[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 46 (Friday, March 29, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3246-S3247]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




            THE SWISS BANKS, THE NAZIS, AND HOLOCAUST ASSETS

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the issue 
that I spoke about yesterday, namely that of the return, by Swiss 
banks, of assets deposited by European Jews and others in the years 
preceding the Holocaust.
  Today, I would like to discuss the revelations disclosed in newly 
discovered documents by my staff. These documents explain the 
connections of certain wartime Swiss bankers with Nazi Germany. The 
documents are disturbing to read, especially when one considers the 
history of the times and the horrors that took place because of the 
murderous actions of the Nazi regime with which these men dealt.
  One such declassified document, dated August 2, 1945, from the 
American Embassy in London, from which made up the American 
Occupational project, ``Operation Safe Haven,'' details the membership 
of the board of directors of the I.G. Farben Co. I.G. Farben was, at 
the time, the largest chemical company in the world, and is known, 
quite infamously for the fact that one of its subsidiaries produced 
``Zyklon B,'' the poison gas used in the gas chambers in the Nazi 
extermination camps in Europe. While voluminous, the document provides 
short biographies of the directors.
  At this time, I would like to ask unanimous consent that a portion of 
this document be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
  It is in this document that several Swiss nationals are listed and 
some are listed as owners or directors of Swiss banks. Following are 
the names of the bankers:
  August Germann: Described as the ``Director of the Bank Fuer 
Unternehmungen, Zurich.''
  Carlo Mollwo: Described as ``A cover man for I.G. Farben formally 
holding 100 percent of the shares of the Swiss bank, Ed. Greutert & 
Cie. (Now H. Sturzenegger & Cie.).''
  Hans Sturzenegger: Described as ``A Swiss and relative of Greutert, 
became Managing Director of the Swiss Bank, Ed. Greutert & Cie. * * * 
In 1942, Sturzenegger was listed as the unlimited partner of the bank 
and Industrie Bank A.G. of Zurich was listed as the limited partner.''
  Theodor Wolfensperger: Described as the ``President of Industrie 
Bank, Zurich. Known as a member of the I.G. clique.''
  Mr. President, I know that this is the stuff of history, but it 
serves to point out one vital factor in understanding how this 
controversy in Switzerland today, came about. Here we have Swiss 
owners, or directors of banks in Switzerland, which might well have 
been the place of deposit for funds of European Jews, and they are 
sitting on the board of I.G. Farben, clearly a notorious company, by 
any standard. These men, as you will see by the document, also headed 
companies which acted as fronts for the Nazis, and later perhaps helped 
get assets looted by the Nazis, out of Europe. My question is, if they 
would do all this for the Nazis, what would they do with the assets of 
Europe's Jews?
  Mr. President, this is a disturbing question, and to one that I truly 
do not know the answer. Nevertheless, I fear the worst. Yet, when 
considering this question, it inevitably begs a further question. What 
role did the Swiss Government play in this regard?
  To provide a possible answer to this question, I would like to 
introduce the now declassified report of Daniel J. Reagan, then 
Counselor of Legation for Economic Affairs at the U.S. legation in 
Bern, who wrote to the Secretary of State on October 4, 1945 concerning 
the lack of cooperation of the Swiss Government.
  I would ask that the text of this report be inserted in the Record at 
this time.
  Mr. President, this is a devastating indictment of the Swiss 
Government and it illustrates how the Swiss went out of their way to 
avoid cooperating with the Allies in breaking up the German war effort 
and its vast economic structure.
  This is only the beginning of our inquiry. We are finding documents 
daily, and with each search, we find more evidence which, I hope will 
place us closer to the truth, namely the authoritative, accurate and 
final accounting of all assets that numerous Swiss banks continue to 
hold from this time period and to which the survivors and rightful 
heirs are entitled.
  The report follows:

                           Secret Attachment

     Sponsor Agency: External Security Intelligence Coordinating 
         Committee, Washington, D.C.
       11. In Switzerland or Connected with the Swiss Business.
       Fritz Fleiner--Member of the Board of I.G. Chemie.
       Dr. Albert Gadow--I.G. Farbon's Swiss representative. 
     Member of the Board of each chief figure in I.G.
       Chemie, Basle. Brother-in-law of Hermann Schmitz.
       August Gormann--Member of I.G. Chemie's Board of Directors, 
     and Director of the Bank Fuer Unternehmungen, Zurich.
       Paul Haefliger--(See IV. A.2.).
       Anton Heinrich--(See IV. A.3.).
       Ernst Huelsmann--(See IV. A.3.).
       Felix Iselin--President of I.G. Chemie, Basle, replacing 
     Hermann Schmitz in 1940. One of most important lawyers in 
     eastern Switzerland, a colonel in the Swiss Army, and chief 
     of its Intelligence Service. Also President of the 
     Schweizerische Treuhand--Gesellschaft of Basle, the chartered 
     accountant firm of the Swiss chemical concerns Ciba, Geigy, 
     and Sandoz. A former colleague of Iselin's has stated that 
     Iselin is a prominent representative of absolutely German 
     interests, and that he goes to Berlin to take orders from 
     Hermann Schmitz and then telephones them to New York from 
     Basle, thus pretending to protect Swiss interests where he is 
     really protecting the interests of I. G. Farben.
       Gottfried Keller--Member of the Board of Directors of I.G. 
     Chemie, Basle.
       Carlo Mollwo--German by birth, married to a Swiss, Became a 
     Swiss citizen. ``A cover man for I.G. Farben'' formerly, 
     holding 100% of the shares of the Swiss bank, Ed. Greutert & 
     Cie. (now H. Sturzenegger & Cie.). He was especially active 
     for I.G. in the nitrogen cartel through Greutert & Cie. 
     President of the Board of Administration of Societe 
     Auxiliaire de Participations et de Depots S.A., and member of 
     the Board of Directors of I.G. Chemie, Basle. Chief auditor 
     for I.G. Chemie since 1929.
       Karl Pfoiffer--(See IV. A.1.).
       Hormann Schmitz--(See IV. A.2.) Resigned as President of 
     I.G. Chemie in 1940 and was replaced by Felix Isolin.
       Hans Sturzeneggor--A Swiss and relative of Groutort, became 
     Managing Director of the Swiss bank, Ed. Greutert & Cio., 
     upon the death of Greutort in 1939, and the name of the bank 
     was changed to H. Sturzeneggor & Cio. He had been trained in 
     the Frankfurt offices of Metallgesellschaft and in the 
     Finance Dept. of I.G. In 1942 Sturzenogger was listed as the 
     unlimited partner of the bank and Industrie Bank A.G. of 
     Zurich was listed as the limited partner. He is a member of 
     the Board of I.G. Chemie
       Theordor Wolfensperger--President of Industrie Bank, 
     Zurich, Switzerland. Known as a member of the I.G. clique. He 
     has been used as a nominee for I.G. in other dummy holding 
     companies, as for instance Mapro, an I.G. camouflaged holding 
     company in the Dutch East Indies.


                               12. Turkey

       Widmann--Manger of Bayor; Turkey. His private funds and 
     personal possessions insured for LT 85,000 are held by Dr. 
     Feridun Frik, Istanbul, at the house of Salahettin Ozgen, 
     Eskisohir.


                           13. Latin American

       Johann Carl Ahrons--Nominal partner in A. Quimica.
       Bayor Lda., Brazil, Probably a front for I.G. Farben.
       Ernst Holmut Andreas--German radio engineer who operated a 
     radio station, ``Radio Bayer'' in Managua, Nicaragua, from 
     1929 to 1940. It advertised Bayer products and in the later 
     years its programs included Nazi propaganda. (In 1940 the 
     station was sold to Joso Mondoza.) He was deported to the 
     U.S. in 1942 and in 1945 was a soldier in the U.S. Army. 
     Believed to be a Nazi and to have operated a secret 
     transmission set in Managua.
                                                                    ____

                                            Bern, October 4, 1945.
     Subject: Transmission of statement from Swiss purporting to 
         give an indication of results of census of German assets.

   [Via air mail pouch--USA War Crimes Office, Oct. 26, 1945--Secret]

     The Honorable
     The Secretary of State,
     Washington.
       Sir: I have the honor to refer to the Legation's telegram 
     No. 4211 (Repeated to London as 1407 and to Paris as 692), 
     September 25, 1945, wherein it was reported that despite 
     repeated and joint efforts of the British, French and 
     ourselves during the past six months to induce the Swiss to 
     implement effectively the agreement of March 8, it now 
     appears that the Swiss are failing to meet in certain 
     respects their engagements under that agreement, indulging in 
     procrastinating tactics and also undermining economic warfare 
     measures. As evidence of this statement there is transmitted, 
     in the original and in translation, a memorandum presented to 
     the

[[Page S3247]]

     Economic Counselor by Mr. Kohli on behalf of the Federal 
     Political Department, embracing what the Swiss describe as 
     their interim report on the census of German assets as 
     promised two months ago (Par. 4, Legation's telegram No. 
     3667, July 24). As it may be seen, this statement presents a 
     mere description of the mode of operation of the Swiss 
     Compensation office, the number of cases blocked without any 
     indication of the results of the census. Mr. Kohli refused to 
     indicate, moreover, when, if at all, any results of the 
     census would be made available to the Allies. He did not 
     contest the joint understanding of the British, French, and 
     ourselves that the Swiss would make available at least the 
     approximate value of interim blocked assets, but they have 
     now failed to do so.
       Early in August Mr. Schwab, Chief of the Swiss Compensation 
     Office, informed the Economic Counselor that he had in the 
     course of preparation what he intimated was a complete report 
     which he was preparing for the Federal Political Department. 
     Mr. Schwab stated at the time that he understood this report 
     was intended for the Allies. Shortly afterwards Mr. Kohli, of 
     the Federal Political Department, informed the Economic 
     Counselor that he had received this report but that it was 
     being translated from German into French for us. The Economic 
     Counselor indicated that the German text would be 
     satisfactory. Mr. Kohli stated he thought it more polite to 
     transmit it in French. On August 23 Mr. Kohli was again 
     reminded that we had not received this document. He stated 
     that the translation had not yet been completed but that we 
     would obtain it in the near future.
       At a meeting on September 12 the Economic Counselor stated 
     that he could not understand why this report, which had been 
     in Mr. Kohli's hands for approximately a month, had not yet 
     been transmitted. Mr. Kohli replied that after the 
     translation had been made from German into French, the latter 
     text had been submitted to Mr. Schwab of the Swiss 
     Compensation Office for the latter's approval, but that Mr. 
     Schwab had been on vacation for two weeks. The Economic 
     Counselor informed Mr. Kohli that this statement was most 
     remarkable, for members of his office had been in 
     communication with Mr. Schwab by telephone several times 
     during the preceding week. The Economic Counselor added that 
     he had advised the Department of State of the promise to 
     supply a report giving the pertinent information so far 
     obtained on the census, but that it now appeared that this 
     report, although completed a month ago by the Swiss 
     Compensation Office, had been held up by the Federal 
     Political Department. He expressed the fear that its 
     transmission to us was, for reasons unknown, no longer 
     intended. Mr. Kohli thereupon gave instructions to his 
     assistant to assure that the French text of the report be 
     delivered to us on the following day, which it was. It should 
     be observed that the Aide-Memoire enclosed herewith bears the 
     date of August 27, although it was not delivered until 
     September 13.
       The foregoing incident has been recited in detail because 
     it suggests that the report prepared by the Swiss 
     Compensation Office and intended for this and the British 
     Legation and the French Embassy was censored and a 
     perfunctory resume substituted therefor. The enclosed report, 
     it is hardly necessary to state, represents a failure on the 
     part of the Swiss to carry out their promise to acquaint us 
     with the interim results of the census and was delivered two 
     weeks after the census was technically closed on August 31.
       This failure of the Swiss to respect their promises is of 
     especial significance at this time. It would appear to be 
     related to the neglect the Swiss have shown inter alia for 
     those provisions of the March 8 agreement which related to 
     the prompt adoption of legislating necessary to facilitate 
     the restoration of looted property and to the attempt made by 
     the Swiss in the Viscose Suisse case, as reported in 
     Legation's telegram 4211, September 25, to negate the 
     influence of the Allied Proclaimed Lists. Reference must also 
     be made by the belated response offered by the Swiss on 
     September 25 (reported in Legation's telegram 4236 of 
     September 28) to Legation's note of August 3 asserting title 
     to German assets and to the Swiss failure to make any 
     response to the Legation's note of July 12. The latter, as 
     reported in Legation's dispatch 12188 of July 27, 1947, 
     requested the Swiss to take steps, in accordance with the 
     March 8 agreement, to assure that no disposition of German or 
     German-controlled property in Switzerland would occur. As 
     reported in Legation's telegram No. 4201 of September 24, 
     1945, despite this note and despite adequate notice from the 
     Economic Counselor of this Legation that one such disposition 
     was about to occur, the Swiss Government took no steps to 
     intervene in the proposed sale of a German school at Davos.
       From these incidents one inference is difficult to avoid: 
     the Swiss Government is pursuing dilatory tactics designed to 
     test the sincerity, firmness, and unity of the Allies with 
     respect to the German assets in Switzerland and with respect 
     to the commercial future of those Swiss enterprises and 
     individuals whose pro-German activities were sufficiently 
     notorious to merit inclusion on the Allied black lists. These 
     tactics are being employed, it would appear, in the belief 
     that, in the interim, the Allies will become so preoccupied 
     with other affairs as to neglect to press for further 
     execution of the March 8, agreement. If they are successful, 
     the Swiss will thereby have escaped the proper and legitimate 
     obligations which the majority of other neutrals have 
     assumed, vis-a-vis the Allies, to put an end to the more 
     important potentials for the continuation of Nazi activities.
       In this connection, attention must be directed to recent 
     discussions in the Swiss Parliament and the Swiss press. As 
     reported in Legation's telegrams 4176, September 20 and 4186, 
     September 21, 1945, Federal Councilor Stampfli, Chief of the 
     Department of Public Economy, and Mr. Dutweiler, influential 
     Swiss political leader, have violently attacked the Allies' 
     listing policy. They have chosen deliberately to misrepresent 
     the purposes and objectives of the Allies with respect to 
     German and Japanese assets and the Proclaimed List. They 
     have categorized these purposes and objectives as 
     ``economic warfare'' directed against the Swiss economy, a 
     statement so palpably false as to require no comment here. 
     The significant point is that these responsible officials 
     and influential spokesmen, supported by large sections of 
     the Swiss press, choose this time to launch an offensive 
     against our lists and the policy behind the lists. This 
     campaign is mounting in scope and intensity. The 
     conclusion here too is difficult to avoid: the Swiss 
     officials are endeavoring to create a public opinion which 
     will accept as proper and in the interests of Switzerland 
     the failures of the Swiss Government to perform wholly in 
     accordance with the provisions and spirit of the 
     agreements made with the Allies.
       Meanwhile, the concealment of German assets is facilitated 
     by inadequate enforcement of existing inadequate legislation 
     and Swiss nationals, in direct contravention of the March 8 
     agreement, are taking title to important German enterprises 
     located here, steps which further complicate the detection of 
     enemy property and the restoration of looted property.
           Respectfully yours, For the Charge d'Affaires a.i.
                                                 Daniel J. Reagan,
                                             Counselor of Legation

     for Economic Affairs.

                          ____________________