[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 46 (Friday, March 29, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H3184-H3204]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




  CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 956, COMMONSENSE PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGAL 
                           REFORM ACT OF 1996

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 394, I call up 
the conference report on the bill (H.R. 956) to establish legal 
standards and procedures for product liability litigation, and for 
other purposes.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.

[[Page H3185]]

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 2(c) of rule XXVIII, the 
conference report is considered as having been read.
  (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the House of 
March 14, 1996, at page H2238.)
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] and 
the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] each will control 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].


                             general leave

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may 
have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks 
on the conference report on H.R. 956.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 15 minutes of my time to the gentleman 
from Virginia [Mr. Bliley], chairman of the Committee on Commerce, and 
I ask unanimous consent that he may be permitted to control that 15 
minutes.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Illinois?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from 
Michigan [Mr. Dingell], former ranking member of the Committee on 
Commerce, the Dean of the House, and I ask unanimous consent that he be 
permitted to yield time in blocks.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report on 
H.R. 956, the Commonsense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996. 
This legislation is an important first step in the longstanding 
congressional effort to reform our legal system. Although the reforms 
contained in the conference report do not go as far as I and many in 
this Chamber would have liked, this legislation takes some important 
first steps in restraining the excesses of the current out-of-control 
legal system. It is a solid downpayment on long-needed reform.
  When the House passed H.R. 956, the Commonsense Product Liability 
Legal Reform Act of 1995, in March of last year, we did so on a strong 
bipartisan vote of 265 to 161. That vote sent a message that the new 
Republican majority in Congress was resolute in its commitment to bring 
about broad-based legal reform and an end to lawsuit abuse. It has 
taken us more than a year to complete this process, but we now have 
before us a conference agreement which, while not as ambitious as the 
House bill, will for the first time in the history of Congress take aim 
at the inequities and inefficiencies of our legal system.
  This is not only a first step in the direction we need to head, but 
it is a step which we can realistically enact this year. The Senate has 
already approved this measure by a vote of 59 to 40. Despite the fact 
that the agreement does not go far as reforms that the House voted 
for--notably extending relief to all civil actions--we must not lose 
sight of the fact that product liability reform is an historic 
accomplishment. It will unleash an American job creation boom and will 
translate into real growth for our economy.
  I would like to take this opportunity to highlight several key 
provisions contained in the conference report.


                           statute of repose

  One very important part of this conference agreement imposes a 
uniform statute of repose of 15 years for cases involving durable 
goods. A statute of repose specifies the period of time after 
manufacture of a product during which a lawsuit relating to the product 
may be brought. The statute of repose addresses the unfairness that 
results when manufacturers are sued on the basis of products that left 
their control many years ago. This allows U.S. manufacturers to compete 
with foreign companies that have entered the marketplace in recent 
years and face no liability exposure for very old products.
  Section 101(7) of the conference report defines the term durable good 
as meaning first, ``any product or any component of any such product 
which has a normal life expectancy of three or more years'' or second, 
any product which ``is of a character subject to allowance for 
depreciation under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 and which is: (A) 
used in a trade or business; (B) held for the production of income; or 
(C) sold or donated to a governmental or private entity for the 
production of goods, training, demonstration or any other similar 
purpose.'' Thus, the agreement describes two distinct categories of 
products which will be covered by the statute of repose provision.
  Under the first clause of the definition, a manufacturer of a product 
such as a machine tool, farm equipment, a bicycle or a ladder, a 
toaster or gas furnace, an elevator, or building materials such as 
plate glass, wall coatings, or roofing tiles could not be sued based on 
harm allegedly caused by that product more than 15 years after the 
product was first delivered. Thus, a product which has a normal life 
expectancy of 3 or more years need not meet any other criteria to 
qualify as a durable good.
  Again, the second clause of section 101(7) covers products that are 
subject to allowance for depreciation under the Internal Revenue Code 
and used in a trade or business, held for the production of income, or 
sold or donated to a governmental or private entity for the production 
of goods, training, or similar purposes. These types of products would 
also be covered by the 15-year statute of repose adopted in the 
conference agreement.
  Some have erroneously stated that the statute of repose in the 
conference report is confined to goods used in the workplace. That is 
not correct. The language of the conference agreement is clearly not 
limited in this manner, nor should it be.
  In his eloquent statement in support of the legislation, Senator 
Gorton pointed out two examples--step ladders and football helmets--
where a large proportion of the price of the product is accounted for 
by the cost of product liability actions and insurance. Senator 
Gorton's use of these examples underscores the irrationality of any 
workplace limitation on the statute of repose. A workplace limitation 
would make unjustified and unfair distinctions between products, and 
could produce wildly inconsistent results for manufacturers who may 
have no control over where, and under what circumstances, their 
products may be used.
  For example, if the statute of repose were limited in such a manner, 
a manufacturer of a ladder used in the workplace would be protected 15 
years after the ladder is sold; but if that same ladder is used in the 
home the statute of repose would not apply. A football helmet used in 
professional sports would be covered by the statute of repose; but one 
used in other settings would not be. There are numerous other examples 
of arbitrary distinctions and unequal treatment that would result from 
a workplace limitation. A manufacturer of a mower used by a farmer 
would be protected from lawsuits after 15 years, while one whose same 
product is used by a weekend gardener would not be. The conference 
report rightly eliminates these types of arbitrary and unfair 
distinctions.
  The statute of repose provision contains certain exceptions. It does 
not, for example, preempt the 18-year statute of repose contained in 
the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994. Neither does it apply 
in a case involving a vehicle used primarily for hire, where the 
existing State statute of repose, if any, would continue to apply.
  The conference agreement provisions will also not apply in the case 
where the manufacturer or seller has expressly warranted the safety or 
life expectancy of the product to be longer than 15 years. In those 
cases, the private agreement of the parties will control.
  The statute of repose also includes a toxic harm exception, which has 
been the source of a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. This 
exception was included in the Senate-passed bill to address a concern 
which had been raised about products that cause physical injuries that 
are latent, that is, injuries that do not manifest themselves for many 
years after a person is first exposed to a product.

  Because the term ``toxic harm'' was not defined in the Senate bill 
and is

[[Page H3186]]

not defined in the conference report, I want to spend a few moments 
clarifying the congressional intent with respect to the scope of this 
provision. Numerous Federal statutes and regulations contain 
definitions of the word ``toxic,'' and some of those definitions differ 
widely from others. Some of those definitions, if relied upon to 
interpret the ``toxic harm'' exception in H.R. 956, would broadly 
except from the statute of repose products where the alleged harm 
ranges from harm caused by excessive noise, cold, vibration, or 
repetitive motion--such as repetitive stress injury--to those in which 
the alleged harm is caused by chemical or other elements, to products 
like asbestos, where the injury to a person caused by the product may 
be latent for many years. The conferees did not adopt or incorporate 
these wide-ranging definitions.
  The House-passed bill contained a provision which addressed the 
problem the Senate bill sought to address, but which used different 
words. The House provision excluded from the statute of repose products 
that cause latent harm, specifically, a ``physical illness the evidence 
of which does not ordinarily appear less than 15 years after the first 
exposure to the product.'' Although the words used were different, the 
intent of the House and Senate provisions was the same: to except from 
the statute's time bar actions involving products alleged to cause 
latent illness.
  The House, therefore, receded to the Senate bill's use of the ``toxic 
harm'' language, because it too is intended to provide an exception 
only for products that cause physical illness, evidence of which cannot 
be detected until long after exposure to the product, such as, harm 
that cannot be detected within a 15-year period.
  Finally, it is important to note that the statute of repose contained 
in the conference agreement only preempts State statutes of repose 
which are longer than 15 years. It also does not limit a State statute 
of repose from extending beyond durable goods to other types of 
products. Thus, for example, a State statute of repose, which limits 
suits to those brought within 12 years of delivery of the product, and 
which covers all goods, would not be affected by the conference 
agreement.


                            punitive damages

  The conference agreement generally adopts the Senate's language 
regarding a limitation on punitive damages. Punitive damages are 
intended for cases where the defendant's conduct has been particularly 
harmful--where the conduct involved gross negligence or intentional 
conduct. They should be awarded only in the most serious cases.
  Punitive damages are generally limited to two times compensatory 
damages or $250,000 whichever is greater. This limitation will be 
imposed by the court in the event that a jury--which is not to be told 
of the cap--awards a higher amount. In the event that the cap operates 
to limit an otherwise higher jury award, the conference agreement 
allows the court to consider whether that cap is appropriate. If after 
reviewing the facts of the case the court finds that the amount of 
punitive damages allowed under the cap is inadequate, the court may 
increase the award, up to the amount of the initial jury punitive 
damage award level. In no event may the punitive damage award exceed 
the amount of the original jury verdict.
  The limitation on the court's ability to award punitive damages in 
excess of the cap in no way suggests that the court will not have the 
normal discretion to review and decrease punitive damage awards in the 
proper circumstances. This power will continue to exist whether or not 
the initial jury award exceeds the limitation imposed under the 
conference agreement.
  A special rule applies in the case of defendants with a net worth of 
$500,000 or less, or entities employing 25 or fewer full-time 
employees. For cases involving those defendants, the cap on punitive 
damages will be two times compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever 
is greater. For cases involving those defendants, the court may not 
increase the award beyond the statutory limit.

  The limitations imposed by the section are to be applied defendant by 
defendant. Thus, in a case involving two or more defendants, the 
plaintiff could potentially obtain the maximum amount of punitive 
damages from each defendant. For purposes of calculating the limit for 
each defendant, compensatory damages will include only the percentage 
of damages for which that defendant is found liable.
  The conference agreement permits a court to award additional damage 
under section 108(a)(3), but only in cases of egregious conduct. 
Egregious conduct in this context means conduct where the defendant 
against which the punitive damages are awarded specifically intended to 
cause the harm that is the subject of the action or acted with actual 
malice toward the claimant. Unless the defendant's conduct meets this 
standard, the provisions of section 108(a)(3) will not apply, and the 
court will have no authority to exceed the amount of punitive damages 
established in section 108(a)(1).
  The provisions of the conference agreement in section 108(a)(3) which 
allow the court to exceed limitations on punitive damages are intended 
by the conferees to be treated as severable in the event a court 
determines that judges lack constitutional authority to award 
additional amounts of punitive damages. Should a court so find, the 
continued operation of the limitations otherwise imposed by section 108 
will not be affected.
  Section 108 does not preempt State laws which more narrowly limit the 
amount of punitive damages that may be awarded. Thus, if a State 
imposes a dollar limit on punitive damages which is less than the cap 
set forth in section 108(a)(1), the State law will apply, and the 
conference agreement's provision allowing for the award of additional 
damages by the court will not apply. Similarly, if the State law 
contains a provision for additur, but restricts the amount of additur 
permitted to less than the initial jury award, the provisions of the 
State law will prevail.
  Thus, the punitive damage reforms of H.R. 956 are minimum standards 
and limitations designed to provide some measure of rationality; they 
would not displace the law of States with more restrictive punitive 
damage regimes. For example, many States have punitive damage 
limitations that do not allow the judge to override the statutory 
maximum. Nothing in the conference report displaces the laws of such 
States. Similarly, States are free to require higher standards of proof 
and to impose substantive requirements in addition to those in the 
conference report.
  The preemptive effect of the punitive damage reforms turns on three 
separate provisions of the conference report. First, the Federal law 
``supersedes State law only to the extent that State law applies to an 
issue covered by the Act.'' Second, the conference report provides that 
``punitive damages may, to the extent permitted by applicable State 
law, be awarded against a defendant if the claimant establishes by 
clear and convincing evidence that conduct carried out by the defendant 
with a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of 
others was the proximate cause of the harm that is the subject of the 
action.'' Third, the conference report provides that the Act ``does not 
preempt or supersede any State or Federal law to the extent that such 
law would further limit the award of punitive damages.''
  Mr. Speaker, the express preservation of State laws that further 
limit the award of punitive damages was part of the bill approved by 
the House in March, but it was not part of the amendment passed by the 
Senate. During the Conference, I led the House conferees in insisting 
that this provision be included. The conference report adopts the House 
preemption language--language that makes very clear the preemptive 
effect of the punitive damage reforms.
  Taken together with the other provisions, this provision conclusively 
demonstrates that the Act would not expand liability for punitive 
damages, or increase the permissible amount of punitive damages, in any 
State. If State law imposes substantive or procedural requirements 
concerning the circumstances under which punitive damages may be 
awarded that are more stringent than the Federal law, the State law 
controls. Similarly, if the application of State law limits on the 
amount of punitive damages results in an award of punitive damages that 
is less than that permitted under the Federal law, the State law 
controls.

[[Page H3187]]

Let me explain, Mr. Speaker, why this is the only interpretation that 
is consistent with the plain language of the conference report, as well 
as the intent of its drafters.

  Consider, for example, more stringent State standards for the award 
of punitive damages. Everyone agrees that the act would not make 
punitive damages available in States, such as Washington, that do not 
currently allow the award of punitive damages. In such States, no award 
of punitive damages is permitted by applicable State law and the 
punitive damage provisions therefore do not come into play.
  Likewise, the act would not lower the standards for awarding punitive 
damages in States such as Colorado--which requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt--or Maryland--which requires proof of actual malice. 
If a claimant meets the standard of proof in the Federal law but not 
the higher standard imposed by State law, no award of punitive damages 
is permitted by applicable state law. Again, the punitive damage 
provisions of the Federal statute simply do not apply to cases in which 
punitive damages would not otherwise be available under State law.
  In addition, State laws that impose a higher standard of proof than 
the Federal act, or that provide for additional substantive 
requirements, further limit awards of punitive damages and therefore 
are not preempted by the act, which does not preempt or supersede any 
State or Federal law to the extent that such law would further limit 
the award of punitive damages. Any State law that would make punitive 
damages unavailable even if the Federal requirements are met, or that 
would result in an award of punitive damages lower than the Federal 
limitations, is one that further limits the award of punitive damages. 
Such laws expressly are not preempted.
  It is also important to recognize, Mr. Speaker, that the act would 
not affect State caps on punitive damages. In most cases, the act would 
limit punitive damages to the greater of $250,000 or two times 
compensatory damages. At the same time, many States have limited 
punitive damages by providing a maximum dollar amount, a multiplier, or 
some other statutory limitation on the amount of punitive damages. In 
many cases, application of these State limitations would result in a 
lower punitive damage award than would application of the Federal 
limitations. In such cases, these State laws would remain in effect.
  For example, Virginia has enacted an absolute cap of $350,000 for 
punitive damages. Illinois limits punitive damages to three times 
economic damages. Application of these limitations to a punitive damage 
award results in the maximum amount of punitive damages permitted by 
applicable State law. Even if the Federal law would allow a higher 
award of punitive damages, therefore, the State law limitations would 
control. By contrast, if the Federal limitations resulted in a lower 
amount, the Federal limitations would control.
  Lest there be any doubt on this subject, the conference report 
expressly provides that the act ``does not preempt or supersede any 
State or Federal law to the extent that such law would further limit 
the award of punitive damages.'' This provision can only mean that if 
application of a State limitation would result in a lower award of 
punitive damages than the Federal rule, the further limit of the State 
law controls.


                            Commercial Loss

  The conference revisions to H.R. 956 are intended to clarify 
congressional intent concerning claims for commercial loss. Commercial 
loss, as defined in section 101(5), means any loss or damage to a 
product itself, loss relating to a dispute over its value, or 
consequential economic loss. As further stated in the definition, any 
claim for any of these three types of loss is to be governed by the 
Uniform Commercial Code or State law versions of its provisions, or by 
contract law. This definitional requirement that all actions for 
commercial loss be governed by commercial or contract law is 
accompanied by the affirmative mandate in section 102(a)(2) that any 
civil action brought for commercial loss shall be governed only by 
applicable commercial or contract law. Congressional intent is to 
codify the historical approach that tort theories are not applicable to 
such claims, and may not be employed with respect to them.

  The reforms contained in H.R. 956 are aimed predominantly at 
correcting certain abuses and providing some reasonable uniformity in 
the tort law of products liability. Claims for commercial loss 
traditionally do not fall in the tort realm, but are dealt with in 
accordance with the contractual agreement created by the parties 
themselves, or by the UCC. This economic loss rule is typified by the 
opinions of the California supreme court in Seely versus White Motor 
Company, and the U.S. Supreme Court in East River Steamship Corporation 
versus Transamerica Delavel. Despite limited judicial inroads by other 
courts that have sought inappropriately to engraft tort branches onto 
the commercial tree, the bill excludes commercial loss from the scope 
of its tort-related provisions. In so excluding commercial loss, 
Congress did not seek to carve out a category of loss undeserving of 
the bill's protections, but rather to recognize that there is a 
massive, extant body of commercial and contract law historically more 
suited to such claims. In order to assure that such claims are not 
subject to tort system abuses that the bill aims to rectify, the 
conference chose affirmatively to mandate that commercial loss claims 
be governed exclusively by commercial or contract law. Such a rule of 
law is necessary to promote uniformity and predictability, in the 
interests of interstate commerce and due process. This position is 
entirely consistent with the House Judiciary Committee report (H. Rept. 
104-64), and codifies the common law rule.
  This bill does not intend to disrupt or affect application of the 
economic loss doctrine. Congress fully supports the traditional rule 
that disputes that essentially involve failed commercial expectations, 
damage or loss to a product itself, or diminished product value, are 
not recoverable in tort. Exclusion of commercial loss from the bill is 
intended to protect the body of extant contract and commercial law, and 
while assuring that tort or other inappropriate causes of action are 
not engrafted onto that body of law.


                         definition of product

  The definition of a product in section 101(14) of the conference 
agreement is not intended to include improvements to real property. A 
manufacturer is able to test its product and control quality in a way 
that is impossible on a construction site where a variety of systems 
are being coordinated to create a more complex structure. Each 
construction project is built from an extremely complicated and unique 
set of drawings and specifications involving interrelated systems and 
many individual products specified by a design professional and over 
which the constructor has little control. Forty-seven States have 
recognized this distinction between a product and an improvement to 
real property by enacting specific statutes of repose for improvements 
to real property. It was the intent of the conferees that the 
definition of product in H.R. 956 honor this distinction.
  Mr. Speaker, after nearly two decades of effort to fashion a 
comprehensive set of product liability reforms, we have crafted a 
bipartisan consensus package of bottom-up reforms. These reforms are 
desperately needed to restore some fairness to our present system and 
to remove roadblocks to our country's economic growth and job creation. 
I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the conference report to 
accompany H.R. 956.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, this is a continuation of the war on public 
safety. We have before us a conference measure which would not only cap 
and limit the amount of damages an injured victim can recover, but 
would, in instances, completely cut off our consumers' and workers' 
rights to seek compensation, even in uncontested cases of negligence.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill, the conference measure before us, in every 
conceivable way has been designed to disadvantage American consumers 
and benefit negligent corporations. The question that hangs over this 
discussion is why.
  Remember, the Conyers amendment to get tough with foreign 
corporations,

[[Page H3188]]

which we voted twice, was dropped in conference, to require the foreign 
corporations to subject themselves to the discovery and jurisdiction in 
the U.S. courts as a condition of doing business in this country, just 
like everybody else. What is wrong with this, and why did the 
conference committee specifically refute the judgment of the majority 
of Members, Democratic and Republican, about this provision?
  To make matters worse, Mr. Speaker, we are considering the bill at 
the same time the majority leader of the House, the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Armey, is proposing to completely eliminate safety agencies 
like the Consumer Product Safety Commission, while simultaneously 
slashing and eliminating safety regulations. Why?
  If Members do not think that the threat of private lawsuits can help 
keep dangerous products off the market, which is what we hope to 
continue to do in our legal system, just ask the parents of children 
who have been killed by flammable pajamas, or the women who have been 
maimed by the Dalkon shield. Both these products are now off the 
market, thanks to the threat of punitive damages.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill will not reduce litigation, but will stack 
jury awards in favor of those with large incomes or that can afford 
powerful legal counsel, and it would remove the most important 
deterrence that stopped dangerous products from coming into our homes 
and communities. So the bill will not reduce litigation, Mr. Speaker, 
because, contrary to the myth, product liability suits represent a 
minute portion of litigation in the United States.
  Is there a law student in any school in America that is not aware 
that product liability suits represent less than 2 percent of the 
litigation carried on in the U.S. courts? Is there anybody that does 
not know that? This is not a partisan fact, it is not a factoid: Less 
than 2 percent of all the suits in the country involve product 
liability; and also, that product liability premiums are going down.
  Punitive damages is also a myth that must be addressed among lawyers 
and Members of Congress. There are only an average of 14 awards a year 
in punitive damages. Please, 14 awards a year in punitive damages. When 
they are awarded, they prevent against deadly dangers in the 
marketplace, asbestos cases, dangerous intrauterine devices. The cap of 
$250,000 on punitive damages is tragic. No Fortune 500 company, or some 
not even Fortune 500, will be deterred from placing dangerous products 
on the market because of a quarter of a million dollar threat of 
punitive damages. It will be factored into the pricing.
  Mr. Speaker, I think more and more of us are aware of that, and are 
going to oppose this measure for those reasons.
  Mr. Speaker, in this measure before us, a conference bill, we limit 
the victim's rights to recover what are known as noneconomic damages 
when they are joint tort feasors. So if a dangerous product induces a 
loss of reproductive capacity in a housewife, say, she may likely be 
limited in her recovery where there are joint tort feasors; but if a 
corporate executive of some expense is injured by the same product or a 
different one and loses his large salary, the bill ensures that he will 
be fully compensated.

  Mr. Speaker, I appeal to Members on the sense of fairness, this is a 
one-way street of Federalism: Return power to the States, as long as it 
disadvantages consumers and working people.
  Finally, do not forget about the special interest favors lurking in 
the bill. Gun sellers and bar owners have obtained special language 
limiting their potential liability for careless sales to third parties. 
Did Members know that was there? It is. Electricity, water, and gas 
utilities corporations have obtained a provision overruling liability 
laws in States which hold them strictly liable for utility disasters. 
Do Members know that is in the bill?
  Like ministers, Congressmen can preach through little babies' cries. 
It does not bother me a bit.
  There are other hidden favors. Mothers Against Drunk Drivers are 
opposed to the bill. Special interests have poured $26 million into it 
to see these special things occur. Mr. Speaker, this bill is of special 
interests, by special interests, and for special interests. The 
administration has indicated that it will veto it. It is going nowhere, 
again, so vote against this extremely damaging, discriminatory piece of 
legislation.
  The following is a more detailed description of the final conference 
report, outlining my concerns with the bill.
     Section 1. Short Title and Table of Contents
       Sec. 2. Findings and Purposes.--Sets forth a number of 
     findings, most notably that our nation is experiencing a 
     litigation explosion which harms our competitiveness. What 
     the conference report fails to note is that the most recent 
     study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that product 
     liability cases represent a mere 1.67 percent of civil cases. 
     And the clear trend of product liability filings as well as 
     damages awarded has been decreasing: according to the 
     National Association of Insurance Commissioners, product 
     liability insurance premiums have dropped more than 28 
     percent between 1989 and 1994. The incidence of punitive 
     damages in product liability cases is far rarer yet: a study 
     by Professor Michael Rustad, termed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
     as the ``most exhaustive study'' ever, found an average of 
     only 14 such cases per year from 1965-1990. The conference 
     report also fails to note that the bill will have very little 
     effect on American competitiveness, since the total of all 
     product liability costs represent a mere one cent per five 
     dollar purchase (according to a comprehensive study completed 
     by the Consumer Federation of America). The one provision in 
     the House bill which would have helped U.S. firms compete--by 
     making it easier for American consumers to sue negligent 
     foreign manufacturers on the same terms as American firms--
     was quietly dropped in conference, even though the Conyers 
     Amendment on this matter passed by a bipartisan vote of 285-
     166, and the House later approved a motion instructing 
     conferees to retain the provision by a vote of 256-142.
       Section 101. Definitions.--The term ``product'' is defined 
     to include (i) electricity, water and gas utilities which are 
     ordinarily subject to a strict liability in tort, and (ii) 
     human tissue, organs, and blood products (both categories of 
     items which were specifically excluded from the House-passed 
     bill). The utility provision has the effect of granting 
     utilities in 44 States the benefit of the various damage caps 
     and limitations in the bill. No rationale has been proffered 
     for treating utilities in these states more beneficially than 
     others.
       Sec. 102. Applicability and Preemption.--The conference 
     report preempts product liability law in all 50 states and 
     the District of Columbia to the extent they are inconsistent 
     with the report. This represents one of the most significant 
     shifts ever in power from the states to the federal 
     government. Despite the fact that 47 states have altered 
     their product liability laws in the last decade, states will 
     no longer be free to promulgate laws which protect their 
     citizens from dangerous and harmful products (although the 
     bill generally does not preempt states from having more 
     restrictive anti-consumer laws). The bill does not apply to 
     limit the product liability rights of businesses suing 
     manufacturers because it includes a ``commercial loss'' 
     exception. In other words, the bill only applies to limit the 
     rights of workers and individual citizens, not corporations.
       Sec. 103. Seller and Lessor Liability.--Provides that a 
     seller or lessor may only be sued for breach of an express 
     warranty, failure to exercise reasonable care, or intentional 
     wrongdoing, unless the court determines the victim would be 
     unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer in any 
     state court. This could force victims to bring actions in 
     out-of-state venues against outside manufacturers, rather 
     than being able to bring suit against their instate seller 
     who could then bring the manufacturer into the action. This 
     section could also have the effect of eliminating a seller's 
     common law liability for failure to warn a consumer about its 
     unsafe characteristics and eliminate the doctrine of implied 
     product warranties by sellers. Although this section does not 
     apply to ``negligent entrustment'' actions, such as those 
     relating to careless sale of liquor or guns, the provision is 
     drafted in a manner so that such liquor and gun sellers would 
     benefit from the other sections of the bill (e.g., relating 
     to limits on punitive damages and joint and several 
     liability). The definition of ``manufacturer'' is so narrowly 
     written that the entity who assembled the product may in some 
     instances not be included within its scope (e.g., the 
     assembler used the preexisting design of another party). In 
     such an event there may be no responsible party for the 
     injured victim to sue--the seller is relieved of liability 
     and there is no ``manufacturer.''
       Sec. 104. Defense Based on Claimant's use of Alcohol or 
     Drugs.--Alters the common law rule of contributory negligence 
     (under which a victim's damages are limited to the extent 
     that his or her own negligence contributed to the accident in 
     question) by specifying that it shall be a complete defense 
     to a product liability action if the victim was intoxicated 
     and was more than 50% responsible for the accident. Since the 
     section provides for no exceptions, it can result in a number 
     of unfair results. For example manufacturers of devices 
     designed to protect against using a product while 
     intoxicated--such as breathalyzers now installed on some 
     cars--would appear to be fully immunized from liability.
       Sec. 105. Misuse or Alteration.--Defendants may have their 
     liability lessened by the percentage of liability 
     attributable to any alteration or misuse of the product. This 
     would

[[Page H3189]]

     even apply in cases where a third party (other than an 
     employer) was responsible for the alteration.
       Sec. 106. Time Limitations of Liability.--Section 106(a) 
     provides for a nationwide two-year statute of limitations, 
     preempting longer statutes in 25 states and the District of 
     Columbia. Section 106(b) creates a new federal ``statute of 
     repose,'' barring any product liability action for certain 
     goods not brought within fifteen years of the date of 
     delivery. The statute of repose applies not only to business 
     goods (such as machinery), but to consumer goods (such as 
     bicycles and microwaves) having a life expectancy of three or 
     more years. The statute of repose provision would result in 
     many occasions where a defective product leads to harm that 
     is totally non-compensable. The one-sided nature of the 
     statute of repose provision is highlighted by the fact that 
     it does not preempt state laws providing for a shorter 
     statute of repose.
       Sec. 107. Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures.--
     Parties are encouraged to pursue alternative dispute 
     resolution under applicable state law, but there are no 
     penalties for parties who refuse to participate.
       Sec. 108. Punitive Damages.--Would arbitrarily limit the 
     maximum amount of punitive damages which may be awarded to 
     the greater of two times compensatory damages or $250,000 
     (although the judge would have very limited discretion to 
     allow an increased award based on a variety of very narrow 
     extenuating factors). Lawsuits against individuals whose net 
     worth does not exceed $500,000 and businesses with less than 
     25 full-time employees would be subject to a reduced punitive 
     damages cap equal to the lesser of $250,000 or two times 
     compensatory damages. The bill would also limit the award of 
     punitive damages to only those cases where the victim had 
     established by ``clear and convincing evidence'' that the 
     injury was the ``proximate cause'' of conduct specifically 
     intended to cause harm manifesting a ``conscious, flagrant 
     indifference to the rights and safety of others.'' Finally, 
     the section would permit any party to request a separate 
     proceeding to determine whether punitive damages should be 
     awarded and the extent of such damages. Again, the punitive 
     damages cap is written so it only preempts states with no 
     punitive damage caps or higher caps, it does not preempt 
     states with lower caps. (This could create confusion to the 
     extent a state's cap is more lenient in some respects, and 
     more restrictive in other respects than the federal 
     standard.)
       These changes would in large part eliminate the role of 
     punitive damages in the product liability system, thereby 
     reducing the system's overall deterrent effect. For a civil 
     case, these proposed evidentiary and substantive standards 
     come close to ``criminalizing'' tort law for purposes of 
     punitive damages: in other words, an injured victim would 
     almost have to show that a manufacturer acted with ``criminal 
     intent''--and not gross negligence. Moreover, the legislation 
     creates a standard of ``conscious indifference'' which 
     appears to be so narrow as to be mutually exclusive. 
     Permitting parties to bifurcate proceedings concerning the 
     award of punitive damages will lead to far more costly and 
     time consuming proceedings, generally working to the 
     disadvantage of harmed victims. The proposed caps largely 
     eliminate incentives for manufacturers to remove life-
     threatening products from the market place, and instead allow 
     defendants to substitute ``cost-benefit'' analyses based on 
     the estimated value of lives. The exception for ``small 
     businesses'' would insulate more than \2/3\ of American 
     businesses from significant punitive damages (according to 
     Census Bureau data), and create perverse new incentives to 
     avoid expanding employment opportunities. The ``additur'' 
     procedure allowing the court to increase punitive damages 
     above the statutory cap may well be held to be an 
     unconstitutional violation of the defendant's right to a jury 
     trial in federal court. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 
     (1935).
       Sec. 109. Liability for Certain Claims Related to Death.--
     This incorporates provisions from the Senate bill so that the 
     punitive damages cap does not apply to a particular action 
     brought in Alabama.
       Sec. 110. Joint and Several Liability--Would supersede 
     traditional state common law by eliminating joint and several 
     liability for non-economic damages, such as pain and 
     suffering. (The justification for the common law rule is that 
     it is better that a wrongdoer who can afford to do so pay 
     more than its share, rather than an innocent victim obtain 
     less than full recovery; also, a defendant who pays more than 
     its share of damages can seek contribution from the other 
     defendants.) The provision has the effect of discriminating 
     against groups less likely to be able to establish 
     significant economic damages, such as women, minorities, 
     seniors and the poor. Moreover, the elimination of joint and 
     several liability would actually increase courts' caseloads 
     and increase litigation costs, by discouraging settlements 
     and requiring injured consumers to initiate multiple claims.
       Sec. 111. Workers Compensation Subrogation--In addition to 
     codifying certain state laws permitting employers to seek 
     subrogation from their employees, this provision allows a 
     responsible manufacturer to seek contribution from a 
     negligent employer up to the amount of workers compensation 
     benefits paid by the employer. (The provision also provides 
     for reimbursement of the employer's legal fees by the 
     manufacturer if the employer is wrongfully brought into an 
     action.) Legal aspects of workers compensation are new issues 
     that the House has never considered or debated before.
       Title II--Limitation on Liability relating to Medical 
     Implants--Suppliers of raw material and component parts used 
     to assemble medical implants (such as breast implants) would 
     only be liable under State law if a victim establishes the 
     supplier failed to meet the contract requirements or 
     specifications for the implant. The bill also specifies new 
     rules for bringing suits against biomaterials manufacturers 
     and sellers, provides for an expedited removal procedure for 
     the biomaterials suits and provides for reimbursement of the 
     defendant's legal fees if the victim's claim against it is 
     found to be meritless. (No reimbursement mechanism is 
     provided for the victim if the suit is successful, however.)
       Title III--Limits on Application; Effective Date--Specifies 
     that federal appellate court decisions supersede other court 
     interpretations and the Act applies to lawsuits brought after 
     the date of enactment.

  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.
  (Mr. BLILEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report 
on H.R. 956, the Commonsense Product Liability and legal Reform Act of 
1995. This is a projobs, procompetitiveness bill that will help to 
bring fairness and accountability back into our legal system.
  Almost two decades ago, the Commerce Committee began a bipartisan 
effort to reform our product liability laws. Over the years, we have 
held dozens of hearings, receiving written and oral testimony from 
hundreds of witnesses. Early last year, the committee reported 
legislation which is incorporated into the conference report before us 
now. And today, as part of the Contract with America, and with the 
leadership of the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee, we 
stand ready to put some historic changes into place.
  I regret that the conference report falls somewhat short of the 
reforms included in our earlier House bill, which passed the House by a 
wide, bipartisan margin. Nonetheless, the conference report contains a 
number of reforms which the Commerce Committee has worked on, and which 
will clearly help to relieve the burden of excessive litigation.
  For example, the conference report still contains critical 
protections for biomaterials suppliers developed in our committee to 
ensure that consumers will have continued access to lifesaving and 
lifeenhancing medical devices. It also still contains provisions for 
reasonableness and balance in product liability punitive damage awards, 
and sets forth enumerated guidelines which should be considered before 
such awards are made. In addition, it includes important exceptions for 
environmental claims, and allows for reasonable limits on the life 
expectancy for products in the workplace.
  These reforms are essential to the long-term competitiveness of the 
American economy, as we established in our work in the Commerce 
Committee over the past number of years.
   Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record, relevant portions of the 
Commerce's Committee's report on H.R. 917, legislation which was 
incorporated in significant part into H.R. 956, the bill before us 
today.

               Excerpts From House Report 104-63, Part 1


                  background and need for legislation

       For two decades, the Committee on Commerce has grappled 
     with the issue of product liability reform. After developing 
     an extensive record on the subject of product liability law, 
     the Committee has concluded that the present system places an 
     enormous burden on interstate commerce, inflates prices, 
     stifles innovation, and subjects manufacturers and sellers to 
     a capricious lottery where sanctions can exceed any found in 
     criminal law. In light of these facts, Congressional action 
     is long overdue.
       Historically, injury caused by a defective product gave 
     rise to a tort action in State courts. As transportation and 
     communications systems developed, more products crossed State 
     boundaries, increasing the volume of interstate commerce 
     exponentially, creating more interstate product liability. 
     From 1973 to 1988, product liability suits in Federal courts 
     increased 1000%; in State courts the increase was between 
     300% and 500%. Meanwhile, tort doctrine in State courts 
     evolved from fault-based standards to strict liability for 
     manufacturers and sellers.
       Tort costs have risen significantly as well, reaching an 
     estimated $132 billion in 1991. (Tillinghast. (1992) tort 
     Cost Trends: An International Perspective. New York:

[[Page H3190]]

     Tillinghast.) Products manufactured in one State are now sold 
     in another and cause injury in yet others. Because each State 
     has different rules governing recovery in tort, forum 
     shopping is encouraged, common law is developed unevenly, and 
     manufacturers are found liable for conduct in one State that 
     would fail to give rise to a cause of action in another.
       American manufacturers and sellers have found that, given 
     the multiplicity of evidentiary standards in State tort law, 
     products may be found defective even after full compliance 
     with all applicable regulations. The vast majority of product 
     liability cases are filed in State courts. This leaves 
     manufacturers and sellers without the benefit of uniform 
     standards on which to base conduct in the design, manufacture 
     and sale of goods. Manufacturers are told that their products 
     must be ``safe,'' without being told what constitutes safety.
       In many jurisdictions, liability on the part of a 
     manufacturer for economic and punitive damages is found in 
     the absence of negligence or malice. The doctrine of joint 
     and several liability often compels a defendant to pay 
     damages far in excess of his proportionate responsibility for 
     the injury, and the plaintiff's Bar has become remarkably 
     skilled at identifying and joining defendants with deep 
     pockets who, despite limited responsibility for injury, would 
     rather settle a case than face the costs and publicity 
     associated with litigation.
       Because over 70% of products manufactured in any one State 
     cross State borders before the point of final sale, American 
     manufacturers must contend with the uncertainty created by 51 
     different product liability jurisdictions in their own 
     domestic market. The result is a de facto ``liability tax'' 
     which chills interstate commerce and deprives consumers of 
     product choice available to consumers in other nations 
     throughout the world. Unfortunately, instead of encouraging 
     the development of safer products, the present system often 
     forces manufacturers to increase product prices or withdraw 
     products from the market altogether. According to surveys 
     reported to the committee by Pace University Professor of Law 
     M. Stuart Madden, because of liability costs, 36% of American 
     manufacturers have withdrawn products from the world 
     market, 47% have withdrawn products from the domestic 
     market, 39% have decided not to introduce new products, 
     and 25% have discontinued new product research.
       The case of Bendectin is illustrative: Bendectin is the 
     only prescription drug in the United States ever approved for 
     combating nausea and vomiting in pregnancy. Introduced in 
     1956, the drug was used in over 30 million pregnancies. In 
     1969, allegations that Bendectin could cause birth defects 
     appeared in some scientific journals. Despite the fact that 
     no causal relationship between Bendectin and birth defects 
     was ever established (the Food and Drug Administration 
     affirmed the drug's safety), nearly 1,700 product liability 
     suits were brought against the manufacturer.
       Almost all cases that went to court were decided in favor 
     of the manufacturer, yet annual revenues from the sale of the 
     drug barely exceeded legal fees and insurance premiums. The 
     manufacturer voluntarily withdrew Bendectin from the market 
     in 1983. While the rate of birth defects has not declined 
     since Bendectin was withdrawn, the cost in the U.S. for 
     treatment of severe nausea during pregnancy is now nearly $40 
     million per year.
       Another example comes from the sporting goods industry. In 
     a 1988 Forbes magazine article, author Peter Huber noted that 
     product liability legal fees and insurance premiums accounted 
     for 55% of the price of a football helmet. (Peter Huber. 
     (Oct. 1988) Forbes ``The Litigation Scandal.'') In 1988, 
     Rawlings Sporting Goods announced that it would no longer 
     manufacture, distribute, or sell football helmets. Rawlings 
     was the 18th company in 18 years to abandon the football 
     helmet business due to liability exposure, joining Spaulding, 
     MacGregor, Medalist, Hutch, and other manufacturers. As one 
     commentator observed:
       ``This situation is not what the crafters of product 
     liability law intended. Product liability law was created to 
     improve product safety and compensate victims of unsafe 
     products. It was not meant to penalize conscientious 
     companies that provide products and services vital to the 
     U.S. economy.''

     (Frederick B. Sontag. (1994) Product Liability and 
     Innovation. ``Indirect Effects of Product Liability on a 
     Corporation.'' National Academy of Engineering.)

       In addition to driving products from the marketplace, 
     raising prices, and draining capital, the patchwork of 
     liability standards throughout the nation severely inhibits 
     the competitiveness of U.S. industry. While it is true that a 
     foreign company doing business in the United States is 
     subject to the same liability laws as a U.S. company, most 
     U.S. companies have had products in the marketplace for 
     longer than their foreign competitors.
       Since many states have no statute of repose, products which 
     have been in use for 15 or more years can still expose a 
     manufacturer to liability. The costs of insuring against 
     product liability and legal fees spent in liability lawsuits 
     are built into the cost of such products, creating a price 
     disadvantage for domestic producers facing well financed 
     foreign competition with far less liability exposure.
       American industry's chief foreign competitors face no such 
     handicap in their domestic markets. Both the European 
     Community (EC) and Japan have uniform product 
     liability regulations. The EC Directive establishing 
     product liability standards was published in 1985, and 
     differs significantly from product liability law in the 
     United States in the following ways: first, a single 
     definition of product ``defect'' applies; second, if a 
     product complies with mandatory regulations issued by 
     public authorities, the manufacturer has no liability 
     exposure; third, noneconomic damages (pain and suffering) 
     are limited; fourth, punitive damages are generally not 
     allowed; fifth, most EC countries limit liability to known 
     technical knowledge; and sixth, a 10-year statute of 
     repose begins when the manufacturer puts a product into 
     the stream of commerce. Operating under the provisions of 
     this Directive, European manufacturers and sellers pay, on 
     average, twenty times less for liability coverage than 
     their American competitors.
       The status quo also retards the ability of American firms 
     to create jobs. A memorandum dated November 30, 1990, from 
     the Office of Vice President Quayle to Members of 
     Congressional Committees considering product liability reform 
     legislation states that 40% of chief executive said product 
     liability has had a major impact on their business; 36% 
     stopped some manufacturing as a result; 15% laid off workers, 
     and 8% closed plants. Almost 90% of American companies will 
     be defendants in a product liability claim at least once 
     according to a 1988 Rand Institute study. In the study, of 
     19,500 companies surveyed, 17,000 were lead defendants in at 
     least one product liability suit.
       In summarizing the background and need for H.R. 917, the 
     Committee finds itself in agreement with the observations of 
     Francois Castaing:
       ``It is well understood that product liability laws have a 
     purpose. They are supposed to compensate for injury, promote 
     safety, and penalize gross negligence. If a corporation is 
     irresponsible, it should be held accountable. But in the 
     United States, the situation has gone beyond punishing gross 
     negligence. Now punishment is meted out for many risks that 
     simply cannot be avoided when a product is produced and sold 
     to a public that has wide discretion in how it chooses to use 
     that product. When no distinctions are made in assigning 
     responsibility for risk and companies are held responsible 
     (and penalized) for all risk--from those attributable to the 
     vagaries of human nature to those truly within a company's 
     aegis--the ability to innovate, engineer, and compete is 
     compromised.''

     Francois J. Castaing. (1994) Product Liability and 
     Innovation. ``Automotive Engineering and Product Liability,'' 
     National Academy of Engineering.

       The present product liability system in the United States 
     unfairly denies consumers the right of free choice in the 
     marketplace and inflates prices for available products. For 
     manufacturers and sellers, the system discourages innovation, 
     retards capital formation, and creates a distinct competitive 
     disadvantage in the world market.
       The Committee has developed an extensive record on the 
     negative impact of product liability on commerce in the 
     United States, and has concluded that Congressional action is 
     long overdue. Support for product liability reform within the 
     Commerce Committee has always been bipartisan, and 
     legislation has been reported from the Committee to the House 
     under both Republican and Democratic Chairmen.


                                hearings

       During the 104th Congress, the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
     Trade, and Hazardous Materials held one day of hearings on 
     H.R. 917, the Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, and 
     related legislation, including section 103 of H.R. 10, the 
     Common Sense Legal Reform Act. Additionally, since the 99th 
     Congress, the Committee has held 12 days of hearings on the 
     subject of product liability reform and that record 
     contributed significantly to the Committee's consideration of 
     H.R. 917.
       On February 21, 1995, the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, 
     and Hazardous Materials held a hearing on H.R. 917, the 
     Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act and Related 
     legislation. Testimony was received from Mr. Paul R. Huard, 
     Senior Vice President, National Association of Manufacturers; 
     Mr. Larry S. Stewart, President, Association of Trial Lawyers 
     of America; Mr. Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., General Counsel, 
     Product Liability Coordinating Committee; Mr. Daniel E. 
     Richardson, Administrator, Latta Road Nursing Home, 
     (testifying on behalf of the National Federation of 
     Independent Business); Mr. Jeffery J. Teitz, Executive 
     Committee, Vice-Chair, Assembly on Federal Issues of the 
     National Conference of State Legislators; and Mr. James A. 
     Anderson, Jr., Vice President of Government Relations, 
     National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors.
       During the 103rd Congress, the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
     Consumer Protection and Competitiveness held three days of 
     hearings on H.R. 1910, the Fairness in Product Liability Act, 
     whose language is closely tracked by H.R. 917. The first 
     hearing was held on February 2, 1994 and focused on the 
     impact of product liability reform on the health care 
     industry. The Subcommittee received testimony from Ms. 
     Stephanie Kanarek; Mr. Ted R. Mannen, Executive Vice-
     President, Health Industry Manufacturers Association; Mr.

[[Page H3191]]

     Calvin A. Campbell, Jr., President and CEO, Goodman Equipment 
     Corporation (testifying on behalf of the American Mining 
     Congress); Ms. Lucinda Finley, Professor, State University of 
     New York at Buffalo Law School; Mr. Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., 
     General Counsel, Product Liability Coordinating Committee; 
     and Mr. Bruce Finzen, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi.
       The second hearing sought a broad spectrum of opinion on 
     the bill from consumers, manufacturers, and academics and was 
     held on April 21, 1994. The Subcommittee received testimony 
     from Mr. Marcus Griffith, President, The Hairlox Company 
     (testifying on behalf of the National Association of 
     Manufacturers); Ms. Dianne Weaver, Weaver, Weaver & Lipton; 
     Ms. Norma Wallis, President, Livernois Engineering 
     (testifying on behalf of the Association of Manufacturing 
     Technology); Mr. Robert Creamer, Executive Director, Illinois 
     Public Action; Professor Stuart Madden, Pace University 
     School of Law; and Professor Andrew Popper, Deputy Dean, 
     Washington College of Law, The American University.
       The Subcommittee received testimony from victims of 
     defective products and other interested parties on May 3, 
     1994, from Janey and Lawrence Fair; Amy Goldrich for Sybil 
     Goldrich, Command Trust Network; Charles Ruhi (accompanied by 
     Don Singer, Attorney); James L. Martin, Director, State & 
     Federal Affairs, National Governors Association; Emmett W. 
     McCarthy, Dreis and Krump Manufacturing Company; James 
     Oliphant, President, Defense Research Institute; Liberty 
     Magarian (testifying on behalf of the Product liability 
     Coordinating Committee); and Larry R. Rogers, Power, Rogers, 
     & Smith.
       In the 100th Congress, the Subcommittee on Commerce, 
     Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness held seven hearings 
     on Federal product liability reform covering punitive damages 
     reform, joint and several liability, workplace safety, the 
     impact of product liability reform on the general aviation 
     industry, state-of-the-art and government standards 
     defenses, the effect of product liability reform on the 
     affordability and availability of product liability 
     insurance, and the issue of product liability reform in 
     general.
       Witnesses included: Representatives Jim Slattery and Al 
     Swift; the Honorable Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce; 
     The Honorable Harry L. Carrico, Chief Justice, Supreme Court 
     of Virginia; Mr. Robert H. Mallot, Chairman and CEO, FMC 
     Corporation; Mr. Victor E. Schwartz, Esq., Crowell & Moring; 
     Mr. John B. Curico, Chairman, President, and CEO, Mack 
     Trucks, Inc.; Mr. Marcus M. Griffith, Hairlox Company; Mr. 
     Joseph Goffman, Public Citizen; Ms. Pamela Gilbert, United 
     States Public Interest Research Group; Mr. Gene Kimmelman, 
     Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of America; Robert 
     L. Habush, President, Association of Trial Lawyers of 
     America; Mr. John T. Subak, Action Commission to Improve the 
     Tort Liability System, American Bar Association; Mr. Stephen 
     Daniels, Project Director, Punitive Damage Project, American 
     Bar Foundation; Professor David G. Owen, University of South 
     Carolina School of Law; Mr. Malcolm Wheeler, Esq., Skadden, 
     Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Mr. Bill Wagner, Esq., Wagner, 
     Cunningham; Mr. George S. Frazza Esq., General Counsel, 
     Johnson and Johnson Products, Inc.; Professor David Randolph 
     Smith, Vanderbilt University School of Law; Professor Aaron 
     Twerski, Brooklyn Law School; Senator Robert Frey, National 
     Conference of State Legislators; Mr. Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., 
     Esq., Kirkland & Ellis (representing Lawyers for Civil 
     Justice); Mr. Robert Martin, Esq., Martin, Pringle, Oliver, 
     Tripplett & Wallace (representing Beech Aircraft 
     Corporation); Mr. Charles T. Hvass, Jr.; Mr. Frederick B. 
     Sontag, President, Unison Industries; Mr. C.O. Miller, Safety 
     Systems, Inc.; Mr. John S. Yodice, Esq., General Counsel, 
     Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association; Mr. Jonathan Howe, 
     President, National Business Aircraft Association; Mr. David 
     M. Silberman, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO; Mr. John 
     Mottley III, Director of Federal Government Relations, 
     National Federation of Independent Business; Mr. Richard 
     Duffy Director, Department of Occupational Health and Safety, 
     International Association of Firefighters (accompanied by 
     Cheryl Gannon, Legislative Assistant); Mr. Kent Martin, 
     Chairman of Government Affairs Committee, National Printing 
     Equipment and Supply Association (accompanied by Mr. Mark J. 
     Nuzzaco, NPES Government Affairs Director); Mr. James A. 
     Mack, Public Affairs Director, National Machine Tool Builders 
     Association; Mr. Jonathan Reynolds, Esq., Cosco, Inc.; Mr. 
     Clarence Ditlow, Executive Director, Center for Auto Safety; 
     Mr. Geoffry R.W. Smith, Esq., McCutchen, Doyle, Brown, and 
     Enerson; Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Health Research Group; Mr. R. 
     David Pittle, Technical Director, Consumers Union; Professor 
     Nicolas A. Ashford, Associate Professor of Technology and 
     Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mr. Howard M. 
     Acosta, Esq., Rahdert, Acosta, and Dickson, P.A.; Professor 
     Jerry Phillips, University of Tennessee School of Law; 
     Richard A. Bowman, Esq., Bowman and Brook; Mr. Frank S. 
     Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, United States Small 
     Business Administration; Professor Joseph A. Page, Georgetown 
     University Law Center; Mr. Edward H. Southton, Deputy 
     Commissioner for Company Supervision, Office of the Insurance 
     Commissioner; Ms. Linda Matson, State Director, National 
     Federation of Independent Business (accompanied by Ms. Mary 
     Jane Norville, National Federal of Independent Business); Ms. 
     Jean Stinson, Vice President, R.W. Summers Railroad 
     Contractor, Inc.; Ms. Debra Ballen, Vice President for Policy 
     Development and Research, American Insurance Association; and 
     Mr. Thomas A. O'Day, Associate Vice President, Alliance of 
     American Insurers (accompanied by Mavis A. Walters, Senior 
     Vice President, Insurance Services Office).


             section-by-section analysis of the legislation

     Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.
       This section provides the title of the Act and a table of 
     contents.
     Section 2. Preemption.
       This section establishes the scope of the Common Sense 
     Product Liability Reform Act, governing any product liability 
     action in any State or Federal court brought against a 
     manufacturer or product seller, on any theory, for harm 
     caused by a product. It does not include actions for 
     commercial loss. State law is only superseded to the extent 
     that State law applies to the same issue. The Act does not 
     affect the sovereign immunity of the States, choice-of-law 
     rules, venue, or environmental laws.
     Section 3. Product Seller Liability.
       This section sets forth the standard of liability for 
     product sellers. A product seller is only liable for harm 
     caused by its product where (1) the claimant establishes that 
     the product was sold by the seller, that the seller failed to 
     exercise reasonable care regarding the product, and that such 
     failure was a proximate cause of the claimant's harm; (2) the 
     seller made an independent express warranty, the product 
     failed to conform to the warranty, and such failure caused 
     the claimant's harm; or (3) the seller was engaged in 
     intentional wrongdoing as determined under State law, and 
     such wrongdoing was the proximate cause of the claimant's 
     harm. Sellers are not required to inspect a product where 
     there is no reasonable opportunity to inspect such product in 
     a manner which would reasonably have revealed the aspect of 
     the product which caused the claimant's harm. A seller would 
     become liable, however, by stepping into the shoes of the 
     manufacturer if the State where the action is filed would not 
     be able to serve process against the manufacturer, or if the 
     State determines that the claimant would be unable to enforce 
     a judgment against the manufacturer.
     Section 4. Alcohol and Drug Defense.
       This section provides a defense to a liability action where 
     a claimant is more than 50% responsible for the accident 
     causing harm as a result of being under the influence of 
     intoxicating alcohol or illegal drug. The determination of 
     intoxication or whether the claimant is under the influence 
     of alcohol or drugs shall be made according to the relevant 
     State law. Illegal drugs include any controlled substances 
     according to federal law.
     Section 5. Misuse or Alteration.
       This section allows a manufacturer or product seller to 
     establish that a percentage of a claimant's harm was 
     proximately caused by the misuse or alteration of a product 
     in violation of an express warning or instructions, or by the 
     misuse or alteration of a product involving a risk of harm 
     which would be known by the typical consumer. The award of 
     damages against the manufacturer or product seller would be 
     reduced by such percentage of claimant's misuse or 
     alteration. The manufacturer's or product seller's liability 
     shall not, however, be reduced by the percentage of 
     responsibility for the harm attributable to the misuse or 
     alteration of a product by the claimant's employer or 
     coemployees who are immune from suit by the claimant 
     pursuant to State law applicable to workplace injuries. 
     These provisions only supersede State law to the extent 
     that State laws are inconsistent.
     Section 6. Statute of Repose.
       This section bars liability for a product liability action 
     unless the complaint is served and filed within 15 years of 
     the time of first retail purchase. This bar will only apply, 
     however, if the claimant is eligible for workers' 
     compensation for the harm, if the harm did not cause a 
     chronic illness, and if the manufacturer or seller did not 
     include an express written warranty as to the useful safe 
     life of the product which was longer than 15 years.
     Section 7. Punitive Damagers.
       This section provides that where states allow punitive 
     damages, such damages may be awarded where a claimant 
     establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the harm 
     suffered was the result of conduct manifesting a conscious, 
     flagrant indifference to the safety of those persons who 
     might be harmed by the product. The punitive damages awarded 
     shall not exceed the greater of $250,000 or three times the 
     economic injury.
       A failure to exercise reasonable care in selecting among 
     alternative product designs or warnings shall not by itself 
     constitute conduct meriting punitive damages, and punitive 
     damages may not be awarded unless compensatory damages have 
     been awarded which are not merely nominal damages. A 
     defendant may request a separate proceeding to determine an 
     award of punitive damages, in which case evidence related 
     only to the claim of punitive damages shall not be admissible 
     in the proceedings to determine compensatory damages.
       The trier of fact shall consider all relevant evidence in 
     determining a punitive damage

[[Page H3192]]

     award, including the severity of harm, the duration, 
     concealment, or profitability of the defendant's conduct, the 
     number of products sold by the defendant which can cause such 
     harm, previous punitive awards to similar claimants, 
     prospective compensatory awards to other claimants, the 
     criminal or civil penalties imposed on the defendant for the 
     complained of conduct, and whether any of the foregoing have 
     been presented in a prior proceeding involving the defendant.
       Punitive damages shall not be awarded against a 
     manufacturer or seller of a drug or device which caused the 
     claimant's harm where such product was preapproved by the 
     Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with respect to its 
     formulation, performance, or adequacy of packaging or 
     labeling, or where it is generally recognized as safe and 
     effective pursuant to conditions established by the FDA. This 
     bar on punitive damages shall not apply where the defendant, 
     before or after FDA approval, intentionally and wrongfully 
     withheld from or misrepresented to the FDA information which 
     is required to be submitted concerning the drug or device, or 
     if any illegal payment to FDA employees were made for the 
     purpose of securing or maintaining drug or device approval.
       The manufacturer and seller of a drug shall not be held 
     liable for punitive damages for a product liability action 
     for harm relating to the adequacy of the drug packaging or 
     labeling, where the drug is required to have tamper-
     resistance packaging (and labeling) under regulations of the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services, unless the claimant 
     establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the drug 
     product is substantially out of compliance with such 
     regulations.
     Section 8. Several Liability for Noneconomic Damages.
       This section provides that joint liability for noneconomic 
     damages shall not be recognized. A separate judgment shall be 
     rendered against each defendant for their several liability 
     for noneconomic damages, which shall be in direct proportion 
     to their individual percentage of responsibility for the 
     claimant's harm, as determined by the trier of fact.
     Section 9. Federal Cause of Action Precluded.
       This section precludes any new Federal cause of action 
     pursuant to a Federal question or Act Congress regulating 
     commerce. It is intended to ensure that no additional 
     jurisdiction is granted under this Act to the Federal courts.
     Section 10. Frivolous Pleadings.
       This section provides that the signing or verification of a 
     pleading in a product liability action shall be considered a 
     certification that to the signor's or verifor's best 
     knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable 
     inquiry, the pleading is not frivolous. A pleading is defined 
     as frivolous if the pleading is groundless and brought in bad 
     faith or for the purpose of harassment or other improper 
     purpose such as to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
     increase in the cost of litigation. Groundless is defined as 
     having no basis in fact or unwarranted by existing law or a 
     good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
     reversal of existing law.
       Within 60 days after a pleading in a product action is 
     filed, a party may petition the court to determine the 
     pleading is frivolous. In making this determination, the 
     court shall consider the multiplicity of parties, the 
     complexity of the claims and defenses, the length of time 
     available to the party to investigate and conduct discovery, 
     and the affidavits, depositions, and other relevant matters. 
     If the court determines that a pleading is indeed frivolous, 
     the court shall impose an appropriate sanction on the 
     signatory or verifier of the pleading, which may include the 
     striking of the offending portion or the entire pleading, the 
     dismissal of a party, or an order to pay the reasonable 
     expenses of an opposition party incurred because of the 
     filing of the pleading, including costs, fees of attorneys, 
     witnesses and experts, and deposition expenses. A general 
     denial and the amount requested for damages shall not 
     constitute a frivolous pleading.
     Section 11. Liability of Biomaterials Suppliers.
       This section provides that a biomaterials supplier is 
     liable for harm caused by a medical device only if the 
     claimant establishes that the biomaterials supplier's failure 
     to meet contract specifications as set forth below was an 
     actual and proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff. The 
     biomaterials supplier is deemed to have failed to meet 
     contract specifications if the raw materials or component 
     parts delivered by the biomaterials supplier did not 
     constitute the product described in the contract between the 
     biomaterials supplier and purchaser, or they fail to meet any 
     specifications that were provided to the biomaterials 
     supplier and not expressly repudiated prior to acceptance of 
     delivery of the supplies, or that were provided to the 
     biomaterials supplier or to the manufacturer by the 
     biomaterials supplier, or which are contained in a master 
     file submitted by the biomaterials supplier to the Secretary 
     of Health and Human Services (HHS) that is currently 
     maintained by the biomaterials supplier for the purposes of 
     premarket approval of medical devices, or specifications that 
     were included in the submissions of the purposes of premarket 
     approval or review by the Secretary of HHS and which have 
     received such clearance and were not expressly repudiated 
     by the biomaterials supplier prior to acceptance.
     Section 12. Definitions.
       This section provides definitions for the following terms: 
     ``biomaterials supplier,'' ``claimant,'' ``commercial loss,'' 
     ``harm,'' ``manufacturer,'' ``product,'' ``product liability 
     action,'' ``product seller,'' and ``State.''
     Section 13. Effective Date.
       This section provides that the Act shall apply to actions 
     which are commenced after the date of its enactment.

  Mr. Speaker, I believe this information will help to establish the 
need for a number of the reforms contained in the pending conference 
report.
  Mr. Speaker, we need commonsense legal reform that will put more 
power into the hands of the American people to make their own consumer 
choices, and bring some sanity back to our legal system. We need 
reforms that recognize responsible behavior, and put an end to the 
legal jackpot mentality. We need commonsense legal reforms today.
  I urge support of this bill.

                              {time}  1215

  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 4 minutes.
  (Mr. DINGELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I will vote for the conference report today 
for three reasons. The first is that the context is relatively balanced 
and sound. The second, it is consistent with similar legislation which 
I have supported over the years. Third, it represents a complete and 
utter repudiation of the extremist Republican agenda, which included 
tacking on to the original House bill a host of special interest 
amendments stripping average Americans of the traditional legal rights 
for the benefits of the wealthy and the powerful few.
  I take some measure of pride, Mr. Speaker, in having launched the 
original product liability reform movement in the Congress back in the 
late 1970's. So it is as one who is no John-Dingell-come-lately to this 
issue. I am pleased today for those people in America's manufacturing 
community who have worked with me for many years on this issue. I 
particularly want to single out one individual for special thanks, Dr. 
Victor Schwarz, an attorney, professor, casebook editor, and nationally 
renowned expert on tort law who, for nearly 20 years has helped guide 
this movement and its supporters in the Congress with sound advice, 
good judgment, and personal integrity.
  But I have trouble mustering any great enthusiasm for today's events. 
The reason is simple. The process leading up to our having this 
legislation on the floor today has been an utter disgrace. The 
conference on this bill was a complete sham. At the one and only 
meeting which the conferees held in December, we were told that the 
conference would be open and bipartisan. Nothing was further from the 
truth. Instead, precisely the opposite occurred. The House Republicans 
proceeded to cut a secret deal in closed meetings with no participation 
by anybody else. There was no discussion, no consultation, and no 
conference meeting after that time.
  Our staffs were presented with the final conference report on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis late one evening after the Members had gone home. 
We were not even given the courtesy of being able to review the 
documents overnight. This is apparently the Republican definition of 
open and bipartisan. It may be open and bipartisan on the other side of 
the aisle, but it is not open and bipartisan, nor is it a process which 
follows the traditions of this House or which takes into consideration 
the concerns of the American people that the matters of this Congress 
should be done in an open and honorable fashion.
  The House Republicans not only excluded Democratic conferees from all 
discussions and decisions, but they ignored the will of the House on 
one very important issue. Last year the House voted to include a 
provision ensuring that foreign companies that sell defective products 
to American consumers are treated the same way as American 
corporations. That amendment was adopted under the leadership of the 
distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Conyers]. The House recently 
reaffirmed that commonsense position by voting to instruct the House 
conferees to insist on this provision in the conference. Despite two 
overwhelming and bipartisan votes, I note, the Republican conferees 
dropped the provision

[[Page H3193]]

entirely. To my knowledge, the Republican Members never even raised 
this issue in the secret backroom discussions on this legislation.
  I note that all eight House Republican conferees voted against the 
original amendment on the motion to instruct. Those few Members are 
entitled to their views, but those views get preferential treatment to 
foreign corporations to the disadvantages of American corporations. But 
that should not empower them to so brazenly disregard the expressed 
will of the House, the expressed will of the American people as clearly 
expressed by this House. The Republicans say they want to reduce 
Federal power, yet last year they were busy sticking the Federal snout 
into dog bite cases, accidents, and slip and fall disputes.

  The bill that passed last year as a part of the contract on America 
amounted to a wish list of all manner of scoundrels and wrongdoers. 
That legislation protected drunk drivers, sexual predators, scoundrels, 
and others who prey upon the weak, defenseless, and infirm, and those 
who intentionally inflict great harm and damage. They treated cases 
involving intentional and gross misconduct as though they were simple 
negligence cases.
  Fortunately, they are not going to get their way. I do not believe 
that the Republican leadership ever wanted enactment of this bill as 
public law. If they did, they would not have allowed it to languish for 
the best part of a year before even asking for a conference. If they 
did, they would not have included in the process a system which 
systematically excluded House Democrats like me who have for years 
supported product liability reform, and they would not have conducted 
the overall matter in the way in which they did. Instead, this will get 
what they really want, not a law, but a campaign issue.
  We have reached the bottom of the barrel when for pure partisan 
games, Republicans will not let Democrats who agree with them work with 
them or participate in the legislative process. Once again, we have 
seen, as it has happened so many times in this Republican Congress, the 
constituents who need real action are getting just promises and press 
conferences and not real action. They will be the losers.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  I stand here today to plead for a special interest, I say to the 
gentleman from Michigan, who so quickly criticizes every manner and 
means of special interest. The special interest for which I make a plea 
are some 8 million Americans who this day contain in their bodies 
medical devices that have been implanted, which have saved their lives 
in many cases, and the supplies for which are being threatened by the 
massive lawsuits that have caused the suppliers of raw materials to 
withhold those materials from future medical devices, like heart 
transplants, brain shunts, heart valves, knee replacements, hip 
replacements.
  That is a special interest, I say to the gentleman from Michigan, 
where we ought to be doing everything we can to make sure that those 
consumers who need replacements, who need heart valves, who need all of 
these medical devices for the sake of their health and their lives, we 
ought to give them the opportunity to have future medical devices 
available, access to them. And what title II does, of this piece of 
legislation, is to release a little bit of the raw material suppliers 
from that type of massive liability that makes no sense, that keeps 
them from supplying these raw materials to the manufacturers of these 
lifesaving medical devices.
  When are we going to try to understand that special interests 
sometimes are those people who are victims of heart attacks, victims of 
disease that we can help if we simply relax a little bit on the 
restrictions on liability that some of the suppliers of these raw 
materials have to face.
  I say it is time for us to encourage the President not to veto heart 
transplants, not to veto brain shunts, not to veto hip replacements, 
but rather to sign the bill into law that will acquire for the American 
people a balance and allow them to have access to all sorts of new and 
wonderful lifesaving medical devices.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds to remind my 
friend from Pennsylvania, Mr. Gekas, that title II of the products 
liability conference report would prohibit most women from recovering 
any damages from the supplier of silicone gel, despite evidence that 
the supplier misled women and many of their doctors about the safety of 
that product. It would also prohibit suits against suppliers of 
biomaterials used in the manufacture of medical implants.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. 
Scott], a distinguished member of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. SCOTT, Mr. Speaker, there is no explosion in punitive damage 
products cases. This chart shows the total number of civil cases that 
are filed, now many are products liability cases. The products 
liability cases get decided by trial, and then when you get down to 
punitive damage awards in liability cases, it is in the millions; 391 
million of the cases filed are punitive damage cases involving 
products.
  Mr. Speaker, one study in 1995 of cases decided in 1992 could only 
find three punitive damage cases in the entire United States.
  This bill is not balanced. It helps corporate wrongdoings at the 
expense of innocent victims. One is the limitation on punitive damages. 
Although they are rare, they have a deterrent effect. Those pajamas 
that the ranking member pointed out, for 3 cents per set of pajamas, 
they could have made them inflammable pajamas, and yet they wanted to 
make that extra 3 cents for every set of pajamas. It is only the 
punitive damages that took them off the market.
  Mr. Speaker, another benefit for wrongdoers is the issue of joint and 
several liability. Most States allow the wrongdoers to figure out who 
has to pay the total damages. This bill forces the innocent victim to 
chase all the insolvent, out of town, and uncooperative defendants in 
order to get their full cooperation.
  Another little benefit for the corporate wrongdoers is that only 
overturned State laws can benefit the consumers. The State laws are 
free to provide additional protection for the corporate wrongdoers, but 
not allowed to provide any more protection for the consumers.
  Mr. Speaker, this hurts the consumer, it helps the corporate 
wrongdoers, it eliminates the deterrent effect, it benefits the 
wrongdoers and forces the plaintiff to chase around for the defendants, 
and I think we should defeat this bill and keep the State laws as they 
are today.

                              {time}  1230

  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Florida [Mr. Stearns], a member of the committee.
  Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for yielding time to 
me.
  Mr. Speaker, I also rise in support of the conference report, and I 
was very glad to hear that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell], 
who is the former chairman of the Committee on Commerce, supports the 
bill. Also I want to recognize Victor Schwarz for all his long-term 
work on this project.
  For almost two decades, Congress has been struggling to interject 
common sense into our product liability laws. I want to commend the 
conferees for their success in bringing balance and reasonableness to 
our legal system. Everyone has heard justice delayed is justice denied. 
Well, this legislation ensures legitimate plaintiffs finally have their 
day in court by ending the frivolous lawsuits that needlessly tie up 
our judicial system.
  Mr. Speaker, these lawsuits have effectively prohibited individuals 
from pursuing legitimate grievances through the judicial system due to 
the fact that the dockets are overcrowded with meritless lawsuits. 
There are studies that indicate that fully half of the costs of our 
tort system are consumed in legal fees and expenses, while only one 
quarter goes to compensate actual economic losses. Attorneys are 
primarily the ones benefiting under the current system. This 
legislation encourages settlements out of court, thereby getting 
lawyers out of the way.

[[Page H3194]]

  I urge all of my colleagues to support this conference report that 
emphasizes fairness and individual accountability while maintaining an 
injured party's fundamental right to restitution.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Doggett].
  Mr. DOGGETT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to 
me.
  In this very serious and weighty debate, I cannot help but be a 
little amused that some of the same forces that come here and complain 
about the litigation explosion, about how our courts are too crowded 
are the same folks that I read about this week in USA Today who are 
going around the country making it against the law to speak ill of 
vegetables. Yes, if you bad mouth brussels sprouts, the USA Today 
reports, it could cost you, if you are opposed to onions, if you diss a 
kiwi. Now in 12 States, it is against the law to do that and you can be 
hauled into court.
  So the same folks that come here and say there are too many lawsuits 
in our courts are going around the country, in fact they are trying to 
do it this week in Maryland, enacting laws to get us in trouble for 
speaking ill of vegetables. But if they turn us into a vegetable 
because of their disregard for safety and health in this country, then 
our rights will be limited.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not about the litigation explosion, it is about 
limiting the rights of individuals whose health and safety is affected. 
What about the effect on cost and on jobs that we have heard so much 
about? Well, the folks that put out Consumer Reports, that is the 
magazine that a lot of us turn to when we have got to buy a 
refrigerator or television or some kind of service and we want to find 
out what the most cost effective alternative is, they report that over 
30 million Americans each year are injured by consumer products and 
29,000 are killed. Only a small fraction of those result in lawsuits, 
but the total cost to us of having assurance that there is protection 
in the event that there is harm caused by a defective product comes to 
about one penny one of a $5 purchase.

  That is a very small price to pay for the assurance that someone who 
is burned and who will face one painful skin graft after another, to a 
young family whose infant is going to require care for the rest of that 
child's life, to a young child who is scarred for life, why deny rights 
to those people when the cost to America is 1 cent for a $5 purchase?
  But we are told, of course, that this is a jobs bill, that it means 
more jobs. It is only anecdotal evidence that tells us that, but why 
then if it is a jobs bill are we replacing the concept of personal 
responsibility with giving foreign manufacturers an advantage over 
American manufacturers? We say that if you build your project in 
Taiwan, in Singapore, in Germany, you are going to have under this 
piece of legislation advantages that are not available to American 
manufacturers. I think that has got it all backward.
  Just as this reliance on something other than personal responsibility 
has got it all backwards, just as the argument of States' rights, of 
letting our States resolve these issues, rather than turning them all 
over to the Federal Government to resolve, has got it all backwards.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Inglis].
  Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for 
yielding me the time.
  I rise in strong support of this conference report and with some 
observations. We have heard a lot about how this is going to impair the 
ability of those that are legitimately injured to recover, so I think 
it is important just to go through an example. Let us assume, as I did 
recently when I had an opportunity to discuss this bill at the Wilson 
Equipment Co. in Spartanburg, SC, that one of their John Deere tractors 
injures somebody.
  Let us assume this scenario. Mr. Jones is cutting grass with a riding 
lawnmower. A rock is thrown out of the lawnmower, hits Mrs. Jones who 
is nearby tending the flower garden or something. Mrs. Jones is hurt 
badly. Let us say she is hurt real badly. Let us see what happens in 
this case. Well, of course the Jones are going to sue for the medical 
bills that Mrs. Jones incurred. They are also going to probably sue for 
pain and suffering, and they are going to sue for punitive damages, 
everybody does. So let us see what happens.
  Economic damages, let us say she had medical bills of $200,000. 
Again, I am assuming that Mrs. Jones is really hurt. If she is really, 
really hurt, it is more than $200,000. But I am intentionally choosing 
a relatively low number, $200,000 economic damages. Now, let us assume 
that the jury awards Mrs. Jones $200,000 for pain and suffering. Mind 
you, it is very important to note this is not limited in this bill. 
Pain and suffering will not be limited so the jury is free to decide 
whatever they want. Mrs. Jones is really hurt and they give her 
$200,000 pain and suffering. She has $200,000 economic damages, 
$200,000 pain and suffering.
  Now we come to the only limit imposed in the bill and that is of 
course punitive damages. The jury is instructed and here is what they 
can do. They can give her 200 plus 200 times 2, would be the maximum 
that they could give in this case. So Mrs. Jones here will get $400,000 
potentially in punitive damages. So she has gotten $200,000 economic 
damages, plus $200,000 pain and suffering, plus $400,000 punitive 
damages. I am sorry, plus $800,000. She has 200 plus 200 times 2, so 
that is $800,000 punitive damage amount. So Mrs. Jones can recover 200 
plus 200 plus 800, which is $1.2 million.
  Now, that is a fair amount of money, but it does not really put Mrs. 
Jones back where she was, and we have to admit that. If she is really 
badly hurt, it is just a bad situation. She has gotten $1.2 million, 
but she would really rather not have the money. She would really rather 
have her health back. But we cannot put her health back, so we give her 
$1.2 million. That is our system operating rationally, I believe; $1.2 
million for this hurt Mrs. Jones.
  Now mind you, there is still plenty of money for the trial lawyers, 
and I realize a lot of people in this body defend trial lawyers as 
though they are the greatest folks in America. There is still one-third 
for them, so in this case the trail lawyers get $400,000. There is 
still plenty of money in the system for adequate recovery.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California. [Mr. Campbell].
  (Mr. CAMPBELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this bill.
  I would like to take this time to comment on the issue of tort 
reform, and its ramifications on our business community, and especially 
upon California's Silicon Valley.
  For years, the debate has raged over whether our country engages in 
excessive litigation. Some have offered the argument that lawsuits are 
socially useful in defusing workplace tension, deterring dangerous 
means of production, and compensating those who have been harmed. 
Others have as strongly maintained that lawsuits have siphoned off 
scandalous amounts of time and energy, caused many good ideas never to 
be commercialized, dried up capital for investment, and crippled 
America in competition with the world. So, who is right?
  I have concluded that our civil liability laws are indeed in need of 
reform to stem the flood of frivolous lawsuits that have detrimentally 
affected productivity and overall employment not only in California but 
across the Nation. My position is based upon a study that I 
participated in, which showed conclusively that the more a State 
reformed its civil liability laws, the greater its productivity and 
employment increased.
  Here are a few facts and statistics:
  Frivolous strike suits, which allege fraud when stocks take 
inevitable dips, have hit every one of Silicon Valley's top 10 
companies and more than 60 percent of the valley's high-technology 
firms.
  According to one estimate, shareholder suits are a $1.4 billion a 
year business, with settlements averaging $11 million.
  A suit brought against 60 computer monitor manufacturers alleges 
fraud on behalf of the manufacturers because monitors labeled as 15 
inches have--due to the dark border characteristic of computer 
technology--an actual viewing space of 14\3/4\ inches.
  The accounting firm of Tillinghast-Towers Perrin reports that the 
tort portion of our legal system cost $152 billion in 1994--two and 
half times the industrialized world average.
  What we need are reforms that will stem this explosion of tort 
litigation; reforms like

[[Page H3195]]

placing caps on contingent fees and pain and suffering awards; allowing 
defendants to pay damages over time; constraining punitive damages; and 
modifying the joint-and-several-liability rule where a party only 
partly at fault can end up paying the entire damage award if the other 
parties at fault cannot.
  I want to make clear that I seek only to bar frivolous lawsuits and 
not block those that have merit. A step in this direction was taken 
when Congress over-rode a Presidential veto and enacted the Securities 
and Litigation Reform Act of 1996. It reigns in frivolous class-action 
suits that victimize employers and investors across State lines. It 
provides, for example, protection to companies with solid records of 
rapid growth from lawsuits over a minor loss in a single quarter. And 
when legal costs can easily rise to the millions of dollars, mostly 
new, startup entrepreneurial high-technology firms are at greatest 
risk. This is especially true for Silicon Valley.
  The litigation mess is not only affecting big business. It also 
prevents small businesses from expanding, causes new drugs and new 
products never to reach the market, and results in charities running 
short of volunteers.
  Everyone today is a potential hostage to capricious and expensive 
lawsuits. National civil liability reform is needed to correct this 
broken system. I do not seek to sanction corporate irresponsibility, 
but merely to obtain reforms necessary to obtain fairness and common 
sense; with the result being more jobs and greater productivity in 
every State.
  Finally, I was disturbed to learn that there is now an Internet web 
site which invites the public to invest in shares of lawsuit stock. 
Essentially what this outfit wants to do is publicly sell and trade 
stock based not on the performance of a corporation, but on the outcome 
of a lawsuit. I cannot view this approach in any other light than as 
another example of how out of control our tort system has become and 
how essential it is that we institute systemic reforms like the ones I 
have mentioned.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 10 seconds.
  Mr. Speaker, I remind the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina 
[Mr. Inglis] that in his hypothetical, he used up 1 of the 14 punitive 
damages cases that occur annually in the U.S. courts.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Bonior], the minority whip.
  Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers] for yielding me the time.
  Let us be clear what this bill does. Let me put this in another 
perspective from the example that was just given by my friend from 
South Carolina. If you are a corporate CEO and you make $1 million a 
year and God forbid you should have an accident because of a product 
malfunction, this bill says that you can receive full recovery of your 
economic losses. But if you are a working mom and you make $15,000 a 
year and you are struggling to put a little away for your child's 
education and you should be injured by that same accident and that 
accident involves more than one wrongdoer and God forbid you should 
lose your ability to have children, you may never be fully compensated 
for pain and loss. Now that is what this bill does.
  This bill says the lives of corporate CEO's and Wall Street bankers 
and the economic elite are more important and more valuable than the 
lives of the working men and women, and I think it is shameful. Mr. 
Speaker, we do not need a bill that tilts the balance away from victims 
of defective products and toward the big corporations who make them.
  We certainly do not need a bill that gives foreign manufacturers a 
leg up on American companies. Even though 82 of my Republican friends 
supported an amendment that put America first, it was dropped in the 
conference committee by the Republicans. That too is shameful. Mr. 
Speaker, if we live in a country where 98 percent of the growth in 
income since 1979 has gone to the top 20 percent, the other 80 percent 
has gotten 2 percent of real income growth in this country. What is 
going on here?
  Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Republican leadership, in both this body 
and in the other body, blocked efforts to raise the minimum wage, and 
once again we are here today trying to write special rules for the 
wealthy one more time. Mr. Speaker, enough is enough. It is a tragedy 
when anybody is injured by a faulty product. Let us not make women and 
children and seniors pay a special price.
  I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this conference report. The 
President has indicated he will veto this bill because of the reasons 
and other reasons that have been given on this floor, the reasons that 
I gave and others have given, and we will need roughly 140-some votes 
to sustain his veto. So this is a very important vote this afternoon, 
and I urge my colleagues for economic justice for the people that we 
represent that we send this measure down to defeat this afternoon.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, could we get a report on how much time 
remains?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gunderson). The gentleman from Virginia 
[Mr. Bliley] has 11 minutes remaining, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
Hyde] has 8 minutes remaining, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
Conyers] has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan 
[Mr. Dingell] has 7 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from 
Ohio [Mr. Oxley].
  Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the conference report.
  For almost two decades now, the House Committee on Commerce has 
grappled with the issue of product liability reform. After developing 
an extensive record on the subject of product liability law, the 
committee concluded that the present system places an enormous burden 
on interstate commerce, inflates prices, stifles innovation, and 
subjects manufacturers and sellers to a capricious lottery where 
sanctions can exceed any found in criminal law.
  Last year, we worked with the Judiciary Committee to draft a joint 
legal reform bill to bring some common sense back into our legal 
system. We then worked with our Senate counterparts to help them move 
this critical legislation forward. While the final conference agreement 
falls somewhat short of the reforms passed in the House, it still 
represents a great achievement and far more than anyone might have 
hoped for just 2 years ago.
  For the first time in our Nation's history, we will enjoy the 
protections of proportionality requirements for punitive damage awards. 
Damage awards for speculative noneconomic injuries will now be based 
directly on someone's actual responsibility for the harm, not on the 
depth of a defendant's financial pockets. Plaintiffs who harm 
themselves primarily through their own excessive use of drugs and 
alcohol will no longer be able to transfer the costs of their addiction 
to third parties, and frivolous claims against innocent product sellers 
and biomaterials suppliers will no longer be allowed.
  These reforms will play a critical role in increasing the long-term 
competitiveness of American industry and thereby protecting American 
jobs. And they will create a renewed emphasis on fairness and 
accountability in our legal system, without undercutting the basic 
rights to restitution for consumers.
  I recognize that the President has promised to veto this pro-jobs, 
pro-fairness bill. This is unfortunate. As Governor, President Clinton 
twice supported resolutions drafted and unanimously approved by the 
National Governors Association calling for Federal product liability 
reform.
  Throughout the last year we have been working with Senator 
Rockefeller's staff in the Senate to communicate with the President and 
modify the bill accordingly, deleting numerous stronger House reforms 
and adopting an extended additur provision for punitive damages which 
his own Cabinet helped to write. The administration's last minute bait-
and-switch was subsequently decried by Senator Rockefeller, who noted 
that ``Special interests and raw political considerations in the White 
House have overridden sound policy judgment.'' This sort of trial 
lawyer protectionism and turnstile politics, revealed earlier on 
securities litigation reform, is beginning to ring very hollow.
  Part of the premise of the Contract With America was to put an end to 
politics as usual in Washington. This legislation is a consensus 
solution, built on decades of bipartisan efforts by my Democratic 
colleagues and fellow Republicans, for bringing some balance and 
reasonableness back into our legal system. I ask your support in 
helping us bring this commonsense reform back into our legal system.
  Let us pass this with an overwhelming vote and send it to the 
President and hope he changes his mind.

[[Page H3196]]

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from New York [Mrs. Lowey].
  (Mrs. LOWEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend her 
remarks.)
  Mrs. LOWEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the conference 
report on the product liability reform. This bill benefits those who 
place profits above the health and safety of the American public, and 
it should be defeated.
  Let's look at some of the real-life consequences that this ill-
considered legislation would have.
  Currently, there are approximately 1 million women who have silicone 
breast implants. To date 100,000 of them have suffered real harm from 
these devices. Although these women were told that the implants were 
safe, many began to leak and break--exposing the women to the silicone 
inside. If this bill is passed, implant manufacturers will be exempted 
from liability, and thousands of the women who are ill will be 
prevented from recovering damages.
  This bill will hurt American women in other ways. The legislation 
eliminates joint and several liability for noneconomic losses--which 
means that if a housewife from my district and Donald Trump are both 
injured by the same defective product, Donald Trump will be able to 
recover much more money for injuries. That's wrong Mr. Speaker--we must 
not make it more difficult for women to recover damages from the 
companies of defective products.
  I would also like to bring to my colleagues' attention a very 
shocking unintended result of this bill. Mothers Against Drunk Driving 
opposes this bill because it will cap punitive damages that can be 
enforced against those who serve alcoholic beverages to obviously 
intoxicated persons and minors.
  Last year, this House passed a measure that I introduced that will 
finally get tough on underage drunk driving. That measure is now the 
law of the land and States that do not have zero tolerance policies for 
teens who drink and drive are in the process of adopting them. We must 
not now take away one of the biggest disincentives bar owners have to 
serving minors by passing this bill. We must not send a mixed message 
to Americans about drunk driving.
  My colleagues, this bill says to companies that making defective 
products is just another cost of doing business. We must demand that 
companies take responsibility for their actions--just as we demand that 
individuals do. Those who put profits ahead of their fellow human 
beings do not deserve our protection.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds simply to say I have 
heard so many things about this bill that just are not so. There is 
nothing in the world inhibiting a woman who has a faulty breast implant 
from suing and getting full recovery, economic, noneconomic, and, if 
the case warrants, punitive damages, twice whatever the economic and 
noneconomic total up to. And if it is an egregious case, the judge can 
add more to it.
  So I just do not know what I am hearing here. They are talking about 
some other bill that has not been written.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman 
from Tennessee [Mr. Bryant].
  (Mr. BRYANT of Tennessee asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. BRYANT of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding me this time.
  I, too, rise in strong support of this bill, this conference report, 
and think it is a very modest bit of reform.
  As an attorney who practiced in the civil litigation area for a 
number of years, it is interesting to hear the debate on this floor. It 
is very different being in the courtroom where you can respond directly 
to statements that are made, sometimes outrageous statements that are 
made, sometimes misstatements that are made. And in the arena on this 
floor it is difficult to sit here and listen to some of these examples 
that are being thrown out as why this very good reform should not 
occur.
  Let me tell you what, let me respond, I guess, in the best way I can 
to some of the allegations being made about this bill. The chart goes 
up and says, well, punitive damages cases are not that significant in 
number, very few are filed in a year, even less awarded.
  Let me tell you in the real world how punitive damage cases affect 
you and I that cause a huge litigation tax on the average American 
citizen that is in the thousands of dollars each year that we all pay 
for in some way or another in direct or indirect costs of product 
liability lawsuits.

  Every case that comes in that has punitive damages claims has to be 
assessed and has to be judged as to whether or not what that case is 
worth in terms of actual compensatory damages and what it is worth from 
a punitive damages standpoint. Many of these cases are settled before 
they even result in lawsuits. They are settled before a case is even 
filed. Those cases are not going to show up on this chart. Most cases 
are settled, once they are filed, out of court before they go to 
judgment. As you settle these cases wherever it is in the process, you 
have to take into account what is this case worth from a punitive 
damage standpoint. It affects very dramatically the cost of litigation. 
Cases that should be settled early should be settled quickly, that do 
not have to go through the long extensive litigation that costs 
everyone, are not settled because of this. If we place a cap, a 
reasonable cap, on punitive damages, it will help the consumer, it will 
help the injured plaintiff get quicker disposition of their lawsuit, 
quicker settlement, quicker money in their hands, quicker compensation. 
And I suggest to you it would be more fair to all concerned. It 
completely allows full recovery for compensatory damages. This bill is 
no way affects a person's right to recover for pain and suffering, 
permanent disability, lost time from work, future income, earning 
capacity diminished, medical bills. It affects that in no way. All it 
affects are punitive damages, and its gets some correlation, some 
relationship between this case and not a pie-in-the-sky figure that 
that particular jury feels like awarding that day, whether it is a 
McDonald's case or the BMW case or whatever. It makes the person 
responsible pay for the negligence they caused, their portion of the 
injury. If a defendant is found liable for 20 percent of the injury, 
they do not have to pay 100 percent of the damages. That is only fair. 
You only pay what you are responsible for causing. And we are hearing 
complaints about that.
  We have heard about the special-interest groups here, and we are not 
really, I guess I should say that this debate really may even be moot 
because we have already been told by our President that he is going to 
veto this bill. He says he is for small business and for doing things 
to stimulate the economy and helping out the small people. But yet he 
is already saying he is going to veto this very modest bill that is 
supported by people on both sides.
  This is not a Republican-Democrat issue.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Berman], a distinguished member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  (Mr. BERMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the conference 
report on what I would view as the Victim Compensation Depriving and 
Deterrence Weakening Product Liability Report.
  I do not oppose this bill in the belief that American law on product 
liability is perfect. But like many other Members of this body, I found 
that my efforts, in committee and on the floor, to moderate the 
excesses of this legislation, and in so doing, to articulate the sorts 
of reforms I can support, were entirely shut out by a majority hell-
bent on moving an industry agenda at the expense of American consumers.
  Nor is it the notion of uniform Federal law on the subject of product 
liability which I oppose, even though this subject has traditionally 
been viewed as a matter for State law. States' rights is not my 
watchword, though I thought it was the operating principle for my 
colleagues in the majority, a principle they seem to set aside when 
expedience dictates.
  But what we find in this conference report is not uniformity. 
Instead, what we have is Federal standards except where a State's law 
is worse in terms of consumer protection. So let there be no mistake 
about what this legislation is about. Uniform national standards? 
Hogwash. This is lowest common denominator justice for consumers.

[[Page H3197]]

  I also want to express my very strong support for solving the 
problems faced by biomaterials suppliers. I am dismayed that their 
interests have been sacrificed to advance an extreme agenda I cannot 
support. If this bill is indeed vetoed, and that veto is sustained, I 
hope that we can move the biomaterials access reforms to solve that 
particular industry's problems for the benefit of all Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, I cannot support legislation that deprives injured 
victims of fair compensation, and eliminates important deterrents to 
the design and manufacture of unsafe products in the first place. I 
oppose this conference report, and I urge my colleagues to do so as 
well.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
distinguished gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Watt], a member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  (Mr. WATT of North Carolina asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. WATT of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition 
to House conference bill H.R. 956, the conference report on the 
Products Liability Reform Act.
  Folks are on the floor today blaming lawyers for all the ills in 
America today. And this conference report is suppose to protect America 
from these greedy trial lawyers. Well, for the record I want you all to 
know that prior to coming to this place, I practiced law for 22 years 
and I'm proud of that and I'm proud of the contributions of the bar in 
shaping America and making it a better place for all of us.
  People often quote the line from Shakespeare's ``Henry VI,'' ``First 
thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.'' Sounds funny out of context. 
But they don't tell you about the scene. It's a scene where a corrupt 
king and his followers are trying to figure out how to suspend 
everybody's freedoms and rights and the only folks who could possibly 
stand in their way--you got it, the lawyers. Think about that the next 
time you're tempted to use this quote.
  Calling someone a hypocrite might be funny too, if it's taken out of 
context. And yesterday, we spent an hour debating whether it was proper 
debate for one of my Republican colleagues to call Democrats 
hypocrites. Well, I want to be careful not to call any one or any party 
a hypocrite, even though the ruling of the Chair yesterday confirmed 
that I would be within my rights to do so. I would, however, like to 
pose the question in the context of this debate on product liability 
reform: Exactly who is being hypocritical?
  Who is being hypocritical when they claim they want to stop the 
explosion of individual product liability claims so that you can 
alleviate the backlog on civil court dockets when, in fact, the backlog 
has been cased by an explosion of civil claims filed by big businesses 
against other big businesses over commercial disputes? My 22 years of 
practicing law showed me, and the statistics confirm it, that antitrust 
and commercial litigation is getting longer and longer, more and more 
complex and taking up more and more court time. At the same time, 
individuals are being squeezed out and priced out of courts. Courts are 
no longer for the people. They can't afford them.
  Who is being hypocritical when they preach about personal 
responsibility for individual citizens but then absolve corporate 
citizens from responsibility for injuries they cause, even when the 
corporations make a calculated business decision to do so?
  Who is being hypocritical when they claim to be champions of States' 
rights and a limited Federal Government on one hand, but then fight for 
this legislation, which would preempt the laws of 50 States which have 
developed over hundreds of years on the other hand?
  Finally, who is being hypocritical when they claim to support 
individual rights even though they're supporting a bill that will 
severely limit an individual's access to justice? That's what this bill 
does.
  Vote ``no'' on this bill. Fight hypocrisy.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute and 20 seconds to the 
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Frank], the ranking member of the 
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary.
  Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I had been undecided on this 
bill. I am now going to vote against it. It is a far better bill than 
the one the House previously did. I still have concerns about the 
unequal effects on women.
  But I must tell you that I am very unprepared at this point to vote 
for one more piece of legislation that the corporate leadership of the 
country wants at a time when it has unfortunately been so resistant and 
unyielding to the cries many of us have made for some fairness and for 
some social justice.
  A company in the city I represent, New Bedford, we just learned, has 
been bought up by a larger entity and a profitable company will be shut 
down, jobs will be lost, and it will be moved away. In the right 
overall mix, I am prepared to support product liability. But at a time 
when the minimum wage is stonewalled, when unions are, in effect, 
dismantled by the misuse of the law by employers, when corporate 
salaries go up and up and up and we get no sympathy whatsoever for the 
plight of workers, I am not prepared to provide one more thing on the 
shopping list of those who are already doing well.
  On the merits, as part of an overall package, I could support this. I 
would hope it would be somewhat better drafted. But I will not at this 
point contribute, will not be part of furthering a public policy 
imbalance which says that those who own do better and better and those 
who work, unfortunately, are treated less and less fairly.
  As part of an overall approach to fairness in America, I would be 
supportive of this, but not as simply one more gift to those who are 
already gifted.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa 
[Mr. Ganske], a member of the committee.
  (Mr. GANSKE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to address the gentleman 
from Massachusetts for a moment and ask that he strongly consider 
supporting this bill. I am going to deviate from my notes and speak to 
a prior speaker who had concerns about breast implants.
  My mother had breast cancer when she was 24 years old. I can remember 
as a child her external implant falling out of her swimming suit. She 
has had a breast implant since then, and this has been a great thing 
for her.
  As a physician, I have been involved with medical devices. I am 
concerned about the availability of these products for our patients. My 
wife had a sister who was born with a condition called hydrocephalus. 
This is where the cerebral spinal fluid does not get absorbed, and if 
there is not a cerebral spinal fluid shot, the head rapidly expands. 
Had that product been available to my wife's sister, she would still be 
alive today.
  If we do not get a handle on product liability, we will not have the 
type of medical devices that will be necessary to protect the lives and 
health of our brothers, our sisters, our parents. This is a very 
reasonable and modest bill. I am glad that my colleague from Michigan 
[Mr. Dingell], the ranking member of the Committee on Commerce, 
supports this bill.
  I would urge the President to sign this bill. This is a bipartisan 
bill. This is not about politics. This should not be about politics. 
This bill is about providing products for people's health and their 
lives.
  Mr. GANSKE. Mr. Speaker, this do-something Congress is working hard 
for the American people. Yesterday, we passed legislation to make 
health insurance more affordable. We passed a bill to allow senior 
citizens to retain more of their earnings if they remain in the work 
force. We passed a bill to give regulatory relief to businesses. We 
passed the line-item veto. And we gave final approval to legislation to 
modernize our Depression-era farm programs.
  Today, we will send to the President product liability legislation to 
restore common sense in this area; to protect consumers and prevent 
abuse that unnecessarily raises the price of practically everything we 
buy. Amazingly, President Clinton has threatened to veto this modest 
bill that Mr. Dingell supports.
  Mr. Speaker, if the President vetoes this bill, the losers will be 
the American people, victims of a hidden lawsuit tax. They pay more for 
goods and services because businesses are forced to spend hundreds of 
millions of dollars in defending frivolous lawsuits.
  Mr. Speaker, this is not partisan politics. A leading Democrat in the 
other body said ``Unfortunately, special interests and raw political 
considerations in the White House have overridden sound policy 
judgment.'' That's a Member of the President's own party speaking.
  I urge my colleagues to vote for this limited legal reform bill and 
to give it the votes necessary to override a threatened veto.
  This bill isn't everything I think is important, nor is it everything 
my colleague from Michigan wants. But in the spirit of cooperation in 
order to move to a better solution, we are both supporting this bill. I 
urge Members of both sides to put aside partisan politics and support 
this bill.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentlewoman from California [Ms. Waters].
  Ms. WATERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strenuous opposition to this 
conference report.

[[Page H3198]]

  Remember the famous Pinto automobile recall, the exploding gas tanks. 
Remember the fact that the manufacturer knew the gas tank in the back 
of the car would explode if hit in an accident. Remember the in-house 
memo that the manufacturer sent that admitted they knew the gas tank 
would explode, but made the cold-blooded decision it would not be cost-
effective to recall the car? They said it would cost them too much 
money. Lives were lost. People were harmed.
  How dare anybody suggest we dismantle our current product liability 
laws? Greedy corporations will increase their profits at the expense of 
the American people if we, as public policymakers, do not have enough 
backbone to stand up for the protections for our citizens. We do not 
deserve to be here if we cannot protect them. As many as 6,000 American 
lives were saved each year due to the current deterrent of product 
liability laws.
  Mr. Speaker, this bill is a sham. It must be defeated.

                              {time}  1300

  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the 
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte], a distinguished member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary.
  (Mr. GOODLATTE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
his remarks.)
  Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the committee for 
yielding me this time.
  Mr. Speaker, the other side and the President have a number of times 
said that this is an anticonsumer bill. Mr. Speaker, this is a 
proconsumer bill. This bill is very fair to those who may experience 
harm as a result of a defective product, but at the same time taking 
away from juries the opportunity to give unlimited amounts of awards 
that affect every consumer in this country by taking product off the 
market, as the previous speaker, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Ganske], 
just indicated, and by increasing the cost of insurance and, as every 
corporation in this country does, spreading that increased cost to 
every consumer in this country with increased prices. This is a very 
fair bill. Juries should not be legislators. They are unelected. They 
should have the opportunity to determine the compensatory damages, to 
determine the pain and suffering award, and a reasonable amount of 
punitive damages in cases where they find it appropriate, but it should 
not be unlimited.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge support of this report.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gunderson). The gentleman from Michigan 
has 10 seconds remaining.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell], the dean of the House, and ask 
unanimous consent that he be allowed to allocate that time.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
California [Mr. Becerra].
  Mr. BECERRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me the 
time.
  Mr. Speaker, on balance, this conference report is transparently 
unbalanced. It is bad where State laws would otherwise benefit 
consumers and victims, and it is good where State laws would benefit 
manufacturers. The problems for States, this law preempts States that 
wish to take action at the State level against product liability abuse.
  Who does this conference report exclude the Conyers provision that 
would have held foreign manufacturers liable for damaging, injuring, 
killing American citizens?
  Why does this conference report on the manufacturer of a defective 
elevator that might be 14 years, 364 days old, let that victim sue that 
manufacturer of that defective elevator, but the next day that same 
victim would not be able to sue because of a statute of limitations 
that would not allow that to occur?
  Why does a victim of a manufacturer's product have to prove, through 
a higher burden of proof, the damage occurred or the injury occurred?
  This is an unbalanced conference report. It does not deserve the 
support of this conference, because it does not support the American 
consumer. I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from 
Washington [Mr. White], a member of the committee.
  Mr. WHITE. Mr. Speaker, until about a year and a half ago, for 15 
years I practiced law in the city of Seattle. I have to tell you that 
anybody who has been involved in our legal system and has taken a fair 
and objective look at it knows that, unfortunately, our legal system is 
broken and badly needs to be fixed.
  It does not have so much to do with the number of cases that are 
filed, the number of product liability cases that we have. It is the 
fact that every week we hear a new ruling that offends our fundamental 
sense of justice about what our system is supposed to produce. Every 
week we hear about the cup of coffee is spilled on someone when they 
are driving in their car and all of a sudden they can collect $2 or $3 
million for that. We hear about the paint job that was not quite right 
on the BMW, and somehow that results in a judgment of multimillions of 
dollars.
  Ordinary people and lawyers and all of us who hear these things get 
the impression that, unfortunately, it is becoming true that our legal 
system has turned into an elaborate game of chance, where if you play 
the game right, you have the right lawyers, you can hit the jackpot and 
make a lot of money.
  That is the most pernicious thing about the developments we have seen 
in our legal system over the last several years. It is a tragedy when a 
child is killed or someone is injured because of using a product. But 
the fact is, no matter how much money we compensate that person for, we 
cannot bring back the child, we cannot bring back the arm that is cut 
off, or we cannot fully solve the damages. Unfortunately, our system 
seems to equate paying money to solving that problem. It is something 
we just cannot do.
  This bill is a modest bill. This bill does not go far enough. There 
are many additional things that we should do to solve the problems in 
our legal system. But it is a modest step that we need to take.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote for this, and I hope very 
much the White House will change its mind and sign this bill when we 
pass it in this Congress.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Skelton].
  Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Speaker, the sad part of this whole debate is the 
fact that it attacks the confidence and credibility of an institution 
that has served Great Britain and the United States and our various 
States now for some 700 years, and that is the jury trial. Sure, juries 
are composed of humans, and you are going to find some cases that many 
people will disagree with the outcome of. Jessie James' brother, Frank 
James, for instance, was acquitted, even though there was hard evidence 
that he held up those banks. Many people disagreed with the outcome of 
the O.J. Simpson case. But overall, Mr. Speaker, the jury trial is a 
very basic institution. What this does is this takes it out of balance.
  I had the opportunity through the years to participate in the 
American justice system by trying cases, by defending people accused in 
civil cases, by representing others. So I think we should do our very 
best maybe to look at this again in light of the fact that we have a 
very sound institution called the jury system.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
   Mr. Speaker, I was shocked to learn that the jury system is somehow 
no longer applicable. That is news to me.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, it gives me pleasure to yield 2 minutes to 
the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Tauzin], a member of the committee.
  Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman for yielding me time.
   Mr. Speaker, let me first make a confession: I am a former trial 
lawyer. I still hold a law degree.
  Let me also disabuse you all of a notion: This House is not composed 
of a majority of lawyers. Only 170 Members of this House admit or 
believe they

[[Page H3199]]

have a law degree; 435 Members, 170, that means three-fifths of this 
House are not lawyers. That surprises most people. They think it is the 
other way around.
  Many of the lawyers in this House rise as I do today in support of 
these commonsense legal reforms, and it is to the lawyers in the House 
I want to speak for a minute.
  We have a responsibility to the legal profession. We were educated in 
it. Many of us practiced in it. Our obligation is to make sure that it 
is a good profession, that it works well, that justice arises out of 
it. And when the law and when the practice of the law is such that it 
encourages frivolous lawsuits, that it encourages the pursuit of deep-
pocket defendants instead of responsible parties, when it does not make 
people personally responsible for their own actions, as this bill does 
when it says if you are drunk or on drugs and you have an accident and 
that is the real cause of the injury you ought not be able to sue 
someone and collect, when we in this body are prepared to write 
comonsense legal reform, lawyers ought to be the first ones to rise and 
say we are prepared to do it.

  We did that on security litigation reform. We passed that bill by a 
two-thirds vote of this House and the other body. The President vetoed 
it. We overrode his veto. We passed good commonsense medical reform, 
malpractice reform yesterday in this House. I hope we see that through 
to finish.
  If we pass this bill today and send it to the President, I hope he 
will do something very important. If lawyers in this House can say yes 
to commonsense legal reform, then the President ought to be able to say 
no to some of his trial lawyer friends, and he ought to sign this good 
bill when it hits his desk.
  Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Speaker, it is a great pleasure to yield the balance 
of my time to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. Schaefer], the chairman 
of the subcommittee.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Colorado is recognized 
for 2\1/2\ minutes.
  (Mr. SCHAEFER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the committee for 
yielding time to me. I commend the work of the House conferees on this 
important legislation. This plan will bring some commonsense to our 
country's product liability laws.
  Sadly, frivolous litigation has become a fact of American life. Too 
often, bringing people to court has taken the place of personal 
responsibility. People treat liability damages like a lottery. Urged on 
by attorneys with huge financial stakes, many people no longer look at 
themselves first for blame, but instead search out the easiest way for 
a big court settlement.
  Frivolous suits cost our economy up to $80 billion every year. Thus, 
American companies have become hesitant to pursue technological 
innovation and product development for fear that their actions may 
result in never-ending court battles and financial ruin. This well-
founded fear is costing jobs, consumer benefits and, if continued 
unchecked, it will cost America its competitive edge.
  I would like to address one particular section, the biomaterials 
access provision. One of America's leading industries is the 
biomaterial device field. These products literally save and enhance 
lives every day. From pacemakers to artificial heart valves to cataract 
replacements, the products afford miraculous opportunities for 
recovery, allowing people to continue their lives.
  The suppliers of base materials oftentimes provide the manufacturer 
with elements of the device that are too costly to produce except in 
mass quantities, but alone have no implant value or purpose.
  Unfortunately, in recent years, these suppliers have been named as 
codefendants in lawsuits against actual device manufacturers. In almost 
every case, they are cleared of any wrong-doing or negligence. 
Nevertheless, in the process, they are forced to spend vast financial 
resources to achieve exoneration.
  This litigation risk has caused many supply companies to, quite 
simply, stop providing base materials for these life-savings devices. 
Consequently, the inability of device manufacturers to obtain the 
needed base supplies is causing the death of the biomaterials industry 
in America.
  The biomaterials section addresses this tragic consequence of 
overzealous litigation. This language will assure that, quite simply, 
unless the supplier is negligent in the design specifications requested 
by the device manufacturer or if the supplier is also a party in the 
overall manufacture or marketing of the device, the supplier is cleared 
from liability.
  This commonsense legal reform bill goes a long way toward ending this 
litigation madness, while preserving each individual's right to pursue 
just compensation for actual harm. I urge my colleagues to support this 
long overdue reform.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pete Geren.
  (Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this 
conference report.
  I believe the Commonsense Product Liability Act has become necessary 
to deal with our increasingly litigious society and the arbitrary and 
capricious nature of many punitive damage awards.
  Today, in 1996, product liability unquestionably has become a major 
factor in interstate commerce. Less so 20 years ago, but today product 
liability determines what goods are available in what States and at 
what price. Further, liability laws have had the impact of sending the 
manufacture of goods overseas, taking American jobs with them, for 
example, as we've seen in the private aircraft industry.
  There can be no doubt that the measures in this legislation--punitive 
damage reform, joint and several liability reform, and a provision 
similar to an amendment that I offered to the original House bill--that 
limits the liability of rental and leasing agencies for the tortious 
acts of another--fall well within this category of appropriate and much 
needed reform. The changes proposed in this bill will rearrange the 
legal landscape, but they will further the cause of commerce and 
competitiveness, reduce costs for consumers and create jobs across 
America.
  The problems we address in this bill are national problems. American 
citizens, businesses, municipalities, and other charities across our 
Nation pay $80 billion a year as a litigation tax. And these costs are 
paid by all of us through increased costs in our goods and services. 
Today 30 percent of the price of a stepladder and over 95 percent of 
the price of childhood vaccines go to cover the costs of tort 
liability. Each new private aircraft made by American workers has a 
$100,000 litigation tax added to its cost. The present system costs 
jobs, costs lives, and burdens every citizen in America with a 
litigation tax that is unaffordable.
  The time has come for sensible product liability reform. This 
legislation will strengthen the economy and the free market by removing 
the impediments to interstate commerce and encouraging innovation. His 
legislation provides a national solution to a national problem, and I 
hope my colleagues will join me in supporting it.
  Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentlewoman from Texas [Ms. Jackson-Lee].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Gunderson). The gentlewoman from Texas 
[Ms. Jackson-Lee] is recognized for 2 minutes and 10 seconds.
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I am here to talk about 
people. I think that is what we have missed in this whole debate. 
Thirty million Americans are injured by consumer products, not 
including automobiles; 29,000 people are killed in tragedies that 
involve everything from medical devices to chain saws.
  It is important that my colleagues realize that we should not draw 
the line in the sand amongst ourselves. This is in fact the people's 
House. Most do not care what side we are on. They only ask that we 
remedy a problem that exists for the American people.
  I have heard my colleagues talk about frivolous lawsuits and moneys 
that are expended.
  Mr. Speaker, may I share with my colleagues that the Department of 
Justice said that product liability cases represent only 1.6 percent of 
civil cases. May I say to my colleagues that we have only had 14 injury 
awards of punitive damages annually for the last 2 years. But allow me 
to tell Members

[[Page H3200]]

a story of an American worker who may be injured by a product older 
than 15 years old. That injured worker may be injured by a product that 
explodes while he is trying to work for his family. That individual has 
no rights under this law. But yet his corporation or his factory could 
still go to court and charge that the product maker interfered with his 
business. But that injured employee can no longer go to the court under 
this legislation. Thirty million Americans are injured by devices.
  I heard my colleague talk about breast implants. Let me respect his 
expertise and the acknowledgment of the progress that has been made in 
breast implants. But there are many, many women who have suffered under 
the present design. I want to make sure that the sons and daughters in 
the future will not suffer the pain of these women who are involved in 
present-day breast implant litigation.
  That is what this House is here for. The people's House is here to 
ensure the people's rights. And this products liability bill is, in 
fact, what the New York Times said, it is the ``Anticonsumer bill for 
1996.''
  Remember the 30 million, remember the 29,000. Vote against this 
legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my concerns regarding the 
conference report on H.R. 956, the product liability reform bill. The 
proponents of H.R. 956 may have intended for this bill to level the 
playing field among consumers and manufacturers but it does not achieve 
this goal. The bill eliminates joint liability for noneconomic damages 
and caps punitive damages at $250,000 or two times compensatory 
damages, whichever is greater.
  While most interested observers agree that some elements of the 
current product liability system need to be reformed, they do not 
believe that such reform is necessary because of a great explosion of 
product liability lawsuits. The Justice Department's Bureau of Justice 
Statistics indicates that product liability cases represent only 1.6 
percent of civil cases. Another influential study on product liability 
lawsuits indicates that there have been only an average of 14 jury 
awards of punitive damages annually for the last two decades.
  Contrary to arguments made by proponents of the bill, the current 
system is not discouraging capital investment or increasing the costs 
of developing new products. In fact, the General Accounting Office 
reports that insurance costs to businesses represent less than 1 
percent of most businesses' gross annual receipts. Moreover, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners indicate that product 
liability insurance premiums have dropped by nearly 30 percent over the 
last 6 years.
  President Clinton has already announced that he will veto this bill 
because it preempts State law when such law favor consumers and defers 
to State law when such provisions favor the manufacturers. I am 
surprised that many members of the majority party in the House support 
this bill's uniform, Federal product liability standards since these 
Members strongly favor granting more authority to State governments.
  Specifically, I am concerned about the elimination of joint and 
several liability for noneconomic losses because of its potentially 
disproportionate impact on women, children, and the elderly. The bill 
retains joint and several liability for economic losses such as lost 
wages. Noneconomic losses such as disfigurement or loss of fertility 
deserve similar treatment by the legal system as economic losses such 
as lost wages. This particularly impacts the number of breast implant 
cases affecting women across America.
  The provisions of the bill relating to punitive damages must be 
carefully examined because punitive damages provide a powerful 
incentive for manufacturers to make strong efforts to ensure that their 
products are safe. A cap of $250,000 on punitive damages would mean 
that some large companies may incorporate this figure as a cost of 
doing business as they implement their quality control procedures for 
manufacturing products. Moreover, a provision in the bill permits 
judges to award punitive damages exceeding $250,000 in egregious 
circumstances. The intent of the bill however, is that a judge would 
rarely exercise this discretion.
  Additionally, I am concerned about the statute of repose provision 
that prohibits courts from awarding damages for injuries caused by 
durable goods that are 15 years or older. The definition of durable 
goods is narrow and excludes various consumer products.
  During the recent elections in California, the voters of that State 
rejected various referenda that would have changed the tort liability 
system by restricting the rights of consumers.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge the Members of the House to carefully review the 
provisions of this bill and consider its potential impact on millions 
of American consumers.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Manzullo].
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Manzullo] 
is recognized for 3 minutes.
  (Mr. MANZULLO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MANZULLO. Mr. Speaker, today we have a great opportunity to move 
America forward by passing this conference report on products liability 
reform. This is not a perfect bill, but it is a fair bill. It is fair 
to the consumers in America, and it is fair to the companies that make 
the products.
  One of the companies is Mattison Technologies of Rockford, IL. This 
is a company facing liability lawsuits involving products that are as 
old as the company itself. Madison is celebrating its 100th year of 
operation. That is correct, Mr. Speaker, Mattison Technologies have 
been manufacturing tools for one century.
  Recently they were sued by a plaintiff in Ohio for a machine that was 
built in 1917. That is right, 1917, the same year Americans went to 
fight in the First World War, the same year the Bolsheviks were turning 
out Czar Nicholas. That is a long time for a machine tool to be 
functioning and too long for a company to be held liable for one of its 
products. Mattison has 150 employees and yet every 3 months the sheriff 
shows up with a brandnew summons bringing a brandnew lawsuit against 
the company.
  I have a letter from Robert Jennings, the general manager. Listen to 
what he said: ``The present product liability situation in this country 
has had a tremendous impact on our ability to successfully compete in 
the marketplace.''
  We are continuously defending lawsuits concerning machines built 30, 
60, and even 70 years ago. ``We are being penalized for building 
quality and longevity into our equipment, yet we believe this is what 
made in America is all about.''
  And what a bitter irony it is that current law keeps manufacturers 
from making better equipment or modifying it because that modification 
could be used to prove the initial design may not have been safe 
enough.
  This bill would help rectify the problem. A 15-year statute of repose 
would stop such lawsuits on old products.
  Mr. Speaker, a company being sued for a machine they manufactured in 
1917. This is outrageous. This bill provides a balance. It protects the 
consumers. It protects the employers. And it also protects employees. 
Why are the 150 employees of Mattison Technologies the beneficiaries of 
this legislation? It is easy. Because if Mattison did not have to 
defend against these lawsuits, they could pour more into productivity, 
more into investment, more employees would be hired. They would become 
more competitive overseas.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a good bill. It is a tough bill. It is a bill 
that is good for the economy of America. It is a bill that relates to 
one of the 1,800 companies in the district that I represent. I would 
encourage the Members of this body to vote in favor of the conference 
report.

                                   Mattison Technologies Inc.,

                                     Rockford, IL, March 28, 1996.
     Re Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act.

     Hon. Donald Manzullo,
     House of Representatives,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear Congressman Manzullo: On behalf of Mattison 
     Technologies, Inc. and its 150 employees, I ask that you 
     support the above referenced legislation.
       The present product liability situation in this country has 
     had a tremendous impact on our ability to successfully 
     compete in the marketplace.
       We are required to defend product liability claims against 
     equipment that we built 50, 60, and yes, even 70 years ago.
       We recently received a Complaint on a woodworking machine 
     we built and shipped in 1917; that's 79 years ago!

[[Page H3201]]

       We are being penalized for building quality and longevity 
     into our equipment, yet we believe this is what ``Made In 
     America'' is all about.
       Among other sensible uniform product liability changes, 
     this Act addresses the ``forever liability problem'' with a 
     15 year Statute of Repose.
       The machinery manufacturing community, so vital to Illinois 
     and the nation's economy, needs this reform.
       Thank you for your support.
           Sincerely yours,
                                               Robert K. Jennings.

  Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my disappointment with the 
conference report on H.R. 956, the Product Liability Reform Act. I have 
long been a supporter of legal reform and in particular, product 
liability tort reform. Unfortunately, some of the measures in this bill 
are too extreme and therefore, I must vote ``no'' on final passage.
  I support a number of the provisions in the conference report 
including the abolishment of joint and several liability for 
noneconomic damages and the encouragement of alternative dispute 
resolution. In addition, the FDA defense proposed in the original 
House-passed bill was lifted in conference. Under the House bill, 
plaintiffs would have been barred from winning punitive damages for 
harm caused by products approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
  The conference agreement also contains a more workable legal standard 
for punitive damages. Under the House bill, plaintiffs would be 
required to prove that a product was specifically intended to cause 
harm. The conference languages, which sets a standard of clear and 
convincing evidence for punitive damages, is a much more reasonable 
standard.
  While the conference report improves on the House-passed legislation 
on punitive damages restrictions, I believe the language is still 
unacceptable. I support reasonable caps on punitive damages. However, 
the conference report allows a large number of businesses to be subject 
to an unreasonably low cap on punitive damages. In addition, an overall 
limit on $250,000, or two times compensatory damages, is also too low. 
I and many of my colleagues had suggested a cap of $500,000. I regret 
that the Conference Committee did not accept that recommendation.
  The additur language was a good attempt to ease the impact of the 
punitive damage cap. It would allow a judge to award punitive damages 
above the cap if the judge determines the defendant's conduct was 
egregious. Although this provision is an improvement, it is subject to 
constitutional challenge, and would not apply to small business.
  As I have indicated, I support many provisions in the conference 
report. However, there is much that I cannot support, including the 
preemption of States' rights, the statue of limitations, and lawsuit 
limits placed on victims of firearms violence.
  I find particularly offensive the inclusion of negligent entrustment 
cases under the limits of this legislation. Sensible product liability 
reform should not subject cases involving gun or alcohol sales to 
minors to these new lower punitive damage limits or higher standards of 
proof.
  Mr. Speaker, we can reform the legal system while still ensuring 
consumer protection. As a supporter of legal reform, I urge a ``no'' 
vote on this conference report so that it can be sent back to 
conference for further consideration.
  Mr. BILBRAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of H.R. 956.
  Because of unwarranted product litigation, medical device 
manufacturers are in danger of being denied access to essential raw 
materials for the production of life-saving technologies. An alarming 
number of suppliers are refusing to sell these raw products to the 
manufacturers, for fear of being joined in a liability suit against the 
manufacturer.
  Mr. Speaker, a full 32 percent of the Nation's medical device 
manufacturers are headquartered in California. A great number of these 
are in my San Diego district. These companies make pacemakers, heart 
valves, and other implantable medical devices which improve the quality 
of life and ease the suffering of innumerable patients. These companies 
depend on patented alloys and synthetics, such as Teflon and synthetic 
polymers, to ensure that these devices will be compatible with the 
patients who need them.
  Under current law, the suppliers of these raw materials can be liable 
in product liability actions brought against device manufacturers, even 
though they have no role in the production or sale of the finished 
devices. As a result, many suppliers have announced plans to limit or 
discontinue sales of these raw biomaterials to device companies. This 
would drastically restrict the ability to provide these innovative 
devices to people who desperately need them.
  This bipartisan conference report will reform this tragic situation, 
by allowing suppliers to resume sales to cutting-edge California device 
manufacturers, and in turn ensure that patients nationwide retain 
access to state-of-the-art technologies. This is about people, Mr. 
Chairman, and doing what we can to make sure patients in need are 
provided relief from their afflictions and suffering.
  Mr. Speaker, this is a fair and bipartisan reform package, and I urge 
my colleagues to support it. Let us send H.R. 956 to the President, 
with the knowledge that Californians who need this reform are watching, 
as is the entire Nation. A veto of this bill, as promised by the 
President and supported by the Trial Lawyers Association, would be 
tragic; however, it would clearly demonstrate to the American people 
where the priorities of this administration truly lie.
  Mrs. MINK of Hawaii. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the 
conference report on H.R. 956, the so-called Commonsense Product 
Liability Legal Reform Act. The only relation this bill has to common 
sense is that it takes just a little common sense to see that it is 
designed to protect big business at the expense of U.S. consumers.
  It pulls the rug out from under U.S. consumers by applying unfair 
limitations on the means through which they can seek relief if hurt by 
a faulty product. It is puzzling that the party who has screamed about 
States' rights for the last year chooses to impose a Federal standard 
when it comes to limiting the rights of consumers. While this bill sets 
a Federal standard for product liability cases it allows States to 
retain their own laws only when it benefits big business. Specifically 
it requires States to adhere to the cap placed on punitive damages by 
this bill, but it does not require punitive damages in States that 
currently do not have punitive damages.
  The arbitrary cap on punitive damages at $250,000 or two times actual 
damages, which ever is greater, is based on highly inflammatory 
rhetoric about the explosion of unreasonable jury awards in product 
liability cases. Product liability cases make up less than 0.5 percent 
of all lawsuits in the Nation. Cases in which punitive damages were 
awarded are even fewer. In 1994, punitive damages were awarded in only 
15 cases nationwide. And nearly 80 percent of these cases resulted in 
the withdrawal of the product, improved product design, or strengthened 
warnings. Punitive damages are meant to punish wrongful actions of 
manufacturers and to deter the future production of similar faulty 
products. A cap of $250,000 is hardly a deterrent for a mega-
corporation.
  For smaller businesses the cap is the lesser of $250,000 or two times 
actual damages. Utilizing a different standard for small business 
establishes a precedent that a person harmed by a small business is 
entitled to less, even though the loss, disfigurement, or pain is equal 
to or greater than an injury incurred by a product of a larger 
business.
  Furthermore, the bill imposes a more difficult burden of proof in 
order for punitive damages to be awarded, further reducing the 
effectiveness of punitive damages as a deterrent. Punitive damages are 
allowed to be awarded only if the plaintiff proves clear and convincing 
evidence that the conduct of the defendant was a conscious flagrant 
indifference to the rights and safety.
  The most offensive provision to me personally is the provision which 
discriminates against women, children, and the elderly by barring joint 
and several liability for noneconomic damages. Treating economic and 
noneconomic damages differently establishes a two-tiered system which 
hurts women, children and the elderly, who typically have damages not 
related to lost wages. Their damages are injury related and go to pain 
and suffering, disability and physical losses. Under this bill a high-
paid corporate executive would recoup all of his economic, income, 
damages while a woman who stays home with her children, a person with 
little or no economic loss, would not. Equal justice should not be 
dependent on age, employment, and economic status.
  The intent of this bill is to discriminate against women, children, 
and the elderly. Since women have been subject to so many faulty 
products and drugs, like DES, silicone breast implants, IUD's, and the 
Dalkon Shield, it is grossly unfair.
  I am a DES mother who took this harmful drug. If this law had been in 
effect at the time of my lawsuit, it would have been very upsetting. My 
losses would not have qualified for access to joint and several 
liability. Such a bar to fair and equitable recovery is unconscionable. 
This bill must be defeated.
  If we are going to move toward a national standard on product 
liability, let it be a fair standard. One that treats men and women the 
same, one that recognizes the value of noneconomic damages, one that 
applies fairly to all businesses, and one that does not arbitrarily 
limit punitive measures needed to curb the production of faulty 
products.
  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote down this conference 
report.

[[Page H3202]]

  Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, this Member rises in support of this 
measure and to express his pleasure that this legislation has advanced 
to this stage and is one step closer to becoming law.
  This Member introduced the first product liability legislation in the 
Nebraska Unicameral Legislature in 1977. During this process this 
Member realized that this issue must be dealt with on the Federal 
level, because the vast majority of products and services move through 
interstate commerce. Addressing product liability at the State level is 
like patching 1 hole in a tire with 50 holes.
  Mr. Speaker, all Americans are paying higher prices for consumer 
goods and services because this legislation has been delayed for so 
very long. The insurance costs incurred by companies protecting against 
and paying for outrageous product liability suits are passed along to 
the consumer each and every day, in each and every product and service 
purchased.
  Perhaps even more outrageously, the current system unfairly imposes 
upon the American public product design standards, which are created in 
response to penalties awarded in a few States with the highest punitive 
and compensatory damages. Those States get to impose their juries' 
ideas of appropriate design and safety standards on the rest of the 
Nation. That is a perversion of federalism. National standards should 
be set by the national legislature. That is what this bill will do.
  Mr. Speaker, this Member has been a long-time cosponsor of product 
liability reform, dating back to at least 1986 when this Member was an 
early cosponsor of registration introduced by his distinguished 
colleague, Mr. Roth. This Member is pleased that this conference report 
is before the House for final approval and urges his colleagues to 
support it.
  Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, as chair of the task force which crafted 
the legal reform plank of the Contract With America, I feel extremely 
gratified to see an important part of our efforts come so far in the 
process.
  Although the reforms contained in the conference report are not as 
sweeping as those the House put forward last year, they are a vast 
improvement over the present legal system. Our present system results 
in higher prices for consumers, lost jobs, and stifled innovation.
  I want to talk about a particular provision in this conference report 
which is more than just sound economic policy; it is sound health 
policy.
  Over 11 million Americans rely on implanted medical technologies, 
ranging from artificial joints to complex mechanical devices such as 
cardiac defribrillators and drug infusion pumps.
  Unfortunately, the spectre of product liability litigation has caused 
many raw material suppliers to restrict the use of their products in 
implanted medical devices. The lack of materials and components for 
these medical devices jeopardizes the well-being--and in some cases the 
very lives--of the millions of Americans who depend on these 
technologies.
  The biomaterials access assurance provisions of H.R. 956 will help 
ensure that the threat of product liability litigation will not hurt 
patients who need access to implanted medical devices. H.R. 956 will 
prohibit claims against biomaterials supplier unless the company acted 
irresponsibly and its mistake actually caused the harm.
  It is also important to note what the biomaterials access assurance 
provisions will not do. Nothing will reduce the amount of money to 
which a person injured by a defective implant is entitled. Device 
manufacturers will design suitability and performance specifications 
for the raw materials, certified by the FDA, and suppliers will 
continue to be liable when materials or components do not meet the 
specifications.
  But suppliers will not be responsible when their products meet the 
manufacturer's specifications. In these circumstances, the 
manufacturers will be responsible for any product defect. This 
commonsense approach protects the rights of injured plaintiffs, but at 
the same time presents a biomaterials shortage our country just cannot 
afford.
  I urge my colleagues to support this important bill.
  Mr. BUYER. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to support this legislation 
which will return common sense to our legal system as it applies to 
products. While these reforms do not go as far as I would like, they 
are essential to restoring balance to our legal system as we seek to 
protect consumers while providing predictability to manufacturers.
  The bill establishes a 15-year limit on when a manufacturer may be 
held liable for its products. Product sellers will not be liable in 
cases where illegal drugs or alcohol contributed more than 50 percent 
toward the harm. In addition, producers will not be liable for the 
percentage of blame attributed to product misuse or alteration.
  This measure makes clear that punitive damages should be awarded only 
in the most serious cases of egregious conduct. Punitive damage awards 
will be linked to the actual harm caused by allowing punitive damage 
awards of up to two times the compensatory damages or $250,000, 
whichever is greater. There are special rules for individuals of 
limited net worth and to small businesses.
  Liability for noneconomic damages will be several, rather than joint, 
making defendants liable only for their proportionate share of the 
fault. This addresses the deep pocket syndrome.
  The bill also addresses the unique difficulty faced by biomedical 
device manufacturers. Medical device manufacturers are quickly losing 
suppliers of materials due to litigation. Huge awards are often sought 
from suppliers even though they had no role in the design, manufacture, 
or sale of a device. The courts are not finding suppliers liable, yet 
millions of dollars and countless hours are spent on defense in court. 
This bill will provide expedited dismissal against suppliers in court 
and they cannot be sued unless they are a manufacturer or a seller of 
devices and as long as they have abided by the contract and supply 
specifications of the manufacturer. Biomedical device manufacturers in 
Warsaw, IN, BIOMET, Zimmer, DePuy, and Danek, are producing the needed 
devices, pacemakers, heart valves, artificial blood vessels, hip and 
knee joints, that add so much to the quality of life for countless 
individuals.
  There are so many small businesses in the Fifth District of Indiana 
that will be helped by this legislation. These businesses will be able 
to concentrate on product development and expansion rather than 
fighting lawsuits. One such company is Whallon Machinery of Royal 
Center, IN, which manufacturers industrial material handling machines. 
In nearly 30 years of business, over 83 percent of all machines built 
are still in use. Prior to 1993, Whallon had no product liability 
claims. One customer had modified a Whallon machine. Had this 
legislation been in place then, Whallon Machinery may not have faced a 
fourfold increase in insurance premiums.
  It is time to return a sense of reasonableness to ensure that injured 
parties are compensated in a manner that protects all consumers and 
America's competitiveness. This legislation is a very good start.
  Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
product liability conference report. This bill effectively condones 
egregious misconduct, carelessness, and greed of manufacturers which 
produce and sell defective products. This bill makes it cost-effective 
for some companies to put profits ahead of safe products. In my 
opinion, Mr. Speaker, this is wrong. The unfortunate victims of the 
repercussions of this legislation are the American consumers.
  I object to the provisions in this bill which arbitrarily limit the 
amount of punitive damages injured person may recoup when harmed by 
faulty or dangerous products. Punitive damages should serve as a 
deterrent to manufacturers who knowingly build and sell dangerous 
products. Punitive damages force companies to fix dangerous products. 
For example, punitive damages have been effective in making safer 
children's pajamas and baby cribs, automobiles, and medical devices. 
Without the threat of these large damage awards, manufacturers have an 
incentive to settle with individuals hurt by dangerous products rather 
than correcting their wrongs. We cannot actively condone and promote 
such unconscionable business practice.
  Proponents of this legislation argue for the need to limit punitive 
damages to $250,000 because without such caps juries have awarded 
ridiculously high punitive damage awards. This is simply not true. The 
National Center for State Courts reports that only 600 of the 1 million 
tort actions filed each year result in punitive damages. It should 
further be noted that most of those are reduced on appeal. It is easy 
to talk about the outrageous $2.7 million award to the woman who was 
burned by the hot coffee at McDonald's. However, let us examine the 
facts. This grandmother had to undergo extensive skin grafts for her 
burns. McDonald's had ignored 700 prior complaints about too-hot coffee 
and, in fact, the judge reduced the punitive damage award to $400,000. 
How many burns must it take to have a company change its harmful ways? 
The unfortunate fact remains that business usually comes down to 
dollars. Mr. Speaker, it cannot pay to make dangerous products. I urge 
my colleagues to defeat this bill.
  Mrs. MEEK of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise 
and extend my remarks.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly oppose the so-called Common Sense Product 
Liability Legal Reform Act.
  There is no common sense in it.
  What is the common sense of having Washington dictate to juries in 
each of the 50 States how to decide a case where someone has been 
injured by a dangerous product?
  What is the common sense of having Washington dictate to the voters 
and State legislatures in each of the 50 States? The States are

[[Page H3203]]

acting. For example, in 1988 Florida's voters rejected, by a vote of 57 
percent to 43 percent, an amendment to the constitution that would have 
arbitrarily capped noneconomic damages in all tort cases at $100,000. 
Since 1986, 31 State legislatures have altered their product liability 
laws.
  The Republican majority preaches federalism and returning power to 
the people. But its actions speak louder than its words. The Republican 
leadership wants to override what the States are doing because it does 
not like what the citizens of each State are deciding.
  The Republican leadership preaches that individuals should be 
accountable for their actions. Why not apply the same standard to 
corporations that make and sell dangerous products?
  Title II of this bill will prevent women who needlessly suffered from 
faulty breast implants from suing the company that negligently supplied 
the silicone gel. That is wrong.
  Mr. Speaker, President Clinton is right when he said he will veto 
this bill. This conference report favors corporate profits over the 
health and safety of our citizens, and I urge my colleagues to vote 
against it.
  Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the conference 
report on H.R. 956, product liability reform.
  Last March, I voted in favor of this legislation because I believed 
there were problems in our product liability system which needed to be 
addressed. We have all heard stories of excessive awards, or juries 
granting vastly different awards for similar injuries. However, the 
conference report before us today and recent congressional action 
radically shift the balance against the consumers.
  To get a better understanding how this new version of product 
liability reform would affect the buying public, I met with Mary 
Griffin from Consumers Union. She discussed with me a number of the 
conference report's provisions which would adversely impact consumers, 
including the 15-year statute of repose, pre-emption of State laws more 
favorable to plaintiffs, the combined effect of the bill and other 
deregulatory efforts, and the 2-year statute of limitations on filing 
lawsuits.
  This legislation contains a number of provisions which, in my 
judgment, would place unreasonable restrictions on individuals' ability 
to receive compensation for injuries caused by faulty products. Taken 
together, these provisions cause the product liability system to tilt 
dramatically against consumers.
  The bill establishes a false and unfair distinction between 
individuals and corporations by limiting the ability of the individual 
to collect damages in product liability cases. For example, the statute 
of repose is set at 15 years for durable products like heavy machinery 
and elevators. If a defective product is more than 15 years old, an 
individual may not sue the manufacturer for injuries the product 
caused. Companies, however, could still go to court to recover damages. 
As a result, if a 16-year-old defective furnace explodes in a factory 
and kills a worker, that individual's family cannot sue the furnace 
manufacturer. The employer, however, is still permitted to take the 
furnace company to court to collect compensation for lost production, 
repairs, and so on.
  The State pre-emption provisions of the conference report also 
trouble me deeply. State laws more favorable to consumers, such as 
higher or unlimited punitive damages, are pre-empted by this bill. At 
the same time, if the State standards are stricter, they are allowed to 
stand. This position is ironic to me given the current mood of Congress 
in returning authority to the States. Evidently, the congressional 
leadership is not confident that States will protect big business 
sufficiently. Under this legislation, companies would not have to go to 
the trouble of venue-shopping; Congress simply guarantees them the best 
possible deal. These pre-emption provisions have earned the bill the 
opposition of the National Conference of State Legislatures, the 
Conference of Chief Justices, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, and many 
other groups.

  I am troubled by the apparent link between this product liability 
reform bill and the current congressional efforts toward deregulation. 
Congress is cutting the budgets of agencies like the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, which are responsible for overseeing the safety of products 
in the workplace and the home. It simply does not make sense to cut 
government safety oversight and, at the same time, slam the courthouse 
door on consumers who are injured by defective products.
  Finally, I must object to the 2-year statute of limitations inserted 
by the conference committee. Under this provision, a person must file a 
lawsuit within 2 years of discovering their injury. Mr. Speaker, many 
of the ailments caused by these injuries are progressive in nature, 
developing over time. A person cannot possibly file a lawsuit when they 
have no idea how their condition may progress and what sort of medical 
treatment they may require in the future.
  For these reasons, I cannot support the conference report on H.R. 
956. I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this legislation.
  Mr. PALLONE. Mr. Speaker, I am strongly opposed to H.R. 956, the so-
called Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act.
  H.R. 956 would pre-empt State law to require a $250,000 cap on 
punitive damage awards. Punitive damages are not compensation to a 
victim--through they serve that purpose--they are intended as 
punishment to businesses that are negligent. Punitive damage awards 
serve as a deterrent to bad actors in the market place who put 
explosive water heaters or automobiles on the market. It forces 
companies to be very careful and it forces them not to cut corners in 
an attempt to make a few dollars more.
  It does not take a degree in math to realize that a $250,000 punitive 
damage award is hardly a deterrent to negligent Fortune 500 companies 
that rake in hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars each 
year. In fact, what this fixed figure does is allow companies to 
carefully calculate the costs and benefits of being negligent. Right 
now, because punitive damage awards are uncertain, the maker of a gas 
heater that has a faulty valve has no idea how much the company will 
lose as a result of successful suits against its faulty product. But 
under this bill, all that manufacturer would have to do is figure out 
how many of those heaters will explode, multiply by $250,000 and then 
compare that with expected profits. If profits outweigh damage awards, 
then you can bet that that deadly product will be out on the market.
  This bill also does not contain language that I and 257 of my 
colleagues supported to hold foreign manufacturers to at least the same 
silly standards in this bill. So if you lose your sight, or your arms, 
or your children because of some negligent U.S. manufacturer, you can 
take some solace in the fact that you will get limited compensation, 
and the manufacturer will have to pay a little bit of money for being 
bad. But, if you lose a family member or your legs as a result of some 
faulty product from a foreign manufacturer, you get nothing. That 
company gets away scot-free, because H.R. 956 gives foreign 
manufacturers a free ride on the health, safety, and welfare of 
American consumers.
  I also find it ironic that Republicans--who have harped on the issue 
of States rights for many years--have put together a bill that tramples 
on States rights. Currently, States enjoy the right to impose either 
ceilings or floors on punitive damages; however, this legislation would 
impose a ceiling while still allowing States to enact even lower damage 
caps. A similar situation exists with regard to the statute of repose 
which is capped at 15 years. In addition, a provision was recently 
added to the bill that would pre-empt the law in numerous States 
governing the liability of certain utilities, including gas pipelines.
  The truth is time after time in this Congress, Republicans have put 
special corporate interests ahead of the needs of the average American. 
That is why I wrote to the President recently urging him to veto H.R. 
956, and I ask that the text of my letter be made part of the Record.
  This is just the latest in a series of efforts to undermine consumer 
protection at the expense of the health and safety of the average 
American. This undermining of American health and safety law represents 
a sea change from the consensus that reigned here for many years. But 
things have changed, and they have changed for the worse.
  For example, early in the year, we passed a risk assessment bill 
that, if enacted, would have effectively repealed current statutory and 
regulatory standards designed to protect health, safety, and the 
environment. That bill contained language that in a mindless, sweeping 
way, would have wiped away decades of work done by Congress, and by 
State and Federal courts.
  And just today, as we were considering H.R. 965, Republicans were 
telling us that the Consumer Product Safety Commission--which each year 
helps prevent millions of injuries due to negligent manufacturers or 
faulty products--had outlived its usefulness because the people were 
well protected by our Nation's product liability laws.
  Mr. Speaker, we need to ensure public safety. We need to protect 
small children. But what we do not need is the H.R. 956 the corporate 
dollars and sense Product Liability Reform Act. I am sure the President 
will veto, and I hope my colleagues will sustain his veto and stop 
Republicans from gutting consumer protections for the benefit of 
corporate special interests.


                                     House of Representatives,

                                   Washington, DC, March 25, 1996.
     Hon. William J. Clinton,
     President of the United States,
     Washington, DC.
       Dear President Clinton: I am writing in support of your 
     announced intention to veto H.R. 956, the Common Sense 
     Product Liability Legal Reform Act.
       H.R. 956 would pre-empt state law to require a $250,000 cap 
     on punitive damage

[[Page H3204]]

     awards. Currently, states enjoy the right to impose either 
     ceilings or floors on punitive damages; however, this 
     legislation would impose a ceiling while still allowing 
     states to enact even lower damage caps. A similar situation 
     exists with regard to the statute of repose which is capped 
     at 15 years. In addition, a provision was recently added to 
     the bill that would pre-empt the law in numerous states 
     governing the liability of certain utilities, including gas 
     pipelines.
       Also, it is clear that the threat of a $250,000 penalty is 
     not a sufficient deterrent to irresponsible behavior in many 
     instances. Nor is it adequate punishment for conduct that 
     results in death or serious injury such as the loss of a 
     limb. Coupled with the legislation's elimination of joint-
     and-several liability for noneconomic damages, this bill, if 
     enacted, would definitively tip the balance against consumers 
     and in favor of those who manufacture and market defective 
     products.
       Finally, it is important to note that this legislation is 
     not being considered in a vacuum. The Republican majority in 
     Congress continues to attack public health, safety and 
     consumer protection laws both through the authorization 
     process and by underfunding the agencies that enforce those 
     laws. Enactment of extreme legislation, like H.R. 956, taken 
     together with these other efforts will surely threaten the 
     health, safety and well being of all Americans.
       For these reasons, I urge you to veto H.R. 956.
           Sincerely,
                                               Frank Pallone, Jr.,
                                               Member of Congress.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is 
ordered.
  There was no objection.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the conference report.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a 
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
present.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
  The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 259, 
nays 158, not voting 14, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 110]

                               YEAS--259

     Allard
     Archer
     Armey
     Bachus
     Baker (CA)
     Baker (LA)
     Ballenger
     Barcia
     Barr
     Barrett (NE)
     Bartlett
     Barton
     Bass
     Bateman
     Bereuter
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bliley
     Blute
     Boehlert
     Boehner
     Bonilla
     Bono
     Boucher
     Brewster
     Browder
     Brownback
     Bryant (TN)
     Bunn
     Bunning
     Burr
     Burton
     Buyer
     Callahan
     Calvert
     Camp
     Campbell
     Canady
     Castle
     Chabot
     Chambliss
     Chenoweth
     Christensen
     Chrysler
     Clement
     Clinger
     Coburn
     Collins (GA)
     Combest
     Condit
     Cooley
     Cox
     Cramer
     Crane
     Crapo
     Cremeans
     Cubin
     Cunningham
     Davis
     Deal
     DeLay
     Dickey
     Dingell
     Dooley
     Doolittle
     Dornan
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Dunn
     Edwards
     Ehlers
     Ehrlich
     Emerson
     English
     Ensign
     Everett
     Ewing
     Fawell
     Flanagan
     Foley
     Forbes
     Fox
     Franks (CT)
     Franks (NJ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Frisa
     Funderburk
     Gallegly
     Ganske
     Gekas
     Geren
     Gilchrest
     Gillmor
     Goodlatte
     Goodling
     Gordon
     Goss
     Graham
     Greenwood
     Gunderson
     Gutknecht
     Hall (OH)
     Hall (TX)
     Hamilton
     Hancock
     Hansen
     Harman
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayworth
     Hefley
     Hefner
     Heineman
     Herger
     Hilleary
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hoke
     Holden
     Horn
     Hostettler
     Houghton
     Hunter
     Hutchinson
     Hyde
     Inglis
     Istook
     Johnson (CT)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones
     Kaptur
     Kasich
     Kelly
     Kennelly
     Kim
     Kingston
     Klug
     Knollenberg
     Kolbe
     LaHood
     Largent
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Laughlin
     Lazio
     Leach
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Lightfoot
     Lincoln
     Linder
     Livingston
     LoBiondo
     Longley
     Lucas
     Manzullo
     McCollum
     McCrery
     McDade
     McHugh
     McInnis
     McIntosh
     McKeon
     Metcalf
     Meyers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Minge
     Molinari
     Montgomery
     Moorhead
     Moran
     Morella
     Myers
     Myrick
     Nethercutt
     Neumann
     Ney
     Norwood
     Nussle
     Oxley
     Packard
     Parker
     Paxon
     Payne (VA)
     Peterson (FL)
     Peterson (MN)
     Petri
     Pombo
     Porter
     Portman
     Pryce
     Quillen
     Quinn
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Reed
     Regula
     Riggs
     Roberts
     Roemer
     Rogers
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roth
     Roukema
     Royce
     Salmon
     Sanford
     Saxton
     Scarborough
     Schaefer
     Schiff
     Seastrand
     Sensenbrenner
     Shadegg
     Shaw
     Shays
     Shuster
     Sisisky
     Skeen
     Slaughter
     Smith (MI)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (WA)
     Solomon
     Souder
     Spence
     Spratt
     Stearns
     Stenholm
     Stockman
     Stump
     Talent
     Tanner
     Tate
     Tauzin
     Taylor (MS)
     Taylor (NC)
     Thomas
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Torkildsen
     Upton
     Vucanovich
     Waldholtz
     Walker
     Walsh
     Wamp
     Watts (OK)
     Weldon (FL)
     White
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wolf
     Young (AK)
     Young (FL)
     Zeliff
     Zimmer

                               NAYS--158

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Andrews
     Baesler
     Baldacci
     Barrett (WI)
     Becerra
     Beilenson
     Bentsen
     Berman
     Bevill
     Bishop
     Bonior
     Borski
     Brown (CA)
     Brown (FL)
     Brown (OH)
     Cardin
     Chapman
     Clay
     Clayton
     Clyburn
     Coble
     Coleman
     Collins (MI)
     Conyers
     Costello
     Coyne
     Danner
     DeFazio
     DeLauro
     Dellums
     Deutsch
     Diaz-Balart
     Dicks
     Dixon
     Doggett
     Doyle
     Durbin
     Engel
     Evans
     Farr
     Fattah
     Fazio
     Fields (LA)
     Filner
     Flake
     Foglietta
     Frank (MA)
     Frost
     Furse
     Gejdenson
     Gephardt
     Gibbons
     Gilman
     Gonzalez
     Green
     Gutierrez
     Hastings (FL)
     Hilliard
     Hinchey
     Hoyer
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jacobs
     Jefferson
     Johnson (SD)
     Johnson, E. B.
     Johnston
     Kanjorski
     Kennedy (MA)
     Kennedy (RI)
     Kildee
     King
     Kleczka
     Klink
     LaFalce
     Lantos
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Lofgren
     Lowey
     Luther
     Maloney
     Manton
     Markey
     Martinez
     Martini
     Mascara
     Matsui
     McCarthy
     McDermott
     McHale
     McKinney
     Meehan
     Meek
     Menendez
     Miller (CA)
     Mink
     Moakley
     Mollohan
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Neal
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Orton
     Owens
     Pallone
     Pastor
     Payne (NJ)
     Pelosi
     Pickett
     Pomeroy
     Poshard
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Richardson
     Rivers
     Rose
     Roybal-Allard
     Rush
     Sabo
     Sanders
     Sawyer
     Schroeder
     Schumer
     Scott
     Serrano
     Skaggs
     Skelton
     Stark
     Studds
     Stupak
     Tejeda
     Thompson
     Thornton
     Thurman
     Torricelli
     Towns
     Traficant
     Velazquez
     Vento
     Visclosky
     Volkmer
     Ward
     Waters
     Watt (NC)
     Waxman
     Williams
     Wilson
     Wise
     Woolsey
     Wynn
     Yates

                             NOT VOTING--14

     Bryant (TX)
     Collins (IL)
     de la Garza
     Eshoo
     Fields (TX)
     Ford
     Fowler
     Hayes
     McNulty
     Smith (TX)
     Stokes
     Torres
     Weldon (PA)
     Weller

                              {time}  1343

  The Clerk announced the following pair:
  On this vote:

       Mrs. Fowler for, with Mrs. Collins of Illinois against.

  Mr. EDWARDS changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''

                          ____________________