[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 40 (Thursday, March 21, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2646-S2658]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
  S. 1632. A bill to prohibit persons convicted of a crime involving 
domestic violence from owning or possessing firearms, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


                          FIREARMS LEGISLATION

 Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing 
legislation that would prohibit individuals who have been convicted of 
a crime involving domestic violence from owning or possessing firearms.
  Under current Federal law, Mr. President, it is illegal for people 
convicted of felonies to possess firearms. Yet many people who engage 
in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or 
convicted of felonies. At the end of the day, maybe following a plea 
bargain, they are convicted of misdemeanors. And these people are still 
free under Federal law to possess firearms.
  This legislation will close this loophole, and will help keep guns 
out of the hands of people who have proven themselves to be violent and 
a threat to those closest to them. The legislation would add to the 
list of persons disqualified from owning or possessing a firearm 
individuals who have been convicted of any crime involving domestic 
violence, regardless of the length, term, or manner of punishment. This 
includes violent crimes committed by a spouse, former spouse, paramour, 
parent, guardian or similar individual.
  Mr. President, although there is a growing awareness about the 
problem of domestic violence, in many places, even today, these 
outrageous acts are not taken as seriously as other forms of brutal 
behavior. Yet each year an estimated 2 million women are victimized by 
domestic violence. That is 10 times the number of women who are 
diagnosed with breast cancer. Of those 2 million women, nearly 6,000 
die at the hands of men who at least at one time claimed to love them. 
About 70 percent of the time, those hands are holding a gun.
  Mr. President, much of the killing and maiming associated with 
domestic violence could not happen but for the presence of a firearm. 
The New England Journal of Medicine reports that in households with a 
history of battering, a gun in the home increases the likelihood that a 
woman will be murdered fivefold. Often, the only difference between a 
battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.
  Acts of domestic violence, by their nature, are especially dangerous 
and require special attention. These crimes involve people who have a 
history together, and who perhaps share a home or a child. These are 
not violent acts between strangers, and they do not arise from a chance 
meeting. Even after a split, the individuals involved often by 
necessity have a continuing relationship of some sort. The husbands, 
boyfriends, and former husbands who commit these crimes often have a 
record of violent and threatening behavior. And yet, frequently, these 
men are being permitted to possess firearms--with no legal 
restrictions.
  The statistics and data are clear. Domestic violence, no matter how 
it is labeled, leads to more domestic violence. And guns in the hand of 
convicted spouse abusers lead to death.
  To me, Mr. President, it is a simple proposition. Those guilty of 
acts of domestic violence should not be trusted to acquire or possess a 
gun. Period.

[[Page S2647]]

  Mr. President, this legislation would save the lives of many innocent 
Americans. But it also would send a message about our Nation's 
commitment to ending domestic violence, and about our determination to 
protect the millions of women and children who suffer from this abuse.
  I hope my colleagues will support the bill, and ask unanimous consent 
that a copy of the legislation be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1632

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. DEFINITIONS.

       Section 921(a) of title 18, United States Code, is amended 
     by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(33) The term `crime involving domestic violence' means a 
     felony or misdemeanor crime of violence, regardless of 
     length, term, or manner of punishment, committed by a current 
     or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a 
     person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a 
     person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the 
     victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person 
     similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the 
     victim under the domestic or family violence laws of the 
     jurisdiction in which such felony or misdemeanor was 
     committed.''.

     SEC. 2. UNLAWFUL ACTS.

       Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) in subsection (d)--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (7);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and 
     inserting ``; or''; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(9) is under indictment for, or has been convicted in any 
     court of, any crime involving domestic violence.''; and
       (2) in subsection (g)--
       (A) by striking ``or'' at the end of paragraph (7);
       (B) in paragraph (8), by striking the comma and inserting 
     ''; or''; and
       (C) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(9) who is under indictment for, or has been convicted in 
     any court, or any crime involving domestic violence,''.

     SEC. 3. RULES AND REGULATIONS.

       Section 926(a) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new 
     paragraph:
       ``(4) regulations providing for the effective receipt and 
     secure storage of firearms relinquished by or seized from 
     persons described in subsection (d)(9) or (g)(9) of section 
     922.''.

     SEC. 4. RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AFTER CONVICTION.

       Section 921(a)(20) of title 18, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking the period at the end and inserting the 
     following: ``; or such restoration of civil rights occurs 
     following conviction of a crime of domestic violence (as 
     defined in section 921(a)(33)). A conviction of a crime of 
     domestic violence shall not be considered to be a conviction 
     for purposes of this chapter if the conviction is reversed or 
     set aside based on a determination that the conviction is 
     invalid, or if the person has been pardoned, unless the 
     authority that grants the pardon expressly states that the 
     person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive 
     firearms.''.

     SEC. 5. ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF FROM CERTAIN FIREARM 
                   PROHIBITIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 925(c) of title 18, United States 
     Code, is amended--
       (1) in the first undesignated sentence, by inserting 
     ``(other than a person convicted of a crime of domestic 
     violence as defined in section 921(a)(33))'' before ``who is 
     prohibited''; and
       (2) in the fourth undesignated sentence--
       (A) by inserting ``person (other than a person convicted of 
     a crime of domestic violence as defined in section 
     921(a)(33)) who is a'' before ``licensed importer''; and
       (B) by striking ``his'' and inserting ``the person's''.
       (b) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to--
       (1) application for administrative relief and actions for 
     judicial review that are pending on the date of enactment of 
     this Act; and
       (2) applications for administrative relief filed, and 
     actions for judicial review brought, after the date of 
     enactment of this Act.
                                 ______

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
  S. 1633. A bill to provide for school-bus safety, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


          THE OMNIBUS SCHOOL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY ACT OF 1996

 Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I am introducing 
legislation, the Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996, that 
would improve the safety of schoolbus travel.
  The legislation would require background checks of schoolbus drivers, 
establish minimum proficiency standards for such drivers, and promote 
advanced technologies that can help prevent schoolbus accidents. In 
addition, the bill calls for a variety of studies that could improve 
schoolbus safety and increase the information on bus safety available 
to school districts and parents.
  Mr. President, America's schoolchildren have a right to safe 
transportation to and from school. And we have a responsibility to do 
everything we can to guarantee that safety.
  To ensure our children's safety, we first must ensure that bus 
drivers are decent individuals who will not harm their passengers. 
Unfortunately, sexual deviants often are attracted to driving a 
schoolbus because the job gives them easy access to children who are 
the focus of their sexual desires.
  Children who ride on schoolbuses, particularly those in elementary 
school, are extremely vulnerable to physical abuse. They are too young 
to comprehend what is being done to them and too small to physically 
defend themselves from an attack. As a nation, we have a responsibility 
to provide as much protection as possible to this vulnerable 
population. My bill therefore would require all States to perform a 
Federal background check on potential schoolbus drivers before they are 
allowed to be alone with our children.
  Eighteen States--Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Louisiana--
already conduct State and Federal background checks on their drivers. 
My amendment generally would not affect how these States administer 
their programs.
  Fourteen States--Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, 
Texas, West Virginia, Nebraska, Illinois, and Wisconsin--currently 
perform only state background checks. This is well-meaning, but 
insufficient. A convicted sexual deviant can easily move to one of 
these States, receive a clean background check, and begin driving his 
prey to and from school. My bill therefore would require those States 
to participate in the nationwide, Federal program.
  There also are 18 States--Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and 
Wyoming--that have no background checks for their schoolbus drivers. 
There is no rational reason why these States should not do more to 
protect their citizens.
  Mr. President, during the 2 months after California instituted 
Federal criminal background checks in 1990, it screened out 150 
convicted sex offenders, child molesters, and violent criminals who 
tried to get permits to drive schoolbuses. This is shocking and my bill 
would address this problem.
  Beyond requiring background checks for prospective schoolbus drivers, 
Mr. President, my bill includes a variety of provisions designed to 
reduce school-bus accidents.
  During the past 10 years, 300 school-age pedestrians under 19 years 
of age have died in schoolbus-related crashes. Two-thirds were killed 
by their own schoolbus. Half of all school-age pedestrians killed by 
schoolbuses in the past 10 years were 5- and 6-year-olds. On average, 
21 school-age pedestrians are killed by schoolbuses each year, and 9 
are killed by other vehicles involved in schoolbus-related crashes.
  Mr. President, as a nation, we need to do much more to prevent 
schoolbus accidents. This bill attacks the problem on a number of 
fronts.
  First, it would establish proficiency standards for schoolbus 
drivers.
  Mr. President, driving a schoolbus with 40 young, screaming children 
is a unique skill that deserves specialized training. Unfortunately, 
many drivers are distracted when their young passengers are noisy or 
otherwise disruptive, and the results can be tragic. Inattention is one 
of the two factors most often reported by police for schoolbus drivers 
striking school-age pedestrians.

[[Page S2648]]

  Bus drivers already are required to possess a commercial driver's 
license with a general endorsement for those driving vehicles with more 
than 15 passengers. However, there are no Federal standards 
specifically directed to schoolbus drivers. My bill would require the 
Secretary of Transportation to prescribe such standards.
  Mr. President, some States already prescribe a level of proficiency 
for schoolbus drivers, but many do not. My bill generally would not 
interfere with existing State programs, but it would ensure that all 
schoolbus drivers meet a minimum standard of proficiency.
  Another way that my bill would reduce schoolbus accidents is by 
assisting States to develop safer places for children to enter and 
leave their bus. For example, States could make bus stops more safe by 
increasing their visibility. Similarly, States could establish special 
safe areas in which children could disembark from busses, away from 
traffic.
  The legislation also would require the Secretary of Transportation to 
promote the use and reduce the cost of hazard warning systems or 
sensors that alert schoolbus drivers of pedestrians or vehicles in, or 
approaching, the path of the schoolbus. These types of warning systems 
can be critical in saving the lives of young people. Unfortunatately, 
many school districts have failed to invest in such systems. One reason 
is that their cost can be high. We need to explore ways to reduce those 
costs.
  Another provision in the bill would require the Secretary to improve 
training materials on schoolbus safety and to improve the distribution 
and availability of such materials to schools for use by the student 
safety patrols. The most effective way to protect schoolchildren is to 
teach them to protect themselves. The Department of Transportation can 
do more in this area.
  My legislation also would promote research into the possibility of 
installing safety belts in schoolbuses.
  Mr. President, in addition to the loss of life attributed to 
schoolbus accidents that I mentioned earlier, approximately 10,000 
schoolbus passengers are injured every year. Most injuries occur during 
side and rollover collisions. In this type of collision, the 
compartmentalized seat does not protect children, who can fall up to 8 
feet to strike the roof, windows, other seats, and other children.
  To reduce these types of injuries, the State of New Jersey requires 
the installation and use of safety belts in all schoolbuses. New 
Jersey's State law in this area was adopted after a study by the New 
Jersey Office of Highway Traffic Safety into the safety of lap 
seatbelts in large school vehicles. That study concluded that 
installation of seatbelts in all schoolbuses would improve vehicles' 
overall safety performance. The study recommended that schoolbuses be 
required to be equipped with seatbelts, which led to later enactment of 
the New Jersey law.
  Mr. President, I support this law and believe it should be adopted on 
a Nation-wide basis. It is nearly impossible for a bus without belts to 
rollover without causing injuries or death. However, I recognize that 
some in Washington believe more information is needed before 
establishing such a Federal requirement.
  One cause of this skepticism is that the Federal Government does not 
study crashes in which there are no injuries. The National 
Transportation Safety Board only investigates bus crashes where there 
are severe injuries or fatalities. Therefore, the data they collect do 
not accurately reflect the benefits of safety belts in schoolbuses.
  A bus with safety belts costs an average of $1,000 more than a bus 
without belts. With an estimated schoolbus life of 15 years, seatbelt 
installation would cost approximately $66 per bus per year.
  Children are already required to wear seatbelts in cars. Installation 
of seatbelts on the standard size schoolbuses would reinforce the 
importance of wearing seatbelts, reduce injuries to our children, cost 
relatively little to install and maintain, and overall, makes schoolbus 
transportation safer for our children.
  My bill would require the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration [NHTSA] to study the safety impact of safety belts on 
schoolbuses. It specifically requires that NHTSA evaluate the real life 
consequences of New Jersey's safety belt law. I am hopeful that the 
resulting study will help end the longstanding debate on this issue, so 
we can move forward to protect the lives of our Nation's children.
  Mr. President, this legislation also requires the Secretary of 
Transportation to begin a rulemaking process to determine the 
feasibility and practicability of: First, decreasing the flammability 
of materials used in the construction of the interiors of schoolbuses; 
second, informing purchasers of schoolbuses on the secondary market 
that those buses may not meet current NHTSA standards; and third, 
establishing construction and design standards for wheelchairs used in 
the transportation of students in schoolbuses.
  The bill also requires the Secretary to conduct a variety of studies 
designed to provide an accurate data base of schoolbus safety 
information. In addition, the bill, in response to requests from some 
States, calls for Federal guidelines on the securing in a schoolbus of 
children under the age of five, and on measures to facilitate their 
evacuation in an emergency.
  Mr. President, the Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996 
is comprehensive legislation that would dramatically reduce deaths and 
injuries of children associated with schoolbus accidents.
  I hope my colleagues will support the bill, and ask unanimous consent 
that the text of the legislation, along with a section-by-section 
analysis of the bill, be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1633

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; FINDINGS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Omnibus 
     School Transportation Safety Act of 1996''.
       (b) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
       (1) In the United States, school buses travel more than 
     4,000,000,000 miles each year to transport approximately 
     25,000,000 children to and from school and various school-
     related activities.
       (2) School buses are specifically designed to carry 
     children safely to and from school, and generally are 
     operated by educational agencies that receive Federal 
     assistance for educational activities.
       (3) On the average, each year in the United States--
       (A) 17 occupants are killed while riding school buses, of 
     which--
       (i) 10 pupils are killed while riding type I school buses 
     with a gross weight rating of greater than 10,000 pounds, and 
     those school buses are predominantly used in the United 
     States;
       (ii) 2 pupils are killed while riding other vehicles used 
     as school buses; and
       (iii) 5 drivers are killed while driving school buses;
       (B) 38 children are killed in loading zones surrounding 
     school buses;
       (C) 480 children are seriously injured while riding school 
     buses; and
       (D) 160 children are seriously injured while boarding or 
     leaving school buses.
       (4) Although most crashes involving school buses are minor, 
     some examples of serious crashes that have had tragic 
     consequences, include--
       (A) the school bus crash that occurred in Alton, Texas;
       (B) the school bus crash that occurred in October of 1995, 
     in Fox River Grove, Illinois; and
       (C) the recent school bus crash outside of Green Bay, 
     Wisconsin, that killed the driver.
       (5) Each year approximately 35,000 school buses are 
     manufactured in the United States. The components for those 
     buses are produced in various locations throughout the United 
     States. The few companies that manufacture those buses ship 
     the buses throughout the United States and to foreign 
     countries.
       (6) Numerous Federal laws, including subtitle VI of title 
     49, United States Code, regulate school buses as commercial 
     motor vehicles. Subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, 
     provides for--
       (A) motor vehicle safety standards under chapter 311 of 
     that subtitle; and
       (B) the regulation of commercial motor vehicle operators 
     under chapter 313 of that subtitle.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall 
     apply:
       (1) Bus.--The term ``bus'' means a motor vehicle with 
     motive power, except a trailer, designed for carrying more 
     than 10 persons.
       (2) Local educational agency.--The term ``local educational 
     agency'' means a local educational agency (as that term is 
     defined in section 14101 of the Elementary and Secondary 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 8801)) that receives Federal 
     funds.
       (3) National criminal history background check system.--The 
     term ``national

[[Page S2649]]

     criminal history background check system'' has the meaning 
     given that term in section 5(6) of the National Child 
     Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119c(6)).
       (4) Newly employed.--With respect to the employment of a 
     school bus driver by an employer, the term ``newly employed'' 
     applies to the initial employment of an individual who has 
     not been similarly employed by that employer.
       (5) Postsecondary institution.--The term ``postsecondary 
     institution'' means an institution of higher education, as 
     that term is defined in section 481(a)(1) of the Higher 
     Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1088(a)(1)).
       (6) Private school.--The term ``private school'' includes 
     any private postsecondary institution.
       (7) School bus.--The term ``school bus''--
       (A) means a bus that is used for purposes that include 
     carrying pupils to and from a public or private school or 
     school-related events on a regular basis; and
       (B) does not include a transit bus or a school-chartered 
     bus.
       (8) School-chartered bus.--The term ``school-chartered 
     bus'' means a bus that is operated under a short-term 
     contract with State, local, or private school authorities, 
     which have acquired exclusive use of the bus at a fixed 
     charge in order to provide transportation for a group of 
     pupils to a special school-related event.
       (9) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Transportation.
       (10) State.--The term ``State'' means each of the 50 
     States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of 
     Puerto Rico.

     SEC. 3. PROFICIENCY STANDARDS FOR SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS.

       (a) Proficiency Standards.--Not later than 1 year after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue 
     regulations establishing proficiency standards for school bus 
     drivers (including drivers of school-chartered buses) who are 
     required under applicable State law to possess a commercial 
     driver's license to operate a school bus.
       (b) Exemption for Certain States.--The regulations issued 
     under subsection (a) shall provide that a State may use State 
     proficiency standards, in lieu of the standards established 
     by such regulations, if--
       (1) the State proficiency standards are established before 
     the date on which the proficiency standards under such 
     regulations are established; and
       (2) the Secretary determines that such State proficiency 
     standards are as rigorous as the proficiency standards under 
     such regulations.
       (c) Demonstration of Proficiency.--Upon the establishment 
     of the proficiency standards under subsection (a), each 
     school bus driver referred to in such subsection shall 
     demonstrate (at such intervals as the Secretary shall 
     prescribe) to the employer of the driver, the local 
     educational agency, the State licensing agency, or other 
     person or agency responsible for regulating school bus 
     drivers, the proficiency of that driver in operating a school 
     bus in accordance, as the case may be, with the proficiency 
     standards--
       (1) established by the regulations issued under subsection 
     (a); or
       (2) established by the State concerned and determined by 
     the Secretary to be as rigorous as the proficiency standards 
     established by the regulations issued under subsection (a).

     SEC. 4. CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS.

       (a) Prohibition on Employment Pending Check.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no local 
     educational agency, private school, or contractor providing 
     school transportation services to a local educational agency 
     or private school, may newly employ an individual as a driver 
     of a school bus of, or on behalf of, the agency or private 
     school before the completion of a background check of that 
     individual through the national criminal history background 
     check system to determine whether the individual has been 
     convicted of a crime which would warrant barring the person 
     from duties as a driver of a school bus.
       (b) Background Check Procedures.--
       (1) In general.--Each State shall establish procedures for 
     conducting a background check under this section.
       (2) Requirements for procedures.--The procedures 
     established under this subsection shall include the 
     designation of an agency of the State to--
       (A) carry out the background checks; and
       (B) meet the guidelines set forth in section 3(b) of the 
     National Child Protection Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 5119a(b)).
       (c) Limitation on Liability.--A local educational agency, 
     private school, or a contractor providing school 
     transportation services to a local educational agency or 
     private school shall not be liable in an action for damages 
     on the basis of a criminal conviction of a person employed by 
     that agency or contractor as a school bus driver if--
       (1) a background check of the person was conducted under 
     this section; and
       (2) the conviction was not disclosed to the local agency, 
     private school, or contractor providing such transportation 
     services pursuant to the background check.
       (d) Fees.--
       (1) In general.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation may impose and collect a fee for providing 
     assistance in the conduct of a background check under this 
     section. The amount of such fee may not exceed the actual 
     cost to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for providing 
     such assistance.
       (2) Monitoring.--The Attorney General of the United States 
     shall monitor the collection of fees under this subsection 
     for purposes of ensuring that--
       (A) the fees are collected on a uniform basis; and
       (B) the amounts collected reflect only the actual cost to 
     the Federal Bureau of Investigation of providing assistance 
     in the conduct of background checks under this section.
       (e) Applicability.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), this 
     section shall apply to an individual newly employed by a 
     local educational agency, private school, or contractor 
     providing school transportation services to a local 
     educational agency or private school beginning on the later 
     of--
       (A) the date that is 60 days after the date of enactment of 
     this Act; or
       (B) the date on which the State agency in which the local 
     educational agency, private school, or contractor providing 
     such transportation services is located establishes the 
     procedures required under subsection (c).
       (2) Background checks conducted by the fbi.--
       (A) In general.--To the maximum extent practicable, during 
     the period specified in subparagraph (B), a local educational 
     agency, private school, or contractor providing school 
     transportation services shall request that the Federal Bureau 
     of Investigation conduct a background check with fingerprints 
     of each individual newly employed by the local educational 
     agency, private school, or contractor as a school bus driver 
     of the local educational agency, private school, or 
     contractor.
       (B) Period of applicability.--Subparagraph (A) shall apply 
     to a local educational agency, private school, or contractor 
     providing school transportation services during the period 
     beginning on the date of enactment of this Act and ending on 
     the date of applicability of this section, as determined 
     under paragraph (1).
       (f) Funding.--
       (1) Violence prevention programs.--Section 4116(b)(5) of 
     the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     7116(b)(5)) is amended by striking ``and neighborhood 
     patrols'' and inserting ``neighborhood patrols, and criminal 
     background checks of potential drivers of school buses under 
     section 4 of the Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 
     1996''.
       (2) Innovative education assistance.--Section 6301(b) of 
     the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     7351(b)) is amended--
       (A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
       (B) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(9) the carrying out of criminal background checks of 
     potential drivers of school buses under section 4 of the 
     Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996.''.

     SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENT VEHICLE-HIGHWAY SYSTEMS 
                   FOR SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

       Section 6055(d) of the Intelligent Vehicle-Highway Systems 
     Act of 1991 (23 U.S.C. 307 note) is amended--
       (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (2);
       (2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (3) and 
     inserting ``; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(4) ensure that 1 or more operational tests advance the 
     use and reduce the cost of intelligent vehicle-highway system 
     technologies (including hazard warning systems or sensors) 
     that alert school bus drivers of pedestrians or vehicles in, 
     or approaching, the path of the school bus.''.

     SEC. 6. STUDY OF OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS IN SCHOOL BUSES.

       (a) Study.--The National Transportation Safety Board 
     organized under chapter 11 of title 49, United States Code, 
     shall conduct a study on the safety consequences of the 
     requirement of the State of New Jersey for lap belts in 
     school buses.
       (b) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the National 
     Transportation Safety Board shall submit to the Congress a 
     report containing the findings of the study conducted under 
     this section.
       (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized 
     to be appropriated to the National Transportation Safety 
     Board to carry out this section $100,000, which shall remain 
     available until expended.

     SEC. 7. TRAFFIC ENGINEERING ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE SCHOOL BUS 
                   SAFETY.

       Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary 
     shall ensure that each State receiving aid to conduct highway 
     safety programs under section 402(c) of title 23, United 
     States Code, may utilize a portion of such aid for the 
     purpose of conducting traffic engineering activities in order 
     to improve the safe operation of school buses.

     SEC. 8. DETERMINATION OF PRACTICABILITY AND FEASIBILITY OF 
                   CERTAIN SAFETY AND ACCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR 
                   SCHOOL BUSES.

       (a) Commencement of Rulemaking Process.--Not later than 6 
     months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
     Secretary shall commence or continue to carry out a 
     rulemaking process to determine the feasibility and 
     practicability of--

[[Page S2650]]

       (1) a requirement for a decrease in the flammability of the 
     materials used in the construction of the interiors of school 
     buses;
       (2) a requirement that individuals, local educational 
     agencies, or companies that sell in the secondary market 
     school buses that may be used in interstate commerce inform 
     purchasers of those buses that those buses may not meet 
     applicable National Highway Transportation Safety 
     Administration standards or Federal Highway Administration 
     standards; and
       (3) the establishment of construction and design standards 
     for wheelchairs used in the transportation of pupils in 
     school buses.
       (b) Final Rule.--Not later than 30 months after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue a final 
     regulation providing for any requirement or standard referred 
     to in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a) that the 
     Secretary determines to be feasible and practicable.
       (c) Report to Congress.--If the Secretary makes a 
     determination that a requirement or standard referred to in 
     paragraph (1), (2), or (3) is not feasible or practicable, 
     not later than the date specified in subsection (b), the 
     Secretary shall prepare and submit to the Congress a report 
     that provides the reasons for that determination.

     SEC. 9. GUIDELINES FOR SAFE TRANSPORTATION OF CHILDREN BY 
                   SCHOOL BUS.

       The Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
     Administration shall develop and disseminate guidelines for 
     ensuring the safe transportation in school buses of children 
     under the age of 5. Those guidelines shall include 
     recommendations for the evacuation of such children from such 
     buses in the event of an emergency.

     SEC. 10. DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ON SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

       (a) Dissemination of Information.--In carrying out research 
     on highway safety under section 403 of title 23, United 
     States Code, in consultation with the appropriate officials 
     or representatives of the American Automobile Association, 
     State educational agencies, and highway safety organizations, 
     the Secretary shall provide for the improvement of--
       (1) training materials on school bus safety; and
       (2) the distribution and availability of such materials to 
     public and private schools for use by the student safety 
     patrols of those schools and to appropriate law enforcement 
     agencies.
       (b) Funding.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
     of the funds made available to the Secretary for research on 
     highway safety and traffic conditions under section 403 of 
     title 23, United States Code, for each of fiscal years 1996 
     through 2001, $100,000 shall be available for each of those 
     fiscal years for the purposes of carrying out this section.

     SEC. 11. STUDY AND REPORT ON SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

       (a) Study.--
       (1) In general.--The Secretary shall carry out a study to 
     determine--
       (A) the extent to which public transit vehicles (as defined 
     by the Secretary) are engaged in school bus operations;
       (B) the point at which a public transit vehicle is 
     sufficiently engaged in such operations as to be considered a 
     school bus for purposes of regulation under Federal law; and
       (C) the differences between school bus operations carried 
     out directly by schools or local educational agencies and 
     school bus operations carried out by schools or local 
     educational agencies by contract or tripper service (as 
     defined by the Secretary).
       (2) Areas.--The study conducted under this subsection shall 
     address the differences between the services and operations 
     referred to in paragraph (1)(C) in terms of--
       (A) crash injury data;
       (B) driver and carrier requirements;
       (C) passenger transportation requirements;
       (D) routes and operational requirements that affect safety;
       (E) vehicle attributes that affect safety;
       (F) bus construction and design standards;
       (G) Federal and State operating assistance (per passenger, 
     per mile, per hour);
       (H) total operating costs;
       (I) Federal and State capital assistance (per passenger, 
     per mile, per hour);
       (J) total capital costs; and
       (K) any other factor that the Secretary considers 
     appropriate.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the 
     committees described in paragraph (2) a report on the results 
     of the study carried out under subsection (a).
       (2) Committees.--The committees referred to in paragraph 
     (1) are--
       (A) the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the 
     Senate;
       (B) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
     of the Senate;
       (C) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
       (D) the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure of 
     the House of Representatives;
       (E) the Committee on Commerce of the House of 
     Representatives; and
       (F) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
     Representatives.

     SEC. 12. IMPROVED INTERSTATE SCHOOL BUS SAFETY.

       (a) Applicability of Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
     Regulations to Interstate School Bus Operations.--Section 
     31136 of title 49, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking the second sentence of subsection (e); and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(g) Applicability to School Transportation Operations of 
     Local Educational Agencies.--Not later than 18 months after 
     the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall 
     issue regulations making the relevant commercial motor 
     carrier safety regulations issued under subsection (a) 
     applicable to all interstate school transportation operations 
     by local educational agencies (as defined in section 14101 of 
     the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
     8801)).''.
       (b) Education Program.--Not later than 180 days after the 
     date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall develop 
     and implement an education program informing all local 
     educational agencies that those agencies are required to 
     comply with the Federal commercial motor vehicle safety 
     regulations issued under section 31136 of title 49, United 
     States Code, when providing interstate transportation on a 
     school bus vehicle to and from school-sanctioned and school-
     related activities.

     SEC. 13. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

       There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are 
     necessary to carry out this Act.
                                                                    ____


  Omnibus School Transportation Safety Act of 1996--Section by Section

       Sec. 1: Short Title; Findings.
       Sec. 2: Definitions.
       Sec. 3: Directs the Secretary to prescribe proficiency 
     standards for school bus drivers.
       At present, school bus drivers are required to have a 
     Commercial Drivers License (CDL). However, CDL training for 
     bus drivers is geared primarily towards commercial motor 
     carrier drivers. ``Inattention'' and ``failure to yield'' 
     were the factors most often reported by police for school bus 
     drivers striking a school-age pedestrian. A school bus driver 
     faces unique driving and pupil control situations that 
     current CDL training does not address. This section will 
     require school bus drivers to be trained to handle these 
     unique situations before they are allowed on the road.
       Sec. 4: Requires states to conduct federal background 
     checks with fingerprints of prospective school bus drivers.
       School bus drivers are alone and off of school property 
     with students for extended periods of time. At present, 18 
     States conduct Federal background checks, 14 States only do 
     state background checks, and 18 States do no background 
     checks on potential drivers. State background checks are not 
     sufficient. Someone can easily move from one State to another 
     and leave their criminal history behind. This provision is 
     designed to ensure that parents know who is alone with their 
     children. Just 2 months after requiring fingerprint criminal 
     background checks, California screened out 150 convicted sex 
     offenders, child molesters and violent criminals who tried to 
     get permits to drive school buses. Funding to assist states 
     that are not already committing resources to this type of 
     activity is provided through the Department of Education's 
     crime free school program.
       Sec. 5: Directs the Secretary to do one or more operation 
     tests to advance the use and reduce the cost of hazard 
     warning systems that alert school bus drivers of pedestrians 
     or vehicles in, or approaching, the path of the school bus.
       Two out of every three children killed in school bus 
     related accidents are killed outside the school bus. Many are 
     struck by their own school bus. The causes vary from driver 
     inattentiveness, blind spots, or children's clothing being 
     caught on a part of the bus causing the bus to drag the child 
     to death. These accidents occur in the bus' ``danger zone.'' 
     While there are electronic devices on the market that are 
     designed to detect and warn drivers when an object is in the 
     danger zone, most are expensive and have reliability 
     problems. The goal of this section is to increase the 
     reliability and reduce the cost of existing technology.
       Sec. 6: Directs to the National Transportation Safety Board 
     to study the safety consequences of required use of safety 
     belts in New Jersey school buses.
       Approximately 10,000 school bus passengers are injured 
     every year. Most injuries and fatalities in the bus occur 
     during side and rollover collisions. In these types of 
     collisions the ``compartmentalized'' seat does not protect 
     children who fall about eight feet and strike the roof, 
     windows, seats and other children. Safety belts have been 
     standard equipment in passenger automobiles for quite some 
     time, and they have proven to be effective life-saving and 
     injury-preventing devices. However, not all school buses are 
     required to be equipped with seat belts.
       The debate on whether or not safety belts should be 
     required on school buses is heated. However, the lack of 
     sufficient data, makes an accurate estimate on the 
     effectiveness of school bus seat belts very difficult. 
     Therefore, my bill directs the National Transportation Safety 
     Board to study the safety consequences of the use of safety 
     belts in New Jersey school buses. New Jersey is the only 
     State which has mandatory school bus safety belt use and it 
     will provide an excellent opportunity for researchers to 
     build the base of knowledge on this subject that we need to 
     determine if safety belts in school buses should be the norm.

[[Page S2651]]

       Sec. 7: Provides aid for the purpose of conducting traffic 
     engineering activities in order to improve the safe operation 
     of school buses in the ``danger zone.''
       An overwhelming number of students are killed during the 
     loading and unloading of the school bus. Proper engineering 
     of loading and unloading zones will improve the safety and 
     reduce the number of accidents and fatalities which take 
     place in the ``danger zone.'' This provision will allow 
     States to utilize section 402(C) funds to assist in the 
     development of safety guidelines for the construction and 
     selection of school bus loading and un-loading zones.
       Sec. 8: Requires the Secretary to begin a rulemaking 
     process to determine the feasibility and practicality of:
       A requirement for a decrease in the flammability of the 
     materials used in the construction of the interiors of school 
     buses;
       A requirement that sellers of school buses in the secondary 
     market inform purchasers that such buses may not meet current 
     National Highway Transportation Safety Administration or 
     Federal Highway Administration standards and;
       Establishing construction and design standards 
     for wheelchairs used in the transportation of students in 
     school buses.
       Reduction of the flammability of material in school buses 
     continues to be on the National Transportation Safety Board's 
     most wanted list. NTSB made this recommendation after the 
     1988 Carrollton, KY bus accident. In that incident, a pre-
     1977 school bus was struck by a pick-up truck. The bus' gas 
     tank was ruptured and a fire ensued, engulfing the entire 
     bus. The bus driver and 26 bus passengers were fatally 
     injured. Had stricter flammability requirements been in 
     effect during construction of this bus the NTSB believes more 
     of the passengers could have escaped the bus without serious 
     injury.
       Used school buses are a popular form of transportation for 
     church groups and civic organizations. Unfortunately, many of 
     these groups believe that school buses are built to the 
     highest safety standards available. This is not the case. 
     Therefore, the bill would require that potential purchasers 
     of used buses are made aware of this fact so they can modify 
     their uses of the bus based upon the level of safety the bus 
     offers in certain situations.
       While there are Federal standards relating to how 
     wheelchairs must be secured into school buses, there are no 
     standards for the wheelchairs themselves. This provision is 
     designed to ensure that students who use a wheelchair are 
     afforded maximum protection in case of a school bus accident.
       Sec. 9: Requires NHTSA to develop and disseminate 
     guidelines on securing children under the age of five in 
     school buses and on evacuating those same children from 
     school buses.
       For one reason or another school districts are beginning to 
     transport more and more children below the age of five in 
     traditional school buses. Most, if not all, school buses and 
     school bus seats are designed to accommodate and protect 
     children age five and older. In addition, state laws and 
     common sense dictate that children under the age of four use 
     a car seat when riding in a motor vehicle. Many communities 
     are struggling with the appropriate way to safely transport 
     children below the age of five in school buses. This 
     provision would require NHTSA to develop guidelines on 
     securing young children in school buses. The provision also 
     addresses the problems evacuation of children in car seats 
     could pose in an emergency.
       Sec. 10: Requires the Secretary to improve and distribute 
     school bus safety information.
       Every year approximately 20 children are killed outside 
     their school bus. They are either struck by their own bus or 
     by another vehicle. One of the most effective ways to prevent 
     these types of accidents is to properly educate children and 
     their parents to these dangers. While a variety of safety 
     information is available, it is not widely distributed. This 
     provision would require the Secretary to review existing 
     safety material, make improvements if necessary and then 
     ensure that the material is adequately distributed to 
     children and parents.
       Sec. 11: Require the Secretary to carry out a study to 
     determine the following:
       The extent to which public transit vehicles are engaged in 
     school bus operations;
       The point at which a public transit vehicle is sufficiently 
     engaged in such operations as to be considered a school bus 
     for purposes of regulation under Federal law and;
       The differences between school bus operations carried out 
     directly by schools or school districts and school bus 
     operations carried out by schools or school districts by 
     contract.
       Federal law prohibits school districts from contracting out 
     to the local municipal bus service to carry out the school 
     district's pupil transportation activities. However, there 
     are some specific exceptions to this rule. With present 
     budget pressures school districts are increasingly looking to 
     take advantage of these exceptions also known as ``tripper 
     service.'' This provision is designed to determine how many 
     communities may be using tripper service as a means of school 
     transportation, at what point a municipal bus engaged in 
     tripper service should be considered a school bus, and the 
     differences between contracted school bus operations and non-
     contracted school bus operations.
       Sec. 12: Extends the applicability of Federal Motor 
     Carriers Safety Regulations to the school transportation 
     operations of Local Education Agencies.
       When operating across State lines, school buses almost 
     without exception must use the same highways--many of them 
     high-speed arteries--as other vehicles. The speeds attained 
     are considerably greater and there is an elevated risk of 
     associated driver fatigue. This fact underscores the need for 
     comprehensive and consistent application of the FMCSR's to 
     any school bus operating across state lines when engaged in 
     school-related and sanctioned activities.
       Since their inception in 1935, the FMCSR's have been 
     incrementally modified. For example, in 1989 the FHWA issued 
     modifications which for the first time subjected all 
     interstate contractor-operated school transportation 
     operations to the FMCSR's. In 1994, the FHWA extended 
     application of the FMCSR's to most interstate private bus 
     operations such as scout groups and churches. My bill would 
     extend the applicability of FMCSR's to buses used by local 
     education agencies which are used in interstate commerce.
       Sec. 13: Authorization of Appropriations.
                                 ______

      By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Helms, 
        Mr. Cochran, Mr. Warner, Mr. Lott, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Smith, Mr. 
        Inhofe, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Kempthorne, Mr. Abraham, Mr. McCain, 
        Mrs. Hutchison, Mr. Coats, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Mack, 
        and Mr. Domenici):
  S. 1635. A bill to establish a United States policy for the 
deployment of a national missile defense system, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.


                     the defend america act of 1996

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today I rise to introduce legislation which 
will have a profound impact on America's future. I am pleased to be 
joined by the chairman of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations 
Committees, the chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, 
the Republican leadership, and other Republicans strongly interested in 
missile defense, in introducing the Defend America Act of 1996. An 
identical bill is being introduced in the House by the Speaker and the 
chairmen of the Appropriations Committee and the National Security 
Committee, among others. This bill addresses the most fundamental 
responsibility the U.S. Government has to its citizens: to protect them 
from harm. At present, the United States has no defense--I repeat--no 
defense against ballistic missiles.
  The Defend America Act of 1996 answers the question of whether 
Americans should be protected from the threat of ballistic missile 
attack with a resounding ``Yes.'' There should be no doubt that we have 
the technical capability to defend our great Nation from the growing 
threat of ballistic missiles. What we need is the will and the 
leadership. We have seen no leadership from the White House on this 
issue. Indeed, we have witnessed a complete denial from the highest 
levels of the administration that there is even a threat to the United 
States. President Clinton vetoed the fiscal year 1996 Defense 
authorization bill because it required developing a national missile 
defense system for deployment by the end of 2003. President Clinton 
refuses to defend America preferring to rely on the false protection of 
the cold-war-era antiballistic missile [ABM] treaty.

  The cold war is over and the threat from ballistic missiles is real 
and growing. Among others, North Korea, Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Syria 
are seeking to obtain weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile 
delivery systems. China and Russia have been engaged in transferring 
related components and technologies.
  Just last week, the former Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, James Woolsey testified before the House National Security 
Committee on his views of the threat posed by ballistic missiles--as 
well as the current national intelligence estimate on this threat. I 
would like to quote from his testimony:

       We are in the midst of an era of revolutionary improvements 
     in missile guidance. These improvements will soon make 
     ballistic missiles much more effective for blackmail purposes 
     . . . even without the need for warheads containing weapons 
     of mass destruction. . . .
       With such guidance improvements, it is quite reasonable to 
     believe that within a few years Saddam or the Chinese rulers 
     will be able to threaten something far more troubling . . .

  Woolsey went on to say:

       But, in current circumstances, nuclear blackmail threats 
     against the United States may be effectively posed by 
     North Korean intermediate ranged missiles targeted on 
     Alaska or Hawaii, or by Chinese ICBM's targeted on Los 
     Angeles.


[[Page S2652]]


  With respect to the national intelligence estimate, Woolsey 
criticized the narrow focus of the estimate which concentrated on 
indigenous intercontinental ballistic missile development--as opposed 
to the transfer of such components and technology. As Woolsey pointed 
out, since the end of the cold war, Russia, China, and North Korea have 
been actively exporting missile technology and components. Furthermore, 
Woolsey noted that the national intelligence estimate only looked at 
the threat to the 48 continental States. Well, the last time I checked, 
Alaska and Hawaii were part of the United States. The bottom line is 
that the threat is real and we cannot wait for it to arrive on our 
doorstep before we act. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Richard Perle stated before the National Security Committee, and I 
quote:

       If we achieve a defensive capability a little before it is 
     absolutely necessary, no harm will have been done. But if we 
     are too late, the result could be catastrophic. In cases like 
     this, it is always wise to err on the side of too much, too 
     soon, rather than too little, too late.

  Mr. President, this legislation establishes a clear policy to deploy 
a national missile defense [NMD] system by the end of 2003, that is 
capable of providing a highly effective defense of U.S. territory 
against limited, unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks. 
The bill also specifies the components of a national missile defense 
system that are to be developed for deployment, including: An 
interceptor system, fixed ground-based radars, space-based sensors, and 
battle management, command, control, and communications.
  To implement this policy, this legislation directs the Secretary of 
Defense to: Promptly initiate planning to meet this deployment goal; 
conduct by the end of 1998, an integrated systems test using NMD 
components; to use streamlined acquisition procedures to reduce cost 
and increase efficiency; and to develop a follow-on NMD program.

  The Secretary of Defense is also required to submit a detailed report 
to the Congress no later than March 15, 1997, which outlines his plans 
for implementing this policy, the estimate costs associated with the 
development and deployment of the NMD system, a cost and operational 
effectiveness analysis of follow-on options, and a determination of the 
point at which NMD development would conflict with the ABM Treay.
  With respect to the ABM Treaty, the legislation urges the President 
to bring the Russians on board, by pursuing high-level discussions with 
Russia to amend the ABM Treaty to allow for the deployment of the NMD 
system specified in this act. If the Russians do agree, the legislation 
requires any agreement to be submitted to the Senate for advice and 
consent. However, if a satisfactory agreement is not reached within a 
year of the date of enactment of this legislation, the President and 
Congress will consider U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
  Mr. President, deploying a national missile defense system--which 
will protect all 50 States--should be our top defense priority. The 
Defend America Act lays out a realistic and responsible course by which 
we can do so.
  A national missile defense system will not only defend, it will 
deter--by reducing the incentive of rogue regimes to acquire ballistic 
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
  I hope that the White House is listening. Republicans are united and 
clear in their message that America must be defended. We are ready to 
exercise leadership to fulfill our responsibility to all Americans to 
protect them from ballistic missile attack.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1635

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Defend America Act of 
     1996''.

     SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

       Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) Although the United States possesses the technological 
     means to develop and deploy defensive systems that would be 
     highly effective in countering limited ballistic missile 
     threats to its territory, the United States has not deployed 
     such systems and currently has no policy to do so.
       (2) The threat that is posed to the national security of 
     the United States by the proliferation of ballistic missiles 
     is significant and growing, both quantitatively and 
     qualitatively.
       (3) The trend in ballistic missile proliferation is toward 
     longer range and increasingly sophisticated missiles.
       (4) Several countries that are hostile to the United States 
     (including North Korea, Iran, Libya, and Iraq) have 
     demonstrated an interest in acquiring ballistic missiles 
     capable of reaching the United States.
       (5) The Intelligence Community of the United States has 
     confirmed that North Korea is developing an intercontinental 
     ballistic missile that will be capable of reaching Alaska or 
     beyond once deployed.
       (6) There are ways for determined countries to acquire 
     missiles capable of threatening the United States with little 
     warning by means other than indigenous development.
       (7) Because of the dire consequences to the United States 
     of not being prepared to defend itself against a rogue 
     missile attack and the long-lead time associated with 
     preparing an effective defense, it is prudent to commence a 
     national missile defense deployment effort before new 
     ballistic missile threats to the United States are 
     unambiguously confirmed.
       (8) The timely deployment by the United States of an 
     effective national missile defense system will reduce the 
     incentives for countries to develop or otherwise acquire 
     intercontinental ballistic missiles, thereby inhibiting as 
     well as countering the proliferation of missiles and weapons 
     of mass destruction.
       (9) Deployment by the United States of a national missile 
     defense system will reduce concerns about the threat of an 
     accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack on the 
     United States.
       (10) The offense-only approach to strategic deterrence 
     presently followed by the United States and Russia is 
     fundamentally adversarial and is not a suitable basis for 
     stability in a world in which the United States and the 
     states of the former Soviet Union are seeking to normalize 
     relations and eliminate Cold War attitudes and arrangements.
       (11) Pursuing a transition to a form of strategic 
     deterrence based increasingly on defensive capabilities and 
     strategies is in the interest of all countries seeking to 
     preserve and enhance strategic stability.
       (12) The deployment of a national missile defense system 
     capable of defending the United States against limited 
     ballistic missile attacks would (A) strengthen deterrence at 
     the levels of forces agreed to by the United States and 
     Russia under the START I Treaty, and (B) further strengthen 
     deterrence if reductions below START I levels are implemented 
     in the future.
       (13) Article XIII of the ABM Treaty envisions ``possible 
     changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on 
     the provisions of this treaty''.
       (14) Articles XIII and XIV of the treaty establish means 
     for the parties to amend the treaty, and the parties have in 
     the past used those means to amend the treaty.
       (15) Article XV of the treaty establishes the means for a 
     party to withdraw from the treaty, upon six months notice 
     ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
     subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme 
     interests''.
       (16) Previous discussions between the United States and 
     Russia, based on Russian President Yeltsin's proposal for a 
     Global Protection System, envisioned an agreement to amend 
     the ABM Treaty to allow (among other measures) deployment of 
     as many as four ground-based interceptor sites in addition to 
     the one site permitted under the ABM Treaty and unrestricted 
     exploitation of sensors based within the atmosphere and in 
     space.

     SEC. 3. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY.

       (a) It is the policy of the United States to deploy by the 
     end of 2003 a National Missile Defense system that--
       (1) is capable of providing a highly-effective defense of 
     the territory of the United States against limited, 
     unauthorized, or accidental ballistic missile attacks; and
       (2) will be augmented over time to provide a layered 
     defense against larger and more sophisticated ballistic 
     missile threats as they emerge.
       (b) It is the policy of the United States to seek a 
     cooperative transition to a regime that does not feature an 
     offense-only form of deterrence as the basis for strategic 
     stability.

     SEC. 4. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE.

       (a) Requirement for Development of System.--To implement 
     the policy established in section 3(a), the Secretary of 
     Defense shall develop for deployment an affordable and 
     operationally effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system 
     which shall achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) 
     by the end of 2003.
       (b) Elements of the NMD System.--The system to be developed 
     for deployment shall include the following elements:
       (1) An interceptor system that optimizes defensive coverage 
     of the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii against 
     limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile 
     attacks and includes one or a combination of the following:
       (A) Ground-based interceptors.

[[Page S2653]]

       (B) Sea-based interceptors.
       (C) Space-based kinetic energy interceptors.
       (D) Space-based directed energy systems.
       (2) Fixed ground-based radars.
       (3) Space-based sensors, including the Space and Missile 
     Tracking System.
       (4) Battle management, command, control, and communications 
     (BM/C3).

     SEC. 5. IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.

       The Secretary of Defense shall--
       (1) upon the enactment of this Act, promptly initiate 
     required preparatory and planning actions that are necessary 
     so as to be capable of meeting the initial operational 
     capability (IOC) date specified in section 4(a);
       (2) plan to conduct by the end of 1998 an integrated 
     systems test which uses elements (including BM/C3 
     elements) that are representative of, and traceable to, the 
     national missile defense system architecture specified in 
     section 4(b);
       (3) prescribe and use streamlined acquisition policies and 
     procedures to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of 
     developing the system specified in section 4(a); and
       (4) develop an affordable national missile defense follow-
     on program that--
       (A) leverages off of the national missile defense system 
     specified in section 4(a), and
       (B) augments that system, as the threat changes, to provide 
     for a layered defense.

     SEC. 6. REPORT ON PLAN FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
                   DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT.

       Not later than March 15, 1997, the Secretary of Defense 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the Secretary's plan for 
     development and deployment of a national missile defense 
     system pursuant to this Act. The report shall include the 
     following matters:
       (1) The Secretary's plan for carrying out this Act, 
     including--
       (A) a detailed description of the system architecture 
     selected for development under section 4(b); and
       (B) a discussion of the justification for the selection of 
     that particular architecture.
       (2) The Secretary's estimate of the amount of 
     appropriations required for research, development, test, 
     evaluation, and for procurement, for each of fiscal years 
     1997 through 2003 in order to achieve the initial operational 
     capability date specified in section 4(a).
       (3) A cost and operational effectiveness analysis of 
     follow-on options to improve the effectiveness of such 
     system.
       (4) A determination of the point at which any activity that 
     is required to be carried out under this Act would conflict 
     with the terms of the ABM Treaty, together with a description 
     of any such activity, the legal basis for the Secretary's 
     determination, and an estimate of the time at which such 
     point would be reached in order to meet the initial 
     operational capability date specified in section 4(a).

     SEC. 7. POLICY REGARDING THE ABM TREATY.

       (a) ABM Treaty Negotiations.--In light of the findings in 
     section 2 and the policy established in section 3, Congress 
     urges the President to pursue high-level discussions with the 
     Russian Federation to achieve an agreement to amend the ABM 
     Treaty to allow deployment of the national missile defense 
     system being developed for deployment under section 4.
       (b) Requirement for Senate Advice and Consent.--If an 
     agreement described in subsection (a) is achieved in 
     discussions described in that subsection, the President shall 
     present that agreement to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent. No funds appropriated or otherwise available for any 
     fiscal year may be obligated or expended to implement such an 
     amendment to the ABM Treaty unless the amendment is made in 
     the same manner as the manner by which a treaty is made.
       (c) Action Upon Failure To Achieve Negotiated Changes 
     Within One Year.--If an agreement described in subsection (a) 
     is not achieved in discussions described in that subsection 
     within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
     the President and Congress, in consultation with each other, 
     shall consider exercising the option of withdrawing the 
     United States from the ABM Treaty in accordance with the 
     provisions of Article XV of that treaty.

     SEC. 8. ABM TREATY DEFINED.

       For purposes of this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the 
     Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
     Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-
     Ballistic Missile Systems, and signed at Moscow on May 26, 
     1972, and includes the Protocols to that Treaty, signed at 
     Moscow on July 3, 1974.

  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I am extremely proud to be a principal 
cosponsor of the Defend America Act of 1996, which was introduced by 
Senator Dole today. This legislation will fill a glaring void in U.S. 
national security policy by requiring the deployment of a national 
missile defense system by 2003 that is capable of defending the United 
States against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile 
attack.
  Ironically, most Americans already believe that we have such a system 
in place. This assumption is understandable since under the 
Constitution the President's first responsibility is to provide for the 
defense of the American homeland. Unfortunately, the current President 
has decided that this obligation is one that can be indefinitely 
delayed. I join Senator Dole and others today in proclaiming that the 
time has come to end America's complete vulnerability to ballistic 
missile blackmail and attack.
  The President and senior members of the administration have argued 
that there is no threat to justify deployment of a national missile 
defense system. This is simply not true. The political and military 
situation in the former Soviet Union has deteriorated, leading to 
greater uncertainty over the control and security of Russian strategic 
nuclear forces. China is firing missiles near Taiwan as if it were a 
skeet range, and has even made veiled threats against the United 
States. North Korea is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile 
that will be capable of reaching the United States once deployed. Other 
hostile and unpredictable countries, such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq, 
have made clear their desire to acquire missiles capable of reaching 
the United States. The technology and knowledge to produce missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction is available on the open market.
  China's recent provocations against Taiwan highlight the need for the 
United States to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as 
possible. Although veiled threats against the United States may be only 
saber rattling, American military and political leaders should not 
ignore them. If the United States possessed even a limited national 
missile defense system, U.S. decision-makers would have a much greater 
degree of flexibility in considering our military and diplomatic 
options. A vulnerable America is not only subject to missile attack, 
but also to blackmail and intimidation.
  Last year, President Clinton vetoed the Defense authorization bill 
mainly because it called for deployment of a national missile defense 
system. The administration argued that there was no need for such a 
system, that the threat is 10 or 15 years away. China has clearly 
illustrated how their judgment is flawed. The threat is here today.
  If the situation should deteriorate between China and Taiwan, 
President Clinton will almost certainly regret the fact that the United 
States has no means of dealing with Chinese missile threats other than 
by our own nuclear threats. This is hardly a credible response. A 
national missile defense system, on the other hand, would eliminate the 
risk and uncertainty that would surely occur if China and the United 
States engaged in a series of nuclear threats and counterthreats. This 
would be an invitation for disaster. If we had an operational national 
missile defense system, we could confidently deal with Chinese missile 
threats and pursue our policies and objectives without intimidation.
  The other important factor to bear in mind when considering the need 
for a national missile defense system, is that such a system can 
actually discourage countries from acquiring long-range missiles in the 
first place. In this sense, we should view national missile defense as 
a powerful nonproliferation tool, not just something to be considered 
some time in the future as a response to newly emerging threats.
  The policy advocated in the Defend America Act of 1996 is virtually 
identical to that contained in the fiscal year 1996 Defense 
Authorization Act, which was passed by Congress and vetoed by the 
President. Like the legislation vetoed by the President, the Defend 
America Act of 1996 would require that the entire United States be 
protected against a limited, accidental, or unauthorized attack by the 
year 2003. It differs from the vetoed legislation in that it provides 
the Secretary of Defense greater flexibility in determining the precise 
architecture for the system.
  The Defend America Act of 1996 urges the President to begin 
negotiations to amend the AMB Treaty to allow for deployment of an 
effective system. But it also recommends that, if these negotiations 
fail to produce acceptable amendments within 1 year, Congress and the 
President should consider withdrawing the United States from the ABM 
Treaty. Nothing in this legislation, however, requires or advocates 
abrogation or violation of the ABM Treaty.
  Mr. President, 3 months ago, the President of the United States 
vetoed

[[Page S2654]]

the Defense authorization bill because he opposed the deployment of a 
system to defend the American people against ballistic missile attack. 
Today, I am honored to join Senator Dole in sending a clear message--we 
will not stand idly by while the United States remains undefended 
against a real and growing threat. The legislation we are introducing 
today will fulfill a constitutional, strategic, and moral obligation 
that has been neglected for 4 years.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am proud to cosponsor this legislation 
to establish a policy for deploying a national defense system for the 
United States. This bill, the National Missile Defense Act of 1996, 
returns the United States on a clear path toward deploying a system to 
defend the American people against limited, accidental, or unauthorized 
ballistic missile attacks.
  In 1991, the Congress enacted the first Missile Defense Act, in a 
bipartisan effort to give direction to the Strategic Defense Initiative 
program, now known as the Ballistic Missile Defense program. The need 
for theater missile defense systems had been tragically demonstrated 
during the Persian Gulf war, and it was clear that the potential 
threats to our continent would continue to exist, even with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union.
  Subsequently, that policy was watered down and its deployment 
objectives were delayed time and again. I congratulate Senator Dole for 
taking the lead today in restoring much-needed direction to our 
national missile defense efforts.
  Our Nation has invested over $38 billion on missile defense programs 
over the past 15 years, with very little effective defensive capability 
to show for it. We are at a turning point in the development of 
capabilities to effectively defend our citizens and our troops deployed 
overseas from the devastating effects of ballistic missile attacks.
  We should focus our missile defense programs on the risk of 
accidental or unauthorized missile launch, missile proliferation in the 
Third World, and particularly the risk of theater missile attacks on 
our forces and allies.
  Deployment of effective, mobile theater missile defense systems for 
our troops in the field should be our first priority. To do so requires 
an evaluation of the many ongoing research programs to determine which 
demonstrates the most promise for deployable capability against 
battlefield missile attacks.
  I am greatly disappointed that the administration chose to ignore 
Congressional direction and cut the theater missile defense funding 
approved by the Congress last year. The core programs identified in the 
fiscal year 1996 Defense authorization bill, including both lower and 
upper tier systems, must be fully funded to ensure the most effective 
protection for our troops in the field. I fully expect Congress to 
restore the funding and restate the programmatic direction to make 
these systems available to our forces.
  At the same time, we must develop a deployment plan for an initial 
national missile defense system to provide an effective defense of U.S. 
territory against limited ballistic missile attacks. This bill 
establishes a goal of 2003 to deploy such a system and directs the 
Secretary of Defense to develop a plan to implement that goal. It is 
now up to the Congress to provide the funding to develop and procure 
the most cost-effective system.
  Both efforts, toward theater and national missile defense systems, 
must balance the critical need for defenses with the reality of fiscal 
constraints. Every effort should be made to engage our allies both 
financially and technically in developing these systems.
  Mr. President, the threat of proliferation is too great to ignore. We 
must not replace the nuclear confrontation of the cold war with 
vulnerability to dictators, extremists, and nations who threaten us 
with nuclear blackmail, or our forces and allies with missile attack. 
Without effective, deployed missile defense systems, we remain at risk.
  I intend to work with Senator Dole to achieve early passage of this 
legislation in the Senate, and I urge President Clinton to approve it 
to ensure the safety of the American people.
  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am proud to join the Republican 
leadership of both the Senate and the House, and all Republican members 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as an original cosponsor of the 
Defend America Act of 1996. I call on all Members of Congress to join 
us in our effort to protect the citizens of the United States from 
ballistic missile attack.
  Earlier this year, President Clinton's veto of the Defense 
authorization bill forced us to reluctantly drop the important national 
missile defense provisions that we had included in that bill. At that 
time, we promised that we would be back with separate legislation to 
provide for the defense of the United States. With the introduction of 
today's legislation, we have fulfilled that promise and will continue 
the fight until this legislation is enacted into law--over President 
Clinton's veto, if necessary.
  Many Americans find it hard to believe that we currently have no 
system in place which could defend our Nation against even a single 
intercontinental ballistic missile strike. This, despite the fact that 
Russia and China currently have the capability to reach our shores with 
their intercontinental ballistic missiles; and North Korea is well on 
its way to deploying a long-range missile capable of striking Alaska. 
In addition, over 30 nations now have short-range ballistic missiles--
30 nations, many hostile to the United States. As China's saber 
rattling against Taiwan continues, we hear reports of veiled threats 
from China of a missile attack against California--something they are 
very capable of doing. And today's papers report that Iraq continues to 
possess Scud missiles.
  The need for defenses against these capabilities is clear. The cold 
war may be over, but the desire of more and more nations to acquire 
ballistic missiles is growing.
  But the Clinton administration believes there is no threat, and they 
have presented the Congress with a defense budget request which ``slow 
rolls'' our ballistic missile defense efforts. The American people 
deserve better.
  That is why I have long been in the forefront of the Republican 
effort to provide both our troops deployed overseas and Americans here 
at home with adequate defenses to counter the very real threat of 
ballistic missile attack. I drafted the Missile Defense Act of 1991 
which--in the aftermath of the Iraqi Scud missile attacks--set the 
United States on the path to acquiring and deploying theater and 
national missile defense systems. I also joined with my Republican 
colleagues on the Armed Services Committee in drafting the Missile 
Defense Act of 1995, an update of the earlier Missile Defense Act. 
Unfortunately, as I mentioned earlier, President Clinton's veto stopped 
that Republican effort to defend Americans.
  The Defend America Act calls for the deployment of a national missile 
defense (NMD) system to protect the United States against limited, 
unauthorized or accidental ballistic missile attacks. It is important 
to emphasize that we are talking about a limited system--one that would 
provide a highly effective capability against a limited ballistic 
missile attack. This is precisely the type of defensive system we need 
to deal with the threats we are facing in the post-cold-war world.
  A key difference between the Defend America Act and the missile 
defense legislation adopted last year, is that the current bill does 
not require the deployment of a specific NMD system. Rather, it 
establishes the requirement to deploy a system by a date certain, but 
leaves it to the Secretary of Defense to propose a plan by March 15, 
1997, to implement this requirement. This is a prudent approach which 
focuses the debate on the real issue--do you want to defend the 
American people against ballistic missile attacks?
  Mr. President, we all remember the Iraqi Scud missile attacks on our 
forces in Saudi Arabia, and our friends in Israel. I was in Tel Aviv 
during the last Scud attack--February 18, 1991.
  I do not want to see U.S. citizens subjected to the terror I 
witnessed in Israel. I pray that we never see a time when Americans are 
forced to carry gas masks around because some madman is threatening our 
shores. We owe it to our citizens to take action now--before it is too 
late--to provide them with effective defenses against these types of 
attacks.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of the legislation 
introduced today by Senator Dole regarding

[[Page S2655]]

national missile defense. I am proud to be an original cosponsor, and I 
want to commend Senator Dole for his steadfast commitment to defending 
America.
  Mr. President, our Nation is walking a very dangerous tightrope. For 
reasons that are unknown and certainly inconceivable to most Americans, 
President Clinton refuses to defend our country against ballistic 
missiles, even though the technology to do so is available today.
  The truth is our Nation is absolutely, completely vulnerable to 
ballistic missiles. We have no defense whatsoever against a missile 
targeted on our territory, our industry, our national treasures, or our 
people. The Patriot missiles that everyone remembers from Desert Storm 
5 years ago are not capable of stopping a long-range missile. In fact, 
they can only defend very small areas against short-range missiles. The 
Patriot is a point-defense system that we send along with our troops 
when they go into harm's way.
  But here at home we have no defenses against long-range missiles 
based in China, in Russia, or in North Korea. We have no defenses 
against the missiles that Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya are so 
vigorously seeking to acquire. That is the truth. That is a fact. And 
that is unacceptable.
  When told of this situation, the vast majority of Americans become 
enraged. They cannot understand why their elected Representatives would 
leave them defenseless against the likes of Saddam Hussein, Mu'ammar 
Qadhafi, or Kim Jong-Il. They cannot understand why the tax dollars 
that they contribute for national defense are not being used to protect 
them. Frankly, they have every right to be upset. There is simply no 
excuse.

  The Congress agrees with the American people and took action last 
year to defend all Americans against ballistic missiles, whatever their 
source. In the Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1996, 
Congress established a program to develop and deploy a national missile 
defense system for the United States. This program was not some 
elaborate star wars concept, but rather, a very modest yet capable 
ground-based system that would provide a limited defense of America 
against accidental, unauthorized, or hostile missile attacks.
  But President Clinton vetoed the Defense bill specifically because of 
the requirement to defend America. In fact, in his statement of 
administration policy, the President called national missile defense 
quote ``unwarranted and unnecessary.''
  Mr. President, that is a very insightful quote, and it gets right to 
the heart of the differences between President Clinton, Presidential 
candidate Bob Dole, and the Republican Congress. To President Clinton, 
providing for the common defense is ``unwarranted and unnecessary.'' To 
the Congress and Senator Dole, it is the most fundamental of our 
constitutional responsibilities.
  Simply put, this is a defining issue. It is an issue that defines our 
Nation's character and commitment to its people. It is an issue that 
defines the two parties. It is an issue that defines the very basic 
difference between two men who are seeking the Presidency. It is an 
issue that history will undoubtedly look back and pass judgment upon 
and, for better or worse, it is an issue that will define our 
generation.
  Mr. President, if we fail to take action to defend America now, while 
we still have the chance, we will certainly regret it. At some point in 
the very near future, we will have waited too long. The theoretical 
threat of a hostile ballistic missile launch will have become a 
reality. And we will have no defense against it.
  What will it take for President Clinton to recognize this threat? 
Must a ballistic missile equipped with a chemical, biological, or 
nuclear warhead rain down upon citizens before he will act? Must tens 
of thousands of Americans perish before he corrects this terrible 
vulnerability.
  To those of us who are cosponsoring this legislation, the answer is, 
``No.'' The time to act is now, not tomorrow. Our Nation is in 
jeopardy. Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction are 
spreading throughout the world and we cannot stop them. In fact, some 
30 nations currently possess, or are actively acquiring, weapons of 
mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them.
  Just yesterday, the United Nations admitted that Iraq is covertly 
storing up to 16 ballistic missiles armed with chemical or biological 
warheads. Iraq is the most inspected and thoroughly monitored country 
in the world. If we cannot find these missiles in the deserts of Iraq, 
how can we expect to track them in the mountains and valleys of China, 
North Korea, Iran, or Syria?
  The answer is, We can't, and even if we could, we have no system to 
counter them. The only solution is to develop missile defenses. This 
bill does just that, and would require that our Nation deploy a 
national missile defense system capable of protecting all Americans by 
the year 2003.
  Mr. President, this is not about politics. It is not about 
partisanship. It is about national security and keeping faith with 
those who elected us and those who depend upon us to safeguard their 
lives and property. If we ignore this obligation, we will have failed 
in our most fundamental constitutional responsibility. To me that is 
unacceptable. It runs against every principle that I stand for, and as 
long as I have a breath in my body, I will fight to prevent that from 
happening.
  Mr. President, I want to again thank the distinguished majority 
leader for bringing this issue before the Senate. He does our Nation a 
profound service by highlighting the missile defense issue, and I am 
proud to cosponsor this important legislation.
  I yield the floor.
                                 ______

      By Mr. HARKIN:
  S. 1637. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to revise 
the tax rules on expatriation, and for other purposes; to the Committee 
on Finance.


                the expatriation tax reform act of 1996

 Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, the time has come to close one of 
the most outrageous tax loopholes on our books today. In fact, it is so 
outrageous, it's hard to believe.
  But today a small number of very wealthy individuals--often 
billionaires--can renounce their U.S. citizenship in order to avoid 
paying their fair share of taxes. And under current law, those same 
individuals can still live in the U.S. for up to half a year--tax-free.
  That's right. Amazingly, the current tax code has a loophole big 
enough for the super rich to fly their private jets right through. I 
call it the Benedict Arnold loophole. You can turn your back on the 
country that made you rich--to get even richer.
  In many cases, those same people come right back to the United 
States. They spend up to 6 months here and claim to be citizens of 
another country just so they can skip out on their tax bill.
  In one case, for example, a very wealthy American acquired 
citizenship in Belize, a small country along the Caribbean coast. Soon 
thereafter, Belize tried to set up a counsel's office in Florida where 
their new citizen had his factories. That way their new ``counsel'' 
could live in the U.S. for a large part of the year without paying his 
U.S. taxes. Ultimately, this was not allowed, but these types of games 
should be stopped once and for all.
  Hard working, tax paying, middle-class Americans have every right to 
be outraged by these tax loopholes. They are costing Americans about 
$1.5 billion. And the money these wealthy tax cheats fail to pay is 
adding to our debt and to the bill that our kids will one day be forced 
to pay. That's unconscionable.
  The bill I am introducing today says enough is enough: It's time to 
close the Benedict Arnold loophole. My legislation provides that if 
these so called ``expatriates'' spend 30 days in the United States they 
must pay their full taxes as a resident alien. Essentially, they would 
be treated like a resident alien, similar to how a U.S. citizen is 
treated.
  In addition, my bill provides that--upon renouncing their 
citizenship--these individuals would pay taxes on all of their gains, 
including those not yet sold. Under current law they can effectively 
escape paying their fair share of taxes by delaying the sale of their 
assets through available loopholes. The Senate passed a provision in 
last year's Budget Reconciliation bill, but it was gutted in 
conference.

[[Page S2656]]

  Where there is a problem with a bilateral tax treaty, the Secretary 
of the Treasury may waive the provision for that individual.
  I hope that the bill I am introducing today become law this year. I 
urge the Senate to support and pass this common sense measure that will 
save taxpayer $1.5 billion.
                                 ______

      By Mr. PRESSLER (for himself, Mr. Glenn, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Kerrey, 
        Mr. Bennett, and Mrs. Feinstein):
  S. 1638. A bill to promote peace and security in South Asia; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.


        THE SOUTH ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY PROMOTION ACT OF 1996

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, today along with my colleagues, Senators 
Glenn, D'Amato, John Kerry, Bennett, and Feinstein, I am introducing 
legislation in an effort to restore credibility to our Nation's already 
damaged nuclear nonproliferation policy. Nonproliferation is one of our 
most important national security concerns, if not the most important. 
Even the President admitted last year that no issue is more important 
to the security of all people than nuclear nonproliferation.
  At present, our efforts in this area are tied to another vital goal: 
the promotion of peace and security in South Asia. I have visited South 
Asia. I have said before it is a region of striking contrasts--a region 
of such enormous potential clouded by tension and instability.
  As all of us well know, last year President Clinton requested, and 
Congress agreed to, a one time exception and partial repeal of one our 
most important nonproliferation laws: the so-called Pressler amendment. 
The Pressler amendment, approved by Congress in 1985, prohibits United 
States military and nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan, including arms 
sales, so long as Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device. The 
Senate had an extensive debate on this subject last fall. As a result 
of last year's exception--known as the Brown amendment--approximately 
370 million dollars' worth of American military goods is scheduled for 
delivery to Pakistan.
  The Brown amendment was very controversial. The central point of the 
controversy was the fact that the Brown amendment was both waiving and 
repealing nuclear nonproliferation law without obtaining one concrete 
nonproliferation concession from Pakistan. We have never provided that 
kind of exception to any other country before. That was one of the 
central reasons why I opposed the Brown amendment. I feared it would 
send the worst possible message: Nuclear proliferation pays.
  The Clinton administration lobbied the Congress quite heavily on the 
Brown amendment. The administration even tried to convince Members of 
Congress that Pakistan did make a nonproliferation concession. The 
Clinton administration claimed its support for the Brown amendment was 
based in part on an understanding it believed it had with the 
Government of Pakistan. On August 3, 1995, Acting Secretary of State 
Peter Tarnoff stated the context of this understanding in a letter to 
the distinguished ranking member and former chairman of the Armed 
Services Committee, Senator Nunn:

       Pakistan knows that the decision to resolve the equipment 
     problem is based on the assumption that there will be no 
     significant change on nuclear and missile non-proliferation 
     issues of concern to the United States.

  Frankly, at the time, I felt the justification was too weak at best 
and unbelievable at worst. I say that from the standpoint of 
experience. You see, the Pressler amendment was passed with a similar 
assurance from Pakistan. Let me remind my colleagues that the Pressler 
amendment was designed to ensure that Pakistan--at that time our 
Nation's third largest foreign aid recipient--continued to receive 
United States assistance. We had an understanding that Pakistan would 
not develop a bomb program, and in return, we would pass the Pressler 
amendment so that our existing laws would not result in a United States 
aid cutoff. As we all know, they did build a bomb program, and 
continued to receive U.S. taxpayer dollars. So I had some serious 
misgivings and a sense of foreboding when the Clinton administration 
stated it was basing its support of the Brown amendment on an assurance 
from Pakistan.
  But that was then, this is now. Now we have a clear, unequivocal 
statement by the Director of Central Intelligence that Pakistan did not 
accept the administration's position in August. This is what Director 
John Deutch told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 
February 22:

       Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community continues to get 
     accurate and timely information on Chinese activities that 
     involve inappropriate weapons technology assistance to other 
     countries: nuclear technology to Pakistan, M-11 missiles to 
     Pakistan, cruise missiles to Iran.

  For the record, I would like to point out that the Director said ``M-
11 missiles,'' not ``M-11 missile technology.''
  So, the administration's assumption that the Government of Pakistan 
would freeze development of its bomb program was erroneous. Our 
intelligence community has found ``accurate and timely information'' 
that Pakistan has, indeed, made significant changes on nuclear and 
missile proliferation issues of concern to the United States. The 
nuclear technology to which Director Deutch alluded would allow 
Pakistan a 100-percent increase in its capacity to make enriched 
uranium, the explosive material of nuclear weapons. The M-11s are 
modern, mobile, nuclear capable ballistic missiles and clearly intended 
to be the principal delivery system of the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
system.

  With the underlying assumption of the administration's position now 
destroyed, there is no longer any justification for the 
administration's support of the Brown amendment. The administration has 
the authority to put the Brown amendment on hold. Federal law 
specifically states that if the President determines that a country has 
delivered or received ``nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or 
technology,'' no funds may be made available under the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, which would include military equipment 
purchased with Foreign Military Sales [FMS]. All the President needs to 
do is enforce our nonproliferation laws and most, if not all of the 
military equipment provided by the Brown amendment remains undelivered. 
That is what I urged the President to do last month.
  Sadly, even though Pakistan broke its assurance to the Clinton 
administration, it has been reported yesterday that the President 
intends to go through with the transfer. This is stunning news. The 
Brown amendment alone was a tough blow to our nonproliferation policy. 
Now the Clinton administration is preparing to cripple our already 
shaken credibility as an enforcer of nuclear nonproliferation. If that 
is the President's decision, and I certainly hope he reconsiders, then 
the law requires that he make an appropriate certification to the 
Congress. This gives Congress two options: First, it could disapprove 
of the President's certification. Under the law it would have 30 days 
to do that. Or, should a certification not be forthcoming, it could 
enact the legislation I am introducing today. This bill, which I 
introduce with bipartisan support, simply repeals the Brown amendment.
  Mr. President, I believe passage of this legislation is necessary if 
our Nation's nuclear nonproliferation policy is to have any 
credibility. Indeed, beyond the simple policy justifications for this 
legislation, I urge my colleagues to keep in mind the circumstance that 
brings me to the floor today. As I stated a moment ago, Pakistan's 
receipt of nuclear technology from China is a sanctionable offense, as 
is its receipt of M-11 missile technology. What makes these offenses 
disturbing is that they were occurring while Pakistan was lobbying the 
administration and Congress to waive and partially repeal nuclear 
nonproliferation law. Equally disturbing are reports that members of 
the Clinton administration knew of the ring magnet transfer at that 
time, but did not divulge this information to members of Congress. The 
irony would be humorous if the issue wasn't so serious.

  I believe that if all my colleagues were aware of this blatant 
violation of our non-proliferation laws last fall, the Brown amendment 
would have failed. Indeed, a supporter of the Brown amendment, 
Congressman Doug Bereuter, admitted that if the Brown amendment was 
reconsidered, its passage would be unlikely. I am confident

[[Page S2657]]

enough that this Congress understands the seriousness of this matter 
and would agree that we need to repeal the Brown amendment or at least 
suspend its implementation until the underlying policy of the 
administration is restored--that being the return of the ring magnets 
and the M-11s from Pakistan to China.
  Mr. President, finally a word about South Asia. Also on February 22, 
CIA Director Deutch named South Asia as his No. 1 worry in the annual 
world wide threat assessment. He noted, ``the potential for conflict is 
high.'' Just a few weeks ago, the Washington Post reported that 
Pakistan is preparing for a possible nuclear weapons test. Even a 
limited nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India would result in 
deaths and destruction on an unprecedented scale in world history. 
Under the circumstances, I feel it would be the height of 
irresponsibility to allow for military aid to one side in such an 
unstable environment. The aftermath of the Brown amendment is proof 
that our relationship with India is impacted by United States 
nonproliferation policy. Because of India's unsafeguarded nuclear 
program, there is no United States-Indian agreement for nuclear 
cooperation. United States military cooperation with India is virtually 
nonexistent. The United States will not export certain forms of missile 
equipment and technology to India and any other goods that are related 
to weapons of mass destruction. It is true that United States sanctions 
have not been invoked against India, but that is because India has not 
violated its commitments under United States law.
  I stand ready to seek a commonsense approach to improve our relations 
with all the countries in South Asia. We need a commonsense approach to 
deal with the problems in that troubled region. Illicit narcotics 
trafficking, terrorism, economic stagnation, and weapons proliferation 
are just some of the issues that plague South Asia. We must seek ways 
to help these countries address all these problems. I am ready to start 
that process. We can start by repealing the Brown amendment and begin 
working on an approach that serves the mutual interests of the people 
of the United States and the people of South Asia.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1638

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. PROMOTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN SOUTH ASIA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The American people fervently desire that all the 
     peoples of South Asia enjoy peace and share an increased 
     sense of security.
       (2) The peace and security of South Asia are threatened by 
     an arms race, particularly the spread of weapons of mass 
     destruction and their modern delivery systems.
       (3) Congress has granted both a one-time exception to and 
     partial repeal of United States nuclear nonproliferation laws 
     in order to permit the Government of Pakistan to receive 
     certain United States military equipment and training and 
     limited economic aid.
       (4) The exception and partial repeal was based on direct 
     assurances to the United States Government that ``there will 
     be no significant change on nuclear and missile 
     nonproliferation issues of concern to the United States''.
       (5) The Director of Central Intelligence has informed 
     Congress that Pakistan has taken recent delivery of ``nuclear 
     technology'' and ``M-11 missiles'' from the People's Republic 
     of China.
       (6) The justification for the exception to and partial 
     repeal of United States nonproliferation laws is no longer 
     valid.
       (b) Repeal.--Section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
     1961 (22 U.S.C. 2375) is amended to read as if the amendments 
     made to such section by section 559 of the Foreign 
     Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
     Appropriations Act, 1996 (Public Law 104-107) had not been 
     made.

  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, last September the Senate approved an 
amendment offered by Senator Brown that allowed the administration to 
deliver hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment to 
Pakistan. In doing so, we decided to ignore Pakistan's continuing 
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles to carry 
them, and we turned our backs on United States non-proliferation law 
and international arms control agreements. Today, I am pleased to 
cosponsor a bill being introduced by Senator Pressler that will repeal 
this misguided provision and will help put U.S. nonproliferation policy 
back on track.
  During Senate consideration of the Brown amendment, the proponents, 
including the administration, argued that transferring the military 
equipment would remove what had become an irritant in our relations 
with Pakistan and would result in enhanced cooperation on 
nonproliferation issues. Unfortunately, the opposite has happened.
  Even as we debated the Brown amendment we had clear and convincing 
evidence that Pakistan had received M-11 ballistic missiles from 
China--a sanctionable offense under the Missile Technology Control 
Regime. We now know that Pakistan also has continued to pursue its 
Nuclear Weapons Program. In an unclassified hearing earlier this year, 
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch testified to the 
Intelligence Committee that he was especially concerned about Pakistani 
efforts to acquire nuclear technology. Although he did not provide 
details, the press has reported that last summer China sent Pakistan 
specialized magnets for use in centrifuges to produce enriched uranium. 
Such a transfer would violate the 1994 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. 
Finally, Director Deutch told the Intelligence Committee that Pakistan 
was likely to test a nuclear weapon if India did, hardly the restraint 
we were promised.
  Since the late 1970's the Pakistani Government has repeatedly assured 
the United States that it does not possess nuclear weapons despite our 
certainty that it does. As recently as November of 1994, Prime Minister 
Bhutto said in an interview with David Frost ``We have neither 
detonated one, nor have we got nuclear weapons.'' Now they are 
practicing the same deception with regard to acquiring missiles from 
China. In July of 1995, a press release from the Pakistan Embassy 
asserted that ``Pakistan has not acquired the M-11 or any other missile 
from China that violates the Missile Technology Control Regime.'' The 
evidence to the contrary is, in my opinion, overwhelming.
  Pakistan has been a friend and ally of the United States since its 
independence. But how many times can you let a friend mislead you and 
how many times can you let a friend put you in danger before you are 
forced to change the nature of the relationship. This is not a question 
of whether we want good relations with Pakistan. Of course we do. We 
want good relations with all countries, but the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems to carry them is 
far more important to our national security than relations with any one 
country. Indeed, this is one of the most important national security 
issues facing us today.
  I congratulate my colleague from South Dakota for his leadership on 
this issue and I am pleased to cosponsor his legislation. I hope that 
we can address this issue before the transfer of this equipment is 
completed.
                                 ______

      By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Warner, and Mr. 
        Gramm):
  S. 1639. A bill to require the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to carry out a demonstration project to 
provide the Department of Defense with reimbursement from the Medicare 
Program for health care services provided to Medicare-eligible 
beneficiaries under TRICARE; to the Committee on Finance.


                    medicare subvention legislation

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, today I am pleased to introduce legislation 
which will demonstrate the cost effectiveness of Medicare reimbursement 
to the Department of Defense [DOD] for treatment of military 
beneficiaries age 65 and older. This bill will enable these individuals 
to enroll in Tricare Prime and be treated in military hospitals.


                        current system is flawed

  As I am sure my colleagues know, Tricare is DOD's new managed health 
care program. While Tricare has merit, it also has flaws: It bars all 
Medicare-eligible retirees and family members from enrolling in Tricare 
Prime. In fact, all career military members and their families 
eventually will be affected, because even those who enroll now will be 
dropped from Tricare at age 65, when they become eligible for

[[Page S2658]]

Medicare. In my view, this breaks long standing health care commitments 
to retirees, may increase costs, and affect military readiness.


                        identifying the problem

  Current law inadvertently encourages DOD and Medicare to work against 
each other. As the defense budget tightens, DOD has a strong incentive 
to push older retirees and families out of the military medical system 
and back into Medicare, although Medicare probably costs both the 
Government and retirees more money than care under the military system. 
Theoretically, Medicare-eligible retirees may still use military 
hospitals on a space-available basis. However, space-available care is 
rapidly becoming nonexistent as military facilities downsize and 
Tricare expands across the country.


                  medicare subvention is the solution

  It seems to me, the solution to this problem is to change the law to 
allow Medicare subvention, allowing Medicare to reimburse DOD for care 
provided to older beneficiaries enrolling in Tricare Prime or otherwise 
using military hospitals.


               demonstration test of medicare subvention

  We need to demonstrate to the interested parties, Department of 
Health and Human Services, and Department of Defense, that subvention 
is indeed a feasible and cost-effective program. Therefore I am 
introducing the legislation which gives those agencies the authority to 
conduct such a test. I believe this test will justify implementing 
subvention and allow those eligible military retirees over 65 to 
participate in Tricare Prime and receive care in military hospitals.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                S. 1639

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. DEMONSTRATION PROJECT FOR MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT 
                   OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH CARE 
                   PROVIDED TO MEDICARE-ELIGIBLE BENEFICIARIES 
                   UNDER TRICARE.

       (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
     and subject to subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall enter into 
     an agreement in order to carry out a demonstration project 
     under which the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
     reimburses the Secretary of Defense, on a capitated basis, 
     from the medicare program under title XVIII of the Social 
     Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.) for certain health care 
     services provided by the Secretary of Defense to medicare-
     eligible military beneficiaries through the TRICARE program.
       (b) Project Requirements.--(1)(A) The Secretary of Defense 
     shall budget for and expend on health care services in each 
     region in which the demonstration project is carried out an 
     amount equal to the amount that the Secretary would otherwise 
     budget for and expend on such services in the absence of the 
     project.
       (B) The Secretary may not be reimbursed under the project 
     for health care services provided to medicare-eligible 
     military beneficiaries in a region until the amount expended 
     by the Secretary to provide health care services in that 
     region exceeds the amount budgeted for health care services 
     in that region under subparagraph (A).
       (2) The agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the 
     Secretary of Health and Human Services shall provide that the 
     cost to the medicare program of providing services under the 
     project does not exceed the cost that the medicare program 
     would otherwise incur in providing such services in the 
     absence of the project.
       (3) The authority of the Secretary of Defense to carry out 
     the project shall expire 3 years after the date of the 
     commencement of the project.
       (c) Reports.--Not later than 14 months after the 
     commencement of the demonstration project under subsection 
     (a), and annually thereafter until the year following the 
     year in which the project is terminated, the Secretary of 
     Defense and the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall 
     jointly submit to Congress a report on the demonstration 
     project. The report shall include the following:
       (1) The number of medicare-eligible military beneficiaries 
     provided health care services under the project during the 
     previous year.
       (2) An assessment of the benefits to such beneficiaries of 
     receiving health care services under the project.
       (3) A description of the cost-shifting, if any, among 
     medical care programs of the Department of Defense that 
     results from the project.
       (4) A description of the cost-shifting, if any, from the 
     Department to the medicare program that results from the 
     project.
       (5) An analysis of the effect of the project on the 
     following:
       (A) Access to the military medical treatment system, 
     including access to military medical treatment facilities.
       (B) The availability of space and facilities and the 
     capabilities of medical staff to provide fee-for-service 
     medical care.
       (C) Established priorities for treatment of beneficiaries 
     under chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code.
       (D) The cost to the Department of providing prescription 
     drugs to the beneficiaries described in subparagraph (C).
       (E) The quality of health care provided by the Department.
       (F) Health care providers and medicare-eligible military 
     beneficiaries in the communities in which the project is 
     carried out.
       (6) An assessment of the effects of continuing the project 
     on the overall budget of the Department for health care and 
     on the budget of each military medical treatment facility.
       (7) An assessment of the effects of continuing the project 
     on expenditures from the medicare trust funds under title 
     XVIII of the Social Security Act.
       (8) An analysis of the lessons learned by the Department as 
     a result of the project.
       (9) Any other information that the Secretary of Defense and 
     the Secretary of Health and Human Services jointly consider 
     appropriate.
       (d) Review by Comptroller General.--Not later than December 
     31 each year in which the demonstration project is carried 
     out under this section, the Comptroller General shall 
     determine and submit to Congress a report on the extent, if 
     any, to which the costs of the Secretary of Defense under the 
     TRICARE program and the costs of the Secretary of Health and 
     Human Services under the medicare program have increased as a 
     result of the project.
       (e) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
       (1) The term ``medicare-eligible military beneficiary'' 
     means a beneficiary under chapter 55 of title 10, United 
     States Code, who is entitled to benefits under part A of 
     title XVIII of the Social Security Act.
       (2) The term ``TRICARE program'' means the managed health 
     care program that is established by the Secretary of Defense 
     under the authority of chapter 55 of title 10, United States 
     Code, principally section 1097 of that title, and includes 
     the competitive selection of contractors to financially 
     underwrite the delivery of health care services under the 
     Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
     Services.

                          ____________________