[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 62 (Tuesday, May 7, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S4764-S4769]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       AMERICAN TROOPS IN BOSNIA

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to talk today about a matter 
that concerns all Americans: the presence of 35,000 young American men 
and women supporting the peace implementation force in Bosnia. Those 
troops were sent as a part of a NATO force to monitor the Bosnian peace 
agreement reached in Dayton, OH, last year. The Senate voted last 
December to support those troops, to provide them whatever they needed 
to do what they have been asked to do. But in the resolution submitted 
by the distinguished Republican leader, Senator Dole, and Senator 
McCain of Arizona, the Senate also said by a margin of 69 to 30 that it 
does not endorse the President's decision or the agreement reached in 
Dayton.
  The House of Representatives was even more harsh. The House voted 287 
to 141 to condemn the Dayton agreement, while expressing support for 
the troops that have been sent on this mission.
  There is never a doubt that we will support fully American troops 
anywhere when they are performing a mission for this country. We will 
always be there for them. But, Mr. President, that does not mean we 
cannot question the policy, and this Senate and the House of 
Representatives did just that.
  Many wanted a vote to deny the President the ability to dispatch the 
troops by withholding the funds needed to pay for such a deployment. 
That was not the right thing to do, and it failed, as it should have. 
But, Mr. President, there are many good reasons why we disagreed with 
the decision to send American troops, even while we acknowledged the 
President's right to do it.
  First, we did not feel that the administration had made a compelling 
case that there was a national security interest in Bosnia to justify 
the deployment of tens of thousands of Americans, with the potential 
loss of American life. Mr. President, that is an essential element of 
any mission upon which we would embark with troops from our country.
  There must be a U.S. security interest for American lives to be at 
risk. But, more importantly, Mr. President, many of us voiced strong 
concern that the administration lacked a strategy for removing those 
troops once they had dug in and become part of the troubled landscape 
in the troubled country of Bosnia.
  What made many of us particularly skeptical was the administration's 
insistence that not only was there an exit strategy, but that the 
troops would be able to perform their complex mission of creating two 
nations from one, patrolling rugged mountain terrain, separating 
hostile belligerents, and ending a 500-year-old civil war in just 1 
year.
  In fact, Mr. President, the Dole-McCain resolution that expressed 
support for the troops and acknowledged the President's authority to 
deploy them specifically noted that the Senate support was conditioned 
on the return of those troops to the United States within 1 year.
  Mr. President, let me remind my colleagues what senior administration 
officials, including the President, assured us as we wrestled with the 
question of whether to support sending young Americans to Bosnia:
  On October 13, 1995, Robert Hunter, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, told 
the Washington Post:

       This is going to be a limited-duration operation-- 12 
     months max. We're not going to take responsibility beyond 
     that.

  On October 18, 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry and Gen. John 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House 
Committee on National Security and the House Committee on International 
Relations:

       The implementation force will complete its mission in a 
     period not to exceed 12 months. We believe this will be more 
     than adequate to accomplish the needed tasks that will allow 
     the peace to become self-sustaining. We anticipate the IFOR 
     will go in heavy and, if successful, would begin drawing down 
     significantly far in advance of the final exit date.

  On October 18, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher told the 
House Committee on National Security:

       The force would have a limited mission and remain for a 
     limited period of time, approximately 1 year.

  On November 28, 1995, President Clinton told the American people in a 
televised address:

       Our Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that this mission 
     should--and will--take about 1 year.

  Mr. President, none of these knowledgeable officials left any room 
for doubt that the American mission in Bosnia would be limited in scope 
and duration. Specifically we were told, with no uncertainty, by 
everyone from the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, to the President of the 
United States, that our troops would be home within 1 year.
  Mr. President, we now learn this is not so. December 20, 1996, was 
the date set as the 1-year mark. That is the date that we have been 
focusing on since the beginning of this mission. We now learn that this 
administration has said to our allies that it intends to keep American 
troops in Bosnia at least until early 1997 and, according to the United 
States Commander of NATO forces, Gen. George Joulwan, maybe longer.
  Mr. President, the reason we got into the mission in Bosnia with NATO 
is because our President told our allies that we would be there with 
troops on the ground if there was a peace agreement. He told them that 
a long time ago. Once we make a commitment to our allies, of course, 
America must stand by the commitment.

  But now, Mr. President, we have the dilemma of two commitments. We 
have the President making a commitment to the American people, to 
Senator Dole, and to the troops that are there, that this would be a 
mission of 1 year. Everyone connected with this mission and with the 
leadership of this administration has repeatedly said 1 year. Now, Mr. 
President, we have the President making a different commitment to our 
allies, saying it is not going to be 1 year, but leaving it rather 
open-ended, into 1997.
  Mr. President, I want to highlight the difference between last year's 
message from the administration and an April 26, 1996, article in the 
Washington Post:

       ``A substantial number of American troops will remain in 
     Bosnia for at least one month after the NATO-led mission ends 
     in December. In a departure from the original plan, NATO 
     commanders have decided to keep a significant force in Bosnia 
     up to the final day of the mission or one year after the 
     peace enforcement began,'' according to spokesman Kenneth 
     Bacon. Earlier officials had said the pullout would begin at 
     least a few months before the December 20 closing date in 
     order to have nearly everyone out by then. Kenneth Bacon said 
     the change in

[[Page S4765]]

     plans stemmed from a request by the Organization for Security 
     and Cooperation in Europe, which is assisting preparations 
     for Bosnia's elections, that NATO keep its full force there 
     until after the elections.

  And, on April 30, 1996, the London Times reported:

       The Clinton administration has scrapped plans to withdraw 
     its forces by the end of this year, and may maintain a 
     substantial American presence in the Balkans for months after 
     the deadline set by Congress. Only weeks ago the White House 
     repeated its promise to Republicans that the troops would be 
     back by December 20, the date agreed at Dayton for the end of 
     the NATO mission in Bosnia. The Pentagon, however, under 
     pressure from allies, international officials and its own 
     Gen. George Joulwan, has admitted that it plans to keep a 
     significant force in the region until the end of January, and 
     maybe longer.

  Those are excerpts from quotes from newspapers.
  Mr. President, this stunning reversal of a critical policy that 
affects the lives of thousands of Americans has been made in such a 
casual way that we must ask if the administration's original commitment 
to withdraw in 1 year was a serious one. It was so casual, many people 
were not even aware that all of a sudden this commitment that was made 
to this Congress to a December 20 deadline by which our troops would be 
out of Bosnia has now been put off, really indefinitely, into 1997.
  The President is breaking his promise to the American people to the 
United States Congress, and, most importantly, to the troops in Bosnia.
  Moreover, Senator Dole had earlier argued forcefully and persuasively 
about arming the Bosnian Government and allowing the Bosnians to defend 
themselves so American troops would not need to be sent in the first 
place. This would have required lifting the U.N. arms embargo on the 
former Yugoslavia, for which our leader argued forcefully and 
persuasively, many times for over a year on this Senate floor. We voted 
to lift the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia so that the Bosnians 
could arm themselves and fight to save their country.
  Senator Dole led the fight to let the Moslems fight for their own 
freedom with help from legitimate sources so that it would be legal to 
help the Bosnian people defend themselves. No Member of the Senate has 
been more outspoken for years about the need for the United States to 
lead our allies in establishing a policy on Bosnia that would avoid the 
need for American troops than our leader, Bob Dole. But each time the 
Congress voted to urge the lifting of the arms embargo, the 
administration refused to respond.
  Now, Mr. President, in addition to the total abrogation of his word 
to the American people regarding when the troops would come home from 
Bosnia, we now learn that, in fact, while President Clinton was 
stopping us from lifting the arms embargo, he was allowing another 
country to provide arms in violation of the embargo. Was it a 
legitimate ally of the United States? No, Mr. President, it was not a 
legitimate ally of the United States that was allowed to violate the 
arms embargo that we in this Congress were trying to lift. No, it was 
an enemy of the United States, a terrorist country: Iran.
  Despite widespread rumors that Iranian arms were being shipped to 
Bosnia in violation of the arms embargo, an embargo this administration 
said we must support, and despite senior officials' strong denials, we 
learn we were deceived. Here we have the quotes, Mr. President. On 
April 15, 1995, a State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, told the 
Los Angeles Times, ``We do not endorse violations of U.N. embargo 
resolutions whatever. We are not violating those resolutions. We don't 
endorse anyone else who is violating them.''
  On June 16, 1995, Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, ``I 
think you get some instant gratification from lifting the arms embargo. 
It is kind of an emotional luxury, but you have to ask yourself, what 
are the consequences of that?'' As late as March of this year, 
President Clinton himself told Congress that ``Iran continued to engage 
in activities that represent a threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States.''
  Mr. President, despite all of those statements by senior 
administration officials and the President himself, we have learned in 
recent weeks that this was not the case at all. Just 3 weeks after the 
President's report to Congress on Iran, it has been reported that the 
administration had given its tacit approval of the shipment by Iran, 
one of America's most hostile adversaries, of weapons to the Bosnian 
Muslim government.
  We are justified in concluding, Mr. President, that the Clinton 
administration policy on Bosnia has been cynical. What many of us were 
advocating for so long--arming the Bosnians and allowing them to defend 
themselves with legitimate sales of arms by people who cared about the 
people--was, in fact, being opposed by the administration by day, but 
by night secret arms shipments from Iran were moving forward with the 
administration's blessing.
  Now, Mr. President, we are faced with similar cynicism regarding the 
deployment of American troops. Those troops are there precisely because 
the administration refused the suggestions by Senator Dole and others 
in the Senate that arming the Bosnians and letting them fight for 
themselves was the best way to go. Instead, the administration adopted 
a half-a-loaf policy of covert arms shipments from Iran, which was too 
little, too late, from the wrong source.
  As with arm sales to Bosnia, the American people have been deceived 
by the Clinton administration on the question of withdrawing American 
troops from Bosnia. Very simply, the President made a commitment to the 
American people, and he is now saying he will not honor that 
commitment.
  Mr. President, many in the Senate personally have opposed the 
administration's policy on Bosnia but honored their belief that the 
President had the authority to deploy troops without permission from 
Congress. Many people on this floor were torn during that debate 
because they so violently disagreed with the policy, but they did 
believe that the President had the right to do it and that the troops 
needed the support from Congress.

  Our Republican leader did so at great political risk. He supported 
the President's right to deploy troops, even though he thought it was 
wrong, but he did so only after getting a commitment from the President 
himself that those troops would have a mission of limited duration, 
limited scope, and they would be home within 1 year. That was the 
promise the President made to our leader.
  We now learn this will not happen. The administration's disregard of 
its commitments to Senator Dole, to the U.S. Congress, and to the 
American people amount to broken promises. Broken promises--there is no 
other way you can put it.
  Today, Mr. President, I am going to ask the President to look at this 
policy, which is a policy of broken promises, broken commitments, and 
contradictory commitments to the American people and to our allies.
  I am going to ask the President to do two things. First of all, to 
honor his commitment to the American people about troop withdrawals 
from Bosnia and to tell our allies this commitment was made. If, in 
fact, he decides that he cannot keep his commitment to the American 
people, I ask him to come back to Congress and talk to us about this, 
rather than just announcing very quietly that the troops are not going 
to be out by December 20 as promised. OK, President Clinton, if that is 
what you believe, come to Congress, talk to us about it, tell us why 
you think this is necessary, and let us have the option of working with 
you if you think you can make the case that we should be there beyond 
the date you promised in your commitment to the American people.
  That is what I ask the President to do today. Either keep his 
commitment to the American people, or come to Congress and discuss it. 
Mr. President, this is too important. We have a policy now in which the 
President is going to expand the use of our American troops beyond his 
commitment to Senator Dole and the American people and this U.S. 
Congress. We have the second revelation that arm shipments from Iran 
were being permitted by this administration at the same time that he 
was keeping us in Congress from lifting the arms embargo, which we 
voted repeatedly to do so that the Moslems in Bosnia could have arms 
from legitimate sources.
  Mr. President, I just ask you, what kind of policy is that? What must 
the

[[Page S4766]]

people of the world think when our President would make commitments 
that he does not keep and when he would keep legitimate arms sources 
from the Bosnian people while allowing Iran, a hostile nation to our 
country, a country with a background and history of terrorism against 
innocent victims, to, in fact, violate the very arms embargo that he 
would not let us lift? Mr. President, this is not the way our country 
should be represented.
  Mr. President, I yield up to 15 minutes to the Senator from Idaho, 
Senator Craig.
  Mr. CRAIG. Mr. President, I will not take that much time this 
morning. I have a few moments before I have to be to another 
commitment. Let me thank my colleague from Texas for her statement and 
for taking out this special order.
  Let me read two quotes that I think speak volumes about what our 
President has caught himself in--that is, doublespeak. Mr. President, 
today you are not telling the American people the truth. For the last 
several months, you have been caught in a very difficult and very 
deceptive game of doublespeak.
  Your representative, Richard Holbrooke, who immediate repudiated the 
Dayton peace accord was quoted on May 3 in a Reuters article saying:

       I will state flatly for the record that this policy was 
     correct--

  He is referring to allowing the Iranians to move arms into the former 
Yugoslavia.

     and that if it hadn't taken place, the Bosnian Muslims would 
     not have survived and we would not have gotten to Dayton.

  That is an absolute opposite from what our President has been telling 
us. Mr. President, that is double speak.
  The next quote from Richard Holbrooke:

       We knew that the Iranians would try to use the aid to buy 
     political influence. It was a calculated policy based on the 
     feeling that you had to choose between a lot of bad choices, 
     and the choice that was chosen kept the Sarajevo government 
     alive. But it left a problem--were the Iranians excessively 
     influential on the ground?

  Mr. President, President Clinton once again was caught in double 
speak. This Congress gave our President an option, a viable, 
responsible, well-thought-out option, to allow the arms embargo to be 
lifted so that parity could be built on both sides. He chose not to do 
that. He chose to openly and publicly deceive the American people.
  Mr. President, part of the debate on the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia has been over the arms embargo, first imposed against the 
Yugoslavian Government in 1991.
  I was part of the majority in Congress that supported lifting the 
arms embargo and felt it was a preferable alternative to the deployment 
of our troops to Bosnia. Along those same lines, I voted against the 
President's proposed deployment last year, and voted against funding 
for that deployment.
  Mr. President, some very disconcerting information has been coming to 
light during the last few months. The importance of these developments 
has led to the establishment of a select committee in the House or 
Representatives. Therefore, I would like to take a moment this morning 
to express some of my concerns and frustrations about the situation in 
Bosnia.
  As I mentioned, a main part of the debate on the crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia has involved the arms embargo, first imposed against the 
Yugoslavian Government in 1991.
  Information continues to surface, showing that while the Congress was 
openly debating the lifting of the arms embargo, the administration was 
giving a green light to Iran, allowing them to circumvent the arms 
embargo.
  Richard Holbrooke, the administration's representative who helped to 
mediate the Dayton Peace Accord, was quoted in a May 3, 1996, Reuters 
article saying:

       I will state flatly for the record that this policy was 
     correct and that if it hadn't taken place, the Bosnian 
     Muslims would not have survived and we would not have gotten 
     to Dayton.

  Mr. President, I would agree with the comment made by Mr. Holbrooke. 
Allowing Iran to circumvent the arms embargo was not this 
administration's only choice--it was certainly not a correct choice. 
The Congress, just last year, provided President Clinton a viable 
alternative by the passage of S. 21, legislation that would have 
unilaterally lifted the U.N. arms embargo illegally enforced against 
Bosnia.
  There was ample reason to question the enforcement of the 1991 
embargo against Bosnia. The original embargo was not imposed on Bosnia, 
because it did not exist in 1991. Rather, it was imposed on Yugoslavia.
  In addition, enforcement of this embargo could arguably violate 
Bosnia's right to self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. charter.
  The legal, unilateral lifting of the arms embargo that was called for 
in S. 21, would have allowed rough parity to exist in this conflict.
  The President chose to veto S. 21, citing concerns that it would be 
breaking from an agreement with our allies, and diminish our 
credibility with Europe.
  Mr. President, the only credibility that has been diminished here has 
been through the administration's efforts to allow one of the strongest 
supporters of terrorism around the world, Iran, to violate the arms 
embargo and gain a foothold in Europe.
  In addition, Iran only provided light weaponry to the Bosnian's, 
which was fine for providing a little protection. However, it was not 
enough to provide the needed shift in the strategic military balance, 
altering Serbia's enormous advantage in the conflict. Therefore, even 
after this evasion of the arms embargo had begun, thousands of Bosnians 
were still being killed, and the Serbian forces continued to capture 
more territory.
  Mr. President, as we continue to see this situation unravel, we now 
face an extended deployment of our troops. After repeated assertions by 
administration officials that our troops' deployment in the IFOR 
mission would be for only 1 year, we now are informed that time will be 
extended. On May 1, the Clinton administration endorsed a recent NATO 
recommendation that IFOR remain at full strength to maintain peace 
until after the Bosnian elections.
  Mr. President, these elections will not occur until September at the 
earliest. It is, therefore, likely that our troops will not be 
withdrawn until January 1997.
  Mr. President, Richard Holbrooke made another assertion about the 
administration's decision in the May 3 reuters article, with respect to 
the risks of dealing with Iran.

       We knew that the Iranians would try to use the aid to buy 
     political influence. It was a calculated policy based on the 
     feeling that you had to choose between a lot of bad choices, 
     and the choice that was chosen kept the Sarajevo Government 
     alive. But, it left a problem--were the Iranians excessively 
     influential on the ground?

  The article continues with Mr. Holbrooke claiming that this problem 
was adequately dealt with through the negotiations of the Dayton 
accord, by including in the agreement that all foreign forces would 
have to leave the country. This is precisely one of the problems that 
our troops have had to face: the removal of foreign forces including 
Iranian forces.
  In addition, it is my understanding that this arms transfer operation 
was allowed to continue until January of this year--after our troops 
were beginning to be deployed as peacekeepers in Bosnia.
  In closing, the Iranian presence that the Clinton administration 
helped to promote is now actively threatening the Dayton accord, the 
American and NATO peacekeepers seeking to enforce it, and the military 
viability and democratic character of Bosnia itself.
  Mr. President, this situation needs to be addressed, and our troops 
need to be brought home.
  I thank my colleague from Texas for taking out this special order. I 
hope the select committee in the House will thoroughly investigate what 
this President is failing to do in foreign policy.
  I yield the remainder of my time.
  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                         Privilege of the Floor

  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
privilege of the floor be granted to Mike

[[Page S4767]]

Montelongo, of my staff, during this period of morning business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, I want to talk for a minute about the 
importance of arming and training the Bosnians.
  One of the commitments that the President made to Senator Dole and 
Senator McCain was to arm and train the Moslems. I want to read from 
the Dole floor speech of November 30, 1995. He said:

       What is needed is a concrete effort, led by the United 
     States, to arm and train the Bosnians. This effort should not 
     be contingent on so-called ``builddown provisions'' in the 
     Dayton agreement. I understand administration officials said 
     this morning that the U.S. or NATO would not be involved in 
     enabling Bosnia to defend itself.
       In my view, it is an abdication of responsibility to rely 
     on unspecified third countries to create the conditions that 
     will allow withdrawal of American forces. The sooner we start 
     to enable Bosnia to defend itself, the sooner U.S. forces can 
     come home. In my view, the definition of a success of this 
     deployment must include a real end to the war. That is only 
     possible with the creation of stable military balance which 
     enables Bosnia to defend itself. Anything less simply exposes 
     American forces to great risk in order to monitor a temporary 
     interlude in the fighting.

  That is what Senator Dole said on the floor on November 30, 1995. 
Both he and Senator McCain repeatedly talked about the importance of 
that element. It is absolutely true. I have been to Bosnia twice in the 
last 8 or 9 months, and I have seen what the three warring factions are 
doing and what their relative strengths are. There is a strong Croatia; 
there is a strong Serb force in Bosnia; there is a good, strong force 
of Moslems, but they are underarmed and undertrained.
  To be very practical, Mr. President, any reader of military history 
or, indeed, history of the world, knows that a lasting peace is best 
kept with strength. The parity of strength among the three parties will 
give Bosnia the very best chance for peace that it could possibly have. 
The reverse is also true. If we do not strengthen the Bosnian Moslems, 
they could be overrun by either of the other two stronger parties. That 
could happen because we have not kept our commitment.
  Mr. President, if we want to have a lasting impact on this country, 
with the vast amount of resources, human and monetary, which our 
country has put forward already, we must take the last step. This 
administration is not doing it. There is no large-scale effort to arm 
and train the Moslems, which was a promise that President Clinton made 
to Senator Dole and to this Congress. It was a promise made.
  Mr. President, that is the key for a lasting cease-fire and the 
possibility for lasting peace in Bosnia. There must be rough parity 
among the three parties. Right now, we are almost halfway into the IFOR 
mission, the NATO mission, of which this country is a part, and we have 
yet to see a real effort in arming and training the Moslems.
  Now, one of the reasons given, Mr. President, is that the Iranian 
contingency has not left Bosnia, has not left Sarajevo. Well, Mr. 
President, why have the Iranians not left Sarajevo?
  Could it be because Iran was the one country that violated the arms 
embargo to help the Bosnian Moslems with arms in their time of need?
  This should come as no surprise. This Congress spoke forcefully time 
and time again: lift the arms embargo. Let arms from legitimate sources 
go into that country and help those people fight for themselves. But 
this administration continued to refuse to allow that to happen, and so 
there was one country that provided the arms. And we now learn that 
this administration knew and did not object to the Iranians providing 
those arms, in violation of the U.N. embargo, which the administration 
refused to let Congress lift.
  Mr. President, it is a botched policy, and I would call today on the 
President of the United States to say just what his policy is. Where is 
the integrity of the policy of this country when two promises that were 
very important have been broken: That we would not violate the arms 
embargo despite repeated attempts by Congress to lift it legitimately, 
and that our troops would go in with a purpose of separating the 
warring factions and leave December 20--two commitments that we now see 
are being broken?
  Mr. President, I see my colleague from Georgia has come to the floor, 
and I am happy to yield up to 10 minutes to my colleague from Georgia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia [Mr. Coverdell] is 
recognized for 10 minutes.
  Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. President, I rise to support the admirable efforts 
by the Senator from Texas who has come to the floor this morning to 
raise and bring attention to a subject that needs considerable 
attention.
  Last year, when we were debating the entire question about whether to 
send United States troops on the ground in Bosnia there was much 
debate--hearings before the Armed Services Committee, hearings before 
the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member. General 
Shalikashvili, Secretary Perry, and others tried to sort out what 
should and should not happen.
  For one, I never believed that the United States should bear the 
amount of responsibility it did in Bosnia. I felt that it was a 
European theater, that the Europeans should have been the predominant 
force, and that the U.S. support, which should have been there, should 
have been just that, in support of a European initiative. I have always 
been worried about this--why around the world when we have a real 
problem; it is in the European theater; the Europeans cannot work it 
out, so we will send in Uncle Sam.
  I think it is a bad precedent to set. But the President made that 
decision, and from that point forward, of course, all of us have been 
unanimous in trying to do everything we can to make certain that our 
soldiers, our men and women, have every support they need.
  But again, the idea that the European theater cannot work it out so 
that the United States has to be the one that leads the way I think 
sets a bad precedent, not only in terms of who bears the responsibility 
but it would be a little bit like the United Kingdom working out Haiti. 
I do not think in anybody's mind the leading force in Haiti would have 
been the United Kingdom or France. It was in our hemisphere. It was our 
back door, and we have borne the brunt of that situation. Here we are 
in the underbelly of Europe, and we are bearing the brunt of it again.
  In addition to, I think, setting a political precedent that could 
lead to problems in the future, let us just look at the financial 
ramifications of it. The United States, which is now the single world 
power, in a period of enormous domestic financial pressure cannot be 
the ultimate financial resource in resolving these world conflicts. And 
the cost of the operation in Bosnia has been and continues to be 
enormous. The effect of that is to squeeze training, squeeze logistical 
support, and squeeze research and development in our own standing 
military. These vast sums of money going into the peacekeeping 
operations put enormous pressure on the ultimate mission of our own 
military, which is to defend the integrity and the shores of the United 
States.
  At the time we were discussing all these questions, Secretary Perry 
came before our Foreign Relations Committee, and in testimony before 
the Foreign Relations Committee Secretary Perry indicated that the 
maximum duration of the U.S. commitment would be 1 year. And I can 
remember on the lips of virtually every member of the committee was the 
assertion or the worry, the anxiety that there would be mission creep; 
that we would get into nation building; that we would begin to assume 
the responsibility of rebuilding this poor and war-torn country and 
circumstance. And there was worry because of the ethnic divisions that 
in 1 year how would all that be quelled. But the assurances from the 
administration, the assurances from Secretary Perry were that we would 
not be in a mission of nation building; it was a military mission, as 
suggested by the Senator from Texas, and that it would be 1 year and 
that would have to suffice. That was the U.S. commitment.
  As the Senator from Texas has suggested this morning and has read 
some of the quotes of the London Times of April 30:

       The Clinton administration has scrapped plans to withdraw 
     its forces by the end of the year.

  And we are beginning to hear pleas from the European theater and 
suggestions that, well, we maybe cannot conclude this at the end of the 
year, and,

[[Page S4768]]

yes, maybe we will be involved in other activities other than the 
initial military mission of separating the warring parties.
  That suggestion leaves the American people once again unclear as to 
how to respond to a Presidential commitment. You go to the American 
people and say we are going to send your sons and daughters over there 
but they are only going to be there a year. You come to the Congress. 
You say we are only going to go for 1 year. We are going to have a very 
narrow, very defined mission.
  When we began to discuss an exit strategy, it was quelled in a minute 
because the administration said the exit strategy was we are out of 
there in a year. And now with the slippage of time, we begin to 
undermine those commitments. Not only does that leave the American 
people, not only does it leave their Representatives, the Congress of 
the United States, unclear as to just where we are and where this all 
leads, but it is almost a certainty to mean more resources, more 
dollars.
  What that means is more pressure on the principal mission of the 
military, more pressure on the budget, more pressure on the funds 
necessary to train American soldiers, more pressure on the budget to 
enter into research and development to keep us the technological 
military we displayed in the Persian Gulf--keep it at the edge.
  We have spent the last 2 years talking about the financial dilemma in 
America. We fought for balanced budgets. We have eliminated programs. 
We have fought through the 1996 budget, and now we will be into the 
1997 budget, trying to save billions of dollars in order to keep the 
country financially healthy, because at the end of the day, without a 
healthy Nation, we cannot fulfill our obligations at home or abroad.

  So those financial questions must be at the core of decisions we make 
about where we put those resources and how long we can suffer those 
resources being spent. That was the worry when this debate began, that 
the peacekeeping missions were putting too much pressure on the 
fundamental mission of the military. Here we are, already beginning to 
take those initial promises to the American people, the initial 
promises to the Congress, and you get this fudging, this fuzzy look 
here.
  I think the Senator from Texas has been absolutely correct in calling 
on the administration to clarify to the people and to the Congress that 
it is going to adhere to the promises made when this mission began, 
that it is going to withdraw at the time it said, that it is not going 
to engage in mission creep, and we are not going to use the U.S. 
military components to be engaged in social rebuilding of the war-torn 
country. I reiterate, it is a good time to reassess the fundamental 
responsibility of the United States as an ally and in support of NATO, 
but at the same time acknowledging that the final responsibility for 
the European theater rests with the Europeans.
  Mr. President, I see my 10 minutes has expired, and I yield back to 
the Senator from Texas.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from Texas is 
recognized for the remainder of her 60 minutes.
  Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. President, we have been talking for the last 45 
minutes about this administration's Bosnia policy. I would just sum it 
up with ``promises made, promises broken.''
  This administration promised: On December 20, 1996, American troops 
would be gone from Bosnia. The second promise was that the arms embargo 
would not be lifted by the President, despite repeated attempts by 
Congress to do so. He refused to lift the arms embargo so that 
legitimate sources could provide arms for Bosnians to fight for 
themselves and their country and their freedom, despite the fact they 
begged us in this Congress to do so. I will never forget the poignant 
testimony of then-Vice President Ganic, who said, ``Let us die fighting 
for our freedom. We are dying anyway. Help us die for a cause.''
  But at the same time the administration was saying we are not going 
to allow legitimate sources of arms for the Moslems. Instead, according 
to news reports, this administration did not object to arms sales from 
another source which was not legitimate, Iran.
  What is the result of that? The result is the Iranian mujaheddin is 
still in Sarajevo. Significant arming and training of the Moslems has 
yet to begin, and the excuse used is the Iranians are still in 
Sarajevo, despite the fact that in the Dayton accords they were to have 
been expelled from Bosnia. And the result is that the December 20 
deadline is not going to be met.
  So we have an administration that would not come to the American 
people and state a policy that the American people could count on and 
that our allies and our enemies would know would stay in place. That is 
the result. The issue of arming and training the Moslems was a key part 
of the negotiations between Senator Dole and the President when we were 
trying to support the President's right to deploy even as we were 
disagreeing with the policy of deployment.
  I want to quote from Senator Dole's statement on the floor, again, 
November 30, 1995:

       In my view, the definition of success of this deployment 
     must include a real end to the war that is only possible with 
     the creation of a stable military balance which enables 
     Bosnia to defend itself. Anything less simply exposes 
     American forces to great risks in order to monitor a 
     temporary interlude in the fighting. In other words, I guess 
     if they all came home next year there might be a temporary 
     interlude to get us through the November activities of 1996, 
     and I am not certain it would last very long.

  Senator McCain, November 30, 1995, in his statement on the floor:

       Further, we must ensure that the goals of their mission are 
     clear and achievable and will justify to some extent the 
     risks we will incur. A clear exit strategy is not time-based 
     but goal-based. We must ensure that the peace we enforce for 
     12 months has a realistic prospect to endure in the 13th, 
     14th, 15th month, and hopefully for years beyond that. 
     Essential to that goal is a stable military balance. To 
     achieve that balance, we will have to see to it that the 
     Bosnian Federation has the means and the training to provide 
     for its own defense from aggression after we have withdrawn. 
     Therefore, I believe our authorization of this deployment 
     must be conditioned on the concrete assurances that the 
     United States will do whatever is necessary, although without 
     using our soldiers who are part of the implementation force, 
     to ensure that the Bosnians can defend themselves at the end 
     of our mission.

  It was clear from Senator Dole and Senator McCain that it was a 
condition of this Senate that the Moslems be armed and trained, to 
create a stable military balance. The President wrote a letter 
confirming that. The President said:

       In the view of my military advisers, this requires 
     minimizing the involvement of U.S. military personnel. But we 
     expect that some individual military officers, for example, 
     working in OSD, DSAA, or other agencies, will be involved in 
     planning this effort. I agree that maintaining flexibility is 
     important to the success of the effort to achieve a stable 
     military balance within Bosnia. But I will do nothing that I 
     believe will endanger the safety of American troops on the 
     ground in Bosnia. I am sure you will agree this is my primary 
     responsibility.

  That is giving the President his due. We agree with that. The 
President went on to say in his letter to Senator Dole and Senator 
McCain:

       I have given you my word that we will make certain that the 
     Bosnian Federation will receive the assistance necessary to 
     achieve an adequate military balance when IFOR leaves. I 
     intend to keep it.

  That is what the President said in writing, December 12, 1995. He 
said the Americans would not be leading that effort, but that we would 
make sure that it would happen. ``I intend to keep my word.'' That is 
what he said. It was a condition. It was a condition for the approval 
of the President's right to deploy.
  We have a policy. We have a promise that is being broken. Either the 
President must keep his commitment to the American people that he will 
withdraw the troops by December 20, as he promised, or the President 
should come back to Congress and tell us why he is breaking his word.
  Why does he feel it is necessary to do this? I think he owes us that 
much. I think he owes the American people that much, and I think he 
owes our troops on the ground that much.
  Mr. President, I think it is time for this administration to 
understand the importance of keeping a promise, whether it is to the 
American people or to our allies or in general to the world, so that 
everyone knows that if we say we are going to do something, we will do 
it. But telling the American people we will withdraw troops by December

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20 and telling our allies that we will leave troops on the ground into 
1997 is not keeping the integrity of the American word, and I think we 
have the right to expect that from our President who is representing 
our country.
  This is a serious issue, and I hope the President will address it 
with integrity.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield back the remainder of my time, and 
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, are we in morning business?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes, until 10:30.

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