to see 
what happens when intelligence budgets are kept hidden.
  I understand the critically important national security questions 
which are at stake in this debate. But as a former member of the Armed 
Services Committee, I do not believe that public disclosure of the 
total amount of money appropriated to the intelligence budget would 
compromise our Nation's security
  The President supports disclosure of the intelligence budget, as does 
the Senate Intelligence Committee. I urge my colleagues to support 
disclosure of this budget as well. Vote ``yes'' on the Conyers 
amendment.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes 
appeared to have it.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and pending 
that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, further proceedings on the 
amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] will be 
postponed
  The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to the bill?


                    amendment offered by mr. combest

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Combest: In the matter proposed to 
     be inserted by section 401, strike ``Make'' and insert in 
     lieu thereof the following: ``Subject to such amounts as may 
     be provided in advance in appropriations Acts, make''.

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  Mr. CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply provides the 
opportunity for the Central Intelligence Agency to execute multiyear 
leasing authority. The CIA has routinely signed multiyear leases since 
1949, relying on section 8 authority to expend appropriated funds of 
the CIA Act. The CIA inspector general now has concerns about the 
propriety of using that authority for overt leases.
  CIA needs are such that it often requires space on a very short 
notice. If it can do so only for short-term leases, 1 year, landlords 
demand higher rental payments. GSA has difficulty meeting CIA's very 
specific needs: readily available space, special security and 
communications needs resulting in added cost for CIA and thus for the 
Government as a whole.
  The CBO raises concerns about the availability of appropriations for 
multiyear leases. My amendment would require that multiyear leases be 
subject to the availability of funds. CBO is also concerned that this 
provision could cost several million dollars per year. We have to 
remember that without this authority, the CIA will continue to use 1-
year leases that will inevitably cost more money. Our best estimate is 
that this provision will save more than a million dollars per year.
  Mr. Chairman, it is technical. It is my understanding that my 
colleague, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks], has no objection 
to this amendment.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  The amendment would amend section 403 of the bill, giving CIA the 
authority to enter into multiyear leases to require that the CIA have 
an appropriation for the total amount of the lease in advance.
  I understand the concern of the Congressional Budget Office and the 
Budget Committee that section 401 as it appears in the bill would allow 
CIA to enter into long-term leases without being subject to 
appropriations action. This was not the intent of the committee.
  However, I do have some concerns about the language of the amendment. 
Since these leases could easily run into many millions of dollars, it 
is not clear to me that there would ever be an authorization or 
appropriation for these leases in advance.
  It is also not clear how funds could be made available for the entire 
term of a 15- or 20-year lease. Nevertheless, because I believe it 
should be possible to find mutually acceptable language in conference, 
I am prepared to accept this amendment for our side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. combest

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. COMBEST: Amend section 402 to read 
     as follows:

     SEC. 402. ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE SURCHARGE ON THE CENTRAL 
                   INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RELATING TO EMPLOYEES WHO 
                   RETIRE OR RESIGN IN FISCAL YEARS 1998 OR 1999 
                   AND WHO RECEIVE VOLUNTARY SEPARATION INCENTIVE 
                   PAYMENTS.

       Section 2(i) of the Central Intelligence Agency Voluntary 
     Separation Pay Act (50 U.S.C. 403-4 note) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new sentence: ``The 
     remittance required by this subsection shall be in lieu of 
     any remittance required by section 4(a) of the Federal 
     Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 (5 U.S.C. 8331 note).''.

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, this section corrects existing law which 
currently requires the CIA to make two payments, one of 9 percent, one 
of 15 percent, for employees who take incentivized retirement from the 
CIA during fiscal years 1998, 1999. The CIA is required to make the 
Government retirement trust fund whole for those individuals who take 
these incentivized retirements. In order to do so, it must reimburse 
the Federal Government 15 percent of the final base pay of each 
individual who retires. Requiring the CIA to make an additional 9 
percent payment becomes a penalty.
  Section 403 eliminates the double surcharge. This amendment is 
identical to one offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica], 
chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil Service. It is my understanding 
that Mr. Dicks has no objections.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment makes clear that what we were trying to 
do in the bill was ensure CIA makes only one payment and not two, to 
the civil service retirement and disability fund for those agency 
employees who take an early retirement or resign and receive separation 
incentives in fiscal year 1998 and 1999.
  The CIA was required to make these payments under both amendments to 
the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act enacted last year and the Federal 
Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994. It was never intended that the CIA 
would have to pay 24 percent for employees leaving the agency under its 
separation incentive program.
  The amendment clarifies that the required 15-percent payment to the 
fund under the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act is in lieu of the 9-
percent payment required under the Federal

[[Page H5416]]

Workforce Restructuring Act. Thus we would be happy to accept it on our 
side and urge the committee to pass it.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. combest

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. COMBEST: In section 303--
       (1) Insert ``(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--'' 
     before ``Section 307''; and
       (2) add at the end thereof the following:
       (b) Transfers.--The second sentence of section 307(a) of 
     the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 is 
     amended to read as follows: ``Within the amount authorized to 
     be used by this section, the Director, consistent with his 
     duty to protect intelligence sources and methods, may 
     transfer such amounts to the agencies within the National 
     Foreign Intelligence Program for the purpose of automatic 
     declassification of records over 25 years old.

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, again this is basically a technical 
amendment. The section provides the Director of Central Intelligence 
the authority to transfer funds authorized for automatic 
declassification within the national foreign intelligence community to 
execute section 3.4 of Executive Order 12958. This provision would 
allow that money which is basically in one pool to be dispensed within 
the NFIP agencies, depending upon the need of that agency to comply 
with the declassification order of Executive Order 12958. It is my 
understanding that there are no objections to this amendment.

                              {time}  1330

  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, the amendment of the gentleman from Texas clarifies 
that the DCI may transfer the funds authorized by section 303 of the 
bill to the agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program 
for the automatic declassification of records over 25 years old.
  The community management staff has pointed out that this transfer 
authority is necessary to move the money the bill provides in the 
community management account back to the various agency programs. I 
have no problem with this technical correction.
  The gentleman's amendment also states that the DCI is to make these 
transfers consistent with his duty to protect sources and methods. This 
particular language is superfluous because the DCI is already required 
by current law to protect sources and methods in everything he does.
  Because I am certain the gentleman does not mean to imply by the 
inclusion of this redundant language that the DCI has any intention of 
violating the requirements of current law in transferring money we 
authorize in this area, I am prepared to accept the amendment for this 
side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  The amendment was agreed to.


                    amendment offered by mr. combest

  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Combest: At the end of the bill, 
     add the following new title:

                   TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

     SEC. 601. AUTHORIZATION OF FUNDING PROVIDED BY 1996 
                   SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT.

       Amounts obligated or expended for intelligence or 
     intelligence-related activities based on and otherwise in 
     accordance with the appropriations provided by the Omnibus 
     Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 
     (Public Law 104-134), including any such obligations or 
     expenditures occurring before the enactment of this Act, 
     shall be deemed to have been specifically authorized by the 
     Congress for purposes of section 504 of the National Security 
     Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414) and are hereby ratified and 
     confirmed.

  Mr. COMBEST (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Texas?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, this is also a technical amendment that 
would correct an oversight in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and 
Appropriations Act of 1996. The law requires specific authorization for 
expenditure of funds for intelligence. The act in question obligated 
funds for intelligence, but contains no provisions for authorization. 
This amendment would correct that oversight.
  It is my understanding that the amendment is acceptable to the 
Committee on Appropriations, and I would yield back the balance of my 
time.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, section 504 of the National Security Act requires that 
funds may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-
related activity only if those funds were specifically authorized by 
the Congress for use for such activities.
  The Combest amendment will provide the necessary authorization for 
funds appropriated earlier this year in the Bosnia supplemental. I 
support the amendment and we are prepared to accept it on our side.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, debate concluded a few minutes ago on the amendment 
offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] about the question 
of declassification of the aggregate amount of intelligence 
expenditures. I wanted nonetheless to address that question briefly at 
this time.
  The debate on this, I think, is easily misconstrued and, therefore, 
misunderstood. It seems to me always appropriate to start with first 
principles, which, in a democracy, ought to be that the maximum amount 
of information about the activities of our Government be made available 
to our citizens.
  Now, there are necessarily exceptions to that principle for national 
security information, for State secrets, but the general principle 
again ought to be to make as much information about the operations of a 
democratically elected, representative government as possible 
available, so that citizens may make informed judgments in the process 
of self-government.
  It has been alleged that somehow vital national security interests 
are going to be compromised if this aggregate intelligence expenditure 
is declassified. I think that is a proposition that is virtually 
impossible to support rationally. It is a figure that is often nearly 
accurately reported in the open press. It is a number that ought to be 
accurately and openly reported in the press so that our fellow citizens 
have at least an overall sense of how much of their hard-earned tax 
dollars is being devoted to this important national purpose.
  The slippery slope argument is often offered up as a reason not to 
take this step, because this step, it is asserted, will inevitably lead 
to the disclosure of constituent amounts within the intelligence 
budget, I think that argument simply is unable to be sustained. We are 
able to keep ourselves from sliding down lots of slopes around this 
place, and I think we can draw a firm line after this particular 
disclosure, and it does not need to lead to others.
  It has also been suggested that this should just be done as a matter 
of executive decision by the President. I think it is an important 
policy judgment that ought to be validated and ratified by a vote of 
the Congress, not just done by act of the executive branch alone.
  Perhaps most helpful is to realize that an extensive review of this 
issue of the disclose of the aggregate intelligence expenditures was 
undertaken by the Aspin-Brown Commission. It has been scrubbed and 
vetted and examined, and it was the judgment of that distinguished 
group of American patriots and experts in defense and intelligence and 
national security matters, that keeping this total budget figure secret 
any longer just simply does not serve any legitimate national security 
or national defense purpose. And it certainly fails to serve the 
legitimate interests of the public in being able to have access to as 
much information about their Government as possible.
  So I hope, when we reach the point in the proceedings where we have a 
vote

[[Page H5417]]

on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers], 
that my colleagues will support his proposal. I think it is an 
appropriate step forward. It will ultimately enhance public 
understanding and, therefore, I would hope public support, for this 
important function of our national Government.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I rise to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Conyers amendment to make 
public the cumulative number of the intelligence budget.
  This is not a new issue to the Congress, Mr. Chairman. Over the past 
several Congresses we have had this debate on the floor about whether 
this number should be released and whether its release would jeopardize 
our national security. I believe the answer is yes, that it should be 
released, and, no, it does not jeopardize our national security.
  When the issue first arose we had the debate, and it was said that we 
needed more information. So our chairman at the time, Mr. Glickman, 
Chairman Glickman, held hearings, very extensive hearings, where 
experts in the field of intelligence confirmed that our national 
security would not be jeopardized and indeed it would be healthy to 
release the number.
  As early as some of the statements as early as 1991 on the subject 
have said, former DCI Robert Gates said, ``I don't have any problem 
with releasing the top-line number of the intelligence community 
budget.''
  That same year former Director of NSA, Bobby Inman, said, ``I am 
certainly prepared to make unclassified the total amount and defend it 
to the public, why 10 percent of our total defense efforts spent both 
for national and tactical intelligence is not a bad goal at all.''
  And of course this year the White House statement on this subject 
said, reflecting the President's determination to promote openness in 
the intelligence community, he has authorized Congress to make public 
the total appropriation.
  Going way back 20 years, the select committee that studied 
governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities stated 
intelligence oversight committee should authorize on an annual basis a 
national intelligence budget, the total amount of which should be made 
public.
  So over the years and as recently as the statements of this year, 
most currently that of DCI John Deutch, the President is persuaded that 
disclosure of the annual amount appropriated for intelligence purposes 
will inform the public and not in itself harm intelligence activities.
  I think that there is a good cross-section of studies and DCI's from 
both, appointed by Presidents of both parties, who have supported 
making this number public, and I think it is a healthy thing to do.
  The defense, the intelligence, community should have to defend the 
amount of money that is spent on intelligence in relationship to the 
rest of the budget. It is especially important this year so that we can 
restore some of the confidence to this process that has been undermined 
by the recent NRO revelations, and on that point, Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to say that when people accept the public trust, they and we all 
have a special responsibility. We must be responsible fiscally for the 
funds that are in our trust, we must understand the stiff competition 
for the funds and, therefore, have to be able to justify how they are 
expended.
  We need to maintain the public confidence in what we are doing, and 
so what happened at NRO is most unfortunate because it did undermine 
all of these, the public confidence and the trust that we all should 
have in husbanding the public dollars.
  And most of all, the actions of any one of these agencies should not 
undermine the strength, the perceived strength, of our country. We have 
to look like we know what we are doing and can account for the 
responsibilities of both fiscal and otherwise in our charge, and so I 
would say that with all of the testimony that we have had over the 
years, with the cooperation now of the executive branch, with the 
definite need that has been demonstrated for in one instance by the NRO 
situation, it behooves this Congress to move to support the Conyers 
amendment to make this number public, to open the intelligence process 
to the extent of saying this is a number that can, that should have to, 
be defended within the total budget process and that it should be done 
in a manner that is not harmful to our intelligence activities nor 
jeopardize the national security of our country.
  I am satisfied by the statements of such a wide-ranging, as I said, 
bipartisan group of people who have testified in hearings of the House 
of Representatives and on the Senate side over a long period of time, 
that there is no doubt that we should make this number public. I urge 
my colleagues to support the Conyers amendment.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
  Mr. Chairman, I will be offering some amendments later on, but I 
wanted to rise in favor of the Conyers amendment also.
  I have always believed that government is not a fungus, that it can 
thrive in sunshine, and I understand that during the whole period of 
the Cold War we wanted to keep this number secret. But I think now we 
ought to be able to get this number out, and I salute the President of 
the United States for saying we ought to put the number out, and I hope 
that this body finally does that.
  Coming here to debate this issue, I always feel very silly because we 
cannot talk about the numbers, we cannot talk about the issues, we 
cannot talk about anything. So what can we talk about? It all sounds 
like a bag of smoke at some point. But I think one of the things that 
the average person wonders is why are we not much more rigorous in our 
oversight? And I must say the only reason I think we do not reveal the 
number is we do not want to admit how poorly we have done some of the 
oversight.
  Now, this is not a great secret. I brought it from the newspapers so 
nobody wants to turn me in to jail. But if my colleagues remember, the 
Washington Post and many other articles were pointing out how the NRO 
had purchased 14 more acres than they needed for their $304 million 
complex, and of course most people remember the big brouhaha about the 
$304 million complex. Here it was being built in suburban Washington on 
the Virginia side, and no one knew. Viola.

                              {time}  1345

  Mr. Chairman, in the district I come from, Denver, CO, they have had 
to shut down Head Start already this year. They ran out of money. We 
have all these people desperately looking for just pennies to keep 
something running, and yet they can, first of all, do a headquarters 
that no one knew about, there it is, and then we find out they had all 
these extra acreages, and nothing ever happens. Then we also find out, 
as we found out this year, that they admitted they had a $3.8 billion 
slush fund.
  I understand we are supposed to call it the surplus unspent funds, 
but I think if any other agency in Government had that kind of slush 
fund or surplus unspent funds, whatever you want to call them, people 
would be down here, the deficit hawks would be down here screaming and 
yelling and hollering, and rightly so.
  I guess the problem I see, Mr. Chairman, is that on one side of the 
budget we are very critical, and I think that is fine, but when it 
comes to defense and intelligence, it does not make any difference. We 
have the report of the slush fund, and yet nobody really wants to talk 
about cutting. Yet, you cannot talk about what percentage of the budget 
that slush fund is because we cannot tell what the budget number is. 
But that is a lot of money.
  If we look again in the generic press, and I am staying right in the 
generic press, my goodness, we would not want to reveal any of these 
secrets because they probably would have to shoot me and whoever else I 
would reveal them to, and I would not want that on my conscience.
  So if we go and look at those numbers, let us look at these numbers 
and look at them seriously, they are saying in the generic press that 
these surplus unspent funds, they are adding about $1 billion to it 
every year. That seems to say to me maybe we are putting too much money 
in it. Are we awake? Are we doing any oversight, or are we just

[[Page H5418]]

saying that this is so important that we will just give them any amount 
of money, whether they can spend it or not?
  I am also sad that we cannot get into more details. I was very 
troubled by the late article in the Atlantic Monthly about some of the 
training that had gone on in the Middle East, so that they think we may 
be responsible for training some of the terrorists, that it was done 
with good will, but it kind of got out of control.
  So if we add all of those things together, we scratch our heads and 
say surely we can at least do what the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers] and the President of the United States have said we could do, 
which is at least put the overall number out of here. Even though I 
will not be here next year, then maybe whoever is here next year can 
have a little bit better debate and put this in a little bit better 
context because we can talk about what percentages these are. I hope 
that the Conyers amendment is passed, Mr. Chairman.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage the chairman of the committee in a 
colloquy concerning section 304 of the bill. I would say to the 
gentleman from Texas, the chairman of the committee, as he knows, this 
provision extends the laws allowing the President to delay the 
imposition of a sanction upon a determination that to proceed with the 
sanction would risk a compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation 
or an intelligence source or method.
  My question, Mr. Chairman, is whether the legislative history 
developed during the debate on this provision last year would still be 
applicable to the extension of the authority for 1 year? My further 
question is that can we expect that this provision will be narrowly 
construed, and only used in the most serious of circumstances, not to 
protect routine intelligence activities?
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
  Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly concur and say yes, we 
would intend for this to still be in effect. As the gentlewoman so 
adequately pointed out, and has been very effective, I think, in 
leading on this issue, we would certainly expect that this provision 
would be narrowly construed and only used in the most serious of 
circumstances. That is certainly the intent of the committee to carry 
forward in this year's authorization.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for engaging in the 
colloquy, and for his confirmation of the understanding that we had of 
the legislative background on this last year. As Members may recall, I 
worked closely with the gentleman from California [Mr. Berman] who is 
an expert in this field, and has an interest in the waiver of sanctions 
and the particular limitations that the chairman of the committee has 
confirmed. I thank the chairman of the committee once again for that 
confirmation.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of 
words.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate a couple of concerns I have about 
this bill. As I have stated, I am going to support it, but we need to 
remember that the money we are spending for intelligence today, in my 
mind, is a tremendous force multiplier for our military.
  When we consider the fact that we can now literally fuse into the 
cockpits of our aircraft intelligence gathered in space to give the 
locations of enemy weapons systems in almost real time, so they can be 
properly targeted, I think all of a sudden we recognize the 
revolutionary improvements that are being made in our overall military 
capability.
  To my friends on the Democratic side, I believe strongly that such 
capabilities will allow us in the future to deter military conflicts. I 
would urge my colleagues, to support the Conyers amendment, of which I 
am a sponsor.
  I think we can disclose the aggregate number, but I want everyone to 
remember that this is still a part of the Defense Department. It is a 
portion of the defense budget that is used not only to gather 
intelligence for our national leadership, but also to be used 
effectively to protect the people that we are sending in harm's way 
every single day all around the world and to convince our adversaries 
that picking a fight with the United States just simply does not make 
sense.
  I had a chance just a few weeks ago to go to our combined air 
operation in Vincenza and to see a real fusion center where 
intelligence from all of our collection platforms is gathered. This 
intelligence is used by our military to find problems in Bosnia that 
are then communicated to the military commanders, and thus they are 
able to avoid possible conflicts that could occur; because of the 
ability to find enemy radars and things of that nature.
  This is truly a revolutionary change in intelligence capabilities, so 
as we sometimes get harsh with the NRO, I would say that John Deutch 
took effective steps. He named a new chief financial officer. He named 
a new head of the NRO, a very fine public servant. The two people that 
were removed are people who have given distinguished service to our 
country. Unfortunately, the financial people at the NRO did not do 
their job properly, and Congress was not properly informed about the 
size of these carryforward funds.
  Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate, there is no evidence that any of 
that money was spent on items not authorized by Congress. One of my 
colleagues talked today about the very famous NRO building. Our 
committee, a bipartisan basis, put out a report that said that we knew 
about this building. In fact, we had good oversight over the building. 
We pointed out that in the other body there were amendments offered by 
members of the Intelligence Committee to accelerate and possibly to 
expand the size of the NRO building.
  So when they then turned around at a later date and said they knew 
nothing about it, many of us in this body had serious reservations 
about how they in fact could say that. Sometimes in a rush we do not 
keep the facts in sight, and we sometimes do not know the history.
  The point I am trying to make, Mr. Chairman, is that the NRO has been 
one of the stellar institutions in our Government. One of the reasons 
we won the cold war was because we had the finest intelligence. We have 
the finest intelligence community of any nation on earth. Those 
intelligence community assets are used to enhance our military 
capability in order to protect American lives and to deter future wars. 
That is why I have always strongly supported our intelligence 
community.
  Can we reduce the money? Yes. Have we reduced the money? Yes. We have 
reduced it significantly.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 3 
additional minutes.)
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, have we reduced the money for defense? Yes. 
We have cut the Defense budget by about $100 billion a year between 
1985 and 1995. We have also cut back on the amount of money for the 
intelligence agencies. We have cut back on the number of personnel. I 
am talking about across the board cuts in the Defense Department, the 
CIA, and all of these agencies, we have reduced the size. Yet, today, 
America is in more countries around the world with military forces that 
require accurate intelligence for their security and support.
  Mr. Chairman, I just urge my colleagues to remember that fact. Yes, 
we can always beat up on an agency, but I am always reminded of the 
fact that this agency is composed of American citizens who serve our 
Government faithfully, who have done an extraordinary job. I just urge 
us to put this into some perspective. If they had failed in building 
these national technical means, then we would be here criticizing them. 
They certainly failed to keep Congress appropriately informed of the 
size of the carryover funds. There is no evidence whatsoever that any 
of that money was improperly spent.
  So let us try to keep this in perspective. Sometimes, with all the 
criticism, the harsh rhetoric, we forget that these are men and women 
who have done a fantastic job for this Nation, and who really do 
deserve our support.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

[[Page H5419]]

  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado, an outstanding 
member of the Committee on Armed Services.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. The gentleman is a good friend and I respect him very 
much, Mr. Chairman.
  My question, Mr. Chairman, is not to be confrontational, but the 
gentleman is not questioning the fact that almost $1 billion a year had 
gone into this $3.8 billion surplus fund, is that correct?
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman was not on the floor, I 
think, when we talked about this a little earlier. As she knows, when 
we buy a weapons system at the Pentagon, sometimes there are billions 
of dollars of unobligated funds that are spend over a period of time. 
In the intelligence area, we incrementally fund. It was the opinion of 
George Mahon and some of the senior members of the Committee on 
Appropriations many years ago that we could not risk a situation where 
Congress has not passed its budget by the start of the fiscal year. 
They believed it was necessary to have a certain amount of flexibility 
in carryforward funds to keep these programs going, if the Congress did 
not get the Defense budget passed. There was a kind of agreement among 
the players to do this.
  What I object to, and I know the gentlewoman from Colorado objects 
to, is that this account, and each one of these were for different 
national technical means, different satellite programs, is that these 
accounts grew too large in the aggregate. None of the money was 
misspent. I think the fault was that Congress was not kept 
appropriately advised about the magnitude.
  I can tell the Members, I am very pleased that it was the staff of 
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and particularly the 
minority staff, that went to the NRO, found this out, made it known to 
the other key committees in the Congress, and last year we dramatically 
reduced the amount of money in those accounts. We used it for Bosnia, 
we use it for other defense priorities, so that the money was not 
wasted. The American people did not get ripped off.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent and on request of Mrs. Schroeder, Mr. Dicks was 
allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, the issue is that the money was not 
spent, and then it forced us to spend a tremendous amount of money just 
on interest on that additional debt we incurred by spending more than 
we really needed to spend at that time, when we build up an account of 
that much over that period of time. And the gentleman knows and I know 
that the fastest growing part of the Federal budget has been interest 
on the debt. We would not allow any other agency to do that.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, of course, as the gentlewoman certainly 
knows and appreciates, this is budget authority. You do not really 
spend money until you spend it. That is an outlay. So they had the 
budget authority, but they never spent the money. So that would not 
incur any obligation by the Federal Treasury.
  In a sense, they had the ability to draw on the Treasury up to $4 
billion, but they did not do it. What we did with that BA is move it to 
other higher priority items like Bosnia, so we did not have to 
appropriate additional money, and again that was agreed to.

                              {time}  1400

  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentlewoman from Colorado.
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman knows that 
everybody in the world would love to have that kind of budget authority 
in the bank that they could move around for things, and we lose the 
oversight capacity.
  Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, the chairman and myself 
have limited the amount of the carry-forward. The director of the CIA, 
one of the most competent individuals I know, has made changes in the 
NRO, has named a new chief financial officer. So in a sense, I think we 
ought to give Mr. Deutch and the administration some support for the 
steps that they have taken to ensure that this does not happen again in 
the future.
  Yes, the NRO made a mistake. Yes, they were wrong. But I want us to 
place in perspective that these same people who did a bad job in their 
accounting also have done some tremendously positive things for the 
country in terms of the satellites that have been built over the years 
that helped us avoid a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] 
has expired.
  (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dicks was allowed to proceed for 1 
additional minute.)
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to hear the 
gentleman say we should give support to the administration. We can do 
that in part by abiding by their budget request and not spending well 
over $1 billion in this budget than the administration requested. We 
will deal with that in some later amendments.


          sequential votes postponed in committee of the whole

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, proceedings will now resume on 
those amendments on which further proceedings were postponed, in the 
following order: the amendment, as amended, offered by the gentleman 
from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson]; the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders]; and the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers].
  The Chair will reduce to 5 minutes the time for any electronic vote 
after the second vote in this series.


            amendment offered by mr. richardson, as amended

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment, as amended, offered by the gentleman from New Mexico 
[Mr. Richardson] on which further proceedings were postponed and on 
which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will designate the amendment, as amended.
  The Clerk designated the amendment, as amended.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 417, 
noes 6, not voting 10, as follows:

                             [Roll No 184]

                               AYES--417

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Andrews
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Baldacci
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Barrett (WI)
     Bartlett
     Bass
     Bateman
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bonior
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Combest
     Condit
     Conyers
     Cooley
     Cox
     Coyne
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Danner
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     DeLay
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Ensign
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Everett
     Ewing
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Filner
     Flanagan
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Furse
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Green (TX)
     Greene (UT)
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutierrez
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)

[[Page H5420]]


     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Johnston
     Jones
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     LaHood
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (GA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Lofgren
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Manzullo
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McDermott
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McKinney
     McNulty
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Mink
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nadler
     Neal
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Pastor
     Paxon
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Poshard
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Rose
     Roth
     Roukema
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stump
     Stupak
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                                NOES--6

     Campbell
     Coburn
     Istook
     Sanford
     Shadegg
     Souder

                             NOT VOTING--10

     Barton
     Bliley
     Chenoweth
     Costello
     Flake
     Funderburk
     Hefley
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1421

  Messrs. PETERSON of Minnesota, ZELIFF, EVERETT, WILSON, and STOCKMAN 
changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                    Amendment Offered by Mr. Sanders

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] on 
which further proceedings were postponed, and on which the noes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The Clerk designated the amendment.


                             Recorded Vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 115, 
noes 311, not voting 7, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 185]

                               AYES--115

     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barcia
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Bonior
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bryant (TX)
     Camp
     Campbell
     Clay
     Clayton
     Coble
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Condit
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Danner
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Ehlers
     Ensign
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Foglietta
     Foley
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Furse
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kleczka
     Klug
     LaHood
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manzullo
     Markey
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Neumann
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Poshard
     Ramstad
     Rangel
     Reed
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rose
     Roth
     Roybal-Allard
     Royce
     Rush
     Sanders
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Slaughter
     Stark
     Studds
     Stupak
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Upton
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Williams
     Woolsey
     Yates

                               NOES--311

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Bereuter
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Borski
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chapman
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clement
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cummings
     Cunningham
     Davis
     de la Garza
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     Engel
     English
     Eshoo
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Forbes
     Ford
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Frost
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gejdenson
     Gekas
     Gephardt
     Geren
     Gibbons
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greene (UT)
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Klink
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lowey
     Lucas
     Manton
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHale
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Menendez
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Pallone
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (FL)
     Pombo
     Pomeroy
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Rahall
     Regula
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Sabo
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Sawyer
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Scott
     Seastrand
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skaggs
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stokes
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thornberry
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Torres
     Traficant
     Volkmer
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Ward
     Watts (OK)
     Waxman
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson
     Wise
     Wolf
     Wynn
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                             NOT VOTING--7

     Bliley
     Costello
     Flake
     Funderburk
     Moakley
     Molinari
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1439

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mr. Moakley for, with Mr. Scarborough against.

  Mrs. CUBIN changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''

[[Page H5421]]

  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania and Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota changed their 
vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


                    amendment offered by mr. conyers

  The CHAIRMAN. The pending business is the demand for a recorded vote 
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] 
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes 
prevailed by voice vote.
  The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The Clerk designated the amendment.


                             recorded vote

  The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
  A recorded vote was ordered.
  The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 176, 
noes 248, not voting 9, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 186]

                               AYES--176

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bonior
     Borski
     Boucher
     Browder
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Bunn
     Chabot
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clement
     Collins (IL)
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Coyne
     Cummings
     Danner
     de la Garza
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Duncan
     Durbin
     Edwards
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Foglietta
     Ford
     Fox
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Goodlatte
     Gordon
     Green (TX)
     Gutierrez
     Hall (OH)
     Hamilton
     Harman
     Hefner
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Holden
     Horn
     Istook
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jacobs
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E.B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kennelly
     Kildee
     Kleczka
     Klink
     Klug
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Leach
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lincoln
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Metcalf
     Millender-McDonald
     Miller (CA)
     Minge
     Mink
     Moakley
     Moran
     Morella
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Payne (VA)
     Pelosi
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rangel
     Reed
     Richardson
     Riggs
     Rivers
     Roemer
     Rohrabacher
     Rose
     Roth
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Sensenbrenner
     Serrano
     Shays
     Skaggs
     Slaughter
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stenholm
     Stokes
     Studds
     Stupak
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torres
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates
     Zimmer

                               NOES--248

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baesler
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Brewster
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bryant (TX)
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Cardin
     Castle
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clinger
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coburn
     Coleman
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     Deal
     DeLay
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Doyle
     Dreier
     Dunn
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Fields (TX)
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fowler
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Gonzalez
     Goodling
     Goss
     Graham
     Greene (UT)
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (TX)
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Hastert
     Hastings (FL)
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hoyer
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Jefferson
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kim
     King
     Kingston
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Linder
     Lipinski
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     Martinez
     Martini
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     McNulty
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Mollohan
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Murtha
     Myers
     Myrick
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Peterson (FL)
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Rahall
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Roberts
     Rogers
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Skelton
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Stearns
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Tejeda
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Visclosky
     Vucanovich
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wise
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Bliley
     Costello
     Flake
     Funderburk
     Gilman
     Molinari
     Nethercutt
     Radanovich
     Scarborough

                              {time}  1448

  Mrs. ROUKEMA changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
  Mr. FOX of Pennsylvania changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
  So the amendment was rejected.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.


            amendment offered by mr. frank of massachusetts

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The Clerk read as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: At the end 
     of title I, insert the following:

     SEC. 105. REDUCTION IN AUTHORIZATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), the 
     aggregate amount authorized to be appropriated by this Act, 
     including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, is reduced by 4.9 
     percent.
       (b) Exception.--Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts 
     authorized to be appropriated by section 201 for the Central 
     Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
       (c) Transfer and Reprogramming Authority.--(1) The 
     President, in consultation with the Director of Central 
     Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, may apply the 
     reduction required by subsection (a) by transferring amounts 
     among the accounts or reprogramming amounts within an 
     account, as specified in the classified Schedule of 
     Authorizations referred to in section 102, so long as the 
     aggregate reduction in the amount authorized to be 
     appropriated by this Act, equals 4.9 percent.
       (2) Before carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
     submit a notification to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, which notification 
     shall include the reasons for each proposed transfer or 
     reprogramming.

  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask 
unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed 
in the Record.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, this amendment would 
essentially hold this year's authorization at the current spending 
level. It is a 4.9 percent reduction from the authorized figure, with 
an exception made for the retirement disability fund. That fund is held 
at the authorized level of the bill which is what is necessary. So it 
has no negative effect there.
  This amendment, if adopted, would give to the executive branch 
officials the ability to reprogram within the totals. So they need not 
apply the restriction across the board.
  It is a 4.9-percent cut. Because of the vote just taken, I may not 
say in public what it is 4.9 percent of, because then the Iranians 
would have valuable information and endanger our security. But I can 
say that it is a cut of well over a billion dollars. The key question 
is, will we, as we move to a zero deficit and severely reduce the 
amount of money available for discretionary programs, not only exempt 
from any reduction national security but continue to give them rates of 
increase well above the rate of inflation?
  This is a proposal before us, an authorizing bill, that raises the 
money

[[Page H5422]]

from the current spending by nearly 5 percent. As we continue that 
pattern, Members must understand that inevitably means that 
environmental cleanup and health care of a discretionary sort and 
education and public safety and transportation get hurt.
  We read recently of the difficulty of the Committee on Appropriations 
in the allocations. They wanted to give more for the veterans and more 
for health care and more for job training and education. They had to do 
that at the expense of infrastructure and environmental cleanup and 
energy and water. This is the reason we face such terrible choices. As 
you increase the national security budget, you inevitably require 
greater decreases everywhere else.
  Members have said, well, it is still a dangerous world even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Yes, it is. But let us reject now the 
argument that says it is a more dangerous place. We have heard Members 
say that it is a more dangerous place now that the Soviet Union has 
collapsed. This House floor may be the only place where we have 
nostalgia for the good old safe days of a heavily armed Soviet Union 
because apparently people felt more secure then.
  Members say, well, we no longer have the Soviet Union but we have 
North Korea, we have Iraq, we have Cuba, those threats, and they are 
threats that grew only since 1990. What we had 8 and 9 years ago was 
all of the threats, the Soviet Union and all of those other nations. 
Now we have a substantially diminished Russian threat and those other 
nations. This amendment does not even call for a reduction, although I 
voted for the previous amendment that would have.
  What we have here is an effort to give more and more money to 
national security, inevitably at the expense and intelligence of every 
other program. I would argue, if you look at the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, outside threats have diminished some. This does not even call 
for a reduction. It calls for level funding.
  Let us again remember that this is the agency which accumulated a $4 
billion surplus in funds. This is the agency that was given more money 
than it needed by its own admission because it took $4 billion and did 
not spend it. That is undeniably an acknowledgment that they got more 
money than they needed. How do we deal with this agency which got more 
money than it needed and squirreled $4 billion away? We give them one 
of the largest increases any Federal agency would get, a 5-percent 
increase in the authorization, 4 percent more than the President asked 
to give. This is an increase of more than a billion dollars over what 
the President wanted to give them.
  At a time when I believe environmental threats and public safety 
threats and incomplete education, those are much graver problems, we 
have to choose. You cannot reach a zero deficit within the time frame 
we have chosen, increase, reward the national intelligence agencies for 
their $4 billion squirreling away by giving them a big increase and 
still have the funds to do other things. I urge adoption of this 
amendment.
  Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentleman's 
amendment.
  Those who follow the floor debate on intelligence from year to year 
are aware, in general terms, that the intelligence budget has been on a 
steady decline, that capabilities are being shut down, and that 
managing intelligence nowadays means making Russian roulette decisions 
on which cuts are least likely to endanger lives.
  Being on the committee has allowed me to see the specifics behind 
these generalized facts. More importantly, it has allowed me to delve 
in person into the intelligence processes and products and see with my 
own eyes their strengths and weaknesses. Some of those weaknesses can 
be sifted out of the mass of largely ludicrous public attacks which 
intelligence is sometimes subject. The strengths, though, tend to be 
largely unknown in the country at large and unheralded in the press. 
Without being too specific, let me mention a few I have personally run 
across.
  Example one: Cooperative clandestine activities undertaken by the CIA 
and other U.S. Government agencies resulted this last year in the 
detection and foiling of planned attacks on U.S. public and private 
citizens. Lives were saved.
  Example two: The CIA worked with cooperative foreign governments to, 
effectively speaking, shut down a terrorist organization that has had a 
long history of successful attacks on U.S. citizens.
  Example three: Young intelligence community scientists constructed 
state-of-the-art computer hardware and custom software capabilities 
that are allowing the Intelligence Community to do what outside 
experts--and our country's enemies--believe to be impossible. I should 
point out that these same scientists work in this specific intelligence 
agency at a salary a fourth or fifth of what they have been offered in 
the private sector--they refuse to leave the work they consider so 
personally satisfying and important to national security.
  Example four: Intelligence Community scientists and clandestine 
operators cooperated to detect, penetrate, and neutralize the 
activities of a pariah regime to develop weapons of mass destruction.
  Example five: The Intelligence Community, working closely with law 
enforcement agencies and foreign governments, provided the essential 
intelligence that led to the crippling of international narcotics 
trafficking organizations.
  Mr. Chairman, I am in strong opposition to this proposed cut. The 
committee recognizes the fact that each year from year to year that 
there is a very small amount of the actual intelligence budget in its 
operations programs that have become familiar to Members of Congress, 
much less to the American people. We take this responsibility very 
seriously.
  There are a number of areas within the intelligence budget that have 
been substantially reduced this year. We have tried to make priorities 
in some areas that we feel are extremely important to move this Nation 
in the future of its role for intelligence. This is not something that 
can be done year by year. This is something that needs to be done on a 
long-term basis to make for certain that the future provides the 
continual need for intelligence capabilities that this country has for 
so many years done very, very well. We are diligent in terms of our 
oversight. We are serious about the fact that we want to make for 
certain that each of these dollars is expended wisely.
  These are dollars, however, that we feel that we can justify to our 
fellow colleagues and to the American people that are critical and 
crucial for the American intelligence capabilities which are at the 
heart of our national security and national defense.

                              {time}  1500

  I think the committee has done a good job of coming up with a 
proposed budget in the authorization bill that we have this year. I 
would strongly support the committee's position on that bill, and I 
would again reiterate my opposition to the proposed cut amendment.
  Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered 
by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank].
  Mr. Chairman, in 7\1/2\ hours of going door to door on Saturday in my 
State of Indiana I heard over and over again from one door to another 
as I listened to Hoosiers tell me what they want to see done in 
Washington, DC, people said to me we want to see more openness and 
honesty out of our elected officials, and we want to see some courage, 
and we want to see some discipline on their part to cast the tough 
votes, to cut spending first in Washington, DC, not to raise our taxes, 
but to cut spending first in Washington, DC.
  Now, if I was a challenger and I had just watched the last few 
minutes of debate here in this esteemed institution, both the votes 
that Members of this body have just cast over the last few minutes fly 
in the face of what the American people want. Is it so much to ask and 
then tell the American people the overall cumulative budget of the 
Central Intelligence Agency? They do some wonderful work for us as 
taxpayers. Should not the American people know what that overall budget 
number is? That does not sacrifice any security on the part of the 
American people to get that one figure, that little bit of knowledge.
  But this body does not agree with that, so that openness and that 
honesty does not come forward.

[[Page H5423]]

  Second, some discipline and some courage around here. Now, the last 
vote would have cut some of the CIA's budget, and in ideal times, since 
they do such extraordinarily important work for us, I wish we could 
give them more money, but we cannot. We are trying to make some tough 
decisions in this place to work toward balancing the budget. So instead 
of even cutting, which this body just rejected, this amendment, which I 
rise in strong support of, simply says this:
  ``Let's keep it at last year's level. If we can't cut into the 
intelligence budget, let's keep it at least last year's level, let's 
make sure that we sacrifice together and that we're fair in terms of 
our budgeting.''
  So I rise in strong support of the gentleman's amendment. If my 
colleagues are deficit hawks and they want a balanced budget, this is a 
good vote. If they want fairness and they do not want to decimate 
Medicare for senior citizens, they do not want to slash education and 
Head Start for children, they want to make sure we have an adequate 
defense, then there have to be some votes around here at least to 
maintain last year's funding level, and that is what the Frank 
amendment does.

  This is a fair and honest and disciplined approach, and I would 
strongly encourage the colleagues in this body to address not just the 
deficit of the budget, but the deficit of will and courage around here 
to cut some budgets other than education and Medicare. So I urge this 
body to support this amendment.
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last 
word.
  Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, I am not a member of the committee of 
jurisdiction for this bill, and I do not come to the floor often to 
talk about matters involving international security. Most of my time is 
consumed with domestic issues and legal issues and banking issues 
because I serve on those committees. I do not come to the floor this 
time to talk about the technicalities of the CIA's budget. I have not 
been upstairs, into the secret room, to review the details of that 
budget.
  Mr. Chairman, I come to talk about ordinary common sense, which is 
what budgeting is about. I come to talk about the setting of 
priorities, which is what budgeting is about. And I cannot believe that 
at a time when we are talking about cutting every single program that 
affects the domestic security of our Nation that, given choices that we 
must make, we could be talking about raising and increasing the level 
of funding for the CIA's budget by 5 percent.
  At a time when we are talking about balancing the Federal budget and 
doing much of it on the backs of the American people who are most 
vulnerable, I cannot believe that we are talking about increasing the 
budget for the Central Intelligence Agency by 5 percent.
  So this is about common sense and priority-setting.
  There are children who are starving in this country. There are 
children who are under-educated in this country. There are children who 
do not know where their next meal is coming from and do not qualify for 
the school lunch program because we do not have enough funds to make 
that possible. There are elderly people who need health care. There are 
Head Start programs that need to be funded. And when we make the choice 
to devote more of our resources to funding the Central Intelligence 
Agency, we do so at the expense of every single one of those programs.
  So, Mr. Chairman, I want to appeal to my colleagues in the wake of 
these past three votes that have gone down that deprive the American 
people of even basic knowledge about what we are even spending on the 
CIA's activities, something that I personally think is sinister and 
unacceptable, to at least bring a level of reasonableness to this 
debate and to this vote in terms of the priorities we are setting for 
our country.
  I cannot believe that we do not have higher priorities for whatever 
amount of money it is we are debating here; I am told it is over a 
billion dollars that is at play in this amendment alone. And given a 
choice between spying on somebody, even if it is for worthy objectives, 
and I have no problem with that, or feeding our children and educating 
our children and providing for the health care and security of our 
people right here in our own country, I beg and plead with my 
colleagues to make the priority our children and our domestic programs.

  Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
of words.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the gentleman from 
Massachusetts' amendment, and if this does not pass, then I am going to 
offer an amendment that says at least freeze the NRO budget at the 1996 
fiscal year number.
  What the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank] is saying is let us 
freeze the entire agency's budget except for retirement and personnel 
and those things, but let us do the spending part of that budget on 
projects. Let us freeze it at the fiscal year 1996 level. Wow, what a 
radical concept. We are still in fiscal year 1996.
  Now I want to ask my colleagues, do they really think the world is so 
much scarier we got to add a whole lot more money for next year? Now we 
cannot say how much, we cannot say what the overall numbers are because 
the last amendment failed, and of course we are trying to keep this all 
secret. I find this very, very frustrating.
  As all my colleagues know, every day we pick up the paper and Great 
Britain is dealing with mad cow disease. Here today on this floor we 
are dealing with sacred cow disease. Spending when we come to the 
Defense Department or when we come to the intelligence agency, oh my 
goodness, this is a total sacred cow, we are going to keep it 
classified, we cannot say anything, and we are going to keep increasing 
it; have a nice day.
  This is for an agency that just 2 weeks ago admitted that what we 
thought was a billion-dollar slush fund was really more like a $4 
billion slush fund. We have been giving them more money than they were 
able to spend any way. So why can we not at least freeze it at the 1996 
level? I think this makes a tremendous amount of sense. Do we really 
think 1997 is going to be so much scarier than 1996 we got to increase 
the spending? I would hope not, and that is what we are talking about.
  If we are ever going to be serious about deficit reduction, we have 
got to challenge our sacred cows as well as everything else. There 
cannot be anything that we hold back, and this is an area where, trust 
me, I have seen the numbers, we got mega bucks and giga bucks buried in 
this, and we are dealing with an agency that has not gotten exactly an 
A-plus for candor with the Congress or for disclosure or for management 
of the funds.
  Look, I think the new Director, John Deutch, is a class A person. I 
think the CIA has many class A people. I think we need some 
intelligence, of course. I think the spy satellites in the sky are very 
important, yes. But I do not think things are so unstable that we need 
to increase this budget this year when we have got so many other 
demands.
  Let me tell you about my city of Denver. Last week we had to shut 
down Head Start. We had to shut down Head Start and send every little 
kid home in the first week in May because they ran out of money.
  Now, I think the education of 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds is every bit as 
important to our national security as increasing the amount of money we 
spend on the CIA. And I think that my colleagues will find Denver, CO, 
is not that different than other places. All sorts of places have had 
to make terrible choices because their budgets have been frozen or cut 
or crunched, and what they had to decide in Colorado was were they 
going to throw some of the little kids out that were eligible or were 
they just going to run the program until they let all the kids who were 
eligible come, and then when it was over send them home, that is it, 
and shut the door. That is what they decided to do.
  I do not know what the good decision is. If there are a whole lot of 
children that are income-eligible and we have to pick and choose 
between them and they are all American citizens, that is a rotten 
choice, that is a rotten choice because those are our future and those 
are our children.
  I think the gentleman from Massachusetts' amendment makes all the 
sense in the world, and anybody who does not vote for it, I do not know 
how

[[Page H5424]]

they can call themselves a deficit hawk, I do not know how we will ever 
get the budget in order if we allow sacred cows to keep grazing in the 
budget year after year, hidden behind a screen, not being able to be 
exposed out in front, and I really think just holding this at last 
year's level, this freeze level, makes all the sense in the world.
  Mr. Chairman, I only wish I thought of it. So I hope all of my 
colleagues vote for the gentleman's amendment.

                              {time}  1515

  The CHAIRMAN. The Committee will rise informally.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Goss) assumed the chair.

                          ____________________