[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 64 (Thursday, May 9, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4928-S4936]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
SPECTRUM REFORM DISCUSSION DRAFT
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I rise today to take another step in my
overall telecommunications and information policy reform agenda. As I
have stated many times, the historic enactment earlier this year of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was only the first step in a new
national telecommunications policy for 21st Century America.
Today, I am putting out for public comment a discussion draft of
spectrum reform legislation to institute comprehensive reforms in how
the Federal Government uses--and fails to use--our most important
valuable national resource, the radio frequency spectrum.
The Spectrum and Its Uses
The radio spectrum is to the information age what oil and steel where
to the Industrial Age. Like any resource, it is finite. Therefore it
must be managed responsibly.
This valuable resource is one of the principle building blocks for
tomorrow's ``Information Economy.'' It also is critical to delivering
new and valuable services to the American public.
All of us have seen the contribution traditional radio-based
services--such as public and commercial broadcasting--have made to our
national life. We have seen the benefits of low-cost satellite
communications, which have enormously expanded the range of news,
information, and entertainment
[[Page S4929]]
choices. We have seen the proven value of cellular radiotelephones. In
addition, there are an array of other critical radio-based
communications services--everything from the radar systems so important
to air traffic control, to the radios policemen, firemen, and
ambulances use, to communications networks central to maintaining a
strong national defense.
From its very beginning, wireless communication has played a vital
role in protecting lives and property. Through the development of radio
and television broadcasting, it has delivered information and
entertainment programming to the public at large. More recently,
wireless, spectrum-based telecommunications services, products and
technologies have proven indispensable enablers and drivers of
productivity and economic growth, as well as international
competitiveness.
Wireless technology can deliver telecommunications and information
services directly to individuals on the move. No longer is being away
from the office desk or factory floor an impediment to doing business.
Fixed locations that cannot be served economically by wireline
facilities because of physical infeasibility or prohibitively high
costs are made accessible. Wireless services also are critically
important in bringing competition to the wireline telephone network--
one of the key goals of the Telecommunications Act.
Today, there is an almost limitless demand for the use of this
spectrum. In other words, the spectrum is an enormously valuable, yet
finite natural resource. This is the crux of the problem with our
current spectrum policy structure. Unless a reformation plan is
developed to create a more effective and efficient use of the spectrum,
a vast array of new spectrum-based products, services, and technologies
will go unrealized for the American people.
The Future
We are on the cusp of great change. Over the past couple of years, we
in the Congress and the Federal Communications Commission [FCC] have
accelerated the deployment of a whole new generation of pocket phones--
so-called ``Personal Communications Services.'' Just this spring, the
FCC authorized a new generation of wireless computers--radio-based
systems that may make it possible for us to interconnect our schools
and provide our students with access to the Internet on a low-cost,
highly, effective basis.
America has pioneered the development of digital television. Later
this year, actual digital broadcast operations may begin. By the turn
of the century--less than 4 years from now--we could have the
equivalent of a digital overlay network in the United States, relying
on a new electronic infrastructure broadcasters hope to put in place.
These and other accomplishments have been achieved despite a
regulatory framework that dates to the days of Marconi. It is a policy
designed for an environment characterized by stable technology and
stable, predictable demand for very basic communications. Under this
antiquated model, the Government--not consumers--largely decides who
uses frequencies, what they are used for, and how they are used--a
government-sponsored electronic industrial policy.
This system is slow. It is anticompetitive. It is antifree speech.
Inefficiencies in the Current Policy
As with other systems of central planning, the spectrum management
system currently utilized in the United States tends to result in
inefficient use of the spectrum resource. Federal regulators --rather
than consumers--decide whether taxis, telephone service, broadcasters,
or foresters are in greatest need of spectrum. Not surprisingly it is a
highly politicized process. Most important, new services, products and
technologies are delayed or, worse yet, denied. This obviously harms
consumers.
Consider cellular phones, the lengthy delay in making cellular
telephone service available imposed tremendous cost on the economy. One
study estimated the delay cost the economy $86 billion. As important,
American consumers were denied a new productivity and security tool for
many years.
Equally troubling, the system constrains competition. One of the most
important qualities of a competitive industry is the ability of new
firms to enter the business. Yet, the bureaucratic allocation process
typically provides for a set number of licenses for each service. This
precludes additional competitors. Only two cellular franchises, for
instance, are allowed in each market.
Delays associated with the allocation and assignment processes, while
perhaps acceptable in a slow changing world, are seriously out of step
with the fast-changing, high-technology world of today. Pressures on
the traditional radio frequency management structure are increasing.
Demand for channels is outstripping supply.
The current environment hobbles progress. It makes it hard for
innovators to gain access to the radio spectrum resources they need to
deliver technology's promise to the American people.
Another problem with current policy is that the Federal Government
alone claims nearly one-third of this critical resource for itself.
Since 1992, there has been a bipartisan commitment to privatize some of
the spectrum the Government has warehoused. Among the benefits of that
bipartisan effort has been a series of spectrum auctions. Those
auctions have produced more than $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury.
Although spectrum auctions have provided significant revenues for the
U.S. Treasury, the overriding policy reason for adopting a spectrum
auction policy is not--I repeat not--to provide more money for the
Government.
Much more important, spectrum auctions have accelerated access to the
resource by private sector entrepreneurs. The key policy goal achieved
with auctions is placing the spectrum resource in the hands of those
who value it most highly. Those who will put it to its best, highest
valued use.
The FCC's current auction authority expires in 1998. We need to
address these issues before then. We then ought to make the FCC's
auction authority permanent.
But as I stated here on the Senate floor on March 13 much more
definitely needs to be done.
Under the comprehensive discussion draft of spectrum reform
legislation I am unveiling today, a far reaching series of reforms
would be initiated.
Spectrum Auction Authority and Exhaustive Licensing
The spectrum reform discussion draft would expand the FCC's spectrum
auction authority. This change would, once and for all, place the
spectrum issue outside of the budget context and squarely in the arena
of communications policy.
The FCC also would be required to exhaustively license all available
spectrum by selecting bands of unallocated and unassigned frequencies
to be auctioned. Any existing licensees in these bands would be
protected and grandfathered. Indeed, they would gain flexibility in use
within their actual or implied service area and spectrum block. The FCC
is directed to maximize the value of spectrum licenses by selecting
broad, low frequency bands of contiguous spectrum that are not fully
assigned. The spectrum licensee seeking flexibility in use also may
apply for any adjacent or cochannel spectrum contiguous to its existing
license that is allocated but unassigned.
Spectrum Flexibility
The key reform contained in this discussion draft is freedom in
spectrum use. While important, auctions are not the most important
reform contained in this legislation. Much more important is replacing
the current Government mandated industrial policy system with a market-
based approach.
Auctions only tell you who gets a license. We now need to discuss
what the license allows you to do.
Like land, the Government shouldn't tell people what they can do with
frequencies. So long as they don't interfere with their neighbors, they
should be able to use it for whatever consumers want.
Like newspapers, the Government shouldn't tell broadcasters what they
say or how they say it. That should be up to viewers.
Simply put, frequencies should be treated more like private property.
However, in making these policy changes we should build on the
current system. Many licensees already have a great deal of flexibility
in what they can do. Let's build on that and give them more freedoms.
Mr. President, at the core of the spectrum reform I am today
proposing is the concept of spectrum flexibility. Flexibility for a
changing world.
[[Page S4930]]
For instance, radio frequency management historically has limited the
permissible uses of allocated bands and assigned channels. This, in
part, has been a function of technology, as well as the characteristics
associated with particular frequencies.
For example, channels allocated to the Forest Products Service
traditionally have been quite low frequencies. This is because those
frequencies have been shown to have the greatest ability to penetrate
underbrush, leaves, and other obstructions naturally occurring in a
forest. New digital communications technologies have gone a long way
toward changing this reality. Today's digital technology includes error
correction and other features which lessen interference.
Another good example of why today's technology requires increased
spectrum flexibility occurs in spread spectrum and digital overlay.
These techniques make it possible for multiple communications pathways
to be established within the same radio frequency channel. In other
words, using this technology, broadcasters could transmit
communications in addition to video and sound signals. Radio broadcast
channels today, for example, already provide local links for paging
operations. Government policy must allow multiple, more intensive use
of radio frequency resources where there is no perceptible adverse
technical impact.
Allowing radio frequency licensees greater flexibility also could
facilitate equipment and systems modernization and upgrading in the
public sector. This would enhance public safety. For example, many
public communications systems today are in need of modernization, to
meet the demand for more cost-effective and responsive law enforcement,
fire safety, and emergency medical services. At the same time, the
financial resources available to many public safety communications
organizations are quite limited.
If local police forces were permitted greater flexibility in use of
their channels, however, this challenge would be less severe. Switching
to new digital communications techniques typically achieves a
significant increase in the total number of channels available--in some
cases, by a factor of four or more. Thus, a local police department
could increase the number of channels available to support its
operations and, at the same time, have capacity available which it
could lease or barter with private communications organizations. Such
arrangements could generate the funds needed to finance modernization.
Greater flexibility is a public interest win-win situation--an option
that benefits all involved and affords the general public both better
service and more communications options.
The FCC already has taken steps to allow some radio licensees more
flexible use. The Commission's cellular radiotelephone rules, for
example, place few constraints on permissible communications. The same
is true in the case of the new PCS services. What is needed, however,
is far greater application of this fundamental principle of flexible
spectrum use. My bill does just that.
Under this discussion draft, each existing and future licensee would
have increased flexibility in use including: The right to use assigned
spectrum for any service, under any regulatory classification, and
under any technical parameters. In addition, the licenses would have
the right to freely transfer the license to others.
The flexible use would have to be within the licensee's existing or
implied service area and spectrum block and could not be inconsistent
with international treaty obligations of the United States. The
spectrum licensee also would bear the burden of showing any new use was
within the existing or implied service area and spectrum block.
Spectrum Privatization
Another major feature of the draft legislation is spectrum
privatization. Simply put, under the discussion draft, the Federal
Government would be obliged to relinquish one-quarter of its spectrum
stockpile. Spectrum auctions would be held to place that spectrum into
the hands of the public as quickly as possible. In addition, Government
agencies would be required to rely, to the maximum extent possible, on
the private sector to meet their radiocommunications needs. Taking into
account the taxes paid, if nothing else, this would definitely help the
public and strengthen the American information technology economy.
Spectrum Management Consolidation
The discussion draft would place the responsibility for managing the
spectrum in the United States solely with the FCC. The Commission would
be required to factor in critical national defense, law enforcement,
and national policy priorities. However, the current regime divides
responsibility between the FCC and the Department of Commerce, would be
streamlined. This would improve the overall management process. It also
would increase accountability.
Self-Managed Regulation
One of the more promising options for radio frequency management
reform is expanded use of self-managed regulation--the use of private
sector radio frequency coordinator groups to handle routine
engineering, frequency coordination, and other functions which, in the
past, typically had been undertaken by FCC staff.
At present, the FCC relies on frequency coordinators to handle many
of the routine chores associated with private mobile radio systems.
Organizations such as the National Association of Business &
Educational Radio [NABER], the Associated Public-Safety Communications
Officers [APCO], and the Special Industrial Radio Service Association
[SIRSA] process applications, conduct engineering surveys, and
otherwise facilitate licensing and channel usage in these specific
private radio services. The FCC does not generally rely on frequency
coordinators, however, with regard to broadcast services, satellite
communications, and other large frequency using services.
The task of being a frequency coordinator depends, in large part,
upon two things: Access to computerized data bases; and some expertise
in radio frequency engineering. Access to data bases today, of course,
is routine. At the same time the number of individuals with substantial
radio frequency management expertise is growing. This is due in part to
Federal Government and defense agency downsizing. There is, in short,
no good reason to assume that multiple frequency coordinators could not
be sanctioned by the FCC. This would have the effect of broadening
users' options.
Competition among frequency coordinator groups, moreover, should have
the effect of ensuring efficient charges and effective, responsive
operations. That has been true in virtually every market in which
competition has been introduced. It should prove true in this case as
well. That is why the discussion draft directs the FCC to expand
substantially the agency's use of private sector frequency coordinator
groups.
Public Safety Spectrum
The draft legislation also directs the FCC to make spectrum block
grants to States for public safety spectrum needs. In lieu of
processing, issuing, and renewing tens of thousands of public safety
communications licenses--at significant cost to licensees, as well as
the FCC--the agency would issue 55 block grants to the chief executive
officer of each State, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
the District of Columbia. It would then be the responsibility of State
Governors to determine eligibility, to ensure compliance with standard
FCC--and other--operating rules, and to resolve disputes among public
safety licensees within their jurisdiction.
This reform would reduce delays and heighten responsiveness to actual
user requirements. It would lessen substantially the burdens of
traditional regulation now borne by the FCC. Most important, it would
tend to ensure more and better public safety communications for State
residents.
Broadcast Television Spectrum
Mr. President, this draft legislation also would resolve the
controversy that has surrounded the digital--or high-definition--
television issue. It would speed up the migration of broadcast
television to digital channels. At the same time, it would firm up the
plans which have been announced regarding the retrocession of one 6 Mhz
channel--assets which could be used for many purposes in addition to
straight broadcast television.
Spectrum in the VHF and UHF television bands has the potential of
being extremely valuable for a variety of
[[Page S4931]]
uses. Current licensing policy, however, keeps this spectrum locked up
in a single, narrowly defined use. The fundamental thrust of this
alternative broadcast TV spectrum policy is to allow markets to guide
the spectrum to its highest valued use, while preserving the current
level of free television service, noncompetitively assigning an
additional 6 MHz to each existing NTSC licensee, and ensuring the
public is fairly compensated for the use of spectrum. This alternative
proposal recognizes the equities of incumbent full power broadcast
licensees in the band to fully and fairly compete in the digital era,
most especially their desire to convert to digital technology. At the
same time--and let me be very clear on this point--it will maintain the
current level of free television service for American consumers.
The Need for Reform
Mr. President, we enacted comprehensive telecommunications
legislation earlier this year for one very simple reason. It became
more and more apparent to all of us that the traditional, highly
bureaucratized telecommunications regulatory system no longer served
the public's best interest. There were unexplainable delays. New
services were not being offered. New investment and job opportunities
were not materializing fast enough.
The oldtime telecommunications regulatory system, in short, had
become the classical regulatory bottleneck. It was stalling forward
progress. As a result--after nearly two decades of struggling with
these issues--this Congress developed and enacted comprehensive reform
legislation.
The discussion draft I am unveiling today is very much the other side
of that fundamental regulatory reform equation. It addresses issues and
choices that Congress, the FCC, and the executive branch have wrestled
with for years. The approach is fair and balanced--and, balanced very
much in terms of helping the American public while strengthening
national competitiveness. I believe it could usher in a dynamic,
vibrant ``Wireless Era'' in which American entrepreneurial capitalism
leads the world into a robust high-technology future that will benefit
all Americans.
Congress has spent years examining the way we manage other natural
resources--from water, grazing, and timber issues so critical to my
part of the country, to the fisheries vitally important to the
Northeast, the Northwest, and, of course, Alaska. The natural resource
this draft legislation focuses upon is just as important to America.
This discussion draft was crafted in consultation with a wide range
of engineering, economic, and public policy experts. It is based, in
large part, upon the extensive open hearings which the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has conducted over the past
few years.
This is a worthy regulatory reform initiative. It could pay enormous
public policy dividends. Let me stress, however, that the unveiling of
this discussion draft is merely the beginning of what I hope will be a
spirited, robust debate. I look forward to continuing to work
cooperatively with all of my colleagues in the Senate and the House to
develop sound, consensus legislation that can be introduced in the near
future. I also want to encourage all affected parties to provide
comments to the committee regarding this proposal.
Mr. President, the radio frequency management and use reforms
contained in this spectrum reform discussion draft hold significant
promise. They would reduce regulatory burdens. They would foster
important public policies including advances in technology and
innovation, greater choice and more customer options, and more
effective, efficient, and responsive use of this valuable national
resource.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the
discussion draft together with the draft legislative language itself be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Summary of Pressler Spectrum Bill Discussion Draft: The Electromagnetic
Spectrum Management Policy Reform and Privatization Act
Spectrum Auction Authority
Permanent Authority. FCC's spectrum auction authority is
extended and made permanent.
Expanded Authority. FCC's spectrum auction authority to
make spectrum license assignments is expanded with the
following limited exceptions: non-mutually exclusive
applications; public safety services; digital television
licenses for broadcasters; and spectrum and associated orbits
within an international satellite system. FCC's auction
authority also expanded to include allocations, where
consistent with the Act.
Exhaustive Licensing. FCC required to exhaustively license
all available spectrum by selecting bands of unallocated and
unassigned frequencies to be auctioned. Any existing
licensees in these bands will be protected and grandfathered
and gain flexibility in use within their actual or implied
service area and spectrum block. FCC is directed to maximize
the value of spectrum licenses by selecting broad, low
frequency bands of contiguous spectrum that are not fully
assigned.
Voluntary Reallocation--Spectrum Flexibility
Flexibility In Use. Each existing and future nonbroadcast
licensee will have flexibility in use which includes: the
right to use assigned spectrum for any service; under any
regulatory classification; under any technical parameters;
and the right to freely transfer this right to others.
Limitations. The flexible use must be within the licensee's
existing or implied service area and spectrum block and
cannot be inconsistent with international treaty obligations
of the United States. The spectrum licensee bears the burden
of showing that any new use is within the existing or implied
service area and spectrum block.
The spectrum licensee seeking flexibility in use may also
apply for any adjacent or cochannel spectrum contiguous to
its existing license that is allocated but unassigned.
Government Spectrum Users
Flexibility In Use. Government spectrum users are also
granted spectrum flexibility rights, including the right to
transfer any spectrum rights now assigned to them to any
government or private sector entity and to receive
compensation for rights transferred.
Privatization. The Federal government is required to make
an additional 25 percent of its exclusive or shared spectrum
below 5 GHz available to the FCC for allocation to private
sector spectrum licensees using spectrum auctions.
BRAC-Like Commission. A Presidentially appointed Advisory
Committee On Withdrawal will be established to determine how
to make available the 25 percent of spectrum for
privatization and to determine what, if any, amount of
spectrum beyond the mandatory 25 percent which will be made
available to the private sector over a period of 10 years.
Financial Incentives. To encourage government agency and
personnel cooperation, financial incentives will be developed
to reward them for opening more spectrum for private sector
use.
Relocation Compensation. Federal government users are
allowed to accept compensation, including in-kind
reimbursement of costs, from any entity to defray the costs
of relocating the Federal entities operations from one set of
spectrum frequencies to another.
Additional Privatization. The Act adopts as statutory law
OMB's Circular A-76 which requires Federal agencies to
undertake an extensive cost-benefit analysis prior to
vertically integrating or continuing to vertically integrate
to meet their needs, and to take into account taxes forgone
when the Government chooses to make rather than buy products
or services to meet its needs. A-76 analysis has simply not
been consistently--nor continuously--applied to Government
radio communications requirements. The new bill changes that
by obliging Federal agencies to systematically review their
communications systems and operations, and shift to private
sector suppliers wherever feasible.
Technology Teaming. The number of communications channels
can be significantly multiplied if the analog communications
facilities used by many Federal agencies were changed to
digital. Federal agencies will be required to team with a
private company to install advanced, digital capability and
increased capacity, which in turn can be equitably
apportioned between agency and private partner.
Multi-Agency Systems. Federal agencies will be required to
explore not only the availability of private sector suppliers
but also other government agency suppliers. Today each
Federal agency maintains--and jealously guards--its own
system. As a result, there are very few ``common user''
systems.
Consolidation of Federal Spectrum Management Function
NTIA Eliminated. Management of spectrum for Federal
government agencies, together with the IRAC Secretariat and
associated support activities, is transferred from NTIA to
the FCC.
National Security Safety Valve. The President may veto any
FCC action which limits the amount of spectrum available to
government users, limits the uses to which spectrum may be
put, or interferes with or compromises Federal use, if such
action substantially harms national security or public
safety.
Non-Exclusive Licenses
For non-exclusive spectrum licenses not assigned by
spectrum auction, the FCC will
[[Page S4932]]
have the authority to use other economic incentives,
including user fees, to ensure that spectrum is assigned and
used efficiently and that the public is fairly compensated
for the use of the spectrum.
Self Managed Regulation
FCC is directed to substantially expand its use of private
sector frequency coordinator groups thus reducing need for
FCC in house engineering.
Public Safety Spectrum Block Grants
Each State will assume responsibility as a block grant
licensee for managing the spectrum currently allocated to
public safety uses within its State boundaries.
Each State may grant licensees the same flexibility in use
available to private FCC licensees.
Interference disputes between the States will be resolved
by the FCC.
Broadcast TV Spectrum--Deposit, Return and Overlay (A Market-Based
Alternative To A Government Mandated And Dictated Transition Policy)
Purpose. Spectrum in the VHF and UHF television bands is
potentially extremely valuable for a variety of uses. Current
licensing policy, however, keeps this spectrum ``locked up''
in a single, narrowly defined use. The fundamental thrust of
this alternative broadcast TV spectrum policy is to allow
markets to guide the spectrum to its highest valued use (as
up front spectrum auctions would) while preserving the
current level of free television service, noncompetitively
assigning an additional 6 MHz to each existing NTSC licensee,
and ensuring the public is fairly compensated for the use of
spectrum. This alternative proposal recognizes the equities
of incumbent full power broadcast licensees in the band to
fully and fairly compete in the digital era, most especially
their desire to convert to digital technology. At the same
time it will maintain the current level of free television
service for American consumers.
No Standards Setting. FCC is specifically precluded from
mandating an HDTV or digital television (DTV) standard for
broadcast licensees or establishing a requirement that all TV
sets sold or imported must be digital compatible by a date
certain.
Deposit. One 6 MHz DTV channel will be assigned non-
competitively to each existing NTSC licensee. Each existing
NTSC licensee will have the choice of receiving a DTV license
for payment of a fee (Deposit) or to simply keep their
existing NTSC license and relinquishing their right to the
DTV license. The deposit will be based on the market value of
the license determined by the auction of the overlay licenses
(see below). Any DTV licenses not accepted will be auctioned
by the FCC as part of an overlay license.
Return. The money deposited for the DTV license can be paid
in installments over a period of 15 years with the money
going into an escrow account. Interest accrued will go to the
U.S. Treasury for deficit reduction. After 15 years from the
date the FCC assigns a DTV license, the broadcast licensee
can relinquish a 6 MHz license and reclaim the full amount of
its deposit (Return), less interest accrued, or continue to
maintain NTSC and/or DTV license operations as outlined
below. The amount of the deposit returned to the broadcast
licensee will decrease 20 percent for each year that the
return of a 6 MHz channel is delayed past 15 years.
DTV Flexibility/Transferability. DTV licensees will have
full flexibility, without imposition of economic fees as
required in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, to use their
assigned DTV channels within their designated service area
for any service consistent with the technical limits imposed
by the FCC to prevent interference to NTSC and other DTV
assignments. DTV licensees may voluntarily transfer their
license at any time, separate from or together with their
existing NTSC channel.
No Mandates. DTV licensees will not be required to meet a
minimum service requirement or construction schedule.
Protecting Consumer Investment. Existing full power NTSC
stations will be grandfathered indefinitely. An NTSC licensee
will be permitted to continue providing standard NTSC
television service or to transfer its license to another
party who will then become the NTSC licensee.
NTSC Flexibility Subject To Replacement Of Free Service. An
NTSC licensee will also be given flexibility within its
assigned channel and service area to provide any services,
without imposition of economic fees as required in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, other than standard NTSC
service subject to technical limits imposed by the FCC to
prevent interference to DTV and other NTSC assignments.
Before any NTSC service may be reduced or discontinued,
however, the NTSC licensee must have provided a comparable
free replacement for such service including necessary
receiving equipment to allow such service to be displayed on
standard NTSC receivers.
Exhaustive Licensing. FCC will define overlay licenses
collectively covering all 402 MHz of spectrum in the current
VHF and UHF TV bands and covering the entire U.S. Each
overlay license will cover a block of one or more contiguous
6 MHz channels and a contiguous geographic area. The FCC will
determine the appropriate spectrum block and area size.
Overlay Auction. Overlay licenses to exhaustively fill the
entire 402 MHz allotted for television broadcasting in each
market will be assigned by a simultaneous, multiple round
auction.
Overlay Flexibility. Within its defined spectrum block and
service area, an overlay licensee will be permitted to
implement any service, subject to power limits defined by the
FCC at the boundaries of such spectrum block and service
area, and subject to additional technical restrictions as may
be imposed by the FCC to protect NTSC and DTV licensees from
harmful interference.
Overlay licenses will be freely transferable.
Overlay licenses may be aggregated to create larger service
areas and spectrum blocks.
Spectrum Report
After 2 years the FCC will prepare a cost-benefit report on
the results of the legislation together with any
recommendations for additional legislation.
S. --
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Policy Reform and Privatization Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) New applications of wireless communications
technologies await access to the electromagnetic spectrum to
provide innovative services to the public.
(2) The spectrum, however, is often characterized as
overcrowded and filled to capacity with current allocations.
(3) Capacity may now be underutilized due to the use of
obsolete technologies, while bands with great promise for
delivering better quality communications products to
consumers fail to realize their potential.
(4) This seeming paradox may be the result of a regulatory
structure that is increasingly inefficient in the dynamic
worlds of telecommunications and information technologies.
(5) This inefficiency results from structural defects in
the system itself, not in the expertise of, or competence at,
the regulatory agencies.
(6) Central allocation mechanisms provide insufficient
information with which to rank competing uses for spectrum,
or competing technologies for delivering those uses.
(7) Approximately one-third of the usable spectrum is
allocated to government or otherwise unavailable for private
sector use. Innovations to help and encourage the government
to use spectrum more efficiently should be adopted.
(8) The dramatic acceleration in the pace of technological
change and the increasing complexity of allocation and
assignment decisions make the case for an overhaul of the
current system more compelling than ever before.
(9) Lack of capital and outmoded equipment have led to
inefficient utilization of the spectrum bands used by Federal
agencies and public safety users.
(10) The management of spectrum can be substantially
reformed by giving most licensees the freedom and incentive
to use the spectrum more efficiently.
(11) In particular, within its explicit or implicit service
area and spectrum block, a licensee should be given--
(A) service and technical flexibility;
(B) freedom to resell or sublease; and
(C) freedom to pick regulatory classification.
(12) To get the full benefit of liberalizing existing
licenses, currently unassigned or unallocated spectrum will
have to be made available in an efficient manner. The
Commission will have to exhaustively license this spectrum
expeditiously. These new assignments should--
(A) be exclusive;
(B) provide new licensees marketplace freedoms similar to
those enjoyed by existing licensees; and
(C) be assigned through simultaneous multiple round
auctions where there are mutually exclusive applicants.
(13) Similar incentive-based reforms should be adopted for
the spectrum used by the Federal government and by the public
safety community, including substantial privatization,
flexibility in use, financial incentives and compensation for
relocation and band clearing, consolidation of the Federal
spectrum management function, and spectrum block grants to
the States.
(14) An alternative broadcast television spectrum policy is
needed to allow markets to guide the spectrum to its highest
valued use while preserving the current level of free
television service, noncompetitively and flexibly assigning
an additional 6 megahertz to each existing NTSC licensee, and
ensuring that the public is fairly compensated for the use of
spectrum.
(15) All reforms should encourage private dispute
resolution and avoid prolonged administrative delays.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
When used in this Act--
(1) Commission.--The term ``Commission'' means the Federal
Communications Commission.
(2) Flexibility in use.--The term ``flexibility in use''
means--
(A) the right to use assigned spectrum for any service
(including but not limited to those defined by the
Commission), under any regulatory classification, and under
any technical parameters, if the use is within the licensee's
existing or implied service area and spectrum block and is
not inconsistent
[[Page S4933]]
with international treaty obligations of the United States,
and
(B) the right to freely transfer this right to others.
(3) Implied service area.--The term ``implied service
area'' means the service area implied by the potential power
level and antenna height for a licensee, even if that area is
not expressly defined in a license.
(4) Service area.--The term ``service area'' means the
geographic area over which a licensee may provide service and
is protected from interference.
(5) Spectrum block.--The term ``spectrum block'' means the
range of frequencies over which the apparatus licensed by the
Commission is authorized to transmit signals.
SEC. 4. SPECTRUM AUCTION AUTHORITY.
(a) Spectrum Auction Authority Made Permanent.--Section
309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j))
is amended--
(1) by striking paragraph (11); and
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (12) and (13) as paragraphs
(11) and (12).
(b) Expansion of Spectrum Auction Authority.--
(1) In general.--Section 309(j) of the Communications Act
of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)) is amended by striking paragraphs
(1) and (2) and inserting the following:
``(1) General Authority.--If mutually exclusive
applications are accepted for any initial license or
construction permit which will involve use of electromagnetic
spectrum, then the Commission shall grant such license or
permit to a qualified applicant through a system of
competitive bidding that meets the requirements of this
subsection. The Commission may also use auctions to allocate
spectrum where it determines that such an auction is
consistent with the purposes of this Act.
``(2) Exemptions.--The Commission may not apply the
competitive bidding authority granted by this subsection to
licenses or construction permits issued by the Commission--
``(A) for public safety radio services, including non-
Government uses the sole or principal purpose of which is to
protect the safety of life, health, and property and which
are not made commercially available to the public;
``(B) for initial licenses or construction permits for new
terrestrial digital television services assigned by the
Commission to existing terrestrial broadcast licenses; or
``(C) for spectrum and associated orbits used in the
provision of any satellite within a global satellite
system.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--Section 309(j)(6) of such Act is
amended--
(A) by striking subparagraph (E); and
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) through (H) as
subparagraphs (E) through (G), respectively.
(c) Exhaustive Spectrum Licensing Policy.--
(1) In general.--The Commission shall complete all actions
necessary to permit the allocation and assignment by
competitive bidding pursuant to section 309(j) of the
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 309(j)) of licenses for
the use of bands of frequencies that--
(A) in the aggregate span not less than 250 megahertz and
that are located below 5 gigahertz, within 1 year after the
date of enactment of this Act; and
(B) in the aggregate span not less than 5 gigahertz and
that are located between 5 gigahertz and 60 gigahertz, within
2 years after the date of enactment of this Act; and
(C) have not, as of the date of enactment of this Act--
(i) been assigned or designated by Commission regulation
for assignment pursuant to such section;
(ii) been identified by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant
to section 113 of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 923);
or
(iii) been reserved for exclusive Federal Government use
pursuant to section 305 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47
U.S.C. 305); and
(D) may include spectrum exhaustively licensed throughout
the United States under the provisions of section
337(c)(4)(C) of the Communications Act of 1934.
(2) Criteria for band selection.--In making available bands
of frequencies for competitive bidding pursuant to paragraph
(1), the Commission shall, to the greatest extent possible,
maximize the value of the spectrum licenses by--
(A) selecting broad, low-frequency bands of contiguous
spectrum that are not fully assigned; and
(B) exhaustively licensing it throughout the United States.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (b)
does not apply with respect to any license or permit for a
terrestrial radio or television broadcast station for which
the Commission has accepted mutually exclusive applications
on or before the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. VOLUNTARY REALLOCATION; SPECTRUM FLEXIBILITY.
(a) In General.--Part I of title III of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new section:
``SEC. 337. SPECTRUM LICENSE USE FLEXIBILITY.
``(a) Flexibility in Use.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of this title to the contrary, each holder of a
nonbroadcast license granted under this title is hereby
granted flexibility in use. A licensee may change the use for
which the license was granted to provide any other use of
that license within its existing explicit or implied service
area and spectrum block, unless the Commission disapproves
the holder's application for such change under subsection
(c).
``(b) Additional Spectrum.--The holder of a nonbroadcast
license making application for a change of use under
subsection (a) may include in the application an application
for any adjacent or co-channel spectrum contiguous to its
nonbroadcast license to which the change of use application
relates that is allocated but unassigned.
``(c) Application; Procedure.--
``(1) Application.--An application for flexibility in use
under subsection (a), or for flexibility in use and for
additional spectrum under subsection (b), shall be made in
such form and at such time as the Commission may require and
shall include an adequate interference showing.
``(2) Public notification.--Within 10 days after receiving
an application under this section, the Commission shall
publish notice of the application in the Federal Register.
``(3) Approval of use flexibility application.--
``(A) In general.--The Commission shall approve an
application for flexibility in use under subsection (a)
unless it determines that--
``(i) the applicant fails to demonstrate that the new use
is within the licensee's existing explicit or implied service
area or spectrum block;
``(ii) the applicant fails to make an adequate interference
showing; or
``(iii) the new use is inconsistent with treaty obligations
of the United States.
``(B) Commission failure to act.--If no objection is filed
with the Commission and the Commission fails to act on the
application within 60 days, the application shall be deemed
approved.
``(C) Third party challenges.--A co-channel licensee or
adjacent channel licensee has standing to object to the
approval of an application under subsection (a) if the
objection is filed in writing with the Commission within 30
days after the date on which the notice of application is
published in the Federal Register.
``(D) Arbitration of interference disputes.--
``(i) If an objection based on interference cannot be
resolved to the satisfaction of the parties within 60 days
after the close of the comment cycle for the application,
then either the applicant or the person making the objection
may invoke binding arbitration to resolve any unresolved
issues by notifying the Commission in writing.
``(ii) Upon receipt of such notification, the Commission
shall appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute.
``(iii) An arbitrator appointed by the Commission under
clause (ii) shall resolve the dispute within 60 days after
appointment.
``(iv) The costs of arbitration shall be paid by the
applicant for license use flexibility or as assigned by the
arbitrator.
``(E) Interference guidelines.--The Commission shall
prepare interference guidelines similar to those now in use
for personal communications services bands for applications
affecting occupied bands that would provide a safe harbor for
any licensee seeking to change its license use.
``(4) Approval of additional spectrum requests.--
``(A) Filing window for competing applications.--Any person
may apply for spectrum requested by another person if the
application is filed within 30 days after notice of the other
person's application is first published in the Federal
Register.
``(B) Approval of noncontested applications.--The
Commission shall approve an application for additional
spectrum under subsection (b) if no other applicant applies
for that spectrum within 30 days after publication of notice
of the application in the Federal Register, unless it
determines that--
``(i) the applicant fails to demonstrate that the new use
is within the licensee's existing explicit or implied service
area or spectrum block;
``(ii) the applicant fails to make an adequate interference
showing; or
``(iii) the new use is inconsistent with treaty obligations
of the United States.
``(C) Commission failure to act.--If no objection is filed
with the Commission and the Commission fails to act on the
application within 60 days, the application shall be deemed
approved.
``(D) Third party challenges.--A co-channel licensee or
adjacent channel licensee has standing to object to the
approval of an application under subsection (a) if the
objection is filed in writing with the Commission within 30
days after the date on which the notice of application is
published in the Federal Register.
``(E) Arbitration of interference disputes.--
``(i) If an objection based on interference cannot be
resolved to the satisfaction of the parties within 60 days
after the close of the comment cycle for the application,
then either the applicant or the person making the objection
may invoke binding arbitration to resolve any unresolved
issues by notifying the Commission in writing.
``(ii) Upon receipt of such notification, the Commission
shall appoint an arbitrator to resolve the dispute.
[[Page S4934]]
``(iii) An arbitrator appointed by the commission under
clause (ii) shall resolve the dispute within 90 days after
appointment.
``(iv) The costs of arbitration shall be paid by the
applicant for license use flexibility or as assigned by the
arbitrator.
``(F) Interference guidelines.--The Commission shall
prepare interference guidelines similar to those now in use
for personal communications services bands for applications
affecting occupied bands that would provide a safe harbor for
any licensee seeking to change its license use.
``(G) Auction of contested spectrum.--If mutually exclusive
applications are accepted for spectrum under subsection (b),
then the Commission shall assign the spectrum through the use
of a system of competitive bidding.
``(H) Expansion of auctioned spectrum.--In auctioning
spectrum under subparagraph (G), the Commission may auction
larger blocks of spectrum encompassing the spectrum requested
by the applicant under subsection (b) if--
``(i) there are inconsistent and overlapping requests for
the unassigned spectrum; or
``(ii) it would enhance the efficient use of spectrum.''.
SEC. 6. GOVERNMENT SPECTRUM USE REFORMS.
(a) Minimum Reallocation of Government Frequencies.--
(1) In general.--Section 114 of the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration
Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 924) is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following:
``(c) Minimum Withdrawal Schedule.--
``(1) In general.--Over a period of 10 years beginning with
fiscal year 1997, the President shall take action under
subsection (a) to withdraw or limit the assignment of not
less than 25 percent of the exclusive or shared spectrum
allocated for Federal government use below 5 gigahertz and
make available the spectrum withdrawn, or otherwise made
available, to the Commission for allocation to private sector
licensees using competitive bidding.
``(2) Advisory committee on withdrawal.--The President
shall appoint an advisory committee of 7 members to advise
the Commission and the President on the choice of spectrum
for withdrawal or limitation of assignment under paragraph
(1) of this subsection. The advisory committee shall also
advise the President and the Commission concerning the
potential for withdrawal or limitation of additional spectrum
beyond the 25 percent of frequencies that are required to be
privatized under paragraph (1) of this subsection, if any.
The advisory committee shall include 3 representatives of
affected Federal departments or agencies, 3 representatives
of the private sector with experience and expertise in
telecommunications, and 1 representative of the public, and
shall meet at such times and places as the President shall
require. The President shall designate a chairman and vice
chairman and provide for appropriate administrative support.
The members of the advisory committee shall serve at the
pleasure of the President.''.
(b) Identification and Reallocation of Frequencies.--
Section 113 of the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration Organization Act (47 U.S.C. 901 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following:
``(f) Relocation of Federal Government Stations.--
``(1) In general.--In order to expedite the efficient use
of the electromagnetic spectrum and notwithstanding section
3302(b) of title 31, United States Code, any Federal entity
which operates a Federal Government station may accept
payment in advance or in-kind reimbursement of costs, or a
combination of payment in advance and in-kind reimbursement,
from any person to defray entirely the expenses of relocating
the Federal entity's operations from one or more radio
spectrum frequencies to any other frequency or frequencies,
including, without limitation, the costs of any modification,
replacement, or reissuance of equipment, facilities,
operating manuals, regulations, or other expenses incurred by
that entity. Any such payment shall be deposited in the
account of such Federal entity in the Treasury of the United
States. Funds deposited according to this section shall be
available, without appropriation or fiscal year limitation,
only for the operations of the Federal entity for which such
funds were deposited under this section.
``(2) Process for relocation.--Any person seeking to
relocate a Federal Government station that has been assigned
a frequency within a band allocated for mixed Federal and
non-Federal use may submit a petition for such relocation to
the Commission. The Commission shall limit the Federal
Government station's operating license to secondary status
when the following requirements are met--
``(A) the person seeking relocation of the Federal
Government station has guaranteed to defray entirely, through
payment in advance, in-kind reimbursement of costs, or a
combination thereof, all relocation costs incurred by the
Federal entity, including all engineering, equipment, site
acquisition and construction, and regulatory fee costs;
``(B) the person seeking relocation completes all
activities necessary for implementing the relocation,
including construction of replacement facilities (if
necessary and appropriate) and identifying and obtaining on
the Federal entity's behalf new frequencies for use by the
relocated Federal Government station (where such station is
not relocating to other technology or to spectrum reserved
exclusively for Federal use);
``(C) any necessary replacement facilities, equipment
modifications, or other changes have been implemented and
tested to ensure that the Federal Government station is able
to accomplish its purposes successfully; and
``(D) the Commission has determined that the proposed use
of the spectrum frequency band to which the Federal entity
will relocate its operations is--
``(i) consistent with obligations undertaken by the United
States in international agreements and with United States
national security and public safety interests; and
``(ii) suitable for the technical characteristics of the
band and consistent with other uses of the band.
In exercising its authority under this subparagraph with
respect to issues that have national security or foreign
relations implications, the Commission shall consult with the
Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State, or both, as
appropriate.
``(3) Right to reclaim.--If within one year after the
relocation the Federal Government station demonstrates to the
Commission that the new facilities or spectrum are not
comparable to the facilities or spectrum from which the
Federal Government station was relocated, the person seeking
such relocation must take reasonable steps to remedy any
defects or pay the Federal entity for the costs of returning
the Federal Government station to the spectrum from which
such station was relocated.
``(g) Federal Action to Expedite Spectrum Transfer.--Any
Federal Government station which operates on electromagnetic
spectrum that has been identified for reallocation for mixed
Federal and non-Federal use in the Spectrum Reallocation
Final Report or by the President pursuant to recommendation
of the Advisory Committee on Withdrawal shall, to the maximum
extent practicable through the use of the authority granted
under subsection (f) and any other applicable provision of
law, take action to relocate its spectrum use to other
frequencies that are reserved for Federal use or to
consolidate its spectrum use with other Federal Government
stations in a manner that maximizes the spectrum available
for non-Federal use.
``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) Federal entity.--The term `Federal entity' means any
Department, agency, or other element of the Federal
Government that utilizes radio frequency spectrum in the
conduct of its authorized activities, including a Federal
power agency.
``(2) Spectrum reallocation final report.--The term
`Spectrum Reallocation Final Report' means the report
submitted by the Secretary to the President and Congress in
compliance with the requirements of subsection (a).''; and
(2) by striking ``(a) or (d)(1)'' in section 114(a)(1) and
inserting ``(a), (d)(1), or (f)''.
(c) Flexibility in Use of Government Spectrum Licenses.--
Part B of title I of the Telecommunications Authorization Act
of 1992 (47 U.S.C. 921 et seq.) is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following:
``SEC. 118. FLEXIBILITY IN USE FOR GOVERNMENT LICENSE-
HOLDERS.
``(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law to the contrary, any department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States that holds an exclusive
spectrum license may change the use of that license under
section 337 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 337)
in the same manner and to the same extent as any other holder
of an exclusive nonbroadcast license.
``(b) Incentives.--To the extent consistent with its
existing authority, each department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States may establish financial
incentives to assist in providing more government-assigned
spectrum for reallocation or assignment beyond the percentage
allocated under section 114(c) of this Act (47 U.S.C.
924(c)).
``(c) Regulations.--The Commission shall promulgate
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section after
consultation with the heads of departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the United States that hold spectrum
licenses.''.
(d) Federal Radiocommunications; Private Enterprise
Reliance.--It shall be the policy of the United States to
rely on competitive private enterprise to the maximum extent
possible to meet the radiocommunications requirements of the
Federal Government. This policy shall apply to all
radiocommunications systems first authorized after December
31, 1996, and shall be applied to all systems authorized as
of that date in accordance with regulations adopted pursuant
to this Act.
(e) Business-government Radio- communications Partnerships;
Technology Teaming.--
(1) The Commission, in consultation with the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, within 6 months after
the date of enactment of this Act shall adopt rules
applicable to all departments, agencies, and
instrumentalities of the United States Government that--
(A) encourage the utilization, to the greatest extent
possible, of previously conducted surveys of all
radiocommunications systems operated by such department,
agency, or instrumentality for the purpose of increasing the
efficiency of those systems; and
(B) authorize the head of each department, agency, and
instrumentality of the United
[[Page S4935]]
States Government to enter into contracts, leases,
partnerships, teaming agreements, and other cooperative
business-government arrangements, that will enable the
private sector to participate, in whole or significant part,
in the upgrading of government radiocommunications systems,
and permit an equitable apportionment of the use of such
upgraded systems to meet both government as well as private
sector needs.
(2) Application to legislative and judicial branches.--
(A) The congress.--As an exercise of the rulemaking power
of the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively,
the regulations promulgated by the Commission under paragraph
(1) are deemed to have been adopted by each House of the
Congress, respectively, as rules applicable only to that
House. The rules so adopted supersede other rules of each
House of the Congress only to the extent that they are
inconsistent with those other rules, and they are enacted
with full recognition of the constitutional right of each
House to change them, to the extent that they relate to that
House, in the same manner and to the same extent as any other
rule of that House.
(B) The federal judiciary.--The judicial branch of the
United States Government is authorized and requested to adopt
the regulations promulgated by the Commission under paragraph
(1) as applicable to the operations of that branch.
(3) Competitive procurement techniques.--Each department,
agency, and instrumentality of the United States Government
is authorized and encouraged to employ competitive
procurement techniques in selecting private sector partners
for the purpose of mutually benefiting from the upgrading of
technology associated with Federal radiocommunications
systems, except that--
(A) the head of any such department, agency, or
instrumentality may waive compliance with competitive
procurement techniques in whole or part, if it is in the
government's interests; and
(B) business-government arrangements undertaken under this
Act shall not be subject to limitations regarding gifts and
bequests to Federal agencies.
The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to the
legislative and judicial branches of the United States
Government to the extent that such branches adopt the same or
similar rules.
(4) Report.--The President shall include as part of the
Budget of the United States for each fiscal year beginning
after the date of enactment of this Act, a report detailing
the number and scope of cooperative business-government
radiocommunications arrangements undertaken in accordance
with this Act for the preceding fiscal year.
(f) Government Communications Systems; Multiple Use and
Application.--
(1) It is the policy of the United States to encourage and
facilitate the multiple, shared use of Federal
radiocommunications systems to the maximum extent possible,
in order to foster more effective and efficient use of radio
spectrum resources.
(2) To implement this policy, the Commission in
consultation with the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, and the Administrator of the General Services
Administration and other appropriate officers or employees of
the United States Government, within 1 year after the date of
enactment of this Act shall adopt rules, regulations, and
budgetary guidelines which--
(A) establish a Federal radiocommunications system
register, to be maintained by the Director, or his designee,
which register shall set forth capacity which could be
available for use by other Federal agencies;
(B) require the heads of all Federal agencies seeking
additional radio spectrum licenses or assignments to certify
that they have fully considered the availability of private
sector radiocommunications alternatives; and, based upon
review of the register required by this Act, have also fully
considered the feasibility of shared use of other Federal
agency systems; and
(C) require all Federal agencies holding radio spectrum
licenses or assignments promptly, and on a continuing basis,
to assess the feasibility and desirability of sharing the
capacity of their radiocommunications systems with other
Federal agencies, and to report their findings for inclusion
in the register required by this Act.
(g) Consolidation of Frequency Management
Responsibilities.--The radio frequency management functions
of the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (hereinafter referred to as ``NTIA''),
including the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee
secretariat and associated support activities (including the
NTIA's electromagnetic compatibility analysis operations),
under the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration Organization Act are hereby transferred to the
Commission.
(h) Presidential Invalidation.--The President may
invalidate any Commission action that--
(1) limits the amount of spectrum available to departments,
agencies, or instrumentalities of the United States;
(2) limits the uses to which such spectrum may be put; or
(3) interferes with or compromises any use by any such
department, agency, or instrumentality
if, after a hearing on the record, the President finds that
such action would substantially harm national security or
public safety.
SEC. 7. NONEXCLUSIVE LICENSES.
The Commission may use such other economic incentives as it
deems appropriate, including user fees, to ensure that
nonexclusive licenses and licenses not issued utilizing
competitive bidding are used efficiently and that the public
is fairly compensated for the use of the spectrum. In
establishing the amount of such fees, the Commission shall
consider such factors as spectrum bandwidth, frequency
location, area of operation, service area population, and the
value of the spectrum as determined by prices paid for
spectrum in Commission auctions.
SEC. 8. SELF-MANAGED REGULATION; EXPANDED RELIANCE OF
FREQUENCY COORDINATION.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall report to
the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and the Chairman of the
Committee on Commerce of the House of Representatives
regarding the radio frequency management, recordskeeping,
coordination, and other functions undertaken by the
Commission that could be performed by private sector radio
frequency coordinator groups.
(b) Assessment.--In preparing this report, the Commission
shall assess the feasibility and desirability of relying upon
nonprofit industry self-regulatory organizations as well as
for-profit organizations, and shall also assess and report on
the potential revenue which might inure to the Government by
selecting private sector radio frequency coordinator groups
through competitive bidding procedures, including auctions.
(c) Rulemaking.--Following the transmittal of its report,
the Commission shall initiate a rulemaking or rulemakings
with a view toward implementing the report's findings, and
shall conclude such proceedings within 6 months.
SEC. 9. BLOCK GRANTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY SPECTRUM TO STATES.
The Commission shall delegate to the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the United States
Virgin Islands, and each State responsibility for assigning
and managing radio frequency spectrum allocated for public
safety communications use. In making that delegation, the
Commission shall consider, among other matters--
(1) a requirement that the polity to which the spectrum
responsibility is delegated notify the Commission of its
assignment of spectrum and its management activities;
(2) permitting each such polity to exercise or to grant
licensees the same flexibility in use that is available to
private sector license holders whose license is granted by
the Commission;
(3) providing for the binding resolution of interference
disputes between such polities by the Commission; and
(4) a requirement that each polity manage its public safety
spectrum allocation to ensure efficient interoperability
between its own wireless communications systems and those of
Federal law enforcement, public safety, and disaster
assistance agencies, to the greatest extent feasible.
SEC. 10. FLEXIBLE NTSC AND DTV LICENSES; DEPOSIT AND RETURN;
FLEXIBLE OVERLAY VHF AND UHF BAND LICENSES.
(a) In General--Part I of title III of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended by section 5 of this Act, is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following:
``SEC. 338. BROADCAST TELEVISION SPECTRUM POLICY.
``(a) Assignment of Flexible DTV Licenses to Existing
Broadcasters.--
``(1) Assignment.--The Commission shall assign one 6
megahertz DTV channel, on a non-competitive basis, to each
existing NTSC licensee. An existing NTSC licensee to whom
such a channel is assigned may--
``(A) receive a DTV license for a deposit; or
``(B) decline to accept a DTV license.
Any DTV license declined shall be auctioned by the Commission
as part of an overlay license. The amount of the deposit
shall be based on the market value of the license as shown by
the auction of the overlay licenses and adjusted for relevant
economic factors, such as the size and population of the area
served. The Commission may waive the deposit in whole or in
part for broadcasters in small markets and for small
broadcasters competing in large markets.
``(2) Use of dtv license.--A licensee to which a DTV
license is assigned under paragraph (1)--
``(A) shall enjoy flexibility in use (within the meaning of
that term as used in section 337(a)) of the license
consistent with technical limits imposed by the Commission to
prevent interference to NTSC and other DTV assignments;
``(B) may not be required to meet a minimum service
requirement or construction schedule; and
``(C) may transfer or relinquish its DTV license at any
time.
``(3) Reassignment of relinquished licenses.--Except as
provided in paragraph (1), the Commission may not reassign
any DTV license relinquished by the licensee to whom it was
assigned or transferred. Any spectrum that had been
previously encumbered by a relinquished DTV license shall be
available for use by overlay licensees (within the meaning of
subsection (c)).
``(4) Deposit and return.--
[[Page S4936]]
``(A) The amount to be paid as a deposit for a DTV license
under paragraph (1)--
``(i) may be paid to the Commission in installments over a
15-year period beginning on the date on which the license is
assigned; and
``(ii) shall be held in escrow and invested in interest-
bearing obligations of the United States.
``(B) Amounts received as interest earned on deposits held
in escrow under subparagraph (A) shall be available to the
United States for tax reduction or deficit reduction
purposes.
``(C) Fifteen years after a DTV license is assigned to an
NTSC licensee under paragraph (1), the licensee may
relinquish its NTSC license or its DTV license. If an NTSC
licensee relinquishes either license under this subparagraph,
then the amount of the deposit paid by the licensee shall be
returned to the licensee, without interest, reduced by 20
percent for each year the licensee continues NTSC operations
in excess of the 15-year period beginning on the date on
which the DTV license is assigned to the licensee.
``(b) Existing NTSC Licenses.--
``(1) Grant of flexibility.--An NTSC licensee with a valid
NTSC license on the date of enactment of the Electromagnetic
Spectrum Management Policy Reform and Privatization Act--
``(A) may provide standard NTSC television service after
such date of enactment;
``(B) may transfer its NTSC license to any other person who
is qualified to be an NTSC licensee; and
``(C) shall enjoy flexibility in use (within the meaning of
that term as used in section 337(a)) of the license, subject
to technical limits imposed by the Commission to prevent
interference to DTV and other NTSC assignments.
``(2) Reduction or discontinuance of NTSC service.--An NTSC
licensee may not reduce or discontinue any NTSC service
unless the licensee provides comparable replacement for such
service free to viewers, as defined and approved by the
Commission, including necessary receiving equipment for all
such service to be displayed on standard NTSC receivers. An
NTSC license relinquished by a licensee who provides such
comparable free replacement service may not be reassigned by
the Commission.
``(3) Reassignment of abandoned or revoked licenses.--An
NTSC license that is--
``(A) abandoned by the licensee without providing
comparable free replacement service (within the meaning of
such term as it is used in paragraph (2) of this subsection);
or
``(B) revoked by the Commission,
shall be reassigned by the Commission by auction for standard
NTSC service, with the same flexibility in use rights
provided to other NTSC licensees.
``(c) Assignment of New Overlay Licenses.--
``(1) In general.--The Commission shall assign overlay
licenses by a simultaneous, multiple round auction. Any
spectrum previously encumbered by NTSC or DTV licenses that
have been relinquished shall be available for use by overlay
licensees in accordance with such terms and conditions,
consistent with the other provisions of this section, as the
Commission may establish.
``(2) Use.--An overlay licensee--
``(A) shall enjoy flexibility in use (within the meaning of
that term as used in section 337(a)) of the license, subject
to--
``(i) power limits set by the Commission at the boundaries
of the spectrum block and service area; and
``(ii) such additional technical restrictions as may be
imposed by the Commission to protect NTSC and DTV licensees,
and authorized land mobile services, from harmful
interference;
``(B) may aggregate multiple overlay licenses to create
larger spectrum blocks and service areas; and
``(C) may transfer an overlay license to any other person
qualified to be an overlay licensee.
``(d) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) DTV.--The term `DTV' means digital television.
``(2) NTSC.--The term `NTSC' means the National Television
Systems Committee.
``(3) NTSC licensee.--The term `NTSC licensee' means a
licensee assigned a television channel allotted for full
power television service under the Commission's rules.
``(4) Overlay license.--
``(A) In general.--The term `overlay license' shall be
defined by the Commission.
``(B) Individually.--As defined by the Commission, each
overlay license shall cover--
``(i) a block of one or more contiguous 6 megahertz
channels; and
``(ii) a contiguous geographic area,
as determined by the Commission.
``(C) Collectively.--As defined by the Commission, overlay
licenses shall cover collectively--
``(i) all 402 megahertz of spectrum in the VHF and UHF
television bands; and
``(ii) the entire area of the United States.
``SEC. 339. COMMISSION MAY NOT ESTABLISH DTV STANDARDS OR DTV
RECEPTION SET REQUIREMENTS.
``Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the
contrary, the Commission may not--
``(1) establish DTV (as defined in section 338(d)(1))
standards; nor
``(2) require that television receivers manufactured in, or
imported into, the United States be capable of receiving and
decoding DTV signals.''.
SEC. 11. REPEAL OF FEES IMPOSED ON BROADCASTERS FOR ANCILLARY
AND SUPPLEMENTARY SERVICES.
Section 336 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.
336) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (e); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (f) and (g) as subsections
(e) and (f).
SEC. 12. SPECTRUM REPORT.
Two years after the date of enactment of this Act, the
Commission shall report the results of implementation of this
Act, together with a cost-benefit analysis of such results,
and any recommendations for additional legislation related
thereto, to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation of the Senate and to the Committee on Commerce
of the House of Representatives.
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