[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 72 (Tuesday, May 21, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H5302-H5303]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
ROMER VERSUS EVANS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May
12, 1995, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Canady] is recognized during
morning business for 5 minutes.
Mr. CANADY of Florida. Mr. Speaker, yesterday was a sad day in our
Nation's history. In one fell swoop, the U.S. Supreme Court managed to
seriously undermine our tradition of democratic self-governance, and,
at the same time, to deliver a harsh slap-in-the-face to all Americans
who seek to preserve traditional moral standards regarding
homosexuality. I hope and expect that American citizens share my sense
of outrage at the Court's action.
I'm referring to the Court's decision in the case of Romer versus
Evans. The case involves an amendment to the Colorado State
Constitution adopted in 1992 by the citizens of that State. The
amendment, known as amendment 2, would have prevented the State or any
of its political subdivisions from enacting, adopting, or enforcing any
law granting homosexuals protected status or other preferential
treatment. Amendment 2 was adopted in response to the actions of
several Colorado cities that had adopted so-called gay rights
ordinances, which had added homosexuals to the list of protected
persons under local antidiscrimination laws.
By a 6-to-3 vote, the court yesterday ruled that amendment 2 violates
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Court held
that amendment 2 ``lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests, and so could only be understood as an expression of
animosity toward homosexuals.''
That might sound like stale legal doctrine, but don't be deceived.
What the Court did yesterday has profoundly troubling implications for
our democracy and for our civilization. As Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas,
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the Court has unleased a new
constitutional doctrine that has no rational limitation.
We must be clear on one important fact: Notwithstanding the
majority's portrayal of amendment 2 as an effort to make homosexuals
``stranger[s] to [Colorado's] laws,'' the measure did no such thing.
All amendment 2 would have accomplished is to prevent the government
from making homosexuals a protected class, or otherwise to make
homosexuality the basis for any preferential treatment. Every Colorado
law of general applicability applies fully to homosexuals. This case,
no matter what the majority held, was about whether or not homosexuals
could be given special protections under the law.
I quote from Justice Scalia's dissent:
The only denial of equal treatment [the majority] contends
homosexuals have suffered is this: They may not obtain
preferential treatment without amending the state
constitution. That is to say, the principle underlying the
Court's opinion is that
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one who is accorded equal treatment under the law, but cannot
as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the
laws, has been denied equal protection of the laws.
It is tough to argue with Justice Scalia's conclusion that the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence ``has achieved terminal
silliness.''
Confessing itself unable to fathom a rational, legitimate
governmental purpose that might be served by amendment 2, the Court
concluded that the amendment thus raised ``the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity'' toward
homosexuals. The Court characterized it as ``a bare desire to harm a
politically unpopular group.''
This conclusion, which lies at the core of the Court's opinion, is as
puzzling as it is offensive. It's puzzling because, just 10 years ago,
the Supreme Court held that nothing in the Constitution prevents States
from enforcing laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy. In Bowers versus
Hardwick, the Court expressly held that government can put citizens in
prison for engaging in homosexual conduct.
Now, however, we learn that the same Constitution forbids States from
deciding that homosexuals should not be granted protected or
preferential status under their laws. I defy anyone to explain how
these two results can be reconciled.
In a truly amazing display of intellectual dishonesty, the Court
majority didn't even attempt such a reconciliation, and indeed, it
didn't even mention the Bowers case.
So there are some serious legal flaws in the Court's decision. But
what truly offends me--and, I would expect, a great many Americans--is
the Court's conclusion that amendment 2 was motivated by ``animosity''
toward homosexuals. Again, I quote from Justice Scalia's dissent: ``To
suggest,'' he writes, ``that [Amendment 2] springs from nothing more
than `a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group' is nothing
short of insulting.''
And so it is. For 2,000 years, our Judeo-Christian ethic has taught
that homosexual conduct is wrong. Accordingly, our laws have always
embodied some moral disapproval of homosexuality. Sometimes that
disapproval takes the form of criminal sanction, as with antisodomy
laws. But often it is expressed in much more subtle ways. Here, for
example, the voters of Colorado decided simply not to extend their
antidiscrimination protections to homosexuals as a discrete protected
class. The Supreme Court has now pronounced that decision to be the
result of rank bigotry, motivated only by animosity toward homosexuals.
Such a crass dismissal of our moral and religious heritage should
provoke outrage on the part of the American people.
I do not come to the floor lightly to criticize our Supreme Court. I
have deep respect for the institution of the Supreme Court, and I have
been quick to praise the Court when it has performed its assigned
constitutional role. But yesterday's decision, Mr. Speaker, does not
deserve our praise; in striking down amendment 2 and in labeling as
``bigots'' adherents to traditional moral values, the Court deserves
our disapproval.
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