[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 40 (Thursday, March 21, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2656-S2657]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. PRESSLER (for himself, Mr. Glenn, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Kerrey, 
        Mr. Bennett, and Mrs. Feinstein):
  S. 1638. A bill to promote peace and security in South Asia; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.


        THE SOUTH ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY PROMOTION ACT OF 1996

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, today along with my colleagues, Senators 
Glenn, D'Amato, John Kerry, Bennett, and Feinstein, I am introducing 
legislation in an effort to restore credibility to our Nation's already 
damaged nuclear nonproliferation policy. Nonproliferation is one of our 
most important national security concerns, if not the most important. 
Even the President admitted last year that no issue is more important 
to the security of all people than nuclear nonproliferation.
  At present, our efforts in this area are tied to another vital goal: 
the promotion of peace and security in South Asia. I have visited South 
Asia. I have said before it is a region of striking contrasts--a region 
of such enormous potential clouded by tension and instability.
  As all of us well know, last year President Clinton requested, and 
Congress agreed to, a one time exception and partial repeal of one our 
most important nonproliferation laws: the so-called Pressler amendment. 
The Pressler amendment, approved by Congress in 1985, prohibits United 
States military and nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, including arms 
sales, so long as Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device. The 
Senate had an extensive debate on this subject last fall. As a result 
of last year's exception--known as the Brown amendment--approximately 
370 million dollars' worth of American military goods is scheduled for 
delivery to Pakistan.
  The Brown amendment was very controversial. The central point of the 
controversy was the fact that the Brown amendment was both waiving and 
repealing nuclear nonproliferation law without obtaining one concrete 
nonproliferation concession from Pakistan. We have never provided that 
kind of exception to any other country before. That was one of the 
central reasons why I opposed the Brown amendment. I feared it would 
send the worst possible message: Nuclear proliferation pays.
  The Clinton administration lobbied the Congress quite heavily on the 
Brown amendment. The administration even tried to convince Members of 
Congress that Pakistan did make a nonproliferation concession. The 
Clinton administration claimed its support for the Brown amendment was 
based in part on an understanding it believed it had with the 
Government of Pakistan. On August 3, 1995, Acting Secretary of State 
Peter Tarnoff stated the context of this understanding in a letter to 
the distinguished ranking member and former chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Nunn:

       Pakistan knows that the decision to resolve the equipment 
     problem is based on the assumption that there will be no 
     significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation 
     issues of concern to the United States.

  Frankly, at the time, I felt the justification was too weak at best 
and unbelievable at worst. I say that from the standpoint of 
experience. You see, the Pressler amendment was passed with a similar 
assurance from Pakistan. Let me remind my colleagues that the Pressler 
amendment was designed to ensure that Pakistan--at that time our 
Nation's third largest foreign aid recipient--continued to receive 
United States assistance. We had an understanding that Pakistan would 
not develop a bomb program, and in return, we would pass the Pressler 
amendment so that our existing laws would not result in a United States 
aid cutoff. As we all know, they did build a bomb program, and 
continued to receive U.S. taxpayer dollars. So I had some serious 
misgivings and a sense of foreboding when the Clinton administration 
stated it was basing its support of the Brown amendment on an assurance 
from Pakistan.
  But that was then, this is now. Now we have a clear, unequivocal 
statement by the Director of Central Intelligence that Pakistan did not 
accept the administration's position in August. This is what Director 
John Deutch told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 
February 22:

       Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community continues to get 
     accurate and timely information on Chinese activities that 
     involve inappropriate weapons technology assistance to other 
     countries: nuclear technology to Pakistan, M-11 missiles to 
     Pakistan, cruise missiles to Iran.

  For the record, I would like to point out that the Director said ``M-
11 missiles,'' not ``M-11 missile technology.''
  So, the administration's assumption that the Government of Pakistan 
would freeze development of its bomb program was erroneous. Our 
intelligence community has found ``accurate and timely information'' 
that Pakistan has, indeed, made significant changes on nuclear and 
missile proliferation issues of concern to the United States. The 
nuclear technology to which Director Deutch alluded would allow 
Pakistan a 100-percent increase in its capacity to make enriched 
uranium, the explosive material of nuclear weapons. The M-11s are 
modern, mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missiles and clearly intended 
to be the principal delivery system of the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
system.

  With the underlying assumption of the administration's position now 
destroyed, there is no longer any justification for the 
administration's support of the Brown amendment. The administration has 
the authority to put the Brown amendment on hold. Federal law 
specifically states that if the President determines that a country has 
delivered or received ``nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or 
technology,'' no funds may be made available under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, which would include military equipment 
purchased with Foreign Military Sales [FMS]. All the President needs to 
do is enforce our nonproliferation laws and most, if not all of the 
military equipment provided by the Brown amendment remains undelivered. 
That is what I urged the President to do last month.
  Sadly, even though Pakistan broke its assurance to the Clinton 
administration, it has been reported yesterday that the President 
intends to go through with the transfer. This is stunning news. The 
Brown amendment alone was a tough blow to our nonproliferation policy. 
Now the Clinton administration is preparing to cripple our already 
shaken credibility as an enforcer of nuclear nonproliferation. If that 
is the President's decision, and I certainly hope he reconsiders, then 
the law requires that he make an appropriate certification to the 
Congress. This gives Congress two options: First, it could disapprove 
of the President's certification. Under the law it would have 30 days 
to do that. Or, should a certification not be forthcoming, it could 
enact the legislation I am introducing today. This bill, which I 
introduce with bipartisan support, simply repeals the Brown amendment.
  Mr. President, I believe passage of this legislation is necessary if 
our Nation's nuclear nonproliferation policy is to have any 
credibility. Indeed, beyond the simple policy justifications for this 
legislation, I urge my colleagues to keep in mind the circumstance that 
brings me to the floor today. As I stated a moment ago, Pakistan's 
receipt of nuclear technology from China is a sanctionable offense, as 
is its receipt of M-11 missile technology. What makes these offenses 
disturbing is that they were occurring while Pakistan was lobbying the 
administration and Congress to waive and partially repeal nuclear 
nonproliferation law. Equally disturbing are reports that members of 
the Clinton administration knew of the ring magnet transfer at that 
time, but did not divulge this information to members of Congress. The 
irony would be humorous if the issue wasn't so serious.

  I believe that if all my colleagues were aware of this blatant 
violation of our non-proliferation laws last fall, the Brown amendment 
would have failed. Indeed, a supporter of the Brown amendment, 
Congressman Doug Bereuter, admitted that if the Brown amendment was 
reconsidered, its passage would be unlikely. I am confident

[[Page S2657]]

enough that this Congress understands the seriousness of this matter 
and would agree that we need to repeal the Brown amendment or at least 
suspend its implementation until the underlying policy of the 
administration is restored--that being the return of the ring magnets 
and the M-11s from Pakistan to China.
  Mr. President, finally a word about South Asia. Also on February 22, 
CIA Director Deutch named South Asia as his No. 1 worry in the annual 
world wide threat assessment. He noted, ``the potential for conflict is 
high.'' Just a few weeks ago, the Washington Post reported that 
Pakistan is preparing for a possible nuclear weapons test. Even a 
limited nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India would result in 
deaths and destruction on an unprecedented scale in world history. 
Under the circumstances, I feel it would be the height of 
irresponsibility to allow for military aid to one side in such an 
unstable environment. The aftermath of the Brown amendment is proof 
that our relationship with India is impacted by United States 
nonproliferation policy. Because of India's unsafeguarded nuclear 
program, there is no United States-Indian agreement for nuclear 
cooperation. United States military cooperation with India is virtually 
nonexistent. The United States will not export certain forms of missile 
equipment and technology to India and any other goods that are related 
to weapons of mass destruction. It is true that United States sanctions 
have not been invoked against India, but that is because India has not 
violated its commitments under United States law.
  I stand ready to seek a commonsense approach to improve our relations 
with all the countries in South Asia. We need a commonsense approach to 
deal with the problems in that troubled region. Illicit narcotics 
trafficking, terrorism, economic stagnation, and weapons proliferation 
are just some of the issues that plague South Asia. We must seek ways 
to help these countries address all these problems. I am ready to start 
that process. We can start by repealing the Brown amendment and begin 
working on an approach that serves the mutual interests of the people 
of the United States and the people of South Asia.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1638

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. PROMOTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The American people fervently desire that all the 
     peoples of South Asia enjoy peace and share an increased 
     sense of security.
       (2) The peace and security of South Asia are threatened by 
     an arms race, particularly the spread of weapons of mass 
     destruction and their modern delivery systems.
       (3) Congress has granted both a one-time exception to and 
     partial repeal of United States nuclear nonproliferation laws 
     in order to permit the Government of Pakistan to receive 
     certain United States military equipment and training and 
     limited economic aid.
       (4) The exception and partial repeal was based on direct 
     assurances to the United States Government that ``there will 
     be no significant change on nuclear and missile 
     nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States''.
       (5) The Director of Central Intelligence has informed 
     Congress that Pakistan has taken recent delivery of ``nuclear 
     technology'' and ``M-11 missiles'' from the People's Republic 
     of China.
       (6) The justification for the exception to and partial 
     repeal of United States nonproliferation laws is no longer 
     valid.
       (b) Repeal.--Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375) is amended to read as if the amendments 
     made to such section by section 559 of the Foreign 
     Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
     Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104-107) had not been 
     made.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, last September the Senate approved an 
amendment offered by Senator Brown that allowed the administration to 
deliver hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment to 
Pakistan. In doing so, we decided to ignore Pakistan's continuing 
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to carry 
them, and we turned our backs on United States non-proliferation law 
and international arms control agreements. Today, I am pleased to 
cosponsor a bill being introduced by Senator Pressler that will repeal 
this misguided provision and will help put U.S. nonproliferation policy 
back on track.
  During Senate consideration of the Brown amendment, the proponents, 
including the administration, argued that transferring the military 
equipment would remove what had become an irritant in our relations 
with Pakistan and would result in enhanced cooperation on 
nonproliferation issues. Unfortunately, the opposite has happened.
  Even as we debated the Brown amendment we had clear and convincing 
evidence that Pakistan had received M-11 ballistic missiles from 
China--a sanctionable offense under the Missile Technology Control 
Regime. We now know that Pakistan also has continued to pursue its 
Nuclear Weapons Program. In an unclassified hearing earlier this year, 
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch testified to the 
Intelligence Committee that he was especially concerned about Pakistani 
efforts to acquire nuclear technology. Although he did not provide 
details, the press has reported that last summer China sent Pakistan 
specialized magnets for use in centrifuges to produce enriched uranium. 
Such a transfer would violate the 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. 
Finally, Director Deutch told the Intelligence Committee that Pakistan 
was likely to test a nuclear weapon if India did, hardly the restraint 
we were promised.
  Since the late 1970's the Pakistani Government has repeatedly assured 
the United States that it does not possess nuclear weapons despite our 
certainty that it does. As recently as November of 1994, Prime Minister 
Bhutto said in an interview with David Frost ``We have neither 
detonated one, nor have we got nuclear weapons.'' Now they are 
practicing the same deception with regard to acquiring missiles from 
China. In July of 1995, a press release from the Pakistan Embassy 
asserted that ``Pakistan has not acquired the M-11 or any other missile 
from China that violates the Missile Technology Control Regime.'' The 
evidence to the contrary is, in my opinion, overwhelming.
  Pakistan has been a friend and ally of the United States since its 
independence. But how many times can you let a friend mislead you and 
how many times can you let a friend put you in danger before you are 
forced to change the nature of the relationship. This is not a question 
of whether we want good relations with Pakistan. Of course we do. We 
want good relations with all countries, but the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems to carry them is 
far more important to our national security than relations with any one 
country. Indeed, this is one of the most important national security 
issues facing us today.
  I congratulate my colleague from South Dakota for his leadership on 
this issue and I am pleased to cosponsor his legislation. I hope that 
we can address this issue before the transfer of this equipment is 
completed.
                                 ______