[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 51 (Friday, April 19, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3742-S3747]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              HAITI POLICY

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this week marks the final withdrawal of 
United States Armed Forces from Haiti. It is an appropriate time to 
ask, ``What did our second intervention of the century in Haiti 
achieve?'' Congress and the American people were deeply divided over 
the wisdom of Operation Uphold Democracy. Many of us were concerned 
that the American intervention to restore President Aristide would not 
lead to lasting and durable change in Haiti.
  Unfortunately, it is now clear that U.S. policy has not achieved its 
stated goals of establishing a rule of law, fostering genuine 
democratic change, and creating sustainable economic development. A 
bicameral staff delegation visited Haiti over the April recess and has 
completed a report which details serious failures of American policy--
failures in each of the three critical areas of politics, security, and 
the economy.


                              Human Rights

  The report concludes that the Clinton administration and the United 
States Embassy have not taken human rights seriously in Haiti. A 
particularly disturbing incident involves the event leading up to the 
assassination of Mrs. Bertin on March 28, 1995--3 days before President 
Clinton visited Haiti. The U.S. Government had concrete information 
about a plot to kill Mrs. Bertin which implicated Aristide government 
officials, including the Minister of Interior. Inexplicably, no one in 
the U.S. Government warned Bertin of the plot. Instead, U.S. officials 
decided to rely on the same government planning Bertin's murder to 
provide her with warning of the plot. This incident deserves, as the 
report recommends, full investigation by the executive branch and by 
the Congress to examine why U.S. officials neglected to act effectively 
on information that they possessed.


                     No Progress on Dole Amendment

  The report details lack of progress in meeting the conditions of the 
so-called Dole amendment on investigating political murders. The report 
also details the lack of action by the U.S. Embassy in examining and 
reporting on a wide range of human rights and police issues. The 
compromise of police investigations by Aristide loyalists was not 
reported. Basic information about murders involving the U.S.-trained 
police forces was not even gathered. It seems clear that the attitude 
of the United States Government was they did not want to know about 
government death squads which would prove embarrassing to the claim of 
Haiti as a foreign policy success.


                  administration's conflicting stories

  The report also details the sustained campaign by the administration, 
chiefly the Agency for International Development [AID], to blame 
Congress by providing intentionally misleading information about U.S. 
assistance programs. The Clinton administration cannot even get its own 
story straight. For example, while AID criticizes Congress for delaying 
aid to the Haitian police because of human rights concerns, the State 
Department takes credit for suspending aid to the Haitian police for 
the same human rights concerns. And while AID was holding up health 
programs because of their concerns about the competence of the Haitian 
Minister of Health, AID officials in Washington, regularly criticized 
Congress for holding up health projects in Haiti.


                       a foreign policy success?

  There has been much in the media about the success of President 
Clinton's Haiti policy. There has been little about the fundamental 
flaws detailed in this report. It is clear, however, that the 
administration knows it is on thin ice: changes in their Haiti policy 
have already been announced in recent days. Earlier this year, 
congressional pressure led to the dismissal of some of the worst human 
rights violators in the Haitian security forces. This week, the 
administration announced it was suspending aid because the Dole 
amendment conditions could not be met. The administration is reportedly 
considering reopening a fund for the victims of human rights 
violations. Most notably, the administration now points to the 
importance of thwarting former President Artiside's effort to undermine 
important policy goals. Long the defender of Aristide, even the Clinton 
administration now admits he refused to allow progress on police reform 
or free market economics. What a difference congressional pressure can 
make.


                   playing politics with haiti policy

  Mr. President, there is no difference between congressional 
Republicans and the stated goals of the Clinton administration in 
Haiti--democracy, economic recovery, and the rule of law. Our 
differences are about the very real problems which have been swept 
under the rug--in the name of defending policy failures. Our 
differences are over the administration's effort's effort to make Haiti 
a political football by blaming Congress for their own shortcomings.
  Mr. President, the U.S. military did its job. There is no security 
threat to the government of Haiti. The dictatorship is destroyed and 
the Haitian army no longer exists. It is on the civilian side where our 
policy has fallen short.
  What have we achieved in our Haiti intervention after 18 months and 
more than $2 billion? The answer is disappointment and missed 
opportunities. The answer is not nearly as much as could have been 
achieved if the administration had been more honest and more able. For 
the sake of the long-suffering people of Haiti, I hope the 
administration will jettison its political approach, and begin working 
with Congress to fashion a workable Haiti policy. I hope they begin 
soon.
  I ask unanimous consent that the report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:


                                                U.S. Congress,

                                   Washington, DC, April 17, 1996.
     Hon. Bob Dole,
     Majority Leader,
     U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Dole: Pursuant to your authorization, we 
     traveled to Haiti from March 30, 1996, to April 3, 1996, to 
     examine political, economic, security and assistance issues. 
     We met with a wide range of U.S., Haitian, and international 
     officials and visited a number of sites including the Haitian 
     National Police Training Center, U.S. Agency for 
     International Development projects, and U.S. Armed Forces 
     headquarters.
       As the final withdrawal of U.S. Armed Forces is underway, 
     we believe our findings

[[Page S3743]]

     and recommendations are particularly timely. Still, if the 
     United States is ever to achieve a truly bipartisan policy 
     toward Haiti, the Clinton Administration must cease its 
     efforts to blame Congress for the shortcomings of its own 
     policy. Our seven principal findings are:
       More than eighteen months after Operation Uphold Democracy 
     began, Haiti's social, political and economic situation 
     remains troubled and tenuous. The U.S. intervention 
     successfully destroyed the military dictatorship, and 
     significantly reduced human rights violations, at a cost of 
     more than $2 billion. However, the U.S. intervention in Haiti 
     has not yet laid the foundation for lasting progress in 
     establishing genuine democracy, in generating economic reform 
     and sustainable development, or fostering respect for the 
     rule of law.
       The conditions set forth in section 583 of Public Law 104-
     107 (the ``Dole Amendment'') on conducting thorough 
     investigations and cooperating with the United States on 
     investigations of extrajudicial and political killings have 
     not been met and will not be met in the foreseeable future.
       The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince has failed to devote 
     sufficient attention or resources to the critical issues of 
     extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses perpetrated by 
     officials of the Haitian government.
       The work of the SIU has been severely compromised by the 
     presence of three American attorneys and one American 
     ``investigator'' closely identified with many who have 
     publicly and regularly questioned the overwhelming evidence 
     of Haitian government involvement in extrajudicial killings. 
     These individuals are paid by the government of Haiti on 
     terms they refused to disclose to the staff delegation, and 
     have had total access to all SIU investigative files. Prior 
     to the arrival of two American contractors hired by the 
     Department of State to work with the SIU, all SIU 
     investigations were supervised and controlled by these 
     attorneys.
       The Clinton Administration has conducted a sustained and 
     coordinated inter-agency effort designed to blame the 
     legislative branch for the shortcomings of its own policies 
     in Haiti. By repeatedly seeking to politicize Haiti policy, 
     the Clinton Administration has done a disservice to the 
     appropriate role of Congress and, more importantly, to the 
     Haitian people. They have also, as a result of systematic 
     obfuscation, kept their own program managers in the dark 
     about these matters, risking the effectiveness of important 
     programs.
       In a striking and profound reversal, U.S. and international 
     officials in Haiti now argue that the Preval government 
     deserves U.S. support in order to prevent former President 
     Aristide from thwarting important policy objectives, 
     especially on economic and judicial reform. The staff 
     delegation consistently heard numerous officials cite policy 
     initiatives--moribund under the Aristide government--which 
     could actually proceed under the Preval government if U.S. 
     and international support was provided. Such criticisms of 
     the Aristide regime, voiced now in retrospect, were not 
     voiced when they could have made a difference.
       The Haitian economy remains highly dependent on foreign 
     assistance, including food aid, and remittances from Haitians 
     living abroad; at least 65 percent of the 1995 budget was 
     provided by international assistance. Despite attempts to 
     promote private investment, adverse internal political 
     developments have reinforced foreign and Haitian investor 
     concerns about the political and security outlook in Haiti. 
     The 1985 level of private investment in Haiti--a very low 
     baseline--is not likely to be restored in this century.
       We have attached our full report with appendices. Finally, 
     we wish to express our appreciation for the efforts of U.S. 
     Ambassador to Haiti, William Lacy Swing, and his staff for 
     facilitating our visit. Despite our differences over elements 
     of U.S. policy in Haiti, Ambassador Swing, our control 
     officer Julie Winn, and the Embassy staff provided invaluable 
     support for our visit.
           Sincerely,
     Randy Scheunemann,
     Charles Flickner,
     Christopher Walker,
     Louis H. Dupart,
     Roger Noriega.

           Report of Congressional Staff Delegation to Haiti

       From March 30, 1996 to April 3, 1996, a delegation of 
     Congressional staff members traveled to Haiti to assess 
     political, economic and human rights issues, and to examine 
     U.S. assistance programs. Our staff delegation was assisted 
     by Karen Harbert, a former AID and International Republican 
     Institute official who traveled to Haiti at her own expense.
       Our delegation included:
       Randy Scheunemann, Adviser on National Security, Majority 
     Leader, United States Senate;
       Louis Dupart, Chief Counsel, Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence, United States House of Representatives;
       Charles Flickner, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Foreign 
     Operations, Committee on Appropriations, United States House 
     of Representatives;
       Roger Noriega, Professional Staff Member, Committee on 
     International Relations, United States House of 
     Representatives;
       Christopher Walker, Senior Professional Staff Member, 
     Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.


                                FINDINGS

       More than 18 months after Operation Uphold Democracy began, 
     Haiti's social, political and economic situation remains 
     troubled and tenuous. The U.S. intervention successfully 
     destroyed the military dictatorship, and significantly 
     reduced human rights violations, at a cost of more than $2 
     billion. However, the U.S. intervention in Haiti has not yet 
     laid the foundation for lasting progress in establishing 
     genuine democracy, in generating economic reform and 
     sustainable development, or fostering respect for the rule of 
     law.


                              RULE OF LAW

                Human rights and extrajudicial killings

       The conditions set forth in section 583 of Public Law 104-
     107 (the ``Dole Amendment'') on conducting thorough 
     investigations and cooperating with the United States on 
     investigations of extrajudicial and political killings have 
     not been met and will not be met in the foreseeable future.
       The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince has failed to devote 
     sufficient attention or resources to the critical issues of 
     extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses perpetrated by 
     officials of the Haitian government.
       Despite general statements about the importance of human 
     rights and the rule of law in Haiti by senior U.S. 
     policymakers, no unequivocal or specific statement on more 
     than 25 extrajudicial killings or the emergence of 
     government-sponsored death squads in Haiti has been made. 
     Serious inattention in Washington to systematic human rights 
     violations contributed to the Embassy's uneven and incomplete 
     attention to the critical issues of human rights and the rule 
     of law. Moreover, there is no commitment to incarceration and 
     prosecution of anyone involved in political murders.
       Examples of the Embassy's failure to gather, act on, or 
     report on information concerning extrajudicial killings and 
     human rights abuses includes the following examples:
       One week prior to the assassination of Mireille Durocher 
     Bertin, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Armed Forces in Haiti 
     received concrete information concerning a plot to murder her 
     which implicated senior Haitian government officials, 
     including the Minister of Interior. For reasons which remain 
     unclear, no American official ever directly warned Bertin or 
     her family of the assassination plot. The decision not to 
     provide a direct warning based on information in the 
     possession of the United States Government had grave and 
     quite possibly fatal consequences. Apparently, the final 
     decision was made--and not challenged by the U.S. Embassy--by 
     the U.S. Military Commander in Haiti, Major General George 
     Fisher.
       Until facilitating a meeting requested by the staff 
     delegation, the American Embassy had no contact with the 
     family of slain lawyer Mireille Durocher Bertin more than one 
     year after her murder--despite the dispatch of some 20 U.S. 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents to investigate 
     the murder. The family provided the staff delegation with new 
     and useful information about the killing.
       Until facilitating a meeting requested by the staff 
     delegation, the U.S. Embassy had made no contact with the 
     relatives of the March 6, 1996, Cite Soleil massacre in which 
     eight people were killed and 11 were wounded.
       The November 7, 1995, shooting in which parliamentarian 
     Jean Hubert Feuille was killed and his colleague Gabriel 
     Fortune was injured has not been investigated adequately. 
     This attack had many similar characteristics to other 
     extrajudicial killings. Fortune publicly claimed that the 
     killers were sent by the ``Palace'' because of Fortune's 
     anti-corruption campaign in the Parliament. The Embassy 
     has made no apparent independent effort to follow-up on 
     Fortune's explosive allegations or determine the status of 
     the material evidence and investigation.
       The Embassy has made no effort to determine basic facts 
     surrounding the May 22, 1995, murder of Michel J. Gonzalez, a 
     neighbor of President Aristide's who was shot and killed near 
     his home by four gunmen riding two motorcycles; the attack 
     was witnessed by Gonzalez' daughter, a U.S. citizen. In a 
     meeting with members of the delegation, sources close to the 
     Gonzalez family confirmed persistent rumors that Gonzalez had 
     been pressed repeatedly to move from his rented home so that 
     President Aristide could acquire the property. Despite these 
     widespread rumors, which might suggest a motive in the 
     attack, neither the Embassy nor MICIVIH has made any effort 
     to determine whether the Gonzalez property (where the house 
     has reportedly been demolished) has been incorporated into 
     Aristide's growing 17-hectare compound.
       Duly Brutus, a member of the democratic PANPRA party, was 
     arrested briefly in July 1995 and his home was attacked by a 
     300-person mob in October, less than a week after his 
     testimony before the House International Relations 
     Committee's Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. Brutus 
     became aware of threats on his life in November 1995. He was 
     advised by the U.S. military in Haiti to contact the U.S. 
     Embassy with regard to the threat. The Embassy was totally 
     unresponsive to his urgent pleas for help. Because the 
     threats persisted and no one at the Embassy would help, 
     Brutus called the Department of Defense in Washington to 
     request there assistance. DoD interceded on his behalf to 
     ensure that he received safe escort to the airport in Port-
     au-Prince an onto a airplane

[[Page S3744]]

     bound for the U.S. In a bizarre turn of events, the Embassy 
     vocally protested DoD's help, which ironically probably saved 
     Mr. Brutus's life. Mr. Brutus has now sought temporary refuge 
     in the United States.
       Just before the delegation's arrival in Haiti, Mr. Brutus' 
     wife heard a disturbance during the night at her home in Port 
     au Prince, after which she found five bullets wrapped in 
     stationery of the Ministry of the Interior. An Embassy 
     political officer called Mrs. Brutus after hearing of the 
     incident but took no further action after being assured by 
     Mrs. Brutus that the HNP authorities appeared to be 
     responding adequately to the incident.
       Carl Denis and four other persons associated with the 
     ``Political Organization for Democracy in Haiti'' (founded by 
     Mireille Durocher Bertin shortly before her murder) were 
     arrested on August 18, 1995, a day after a four-person 
     demonstration in Port au Prince. They have since languished 
     in the Haitian National Penitentiary without being charged 
     with any crime, reportedly in violation of Haitian criminal 
     procedure. Mr. Denis told members of the delegation that the 
     lone U.S. Embassy visit was by a ``staff sergeant''; Mr. 
     Denis' arrest was reported in the State Department's 1995 
     human rights report on Haiti. In early March, Mr. Denis was 
     visited by a representative of the Minister of Justice, who 
     told him that there was no merit to the case; he and his 
     companions remain in prison today.
       The Embassy terminated its human rights victims fund 
     shortly after the U.S. intervention. The fund provided more 
     than $219,000 for more than 1,700 victims of human rights 
     abuses and their relatives during the de facto regime's rule. 
     Terminating the fund after the installation of President 
     Aristide sent a clear signal that victims of human rights 
     abuses under the Aristide and Preval governments are of less 
     importance to the U.S. government that victims of abuses 
     under the de facto regime.
       The U.S. Embassy's Political Section is now fully staffed--
     which was not the case when one member of the delegation 
     traveled to Haiti in August 1996. The section includes three 
     officers covering political-military issues on a full time 
     basis and one full-time human rights officer. Given the 
     adequate staffing, the Embassy's apparently complete reliance 
     on non-U.S. sources (such as foreigners serving with the 
     United Nations) for reporting on high-profile cases 
     ostensibly important to Washington is perplexing and 
     disturbing.
       In light of Washington's silence and the Embassy's 
     inaction, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that U.S. 
     officials did not attempt to develop independent information 
     on extrajudicial killings because U.S. policymakers did not 
     want to know the truth.
       U.S. government lack of interest and attention to 
     extrajudicial killings--until forced by Congressional 
     pressure to act--sent a signal to successive Haitian 
     governments that the U.S. would tolerate these actions.
       The ``Presidential Commission on Truth and Justice,'' which 
     was established after President Aristide's return, to 
     investigate human rights violations that took place during 
     his exile, presented its report to Aristide on February 5, 
     1996. Although the Commission's findings have not been made 
     public, its recommendations reportedly include compensating 
     victims and establishing an international tribunal with 
     foreign assistance to adjudicate some of the ``5,000 cases'' 
     covered in the Commission's report. The Commission relied on 
     support from the Canadian government and the UN Development 
     Program since USAID failed to deliver on its promise to 
     provide the Commission $50,000 for vehicles, computers, and 
     office equipment.

                           Police dismissals

       Eight individuals in the police and security apparatus of 
     the Aristide regime have been implicated in extrajudicial 
     murders by credible evidence. After pressure from Congress, 
     including passage of the ``Dole Amendment'' and objection to 
     obligation of police assistance by House International 
     Relations Committee Chairman Gilman, the Preval government 
     agreed these individuals would not serve in any police and 
     security force.
       Congressional Republicans had long raised concerns about 
     these individuals even before Operation Uphold Democracy 
     began. President Aristide consistently refused to take any 
     action against these individuals, and many of them remained 
     in Aristide's inner circle until the end of his rule. Many of 
     them remain close to Aristide today. President Preval 
     deserves credit for doing what his predecessor would not: 
     acting against the most egregious violators of human rights 
     in the Haitian security forces.

                        Haitian National Police

       Creation of a 5,000 person Haitian National Police (HNP) 
     has been a massive undertaking costing the U.S. taxpayers 
     more than $45 million to date. Despite the assistance 
     provided by the Department of Justice's International 
     Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), 
     the HNP continues to be plagued by the absence of qualified 
     leadership, lack of equipment, and lack of clear political 
     support at the highest levels of the Haitian government.
       The March 6, 1996 killings in Cite Soleil will be a 
     critical watershed for the Haitian National Police. Reliable 
     reports--including eyewitnesses interviewed by the staff 
     delegation--implicate members of the HNP in the murders. 
     Beyond the alleged direct involvement of HNP officers in the 
     crimes, senior HNP officials must bear responsibility for the 
     loss of control of the situation. The new HNP Inspector 
     General--dismissed under the Aristide regime for actually 
     trying to investigate a political murder--has begun to 
     investigate the Cite Soleil incident.
       In addition to Cite Soleil, HNP officers have been involved 
     in a number of shootings, beatings and other human rights 
     abuses. In addition, at least one officer has been murdered 
     in circumstances which remain unclear.
       Although the HNP has developed its manuel de directives, a 
     code of regulations and operating procedures, most HNP 
     officers are not familiar with it, making disciplinary action 
     against HNP officers for violations of law or human rights 
     infrequent. Staff were informed by MICIVIH officials in 
     Goniaves that a local HNP commissaire was known to have 
     committed at least two abuses, including severely beating a 
     civilian, but was merely demoted to the rank of officer.
       The delegation learned from U.N. Civilian Police (CIVPOL) 
     trainers that HNP officers recently destroyed two new U.N. 
     vehicles during routine patrols in Gonaives and that the 
     drivers of the vehicles possessed no driver's licenses nor 
     had been taught how to drive. CIVPOL field personnel estimate 
     that 98 percent of all HNP officers do not know how to drive. 
     According to the U.S. State Department, 300 of the 500 
     vehicles provided to the HNP have been wrecked.
       In addition to the Haitian National Police, numerous other 
     armed governmental security forces exist in Haiti, including 
     the National Intelligence Service (SIN), the Ministerial 
     Guards, the National Palace and Residential Security Unit 
     (NPRSU) and the Presidential Security Unit. Particularly in 
     the cases of the SIN, the NPRSU and the Ministerial Guards, 
     it is unclear who in the Government of Haiti controls their 
     activities. There are widespread and credible reports of 
     serious human rights abuses by these security forces.

                    Special Investigative Unit (SIU)

       The much-trumpeted Special Investigative Unit (SIU) of the 
     Haitian National Police is woefully ill-prepared to undertake 
     the criminal investigations with which it has been charged.
       SIU investigators have no more than one week of specialized 
     training in skills necessary to conduct criminal 
     investigations.
       The SIU is only at 25 percent of the strength proposed by 
     the U.S., and has yet to receive any of the 100 percent 
     increase in investigators promised by the Haitian government. 
     The SIU currently consists of only 10 officers, charged with 
     more than 80 cases.
       SIU investigators do not have access to vehicles, 
     communications equipment, office supplies, and basic 
     investigative equipment. The SIU received office space large 
     enough and secure enough to accommodate its needs.
       The work of the SIU has been severely compromised by the 
     presence of three American attorneys and one American 
     ``investigator'' closely identified with many who have 
     publicly and regularly questioned the overwhelming evidence 
     of Haitian government involvement in extrajudicial killings. 
     These individuals are paid by the government of Haiti on 
     terms they refused to disclose to the staff delegation, and 
     have had total access to all SIU investigative files. Prior 
     to the arrival of two American contractors hired by the 
     Department of State to work with the SIU, all SIU 
     investigations were supervised and controlled by these 
     lawyers.
       U.S. Embassy officials did not comprehend or report on the 
     significance of critical issues relating to extrajudicial 
     killings, including crucial developments at the Special 
     Investigative Unit (SIU) of the Haitian National Police. The 
     Embassy official responsible for police issues visited the 
     SIU less than once a month since its creation in October, 
     1995.
       Even if the American lawyers and ``investigator'' who have 
     tainted SIU actions to date are physically removed and 
     receive no further access to SIU investigators and 
     information, severe damage has already compromised the 
     activities of the SIU on the most important cases. One lawyer 
     was present for the December, 1995 FBI briefing of Haitian 
     government officials on the Bertin case, and all SIU files 
     have already been available for their unlimited perusal.
       It is unclear why the vast majority of the SIU's caseload 
     involves crimes from the de facto years. These cases were the 
     subject of the Truth Commission report, and these crimes were 
     an important factor leading to U.S. intervention. It is also 
     unclear why, in light of the decision to include cases prior 
     to September 1994, cases from the first seven months of 
     President Aristide's rule were excluded.

                               Narcotics

       For years, endemic corruption and unpatrolled borders, 
     water, and ports have made Haiti a prime target for the 
     smuggling of illicit drugs. After months of inaction under 
     Aristide, the new Haitian government has named a chief of its 
     anti-narcotics unit. The police chief has promised but not 
     yet delivered adequate nationwide staffing or resources. 
     Members of the inexperienced police force will require basic 
     investigative and anti-drug training. A full time DEA office 
     and a State Department Narcotics Assistance Section resident 
     in Miami is moving to implement training and cooperation 
     plans.

                            Judicial reform

       Haiti's judicial system is almost completely dysfunctional. 
     Despite more than $3

[[Page S3745]]

     million in AID assistance already obligated (AID has 
     programed $18 million through FY 1999), even the most basic 
     training and equipment needs remain unmet. While AID claims 
     that 400 judges and prosecutors have benefited from short-
     term training seminars, AID has ``detected a steady pattern 
     of judges selected by the Ministry for training only to be 
     fired shortly after--or even during--the two week course.'' 
     Even if HNP investigations bring prosecutions against those 
     responsible for the politically motivated murders, it is 
     unlikely that the judicial system can swiftly, much less 
     impartially, act on these cases.


         CLINTON ADMINISTRATION POLITICIZATION OF HAITI POLICY

       The Clinton Administration has conducted a sustained and 
     coordinated inter-agency effort designed to blame the 
     legislative branch for the shortcomings of its own policies 
     in Haiti. By repeatedly seeking to politicize Haiti policy, 
     the Clinton Administration has done a disservice to the 
     appropriate role of Congress and, more importantly, to the 
     Haitian people. It has also, as a result of systematic 
     obfuscation, kept its own program managers in the dark about 
     these matters, risking the effectiveness of important 
     programs.
       The staff delegation heard numerous examples of incomplete, 
     inaccurate, and intentionally misleading information about 
     the role of Congress provided by Clinton Administration 
     officials in Washington to staff, the AID mission, government 
     of Haiti officials and the Haitian business community.
       The Embassy and senior Administration officials have 
     repeatedly stated that they welcome Congressional pressure 
     because it leverages their pressure on the Haitian 
     government. Unfortunately, the staff delegation found an 
     absence of pressure by the Administration unless there was 
     Congressional interest.
       While senior AID officials assert that Congress is 
     responsible for delays in providing police training programs 
     in Haiti, State Department officials take credit for 
     suspending police training assistance because of the presence 
     of alleged criminals in senior police positions. ICITAP 
     officials in Haiti were not informed of key policy decisions 
     impacting police training programs nor the basis for such 
     decisions.
       Senior Administration officials in Washington also 
     criticize Congress for failing to make available funding for 
     certain AID projects in Haiti, yet they conceal the complete 
     picture of serious problems with U.S. assistance programs in 
     Haiti.
       While criticizing Congressional concerns about $4.2 million 
     in development assistance programs alleged to be 
     ``humanitarian'', AID itself has delayed obligation of more 
     than $5.5 million for similar programs because of serious 
     concerns about the competence of the Haitian cabinet minister 
     responsible for administering these funds.
       AID, not Congress, has withheld since 1995 a $4.6 million 
     cash transfer to the Haitian treasury because of that 
     government's failure to meet mutually-agreed upon 
     privatization goals.
       AID officials have criticized a congressional hold on an 
     environmental project known as ``Agricultural Sustainable 
     Systems and Environmental Transformations'' (ASSET). Yet at a 
     bipartisan congressional staff briefing in February, 1996, 
     AID officials stated that they intended to withdraw the 
     project altogether because, according to internal AID 
     documents, the project ``has been stymied'' by the Haitian 
     Ministry of Environment. Other AID electronic mail messages 
     reveal that AID did not withdraw the project because AID's 
     Assistant Administrator of Latin America and the Caribbean 
     sought political advantage in blaming Congress for holding up 
     the project.
       In Washington, the Administrator of AID blames Congress for 
     withholding humanitarian aid, but in Haiti, AID internal 
     documents state that ``the $50 million Health Systems 2004 
     Project ``is languishing'' because of problems with the 
     Haitian Minister of Health.
       The impact of the ``Dole Amendment'' has been consistently 
     misrepresented by officials in Washington and within the U.S. 
     Embassy in Haiti. Despite the clear exemptions for 
     humanitarian and electoral assistance, numerous Haitian and 
     U.S. officials have been informed--incorrectly--that the 
     ``Dole Amendment'' is responsible for delays in such 
     programs.


                  DEMOCRATIZATION AND POLITICAL ISSUES

                    Haiti's political power struggle

       In a striking and profound reversal, U.S. and international 
     officials in Haiti now argue that the Preval government 
     deserves U.S. support in order to prevent former President 
     Aristide from thwarting important policy objectives, 
     especially on economic and judicial reform. The staff 
     delegation consistently heard numerous officials cite policy 
     initiatives--moribund under the Aristide government--which 
     could actually proceed under the Preval government if U.S. 
     and international support were provided. Such criticisms of 
     the Aristide regime, voiced now in retrospect, were not 
     voiced when they could have made a difference.
       Although Lavalas formally controls the executive, 
     legislative and judicial branches of government, a three way 
     struggle for political power is thought to be underway in 
     Haiti: President Preval has the government, Gerard Pierre 
     Charles has the Lavalas political organization, and former 
     President Aristide has the popular support. Unfortunately, 
     while President Preval's stated objectives most closely match 
     U.S. policy goals, he is the weakest of the three contenders.

                         Presidential elections

       Presidential elections were held on December 17, 1995. 
     Aristide's hand-picked successor, Rene Preval, won 80 percent 
     of the vote with only 25 percent of eligible voters casting 
     ballots. Preval campaigned as Aristide's ``twin,'' touting 
     ``Five More Years of Lavalas.'' Although these elections were 
     run more efficiently than the controversial June 25 
     parliamentary balloting, a level playing field did not exist. 
     Aristide's Lavalas movement dominated the Provisional 
     Electoral Council (CEP) on national and regional levels. 
     Lavalas partisans routinely harassed opposition figures, 
     driving some center-to-right leaders out of the country 
     altogether. The presidential filing deadline coincided with 
     widespread political riots, incited by President Aristide's 
     November 11, 1995 eulogy for slain parliamentarian Jean 
     Hubert Feuille.
       Opposition parties, whose many valid complaints about the 
     parliamentary elections were unheeded, boycotted the 
     elections altogether. What remained of the ``independent 
     media'' (where radio is most important) practiced ``self-
     censorship,'' avoiding stories that might offend Lavalas 
     partisans. And, international observers (including the United 
     States government, the OAS, and the UN), in a rush to 
     vindicate their mission, rubber-stamped the parliamentary and 
     presidential results.

                           The 1995 elections

       Haiti's series of elections in 1995 were deeply flawed and 
     did little to advance genuine democracy in Haiti. The 
     egregious flaws before, during and after the June, August, 
     September and November elections cast a serious and lingering 
     cloud over the limited progress toward democratic pluralism 
     in Haiti.
       The democratic opposition in Haiti is demoralized and 
     fragmented. U.S. credibility with the democratic opposition 
     never recovered from two serious blows: refusal to 
     acknowledge systematic problems before the June 25 elections; 
     and the rapid U.S. stamp of approval issued the day of the 
     elections before the polls closed by the head of the official 
     U.S. observer delegation, AID Administrator J. Brian Atwood. 
     Overwhelming evidence of insecure ballots, candidate 
     exclusion and a host of other problems has been detailed 
     comprehensively by the International Republican Institute and 
     the Carter Center. AID documents published recently have 
     dropped the word ``fair'' from its descriptions of the 1995 
     electoral process.
       A U.S. government-brokered accord between the democratic 
     opposition and Aristide government after the June 25 
     elections were belated, and ultimately ineffective. The most 
     significant potential breakthrough in these negotiations was 
     halted by President Aristide's own intransigence.
       There still has not been a full and satisfactory accounting 
     of all U.S. election support assistance in 1995 (in excess of 
     $12 million). Because of this failure, AID has no funds 
     programmed for the 1996 Territorial Assembly and Senate 
     elections and refuses to provide any election support until 
     the United Nations and the Haitian Provisional Electoral 
     Council (CEP) undertake and release a complete accounting of 
     all USAID funds in the Haitian Election Trust Fund.

                           Haitian Parliament

       The Lavalas-dominated bicameral parliament has demonstrated 
     unusual independence from the executive branch by rejecting 
     Aristide's choice for police chief, negotiating prime 
     minister and cabinet candidates, and scrutinizing Preval's 
     budget request. Preval is moving slowly to educate and inform 
     a skeptical, populist Parliament that will be called upon, 
     within a few months, to consider budget cuts, civil service 
     reform, privatization of state enterprises, among others. 
     Many parliamentarians have no government experience, and the 
     institution has no research staff or facilities to carry out 
     basic analytical or deliberative functions. For these 
     reasons, despite the guarded optimism about the Preval 
     government's commitment to economic reform, the parliament 
     may prove to be a battleground--and a bottleneck.


                         INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE

       O.A.S./U.N. civilian monitoring mission in Haiti (MICIVIH)

       A case has been made for a continued international presence 
     in Haiti after the expiration of the UNMIH II and MICIVIH 
     mandates, but it is by no means certain that extension of 
     either of these operations under their current mandate is the 
     best form for such a presence to take.
       MICIVIH's current mandate expires on May 31 and an internal 
     U.N. Security Council dispute may preclude extension. In its 
     current scaled-down form, MICIVIH has 64 observers in Haiti 
     (each paid $5-6000 monthly) down from a peak of 170, and has 
     7 offices down from a peak of 12. MICIVIH currently spends 
     almost $600,000 monthly.
       MICIVIH has adopted a passive role in observing human 
     rights conditions in Haiti, with the mission's director 
     describing conditions today as ``relatively quiet.'' MICIVIH 
     has identified more than 20 murders in the past year as 
     ``commando-style executions'', the victims of which include 
     political opposition leaders and business persons. U.S. 
     officials acknowledge publicly that several of these killings 
     are linked and that Haitian

[[Page S3746]]

     government officials appear to have been involved in the 
     murders and the subsequent cover-up. MICIVIH, which played an 
     activist role when the de facto regime held power, has made 
     little effort to press the Haitian government for 
     investigation or prosecution of these killings.


                         U.S. Military Presence

       All U.S. military forces associated with UNMIH operation 
     are scheduled to leave Haiti by April 23. The U.S. bilateral 
     military engineering, medical, and civil affairs exercise 
     ``Fairwinds'', consisting of active duty and reserve forces, 
     will continue through 1997.
       The U.S. military continues to provide important 
     engineering and civil works support in Haiti. Despite the 
     persistent refusal of the government of Haiti to respond to 
     requests about priority projects, the U.S. military has 
     undertaken a series of successful civil works efforts to 
     rehabilitate roads, sewers, schools and health clinics.
       The Administration recently decided to keep two Chinook 
     heavy-lift helicopters and 40 personnel in Haiti to support 
     the Canadian contingent of UNMIH through May 10. After that, 
     a U.S. contractor will operate helicopters in support of 
     UNMIH forces. On April 10, 1996, the State Department 
     notified Congress of its intent to finance the air support 
     (at least $1.2 million during the next six months) from its 
     voluntary peacekeeping account.


                        ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT

                            Haitian Economy

       The Haitian economy remains highly dependent on foreign 
     assistance, including food aid, and remittances from Haitians 
     living abroad; at least 65 percent of the 1995 budget was 
     provided by international assistance. Despite attempts to 
     promote private investment, adverse internal political 
     developments have reinforced foreign and Haitian investor 
     concerns about the political and security outlook in Haiti. 
     The 1985 level of private investment in Haiti--a very low 
     baseline --is not likely to be restored in this century.
       A major problem for Haitians seeking to break their 
     nation's cycle of misgovernance and poverty is the simple 
     fact that revenues (at about 3 percent of GDP) do not come 
     close to the admittedly inadequate level of government 
     spending (about 7 percent of GDP). Ambitious U.S. Embassy and 
     AID attempts to ``irreversibly and fundamentally change 
     Haitian society'' through projects aimed at Haitian 
     institutions over several years will fail if Haiti cannot pay 
     its government workers and police. They will also fail if 
     Haiti cannot correct its macroeconomic policy. Sustainable 
     development is a distant dream under these circumstances.

                             Privatization

       President Preval renewed the commitments he made in 
     Washington, D.C. in late March 1996 to resume the 
     privatization program halted by former President Aristide in 
     October 1995. Whether the new President can overcome strident 
     opposition to privatization from his predecessor and a 
     skeptical parliament remains to be seen.
       An ambitious schedule for comprehensive economic reforms 
     calls for negotiations between the Preval Government and 
     international donors to begin on April 15, possibly resulting 
     in signed agreements by the end of May. The untested new 
     Haitian Minister of Finance and the remaining Preval economic 
     team will have to stretch their limited political mandate and 
     untested political skills to the limit if there is to be hope 
     of reaching agreements acceptable to both Washington and the 
     Lavalas coalition.
       Privatization will continue to be a major sticking point. 
     Both the U.S. and the World Bank appear to be insisting on 
     completion of the process of turning over to private 
     management on a lease basis the local flour mill and cement 
     plant--both of which are idle. Both became symbols of 
     Aristide's resistance to economic reform when he refused to 
     open bids for management of the mill and plant in October 
     1995. This led to the resignation of reformist Prime Minister 
     Smarck Michel, and the termination of nascent economic 
     recovery in the months since.
       At the beginning of April, some elements of Haiti's 
     economic team were searching for a way to proceed with 
     privatization while taking into account popular resistance to 
     the concept. A draft proposal would accelerate the outright 
     sale of 50 percent of the flour mill and cement plant. The 
     remaining 50 percent would be assigned to a holding company 
     representing local authorities who could eventually benefit 
     from any distributed profits.
       Bureaucratic waste, fraud and corruption continue to be a 
     major drag on the Haitian government. More than 90 percent of 
     the entire Haitian budget is dedicated to salaries, and up to 
     30 percent of the Haitian civil service consists of 
     ``phantom'' employees drawing 50 percent of the payroll.

                  International financial institutions

       The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and 
     the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) are committing far 
     more economic resources to Haiti than the major bilateral 
     donors, the United States, Canada, and France. About $230 
     million was made available by the IFIs in 1995 through the 
     simple device of releasing funds frozen during Aristide's 
     exile. An equal or greater amount is scheduled for 1996. Of 
     course, the military costs absorbed by the United States and 
     Canada in restoring President Aristide have not been taken 
     into account when measuring bilateral foreign aid 
     contributions.
       More than $100 million in IFI assistance is frozen because 
     of the Haitian government's refusal to meet mutually-agreed 
     upon privatization goals.
       The IMF and World Bank are approaching their 1996 
     negotiations with the Preval Government with some 
     determination to avoid repeating the exceptional procedures 
     used to disburse funds to the Aristide Government in early 
     1995. Those loans lacked specific conditions and were heavily 
     front-loaded, precluding any opportunity to match promises 
     with performance.
       By summer, IMF and World Bank disbursements will be needed 
     in order to meet GOH payrolls and balance of payments 
     requirements. Without a viable economic reform package in 
     place by June 1, that schedule will not be met. Any delays or 
     breakdown in negotiations with the IFIs will result in a 
     renewal of Clinton Administration efforts to fill the 
     resulting budget gap through use of bilateral ESF, of which 
     up to $60 million may remain from the 1996 appropriation. 
     Much of the ESF for Haiti is now allocated to projects.
       The IDB representative in Haiti may be more willing than 
     his IFI counterparts to advance up to $350 million in 
     additional concessional loans to the Preval Government. He 
     appeared to measure success by the level of loans committed, 
     not their contribution to sound policies in Haiti. It should 
     be noted that the IDB and the World Bank were willing to co-
     finance public works projects in Haiti undertaken by U.S. 
     armed forces engineers when AID appeared unable to do so.

                          AID mission in Haiti

       Many AID projects do not meet the basic criteria of 
     ``sustainability''. For example, according to an internal AID 
     evaluation of its community development projects in one area 
     of Port-au-Prince, a majority either failed or were 
     unsustainable. AID's internal auditor notes in the case of 
     renovations to the school, Ecole La Sanctification, ``This 
     was a gift, not a project!'' and for another project AID 
     writes, ``This project was a one time affair without a 
     sustainable component towards development.''
       AID's sole contribution to privatization in Haiti has been 
     a $2 million grant to the International Finance Corporation 
     to fund IFC-sponsored reports and, according to AID, a 
     ``public awareness campaign''. In light of the strong--and 
     ill-informed--public opposition to privatization in Haiti, 
     any public awareness campaign has failed.
       Through AID's new ``Results Review and Resource 
     Requirements'' (``R4'') process, it is difficult to assess 
     AID's successes and failures since AID now claims credit for 
     projects in which it has no financial or technical stake. For 
     example, AID claims it ``assisted the U.S. military. . .to 
     identify infrastructure projects.'' Senior U.S. military 
     officials claim that no collaboration exists between the U.S. 
     military and USAID. Further, the project in question, repairs 
     to Harry Truman Blvd.--the city's main thoroughfare which 
     runs in front of the U.S. Embassy--were paid for by the 
     Inter-American Development Bank.
       As part of its short term jobs program, AID contracted to 
     develop a data-base of Haitians and Haitian-American 
     residents with marketable technical skills. An AID contractor 
     was paid to develop the skills bank data-base, which includes 
     1,171 listings, and it completed its work in October 1995. 
     Despite AID's purported goal of the project which was ``rapid 
     mobilization of individuals'', today--five months later--no 
     part of the data-base has been made available to the Haitian 
     government or local organizations.
       AID lacks innovative methods for dealing with the critical 
     problems facing Haiti. For example, AID's ASSET project seeks 
     to plant more trees in Haiti, continuing a program which has 
     resulted in the planting of 90 million trees over 15 years. 
     Regrettably, there is little evidence that additional tree 
     planting will be effective since Haitians continue the 
     massive deforestation of their country at a rate of 30 
     million trees annually.
       AID's grantee to work with the Parliament, has little 
     experience working with legislatures or working with Haiti, 
     is moving slowly in its critical work. A previous contractor 
     with extensive experience in Haiti and in parliamentary 
     development, was dropped by AID, apparently because of the 
     contractor's previous work with the democratic opposition to 
     President Aristide.
       AID takes credit for a training program for 3,000 
     demobilized enlisted former members of the Haitian armed 
     forces (FAd'H), and for 2,400 ex-members of Interim Public 
     Security Force. While AID claims 2,800 ``employment 
     opportunities with private employers have been identified,'' 
     AID documents omit the fact that less than 4 percent of the 
     former FAd'H members have actually found employment. AID 
     officials also reportedly boycotted graduation ceremonies for 
     the former FAd'H trainees for ideological reasons.

                        U.N. development program

       As with all UNDP projects, it is difficult to determine 
     their success, failure or sustainability since nearly all of 
     UNDP projects are subcontracted out to other United Nations 
     agencies or to private contractors to provide ``technical 
     assistance.'' Staff did learn that UNDP's contribution to 
     Haitian privatization consisted of a single technical report, 
     which, despite 15 months of preparation and review, has not 
     yet been submitted to the government of Haiti nor 
     disseminated to the private sector. The U.S. Embassy also 
     remains at odds with UNDP over a prison reform project, 
     repeatedly yet unsuccessfully

[[Page S3747]]

     urging UNDP to do more than offer seminars.
       Staff visited a $10,000 pilot project designed by UNDP to 
     teach rural farmers basic agricultural methods to alleviate 
     soil erosion from hillside farming. It is curious that UNDP 
     is only now undertaking a pilot project of this nature since 
     environmental destruction due to this method of farming has 
     been evident in Haiti for decades.


                            RECOMMENDATIONS

                              Rule of Law

                        Haitian National Police

       The Government of Haiti should immediately demonstrate its 
     commitment to the Haitian National Police and the Special 
     Investigative Unit. President Preval's visit to the SIU 
     immediately after the delegation left Haiti was a positive 
     step--unfortunately, the visit was not well-coordinated and 
     no one was at the unit's headquarters during the visit.
       ICITAP should repair the critical flaws apparent in its 
     Haiti training program, especially in supervisory and 
     investigative personnel, revising future training programs it 
     carries out. The desperate lack of trained supervisory and 
     investigatory personnel must also be immediately addressed if 
     the Haitian National Police and its specialized units are 
     ever to operate effectively. Both shortages should have been 
     foreseen much earlier, and should be addressed in future 
     ICITAP programs.
       Visas to enter the United States should be immediately 
     withdrawn for all current or former Haitian officials 
     suspected on the basis of credible evidence to be involved in 
     extrajudicial killings or other gross violations of human 
     rights until they are formally cleared by the Haitian 
     judicial system.
       In light of the fact that the report required by the ``Dole 
     Amendment'' cannot be honestly made, U.S. assistance to the 
     government of Haiti must be immediately reviewed, and all 
     ongoing assistance programs, except for legitimate 
     humanitarian or electoral assistance, to the government 
     should be suspended pending the outcome of the review.

                       Special Investigative Unit

       No further assistance to the HNP or the SIU should be 
     obligated or expended until the following conditions have 
     occurred:

       A credible, respected head of the SIU is appointed.
       A full-time prosecutor is assigned to the SIU.
       Additional investigators are assigned to the unit, 
     reflecting the U.S. preference for 40 full-time 
     investigators.
       Priority in manpower and other resources is given to cases 
     of extrajudicial killing after the return of former President 
     Aristide.
       Access to SIU investigations, investigators and material is 
     completely and demonstrably denied to the American lawyers 
     and ``investigator'' who have been working with the SIU or 
     anyone else who might compromise the integrity of the 
     investigations.

       If the above conditions have been met, and after prior 
     consultation with Congress, ICITAP should move immediately to 
     augment training and technical assistance for the Inspector 
     General of the HNP and the Special Investigative Unit, 
     including forensics, communication and other much-needed aid.
       After the modus operandi of the SIU is clearly defined to 
     ensure the security of sensitive material, the FBI should 
     cooperate fully, including sharing complete files, with the 
     U.S. SIU contractors to ensure timely access to all evidence 
     and reports needed to conduct a thorough investigation of 
     extrajudicial killings.

                              U.S. Embassy

       The Embassy must make human rights a priority. The Embassy 
     should immediately reconstitute its human rights fund to 
     assist victims of political violence and their families. The 
     Embassy should assume responsibility for monitoring, 
     gathering information and reporting on extrajudical killings, 
     including the murders of Mireille Bertin, Jean Hubert 
     Feuille, Michael Gonzalez, and those killed in the Cite 
     Soleil massacre.
       The Inspectors General at the Department of Defense and the 
     Department of State, the General Accounting Office and the 
     U.S. Congress should conduct independent investigations into 
     the reasons why no U.S. government official warned Mireille 
     Durocher Bertin of an assassination plot against her 
     involving senior Haitian government officials, despite 
     possessing clear and credible information of such a plot. The 
     investigation should include the role of U.S. Embassy and 
     U.S. Armed Forces personnel in the decision not to directly 
     inform Bertin about the assassination plot.

                             Politicization

       The Administration should cooperate fully with all 
     Congressional Committee requests for documents related to 
     U.S. policy in Haiti. Timely responses to all Congressional 
     requests for information regarding the Administration's 
     policies in Haiti would be a positive, good faith step in 
     restoring bipartisan cooperation in Haiti.
       Administration officials should end their intentional 
     mischaracterizations of the ``Dole Amendment'' and should 
     make available to the U.S. Embassy, the USAID mission in 
     Haiti, the government of Haiti, nongovernmental organizations 
     and the media accurate information about the reasons for the 
     withholding of U.S. assistance.

                        Economy and development

                       AID and assistance issues

       AID should not consider releasing the Fiscal Year 1995 $4.6 
     million cash transfer to the government of Haiti until true 
     privatization has taken hold. Under current circumstances, 
     the staff delegation does not foresee the situation in Haiti 
     improving to the point at which there would be justification 
     for releasing any Fiscal Year 1996 funds for balance of 
     payments support. Without swift action by the government of 
     Haiti to substantially cut its civil service payroll, any 
     U.S. balance of payments support will only be wasted.
       Congress should not approve any additional Administration 
     requests to use scarce ESF funds in Haiti until a sustainable 
     economic reform program has been implemented. Congress should 
     also carefully monitor the use of the $60 million in ESF made 
     available from the FY 1996 appropriation.
       Given that AID claims it cannot move forward on its ASSET 
     project due to government of Haiti intransigence, AID should 
     immediately withdraw this Congressional Notification.
       AID should immediately terminate projects which are not 
     sustainable. While many of the short term jobs programs and 
     training aid have given the perception that Haiti's economy 
     is progressing and that AID's efforts in this area have been 
     successful, that is simply not the case. As seen by the staff 
     delegation, when AID resources for these projects are 
     exhausted, the projects have failed.

                             Privatization

       The Government of Haiti must accelerate the rate of 
     privatization. Privatizing the cement factory and the flour 
     mill, while important, should not represent the culmination 
     of the government's efforts, rather they should serve as a 
     useful first step catalysts to further privatization.
       The International Financial Institutions should hold firm 
     on their insistence on steps toward privatization, requiring 
     that reforms be enacted before assistance is disbursed. 
     Congress should carefully review the 1997 request for the 
     IADB's Fund for Special Operations to ensure that its use in 
     Haiti would not result in the postponing of economic and 
     civil service reform and privatization. Further, U.S. 
     executive directors at these institutions should use 
     significant American leverage, including their voice and 
     vote, to ensure that reforms precede assistance.

                      Democratization and politics

       AID must intensify its effort to provide material and 
     technical support so the Parliament can function as 
     efficiently as possible. Current delays, in large part due to 
     AID's change of contractor midstream, should be immediately 
     resolved. Support should include timely, practical assistance 
     on substantive issues which are expected to be taken up by 
     the Parliament soon.
       AID should demand a full and complete accounting from the 
     United Nations and the government of Haiti for all U.S. 
     assistance provided for the 1995 elections. No additional 
     election assistance should be provided until this accounting 
     is made public and made available to Congress.

                         International presence

       The MICIVIH mission should not divert all its attention 
     toward long-term institution building in Haiti at this time, 
     rather it should be more aggressive in its basic human rights 
     monitoring and reporting activities. MICIVIH should further 
     press the Preval government to investigate all human rights 
     violations, especially those cases under the investigative 
     jurisdiction of the SIU and the Truth Commission.

                          ____________________