[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 60 (Friday, May 3, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Page S4684]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

 Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, on Thursday of last week, the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably, by a 13 to 5 vote, the 
resolution of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC]. I 
applaud the committee's action and the leadership of Senators Lugar, 
Pell, Kassebaum, Kerry, and Biden, not to mention the hard work of the 
committee staff, to advance this major arms control treaty. I hope that 
floor consideration can be scheduled as early as possible. While I 
realize that there may be difficulties on the floor, this treaty is of 
such importance that it would be an abrogation of our responsibility, 
when it is out of committee and ready to go, not to provide advice and 
consent before the end of this Congress.
  I note that Majority Leader Dole stated on December 7 of last year 
that it was his intention that the Senate would consider the Convention 
in a reasonable time period once the Convention is on the Executive 
Calendar. Well, the Chemical Weapons Convention is now on the calendar, 
and the reasonable time clock is ticking.
  As all major arms control treaties must be, the CWC is a bipartisan 
measure. It was negotiated during the Reagan administration, signed by 
President Bush, and submitted to the Senate by President Clinton. It 
was approved by a strong bipartisan majority of the Foreign Relations 
Committee. It is endorsed by arms control advocates and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association. Some critics of the CWC have sought to blame 
the Democrats for failing to ratify the Convention when they controlled 
the Senate. Yes, the Senate should have acted on the CWC in 1994, but 
that fact does not provide a reason not to act in 1996. The sooner we 
can ratify the Convention, the sooner we can eliminate these horrible 
weapons.
  While U.S. accession to the treaty is not a legal requirement for the 
treaty to enter into force, it has become a practical requirement. The 
case of the CWC is yet another example of the continued primacy of U.S. 
leadership in international politics. Ratification by 65 countries is 
necessary for the CWC to enter into force. Currently, only 49 have done 
so, and it has become clear that many are waiting for U.S. 
ratification. Why? For one, because the United States maintains one of 
the two largest stockpiles of chemical weapons. But more fundamentally, 
because nations continue to look to the United States for leadership in 
matters of great international import. President George Bush wrote in 
1994: ``United States leadership is required once again to bring this 
historic agreement into force.'' This remains true today. Prompt action 
is our responsibility.
  Critics of the CWC, and there appear to be few, argue that U.S. 
security is harmed by our approval of a treaty that binds us to destroy 
a class of weapons we currently possess, while citing that certain 
``rogue'' states have not signed the treaty and raising questions over 
Russian compliance. They argue that, by proceeding to eliminate its 
chemical weapons stockpile under the CWC, the United States is 
depriving itself of a deterrent capability against any state that 
maintains some CW capacity. However, deterrence is based on the ability 
to respond in kind, and that assumes that chemical weapons are a 
legitimate instrument of warfare for the U.S. military.
  The fundamental basis behind the CWC, however, is that chemical 
weapons are not legitimate for war-fighting. This consensus goes back 
to World War I, where the invidious use of mustard gas prompted the 
1925 Geneva Protocol to prohibit the use of chemical warfare agents. 
More recently, the Iraqi attacks on the Kurds in 1988 and the Sarin gas 
attack on the Tokyo subway last year have reminded the international 
community of the terror of chemical weapons. Try as we might to 
stigmatize chemical weapons through other means, there can be no 
substitute for, in the words of President Bush's National Security 
Advisor Gen. Brent Scowcroft, ``the clear international norms against 
chemical weapons, the legal framework, and the challenge inspections 
embodied in the Chemical Weapons Convention.''
  A chemical weapons deterrent capability for the United States is not 
only unnecessary, it is inconceivable. If U.S. troops or territory were 
subject to a chemical attack, our military has ample means to respond 
in conventional ways, if a military response were deemed appropriate. 
Defense Secretary William Perry testified last month to the Foreign 
Relations Committee that ``we have an effective range of capabilities 
to protect against, to deter, or to retaliate against the use of 
chemical weapons * * *'' JCS Chairman Gen. John Shalikashvili testified 
in 1994 that ``while forgoing the ability to retaliate in kind, the 
U.S. military retains the wherewithal to deter and defend against a 
chemical attack.'' Additionally, I doubt that many Americans would feel 
comfortable with having a military that is prepared to wage gas attacks 
on foreign populations. In essence, how could we ask the world to make 
illegal these weapons, if we reserve the right to their legitimate use?
  There are a number of other criticisms of the CWC to address, and I 
hope to do so at a later time. Simply put, the CWC will improve our 
national security by establishing the legal basis, the timetable and 
the verification regime necessary to ban chemical weapons. I am pleased 
that the Foreign Relations Committee has finally reported out the 
Convention, and I hope that we can proceed to give our advice and 
consent as soon as possible.

                          ____________________