Congressional Record, Volume 142 Issue 45 (Thursday, March 28, 1996)

[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 45 (Thursday, March 28, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S3134-S3144]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1996 AND 1997--
CONFERENCE REPORT

The Senate continued with the consideration of the conference report.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I was one of the first Members of the
Senate to support Senator Helms' efforts to consolidate U.S. foreign
policy agencies. This bill does not go as far as I or many of my
colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee had hoped it would in
this respect. I, and I know the chairman, had envisioned a
consolidation which would require the dismantlement of three agencies--
USAID, USIA, and ACDA. But just getting the bill into and out of the
conference committee was a major accomplishment and I commend the
chairman for it.
I support the bill and I will vote for it. A savings of $1.7 billion
over 4 years and the merging into the State Department of at least one
foreign policy agency is a proposition simply too good to pass up.
However, I do want to register my steadfast opposition to one
particular provision in the bill. The conference report conditions
funding for any expansion in United States diplomatic relations with
Vietnam on Presidential certifications in a number of areas related to
missing United States servicemen. The Senate wisely refrained from
including similar language in its bill, and despite its several efforts
to address the issue in previous legislation, the House included only
sense-of-the-Congress language.
Given that neither House decided to legislate in this area, I was
quite dismayed to find out that somehow during the proceedings of the
conference committee, the conferees actually decided to make the House
language tougher. One reasonably expects--and common

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sense would indicate--that a compromise develops midway between two
positions. But in this case, compromise involved not only caving to the
House position, but giving House conferees something for their trouble.
This is the third time that I have come to the floor to register my
opposition to the same language in different conference reports. I know
that conferees often have a difficult time dealing with this issue. On
one side of the debate are those who seek to block the President's
decision to normalize relations with Vietnam at every opportunity. They
are extraordinarily focused and unrelenting. In contrast, those on the
other side of the debate either have an understandable predominate
interest in reaching a real compromise, or truly see no harm in forcing
the President's hand.
As was the case with the CJS conference report, the balance of
sentiments on this issue in this conference has contributed to the
certainty of a Presidential veto. I know that the President would have
likely vetoed the bill anyway. He has fought the idea of State
Department reorganization since Secretary Christopher first proposed
it. However, I think we have complicated the case for consolidation
with this provision on Vietnam. In short, we have given the President
one more reason to veto the bill. And unlike some of his reasons, to my
mind, this one is legitimate.
When the bill returns to the Senate for a possible veto override, I
hope the conference will revisit the issue of United States-Vietnam
relations and approve language which reflects the will of at least one
House of Congress. Consistent with his constitutional powers, the
President last year made a decision to normalize relations with
Vietnam. As I have pointed out to my colleagues a number of times, this
is a fact. The President should not be constrained in his efforts to
carry out his decision. If we cannot respect President Clinton's
decision on its merits, we ought to at least respect the power his
office entitles him to exercise.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I oppose H.R. 1561. I do so for many
reasons.
I believe that this bill is not only myopic, but it is dangerous.
H.R. 1561 calls upon the President to eliminate one of three foreign
policy agencies and includes authorization levels that would force the
United States to withdraw from some international organizations. It
overlooks the successful efforts the administration has already
undertaken to reduce its expenditures. Mr. President, the United States
is unquestionably the strongest Nation in the world. These foreign
affairs agencies are essential to U.S. leadership. H.R. 1561 undermines
our strength and leadership in the world.
In addition to objection to the general direction the bill takes us,
there are also specific provisions that are seriously flawed.
Specifically, look at how this bill treats relations with Vietnam.
Section 1214 makes funding for a U.S. Embassy in Vietnam dependent upon
a Presidential certification that Vietnam is fully cooperating on the
POW/MIA issue. Most certainly we all want to resolve any outstanding
POW/MIA cases. However, this provision isn't likely to facilitate that
end. This provision, if enacted, could threaten the progress that has
already been made on the POW/MIA issue. Moreover, it could restrict the
President's ability to pursue our national interests in Vietnam and put
United States firms at a competitive disadvantage.
Second, it terms of U.S. participation in the United Nations, this
bill provides inadequate funding levels for fiscal years 1996 and 1997.
The United States is already $1.2 billion in arrears to the United
Nations. Besides being irresponsible, this outstanding obligation
thwarts our influence in the United Nations and impedes our diplomatic
efforts to reform the institution. Even Namibia, one of the poorest
countries in the world with a GDP 86 times less than the United States,
has paid up. That, Mr. President, is shameful.
Third, H.R. 1561 fails to resolve the limitations on U.S. population
assistance programs placed in the fiscal year 1996 foreign operations
appropriations legislation. Such restriction will have a serious,
detrimental impact on women and families in the developing world. These
restrictions will cause an estimated 7 million couples in developing
countries to be without access to safe, voluntary family planning
services. And what will the result be? Millions of unwanted pregnancies
and abortions. Mr. President, I am sure that none of my colleagues want
to see this happen.
Mr. President, I conclude my statement by reiterating that H.R. 1561
is shortsighted, dangerous, and that I vigorously oppose it. I
encourage my colleagues to join me in voting against the conference
report.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, today, we have before us significant
legislation which, if it becomes law, will restructure the principal
institutions used to conduct America's foreign policy. The process
leading to this point may have been less bipartisan and less open than
some of us would have desired. But I want to commend the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, for his determination
in shepherding this difficult bill through the legislative process.
The heart of this bill is its reorganization of our Nation's foreign
policy bureaucracy. While I still have reservations about the continued
deep cuts in our foreign affairs spending--an account that already has
sustained deep cuts since the late 1980s--that is not the issue here.
Congress made the decision to continue cutting our foreign affairs
spending when we passed the budget resolution last year. The purpose of
this authorizing legislation is to try to shape those cuts in a manner
that will best protect our ability to carry out the Nation's foreign
policy.
I believe this conference report's approach to streamlining and
consolidation--an approach dramatically different from the original
versions introduced a year ago in both Houses--is reasonable. In
essence, this legislation would require the abolition of one of our
four principal foreign policy agencies and would require a savings of
$1.8 billion over 4 years. It wisely vests in the President, however,
the maximum possible flexibility to determine the details of
reorganization.
Because the reorganization provisions are, in my judgment,
reasonable, I intend to vote for this legislation. However, I very much
regret that the legislation also contains many foreign policy
provisions which have been less scrutinized and which, in my view,
would have been better omitted. Let me outline my specific concerns
with the legislation:
First, the bill contains a number of provisions that may further
irritate our relations with China. Most important among these is the
provision asserting that the Taiwan Relations Act takes precedence over
the 1982 Sino-United States joint communique. The triangular
relationship between Washington, Beijing and Taipei is a delicate
diplomatic balance in each of its legs, and in this legislation
Congress is needlessly seeking to strengthen one leg--the leg between
Washington and Taipei--without regard for the effect on the other two.
Second, the bill unwisely reopens the difficult debate about our
relations with Vietnam. In 1994, after weighing the arguments on both
sides, Congress concluded that normalizing relations with Vietnam best
serves America's national interests in that region. I do not believe we
should roll back that decision today.
Third, the bill creates a new category of political asylum for
persons fleeing coercive population practices. I have opposed this
provision from its inception because I believe it may open a floodgate
of false claims for immigrants from certain countries not otherwise
able to enter the United States.
Fourth, the conference report restores several provisions that
require withholding of U.S. contributions to the United Nations--
provisions that were struck from the Senate bill at my request. I
believe that we have reached the limits of this nickel-and-dime
approach to reforming the United Nations and that these narrow
withholding requirements have become counterproductive. What is needed,
in my view, is a broader approach to reform. Unfortunately, a provision
that I added to the Senate bill to require the administration to submit
to Congress an overall proposal for reforming the United Nations
consistent with several specific objectives has been dropped from the
conference report.
Fifth, this legislation has cherry picked the foreign aid
authorization

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bill, incorporating a small handful of its most politically popular
provisions into the broader State Department Authorization bill. This
approach ensures that no other foreign aid authorization will be
enacted this year. I worry we are creating a situation in which no
foreign aid program other than the few in this bill will be authorized
and, as a result, funding for any others may be blocked.
Sixth, this authorization legislation does not deal with the
difficult population issue of international family planning, despite
the compromise reached in the Foreign Operations Appropriations debate
stipulating that the matter would be handled in this bill.
Seventh, the legislation ends the United States housing guarantee
program, with an exception for our program in South Africa. I tend to
believe this is an important program that should not be banned by
statute.
Mr. President, this is a long list of objections. To weigh them
against the strengths of the bill's reorganization provisions was no
easy task. I concluded, however, that the bill on balance is
worthwhile--largely because its reorganization provisions will bring an
order to the inevitable downsizing of these agencies that otherwise
might not exist. I also want to support the Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee. However, I understand the President has reached a
different conclusion and intends to veto this legislation. If that
occurs, I cannot give assurances that I would vote to override his
veto.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I want to compliment my friend from North
Carolina for moving forward a proposal to reduce the size of government
that was opposed by the Administration and those on the other side of
the aisle. I think through his persistence we have a bill that may not
go as far as most of us in the Senate would like to see, but at least
it is a step in the right direction.
I do think, however, that the debate on this bill helps to magnify
the fundamental differences between those on this side of the aisle and
those on the other side of the aisle.
When this bill was originally proposed it would have eliminated three
government agencies, The Agency for International Development [AID],
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] and The United States
Information Agency [USIA] and folded these functions back into the
State Department. By doing this, the American taxpayer would have saved
$3.66 billion during the next four years.
Now we have a bill that calls for the elimination of these three
agencies, but the bill allows the President to issue a waiver for the
elimination of two of these three agencies. The result is that the
American taxpayer will only realize about half of the $3.66 billion in
savings as originally proposed.
I want to remind my colleagues how we got from the original version
of the bill to the Conference Report. This is especially enlightening
because when the bill was originally proposed, it was hailed as the
Helms-Christopher plan because the bill mirrored a plan outlined by
Secretary of State Warren Christopher to eliminate these agencies.
This is what the January 12, 1995 edition of the Washington Times had
to say about this bill:

If imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, then
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott ought to be basking in the glow of
admiration beaming upon them from Capitol Hill. Jesse Helms
and Rep. Benjamin Gilman, chairmen of the Senate and House
Foreign Affairs Committees, recently unveiled their plan for
the re-invention of the U.S. State Department and--Ta-da--it
bore more than a passing resemblance to the plan produced by
Messrs. Christopher and Talbott.

However, when Vice-President Gore and his re-inventing government
staff got a hold of Secretary Christoper's plan it was fundamentally
altered. Instead of adopting it, the Vice-President decided to
streamline these agencies. And since then, according to the August 5,
1995 edition of Congressional Quarterly, ``the administration . . . has
mounted a furious effort to kill the Helms bill.''
Once again, I want to compliment my friend from North Carolina for
continuing to move this plan as originally proposed forward in the face
of opposition. He moved the bill through his committee, but when the
bill got to the floor of the Senate, the Democrats here carried the
administration's torch and frustrated efforts to eliminate these
agencies.
Twice the Senate tried to cut-off debate, and twice, along party
lines, the Senate was prevented from moving forward on the bill.
I wish to remind my friends on the other side of the aisle and the
American people, that the bill does not eliminate the functions of The
Agency for International Development [AID], The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency [ACDA] and The United States Information Agency
[USIA]. Some have argued that the bill in its original form would have
eliminated important government functions. I ask how? The bill
transfers the functions of these agencies to the State Department and
eliminates the bureaucracy created by these independent agencies.
I wish to point out again for my colleagues in the Senate, that the
first bill of the 104th Congress that would have eliminated three
government agencies faced vigorous opposition by the Democrats in its
original form. And the watered down version, which we are about to pass
which would eliminate only one government agency, faces a certain veto
by the President. This despite the fact that in his state of the union
address the President said ``the era of the big government is over.''
I don't think the American people could get a more clear picture of
who is doing what about the size of government.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, much of the debate today has addressed
issues that are important but peripheral to the focus of this bill,
which is the size and organization of the State Department and
associated foreign policy agencies.
Going back to the Nixon administration, numerous reviews have been
conducted by the Foreign Relations Committee, its House counterpart,
and many executive branch-appointed groups to determine how best to
streamline the array of foreign policy agencies that exist. My staff at
the Oversight of Government Management has studied this issue, as well.
A common theme of these reviews has been that more efficiencies can be
achieved, and this probably should include the merging of some existing
agencies. The conference report now before the Senate directs, in
essence, the elimination of at least one of three agencies--the Agency
for International Development [AID], the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency [ACDA], or the U.S. Information Agency [USIA]--with primary
focus on AID and ACDA.
The 1989 House Foreign Affairs Committee report coauthored by
Congressmen Hamilton and Gilman called for AID's elimination. A 1992
report by a bipartisan group appointed by AID, itself, called for AID's
merger into the State Department.
A decade ago, I cochaired with Harold Brown a study group at the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. We commissioned
a paper on why ACDA should not be merged into the State Department.
Quite frankly, despite the best efforts of the author who was an
advocate of ACDA, the resulting paper produced only weak arguments for
keeping ACDA as an independent agency.
Three years ago, Lynn Davis, a protege of Secretary Browns, was
appointed by the Clinton administration to be Under Secretary of State.
One of her first initiatives was to push to merge ACDA into the State
Department, but her effort failed in the face of congressional
opposition.
Last year, Secretary Christopher, himself, proposed merging these
three agencies into the State Department, but his proposal was not
accepted.
So the concept of merging ACDA, at least, into the State Department
is hardly radical. And few would argue that, in after the
``reinvention'' initiatives undertaken by the current administrator,
more must be done to reduce the size and improve the effectiveness of
AID.
This bill makes clear the desire of Congress to see genuine
streamlining, talked about for so many years, finally and effectively
implemented.
At the same time, legitimate questions have been raised as to whether
the specific mechanism in the conference report is the best way to go
about it. Throughout the Reagan and

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Bush administrations, Republicans criticized congressional micromanage-
ment of the President's foreign policy. Some will ask why now, in 1996,
we seem to be shifting direction and trying to impose restrictions on
the President. Even more than in the case of the reorganization
provisions of the conference report, this is true for many of the
conference report's policy provisions.
In this regard, I would highlight sections dealing with the Housing
Investment Guarantee Program, Vietnamese migrants, and China. Besides
being unrelated to the core function of this bill, many such provisions
contain unwise policy prescriptions.
We should encourage, for example, aid programs that leverage private
international investment, not terminate such programs as the conference
report would do. We should encourage enhanced dialogue between United
States and Chinese officials, rather than discourage it as the
conference report would do.
Despite these deficiencies, however, the bill does make progress on
the decades-old project of streamlining the various foreign policy
agencies, and so I intend to vote for it.
If the President does veto the conference report, I hope that we can
act promptly to rework it into a bill that can be enacted by deleting
or modifying these objectionable provisions.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum with the
time to be charged proportionately.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bennett). Without objection, it is so
ordered. The time will be charged proportionately, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina, managing the
bill, was seeking recognition.
The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Let us be fair about this thing. This is two Democratic
Senators. The Senator from Maryland has been waiting around to speak,
and I want to be sure that he is agreeable to being preceded.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, in the case of the Senator from Maryland,
will the Chair deem that he has been yielded time by Senator Kerry?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the Chair's understanding. The Senator
from Maryland.
Mr. HELMS. Very well.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes. How much time
is still available to Senator Kerry?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. He has 67 minutes and 45 seconds.
Mr. SARBANES. I yield myself 10 minutes of Senator Kerry's time. I am
authorized to do that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maryland is recognized.
Mr. SARBANES. I thank the Chair, and I thank the distinguished
chairman of the committee.
Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the conference report. I
regret that should be the case, because I really do think we should
make a very strong effort here to develop a bipartisan approach toward
our foreign policy. But this bill takes us in so many of the wrong
directions that I simply cannot support it.
First of all, we must understand that we are in a new period with
respect to foreign policy. Now that the cold war is over, in my
judgment the United States needs to bolster its diplomatic, economic,
and political capacities to influence events around the world. We need
to anticipate and prevent conflicts through mediation and negotiation.
We need to promote sustainable development and support human rights in
order to avoid conflicts, which would then lead to even larger economic
and human costs. We need to protect our citizens--indeed, all of the
world's citizens--from disease, environmental degradation, exhaustion
of natural resources, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
terrorism, and trafficking in narcotics.
These are all issues that transcend national borders. They are
sapping the vitality and strength of societies all across the world.
And as the focus shifts to economic matters, we need to expand markets
for U.S. goods and services and to create a level international playing
field for American workers.
Frankly, I think that these things often can be accomplished more
safely, more effectively, and at lesser cost through carefully designed
foreign assistance programs and skillful diplomatic engagement than by
retreat back to our shores, to a new form of isolationism, or by
resorting routinely to unilateral military intervention. The reliance
on military force is, of course, our ultimate protection. But many of
the problems we are now dealing with are amenable to resolution or
subject to influence well short of that. This is a major change from
the cold war.
This legislation undertakes, in effect, to impose on the executive
branch a reorganization of the foreign policy functions of the
Government. I am very frank to tell you that I think if the political
situation were reversed and there were a Democratic Congress trying to
impose this upon a Republican President, my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle would be protesting very loudly that this was an
inappropriate intrusion into the functions of the Chief Executive, an
improper effort to limit the executive's ability to determine the
organization of the foreign policy agencies.
Unfortunately, there is not a shared approach on this bill. It was
reported out of the committee on a straight party-line vote. It
confronted a similar situation on the floor until some concessions were
made. Unfortunately, when we got to conference, most of those
concessions were abandoned. So the bill now before us is markedly
different than the bill that passed the Senate.
I did not support the bill that passed the Senate, and since it has
worsened in conference, by definition I would not support the
conference report. But for those who did support the Senate bill, I
want to underscore the fact that the bill now before us is markedly
different from what moved out of the Senate. Moreover, in my judgment,
in virtually every instance it is different in the wrong direction. In
other words, there is even less reason to support this legislation, and
more reason to oppose it.
There are many troubling provisions in this legislation. Let me just
touch on some of them. I am not going to try to cover them all. I know
the hour is late, and others wish to speak.
I have talked about the reorganization proposal that provides for
mandatory elimination of at least one of the foreign policy agencies. I
happen to think that these agencies are doing a good job, particularly
under the restructuring efforts that are taking place internally, and
in that regard I particularly cite for commendation the efforts at AID.
Under the able leadership of the Administrator, Brian Atwood, that
agency has been streamlined and energized in order to do its job more
effectively.
Secondly, this authorization bill would have the effect of providing
caps on appropriations--in other words, of setting ceilings on
spending--which are far below the levels necessary to conduct foreign
policy and to sustain our interests overseas. I think we are going to
face important challenges in the coming years. I do not think we ought
to hamstring the ability of the Executive to deal with them. I simply
offer to my colleagues on the other side the proposition that they have
one of their own now seeking to be the Chief Executive, and they ought
to stop and think twice whether they would want him hobbled and
hamstrung, as I believe this legislation would do.
This legislation imposes very severe cuts in terms of U.S.
participation at the United Nations. I know for many people, the United
Nations is not the most popular agency, but let me simply submit to
you, if we did not have the U.N., we would have to invent it. In many
instances, the United Nations helps us to achieve important U.S.
foreign policy objectives. Often when a situation breaks out around the
world, the first reaction everyone has is, ``Well, the United Nations
ought to do something about it,'' and, in many instances, the U.N. has
done something about it very successfully.

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We are now the largest deadbeat at the U.N. in terms of meeting our
dues and assessments. I think for a Nation which constantly asserts
that it is the world's leader, this is a sorry state of affairs.
Unfortunately, the conference report before us would only exacerbate
this situation.
Furthermore, this legislation makes such drastic changes with respect
to AID that I doubt very much that that agency would be able to
continue to function in any meaningful manner.
In that regard, I ask unanimous consent that a letter from 20
religious and faith-based organizations be printed in the Record at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, this is a letter from 20 religious and
faith-based organizations urging opposition to H.R. 1561.
Let me quote from that letter urging this opposition to the
conference report:

. . . The bill would eviscerate further the U.S. commitment
to self-help development for poor people in the developing
world.
We are particularly troubled by the bill's proposal to
abolish the Agency for International Development.

They then go on to say that this would be a misordering of U.S.
priorities; that support for poverty eradication and self-help
development should be a primary objective of U.S. foreign aid and that
it should be administered by an independent agency.
They then discuss other matters in the legislation about which they
are very concerned. I think this is a very thoughtful letter, and I
hope my colleagues will examine it very closely.
Mr. President, the administration has indicated that they will veto
this legislation, as I think they should. I have not discussed some of
the particular regional matters. A number of my colleagues have
discussed the Taiwan Relations Act and the impact that this has on the
United States relationship with Taiwan and on our relationship with the
People's Republic of China. I do not think the provisions that are in
this legislation have been carefully thought through, and if they were
adopted we could run a high risk of destabilizing the situation and
contributing to heightened tensions in the region.
Others, I know, have talked also about the family planning
implications of this legislation and the fact that it misses an
opportunity to correct appropriations restrictions that are having a
deleterious impact on women and families in the developing world. This
is voluntary family planning services that we are talking about. It is
not the abortion issue. I am talking about programs that are designed
to make family planning information and services safe and accessible,
programs that have had a positive impact around the world. In fact,
U.S. foreign assistance does not provide funding for abortion. What we
are talking about here are international family planning programs which
have been in place for many, many years and traditionally are strongly
supported on both sides of the aisle.
So, in summary, Mr. President, I think this legislation falls well
short of what we should be enacting into law. I very much regret that
the end product is, in my view, essentially a partisan affair. We ought
not to be formulating our foreign policy that way, but that is what has
happened here.
I would also like to commend Senator Kerry of Massachusetts, who has
made a yeoman's effort to reach out in an inclusive way and to try to
shape reasonable legislation. I very much regret that that was not
achieved, and I urge my colleagues to vote against the conference
report.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Exhibit 1

20 Religious and Faith-based Organizations Urge Opposition to H.R.
1561, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act of 1995

Dear Senator: We strongly urge your opposition to the
conference report on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations
Revitalization Act of 1995, when it is considered by the full
Senate. The bill would eviscerate further the U.S. commitment
to self-help development for poor people in the developing
world.
We are particularly troubled by the bill's proposal to
abolish the Agency for International Development. The harm
posed by such a proposal is not undone by the provision
allowing a presidential waiver of the requirement to abolish
two foreign policy agencies. While we support the reform of
AID, we do not believe that transferring its functions to the
State Department would accomplish such reform. To the
contrary, we believe strongly that U.S. assistance for
development should be administered by an agency separate from
the State Department so that the long-term needs for
sustainable development are not sacrificed for short-term
political objectives. Assistance in support of political
objectives already accounts for the majority of U.S. foreign
aid. This, in our view, represents a serious misordering of
the priorities that should govern U.S. foreign assistance. We
believe that support for poverty eradication and self-help
development should be the primary objective of U.S. foreign
aid and that it should be administered by an independent
agency.
We are also concerned about the funding levels for a number
of programs as authorized in the legislation. We believe that
funding for U.S. contributions to international
organizations, including the general budget of the United
Nations, is inadequate. We also believe that funding for U.N.
peacekeeping activities for FY 97 is insufficient. We believe
that it is imperative that funding be approved that, at a
minimum, will not increase the arrearages in U.S.
contributions to the U.N., including peacekeeping activities.
Continued U.S. disregard for treaty obligations related to
assessed contributions will further undermine U.S. leadership
in the world.
We oppose the militarization of the international narcotics
control program and are especially concerned that funding
would nearly double in FY 97 to $213 million. The program has
proven largely ineffective in reducing the volume of illicit
drugs entering the U.S. At the same time it has strengthened
foreign militaries that have engaged in serious and
systematic human rights violations.
The bill contains a number of constructive refugee and
migration policy provisions that deserve support. We regret
that these provisions may not be enacted because of
objectionable provisions throughout the rest of the bill.
We are encouraged by the Administration's statement that
the President will veto the bill if it is presented to him in
its current form. We hope that there will be sufficient
opposition in the Senate to defeat the measure, making such a
veto unnecessary. We urge you to oppose the bill.
Sincerely,
David Bechmann, President, Bread for the World; Mark
Brown, Associate Director for Advocacy, Lutheran Office
for Governmental Affairs, Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America; Imani Countess, Executive Director,
Washington Office on Africa; Michael Dodd, Director,
Columban Fathers Justice and Peace Office; Bill Dyer,
Justice and Peace Officer, Missionaries of Africa;
Richelle Friedman, Lobbyist, NETWORK, A national
Catholic Social Justice Lobby; Jaydee R. Hanson,
Assistant General Secretary, Ministry of God's
Creation, General Board of Church and Society, United
Methodist Church; Maureen Healy, Africa Liaison,
Society of St. Ursula; Rev. Dan C. Hoffman, Area
Executive, Global Ministries of the United Church of
Christ/Disciples of Christ; Rev. Elenora Giddings
Ivory, Director, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.),
Washington Office; Kathryn J. Johnson, Interim
Director, Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace;
Jay Lintner, Director, Office for Church in Society;/
United Church of Christ; Erich D. Mathias, Program
Associate, Global Ministries of the United Church of
Christ/Disciples of Christ; James Matlack, Director,
Washington Office, American Friends Service Committee;
Timothy A. McElwee, Director, Washington Office, Church
of the Brethen; Terence W. Miller, Director, Maryknoll
Justice and Peace Office; Richard S. Scobie, Executive
Director, Unitarian Service Committee, Lawrence
Turnipseed, Executive Director, Church World Service;
George Vickers, Executive Director, Washington Office
on Latin America; Kathryn Wolford, President, Lutheran
World Relief.

Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I yield myself up to 6 minutes off the
time Senator Kerry has reserved.
Mr. President, I also oppose the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act
of 1995. In my view, it is wrongheaded legislation and, if enacted, it
will undermine our national interests. The legislation, in fact, does
undermine the President's constitutional mandate to conduct the foreign
affairs of the Nation. By passing a bill such as this, we would be
trying to run America's foreign policy out of this Chamber rather than
allowing the Executive to conduct the Nation's foreign policy.
Among my concerns about this act is the forced consolidation of
agencies. By passing the act, we would tell the

[[Page S3139]]

President that he is required to eliminate at least one foreign affairs
agency, either the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S.
Information Agency, or the Agency for International Development. When
the goal becomes putting the Government out of business and wrecking
departments and agencies in some haphazard approach without carefully
considering the consequences that a particular agency's termination
might have, then something has gone very wrong.
Furthermore, the authorization levels that are provided in the bill
will force other organizations to retreat further from engagement in
world affairs.
America needs to pursue its interests vigorously in international
affairs and to assure that the interests of American citizens are
promoted. Withdrawing from the world will only help to make our
citizens victims of emerging problems to which we will be ill-equipped
to respond if this bill becomes law.
The legislation sets authorization ceilings in fiscal years 1996 and
1997 that are far below the levels necessary to conduct the President's
foreign policy and to properly maintain U.S. interests abroad in such
areas as overseas posts, foreign affairs agencies, arms control and
nonproliferation activities, international organizations and
peacekeeping, public diplomacy and sustainable development.
In this bill, the Congress is recklessly venturing into an already
stressful set of complex problems between the People's Republic of
China and Taiwan. By amending the Taiwan Relations Act to state that
the act supersedes the provisions of the 1982 joint communique between
the United States and China, as the bill instructs, we are certain to
pour oil on a smoldering flame. Many commentators and scholars argue
that this would be seen as a repudiation of a critical and stabilizing
element of the longstanding United States policy toward China.
This bill also expresses the sense of Congress that the President of
Taiwan should be admitted to the United States for a visit this year
with all appropriate courtesies. We have already gone down that road
once. It seems clear to me that it is foolish, if not dangerous, for us
to do so once again.
My list of concerns continues in that that bill prohibits any funds
from being used to open, expand or operate a diplomatic or consular
post in Vietnam unless a number of compliance items are met by Vietnam.
I am not going to debate whether those compliance guidelines are
important. I believe that they are probably valid things to pursue, but
not as a condition to establishing an embassy or getting it operating.
This is cold war legislation that does not appear to recognize that the
cold war is over and that the world has moved on. It is not appropriate
for this Chamber to micromanage the President's foreign affairs
initiatives in this manner.
On other fronts, the Foreign Relations Revitalization Act compels the
United States to downgrade its participation in the United Nations,
significantly restricts our country's ability to coordinate
peacekeeping efforts and intelligence activities, when global stability
issues are at stake. Our role in the United Nations is something that
certainly deserves national discussion and debate, but this bill
presupposes the answer to that discussion.
Mr. President, this act should be rejected. It clearly does not
further the best interests of the American public. I urge my colleagues
to vote against its passage.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. NUNN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 117 minutes.
Mr. NUNN. I will not need all that time. But could I inquire of the
Chair what happened to my 3 minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There were three quorum calls, equally
divided. Each one took 1 minute.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair. I can assure my colleagues I will not
need all of my time.
Mr. President, I rise in strong opposition to the conference report
on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal years
1996 and 1997. Although I have a number of problems with the conference
report, Senator Bingaman from New Mexico and others have identified a
number of problems that I will identify myself with. I would like to
focus my remarks on the provisions relating to China.
Mr. President, I am relieved that tensions in the Taiwan Strait
appear to be easing in the aftermath of Democratic elections in Taipei.
We are already very proud of what occurred in Taipei and proud of the
people in Taiwan for carrying out their democratic elections under
great pressure from the mainland.
I am pleased that the Governments of the People's Republic of China
and Taiwan are now making conciliatory statements. I hope a high level
of dialogue between these two Governments can take place in the near
future.
Mr. President, it would be truly ironic if China and Taiwan begin
moving down the road to improving their relations while we take actions
in the U.S. Congress that will further the deterioration in the
relations between the United States and China. I would find that very
ironic. But I am afraid that that is what this act will do.
Before I discuss the specific provisions of this conference report, I
would note that the Senate passed a concurrent resolution last Thursday
expressing the Sense of Congress regarding missile tests and military
exercises by China. As I noted in my floor speech on that concurrent
resolution, which had bipartisan support and passed by a vote of 97 to
0, it was ``well-reasoned and responsible and * * * designed to make a
constructive contribution to the situation.''
The concurrent resolution reviewed the history of the three joint
communiques under three different Presidents, noted the adherence to a
one-China policy by the administrations of Presidents Nixon, Ford,
Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, and ``deplored'' China's missile
tests and military exercises as ``potentially serious threats to the
peace, security, and stability of Taiwan, and not in the spirit of the
three United States-China Joint Communiques.''
The concurrent resolution went on to cite provisions of the Taiwan
Relations Act and ended by stating that--

The Government of Taiwan should remain committed to the
peaceful resolution of its future relations with the People's
Republic of China by mutual decision.

Mr. President, the concurrent resolution the Senate passed last week
was responsible and was designed to make a constructive contribution to
the situation. Unfortunately, the China provisions of the conference
report are, in my view, not responsible and not constructive.
I will just go into detail on a couple of the most troublesome
provisions. Section 1601 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act now
pending would amend the Taiwan Relations Act to provide that the Act
supersedes the provisions of the 1982 Joint Communique issued under
President Reagan.
Mr. President, if it is a matter of law, and it is, that the Taiwan
Relations Act supersedes the communique, then that already happened
without any declaration of the Senate. Less than a week after the
Senate, without one dissenting vote, specifically pointed to the three
United States-China Joint Communiques, this act, if it becomes law,
could be interpreted as nullifying the validity of one of those joint
communiques.
Just to go into details of the 1982 Reagan Joint Communique, it
stated in part that--

The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of
Taiwan is China's internal affair. The message to compatriots
in Taiwan, issued by China on January 1, 1979, promulgated
a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful
reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal
put forward by China on September 30, 1981, represented a
further major effort under this fundamental policy to
strive for a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.

Then section 5:

The United States Government attaches great importance to
its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no
intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and
territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal
affairs, or pursuing a policy of ``two Chinas'' or ``one
China, one Taiwan.''

Then section 6:

Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the
United States Government states that it does not seek to
carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan,

[[Page S3140]]

that its arm sales to Taiwan will not exceed either in
qualitative or quantitative terms, the level of those
supplied in recent years since the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and
that it intends to reduce gradually the sales and arms to
Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.
In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's
consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this
issue.

Mr. President, I believe it is instructive and very important for the
Senate, because this is an important vote--I do not know whether people
are listening. I do not know whether people have studied this act. I do
not know whether people understand the far-reaching implications of
this, but this is one of the most important votes we will make this
year.
I believe it is instructive, particularly for colleagues on the
Republican side of the aisle, to note that President Reagan issued a
statement in conjunction with the 1982 Joint Communique, which was
prepared by the Reagan administration.
In that statement President Reagan stated that--I am quoting--

Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set
forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act.

Mr. President, if President Reagan was right in that carefully
crafted statement--this was not a speech off the cuff or a remark he
made on television or anything of that nature. This was a very
carefully crafted statement by President Reagan in 1982, that went
along with the communique with China.
Again, I want to point out the most important sentence that he said
in that statement that relates to this act tonight. He states:

Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set
forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act.

Mr. President, the pending legislation strongly implies that
President Reagan was wrong in this carefully crafted statement in 1982.
If the Taiwan Relations Act is inconsistent with the 1982 Joint
Communique, President Reagan was wrong, and this act would be viewed as
creating a new interpretation of United States-China policy.
Make no mistake about it: If President Reagan was right in his
statement, then there is absolutely no need for this act to refer to
any kind of superseding of the joint communique--if he was correct. If
he was wrong, all these years under both President Reagan, President
Bush and under President Clinton, then we have had a communique which
the State Department, our policy, our three Presidents, have felt was
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and which we have been
following regarding arm sales and so forth, that, in effect, is now
being implicitly overruled.
Do we really want to implicitly take a step tonight that could be
viewed and certainly will be viewed by China and by others in the world
as creating a new interpretation of United States-China policy by law?
Are we prepared to do that? That is what this legislation does. If that
is what the Senate wants to do tonight, people can go right ahead and
vote for it. It will pass, and the President will have to decide what
to do.
I do not believe the Senate of the United States is focused on this,
and I do not believe my colleagues thoroughly understand the very
profound implications of this, in effect, declaration, or implied
declaration, that the Taiwan Relations Act is inconsistent with
President Reagan's joint communique with China of 1992.
To continue quoting President Reagan in the statement he made after
the joint communique, not part of the joint communique: ``Arms sales
will continue in accordance with the Act and with the full expectation
that the approach of the Chinese Government to the resolution of the
Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful.''
Do we want to implicitly overrule that sentence? Do we want to
implicitly overrule the first sentence that I have already read twice,
but will read again, ``Regarding future United States arms sales to
Taiwan, our policy, set forth clear in the communique, is fully
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act''? Which of those sentences do
we want to implicitly state has been superseded by the Taiwan Relations
Act?
``Arms sales will continue in accordance with the Act and with the
full expectation that the approach of the Chinese Government to the
resolution of the Taiwan issue will continue to be peaceful.'' Is that
statement wrong? Is the first statement wrong? That seems to be what we
are saying.
``We attach great significance,'' again, President Reagan's
statement, ``We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in
the communique regarding China's `fundamental' policy; and it is clear
from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this
peaceful policy fully in mind.''
Continuing from President Reagan, ``The position of the United States
Government has always been clear and consistent in this regard. The
Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese people, on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait to resolve. We will not interfere in this matter or
prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan
in this matter. At the same time, we have an abiding interest and
concern that any resolution be peaceful. I shall never waiver from this
fundamental position.''
Mr. President, this legislation, in effect, says that President
Reagan did not know what he was doing when he made that statement, that
the Taiwan Relations Act itself superseded the joint communique,
because it was inconsistent with it. There is no reason for it to
supersede the joint communique unless there is an inconsistency. If
there is no inconsistency, there is no reason to say it supersedes it,
because the consistent joint communique would not be overruled by a
consistent United States law, which the Taiwan Relations Act is--it is
law. There is no doubt about that.
President Reagan made it clear in his Presidential statement that the
reduction in arms sales to Taiwan is based upon the premise, as
expressed in the joint communique, that the Taiwan question will be
settled peacefully.
Mr. President, China believes that Taiwan has acted in ways that are
inconsistent with the one-China policy. No question but that is what
China believes and is the basis of a lot of their action. Taiwan
contends it does not seek independence. President Li has said that.
President Li has also restated his desire for peaceful reunification
with the mainland.

China, in my view, has greatly overreacted to its perceptions by
conducting missile launches and military exercises which I believe are
inconsistent with the other fundamental principle of settling the
Taiwan question peacefully. I happen to believe that what China has
done in recent weeks is counterproductive to its own purpose, which is,
as stated, eventual peaceful reunification.
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 was enacted at the time of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and
China, a diplomatic act which established the principle of one China.
The Taiwan Relations Act was needed to create a foundation for dealing
with Taiwan in the aftermath of the end of diplomatic relations with
the Republic of China. It did not, nor did it need to, refer to the
one-China principle, because it focused instead on ensuring that the
Taiwan question was settled peacefully by ensuring that Taiwan had the
means to defend itself.
Enactment of section 1601 of this act pending before us now, which is
the pending conference report, could be interpreted--and I say would be
interpreted by many--to say that the Taiwan Relations Act is
inconsistent and even supersedes the principle of one China. I do not
believe that is what the authors intended to do here. Perhaps they can
clarify that.
I am fearful that a number of people in the world, including China
itself, could very well interpret this legislation as superseding the
principle of one China. This is a complex, complicated area where words
really do matter. I think we should be very careful this evening.
Mr. President, I believe China's provocative military actions have
been dangerous and counterproductive to China's interest and certainly
to the interest of stability in that area of the world. I believe that
China has greatly overreacted on the subject of Taiwan. The enactment
of this conference report will make the situation worse because it
would undercut one of the two

[[Page S3141]]

main principles of our relationship with China and could give the
Chinese--probably would give the Chinese--the impression that the
United States was no longer willing to live up to its commitments as
set out in the three joint communiques by President Nixon, President
Carter, and President Reagan, and followed by the other Presidents,
including President Bush and President Clinton.
Mr. President, I believe this legislation, if it passed and became
law, would be a very, very serious mistake, one of the most profound
mistakes this Congress has made and probably any Congress has made in
recent years. I think it would take our troubled relations with China
and turn them into a real downward spiral of additional trouble.
Mr. President, I also would like to call the Senate's attention to
section 1702 of the act, the Declaration of Congress Regarding U.S.
Government Human Rights Policy Toward China. Within this section, it is
expressed in the sense of the Congress that ``The President should
decline the invitation to visit China until and unless there is a
dramatic overall progress on human rights in China and Tibet and
communicate to the Government of China that such a visit cannot take
place without such progress.''
Mr. President, this is exactly what we have done in this country
under two Presidents, President Bush and President Clinton, for the
last 7 years. It does not appear to be working very well. This is
basically a freezing, if we took the sense of the Congress seriously--
if the President did--a freezing of the status quo.
Mr. President, while I believe it is counterproductive to our own
goals to make human rights in China the centerpiece and the be-all and
end-all of United States-Chinese relations, I do not think we further
our goals when we do that, including our human rights goals. The United
States has a strong interest in seeing respect for human rights improve
in China and, indeed, all over the world. The enactment of this
provision or any provision similar to it would run counter to the very
actions the United States must take in order to address and help
constructively resolve the differences between the United States and
China, including, but not limited to, progress on human rights.
Mr. President, I think a lot of people forget that the United States
has 38,000 troops in Korea. We have the most isolated regime in the
world, North Korea, that is not only on a quest--or has been up until
the last year--to become a nuclear power, but also has, according to
reports, increasing problems with starvation, including predictions by
most organizations that the problems are going to get worse in the next
3 or 4 months.
Mr. President, one of the things that people do not recognize is that
China has been very, very constructive in terms of the United States'
position on the Korean Peninsula, both in terms of encouraging North
Korea to behave in the nuclear area and also encouraging the parties
there to resolve their differences with dialogue and without a war.
This is a dangerous situation in Korea. We have 38,000 troops there.
In our relationship with China, we appear to forget altogether about
the connection between China and the situation in Korea.
I do not see how we can do that and keep our minds on our duty to our
own military forces that are stationed there. But it seems to be
completely ignored in all of our debates about China. I would say, on
the one side, people on the left seem to believe that, in China, 10
dissidents is on the same level, at least, with the whole United States
question on the Korean Peninsula. People on the right seem to believe
that we can take positions that basically unravel, or at least
implicitly unravel, communiques entered into by Presidents Reagan,
Carter, and Nixon, and we can do that with impunity, and we can forget
any relationship between what we do vis-a-vis China in terms of keeping
our agreements, and what they may do regarding helping us resolve the
Korean situation peacefully.
There are a lot of other mutual interests we have with China, but
they get lost in this atmosphere. Perhaps they will continue to get
lost until we have the kind of high-level dialogue between the
President of the United States and the President of China, and between
our Secretary of State and their Foreign Minister, that can begin to
talk about mutual interests and resolve the differences, which are
differences of considerable importance, within the framework of working
as partners with mutual interests. That is not possible in the current
atmosphere.
But what this bill says is that we should place human rights in China
and in Tibet above anything else. The Korean Peninsula, the nuclear
quest for arms in Korea, the 38,000 American troops that are in Korea,
the stability of Northeast Asia, and even Taiwan-China relations. We
are saying--if you take this seriously--that the President should not
have any kind of visit to China until they act, in American terms,
acceptably on human rights both in China and Tibet.
Mr. President, on human rights, I think the United States is unique.
But we will really be unique if we take this resolution seriously,
because we would be the only country in the world that takes that
position. Not a single ally--not one--has taken the position that their
head of State should not visit China. That is what we are saying here--
that the President should not visit China.
Mr. President, maybe we do not take these sense-of-the-Congress
resolutions seriously. They are not law, and would not be binding the
President. If we do not take them seriously and they are not important,
how do we expect anybody else to take them seriously? Unfortunately,
when we put resolutions like this in the bill, the only people that
take them seriously are the people they affect adversely. And they
react adversely. So I do not know what we are really trying to say
here. But I know it is counterproductive. It would postpone, if not
preclude, efforts to establish a much-needed strategic dialogue between
the United States and China. Clearly, the dialog with China is more
important than ever at this time-- unless we really want to go into a
period of years of cold war and dangers of something far worse than
cold war, in that part of the world.
For the strategic dialogue between the United States and China to be
successful in working to resolve our differences, participation is
required on the highest levels of leadership. That means the President
of the United States has an active role to play, whether it be
President Clinton or President Dole in 1997. How soon this resolution
would apply to ``President'' Dole, saying to him, ``You should not have
any Presidential visit or dialog with China until they meet our terms
on human rights''--I really have a hard time believing that we are
serious about saying this.
So whichever President is elected in 1996, that is what this
resolution is saying. This is indefinite. This resolution says we do
not think you should ever visit China until you have resolved the human
rights questions in China and Tibet to our satisfaction.
Mr. President, we have not treated any other country in the world
this way. We do not treat Russia that way right now. We expect the
President of the United States to meet with President Yeltsin, but most
of us deplore what is happening in Chechnya, the continued killing of a
tremendous number of innocent people there. We do not say to the
President, ``Do not visit Russia.''

Mr. President, people forget that we are very proud of what Taiwan
has done. Taiwan had an election under very serious pressure. We are
proud of their economic progress. All of us have very close friends in
Taiwan. These are some of the most productive, energetic people in the
world. And this country is always going to have a very friendly
relationship with the people in Taiwan.
We were very patient with Taiwan. They were not a democracy, in our
sense of the word, for years and years. We are celebrating democracy
now. For 35 years, we supported Taiwan when they were not a democracy.
We have had the same thing with the South Koreans. We celebrate what is
happening in South Korea now, with the democratic election of a
President. We went for years and years and years, where we spent
literally billions of dollars helping defend South Korea when they did
not meet our definition of human rights. It is only in recent years
that they have. And now we single out China and say, ``We do not want
our

[[Page S3142]]

President talking to you, or visiting you, or having any dialogue with
you, until you meet our definition of human rights.''
I really do not believe the Senate of the United States wants to say
this tonight. That is what we will say if we pass this resolution.
Mr. President, 7 years have passed since an American President, or
Vice President, has journeyed to Beijing, or the President, or premier,
of China has been in Washington. This provision would say to the
President: ``please do not change this situation. This is a great
policy. It is really working.'' Well, is it working? Does anybody think
that helped our relations? I think this is a fundamental error that
would be damaging to United States-China relations and United States
foreign policy.
This conference report's provisions attempt to deal with differences
with China by prohibiting initiatives and efforts that would help
resolve the very differences that we are frustrated about.
Quoting from a speech I gave on China about 3 weeks ago:

Not only must our expectations be realistic, but we cannot
wait to engage extensively with China until it has become
more like us. . . . We must engage with China and its current
leaders now. . . . China's transition and its potential
impels America, insofar as possible, to be actors on the
scene.

Mr. President, China is determined to preserve the areas it considers
part of China, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibet. Passage
of this legislation will inevitably cause China to harden its position.
We should not make miscalculations regarding this.
From the Chinese perspective, Tibet, like Taiwan, is considered to be
an issue of sovereignty to be resolved internally by China and Tibet.
In the Foreign Relations Authorization Act pending before us, it is
expressed as the sense of Congress that ``Tibet * * * is an occupied
country under the established principles of international law.'' That
is what we are saying in this bill.
Mr. President, as a matter of fact, longstanding United States policy
is that Tibet is part of China. That is not a new policy by the Clinton
administration. We have had that policy through a number of
administrations. This is also shared by every member of the United
Nations. Even the Dalai Lama does not go as far as this conference
report. What are we doing? What are we doing? Do we know?
Mr. President, I view with concern section 1303 of the act, which
advocates establishing a special envoy for Tibet. That is what we are
voting on. This provision would have the United States establish a
level of official relations with Tibet--if you take it seriously--that
undermines our longstanding, established Tibetan policy. More
important, this provision would weaken our ability to influence Chinese
policies in Tibet and would greatly weaken our influence to protect the
people in Tibet from abuses, which we all know have occurred.
My specific concerns are as follows: The proposed duties of the
special envoy would duplicate and, I believe, greatly undercut
responsibilities already being discharged by the United States State
Department--that is, promoting dialog between the Dalai Lama and the
Chinese Government concerning the religious and cultural integrity of
Tibet and discussing the human rights problems in Tibet with Chinese
Government officials.
The President has already appointed, the Senate has confirmed, and
the Chinese Government has accepted an envoy to all of China--and that
is the United States Ambassador, resident in Beijing--our former
colleague, Ambassador Sasser.
The Chinese Government, in my view, would refuse to accept a special
envoy for Tibet, and would in all likelihood make regular travel to
Tibet impossible for United States diplomats.
Is that what we want? Do we want to imply that Tibet is separate from
China, and do we want to have a separate United States envoy, and
probably in all likelihood result in virtually cutting off access of
the United States to Tibet? Is that what we want? Because that is what
we are voting on.
Mr. President, this provision in my view would be counterproductive
to its intended purpose. I am sure the purpose of the provision is to
help the people of Tibet. My view is that it would be totally
counterproductive to that end. The United States can maintain and
promote good relations between the Dalai Lama and his representatives.
We can promote the need for substantive negotiations to take place
between the Dalai Lama, or his representatives, and senior members of
the Government of China. We can coordinate United States Government
policies, programs, and projects concerning Tibet, and we can carry out
any other actions the President deems necessary with regard to Tibet
without the need to establish a special envoy in the process.
The United States cannot solve the question of Tibet on the floor of
this Congress. Only the people in Tibet and the people all over China,
including Tibet, can resolve their differences. A special envoy could
neither contribute to this dialogue nor foster a solution, but is
likely to be totally counterproductive.
I will close by making just one additional observation on another
provision, without getting into detail. Some of my other colleagues
have already spoken on this. Section 1708 of the pending authorization
bill states that ``the President of Taiwan should be admitted to the
United States for a visit in 1996 with all appropriate courtesies.''
Mr. President, this provision, to say the least, is unwise at this
point in time--unless we want to deploy our aircraft carriers, several
of them, to the region, and spend a great deal of the next several
years in the Taiwan Strait.

Privilege of the Floor

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Maurice
Hutchinson, legislative fellow of my staff, be admitted privileges of
the floor during the consideration of the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.
Mr. NUNN. Does anyone else have time at this point?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has 52 minutes,
and the Senator from North Carolina has 37 minutes.
Mr. NUNN. I yield to the former chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee and ranking Democrat, Mr. Pell, whatever time he desires.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I thank my colleague.
Mr. President, I regret that I am unable to support this conference
report on H.R. 1561, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal
years 1996 and 1997. I recognize that House and Senate Republican
conferees have attempted to find a middle-ground between the respective
bills passed by each House and that this conference report is an
improvement over the House-passed bill. Although there are some
provisions in the bill that I support, I believe the bill is
fundamentally flawed in four areas--reorganization of the foreign
affairs agencies, funding for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and for our contributions to the United Nation, and American policy
toward China.
This bill requires the President to abolish one of the foreign
affairs agencies--AID, USIA, or CDA. There is no doubt that this is an
improvement over the original language in the House bill, which
mandated the abolishment of all three of these agencies. However, this
conference report falls far short of the Senate bill, which sought to
force consolidation through savings rather than the mandatory abolition
of agencies. The Senate bill preserved the President's constitutional
right to determine how to organize those agencies which carry out the
foreign policy directives of the President of the United States. The
conference report takes that away. I cannot support a bill which
crosses this line and abolishes an important foreign affairs agency
simply for the sake of abolishment. On an issue such as this I feel it
is important for the Congress to acknowledge the prerogative of the
President to organize the foreign affairs agencies in a manner which
best serves the nation's interests and the President's foreign policy
priorities.
As a strong supporter of ACDA and its mission, I am deeply disturbed
by the inadequate funding levels for ACDA in this bill. The fiscal year
1996 authorization of $35.7 million represents a 28

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percent reduction from the fiscal year 1995 level. The fiscal year 1997
authorization of $28 million is not only a 44 percent reduction from
the fiscal year 1995 level, but cuts ACDA so deeply that it can no
longer carry out its core missions, such as being our watchdog on
proliferation, verifying arms control agreements, and monitoring
compliance with new agreements. This is a foolish and costly approach
at a time when our needs in the area of arms control are increasing,
not decreasing.
The conference report also fails to authorize the necessary funds for
the United States to pay assessed contributions to the United Nations
and its related agencies. I agree that we need to do all that we can to
force the United Nations to adopt serious management and financial
reforms but failing to meet our treaty obligations is not the way to
achieve this goal. It simply diminishes our influence and encourages
other nations to take the same, ill-advised approach.
Finally, section 1601 of the conference report amends the Taiwan
Relations Act [TRA] of 1979, to say that the provisions of the Act
relating to arms sales to Taiwan supersede any provision of the joint
communique, signed between the United States and China in 1982,
limiting such arm sales. I believe this provision was added out of
genuine concern for the people of Taiwan, a concern I share. But I also
believe that this is the wrong approach to Taiwan's security problem
and the wrong time to take it.
Our relationship with the People's Republic of China is at one of its
lowest points in history, certainly the lowest point since the
Tiananmen massacre. We have major disputes with the Chinese on a number
of serious issues, ranging from trade to human rights to proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. While we will not back away from any of
these issues, it is important that both governments act prudently and
not unnecessarily damage the relationship further. But this bill does
the opposite, by undercutting the basis for United States-Chinese
relations. Section 1601 constitutes a unilateral revision of one of the
cornerstones of the bilateral relationship. Adopting a measure like
this would certainly cause a backlash from Beijing, by playing into the
hands of hard liners in the Chinese leadership and aiding them in their
attempt to promote an anti-Western, anti-United States agenda.
I also think this approach is likely to fail in its fundamental
purpose of advancing Taiwan's security. For almost 3 weeks, we saw
tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait as China tested M-9 missiles and
held massive military exercises in an attempt to intimidate a Taipei it
fears is heading toward a declaration of independence, aided by foreign
powers. Just this week, after Taiwan's historic presidential election
on Saturday, we are seeing some initial positive signs that both
governments are reaching out to each other in order to move back toward
a more stable relationship. A reversal of U.S. arms sales policy at
this time would certainly hamper those efforts. It is very much in
Taiwan's security interest that all three capitals work to defuse
tensions, not inflame them. Section 1601 would further damage already
strained relations with Beijing and likely endanger, rather than
strengthen Taiwan. It is the wrong policy at the wrong time.
Mr. President, for these reasons, I intend to vote against this
conference report. The President has indicated that he will veto this
bill over the issues I have discussed as well as some others, and I ask
unanimous consent that the administration's statement to that effect be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Statement of Administration Policy H.R. 1561--Foreign Relations
Revitalization Act of 1995

If the conference report on H.R. 1561 is presented to the
President in its current form, the President will veto the
bill. While steps have been taken to improve the bill, it
still contains numerous provisions which do not serve U.S.
foreign policy or U.S. national interests.
The principal reasons for the veto are:
Forced Consolidated of Agencies. The legislation interferes
with the President's prerogatives to organize the foreign
affairs agencies in a manner that best serves the Nation's
interests and the Administration's foreign policy priorities.
This bill mandates the abolition of at least one foreign
affairs agency, and includes authorization levels that would
force other organizations to retreat further from engagement
in world affairs. The Administration has already implemented
significant reinvention of and reductions in international
programs and is working towards further streamlining and
reorganization. H.R. 1561 fails to provide, however, the
necessary flexibility for the Administration to manage the
agencies that implement foreign policy, which is essential to
United States leadership.
Authorization of Appropriations. The authorization levels
included in the bill for FYs 1996 and 1997, which constitute
ceilings on appropriations, are below the levels necessary to
conduct the President's foreign policy and to maintain U.S.
interests overseas in such areas as operating overseas posts
of foreign affairs agencies, arms control and
nonproliferation, international organizations and
peacekeeping, public diplomacy, and sustainable development.
In addition, these levels would cause reduction-in-force
(RIFs) of highly skilled personnel at several foreign affairs
agencies.
Taiwan Relations Act. Section 1601 amends the Taiwan
Relations Act to state that the Act supersedes the provisions
of the 1982 Joint Communique between the United States and
China. This would be seen as a repudiation of a critical and
stabilizing element of long-standing U.S. policy towards
China, increasing risks at a time of heightened tensions.
Relations with Vietnam. Section 1214, concerning the use of
funds to further normalize relations with Vietnam, unduly
restricts the President's ability to pursue national
interests in Vietnam, and in particular could threaten the
progress that has been made on POW/MIA issues and put U.S.
firms at a competitive disadvantage. Legislation which
restricts the opening of missions also raises constitutional
concerns.
U.S. Participation in International Organizations.
Provisions related to U.S. participation in the United
Nations, which provide inadequate funding levels for FYs 1996
and 1997, and unworkable notification requirements would
undermine U.S. diplomatic efforts to reform the U.N. and to
reduce the assessed U.S. share of the U.N. budget.
Furthermore, the provisions could interfere with ongoing
Executive-Legislative Branch discussions aimed at achieving a
consensus on UN funding and reform issues.
Housing Guaranty Program. Section 1111 would terminate
several worthwhile country program, such as those in Eastern
Europe and would eliminate any future programs, including
those for South Africa. Additionally, this provision could
inadvertently cause the cut-off of development assistance to
many of the poorest countries of the world, as well as the
cut-off of Economic Support Fund (ESF) anti-crime and
narcotics-related assistance.
Family Planning. The conference report fails to remedy the
severe limitations on U.S. population assistance programs
placed in the FY 1996 foreign operations appropriations
legislation. These restrictions will have a major,
deleterious impact on women and families in the development
world. It is estimated that nearly 7 million couples in
developing countries, will have no access to safe, voluntary
family planning services. The result will be millions of
unwanted pregnancies and abortions.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I am going to suggest the absence of a
quorum, but I want to ask unanimous consent that all quorum calls
henceforth be charged proportionately.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this has been cleared on both sides. I ask
unanimous consent that the vote on the conference report occur at 9
p.m. tonight, with the time between now and the vote to be divided as
follows: Senator Biden, for up to 20 minutes, and all remaining time
under the control of Senator Dole, the majority leader, or his
designee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

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The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

____________________