[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 50 (Thursday, April 18, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3617-S3620]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                           CRISIS IN LIBERIA

  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the resumption of violence in Liberia is of 
great concern to me. A factional standoff over an ousted government 
minister has led to widespread looting, arson, and murder, plunging the 
country into a state of chaos. This spasm of violence is the first 
major interruption of the Abuja Accords, which have held peace together 
in Liberia since last August.

[[Page S3618]]

  The deterioration of Liberia is disheartening. Since 1989, the civil 
war has caused the deaths of more than 150,000 people and has displaced 
more than 800,000. Thousands of children have been conscripted to the 
armed forces. The resumption of violence threatens the lives of even 
more Liberians. The potential of a massive humanitarian disaster is 
high, as supplies of food and water dwindle, sanitary conditions 
deteriorate, and outbreaks of cholera erupt.
  Mr. President, The United States has a special responsibility toward 
Liberia. Founded in the early 19th century by freed slaves, the United 
States and Liberia have had almost 150 years of uninterrupted 
friendship. In World War II, the airfields and ports of Liberia were a 
key part of the link to supply the battlefields in North Africa and 
Europe. During the cold war, the people of Liberia were at many times 
the only reliable ally of the United States in Africa. Liberia served 
as a ``listening post'' and headquarters to the United States 
intelligence services. At the United Nations, Liberia consistently 
voted for the United States position even when this position was 
unpopular with other developing nations.
  In addition, I would like to add that I have a special interest in 
this war-devastated country as so many emigrants from Liberia have 
settled in Rhode Island. Just this morning, a delegation of 
approximately 400 Liberian-Americans who live in my State participated 
in an impressive demonstration of their eagerness for peace to be 
restored to this tragically war-torn country.
  These Rhode Islanders, led by longtime community leader Lady Bush, 
marched several miles into downtown Providence where they demonstrated 
in front of the Federal Courthouse Building and met with members of my 
staff and the staff of my colleague, Senator Chafee.
  The demonstrators presented a petition, entitled ``Plea for an 
Immediate End To the Human Carnage in Liberia.'' It urges active U.S. 
Government efforts to end the fighting and places the blame for the 
latest outbreak of terror and fighting squarely on the assorted 
warlords whose forces control various portions of the capital and the 
country.
  I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that petition be printed in 
the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, it is understandable that the international 
community is hesitant about investing anything more in Liberia. It is 
up to the faction leaders who constituted the last Council of State and 
who control the rival forces to stop the looting and killing and to 
rebuild a sense of national unity. The rival warlords must demonstrate 
that they are ready for peace. The people of Liberia should not have to 
endure any more violence. If the United States pulls out of Liberia, it 
will certainly put the last nail in the coffin for this poor, African 
nation. Moreover, if the situation in Liberia continues to unravel, the 
regional implications will be of monumental proportions.
  I believe the United States must have an immediate response to this 
crisis. As a result, I am cosponsor of the resolution introduced this 
afternoon by my distinguished colleague from Wisconsin, Senator 
Feingold. Among others, this resolution urges the administration to 
support West African peacekeepers, to influence other nations to 
support the peacekeeping force, and to lead efforts in the United 
Nations to sanction those parties which violate the U.N. arms embargo 
on Liberia.
  I would like to add that it is imperative that the international 
community, at its highest levels, make public their views on the 
atrocities in Liberia. The international community, moreover, must 
actively engage with ECOMOG and ECOWAS, to find a lasting solution. And 
most importantly, I call upon the competing warlords to stop the 
pillaging of Liberia. There has already been too much bloodshed, too 
much hope lost.

                               Exhibit 1

                                    Liberian Community Association


                                        of Rhode Island, Inc.,

                                   Providence, RI, April 18, 1996.

 Petition of the Liberian Community Association of Rhode Island to the 
                    Government of the United States

     Subject: Plea for an Immediate End To the Human Carnage in 
         Liberia

       Whereas the Republic of Liberia was founded and funded by 
     humanitarian societies in the United States, with the 
     appropriation and assistance of the American Government as a 
     safe haven for emancipated people of color;
       And whereas throughout its one hundred forty nine years of 
     independence, the people and Government of these United 
     States of America have manifested friendly and benign 
     interest in Liberia's right to exist as a sovereign state, 
     lending aid in times of national exigencies and emergencies;
       And whereas Liberia has always shown its gratitude and 
     appreciation to the Government and people of the United 
     States by being staunch ally and trusted African friend 
     during times and circumstances critical to the national 
     interest of the United States;
       And whereas the on-going genocidal civil conflict in 
     Liberia resulted from the rash, diabolical, dictatorial, and 
     military rules which set the stage for subsequent atrocities 
     and infrastructure destruction, causing the displacement at 
     home and abroad of over one half the population, many of whom 
     are stranded in the United States;
       And whereas the civil war since 1989 has resulted into the 
     slaughter of a quarter million people, most of whom are 
     civilians; women, children and the elderly;
       And whereas the war-lords do not have the fortitude to 
     honor the many peace accords that they themselves signed, 
     resulting into the carnage that began on April 5, 1996 and 
     continues to date, described by the international press and 
     the United States Government as the worst in three years;
       And whereas the EMOMOG has proven that it cannot enforce 
     the cease-fire, monitor the disarmament process and protect 
     innocent civilians;
       And whereas the rebels and government troops, some as young 
     as six are still heavily armed;
       And whereas the recent carnage that began April 5, 1996 is 
     so war torn that the United States is evacuating its citizens 
     from Liberia;
       And whereas the recent massacre of women and children is so 
     contiguous that Americans, Americans of Liberian descent, and 
     Liberians residing in Rhode Island convened on April 14, 1996 
     and after deliberation resolved that the organization 
     petitions the United States Government to intervene to help 
     bring the carnage to an immediate end.
       We therefore, appeal to the United States to:
       1. intervene directly to bring the carnage to an end;
       2. use it economic, diplomatic and military leverages to 
     encourage the warring factions to call for, and honor a true 
     cease-fire and disarmament;
       3. convene a meeting of the war-lords in the United States 
     to work out modalities for the enforcement of the cease-fire 
     as in the case of Bosnia;
       4. to help plan, monitor, and enforce the disarmament 
     process;
       5. impose an embargo on the shipment of arms to any of the 
     warring factions;
       6. freeze all assets of the war-lords, their family 
     members, and representatives; and
       7. deny all war-lords, their family members and 
     representatives visas to travel to the United States except 
     for a conference to resolve the conflict.
       We call on all peace loving countries of the world, the 
     United Nations and other international organizations to join 
     the United States, a country of goodwill that has practically 
     resolved all conflicts in modern times, to do the same for 
     Liberia. We are pleading. Please help us.


                            NUCLEAR SECURITY

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise today to call attention to the 
single greatest security threat to Americans in the post-cold war ERA--
the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could be acquired by 
rogue states, criminal organizations, or terrorists, and used against 
American targets.
  In the coming weeks, I hope that this body will have the opportunity 
to act on the Chemical Weapons Convention and reduce one portion of 
this threat.
  Today, however, as President Clinton prepares to join President 
Yeltsin and the G-7 leaders in Moscow for a nuclear safety and security 
summit over the next 2 days, I would like to focus my remarks on the 
nuclear threat.
  President Clinton has placed nuclear nonproliferation at the top of 
the U.S. national security agenda--he is clearly committed and willing 
to lead on this issue. Vice President Gore's regular meetings with 
Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also have advanced nuclear 
security. Indeed, in the last 3 years we have seen important agreements 
and cooperative projects between U.S. officials and their counterparts 
in Russia and other Republics of the former Soviet Union.
  Despite these positive steps, however, the threat before us remains 
immense, and the path to nuclear security remains long and difficult. 
We need to understand the potential magnitude of

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the threat, and muster the resolve and resources to address it 
effectively.


                        the nature of the threat

  Mr. President, Soviet nuclear missiles no longer point at American 
cities. With the START process, we have also seen and hopefully will 
continue to see significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons in 
the former Soviet Union. But these arms control successes should not 
give us a false sense of security.
  Over 100,000 weapons or weapons equivalent material remain strewn--
literally strewn--about Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The 
centralized system that prevented the possible theft or diversion of 
this immense quantity of fissile material during the cold war no longer 
exists.
  I should also note that each year as more nuclear warheads are 
dismantled, additional tons of weapons-grade material move from 
relatively more secure military facilities to less secure nuclear 
storage facilities. The 3,000 warheads that are dismantled each year 
yield 15 tons of plutonium and 45 tons of highly-enriched uranium.
  Of this veritable cornucopia of dangerous fissile material spread 
across the territory of the former Soviet Union, only a small fraction 
would be required to wreak unspeakable damage.
  It takes only 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms 
of plutonium to create a weapon capable of massive destruction. We are 
talking about an amount of uranium the size of a softball--or a 
baseball in the case of plutonium. That small amount of material could 
be easily concealed and transported in a sturdy briefcase or a 
backpack.
  As my colleagues know, the greatest barrier to overcome in 
manufacturing a nuclear weapon is acquiring the appropriate grade and 
quantity of fissile material. After that, it just takes a little time, 
money, and technical know-how.
  A determined terrorist or rogue state does not even need to build a 
perfectly designed atomic bomb with the highest grade fissile material 
to create unimaginable terror. A weapon built of crude, low-grade 
nuclear material such as a nuclear radiological device would be 
sufficient to generate widespread panic.
  This is not just doomsday rhetoric. Does anyone actually deny that 
there exists a great demand today for nuclear material? Those who are 
not yet convinced need only consider the chilling incidents that have 
occurred over the last few years. As my colleagues are well aware, gram 
and kilogram quantities of weapons-grade uranium--almost surely leaked 
from the former Soviet Union--have been seized in Moscow, Munich, and 
Prague. In addition, dismantled parts of Soviet nuclear missiles have 
made their way to Iraq.
  We know that the demand exists. We also know that the supply exists. 
Elementary economics tells us that without intervention, a supply curve 
and a demand curve will intersect--and you will have a transaction. It 
is incumbent upon us to intervene and prevent even one of these 
potentially deadly transactions from occurring.
  These are the key challenges we face in doing so:
  How do we develop a comprehensive accounting system for all nuclear 
material in the former Soviet Union?
  How do we gather and physically protect nuclear material in a limited 
number of secure sites?
  How do we safely dispose of excess nuclear material?
  How do we prevent the theft and smuggling of nuclear material?
  And, how do we prevent former Soviet nuclear experts from selling 
their knowhow to rogue states or terrorists?
  The answers to these questions are not exclusively of concern to the 
United States. They are vitally important to Western Europe, Japan, and 
even to Russia.


                the situation in the former soviet union

  Perhaps it would be useful if I briefly walked through what we know 
about the situation in Russia today to demonstrate the difficulties we 
face in meeting these challenges.
  First, the collapse of the Soviet command and control security system 
has been replaced by chaos and the absence of many controls at sites 
where nuclear materials are stored. In the context of Russia's current 
tumultuous social and economic conditions, we are talking about an 
environment conducive to theft and extortion.
  Second, the Soviet Union had no comprehensive accounting system for 
nuclear weapons and fissile material--certainly no computerized 
inventory. In other words, we--including the Russians--do not even know 
exactly where all of the Soviet Nuclear material is stored or how much 
of it exists. We think most nuclear material is located in 80 to 100 
sites. But there may be another 40 sites. We think the Soviet Union 
produced some 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and some 200 
metric tons of plutonium. Needless to say, it would be difficult to 
determine if a few kilograms of this material were misplaced here and 
there.
  Third, the lack of physical protection of nuclear material in the 
former Soviet Union is shocking. Nuclear material is stored in 
containers without seals to prevent tampering. Many of the labs, 
research centers, and power plants with nuclear material do not have 
perimeter fences, electronic sensors, or monitoring cameras to deter 
and detect intruders. Instead, U.S. officials have seen nuclear rods 
stored in metal lockers secured with padlocks. According to the Russian 
Government, 80 percent of its nuclear facilities--80 percent--do not 
have radiation detectors to prevent those on the inside from walking 
out the door with nuclear material.
  Fourth, there are nuclear technicians and guards at these facilities 
who have not been paid in months. I have heard that the senior staff of 
one nuclear facility abandon their posts a few hours a day to tend to 
their potato gardens, so that they will have food to eat. It seems to 
me that these conditions are so ripe for corruption that the threat of 
an inside job is much greater than the threat of an outside thief 
entering a nuclear facility--as easy as that may be.
  Fifth, current border controls throughout the former Soviet Union are 
notoriously weak. If smuggled nuclear material passes through Europe, 
we have some chance that intelligence officials and law enforcement can 
interdict it. However, trafficking routes through the Caucasus or 
Central Asia are another story--the chances of successful interdiction 
are slim to none.
  Finally, we have the problem of the thousands of nuclear scientists 
and technicians in the former Soviet Union with knowledge about nuclear 
weapons who are looking for ways to make a living in the new world 
order. Their expertise would certainly be welcome in some aspiring 
nuclear states that immediately come to mind.


                            the u.s response

  After a slow start 4 years ago, many of these problems are now being 
addressed by our Departments of Defense and Energy. The Energy 
Department, for example, has equipped a number of nuclear facilities in 
the former Soviet Union with fences, monitors, and sensors. The United 
States Enrichment Corporation has arranged for the purchase of 500 
metric tons of highly enriched uranium to be converted into commercial 
reactor fuel. Newly created international research institutes have 
employed hundreds of Russian nuclear scientists. Such cooperative 
efforts need to be evaluated and duplicated on a much larger scale.
  I commend my distinguished colleagues Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar 
for bringing attention to global proliferation threats through Senator 
Nunn's recent hearings of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 
and Senator Lugar's hearings last august on the issue of Loose Nukes. I 
might add that Senator Lugar's hearings are the only hearings that have 
been held on this critical issue in the Foreign Relations Committee in 
the 104th Congress.
  Mr. President, I think that it is worth asking: are we directing 
America's limited resources proportionately to meet a clear and present 
threat which I and many of my colleagues regard as our greatest 
national security challenge?
  In 1991, my colleagues Senators Nunn and Lugar had the foresight to 
devise the cooperative threat reduction program to assist the states of 
the former Soviet Union in dismantling nuclear warheads and protecting 
nuclear materials. Over the last 5 years funding for the Nunn-Lugar 
program has totaled $1.5 billion--an average of $300 million

[[Page S3620]]

per year, or about one-tenth of 1 percent of our annual defense budget. 
In addition, this year's funding level was cut 25 percent from last 
year's level.
  In contrast, consider how much time, money, and energy we have spent 
on the proposed missile defense system to meet the improbable long-
range ballistic missile threat, which we are told is at least 15 years 
away. We have spent some $35 billion over the years on missile 
defenses. I find it hard to believe that this disparity in spending 
corresponds to the threats we face.
  As I have repeatedly stated on this floor, a long-range ballistic 
missile will not be the most likely means of delivery of a weapon of 
mass destruction to the United States. No. A much more likely scenario 
is that a terrorist group will smuggle material and parts for a 
nuclear, chemical, or biological device onto our shores--perhaps by any 
of the many routes used by narcotics traffickers--and then reconstruct 
a weapon of mass destruction, put it in a van, and detonate it in near 
an important American landmark.
  That is the more likely threat, and that is where we should be 
focusing the bulk of our energies, not on reviving star wars.


                           the nuclear summit

  Mr. President, I hope that my colleagues recognize that we are 
engaged in a race against time. Either we will help secure this 
material and provide our citizens with the safety to which they are 
entitled, or rogue elements will procure this material and use it to 
blackmail civilization.
  The danger of uncontrolled nuclear material is a first level national 
security threat to the United States of America and a first level 
national security threat to our friends and allies. We cannot simply 
ignore the problem and leave if for Russia to solve on her own. 
Likewise, Russia cannot simply downplay the potential threat and delay 
implementing concrete measures. Indeed, Russia itself is a target--just 
last November Chechen separatists placed radioactive material in a 
Moscow park.
  To be successful, the nuclear safety and security summit must build a 
global consensus on the nature of the threat before us and generate 
wider cooperation for swift action.
  The critical first step must be to improve the physical protection of 
nuclear material at the source--secure the material at a limited number 
of sites and institute a comprehensive accounting system. That, in my 
opinion, is the most important agenda item for the leaders of the G-7 
and Russia at the nuclear summit.
  World leaders at the summit will also discuss ways to improve 
cooperation in countering nuclear material smuggling. Given the limited 
success we have had in interdicting narcotics traffickers, I am not 
optimistic about the prospects of interdiction alone to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear material. Nonetheless, much more can and 
should be done to improve border controls and intelligence cooperation.
  Mr. President, it is my hope that the nuclear safety and security 
summit in Moscow this week will help propel the world's leaders to take 
immediate preventative and rational steps toward nuclear security. The 
alternative is to delay action until after our first nuclear terrorist 
incident--whether in a Moscow park, a Tokyo subway, or a New York 
office building.
  Mr. President, no other nation can match the expertise and resources 
of the United States. We must be the leader in promoting cooperative 
efforts to reduce the nuclear threat. Investments we make in this area 
today will reap a future return in the form of enhanced security for 
all Americans.

                          ____________________