[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 61 (Monday, May 6, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H4425-H4427]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 COMMON SENSE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT OF 1996--VETO MESSAGE FROM 
          THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. 104-207)

  The SPEAKER laid before the House the following veto message from the 
President of the United States:


[[Page H4426]]


     To the House of Representatives:
  I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 956, the ``Common 
Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996.''
  I support real commonsense product liability reform. To deserve that 
label, however, legislation must adequately protect the interests of 
consumers, in addition to the interests of manufacturers and sellers. 
Further, the legislation must respect the important role of the States 
in our Federal system. The Congress could have passed such legislation, 
appropriately limited in scope and balanced in application, meeting 
these test. Had the Congress done so, I would have signed the bill 
gladly. The Congress, however, chose not to do so, deciding instead to 
retain provisions in the bill that I made clear I could not accept.
  This bill inappropriately intrudes on State authority, and does so in 
a way that tilts the legal playing field against consumers. While some 
Federal action in this area is proper because no one State can 
alleviate nationwide problems in the tort system, the States should 
have, as they always have had, primary responsibility for tort law. The 
States traditionally have handled this job well, serving as 
laboratories for new ideas and making needed reforms. This bill unduly 
interferes with that process in products cases; moreover, it does so in 
a way that peculiarly disadvantages consumers. As a rule, this bill 
displaces State law only when that law is more favorable to consumers; 
it defers to State law when that law is more helpful to manufacturers 
and sellers. I cannot accept, absent compelling reasons, such a one-way 
street of federalism.
  Apart from this general problem of displacing State authority in an 
unbalanced manner, specific provisions of H.R. 956 unfairly 
disadvantage consumers and their families. Consumers should be able to 
count on the safety of the products they purchase. And if these 
products are defective and cause harm, consumers should be able to get 
adequate compensation for their losses. Certain provisions in this bill 
work against these goals, preventing some injured persons from 
recovering the full measure of their damages and increasing the 
possibility that defective goods will come onto the market as a result 
of intentional misconduct.
  In particular, I object to the following provisions of the bill, 
which subject consumers to too great a risk of harm.
  First, as I previously have stated, I oppose wholly eliminating joint 
liability for noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering because 
such a change could prevent many persons from receiving full 
compensation for injury. When one wrongdoer cannot pay its portion of 
the judgment, the other wrongdoers, and not the innocent victim, should 
have to shoulder that part of the award. Traditional law accomplishes 
this result. In contrast, this bill would leave the victim to bear 
these damages on his or her own. Given how often companies that 
manufacture defective products go bankrupt, this provision has 
potentially large consequences.
  This provision is all the more troubling because it unfairly 
discriminates against the most vulnerable members of our society--the 
elderly, the poor, children, and nonworking women--whose injuries often 
involve mostly noneconomic losses. There is no reason for this kind of 
discrimination. Noneconomic damages are as real and as important to 
victims as economic damages. We should not create a tort system in 
which people with the greatest need of protection stand the least 
chance of receiving it.
  Second, as I also have stated, I oppose arbitrary ceilings on 
punitive damages, because they endanger the safety of the public. 
Capping punitive damages undermines their very purpose, which is to 
punish and thereby deter egregious misconduct. The provision of the 
bill allowing judges to exceed the cap if certain factors are present 
helps to mitigate, but does not cure this problem, given the clear 
intent of the Congress, as expressed in the Statement of Managers, that 
judges should use this authority only in the most unusual cases.
  In addition, I am concerned that the Conference Report fails to fix 
an oversight in title II of the bill, which limits actions against 
suppliers of materials used in devices implanted in the body. In 
general, title II is a laudable attempt to ensure the supply of 
materials needed to make life-saving medical devices, such as 
artificial heart valves. But as I believe even many supporters of the 
bill agree, a supplier of materials who knew or should have known that 
the materials, as implanted, would cause injury should not receive any 
protection from suit. Title II's protections must be clearly limited to 
nonnegligent suppliers.
  My opposition to these Senate-passed provisions were known prior to 
the Conference on the bill. But instead of addressing these issues, the 
Conference Committee took several steps backward in the direction of 
the bill approved by the House.
  First, the Conference Report seems to expand the scope of the bill, 
inappropriately applying the limits on punitive and noneconomic damages 
to lawsuits, where, for example, a gun dealer has knowingly sold a gun 
to a convicted felon or a bar owner has knowingly served a drink to an 
obviously inebriated customer. I believe that such suits should go 
forward unhindered. Some in the Congress have argued that the change 
made in Conference is technical in nature, so that the bill still 
exempts these actions. But I do not read the change in this way--and in 
any event, I do not believe that a victim of a drunk driver should have 
to argue in court about this matter. The Congress should not have made 
this last-minute change, creating this unfortunate ambiguity, in the 
scope of the bill.
  In addition, the Conference Report makes certain changes that, though 
sounding technical, may cut off a victim's ability to sue a negligent 
manufacturer. The Report deletes a provision that would have stopped 
the statute of limitations from running when a bankruptcy court issues 
the automatic stay that prevents suits from being filed during 
bankruptcy proceedings. The effect of this seemingly legalistic change 
will be that some persons harmed by companies that have entered 
bankruptcy proceedings (as makers of defective products often do) will 
lose any meaningful opportunity to bring valid claims.
  Similarly, the Conference Report reduces the statute of repose to 15 
years (and less if States to provide) and applies the statute to a 
wider range of goods, including handguns. This change, which bars a 
suit against a maker of an older product even if that product has just 
caused injury, also will preclude some valid suits.
  In recent weeks, I have heard from many victims of defective products 
whose efforts to recover compensation would have been frustrated by 
this bill. I have heard from a woman who would not have received full 
compensatory damages under this bill for the death of a child because 
one wrongdoer could not pay his portion of the judgment. I have heard 
from women whose suits against makers of defective contraceptive 
devices--and the punitive damages awarded in those suits--forced the 
products off the market, in a way that this bill's cap on punitives 
would make much harder. I have heard from persons injured by products 
more than 15 years old, who under this bill could not bring suit at 
all.
  Injured people cannot be left to suffer in this fashion; furthermore, 
the few companies that cause these injuries cannot be left, through 
lack of a deterrent, to engage in misconduct. I therefore must return 
the bill that has been presented to me. This bill would undermine the 
ability of courts to provide relief to victims of harmful products and 
thereby endanger the health and safety of the entire American public. 
There is nothing common sense about such reforms to product liability 
law.
                                                  William J. Clinton.  
  The White House, May 2, 1996.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Horn). The objections of the President 
will be spread at large upon the Journal, and the message and bill will 
be printed as a House document.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further 
consideration of the veto message on the bill, H.R. 956, be postponed 
until Thursday, May 9, 1996, and that upon further consideration of the 
veto message on that day, the previous question be considered as 
ordered on the question of passage of the bill, the objections of the 
President to the contrary notwithstanding, without intervening motion 
or debate except 1 hour of debate on the question of passage.

[[Page H4427]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, consideration of the veto 
message on H.R. 956 will be postponed until Thursday, May 9, 1996, and, 
upon further consideration of the veto message on that day, the 
previous question shall be considered as ordered on the question of 
passage of the bill, the objections of the President to contrary 
notwithstanding, without intervening motion or debate, except 1 hour of 
debate on the question of passage.
  There was no objection.

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