[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 62 (Tuesday, May 7, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4764-S4769]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
AMERICAN TROOPS IN BOSNIA
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to talk today about a matter
that concerns all Americans: the presence of 35,000 young American men
and women supporting the peace implementation force in Bosnia. Those
troops were sent as a part of a NATO force to monitor the Bosnian peace
agreement reached in Dayton, OH, last year. The Senate voted last
December to support those troops, to provide them whatever they needed
to do what they have been asked to do. But in the resolution submitted
by the distinguished Republican leader, Senator Dole, and Senator
McCain of Arizona, the Senate also said by a margin of 69 to 30 that it
does not endorse the President's decision or the agreement reached in
Dayton.
The House of Representatives was even more harsh. The House voted 287
to 141 to condemn the Dayton agreement, while expressing support for
the troops that have been sent on this mission.
There is never a doubt that we will support fully American troops
anywhere when they are performing a mission for this country. We will
always be there for them. But, Mr. President, that does not mean we
cannot question the policy, and this Senate and the House of
Representatives did just that.
Many wanted a vote to deny the President the ability to dispatch the
troops by withholding the funds needed to pay for such a deployment.
That was not the right thing to do, and it failed, as it should have.
But, Mr. President, there are many good reasons why we disagreed with
the decision to send American troops, even while we acknowledged the
President's right to do it.
First, we did not feel that the administration had made a compelling
case that there was a national security interest in Bosnia to justify
the deployment of tens of thousands of Americans, with the potential
loss of American life. Mr. President, that is an essential element of
any mission upon which we would embark with troops from our country.
There must be a U.S. security interest for American lives to be at
risk. But, more importantly, Mr. President, many of us voiced strong
concern that the administration lacked a strategy for removing those
troops once they had dug in and become part of the troubled landscape
in the troubled country of Bosnia.
What made many of us particularly skeptical was the administration's
insistence that not only was there an exit strategy, but that the
troops would be able to perform their complex mission of creating two
nations from one, patrolling rugged mountain terrain, separating
hostile belligerents, and ending a 500-year-old civil war in just 1
year.
In fact, Mr. President, the Dole-McCain resolution that expressed
support for the troops and acknowledged the President's authority to
deploy them specifically noted that the Senate support was conditioned
on the return of those troops to the United States within 1 year.
Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues what senior administration
officials, including the President, assured us as we wrestled with the
question of whether to support sending young Americans to Bosnia:
On October 13, 1995, Robert Hunter, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, told
the Washington Post:
This is going to be a limited-duration operation-- 12
months max. We're not going to take responsibility beyond
that.
On October 18, 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry and Gen. John
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House
Committee on National Security and the House Committee on International
Relations:
The implementation force will complete its mission in a
period not to exceed 12 months. We believe this will be more
than adequate to accomplish the needed tasks that will allow
the peace to become self-sustaining. We anticipate the IFOR
will go in heavy and, if successful, would begin drawing down
significantly far in advance of the final exit date.
On October 18, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the
House Committee on National Security:
The force would have a limited mission and remain for a
limited period of time, approximately 1 year.
On November 28, 1995, President Clinton told the American people in a
televised address:
Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission
should--and will--take about 1 year.
Mr. President, none of these knowledgeable officials left any room
for doubt that the American mission in Bosnia would be limited in scope
and duration. Specifically we were told, with no uncertainty, by
everyone from the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, to the President of the
United States, that our troops would be home within 1 year.
Mr. President, we now learn this is not so. December 20, 1996, was
the date set as the 1-year mark. That is the date that we have been
focusing on since the beginning of this mission. We now learn that this
administration has said to our allies that it intends to keep American
troops in Bosnia at least until early 1997 and, according to the United
States Commander of NATO forces, Gen. George Joulwan, maybe longer.
Mr. President, the reason we got into the mission in Bosnia with NATO
is because our President told our allies that we would be there with
troops on the ground if there was a peace agreement. He told them that
a long time ago. Once we make a commitment to our allies, of course,
America must stand by the commitment.
But now, Mr. President, we have the dilemma of two commitments. We
have the President making a commitment to the American people, to
Senator Dole, and to the troops that are there, that this would be a
mission of 1 year. Everyone connected with this mission and with the
leadership of this administration has repeatedly said 1 year. Now, Mr.
President, we have the President making a different commitment to our
allies, saying it is not going to be 1 year, but leaving it rather
open-ended, into 1997.
Mr. President, I want to highlight the difference between last year's
message from the administration and an April 26, 1996, article in the
Washington Post:
``A substantial number of American troops will remain in
Bosnia for at least one month after the NATO-led mission ends
in December. In a departure from the original plan, NATO
commanders have decided to keep a significant force in Bosnia
up to the final day of the mission or one year after the
peace enforcement began,'' according to spokesman Kenneth
Bacon. Earlier officials had said the pullout would begin at
least a few months before the December 20 closing date in
order to have nearly everyone out by then. Kenneth Bacon said
the change in
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plans stemmed from a request by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, which is assisting preparations
for Bosnia's elections, that NATO keep its full force there
until after the elections.
And, on April 30, 1996, the London Times reported:
The Clinton administration has scrapped plans to withdraw
its forces by the end of this year, and may maintain a
substantial American presence in the Balkans for months after
the deadline set by Congress. Only weeks ago the White House
repeated its promise to Republicans that the troops would be
back by December 20, the date agreed at Dayton for the end of
the NATO mission in Bosnia. The Pentagon, however, under
pressure from allies, international officials and its own
Gen. George Joulwan, has admitted that it plans to keep a
significant force in the region until the end of January, and
maybe longer.
Those are excerpts from quotes from newspapers.
Mr. President, this stunning reversal of a critical policy that
affects the lives of thousands of Americans has been made in such a
casual way that we must ask if the administration's original commitment
to withdraw in 1 year was a serious one. It was so casual, many people
were not even aware that all of a sudden this commitment that was made
to this Congress to a December 20 deadline by which our troops would be
out of Bosnia has now been put off, really indefinitely, into 1997.
The President is breaking his promise to the American people to the
United States Congress, and, most importantly, to the troops in Bosnia.
Moreover, Senator Dole had earlier argued forcefully and persuasively
about arming the Bosnian Government and allowing the Bosnians to defend
themselves so American troops would not need to be sent in the first
place. This would have required lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the
former Yugoslavia, for which our leader argued forcefully and
persuasively, many times for over a year on this Senate floor. We voted
to lift the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia so that the Bosnians
could arm themselves and fight to save their country.
Senator Dole led the fight to let the Moslems fight for their own
freedom with help from legitimate sources so that it would be legal to
help the Bosnian people defend themselves. No Member of the Senate has
been more outspoken for years about the need for the United States to
lead our allies in establishing a policy on Bosnia that would avoid the
need for American troops than our leader, Bob Dole. But each time the
Congress voted to urge the lifting of the arms embargo, the
administration refused to respond.
Now, Mr. President, in addition to the total abrogation of his word
to the American people regarding when the troops would come home from
Bosnia, we now learn that, in fact, while President Clinton was
stopping us from lifting the arms embargo, he was allowing another
country to provide arms in violation of the embargo. Was it a
legitimate ally of the United States? No, Mr. President, it was not a
legitimate ally of the United States that was allowed to violate the
arms embargo that we in this Congress were trying to lift. No, it was
an enemy of the United States, a terrorist country: Iran.
Despite widespread rumors that Iranian arms were being shipped to
Bosnia in violation of the arms embargo, an embargo this administration
said we must support, and despite senior officials' strong denials, we
learn we were deceived. Here we have the quotes, Mr. President. On
April 15, 1995, a State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, told the
Los Angeles Times, ``We do not endorse violations of U.N. embargo
resolutions whatever. We are not violating those resolutions. We don't
endorse anyone else who is violating them.''
On June 16, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, ``I
think you get some instant gratification from lifting the arms embargo.
It is kind of an emotional luxury, but you have to ask yourself, what
are the consequences of that?'' As late as March of this year,
President Clinton himself told Congress that ``Iran continued to engage
in activities that represent a threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States.''
Mr. President, despite all of those statements by senior
administration officials and the President himself, we have learned in
recent weeks that this was not the case at all. Just 3 weeks after the
President's report to Congress on Iran, it has been reported that the
administration had given its tacit approval of the shipment by Iran,
one of America's most hostile adversaries, of weapons to the Bosnian
Muslim government.
We are justified in concluding, Mr. President, that the Clinton
administration policy on Bosnia has been cynical. What many of us were
advocating for so long--arming the Bosnians and allowing them to defend
themselves with legitimate sales of arms by people who cared about the
people--was, in fact, being opposed by the administration by day, but
by night secret arms shipments from Iran were moving forward with the
administration's blessing.
Now, Mr. President, we are faced with similar cynicism regarding the
deployment of American troops. Those troops are there precisely because
the administration refused the suggestions by Senator Dole and others
in the Senate that arming the Bosnians and letting them fight for
themselves was the best way to go. Instead, the administration adopted
a half-a-loaf policy of covert arms shipments from Iran, which was too
little, too late, from the wrong source.
As with arm sales to Bosnia, the American people have been deceived
by the Clinton administration on the question of withdrawing American
troops from Bosnia. Very simply, the President made a commitment to the
American people, and he is now saying he will not honor that
commitment.
Mr. President, many in the Senate personally have opposed the
administration's policy on Bosnia but honored their belief that the
President had the authority to deploy troops without permission from
Congress. Many people on this floor were torn during that debate
because they so violently disagreed with the policy, but they did
believe that the President had the right to do it and that the troops
needed the support from Congress.
Our Republican leader did so at great political risk. He supported
the President's right to deploy troops, even though he thought it was
wrong, but he did so only after getting a commitment from the President
himself that those troops would have a mission of limited duration,
limited scope, and they would be home within 1 year. That was the
promise the President made to our leader.
We now learn this will not happen. The administration's disregard of
its commitments to Senator Dole, to the U.S. Congress, and to the
American people amount to broken promises. Broken promises--there is no
other way you can put it.
Today, Mr. President, I am going to ask the President to look at this
policy, which is a policy of broken promises, broken commitments, and
contradictory commitments to the American people and to our allies.
I am going to ask the President to do two things. First of all, to
honor his commitment to the American people about troop withdrawals
from Bosnia and to tell our allies this commitment was made. If, in
fact, he decides that he cannot keep his commitment to the American
people, I ask him to come back to Congress and talk to us about this,
rather than just announcing very quietly that the troops are not going
to be out by December 20 as promised. OK, President Clinton, if that is
what you believe, come to Congress, talk to us about it, tell us why
you think this is necessary, and let us have the option of working with
you if you think you can make the case that we should be there beyond
the date you promised in your commitment to the American people.
That is what I ask the President to do today. Either keep his
commitment to the American people, or come to Congress and discuss it.
Mr. President, this is too important. We have a policy now in which the
President is going to expand the use of our American troops beyond his
commitment to Senator Dole and the American people and this U.S.
Congress. We have the second revelation that arm shipments from Iran
were being permitted by this administration at the same time that he
was keeping us in Congress from lifting the arms embargo, which we
voted repeatedly to do so that the Moslems in Bosnia could have arms
from legitimate sources.
Mr. President, I just ask you, what kind of policy is that? What must
the
[[Page S4766]]
people of the world think when our President would make commitments
that he does not keep and when he would keep legitimate arms sources
from the Bosnian people while allowing Iran, a hostile nation to our
country, a country with a background and history of terrorism against
innocent victims, to, in fact, violate the very arms embargo that he
would not let us lift? Mr. President, this is not the way our country
should be represented.
Mr. President, I yield up to 15 minutes to the Senator from Idaho,
Senator Craig.
Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I will not take that much time this
morning. I have a few moments before I have to be to another
commitment. Let me thank my colleague from Texas for her statement and
for taking out this special order.
Let me read two quotes that I think speak volumes about what our
President has caught himself in--that is, doublespeak. Mr. President,
today you are not telling the American people the truth. For the last
several months, you have been caught in a very difficult and very
deceptive game of doublespeak.
Your representative, Richard Holbrooke, who immediate repudiated the
Dayton peace accord was quoted on May 3 in a Reuters article saying:
I will state flatly for the record that this policy was
correct--
He is referring to allowing the Iranians to move arms into the former
Yugoslavia.
and that if it hadn't taken place, the Bosnian Muslims would
not have survived and we would not have gotten to Dayton.
That is an absolute opposite from what our President has been telling
us. Mr. President, that is double speak.
The next quote from Richard Holbrooke:
We knew that the Iranians would try to use the aid to buy
political influence. It was a calculated policy based on the
feeling that you had to choose between a lot of bad choices,
and the choice that was chosen kept the Sarajevo government
alive. But it left a problem--were the Iranians excessively
influential on the ground?
Mr. President, President Clinton once again was caught in double
speak. This Congress gave our President an option, a viable,
responsible, well-thought-out option, to allow the arms embargo to be
lifted so that parity could be built on both sides. He chose not to do
that. He chose to openly and publicly deceive the American people.
Mr. President, part of the debate on the crisis in the former
Yugoslavia has been over the arms embargo, first imposed against the
Yugoslavian Government in 1991.
I was part of the majority in Congress that supported lifting the
arms embargo and felt it was a preferable alternative to the deployment
of our troops to Bosnia. Along those same lines, I voted against the
President's proposed deployment last year, and voted against funding
for that deployment.
Mr. President, some very disconcerting information has been coming to
light during the last few months. The importance of these developments
has led to the establishment of a select committee in the House or
Representatives. Therefore, I would like to take a moment this morning
to express some of my concerns and frustrations about the situation in
Bosnia.
As I mentioned, a main part of the debate on the crisis in the former
Yugoslavia has involved the arms embargo, first imposed against the
Yugoslavian Government in 1991.
Information continues to surface, showing that while the Congress was
openly debating the lifting of the arms embargo, the administration was
giving a green light to Iran, allowing them to circumvent the arms
embargo.
Richard Holbrooke, the administration's representative who helped to
mediate the Dayton Peace Accord, was quoted in a May 3, 1996, Reuters
article saying:
I will state flatly for the record that this policy was
correct and that if it hadn't taken place, the Bosnian
Muslims would not have survived and we would not have gotten
to Dayton.
Mr. President, I would agree with the comment made by Mr. Holbrooke.
Allowing Iran to circumvent the arms embargo was not this
administration's only choice--it was certainly not a correct choice.
The Congress, just last year, provided President Clinton a viable
alternative by the passage of S. 21, legislation that would have
unilaterally lifted the U.N. arms embargo illegally enforced against
Bosnia.
There was ample reason to question the enforcement of the 1991
embargo against Bosnia. The original embargo was not imposed on Bosnia,
because it did not exist in 1991. Rather, it was imposed on Yugoslavia.
In addition, enforcement of this embargo could arguably violate
Bosnia's right to self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. charter.
The legal, unilateral lifting of the arms embargo that was called for
in S. 21, would have allowed rough parity to exist in this conflict.
The President chose to veto S. 21, citing concerns that it would be
breaking from an agreement with our allies, and diminish our
credibility with Europe.
Mr. President, the only credibility that has been diminished here has
been through the administration's efforts to allow one of the strongest
supporters of terrorism around the world, Iran, to violate the arms
embargo and gain a foothold in Europe.
In addition, Iran only provided light weaponry to the Bosnian's,
which was fine for providing a little protection. However, it was not
enough to provide the needed shift in the strategic military balance,
altering Serbia's enormous advantage in the conflict. Therefore, even
after this evasion of the arms embargo had begun, thousands of Bosnians
were still being killed, and the Serbian forces continued to capture
more territory.
Mr. President, as we continue to see this situation unravel, we now
face an extended deployment of our troops. After repeated assertions by
administration officials that our troops' deployment in the IFOR
mission would be for only 1 year, we now are informed that time will be
extended. On May 1, the Clinton administration endorsed a recent NATO
recommendation that IFOR remain at full strength to maintain peace
until after the Bosnian elections.
Mr. President, these elections will not occur until September at the
earliest. It is, therefore, likely that our troops will not be
withdrawn until January 1997.
Mr. President, Richard Holbrooke made another assertion about the
administration's decision in the May 3 reuters article, with respect to
the risks of dealing with Iran.
We knew that the Iranians would try to use the aid to buy
political influence. It was a calculated policy based on the
feeling that you had to choose between a lot of bad choices,
and the choice that was chosen kept the Sarajevo Government
alive. But, it left a problem--were the Iranians excessively
influential on the ground?
The article continues with Mr. Holbrooke claiming that this problem
was adequately dealt with through the negotiations of the Dayton
accord, by including in the agreement that all foreign forces would
have to leave the country. This is precisely one of the problems that
our troops have had to face: the removal of foreign forces including
Iranian forces.
In addition, it is my understanding that this arms transfer operation
was allowed to continue until January of this year--after our troops
were beginning to be deployed as peacekeepers in Bosnia.
In closing, the Iranian presence that the Clinton administration
helped to promote is now actively threatening the Dayton accord, the
American and NATO peacekeepers seeking to enforce it, and the military
viability and democratic character of Bosnia itself.
Mr. President, this situation needs to be addressed, and our troops
need to be brought home.
I thank my colleague from Texas for taking out this special order. I
hope the select committee in the House will thoroughly investigate what
this President is failing to do in foreign policy.
I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Privilege of the Floor
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the
privilege of the floor be granted to Mike
[[Page S4767]]
Montelongo, of my staff, during this period of morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to talk for a minute about the
importance of arming and training the Bosnians.
One of the commitments that the President made to Senator Dole and
Senator McCain was to arm and train the Moslems. I want to read from
the Dole floor speech of November 30, 1995. He said:
What is needed is a concrete effort, led by the United
States, to arm and train the Bosnians. This effort should not
be contingent on so-called ``builddown provisions'' in the
Dayton agreement. I understand administration officials said
this morning that the U.S. or NATO would not be involved in
enabling Bosnia to defend itself.
In my view, it is an abdication of responsibility to rely
on unspecified third countries to create the conditions that
will allow withdrawal of American forces. The sooner we start
to enable Bosnia to defend itself, the sooner U.S. forces can
come home. In my view, the definition of a success of this
deployment must include a real end to the war. That is only
possible with the creation of stable military balance which
enables Bosnia to defend itself. Anything less simply exposes
American forces to great risk in order to monitor a temporary
interlude in the fighting.
That is what Senator Dole said on the floor on November 30, 1995.
Both he and Senator McCain repeatedly talked about the importance of
that element. It is absolutely true. I have been to Bosnia twice in the
last 8 or 9 months, and I have seen what the three warring factions are
doing and what their relative strengths are. There is a strong Croatia;
there is a strong Serb force in Bosnia; there is a good, strong force
of Moslems, but they are underarmed and undertrained.
To be very practical, Mr. President, any reader of military history
or, indeed, history of the world, knows that a lasting peace is best
kept with strength. The parity of strength among the three parties will
give Bosnia the very best chance for peace that it could possibly have.
The reverse is also true. If we do not strengthen the Bosnian Moslems,
they could be overrun by either of the other two stronger parties. That
could happen because we have not kept our commitment.
Mr. President, if we want to have a lasting impact on this country,
with the vast amount of resources, human and monetary, which our
country has put forward already, we must take the last step. This
administration is not doing it. There is no large-scale effort to arm
and train the Moslems, which was a promise that President Clinton made
to Senator Dole and to this Congress. It was a promise made.
Mr. President, that is the key for a lasting cease-fire and the
possibility for lasting peace in Bosnia. There must be rough parity
among the three parties. Right now, we are almost halfway into the IFOR
mission, the NATO mission, of which this country is a part, and we have
yet to see a real effort in arming and training the Moslems.
Now, one of the reasons given, Mr. President, is that the Iranian
contingency has not left Bosnia, has not left Sarajevo. Well, Mr.
President, why have the Iranians not left Sarajevo?
Could it be because Iran was the one country that violated the arms
embargo to help the Bosnian Moslems with arms in their time of need?
This should come as no surprise. This Congress spoke forcefully time
and time again: lift the arms embargo. Let arms from legitimate sources
go into that country and help those people fight for themselves. But
this administration continued to refuse to allow that to happen, and so
there was one country that provided the arms. And we now learn that
this administration knew and did not object to the Iranians providing
those arms, in violation of the U.N. embargo, which the administration
refused to let Congress lift.
Mr. President, it is a botched policy, and I would call today on the
President of the United States to say just what his policy is. Where is
the integrity of the policy of this country when two promises that were
very important have been broken: That we would not violate the arms
embargo despite repeated attempts by Congress to lift it legitimately,
and that our troops would go in with a purpose of separating the
warring factions and leave December 20--two commitments that we now see
are being broken?
Mr. President, I see my colleague from Georgia has come to the floor,
and I am happy to yield up to 10 minutes to my colleague from Georgia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Coverdell] is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I rise to support the admirable efforts
by the Senator from Texas who has come to the floor this morning to
raise and bring attention to a subject that needs considerable
attention.
Last year, when we were debating the entire question about whether to
send United States troops on the ground in Bosnia there was much
debate--hearings before the Armed Services Committee, hearings before
the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member. General
Shalikashvili, Secretary Perry, and others tried to sort out what
should and should not happen.
For one, I never believed that the United States should bear the
amount of responsibility it did in Bosnia. I felt that it was a
European theater, that the Europeans should have been the predominant
force, and that the U.S. support, which should have been there, should
have been just that, in support of a European initiative. I have always
been worried about this--why around the world when we have a real
problem; it is in the European theater; the Europeans cannot work it
out, so we will send in Uncle Sam.
I think it is a bad precedent to set. But the President made that
decision, and from that point forward, of course, all of us have been
unanimous in trying to do everything we can to make certain that our
soldiers, our men and women, have every support they need.
But again, the idea that the European theater cannot work it out so
that the United States has to be the one that leads the way I think
sets a bad precedent, not only in terms of who bears the responsibility
but it would be a little bit like the United Kingdom working out Haiti.
I do not think in anybody's mind the leading force in Haiti would have
been the United Kingdom or France. It was in our hemisphere. It was our
back door, and we have borne the brunt of that situation. Here we are
in the underbelly of Europe, and we are bearing the brunt of it again.
In addition to, I think, setting a political precedent that could
lead to problems in the future, let us just look at the financial
ramifications of it. The United States, which is now the single world
power, in a period of enormous domestic financial pressure cannot be
the ultimate financial resource in resolving these world conflicts. And
the cost of the operation in Bosnia has been and continues to be
enormous. The effect of that is to squeeze training, squeeze logistical
support, and squeeze research and development in our own standing
military. These vast sums of money going into the peacekeeping
operations put enormous pressure on the ultimate mission of our own
military, which is to defend the integrity and the shores of the United
States.
At the time we were discussing all these questions, Secretary Perry
came before our Foreign Relations Committee, and in testimony before
the Foreign Relations Committee Secretary Perry indicated that the
maximum duration of the U.S. commitment would be 1 year. And I can
remember on the lips of virtually every member of the committee was the
assertion or the worry, the anxiety that there would be mission creep;
that we would get into nation building; that we would begin to assume
the responsibility of rebuilding this poor and war-torn country and
circumstance. And there was worry because of the ethnic divisions that
in 1 year how would all that be quelled. But the assurances from the
administration, the assurances from Secretary Perry were that we would
not be in a mission of nation building; it was a military mission, as
suggested by the Senator from Texas, and that it would be 1 year and
that would have to suffice. That was the U.S. commitment.
As the Senator from Texas has suggested this morning and has read
some of the quotes of the London Times of April 30:
The Clinton administration has scrapped plans to withdraw
its forces by the end of the year.
And we are beginning to hear pleas from the European theater and
suggestions that, well, we maybe cannot conclude this at the end of the
year, and,
[[Page S4768]]
yes, maybe we will be involved in other activities other than the
initial military mission of separating the warring parties.
That suggestion leaves the American people once again unclear as to
how to respond to a Presidential commitment. You go to the American
people and say we are going to send your sons and daughters over there
but they are only going to be there a year. You come to the Congress.
You say we are only going to go for 1 year. We are going to have a very
narrow, very defined mission.
When we began to discuss an exit strategy, it was quelled in a minute
because the administration said the exit strategy was we are out of
there in a year. And now with the slippage of time, we begin to
undermine those commitments. Not only does that leave the American
people, not only does it leave their Representatives, the Congress of
the United States, unclear as to just where we are and where this all
leads, but it is almost a certainty to mean more resources, more
dollars.
What that means is more pressure on the principal mission of the
military, more pressure on the budget, more pressure on the funds
necessary to train American soldiers, more pressure on the budget to
enter into research and development to keep us the technological
military we displayed in the Persian Gulf--keep it at the edge.
We have spent the last 2 years talking about the financial dilemma in
America. We fought for balanced budgets. We have eliminated programs.
We have fought through the 1996 budget, and now we will be into the
1997 budget, trying to save billions of dollars in order to keep the
country financially healthy, because at the end of the day, without a
healthy Nation, we cannot fulfill our obligations at home or abroad.
So those financial questions must be at the core of decisions we make
about where we put those resources and how long we can suffer those
resources being spent. That was the worry when this debate began, that
the peacekeeping missions were putting too much pressure on the
fundamental mission of the military. Here we are, already beginning to
take those initial promises to the American people, the initial
promises to the Congress, and you get this fudging, this fuzzy look
here.
I think the Senator from Texas has been absolutely correct in calling
on the administration to clarify to the people and to the Congress that
it is going to adhere to the promises made when this mission began,
that it is going to withdraw at the time it said, that it is not going
to engage in mission creep, and we are not going to use the U.S.
military components to be engaged in social rebuilding of the war-torn
country. I reiterate, it is a good time to reassess the fundamental
responsibility of the United States as an ally and in support of NATO,
but at the same time acknowledging that the final responsibility for
the European theater rests with the Europeans.
Mr. President, I see my 10 minutes has expired, and I yield back to
the Senator from Texas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from Texas is
recognized for the remainder of her 60 minutes.
Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, we have been talking for the last 45
minutes about this administration's Bosnia policy. I would just sum it
up with ``promises made, promises broken.''
This administration promised: On December 20, 1996, American troops
would be gone from Bosnia. The second promise was that the arms embargo
would not be lifted by the President, despite repeated attempts by
Congress to do so. He refused to lift the arms embargo so that
legitimate sources could provide arms for Bosnians to fight for
themselves and their country and their freedom, despite the fact they
begged us in this Congress to do so. I will never forget the poignant
testimony of then-Vice President Ganic, who said, ``Let us die fighting
for our freedom. We are dying anyway. Help us die for a cause.''
But at the same time the administration was saying we are not going
to allow legitimate sources of arms for the Moslems. Instead, according
to news reports, this administration did not object to arms sales from
another source which was not legitimate, Iran.
What is the result of that? The result is the Iranian mujaheddin is
still in Sarajevo. Significant arming and training of the Moslems has
yet to begin, and the excuse used is the Iranians are still in
Sarajevo, despite the fact that in the Dayton accords they were to have
been expelled from Bosnia. And the result is that the December 20
deadline is not going to be met.
So we have an administration that would not come to the American
people and state a policy that the American people could count on and
that our allies and our enemies would know would stay in place. That is
the result. The issue of arming and training the Moslems was a key part
of the negotiations between Senator Dole and the President when we were
trying to support the President's right to deploy even as we were
disagreeing with the policy of deployment.
I want to quote from Senator Dole's statement on the floor, again,
November 30, 1995:
In my view, the definition of success of this deployment
must include a real end to the war that is only possible with
the creation of a stable military balance which enables
Bosnia to defend itself. Anything less simply exposes
American forces to great risks in order to monitor a
temporary interlude in the fighting. In other words, I guess
if they all came home next year there might be a temporary
interlude to get us through the November activities of 1996,
and I am not certain it would last very long.
Senator McCain, November 30, 1995, in his statement on the floor:
Further, we must ensure that the goals of their mission are
clear and achievable and will justify to some extent the
risks we will incur. A clear exit strategy is not time-based
but goal-based. We must ensure that the peace we enforce for
12 months has a realistic prospect to endure in the 13th,
14th, 15th month, and hopefully for years beyond that.
Essential to that goal is a stable military balance. To
achieve that balance, we will have to see to it that the
Bosnian Federation has the means and the training to provide
for its own defense from aggression after we have withdrawn.
Therefore, I believe our authorization of this deployment
must be conditioned on the concrete assurances that the
United States will do whatever is necessary, although without
using our soldiers who are part of the implementation force,
to ensure that the Bosnians can defend themselves at the end
of our mission.
It was clear from Senator Dole and Senator McCain that it was a
condition of this Senate that the Moslems be armed and trained, to
create a stable military balance. The President wrote a letter
confirming that. The President said:
In the view of my military advisers, this requires
minimizing the involvement of U.S. military personnel. But we
expect that some individual military officers, for example,
working in OSD, DSAA, or other agencies, will be involved in
planning this effort. I agree that maintaining flexibility is
important to the success of the effort to achieve a stable
military balance within Bosnia. But I will do nothing that I
believe will endanger the safety of American troops on the
ground in Bosnia. I am sure you will agree this is my primary
responsibility.
That is giving the President his due. We agree with that. The
President went on to say in his letter to Senator Dole and Senator
McCain:
I have given you my word that we will make certain that the
Bosnian Federation will receive the assistance necessary to
achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. I
intend to keep it.
That is what the President said in writing, December 12, 1995. He
said the Americans would not be leading that effort, but that we would
make sure that it would happen. ``I intend to keep my word.'' That is
what he said. It was a condition. It was a condition for the approval
of the President's right to deploy.
We have a policy. We have a promise that is being broken. Either the
President must keep his commitment to the American people that he will
withdraw the troops by December 20, as he promised, or the President
should come back to Congress and tell us why he is breaking his word.
Why does he feel it is necessary to do this? I think he owes us that
much. I think he owes the American people that much, and I think he
owes our troops on the ground that much.
Mr. President, I think it is time for this administration to
understand the importance of keeping a promise, whether it is to the
American people or to our allies or in general to the world, so that
everyone knows that if we say we are going to do something, we will do
it. But telling the American people we will withdraw troops by December
[[Page S4769]]
20 and telling our allies that we will leave troops on the ground into
1997 is not keeping the integrity of the American word, and I think we
have the right to expect that from our President who is representing
our country.
This is a serious issue, and I hope the President will address it
with integrity.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield back the remainder of my time, and
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, are we in morning business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, until 10:30.
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