[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 51 (Friday, April 19, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3697-S3698]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                              IRAN-BOSNIA

  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the investigation which 
the Select Committee on Intelligence has undertaken at the majority 
leader's request regarding allegations that the administration may have 
secretly acquiesced in or facilitated Iranian arms shipments to the 
Bosnian Moslems in 1994 and 1995, in violation of stated United States 
policy. This is a serious request made by a Senator long involved with 
United States policy in Bosnia. Some have said this request was made 
for political reasons. Perhaps that is the case. But there is also 
sufficient reason to believe the Senator from Kansas would have made 
this request regardless of the political climate or season.
  The Intelligence Committee begins this task with a solid base of 
information because we received some, but not all, of the intelligence 
available to the administration at the time the Iranian arms shipments 
were occurring. Our committee has been reviewing and adding to that 
information base in the 2 weeks since Chairman Specter received the 
majority leader's request. We are well positioned to do a through job 
for the Senate on the sensitive intelligence issues surrounding this 
matter, particularly the question of whether or not the administration 
conducted a covert action without informing Congress.
  In addition to our familiarity with the topic, the Intelligence 
Committee is also likely to do a good job on its part of this 
investigation because we are a bipartisan committee. In setting the 
strength and composition of the committee, the Senate directed, in 
Senate Resolution 400, that our membership be close to balance at nine 
majority members and eight minority, regardless of the composition of 
the Senate floor, and that the senior minority member function as a 
vice chairman, not as a ranking member. In creating the Intelligence 
Committee, the Senate clearly believed that intelligence was too 
sensitive to be overseen in a partisan, adversarial manner. Chairman 
Specter approaches his leadership duties on the committee in that 
nonpartisan spirit, and so do I.
  The history of this committee is replete with conduct like that of 
Senators Cohen and Warner, Boren, Nunn, Moynihan, and others, who have 
come to this committee and said we are not going to serve in a partisan 
fashion. We are not going to answer the call of our party, we are going 
to answer the call of our country. The present and future course of 
this committee should as well.
  Open allegations against the administration, and a requirement to 
investigate those allegations, can strain even the most sincere 
commitment to bipartisanship. Those strains have not

[[Page S3698]]

yet been felt in the Intelligence Committee in this case. Chairman 
Specter and I have tasked a single group of professional staff to 
support all committee members and all information which comes into the 
committee's hands will be shared equally with all members. This is the 
way we have always operated.
  As for myself, I don't see the vice chairman's role to be an advocate 
of the administration. As we pursue questions, I will not be a 
Democratic Senator defending fellow Democrats, but rather a U.S. 
Senator following the facts wherever they lead and reaching a 
conclusion based on those facts. I am confident Chairman Specter feels 
the same way about his role.
  I spoke of the Intelligence Committee's readiness to do a thorough 
job. Our thoroughness will be improved if we get all the relevant 
information from the administration. As many colleagues are aware, the 
committee has been denied the opportunity to read the intelligence 
oversight board's report on this case. The implication is clear that if 
we subpoena the report, the President will assert executive privilege.

  The intelligence oversight board is wholly within the Executive 
Office of the President, so there may be legitimate executive privilege 
here. But if the report is off limits to Congress, then the 
administration should not cite the report as having determined that no 
covert action occurred. The administration can't have it both ways. 
They should either give Congress the report, or stop citing it as 
vindication.
  An Associated Press story yesterday quoted a White House spokeswoman, 
Mary Ellen Glynn, saying, ``the point is not to withhold information. 
The point is to protect sources.'' Mr. President, this rationale for 
denying information to Congress has no basis. The Intelligence 
Committee has received and stored the most highly classified material 
for years, and its record for protecting sources and methods is far 
better than that of the executive branch. So security is simply no 
excuse, and an invalid reason to deny information to Congress. My 
advice to the administration is, fully inform Congress.
  The committee lacks all the facts, but on the basis of what we have, 
I do not see evidence of a covert action. But I stress that is a 
preliminary assessment and not a conclusion. I am open to the evidence. 
Certainly, if there was a covert action, Congress should have been 
informed, and the Intelligence Committee received no such information. 
If press reports are correct, in later 1994 CIA Director Woolsey sensed 
from information he was getting from CIA channels that a United States 
covert action, an action he and presumably other CIA personnel were not 
privy to, was in progress in Croatia. Director Woolsey reportedly came 
to the White House with his concerns. The Intelligence Committee needs 
to know what evidence was the basis of Director Woolsey's concerns. We 
also need to know why he did not share his concerns with the oversight 
committees.
  Mr. President, my interest in getting to the bottom of this case is 
not based solely on the majority leader's request. In my view, if the 
press reports are correct, the United States chose a course of action 
in Croatia and Bosnia with very serious down-side risks. The Bosnian 
situation was and is exceptionally complex and presented few good 
options to policymakers. But our alignment with Iran, even if it was a 
passive and accidental alignment, was very dangerous. Every President 
since Jimmy Carter has declared a state of emergency with respect to 
Iran, and United States laws and Executive orders have embargoed 
imports from Iran, limited United States exports to Iran, banned United 
States trade and investment in Iran including the trading of Iranian 
oil overseas by United States companies or their foreign affiliates, 
and placed sanctions on persons or countries who supply Iran with any 
goods or technologies that could contribute to Iran getting 
destabilizing conventional weapons or any weapons of mass destruction 
technology. These laws and Executive orders are there for a reason: to 
contain and isolate a country which conducts and supports terrorism and 
attempts to proliferate nuclear and chemical weapons. A policy which 
depends on such an amoral country to arm the otherwise defenseless 
Bosnian Moslems is dangerous--not merely politically dangerous, but 
potentially threatening to our allies and eventually to our own forces, 
when they deployed a year later. To turn a blind eye to Iranian 
shipments is to turn a blind eye to the possibility of United States 
casualties at the hands of the very people we have allowed to be armed, 
especially with a United States deployment imminent.
  Critics of this policy have to admit an inconvenient fact: risky as 
it was, the policy worked. Our allies did not pull their forces 
summarily out of the former Yugoslavia, which they might have done if 
we had unilaterally lifted the arms embargo. The Bosnian Moslems were 
not overwhelmed; in fact, they defended themselves creditably and even 
went on the offensive. The policy brought about a balance which made 
possible the Dayton Accords and the peace which IFOR is enforcing 
today.
  But even though the administration's risky Bosnia policy has worked, 
at least so far, the Intelligence Committee is obligated to investigate 
whatever may have been the United States role in the Iranian arms 
shipment. I take that obligation very seriously, and I look forward to 
joining with my chairman in rendering a full report.
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleagues from 
Alaska and Georgia for yielding me a moment. I compliment my 
distinguished colleague from Nebraska for his eloquent statement. I 
think it is very important, as Senator Kerrey has outlined, the 
bipartisan, nonpartisan nature of the Intelligence Committee being 
emphasized.
  As Senator Kerrey, I approach this investigation with a total open 
mind and no predisposition and determination to see the inquiry is 
totally nonpolitical, bipartisan, nonpartisan, as we take a look at the 
shipment of Iranian arms to the Bosnian Moslems.
  I thank my colleagues and yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Alaska is recognized.

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