[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 40 (Thursday, March 21, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2553-S2591]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
COMMONSENSE PRODUCT LIABILITY LEGAL REFORM ACT OF 1996--CONFERENCE
REPORT
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). Under the previous order, the
Senate will now proceed to the conference report to accompany H.R. 956.
The time between now and 12 noon is equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the
two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R.
956), a bill to establish legal standards and procedures for
product liability litigation, and for other purposes, having
met, after full and fair conference, have agreed to recommend
and do recommend to their respective Houses this report,
signed by a majority of the conferees.
The Senate resumed consideration of the conference report.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, as we proceed toward the climax of the
debate on product liability and a vote on the bill at noon, I believe
it appropriate to state what I think the issues in this debate truly
are. The question involved in whether or not we wish to reform the
product liability litigation system of this country has, I think,
primarily to do with the products that are available to the American
people, the rapidity with which new products are researched, developed,
introduced, and marketed, and the cost of those products to the people
of the United States.
In each of these cases, the closely related question, of course, is
the system of justice by which people who believe that they have been
wronged get a determination as to whether or not such a wrong has been
committed and how much compensation should be granted when a wrong is
determined.
Our present legal system serves well neither of these goals. We have,
in many areas, a frequent reduction in the number of companies that are
willing to engage in vitally important businesses: a reduction from
something like a dozen to one, in the producers of serum for whooping
cough; a reduction from 20 to 2, in the number of companies willing to
produce helmets, football helmets, for players, whether professional or
college or high school or otherwise.
There is a constant fear on the part of product developers that the
unpredictable costs of product liability litigation, whether or not it
is successful, are simply greater than any potential profits that can
be gained from the development and marketing of a product. For example,
Science magazine has identified three U.S. laboratories that suspended
or canceled research on promising AIDS vaccines. Union Carbide funded
and developed a suitcase-size kidney dialysis unit for home use. It was
sold to a foreign corporation
[[Page S2554]]
after the company determined that potential liability risks under the
present system of law made the product uneconomical.
Another company developed a phosphate fiber substitute for asbestos,
the subject, obviously, of a tremendous amount of litigation. Not only
was the product safe, it was biodegradable and environmentally sound.
Although the product could have generated an estimated $100 million a
year in revenues, the company concluded that plaintiffs' attorneys
would make the product a target for expensive legal claims, and it was
therefore too risky to market.
Another company developed a chemical process that would speed up the
natural bacterial decomposition of hazardous materials and might have
been used to clean up hundreds of leaking underground storage sites.
Despite its successful demonstration at several sites, the new
technology was abandoned because the risk from potential lawsuits was
too great.
In addition, even those companies that have been willing to stay in a
particular business have been forced to increase the charges for the
products they market, sometimes astronomically, in order to cover their
cost of product liability litigation. Lederle Laboratories, which is
now the lone maker of the DPT vaccine, all other manufacturers having
abandoned the field, raised its price per dose from $2.80 in 1986 to
$11.40 in 1987 to pay for the cost of lawsuits. One other company does
continue to produce, solely out of a feeling of social responsibility.
This chart behind me indicates the litigation tax cost of a number of
products produced and marketed in the United States: almost $24 for an
8-foot aluminum ladder; $3,000 for a heart pacemaker; $170 for a
motorized wheelchair; 18 cents for a regulation baseball. There are
example after example of the added costs to American consumers to pay
for the lottery that is product liability litigation today.
What do we have in the litigation system itself? We have a system
that is truly a lottery, one in which the average small claimant with a
very minor injury is likely to recover much more than that person's
actual losses, while the average seriously injured individual recovers
much less, with a few lucky ones in a few States with high punitive
damage award histories receiving much more. But the bottom line, the
total cost, is that for every dollar which the system itself costs,
every dollar that goes into the product liability litigation system,
well under 50 cents goes to the victim. Mr. President, 50 cents or more
goes to the lawyers, and an additional amount in transaction costs for
related professions. There is no wonder the defense of the present
system is so fierce.
So this bill is designed to do two things. It is designed, to a
certain degree, to make more uniform and predictable the way in which
the product liability litigation or claim system will work; to make it
more just, actually to increase claimants' rights in some areas, like
the statute of limitations; to reduce the cost of litigation and the
overall transaction costs; to restore the competitiveness of American
industry; to provide additional incentives for research, to develop, to
offer for sale in the market widely the kinds of new and better medical
devices, mechanical products, sporting goods that we, as Americans,
have come to expect.
No one else in the world has a system like ours. No one else has a
system more expensive, no one else has a system that so discourages
research and development and marketing of new products.
Finally, Mr. President, we already have an example of how legislation
like this works in the real world. In August 1994, less than 2 years
ago, this Congress passed and this President signed an 18-year statute
of repose for piston-driven aircraft, small aircraft. An industry that
had almost been driven out of the United States--famous companies like
Piper went into bankruptcy and others like Cessna, with barely one-
tenth of the production that they had a decade earlier because of the
cost of litigation--has now begun a recovery, a recovery which has
proceeded much more rapidly, I think, even than the sponsors of that
bill hoped, but one which is symbolized better than anything else by
the construction of a new plant for Cessna at a cost of some $40
million to employ some 2,000 men and women at highly skilled, first-
rate jobs, producing high-quality private aircraft for American
purchasers.
This kind of legislation works, Mr. President. It works for the
economy, it works for our consumers, it works for our system of
justice. It should be passed and should become law.
Mr. KENNEDY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from South
Carolina will yield me 15 minutes.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I will be delighted to yield the distinguished Senator
15 minutes.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, just in terms of schedules, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senator from California be recognized for 15
minutes for her comments at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I think it is only appropriate that we
look at the context in which this legislation has been presented to the
Senate. Others have described the bill in great detail, and, if time
permits, I will mention the various provisions in the bill that I find
most objectionable. But I think this body and the American people ought
to understand in a comprehensive way what is happening to consumer
protections during the course of this Congress in this and other bills.
This bill is supported by a number of big business, special interest
groups who have advanced a series of legislative and regulatory
initiatives designed to protect those interests.
We cannot just look at this legislation in a vacuum, Mr. President.
For example, we have to look at what is happening in the Appropriations
Committees, where the appropriators are cutting back on inspections by
the various agencies of Government responsible for protecting health
and safety in the workplace. In the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, there is a 20-percent reduction in enforcement. In the
Environmental Protection Agency, there is a 25-percent reduction in
enforcement. The Consumer Product Safety Commission has been cut and is
now at its lowest level of enforcement funding since 1972. Even the
National Transportation Safety Administration is facing cuts, and that
is an agency whose total enforcement budget is only about $8 million to
begin with.
What is happening? The same forces that are supporting this tort-
related legislation are trying to reduce protection for the American
worker and the American consumer in the regulatory agencies by denying
adequate enforcement of existing regulations.
Second, these same forces are proposing sweeping changes in the
landmark legislation that established the regulatory agencies. In the
Labor and Human Resources Committee, for example, last week we
considered a bill to weaken the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and
next week we're moving on to the Food and Drug Administration. In the
OSHA bill, 90 percent of all the companies would be excluded from any
kind of inspection at all. That so-called reform bill would reduce the
penalties and reduce the kinds of enforcement mechanisms that would be
available to OSHA.
So you have the cutbacks in inspections and you have the efforts by
the same interests to reduce the effectiveness of the enforcement tools
available to OSHA, FDA, EPA, and these other agencies. And at the same
moment that is happening, we are presented with this product liability
legislation. Anybody who believes that we are considering this in a
vacuum does not understand what the legislative process is all about.
Nor are the limits on tort liability in this bill the only ones under
consideration in this Congress. The Republican leadership in the House
of Representatives has added medical malpractice liability limits to
the bipartisan bill that Senator Kassebaum and I introduced. We will
have a chance to debate that next month. And it was not long ago that
we were debating the loser pays concept, an antiquated system used in
Great Britain which is now being abandoned there because it fails to
protect the consumers in that country. And no doubt we will again face
proposals to create an ``FDA Defense''
[[Page S2555]]
under which medical devices or pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA
would be immune from lawsuits, no matter how recklessly they are
manufactured. How long are we going to have to wait for that particular
proposal? And the list goes on and on.
So, Mr. President, we have to ask ourselves: What are the two major
protections for American consumers? They are the tort system and
regulatory protection. Those are the twin pillars under which the
American people are protected. They are the twin pillars that assure us
of the safest food, the safest water and the safest consumer products
available. They are the twin pillars for the protection of the American
worker in the workplace and against environmental hazards.
But both pillars are under assault. That is the context in which this
bill comes before the Senate.
The other context in which we operate is a Republican Congress that
has told us over and over again that Washington does not know best. But
in the tort area, which has been recognized for over 200 years as being
a State prerogative, its a different ballgame. I suppose our good
friends who are proposing this bill say, ``All right, Washington knows
best on this one.''
Well under this bill, it appears that Massachusetts does not know
best. Because even though my State legislature has decided that
Massachusetts consumers should have the benefit of no statute of
repose, this bill is going to impose a Federal 15-year period of repose
on them. So there is going to be fewer protections for the people of
Massachusetts because Washington knows best. Any State that has
provided additional kinds of protections for their consumers, they are
out of business.
We have been listening to a lot of speeches in the last year and a
half about how Washington does not always know best, there is local
knowledge, States can fulfill their responsibilities to the people. I
hope we will hear a diminution of the number of those speeches, because
what in this particular proposal it turns out that the special
interests, the special business interests, know what is best for the
American consumer. That is hogwash, Mr. President, absolute hogwash.
The American consumer wants to know who is going to be on their side.
They want a safe workplace, safe food, inspections to ensure that we
are going to have clean air, clean water, and a safe transportation
system.
All those are under assault in this Congress, and now in this product
liability bill we are going to immunize the major companies that may
even willingly or knowingly commit grievous negligence. In 15 years
after they put a ticking time bomb on the market they are going to be
immunized under this statute of repose. So, Mr. President, we should
understand that this really is not about the research costs. This is
not about health and safety costs to the consumer.
What about those 2,700 women who died from perforated uteruses from
the Dalkon shield before we passed the medical device legislation? We
had those hearings. It was not long ago. You talk to individual after
individual who appeared at those hearings and they say, ``Why didn't
someone do something to protect us? Why didn't someone speak out?''
This is the responsibility of Government. Individual citizens have
limited resources. They do not have the great financial resources to
protect their interests alone.
So, Mr. President, I agree with those who say to the consumer--
beware, beware. This legislation has a head of steam. It is bad enough.
But, my friends, this is just the camel's nose under the tent with
regard to the attack on consumer protections in this country.
For that reason, and for all of the reasons that have been outlined
in considerable detail in my statement which I will include in the
Record, I hope this bill will be rejected in the Senate. And I admire
the President of the United States for standing up against the special
big business interests. He understands the anticonsumer context in
which this bill may come before him. He understands what I am saying
about the camel's nose under the tent. He understands that the next
bill he sees may include medical malpractice liability limits.
According to the Harvard public health study, tens of thousands of
people died in hospitals in this country last year from negligence in
the medical system. We will have an opportunity to debate that issue in
the coming months.
So, Mr. President, this is a matter of fundamental protection of
American consumers. These extreme regulatory reform and tort reform
bills are poised to deprive the American people of the safest food in
the world, the safest air and water in the world and the safest
products on the market. We must not sacrifice the interests of the
American consumer.
If we accept this bill, Mr. President--and if we did not have a
President with the guts to stand up and veto it--we would be retreating
on our commitment to the American consumer to protect them from death
and serious bodily injury. I hope this bill is rejected, and I ask that
the text of my prepared statement, be printed in the Record, along with
an editorial from today's New York Times.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy on H.R. 956 The Product
Liability Conference Report
I strongly oppose the conference report on the product
liability bill, and I urge my colleagues to reject it,
because it constitutes an unacceptable threat to the health
and safety of American consumers.
This is not ``common sense legal reform.'' It is special
interest legislation of the worst kind. Our Republican
friends pretend that it is designed to end current abuses of
the legal system. In reality, this bill panders to the worst
instincts of big business. President Clinton has promised to
veto this bill, and it eminently deserves the veto it will
get.
This bill has three grave flaws. It arbitrarily caps
punitive damages against the most reckless manufacturers of
deadly products. It nullifies the sound common law principle
of joint and several liability. And it preempts State law in
ways that are both unwise and unfair.
Even worse, this bill does not come before the Senate in
isolation. It is part of a shameful pattern. It comes before
the Senate at a time when the Republican Congress is waging
an all-out assault on the health and safety of the American
public:
So-called regulatory reform bills would drastically weaken
the existing rules that protect public health and safety.
Republican appropriations bills would drastically slash
enforcement funds for agencies that carry out the current
health and safety laws.
And now, the entire tort system, which provides basic legal
protections for the public against defective products, is
under Republican attack in this bill.
This is not a liability reform bill at all--it is an avoid-
liability bill. It is part of a Republican triple play
against the health and safety of the American people by
irresponsible business interests.
The strategy is all too clear--undermine the Government's
ability to protect health and safety by slashing agency rules
and budgets, then slam the courthouse door in the face of all
those harmed by the lack of consumer protections.
Wise regulation, effective enforcement, and access to the
courts are three basic pillars of consumer protection.
Regulation is intended to prevent the manufacture of
defective products in the first place. Enforcement keeps
business honest. Tort law guarantees adequate remedies for
victims of dangerous and unsafe products when regulation and
enforcement fail.
The same business interests who support this bill are also
urging Congress to weaken the regulatory protections and
defund enforcement.
It is ironic that the many Republican supporters of this
bill who preach respect for the States refuse to practice
what they preach. This legislation is intentionally designed
to ride roughshod over State law.
For the past year and a half, we have heard a great deal
from the Republican majority about States' rights. On issues
such as welfare, education and crime, the Republican majority
says it wants to return power to the States.
But when it comes to making sure that big business is
protected from lawsuits brought by injured consumers,
suddenly ``Washington knows best.''
Tort law is traditionally a State responsibility. In fact,
in recent years, many State legislatures have enacted genuine
reforms to address the problems of frivolous lawsuits and
excessive damage awards. Federal intervention is completely
unnecessary--and in this case, counter-productive.
This bill is also very different from the securities
litigation reform bill enacted earlier this year, which I
supported. The integrity of the stock market is clearly a
Federal concern, and Congress has legislated in that area for
over 60 years. The field of product liability law, in
contrast, has been the province of State legislatures for
over 200 years. There is no compelling reason for
substituting the judgment of Congress for the judgment of
elected State officials and the State courts where the vast
majority of these cases are resolved.
[[Page S2556]]
Our specific objections to this bill are numerous and
serious. It denies adequate compensation to victims of
defective products, and undermines necessary incentives for
manufacturers to produce safe products.
The cap on punitive damages will limit the ability of the
courts to punish the most flagrant conduct by reckless
manufacturers. Punitive damages serve a valid purpose by
deterring wrongful conduct that injures innocent victims.
Such damages are especially justified as a deterrent against
manufacturers who engage in intentional wrongful conduct, or
who are recklessly indifferent to the safety of others. They
should not be let off with a slap on the wrist. Such extreme
misconduct must be fully punished in a manner that creates a
clear deterrent to future wrongdoing.
The so-called ``waiver'' in the conference report is
supposed to permit courts to exceed the cap in flagrant
cases. But there is serious doubt about the constitutionality
of that provision under the seventh amendment. If it is
struck down, all that is left will be a rigid Federal cap on
damages.
The nullification of the common law principle of ``joint
and several liability'' is also unacceptable. It will
severely hamper the ability of innocent victims to obtain
compensation for their injuries. For at least 100 years,
courts and State legislatures have recognized the
unfairness of forcing an innocent party to bear the cost
of other people's negligence, if one or more of the
wrongdoers are available to pay compensation. That is a
sensible rule, and Congress should not undermine it.
Proponents of Federal product liability reform say they
want national standards for goods that are sold across State
lines. But the conference report before us achieves no such
uniformity. It preempts State laws in an uneven and unfair
manner.
Punitive damage laws favorable to plaintiffs will be
replaced by the new Federal standard. But laws prohibiting
punitive damages altogether will stand. Similarly, the bill
creates a 15-year Federal statute of repose, but permits
State statutes of shorter length to remain in effect.
The end result is not uniformity, but unfairness. This bill
is rigged to benefit negligent manufacturers and their
insurance companies, while ignoring injured plaintiffs and
the millions of American consumers who will no longer be
protected adequately from dangerous and defective products.
All of these flaws were present in the Senate bill that
many of us opposed. But the anticonsumer bias of this
legislation became even worse after the conference with the
House of Representatives.
For example, the Senate bill contained a 20-year statute of
repose, but the conferees have adopted a 15-year period. As a
result, after 15 years, manufacturers of even the most
defectively designed or recklessly produced products are
immunized from liability and will get off scot-free, no
matter how much injury their products may cause.
In addition, types of products that qualify for this
blatant protection are expanded dramatically. In the Senate
bill, only workplace machinery was covered. But now, all
durable goods, including common household products, are given
this unjustified protection.
Massachusetts currently has no statute of repose, so this
bill represents a major loss of protection for consumers in
my State.
When the Senate debated this bill last year, I spoke at
length in opposition to medical malpractice amendments. I am
pleased that the conference report does not include such
amendments. Nor does it include the so-called ``FDA defense''
in the House bill, which would prevent punitive damages in
cases involving drugs or medical devices approved by the FDA.
But the bill does apply to manufacturers of drugs and
medical devices, just as it applies to other products. The
cumulative effect of the many anticonsumer provisions in the
bill is to protect these manufacturers at the expense of the
health and safety of the people who rely on these products.
This bill is nonsense, not common sense. It pretends to
support the legitimate goals of reducing frivolous litigation
and improving the civil justice system. In reality, it is
special interest legislation that denies fair compensation to
victims of negligence and limits the ability of the tort
system to deal effectively with gross misconduct by business.
If this bill came off the factory assembly line, it would
be labeled ``unsafe for human use.'' And if the principle of
quality control applies in the United States Senate, this
bill would be soundly rejected. It is a sweetheart deal for
business and insurance interests, and a raw deal for the
public interest.
____
[From the New York Times, Mar. 21, 1996]
The Anti-Consumer Act of 1996
The Senate is preparing to vote today on a pernicious piece
of anti-consumer legislation masquerading as product
liability ``reform.'' The measure is little more than a
bipartisan gift to manufacturers and trade associations that
supplemented their lobbying and generous campaign
contributions with misleading propaganda exaggerating the
problem of high verdicts. The bill would arbitrarily cap the
punitive damages that juries may award--dangerously weakening
the ability of the civil justice system to punish, and
thereby deter, the reckless manufacture or sale of unsafe
products.
If a majority of senators will not heed legitimate concerns
about the measure's rollback of consumer protection,
President Clinton must be prepared to make good on his veto
threat.
The bill is a convenient exception to Capitol Hill's
prevailing philosophy of devolving power to the states. It
would compel all states, even in their own courts, to limit
punitive damages. The phony rationale given is the need to
create a single national commercial standard. But that
standard would be applied only when it would benefit the
manufacturers. The bill would override the product liability
laws of states that allow unlimited punitive damages, for
example, but it would impose no such damages on states that
do not now have them.
Under the measure, plaintiffs who sue successfully for farm
from faulty products could be compensated, as they should be,
for medical expenses, lost wages, damaged property and other
actual damages. But punitive damages, which are awarded by
juries in cases of egregious misconduct, would be limited in
most cases to $250,000 or two times actual damages, whichever
is greater. That is hardly enough money to serve as a
deterrent to major corporations.
Senator John D. Rockefeller 4th of West Virginia, a
Democratic architect of this attack on civil justice, has
suggested that President Clinton is trying to scuttle the
bill to reward major campaign contributors, like trial
lawyers. True, the American Association of Trial Lawyers has
been one of Mr. Clinton's strongest political and financial
backers. But by now it is laughable for Mr. Rockefeller to
make purity an issue, given the far greater sums tossed into
this fight by the powerful business interests amassed on the
other side.
``For irresponsible companies willing to put profits above
all else, the bill's capping of punitive damages increases
the incentive to engage in the egregious misconduct of
knowingly manufacturing and selling of defective products,''
Mr. Clinton said last week. On the merits, the President was
right.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California.
Mrs. BOXER. Thank you very much, Mr. President.
I want to thank the Senator from Massachusetts for explaining, in his
usual way, why this bill deserves to be defeated. Explaining that it
is, in fact, part of a pattern of this Congress which continually
brings up legislation that does not make life better for people, but in
fact, puts them at risk. In fact, puts them at risk, whether it is
cutting, as the Senator said, enforcement funds from the Environmental
Protection Agency, or weakening our laws that have worked well to bring
us the safest products in the world.
Mr. President, I come to this debate by asking a very straightforward
question. I am not an attorney, and I tend to look at things in a
different way. This is the question I ask: If a young woman, say age
21, is working in a factory and a faulty machine blows up in her face
and she is disfigured beyond belief for the rest of her life, should
the company who made that faulty product be penalized in such a way
that they, and for that matter no other company, will ever make such a
faulty product again? I say yes. I say yes.
The company that made that faulty product, and as you will see in
many cases, knew they were doing it, should face damages that act as a
deterrent for the future. This bill does just the opposite. It will let
a company that made such a product, and other companies that might make
such a product, off the hook. If we pass this bill, such a company,
which might well have profits in the billions of dollars, will be given
the equivalent of a slap on the wrist. Because those punitive damages
meant to punish them--that is what punitive damages mean, punishment--
will be so low they will not be large enough for them to care. Those
are the brutal and cold facts. I wish they were not true, but they are
true.
I have heard many businesses use words like this: ``Oh, well, it is
just a cost of doing business.'' ``Just a cost of doing business.'' In
other words, they will factor in lawsuits that go against them into
their bottom line. I think the Senator from Washington has proved the
point. They factor it into their bottom line. He shows it on his chart.
How cold can you get? If we cap punitive damages, as is put forth in
this bill, we are taking the safest system in the world for consumers,
changing it, and putting people at risk.
There are other problems in this bill that deal with the statute of
repose. Some machinery has a lifetime of 30, or 40 years. In 15 years,
those companies are completely off the hook under this bill.
I also join with the Senator from Massachusetts in thanking our
President. He is taking the heat on this one. He is standing up for the
consumers.
[[Page S2557]]
He is standing up for future victims. He is standing up so that we
will not have so many victims of faulty products.
I want to give you some examples of actual cases. We are going to
take the case of the Pinto automobile, and a young man named Richard
Grimshaw. The exploding Pinto tank is a very clear example of what I am
talking about. The gas tank exploded and burned in rear-end collisions.
Many of us remember this. The company knew this was a problem. It all
came out in court. But they sold the car anyway after they did a cost-
benefit analysis and found out it would save them $21 million to delay
the corrections for 2 years.
What happened when that fatal decision was made? A 13-year-old boy
from my State, Richard Grimshaw, was badly burned in a rear-end
accident while driving from Anaheim to Barstow. In the words of the
California State court judge who presided over Richard's lawsuit, he
suffered ``ghastly'' burns over 60 percent of his body, had whole
fingers burned off, and required 60 surgeries over a 10-year period.
That was 25 years ago. That tragic accident is still with Richard.
For the rest of his life, it will be with Richard. Is that the kind of
world we want to encourage, where a company figures it is more cost
effective to delay fixing a dangerous product than to risk a lawsuit? I
hope not. Yet, if this bill passes, my friends, that is what is going
to happen in the boardrooms across America.
Now, not all people in business fall into that category, but
unfortunately we have got to look at history, my friends, and learn
from it. The memos clearly showed in the Pinto case that a calculated
decision was made to delay fixing that car.
Let me read from the pen of the California State judge who upheld
that award. In part, ``Punitive damages remain the most effective
remedy for consumer protection against defectively designed mass
produced articles.'' ``* * *. Punitive damages thus remain the most
effective remedy.'' What does this bill do? It guts that. The court
concluded, ``Ford could have corrected the hazardous design defects at
minimal cost but decided to defer defection of the shortcomings by
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis, balancing human lives and limbs
against corporate profits.''
Mr. President, are we going to ignore this judge's warning and turn
back the clock to a time when callous companies ruined the lives of
children, like that boy in Barstow, because of their bottom line? God,
I hope we do not do that. If we do, in this particular Congress, I hope
this President sticks with it and vetoes this bill.
Did you ever hear about the baby crib story? Another example of a
situation that happened in California in the 1970's. A baby crib
company produced a dangerous crib where side slats would strangle a
baby trying to climb out. Six babies were strangled and the company
stopped selling the crib, but it refused to warn the existing owners
that there was a problem. They refused to do that. So the parents of
Gail Crusan, she was 13 months old, did not know it was a dangerous
crib. The company even refused a request by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission to issue a national press release. It took an award of
$475,000 in punitive damages against the company to finally get them to
notify parents who had bought that crib. Punitive damages did what the
Government could not do. It caused the manufacturer to warn parents
that their children were in cribs that could kill them.
What are we going to do? We are going to make it possible for future
companies to put our children at risk. I do not want to go back to
those days, Mr. President. The proponents of this bill want us to
substitute the long arm of the U.S. Senate and the Congress for the
local jury of peers who sit in a courtroom.
Again, I back up what my colleague from Massachusetts says. State
control, local control, give them the welfare, give them the Medicaid,
cancel national nursing home standards, let the local people decide--
that is what we hear out of the Republicans in this Congress, day in
and day out. But when it comes to this, protecting consumers, we are
going to pass a weaker law and force it on the States? Not on my watch.
Not if I can help it. And not on this President's watch. Not if he can
help it.
I cannot believe the selective logic that we hear around here. When
it suits this Republican Congress, they are all for shipping things
back to the States. But when it is in their interest, keep the control
in Washington. Boy, I tell you, there is not much shame about that. It
simply does not add up.
Now, we hear talk about special interests. Face it, there are special
interests here. There are the lawyers on the one side and there are the
corporations on the other. So I want to look at who does not have an ax
to grind. Who are they? Let me tell you some of the people who oppose
this bill. They have no ax to grind. They are not on one special
interest or the other. The Brain Injury Association, the Center for
Auto Safety, Children Afflicted by Toxic Substances, Citizen Action,
Coalition for Consumer Rights, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Consumer
Federation of America, Consumers Union, the Gray Panthers, National
Consumers League, National Hispanic Council on Aging, Public Citizen,
Remove Intoxicated Drivers, U.S. Public Interest Research Group,
Violence Policy Center, Nuclear Information and Resource Services,
Clean Water Action, the Sierra Club, Dalkon Shield Information Network,
DES Action USA, the Feminist Majority, the National Organization of
Women, the National Women's Health Network, the National Women's Law
Center, and Women Employed.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
a list of all of these groups.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Thirty-Seven Citizen Groups Opposing the Product Liability Conference
Report
AFL-CIO.
Brain Injury Association.
Center for Auto Safety.
Children Afflicted by Toxic Substances.
Citizen Action.
Coalition for Consumer Rights.
Coalition to Stop Gun Violence.
Consumer Federation of America.
Consumers Union.
The Empower Program.
Gray Panthers.
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers.
Int'l Union, United Automobile Aerospace & Agricultural
Implement Workers of America.
Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures.
National Consumers League.
National Farmers Union.
National Hispanic Council On Aging.
Public Citizen.
Remove Intoxicated Drivers.
Safe Tables Our Priorities.
United Food and Commercial Workers.
U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
United Steelworkers of America.
Violence Policy Center.
Nuclear Groups:
Nuclear Information & Resource Service.
Public Citizen's Critical Mass.
Safe Energy Communication Council.
U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
Environmental Groups:
Clean Water Action.
Sierra Club.
Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund.
U.S. Public Interest Research Group.
Women's Groups:
Dalkon Shield Information Network.
DES Action USA.
Feminist Majority.
National Organization for Women.
National Women's Health Network.
National Women's Law Center.
Women Employed.
Mrs. BOXER. Mr. President, we should not look to the lawyers and we
should not look to the companies. We should look to the people who
stand up and speak for consumers and speak for victims.
Now, I think this bill is particularly tough on women. I do not know
what has happened to this place, but do we forget things that just
happened? Do we forget about the silicone gel breast implants which
were introduced in the market in 1962 with no long-term testing before
being placed inside women? Implant patients and some doctors were told
by manufacturers that the implants were safe and would last a lifetime.
However, the implants were found to leak or rupture, releasing silicone
into the body, now known to migrate to the brain, liver, spinal fluid,
and kidneys. Now many women with ruptured implants are sick with a
variety of autoimmune diseases.
It was because of a lawsuit that included a punitive damage award of
$6.5 million that the full extent of the hazards associated with
silicone gel breast implants were brought to the public's attention.
The availability of silicone
[[Page S2558]]
gel breast implants were restricted only after Dow-Corning was held
liable for punitive damages.
Do we not think more about women's health? Have we forgotten that?
Have we forgotten the Copper-Seven IUD? The manufacturer knew for more
than 10 years that their product could cause loss of fertility, serious
infection, and the need to remove reproductive organs. Instead of doing
anything about it, the manufacturer continued to earn profits and put
millions of women at risk. A jury awarded one $7 million punitive
damage award for what it determined to be the manufacturer's
intentional misrepresentation of its birth control devices. Under this
bill, that manufacturer would have had to pay $250,000, or double the
plaintiff's compensatory damages, whichever is higher. We know in most
cases women do not get as much in compensatory damages as men because
women often earn less money. We know that. This bill is antiwomen. We
should call it what it is.
How about the Dalkon shield? You heard the Senator from Massachusetts
talk about that. It took eight punitive damage awards before A.H.
Robins discontinued the Dalkon shield. A $7.5 million punitive damage
award was awarded to a 27-year-old woman who had to have her uterus
removed, rendering her sterile and in need of dangerous synthetic
hormone treatments. That was extraordinary. But it took more than one
punitive damage award. They made so much profit they kept on producing
it. They concealed studies of the dangerous effects and even misled the
doctors into prescribing the IUD.
If it takes multiple punitive damage awards to force a major
corporation like A.H. Robins to stop selling dangerous products, how
could dangerous products be stopped by this legislation which caps
punitive damage awards to relatively low amounts? The Dalkon shield is
yet another example of how the current system finally took a dangerous
contraceptive off the market.
I cannot believe there are those in this body who feel that this
legislation can make life better for the people of this country, just
on the few examples that I have brought here today. To the contrary, it
will put our people at great risk.
The Senator from Washington shows you with his chart that businesses
write it into the bottom line.
The proponents of this legislation argue that the current system
prevents women from having more choices when it comes to
contraceptives. Well, I have a daughter, and a lot of you have
daughters. Do you want to see dangerous contraceptives come on the
market? Let me tell you unequivocally--and I will debate this point toe
to toe with anyone in this Chamber--if the current system is preventing
other Copper-7 IUD's or Dalkon shields, or other dangerous
contraceptives from coming on the market, I say that is good. Because I
do not want my daughter sterile, and I do not want my daughter sick,
and I want her to have more children if she chooses to do that, and to
live a healthy life. We want contraceptives, but we want them to be
safe.
In conclusion, Mr. President, let there be no mistake as to what this
conference report is all about. This is not proconsumer legislation.
This legislation is anticonsumer. That is why every major consumer
group in this country opposes it strongly.
The conference report is about protecting wrongdoers. Now, if some of
my colleagues, for whom I have great respect, see it another way, that
is their right. But I am here to call it the way I see it. It is
designed to relieve corporate America of its proper legal duty to make
safe products, represent them accurately, and treat consumers fairly.
I have seen no justification put forth thus far in this debate by the
proponents of this conference report that leads me to believe that it
will help our people. I believe it will, in fact, trample on the rights
of American consumers. We, in this Senate, are the last line of defense
of the rights of the American consumers and for working families. I
tell you, we need to protect them from this legislation.
Again, I thank the President for getting out there and saying he is
standing on the side of the consumers. To those who say, ``He is doing
it for lawyers,'' we can argue that from night until day, lawyers on
one side, big business on the other. For some, that is a tough choice.
That is not what the choice is about. The choice is about the consumer.
The choice is about little babies in cribs. The choice is about women's
reproductive health, safety in the workplace, at home, and when we are
at leisure. That is what it is about. I say that this U.S. Senate
should stand with the consumers. If you do that, you are fulfilling
your responsibilities.
I thank the Chair, and I thank Senator Hollings.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator,
first, from Massachusetts, for his presentation this morning, in a most
meaningful way and, of course, the Senator from California. She really
keynoted the issue as it should be in a very cogent and persuasive
fashion. When we say consumers, that is the people versus those making
a profit on defective products, with shoddy manufacturing.
America is the safest place in the world to live. That is part and
parcel, as mostly I would say, I guess, because of our State
legislatures. The State legislatures have acted on the need of product
liability provisions. They have acted and they have maintained their
laws. But it now becomes an assault in the name of a cost of a hotel
room, or a ski lift, and such nonsense as that, trying to really move
the attention, I guess, of the Senators, thinking they, frankly, do not
have much sense and will go along with that kind of nonsense. Thinking
that Senators will not understand what the Senator from California is
trying to emphasize--these are real life injuries, and the more we get
into them in a very meaningful way, as we do in trial law practice, the
less danger and injury has been caused. So I could not express my
gratitude enough to the Senator from California. I wish we could go
ahead and vote right now, but I will retain the balance of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I yield such time as the Senator from West
Virginia may desire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank my colleague. Mr. President, I am very happy
that we are here this morning with this remaining part of the debate.
Already, a variety of charges have been made, which have no basis in
fact, as they relate to the product liability reform. But I think
rather than to try to go into that, it would be better to focus on what
this law is trying to do and why it is a good conference report.
In a matter of a couple of hours, we are going to pass this
conference report. It will pass. The House and the Senate, for the
first time, I believe, in recent history will have passed product
liability tort reform. So it is an interesting and, I think, a rather
noteworthy point of history.
We have had really a couple of decades of hearings, markups, and
arguments. I remember one time a number of years ago we actually had 60
votes on cloture, and the majority leader at that time--it was still
legal to do so--stopped the vote, actually stopped the vote. The
Presiding Officer was not here in this body yet. For 45 minutes we
waited, and all of a sudden, two ``yes'' votes became two ``no'' votes.
I retain in a desk drawer in my office the sheet which is held at the
Democratic desk, which shows how the numbers go up, and they went up to
57, 58, 59, and got to 60, and then it went from 60 to 59 to 58. So
there is a lot of history on this. Of course, there is a lot of
emotion. A lot of that emotion is justified. Some of it is not. But
history, there is.
I expect the House to approve this report in short order and send it
on to the President, who has a chance, I think, to do something
remarkable and significant for this country, if he should choose to
sign what will then be the legislation.
I regret that yesterday's debate demonstrated--and already this
morning some, too--there are some very fundamental misunderstandings. I
think some of the misunderstandings are very deliberate. They are
deliberately put forward to obscure and obfuscate. I think the reason
for that is understandable. Product liability tort reform law is not
everybody's first choice of the day when they get up in the morning.
They do not say, ``How can I get deeper into product liability tort
[[Page S2559]]
reform law?'' Those of us who are not even lawyers understand best what
I am talking about.
Therefore, it becomes easy to mislead. I suppose it is easy for the
proponents, as well as for the opponents of this legislation, to
mislead. But I think that the proponents have really tried not to
mislead, to stick to what is in the legislation. The opponents have
been vigorous in their work, which is part of the legislative process.
I want to emphasize that this conference report is only, Mr.
President, about something called product liability reform. That is all
it is. It does not pretend to be more. It does not pretend to solve the
crisis in Bosnia or hunger in Rwanda, nor anything else. It is just
about product liability reform.
It establishes some uniformity for consumers and businesses in our
product liability system. That is what we attempted to do. That is it.
Product liability reform. This is not broad civil justice reform. This
is not an overreaching House contract item. This is not a bill that
protects drug traffickers, or gun users, or those who sell drugs or
guns. This is not an extreme bill. This is a limited bill.
The Senator from the State of Washington, who has been credible
throughout this process, has been extraordinary, I think, in helping to
discipline and to make sure that we sculpted this bill and then kept
this bill basically in the form --virtually, with the main exception of
the statute of repose--as the Senate passed it last May, which is
almost a year ago.
One of the reasons for this long, long period of time is that it took
a long time for the House to accept that we really meant it, and that
when we said we were going to stick with the Senate bill, we really
meant it, and that in fact we had to, in any event because it was a
matter of mathematics. Yesterday we did not get 58 votes, we got 60
votes. Finally that was understood.
So what this bill does is establish a fair and a balanced commonsense
rule which benefits both consumers and business persons, and it will
create jobs. The Senator from Washington has discussed the aviation
liability reform. I think it will improve product safety because it
will allow manufacturers to make improvements.
Now, manufacturers often decline to make improvements to their
product because they are afraid that if they make an improvement, it
will infer somehow that their previous iteration of the same product
was deficient or unsafe. So rather than take that chance they do not
make the improvement. That does not help consumers.
I think it will encourage innovation. I know it is going to encourage
innovation. And I think it will stimulate economic growth just as the
aviation bill did.
I have to say once again that there are all kinds of ways of
protecting the consumer. We can do it through being sure that there are
punitive damages available. That is the reason for the additional
amount that was added, and that is also the reason that at the
suggestion of the Department of Justice we clarify, the additional
amount to make it a stronger case should there be a constitutional
challenge against it--because we are determined that there will be no
cap on punitive damages except whatever the jury decides.
I am forced just by definition of the world that we live in to look
at, once again, at our competition. You know that when people lose jobs
in our country or do not gain jobs that they might gain, that is one of
the worst things you can do to them. It is injuring them in a very
severe way. It is depriving them of family and economic justice. In the
case where it puts people on Medicaid, that is very obviously the
consequence of that. Not having a job is a way to hurt somebody deep
and hard.
In the European Economic Community, which has, I think, 350 million
consumers--Europe is one of our huge competitors--there are 13
countries in that community. Those countries presumably have provinces,
or whatever they call them. It does not make any difference. They
overrun all of that, and they have one uniform product liability law
for all of those countries because they want to be able to minimize
transactional costs, maximize research and development, maximize jobs,
and maximize their competition against the United States of America,
which is their principal competitor. So they have banded together to do
this because they know that, if they do that, they will have a leg up
on us in terms of the creation of jobs.
Japan, which I think very few would argue is not a competitor to the
United States economically, has just this year done the same thing. So
they have a single uniform liability law for their entire nation. They
do not sue a whole lot anyway. I think there are 13,000 lawyers in
Japan, and there are 600,000 or 700,000 in the United States.
Nevertheless, they are ready.
So they understand that the system that America has has very, very
high transaction costs, and they understand that the high transaction
costs exceed the compensation that is ultimately paid to the victims of
defective products. That is great for lawyers--both for trial lawyers
and defense lawyers. They are both equally guilty. But they get the
money, not the victim. They get the majority of it. It used to be that
in the Wild West people carried six-shooters, and they would just
shoot. We have a different, more modern way of doing it now, and we
destroy ourselves in other kinds of ways.
So these transaction costs, of course, are then real costs, and they
have to be passed on to the consumers through higher priced products.
People say when you pay more for a product that, ``Well, that is the
kind of argument people make.'' It is true. We pay more. The Senator
from Washington is prepared to give all kinds of statistics about that.
He did yesterday. We pay more. Consumers pay more so that the trial
lawyers and the defense lawyers can make more. In a sense, I am not
blaming them because that is the system of law that they live under, as
do we. That is why we are trying to change the law--so as to bring some
more common sense into this process.
The system's unpredictability and inefficiency are big items.
Unpredictability is a bad thing. It is a bad thing. It is a lack of
uniformity, a lack of predictability. It is harmful. It stifles
innovation. It stifles research and development.
What is the very first thing that happens in this country? I have
heard many times the distinguished Senator from South Carolina say
this. When a company gets in trouble, or a company is up against a
lawsuit, or a company is whatever for whatever reason in trouble, what
is the first thing they do? They cut out research and development. That
is the first thing they cut, which is, in fact in many instances, one
of the last things they should cut.
It is just like a hospital. When a hospital gets in trouble
financially, what is the first thing they do? They close the emergency
room because it is the most expensive, which is often the last thing
they should do in terms of the community they serve. But they act as
they believe they have to act, and we have to understand that.
So, stifling innovation and keeping beneficial products off the
market has handicapped American firms as they try to compete in a
global marketplace. The current system is simply unfair, therefore,
again to consumers and to businesses alike, and that is why we are
projecting this conference report forward.
Of course, many of the States have fully recognized the inequities of
the current system, as has been pointed out by a number on the other
side of this argument. The States are very aggressive on this, and they
have moved ahead to enact product liability reform. Thirty States have
made major changes in joint and several, for example, and in most
cases--virtually all cases--it is limiting joint and several. But by
doing so, while solving some issues, they have inadvertently created
other kinds of problems.
Only through Federal product liability reform can we, in this
Senator's judgment, resolve the problems caused by the current State-
by-State product liability system. State legislatures can be very
helpful in this area, but it is virtually impossible for them to be
uniform because they are all different.
We have 134 legislators in our State of West Virginia in the senate
and house. They are not going to do the same thing that Ohio does, or
that Kentucky does, or that Virginia or Maryland do. They are just not
going to. So you have, in fact, 51 different laws relating to product
liability in our country.
[[Page S2560]]
As I said yesterday, years and years ago I suppose that the majority
of products made in the States were sold in those States. That is no
longer true. Seventy percent of products made in the State of Ohio, and
in the State of the Presiding Officer, if it is at the national
average, are sold outside of Ohio. The same is true with the State of
West Virginia, the State of Washington, and the State of South
Carolina. So we are an interstate as well as an international economy.
Therefore, we need uniformity at certain points to shape and adapt to
that.
For this reason, State reform legislation--because of the 70 percent
being shipped outside of the State of manufactured goods, less than 30
percent effectiveness is the standard for State law. I mean, by
definition, they have to be less than 30 percent effective. On the
other hand, all of the State citizens who sue in the State are governed
by that State's product liability statute, and thus they fall victim to
an antiquated system, and the people here want to protect them.
That is why the National Governors' Association recognized both the
need for product liability reform and the necessity of Federal action
to effectuate that reform. They did not say, well, States, you have to
do a better job and do things more alike. They said, no, there have to
be places where the Federal Government sets uniform standards.
The Senator from South Carolina was talking yesterday about how the
States always want to have more power; they want to have the power
shifted to them. That is the direction in which our country is going.
That is not the direction of the National Governors' Association on
product liability and tort reform. They want more Federal action. That
is why the American Legislative Exchange Council, not very well-known,
but it is a bipartisan group of over 2,500 State legislators--that is a
lot of them--representing all 50 States, three times has called upon
Congress to enact product liability law which is Federal. That is why
President Clinton has said that he supports the enactment of limited
but meaningful product liability reform at the Federal level. He said
that in a number of statements--in a letter to us, in a statement of
policy to us--during the course of this debate. H.R. 956 contains that
limited but meaningful product liability reform which makes common
sense and which has measures which are good for ordinary consumers and
businesses.
Incidentally, Mr. President, I wish to make one point. People keep
referring--and even there was an article this morning in the Washington
Post--to big business versus trial lawyers. On the business side, it is
not big business which is really at stake here. It is small business.
That is the reason for the support of the National Federation of
Independent Businesses.
Mr. President, 98 percent of businesses in America are small. Those
are the people who get put out of business most quickly. Those are the
people who have the least cash reserve. Those are the people who live
at the margins. Those are also places, we have long established, from
where often the best ideas come. That is the overwhelming dynamic
center of the American economy.
So H.R. 956 contains, as I have said, what I believe is needed.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list describing the
major provisions of the conference report be printed in the Record at
the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, the conference report does, however,
provide the following: legal fairness for product sellers; a rule to
discourage illegal use of alcohol and drugs--we cannot stop it but to
discourage it, certainly not to reward it--a proconsumer statute of
limitations, an enormously proconsumer statute of limitations; a
statute of repose that will stimulate jobs and economic growth;
alternative dispute resolution as a way of settling some of these
matters. It is voluntary, which is not so thrilling to me. I wish it
were not. I wish it were mandatory, but it is voluntary. At least it is
there. That is the way they do things in Japan. That is why they settle
everything over there, which is not to say they do not have their
economic problems, but product liability is not one of their problems.
Punitive damages fairness is in this bill. Opponents of the bill say we
cap punitive damages. Untrue. Untrue. I will not vote for legislation
which caps punitive damages, as I would not vote for legislation that
caps what lawyers can make. Part of me would like to, but I do not
believe that because I believe the market should make that decision.
But punitive damages are not capped.
We added the additional amount provision, originally called the judge
additur provision, a suggestion which was endorsed by a number of high-
up folks at the White House and then the whole idea for making sure
that it was more constitutional came from the Department of Justice,
which I presume to be the executive branch of Government. So there are
no caps on punitive damages, and I will assert there could not be
because I was a part of this bill. I was not going to go along with a
bill that would allow such a thing.
There is several liability for noneconomic loss; workers compensation
subrogation; biomaterials access assurance.
These, Mr. President, are some of the highlights.
Now, in winding up here, I should like to take a moment to comment on
where we stand in the legislative process. I wish to be hopeful; I try
to be hopeful; I am hopeful; I will insist on being hopeful; I will be
everlastingly hopeful that the President will reconsider his decision
to veto this product liability conference report and that in fact he
will sign it. I firmly believe that the President can sign this bill,
even recognizing that he will not support each of its provisions. There
are some provisions that I think ought to be in this. There are some
provisions which I think ought to be changed, some. Nobody gets
everything they want. There are 535 people in the Congress.
Even though the President might not support each of its provisions,
when the product liability conference report is considered in its
totality, in balance with the need for this reform, I remain hopeful
that the President will still seize this opportunity to participate in
product liability reform which will benefit in fact the American people
and the American economy. From my point of view, I stand ready to work
with the President to achieve what I believe is our common goal, his
goal, my goal, our goal, of fairly balancing what needs to be fixed in
our broken product liability system, which he surely must recognize,
while preserving important rights for consumers. This is not business
versus consumers. We are trying to achieve a balance where each
business and consumer gets certain improvements, and providing business
with the predictability that they need to compete in today's economy.
In conclusion, because I do not know how much time is remaining--and
I am not interested--I wish to thank a few people. First of all, I
again wish to thank Senator Gorton, Senator Slade Gorton from the State
of Washington, G-o-r-t-o-n. That is his name. He has been absolutely
incredible over the years and continues to be in this process--
remarkable, calm, intellectual, unflappable, fair, flexible. It is just
a stunning privilege to be able to work with Slade Gorton and with his
staff, Jeanne Bumpus, Trent Erickson; Commerce Committee staff, Lance
Bultena. We spend a lot of time together. When you do these things, you
get real close.
I thank all of the Democratic supporters, not that that is a
convention full of people, but I thank each and every one of them and
all of their staff. And, obviously and particularly, I want to thank my
own staff: Jim Gottlieb, a superb lawyer--inventive, flexible, calm,
tough, a great negotiator and a marvelous human being; Ellen Doneski,
who is just indefatigable. She is just like some kind of a rolling
army--cannot be stopped. She has a tremendous sense of humor, is
relaxed, adamant, just puts her mind to this or other things. She is
actually part of my health care staff, but she is so smart and so
flexible she can get this mastered. She is not a lawyer, but do not
tell anybody that because everybody thinks she is.
Then I want to thank another person who is not here because her
fiance has been through, and is still going through, a terrible,
terrible crisis, and that is Tamera Stanton, who is kind of
[[Page S2561]]
here in spirit. When we were having this debate last year, she sat next
to me. She is my legislative director, an extraordinary, brilliant,
wonderful person who is now going through a very, very tough--but also
encouraging--experience in terms of the health of her fiance, as they
hope and plan to get married in June.
So, I am mindful of these people, grateful to these people, and I
thank my colleagues for their forbearance.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that numerous fact sheets, and
a list and letter from small business organizations, be printed in the
Record. I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Exhibit 1
major provisions of conference report
Legal Fairness For Product Sellers: Product sellers are
held liable only for their own negligence or failure to
comply with an express warranty. The product seller, however,
remains liable as if it were the manufacturer if the
manufacturer cannot be brought into court or is unable to pay
a judgement. This provision assures injured persons will
always have available an avenue for recovery, while relieving
retailers and wholesaler-distributors of substantial
unnecessary legal costs. The provision is ``consumer
neutral'' and any attempt to characterize it another way
lacks credibility.
Rule to Discourage Illegal Use of Alcohol and Drugs: The
defendant has an absolute defense in a product liability
action if the plaintiff was under the influence of
intoxicating alcohol or illegal drugs and as a result this
influence was more than 50 percent responsible for his or her
own injuries. The alcohol/drug defense in H.R. 956 is
consistent with law of the substantial majority of states
implements sound public policy. It tells persons that if they
are drunk or on drugs and that is the principal cause of an
accident, they will not be rewarded through the product
liability system. It also relieves law-abiding citizens from
having to subsidize others' irresponsible conduct through
higher consumer prices. This provision has not been
controversial or challenged by professional consumer groups
as unfair.
Pro-Consumer Statute of Limitation: H.R. 956 permits a
plaintiff to file a complaint within 2 years after he or she
discovers or should have discovered both the harm and its
cause. This is a liberal, pro-claimant provision, which will
be particularly helpful to persons who have been injured by
products that result in latent inquiries (e.g., drugs and
chemicals). Contrary to the suggestion by some opponents,
this provision will create a uniform, fair national standard
which will open courthouse doors to plaintiffs in many
states, such as Virginia.
Statue Of Repose Will Create Jobs and Stimulate Economic
Growth: A limited statistic of repose of 15 years is
established for durable goods used in the workplace, unless
the defendant made an express warranty in writing as to the
safety of the specified product involved, and the warranty
was longer than the period of repose (15 years). Then, the
statue of repose does not apply until that warranty period is
complete. The statute of repose provision will not apply in
cases involving a ``toxic harm.''
Strong support exists for this reform, particularly as a
result of the enactment of the General Aircraft
Revitalization Act of 1994, signed by President Clinton in
August 1994, which created a federal eighteen year statute of
repose of general aviation aircraft. This law has resulted in
production of safer aircraft and the creation of thousands of
new jobs and has not been perceived as unfair to consumers. A
growing number of states have enacted legislation in this
area as well. The statute of repose in H.R. 956 is both
longer and more limited in scope than any existing law.
As one might expect, there are very few cases involving
older workplace durable goods and they are generally won by
defendants. Nevertheless, cases involving very old products
bring about substantial legal costs and put American machine
tool builders and other durable goods manufacturers at a
disadvantage with foreign competitors. Foreign competitors
rarely have machines in this country that are thirty or more
years old, so they pay less liability insurance than their
American competitors.
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Either party may offer to
participate in a voluntary, non-binding state-approved
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedure. This pro-
consumer provision is intended to promote the use of ADR
procedures, which can provide a quicker and cheaper mechanism
of handling legal claims. This provision should help such
individuals receive compensation for their claims more
quickly and bypass the need to retain costly legal
representation.
Punitive Damages Fairness: Punitive damages are quasi-
criminal punishment for wrongdoing; they are a windfall to
the claimant and have nothing to do with compensation for
injury. H.R. 956 permits punitive damages to be awarded if a
plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
harm was caused by the defendant's ``conscious, flagrant
indifference to the rights or safety of others.'' The
standard is consistent with law in most states.
Punitive damages may be awarded against a larger business
up to the greater of $250,000 or two times the claimant's
total economic and noneconomic damages; against an individual
or small business, punitive damages can be awarded up to the
lesser of $250,000 or two times the claimant's total economic
and noneconomic damages. The provision is ``gender neutral''
and places no limitation on compensatory damages (economic
damages plus ``noneconomic damages'' such as pain and
suffering). A special rule allows a judge to augment the
punitive damages award against a big business when the
``proportionate'' award is ``insufficient to punish the
egregious conduct of the defendant.'' A controversial
provision that would allow the defendant the right to a new
trial if the court used this special power has been removed
from the legislation and does not appear in the conference
report--as Senator Gorton and I vowed it would not.
Approximately one-quarter of the States have set forth
guidelines on punitive damages awards, including Illinois,
Indiana, North Carolina, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Texas in
1995. Because H.R. 956 is not preemptive, the outcome of many
punitive damages cases involving larger businesses would not
be affected. In some cases against small businesses, however,
the outcome may help the business survive, because the bill
limits the amount of punitive damages recoverable against a
small business to $250,000. This is a particular benefit to
the small business community, since an award exceeding
$250,000 could virtually wipe out most small businesses.
Several Liability For Noneconomic Loss: The rule of joint
liability, commonly called joint and several liability,
provides that when two or more persons engage in conduct that
might subject them to individual liability and their conduct
produces a single, indivisible injury, each defendant will be
liable for the total amount of damages. This system is unfair
and blunts incentives for safety, because it allows
negligent actors to under-insure and puts full
responsibility on those who may have been only marginally
at fault. Thus, a jury's specific finding that a defendant
is minimally at fault gets overridden and the minor player
in the lawsuit bears an unfair and costly burden.
Joint and several liability produces extreme harm for our
society. For example, Julie Nimmons, CEO of Shutt Sports
Group, Inc. in Illinois, has testified that joint liability
has caused manufacturers of protective sporting goods
equipment, such as safety helmets, to withdraw products from
the market or be chilled from introducing new products.
Recognizing the urgent need for reform of this unfair
doctrine, 33 states have already abolished or modified the
principle of joint and several liability.
H.R. 956 adopts a balanced approach between those who call
for joint liability to be abolished and those who wish for it
to remain unchecked. The legislation eliminates joint
liability for ``noneconomic damages'' (e.g., damages for pain
and suffering or emotional distress), while permitting the
states to retain full joint liability with respect to
economic losses (e.g., lost wages, medical expenses, and
substitute domestic services). This means that each defendant
will be liable for noneconomic damages in an amount
proportional to its percentage of fault of the harm. This
``fair share'' rule is based on a joint liability reform
enacted in California through a ballot initiative approved by
the majority of voters in 1986. The same approach was enacted
by the Nebraska legislature in 1991.
It has been argued by some opponents that the provision is
``anti-women'' because their economic damages may be lower
than men and, for that reason, they depend on noneconomic or
so-called ``pain and suffering'' damages. However, there has
been absolutely no showing in California, a large and
litigious state, that the California approach discriminated
against any sex or any group. In fact, noted California trial
attorney Suzell Smith has testified that the California law
is fair and has worked well for consumers.
Workers' Compensation Subrogation: This provision preserves
an employer's right to recover workers' compensation benefits
from a manufacturer whose product harmed a worker unless the
manufacturer can prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the employer caused the injury. This provision would
modify state law in a very positive way. It would create a
new private incentive on employers to keep their workplace
safe and achieve this goal without reducing the amount an
injured employee can recover in a product liability action.
This provision has not been challenged by professional groups
as controversial or unfair.
Biomaterials Access Assurance: Millions of citizens depend
on the availability of lifesaving and life-enhancing medical
devices, such as pacemakers and hip and knee joints. The
availability of these devices is critically threatened,
however, because suppliers have ceased supplying basic raw
materials to medical device manufacturers. A 1994 study by
Aronoff Associates concluded that there are significant
numbers of raw materials that are ``at risk'' of shortages in
the immediate future. Suppliers have found that the risks and
costs of responding to litigation related to medical
technology far exceeds potential sales revenues, even though
costs are not finding suppliers liable!
H.R. 956 will safeguard the availability of a wide variety
of lifesaving and life-enhancing medical devices. The
provision was introduced in this Congress as S. 303, the
[[Page S2562]]
``Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1995,'' by Senators
Lieberman and McCain and was added to the Senate version of
H.R. 956 during the Commerce Committee's markup. The
provision, which has been the subject of hearings and enjoys
very strong bipartisan support, will help prevent a public
health crisis by limiting the liability of biomaterials
suppliers to instances of genuine fault and establishing a
procedure to ensure that suppliers--not manufacturers, can
avoid litigation without incurring heavy legal costs. This
provision is critically important to all Americans,
particularly women, according to Phyllis Greenberger,
Executive Director for the Society for the Advancement of
Women's Health Research.
Ironically, even though this bipartisan provision would
unquestionably provide a tremendous public health benefit and
would not adversely affect consumers, it is not well
understood by some and, therefore, becomes a target by those
who are willing to concoct and perpetuate untruths in the
desperate attempt to selfishly promote their own economic
agenda. The fact is that this is a proconsumer provision
which does not in any way limit the ability of claimants to
seek recovery from medical device manufacturers; the
provision recognizes the ``common sense'' principal that
suppliers of basic materials, who are not dcurrently found
liable, should not be permitted to be indiscriminately hauled
into court.
Exhibit 2
the facts on product liability
Fact: There is no cap on economic or noneconomic damages.
Claimants will continue to be able to recover whatever they
are awarded in a court.
Fact: The statue of repose remains limited to durable goods
in the workplace only. Statements being made that we now
cover all goods are simply wrong.
Fact: Product sellers, lessors, or renters will NOT be
protected from negligent entrustment liability. That is
precisely why the ``negligent entrustment'' exception was
moved to the product sellers section of the bill.
Fact: Dow Corning, and other companies who made or make
breast implants will NOT be shielded from liability. Whether
or not they supplied the silicone, they remain liable as
manufacturers.
Fact: Drunk drivers, gun users, etc will NOT be protected
from liability in any way. Opponents are intentionally trying
to confuse harm caused by a product, which IS covered in the
bill, and harm cause by the products' use by another, which
is NOT covered in the bill and remains totally subject to
existing state law. (See Sec 101 (15) and 102 (a)(1)--
definition of product liability action includes only ``harm
caused by a product'' not ``use.'' This is a big difference.
Fact: In all states that permit punitive damages, they will
continue to be available, and the ``additional amount''
provision will apply in all those states, regardless of
whether caps are higher or lower in that state.
Fact: Tolling of the statue of limitations will be covered
as they now are, by applicable state and federal law. For
example, see 11 USC 108c automatic tolling in bankruptcy
cases. Nothing in the bill or omitted from the bill will
change state law on tolling.
Fact: State law will continue to control whether or not
electricity, stem, etc is considered a product or not.
Fact: This is NOT one-way preemption, but a mix of state
and federal rules. Products are in interstate commerce, and
should be subject to more uniform rules for businesses and
consumers.
Fact: 30 states have modified joint and several liability
at this point. The federal proposal follows the California
law affecting ONLY noneconomic damages.
provision and product liability conference report, march 13, 1996
Liability of Product Seller
Same as Senate bill--Product seller can be held liable as
manufacturer only in limited circumstances.
Applicability/Preemption
Same as Senate bill--Applicable to product liability cases
only.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Same as Senate bill--Dispute Resolution (ADR), with no
defendant loser pays provision.
Defenses Regarding Alcohol or Drugs
Same as Senate bill--Complete defense if claimant was more
than 50 percent responsible.
Reduction for Misuse or Alteration
Same as Senate bill--Reduction of damages by the percentage
of harm which is the result of the misuse or alteration.
Punitive Damages
Same as Senate bill: (a) Ceiling of greater of $250,000 or
2 compensatory; (b) DeWine Amendment including assets in
determination of damages; (c) DeWine small business amdt--
limits punitive damage awards for business under 25
employees, to the lesser of $250,000 or 2 compensatory
damages; and (d) Judge can award an additional amount for
punitive damages in egregious cases, under factors set forth
in bill. [Clarification that judge can award all the way up
to the initial jury award.]
Statute of Limitations
Same as Senate bill--Two years after date of discovery of
the harm and cause of harm or date that these should have
been discovered.
Statute of Repose
Retains Senate scope--Limits to 15 years for durable goods
in the workplace only, with exception for toxic harm.
Joint and Several Liability for Noneconomic Loss
Same as Senate bill--Joint and several liability for all
economic damages, and several liability for noneconomic
damages.
Federal Cause of Action
Same as Senate bill--No new federal cause of action.
Biomaterials
Same as Senate bill--Biomaterial suppliers who furnish raw
materials or component parts, but who are not manufacturers
or sellers, are protected from liability; amendments
addressing shell corporation concerns and deleting the
certificate of merit requirement.
Is this one-way pre-emption?
This is a real red herring argument. The truth is this is a
balanced bill--for consumers and for business. In some cases
state law prevails, and in some cases, the federal law
controls.
The goal of federal legislation, especially where you are
dealing with interstate commerce, is uniformity, fairness,
and predictability. It naturally follows that Federal laws
very often must preempt inconsistent state laws. And this
product liability bill allows maximum flexibility for the
states within a uniform federal system.
The interpretation of which laws apply to which situations,
is complicated (and is best left to the lawyers). But lets
look at a few of the specifics of the bill:
If a state has a shorter statute of limitations, and many
do, this bill makes it longer. Period. Which way is that
preemption?
If a state has a statute of repose, this bill makes no
change as to the time period, but does make sure that victims
of toxic harm receive compensation regardless of the time
that their injury is discovered.
If a state doesn't allow punitive damages, at all under
current law, this bill makes no change in that state's laws.
In some states that do permit punitive damages, such as
Colorado and Maryland, the standard for allowing punitive
damages is lessened, not stricter. (The standard goes from
one requiring proof ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' and
``actual malice'' to ``clear and convincing evidence.)
If a state does permit punitive damages, I believe that the
new federal rules will, for the first time, permit judicial
flexibility in determining the amount of punitive damages,
even if there is a cap on the amount of punitive damages
under that state's law which is different that the new
federal bill.
So, in summary, yes this bill does preempt state law in
some situations. But to suggest that it is totally one-way is
misleading at best.
The conference report is a tightly balanced bill seeking to
make some uniformity out of a patchwork of conflicting state
laws.
____
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, March 20, 1996.
Katherine Prescott,
National President, MADD, Irving, TX.
Dear Ms. Prescott: Your letter of March 19 is wrong, and
based on a totally incorrect quoting of the proposed law.
Your letter says that the product liability bill covers
``harm caused by a product or product use.'' that is
incorrect.
The legislation reads: ``harm caused by a product'' only.
You have been misinformed, perhaps intentionally, in an
effort to convince you that cases of drunk driving would be
covered under the bill. The fact is that cases of drunk
driving or so-called dram shop cases would not be covered by
this legislation.
In addition, those who ``negligently entrust'' a product,
such as alcohol, resulting in drunk driving situations, would
not be protected in any way under the law.
I will read your incorrect letter, and this response, into
the Congressional Record today, and I expect you will want
for me to include your retraction letter as well.
Kindly FAX your retraction to me immediately at 202-224-
9575.
Thank you.
Sincerely,
John D. Rockefeller IV.
____
IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROVISIONS ELIMINATING JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
FOR NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
The Conference Committee version of the product liability
bill is currently expected to retain the Senate bill's
provision eliminating joint liability for noneconomic
damages. This Federal law provision would not significantly
change the law in those states which already either have
eliminated or severely limited joint liability, or have
imposed specific limitations on the award of noneconomic
damages.
Twelve states have eliminated joint liability altogether:
Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont and Wyoming.
Two states have eliminated joint liability for noneconomic
damages: California and Nebraska.
Ten states have otherwise limited the availability of joint
liability as to noneconomic damages or damages generally, so
[[Page S2563]]
as to make it significantly less likely that noneconomic
damages would be subject to joint liability: Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Texas.
Three states have eliminated joint liability in cases in
which the plaintiff is negligent: Georgia, Ohio and Oklahoma.
Five states (including three already mentioned) have capped
awards of noneconomic damages: Alaska, California, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan.
In all, 30 states have adopted measures that already limit
the recovery of noneconomic damages. These include eight of
the nine largest states in the union--California, New York,
Texas, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan and New Jersey.
____
SMALL BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM
National Federation of Independent Business (600,000 small
businesses).
National Association of Wholesaler-Distributors (156 trade
associations representing 250,000 small businesses).
U.S. Chamber of Commerce (215,000 small businesses).
National Association of Manufacturers (10,000 small
businesses).
Small Business Legislative Council.
National Association of Women Business Owners.
National Small Business United.
____
joint letter to members of congress from american small business
leaders on product liability reform, april 3, 1995
Dear Members of Congress: On behalf of the nation's more
than 21 million small and growing businesses, we are writing
to strongly urge your support of S. 565, The Product
Liability Fairness Act of 1995.
You know the problem: A single lawsuit can and has put many
small business owners out of business.
For many small businesses, the explosion in product
liability cases means it is simply impossible to find and
keep affordable liability insurance.
You've heard the horror stories. (If you haven't, give us a
call.)
Why should you care? Small businesses create virtually all
the net new jobs in the economy. And businesses owned by
women now employ more people than the entire Fortune 500
combined. While most of our company names are not household
words, small business comprises the backbone of the nation's
economy--from Main Street to Wall Street.
We need your help.
Product liability reform was the #1 issue at the White
House Conference on Small Business in 1986. Finally, after
more than a decade of struggle, product liability reform
seems within our reach.
Please support S. 565, The Product Liability Fairness Act
of 1995, and help protect U.S. consumers, workers and small
businesses. Our future and the future of our nation's
economy, depends on it.
Thank you for your support.
Gary Kushner, President, Kushner & Company, Inc., President,
National Small Business United, Kalamazoo, Michigan
Carol Ann Schneider, President, Seek, Inc., President,
Independent Business Association of Wisconsin
Patty DeDominici, President, National Association of Women
Business Owners (NAWBO), Los Angeles, California
Willis T. White, President, California Black Chamber of
Commerce, Burlingame, California
Thomas Gearing, President, The Patriot Company, Federal
Reserve Board, Small Business Advisory Committee,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Margaret M. Morris, NAWBO Chapter President, Chevy Chase,
Maryland
Lewis G. Kranick, Chairman of the Board, Krandex Corporation,
Wisconsin Delegation Chair--1986, White House Conference
on Small Business, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Linda Pinson, Principal, Out of Your Mind . . . and Into the
Marketplace, NAWBO Financial Services Council, Tustin,
California
Dale O. Anderson, President, Greater North Dakota
Association, Bismark, North Dakota
Chellie Campbell, President, Cameren Diversified Management,
Inc., NAWBO Public Policy Council, Pacific Palisades,
California
Brooke Miller, NAWBO Chapter President, St. Louis, Missouri
John F. Robinson, President & C.E.O., National Minority
Business Council, Inc., New York, New York
Lucille Treganowan, President, Transmissions by Lucille,
Inc., NAWBO Chapter President, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Wanda Gozdz, President, W. Gozdz Enterprises, Inc., NAWBO
Public Policy Council, Plantation, Florida
Frank A. Buethe, Manager, Advance Business Development
Center, Green Bay Chamber of Commerce, Green Bay,
Wisconsin
Rachel A. Owens, Family Business Specialist, Mass Mutual,
NAWBO Chapter President, Irvine, California
Brenda Dandy, Vice President, Marine Enterprises
International, Inc., NAWBO Financial Services Council,
Baltimore, Maryland
Terry E. Tullo, Executive Director, National Business
Association, Dallas, Texas
Tana S. Davis, Owner, Tana Davis C.P.A., NAWBO Chapter
President, Encino, California
Mary G. Zahn, President, M.C. Zahn & Associates, NAWBO Public
Policy Council, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Gary Woodbury, President, Small Business Association of
Michigan
Hector M. Hyacinthe, President, Packard Frank Organization,
Inc., New York Delegation Chair--1986, White House
Conference on Small Business, Ardsley, New York
Mary Ellen Mitchell, Executive Director, Independent Business
Association of Wisconsin, NSBU Council of Regional
Executives, Madison, Wisconsin
Susan J. Winer, President, Stratenomics, Illinois Delegation
Chair--1986, White House Conference on Small Business,
Chicago, Illinois
Lucy R. Benham, Vice President, Keywelland Rosenfeld, P.C.,
NAWBO Public Policy Council, Troy, Michigan
Beverly J. Cremer, Chief Executive Officer, I & S Packaging,
NAWBO Chapter President, Kansas City, Missouri
C. Virginia Kirkpatrick, President/Owner, CVK Personnel
Management & Training Specialists, NAWBO Financial
Services Council, St. Louis, Missouri
Mary Ann Ellis, President, American Speedy Printing, NAWBO
Chapter President, Boynton Beach, Florida
Shaw Mudge, Jr., Vice President, Operations, Shaw Mudge &
Company, Connecticut Delegation Chair--1986, White House
Conference on Small Business, Stamford, Connecticut
Eunice M. Conn, Executive Director, Small Business United of
Illinois, NSBJ Council of Regional Executives, Niles,
Illinois
Ronald B. Cohen, President, Cohen & Company, Immediate Past
President, NSBJ, Cleveland, Ohio
Hilda Heglund, Executive Director, Council of Small Business
Executives, Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of
Commerce, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Karin L. Kane, Owner/Operator, Dorrino's Pizza, NAVBO Chapter
President, Salt Lake City, Utah
Suzanne F. Taylor, President & Owner, S.T.A. Southern
California, Inc., Vice President--Public Policy Council,
NAWBO, South Laguna, California
Suzanne Pease, Owner, Ampersand Graphics, NAWBO Chapter
President, Morganville, New Jersey
Maryjane Rebick, Co-Owner, Executive Vice President, Copy
Systems, NAWBO Public Policy Council, Little Rock,
Arkansas
Arlene Weis, President, Heart to Home, Inc., NAWBO Public
Policy Council, Great Neck, New York
Deepay Mukerjee, President, R.F. Technologies, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, Lewiston, Maine
David Sahagun, Dealer, Castro Street Chevron, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, San Francisco,
California
Dona Penn, Owner, Gigantic Cleaners, NAWBO Public Policy
Council, Aurora, Colorado
Barbara Baranowski, Owner, Condo Getaways, NAWBO Chapter
President, North Monmouth, New Jersey
Sheelah R. Yawitz, President, Missouri Merchants and
Manufacturers Association, Chesterfield, Missouri
David R. Pinkus, Executive Director, Small Business United of
Texas, Texas Delegation Chair--1986, White House
Conference on Small Business, Austin, Texas
David P. Asbridge, Partner, Sunrise Construction, Inc., 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business, Rapid
City, South Dakota
Marj Flemming, Owner, Expeditions in Leadership, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Signal Mountain, Tennessee
Jo Lee Lutnes, Owner, Studio 7 Public Relations, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Columbus, Nebraska
Margaret Lescrenier, Vice President, Gammex RMI, Small
Business Committee Member, Wisconsin Manufacturers and
Commerce
Gordon Thomsen, Chief Executive Officer, Trail King
Industries, Inc., 1994 Small Business Administration
National Exporter of the Year, Mitchell, South Dakota
Leri Slonneger, NAWBO Chapter President, Washington, Illinois
Shalmerdean A. Knuths, Co-Owner/Director of Administration,
Rosco Manufacturing Company, 1995 Delegate, White House
Conference on Small Business, Madison, South Dakota
Alan M. Shaivitz, President, Allan Shaivitz Associates, Inc.,
1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Baltimore, Maryland
Linda Butts, President/Owner, Prairie Restaurant & Bakery,
Member, NFIB, Carrington, North Dakota
Malcolm N. Outlaw, Owner/President, Sunwest Mud Company,
Board Member, Small Business United of Texas, Midland,
Texas
Suzanne Martin, Council of Smaller Enterprises, Greater
Cleveland Growth Association, NSBJ Council of Regional
Executives, Cleveland, Ohio
[[Page S2564]]
David L. Condra, President, Dalcon Computer Systems, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Nashville, Tennessee
Doris Morgan, Vice President, Cherrybank, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, Hazlehurst,
Mississippi
Dr. Earl H. Hess, Lancaster Laboratories, Inc., Pennsylvania
Delegation Chair--1986, White House Conference on Small
Business, Lancaster, Pennsylvania
Ralph S. Goldin, President, Goldin & Stafford, Inc., 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Landover, Maryland
John C. Rennie, President, Pacer Systems, Inc., Past
President, NSBU, Billerica, Massachusetts
Murray A. Gerber, President, Prototype & Plastic Mold
Company, Inc., Connecticut Delegation Chair--1986, White
House Conference on Small Business, Middletown,
Connecticut
Robert E. Greene, Chairman & CEO, Network Recruiters, Inc.,
1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Bel Air, Maryland
Jule M. Scofield, Executive Director, Smaller Business
Association of New England, Waltham, Massachusetts
Jack Kavaney, President, Gateway Properties, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, Bismarck, North
Dakota
Leo R. McDonough, President, Pennsylvania Small Business
United, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
Sarah Lumley, Co-Proprietor, Save-A-Buck Auto Sales, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Sumter, South Carolina
David A. Nicholas, General Manager, Dapco Welding Supplies,
Inc., Hagerstown, Maryland
Joan Frentz, NAWBO Chapter President, 1995 Delegate, White
House Conference on Small Business, Louisville, Kentucky
Bruce A. Hasche, Controller, Sencore, Inc., South Dakota
Delegation Chair--1995, White House Conference on Small
Business, Sioux Falls, South Dakota
Michael J. McCurdy, Franchisee, 7-Eleven, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, Baltimore,
Maryland
Robert G. Clark, President, Clark Publishing, Inc., 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Lexington, Kentucky
Michael Stocklin, President, Flathead Business & Industry
Association, Kalispell, Montana
Van Billington, Executive Director, Retail Confectioners
International, NSBC Council of Regional Executives,
Glenview, Illinois
Daniel L. Biedenbender, Vice President, Atlas Iron & Wire
Works, Inc., National Treasurer, American Subcontractors
Association, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Earl B. Chavis, Owner, CTM Tech, Inc., 1995 Delegate, White
House Conference on Small Business, Florence, South
Carolina
Patricia F. Moenert, President & Owner, Moenert Executive
Realty, Inc., Boynton Beach, Florida
Rudolph Lewis, President, National Association of Home Based
Businesses, Owings Mills, Maryland
Robert F. Taylor, President, Erie Manufacturing Company,
Board of Directors, Council of Small Business Executives,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Duane E. Smith, Administrative Partner, Charles Bailly &
Company, 1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small
Business, Billings, Montana
Gary Batey, General Manager, Independent Cement Corporation,
Hagerstown, Maryland
G. Jesse Flynn, C.E.O., Flynn Brothers Contracting, Inc.,
1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Louisville, Kentucky
Frank J. Tooke, Montana Society of CPAs, 1995 Delegate, White
House Conference on Small Business, Miles City, Montana
Brenda B. Schissler, President, StaffMasters, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, Louisville,
Kentucky
Henry Carson III, Vice President, Henry Carson Company,
Member, South Dakota Family Business Council, Sioux
Falls, South Dakota
Roy H. Hunt, President & C.E.O., Hunt Tractor, Inc., Kentucky
Delegation Chair--1995, White House Conference on Small
Business, Louisville, Kentucky
Susan D. Cutaia, President, Tiger Security Products, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business, Boca
Raton, Florida
Charles F. Hood, Franchisee, 7-Eleven, Member, Baltimore
Franchise Owners Association, Jarr, Maryland
Kenneth D. Gough, President, Accurate Machine Products
Corporation, Chairman, Small Business Committee, Tri-
Health Business Alliance, Johnson City, Tennessee
James W. Kessinger, President, Anderson Packaging, Inc.,
Kentucky Delegation Vice-Chair--1995, White House
Conference on Small Business, Lawrenceburg, Kentucky
Charles Aiken, Owner, Health Force of Columbia, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Columbia, South Carolina
Kay Meurer, President, Discount Office Interiors, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Louisville, Kentucky
Kevin R. Nyberg, President, Nyberg's Ace Hardware, Member,
National Retail Hardware Association, Sioux Falls, South
Dakota
Tom Everist, President, L.G. Everist, Inc., Sioux Falls,
South Dakota
Lewis A. Shattuck, Executive Vice President, Barre Granite
Association, Member, Associated Industries of Vermont,
Barre, Vermont
Tom Batcheller, President, Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business, Sioux
Falls, South Dakota
Lalit K. Sarin, President & C.E.O., Shelby Industries, Inc.,
1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Shelbyville, Kentucky
Christine S. Huston, Manager, Economic & Business
Development, Indiana Chamber's Small Business Council,
NSBU Council of Regional Executives, Indianapolis,
Indiana
Dean M. Randash, President, NAPA Auto Parts, 1995 Delegate,
White House Conference on Small Business, Helena, Montana
Luis G. Fernandez, M.D., Director, Trauma Services, Mother
Frances Hospital, Member, American College of Surgeons,
Tyler, Texas
Ed Grogan, President & C.E.O., Montana Medical Benefit Plan,
1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Kalispell, Montana
David Davis, President, Advanced Home Care, Inc., 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Unicoi, Tennessee
Joe Kropkowski, President, Baltimore Franchise Owners
Association, Bel Air, Maryland
Susan Szymczak, President, Safeway Sling USA, Inc., Member,
Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce,
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
H. Victoria Nelson, Proprietor, Jarnel Iron & Forge, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Hagerstown, Maryland
Helen Selinger, President, Sloan Products Company, Inc., 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business,
Matawan, New Jersey
Charles B. Holder, President, Hol-Mac Corporation, 1995
Delegate, White House Conference on Small Business, Bay
Springs, Mississippi
Marguerite Tebbets, President, Window Pretties, Inc.,
President, Women Business Development Center, Kennebunk,
Maine
Catherine Pawelek, NAWBO Chapter President, Coral Gables,
Florida
Mak Gonzenbach, Vice President, Valley Queen Cheese Factory,
Inc., 1995 Delegate, White House Conference on Small
Business, Milbank, South Dakota
Geoff Titherington, Owner, Bonanza, American Franchisees
Association, Sanford, Maine
Richard Watson, Executive Vice President, Walker Machine
Products, Inc., National Screw Machine Products
Association, Collierville, Tennessee
Tonya G. Jones, President, Mark IV Enterprises, Inc., NFIE
Guardian Advisory Council, 1995 Delegate, White House
Conference on Small Business, Nashville, Tennessee
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Coverdell). Who yields time?
The Chair recognizes the Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, my distinguished colleague from West
Virginia just thanked a group of people. I wondered who they were. I
knew no lawyer who had ever tried a case in a courtroom would ever put
up a bill of this kind. So, having sponsored this measure, they would
have to have some extraneous help of some kind to fashion an abortion
as this ``conspiracy''--not conference--report. I emphasize
``conspiracy,'' Mr. President.
The distinguished Senator from West Virginia says when you work with
him, it is very close and everything else. Of course, he did not thank
the Senator from South Carolina because we never got close because we
never conferred and we never were told about a meeting. We could not
see the draft. We heard first about this so-called conference, or
conspiracy, report, with Richard Threlkeld on CBS at 7:20 last Thursday
evening on the evening news, when he said it was coming up. I had yet
to get a copy, even though I am a member of the conference, struggling
around on Friday to try to find out what we were going to have.
The story down in the local press, the way they politically work it,
was that the Senator from South Carolina was going to filibuster. We
had not had a chance to debate. We had not had a chance to debate. But
the point of the matter is that, as the Senator from West Virginia
talks about small business, small business--look at the chart. That is
not small business. I think he ought to talk more closely with the
[[Page S2565]]
distinguished Senator from Washington, whom he has been working with,
because they are not quite in step.
These heart pacemakers at $3,000, motorized wheelchairs, hotel bills,
tonsillectomies, maternity stays, and all--maybe somebody is selling a
baseball. We will let that one go by--18 cents. I hope we are not
finding a Federal need up here, with all the States rights atmosphere,
to all of a sudden pass a Federal law on account of 18 cents on the
cost of a baseball.
We go through, and it is really sad, because, going right to the
chart, we have never seen that before. I guess that is the option of
those who do not have a case, to try to do it by sheer surprise. They
came in first years ago--I will never forget it--and said there was a
litigation explosion. You do not hear them arguing about the litigation
explosion anymore.
They said there was an insurance crisis. We have here in the record
that insurance companies are making billions and billions of dollars,
so there is not that. Their reserves are up to an all-time high. They
are doing great. So the insurance company is doing well, so you do not
have that.
Then they had the matter of uniformity. Mr. President, they were
going to get all the States together and have uniformity, but it is
quite obvious that the many splendored thing, the test tube of
federalism at the State level, clashed with that uniformity. And they
created specific exemptions for those States who had more stringent
requirements of an injured party. Those State laws could hold. Those
who had less stringent laws would have to come under the stringent
restrictions of this particular measure. So on the face of it, it
showed absolutely no uniformity. So they gave up on uniformity, in a
fashion.
Then they went to the matter of global competition. That is a sort of
mystique around this Congress. We in Washington have discovered global
competition. The matter of losing your job is psychological--the
``anxiety society'' they write about. ``Downsizing.'' It is all so
polite. Heck, they have been fired, and they moved the jobs overseas.
Who has moved them? It is not global; it is us.
It is like the Spanish Civil War with the fifth column. Over half of
what we are importing in here are American multinational generated. I
used the figure that they had researched back in the late 1970's. It
was 41 percent. I know over 50 percent of the imports are by 200
companies of the Fortune 500. They are the big, powerful people who can
afford it. Small business cannot move overseas, but big business has
moved overseas and continues, in a veritable hemorrhage. We explained
it to everyone so they could understand the cost of manufacture. It was
30 percent of volume for the associates or workers, employees--you can
save as much as 20 percent.
It is a given, if you move to a low-wage country, a $500 million
company can save $100 million if they just keep their executive office
here, their sales force, but move their manufacture to a low-wage
country. They can move offshore and get rich, or they can continue to
stay and work their own people and go broke. That is the trade policy
of this Congress. These companies are not greedy. If I ran the company,
if you ran the company, we would do the same thing. Competition has
moved. So are we going to sit around here and wonder--what? That
Congress is running around in a circle about term limits and all these
other little funny things they can think of, including product
liability that the States have long handled.
The distinguished Senator from Rhode Island got up and said ``15
years, 15 years'' the Congress has considered this issue. But the State
of Rhode Island has responded. That is the mystery to me, that the
proponents come around and act, all of a sudden, like they have
discovered these things. Assume everything is true on that chart next
to the Senator of Washington. What has the legislature of the State of
Washington done about it? They have acted. The State of Georgia has
acted. The State of South Carolina had product liability reform back in
1988. It was fully debated. But all of a sudden, we in Congress
discover things. Why? Because we take a poll. None of these pollsters
has ever served in public office, but they get the hot-button items,
six or seven of them--and you have Victor Schwartz, that is a good
one--saying how they went after the lawyers. They go after the doctors.
Everybody is against the doctors, until they need one. Everybody is
against the lawyers, until they need one. That is a given in society.
But you do not just pass Federal laws to vitiate the laws of the 50
States on a statute of repose. Take the referendum they had in the
State of Arizona. The proponents of this measure say, ``Forget about
your referendum.'' They want to get back to the people, but ``we are
going to tell you from Washington what to do, State of Arizona,
regardless of your referendum.'' So what is going on up here?
Now they come with the shunt. We are used to trying cases. You are
limited to the record and the proof that you have, but this crowd just
makes it up at the last minute. They have gone back to the products
that have been kept off the market, and the shunt. I had not heard
about the shunt, so we called up the Food and Drug Administration and
they said there is no problem.
Yes, Dow has been cited by our distinguished colleagues from
Connecticut and Washington as going broke. It ought to go broke. They
will never make--and a lot of other companies will never make--those
implants like that again and try to sell them like hot cakes. Yes,
sirree, that is what happens in our society, and we repair that kind of
nonsense that goes on. Innocent women going in and thinking they are
getting a health cure and instead they are ending their lives.
So Dow does not sell them anymore, but Applied Silicon sells silicon,
Neusal sells silicon. And we get another list of those--that little bit
of material that goes into the shunt that takes the water off the
brain. The inference of the Senators here trying to use that argument
is that children and individuals are going to die unless we pass
product liability at the Federal level. Come on.
Take that chart next to the Senator from Washington. If a pacemaker
costs $3,000, that has far more intricate materials than a shunt. They
would take pacemakers off the market if you followed the logic of their
argument. You could not afford $3,000 for that. I question that figure,
to tell you the truth. I wish I had a chance to try it. My mother
passed on just a few years ago, dying at 95 years of age, but she had
four pacemakers and we never paid that. Maybe it is cheaper in Georgia
and South Carolina than up here in this land--$18,000.
But let us assume the truth. If the truth is there, then pacemakers
have to get off the market, using the logic of the argument about the
shunt and a little bit of silicon material that goes into it. Come on.
It is available. It is a false argument.
We are going to have to have a legislative congressional committee
appointed on ski lifts, because it is only $2. It is way more dangerous
than $2. I have been on them. The Presiding Officer has been on them.
Get on one of those things and find out they are only spending $2 for
safety. We have to get that up.
That is the real Federal problem. Their little charts. They had the
coffee chart yesterday. They took down the coffee chart. At least they
have some shame. We proved that punitive damages award had been cut.
The judges in New Mexico have sense, but the coffee case had no sense.
When the proponents finally found that out, they took the chart down.
What do they do here? Assuming all of that, as I say, is true, they
act like the States have never acted before. I wanted to emphasize,
too, coming in with this thing. Now let me read you this particular ad
by the American pharmaceutical research companies, which appeared on
the Federal page of the Washington Post on March 27, 1995. Here is what
the American pharmaceutical group of manufacturers advertise in this
ad:
Drug companies target major diseases with record R&D
investment. Pharmaceutical companies will spend nearly $15
billion on drug research and development in 1995. New
medicines in development for leading diseases include 86 for
heart disease and stroke, 124 for cancer, 107 for AIDS and
AIDS-related diseases, 19 for Alzheimer's, 46 for mental
diseases, and 79 for infectious diseases.
In this ad the pharmaceutical companies include a bar graph showing
their steady increase in R&D investment
[[Page S2566]]
since 1977. They spent $1.3 billion in 1977, $2 billion in 1980, $3.2
billion in 1983, $4.7 billion in 1986, $7.3 billion in 1989, $11.5
billion in 1992, and an estimated $14.9 billion in 1995.
Maybe they will go out and research a new kind of silicon--they spent
almost $15 billion on overall research in 1995. But if you listen to
the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from Washington, you would
think you cannot get the drugs on account of product liability; the
drug companies are all going out of business.
In fact, the foreign drug companies are all coming from Europe over
here like gangbusters and investing. I will have a list before we end
this debate this morning of the pharmaceutical companies joining in and
they are not complaining. They are coming from Switzerland to South
Carolina and Hoffmann-La Roche is not complaining about product
liability. Wellcome is coming in with Glaxo in North Carolina. They are
not complaining about product liability. We have product liability laws
in our States.
What they do in this measure, Mr. President, if you read it, goes way
too far. We see this the more we now have a chance to look at it and
wonder why. For example, I wondered why MADD came out against this
bill, and then when I read that provision about punitive damages and
substances--let us have all the drunk drivers not worry about punitive
damages, do not worry about punishment, go ahead, drive drunk. Here we
have the finest movement under MADD at the Federal and the State level.
But this crowd now wants to write a bill so zealous about punitive
damages and getting rid of it--at least one Senator said he did not
even believe in punitive damages--that I can tell you now that they
said tell the drunk drivers to go ahead, do not worry about punishment,
drive. Tell the trial judge that you are obligated under the common law
to charge the jury with the law, but keep it a secret.
The Senator from West Virginia said we do not have a cap. I guess
that is the part he is reading in the bill, because as far as the jury
knows, there is no cap. Why? Because that is the law under the common
law, but they have a provision in here where the judge does not tell
the jury about the law.
Now come on, what kind of laws are we passing here? Tell the drunk
drivers, ``Go ahead, drive drunk.'' Tell the judge who has the
responsibility to stay out of the facts of the case, to, by gosh, keep
the law secret and then come around and have a new hearing on the facts
in violation of the Constitution.
The Cessna crowd, tell them now with the statute of repose, ``Don't
worry about it, as long as the part would last for 15 years.'' Most of
the planes I have been flying in are more than that. When you fly
around in a State in small planes, you will find they are more than 15
years old. But tell Cessna that they can go like gangbusters, do not
worry about the parts.
There, shoot the Maytag man. Put him out of business. He does not
have to stand there and say, ``My refrigerator is not going to catch
fire. It is 30 years old, and they still haven't called me to repair
it.'' Shoot the Maytag man.
Blow up the furnaces. I went through a textile plant just the other
day. It is 100 years old, but the machinery is brand new. They are
competitive. When I first started, the shunts, as they call them, in
the weaving machines used to be about 200; then they got to 400, then
1,500. The Japanese made machines up above that, I do not know how many
thousands. They have the newest machinery.
Yes, somebody in the plant may have been hurt. But now, hereafter,
when you have to put all that investment in there, do not worry about
the cost of the safety of the worker after the machine is 15 years old.
I think they will close down the textile show we have in Greenville for
new machinery because we are going to pass the law that after 15 years
you can forget about how safe a machine is. There is no more product
liability. They will take the hindmost. Just get hurt. Do not worry
about it. Let society take care of the injuries and everything else
because the national Congress, in the face of the State laws and
provisions that are working extremely well as of now, decided exactly
what to do.
The utilities, oh, heavens, we had a good half-hour show on yesterday
about the utilities. The utilities, now they did not want to write
strict liability, so they wrote a double negative in the particular
provision. Of course, the distinguished Senator had a difficult time
trying to answer the questions because you could tell the lawyers
downtown wrote this thing, not the staff. If the staff had written it,
you would have seen somebody getting cussed out for writing that kind
of thing. But the lawyers downtown were writing that thing up. They did
not want to mention what they really meant.
That is, for the utilities, do not worry about the highest degree of
care we require in Georgia, South Carolina and the States of America
because now we have a provision in here to tell the utilities to go
ahead, forget about the highest degree of care.
Then, the corporate head was riding with his worker after work in the
evening. They get into a wreck. A big trucking company runs the red
light. The corporate head can get $16 million--no, excuse me, it says
double economic damages. We had one corporate head making $16 million,
so he could get a $32 million verdict. But the poor fellow sitting in
the front seat with him has got a cap--the gentleman said it ``ain't no
cap'' --but he gets $250,000. He is capped.
That is how the workers and consumers got this. The proponents of the
bill discriminate against the people they say they are trying to help.
They cannot name an organization of workers, consumers or others who
are not affluent that favors this nonsense. The proponents come around
and discriminate against those of modest means--the senior citizens,
women, children.
Oh, on pain and suffering, well, they are compensated. They have to
have another hurdle. We put in another hurdle for them regarding joint
and several liability. Mr. President, they come right down to the wire.
I was watching this morning when the distinguished majority leader
was on TV. He was talking about guns and the second amendment. Let me
read two other amendments.
In suits at common law [amendment VII], where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of common law.
They absolutely mandate it be reexamined by the trial judge. That is
in violation of amendment VII.
Then amendment X:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to States respectively, or to the people.
The distinguished majority leader always comes and says, ``Look, I
have got here in my pocket'' the 10th amendment--some carry around the
contract. The distinguished senior Senator from West Virginia carries
around the Constitution. The distinguished majority leader carries
around the 10th amendment, until this.
When it comes to Medicaid, let the States handle it. When it comes to
education, abolish the Department; that is a function of the States.
When it comes to welfare, the Governors come in and say, let the States
handle it. When it comes, by cracky, to crime, we have had a 2-year
intramural around here trying to make sure that we get back to a
program that we know did not work.
President Nixon put in LEAA, block grants, to the States. The next
thing you know, they had a tank down in Hampton, VA, to protect the
courthouse. I do not know what was going to attack the courthouse in
Hampton. They had the Governor of Indiana buying a plane, a Beechcraft,
so his wife could go and buy her clothes in New York. They were buying
planes and buying tanks and everything else. Trying to get the money
down to the officer on the beat was like delivering letters by way of a
rabbit; you could not get it there.
At the time the city, the council, got it, the State, whatever, a
politician got his hands on it. It was all for law enforcement, but law
enforcement never saw it. But they say, ``Oh, no, we've got to have
block grants.'' After the experience where we had to abolish the LEAA,
they come with this one on account of the political poll.
Lawyers. They have two giants, they say, the consumers and the trial
lawyers, consumers and trial lawyers. The
[[Page S2567]]
Senator from California emphasized what needs to be emphasized, and
that is that we are looking out for individuals and individual
injuries. It is not easy to try these injury cases. As we all know,
less than 4 percent of all civil cases are product liability, less than
1 percent get to the courts, and product liability accounts for less
than 1 percent of the cost of any of these products. They can keep on
putting up charts, but the Conference Board refuted that. They said
less than 1 percent of the cost of any of their articles were
attributable to product liability. So what did we do? What did we do?
We pass a totally unconstitutional measure. But more than anything
else, Mr. President, the word ``greed'' has been used around here. I
could not, in conscience, come and say, now, let us apply this all to
injured individuals but not to injured businesses. Oh, no. No, no.
I see where United Airlines wants to sue that manufacturer of the
baggage handler. It got loose up in Denver, that machine. We had one of
those machines, Mr. President, when I was in college. It had the
laundry where you sent your clothes over there, and it had a machine
that ripped the buttons off your shirt and shot them through your
socks. I know that machine now is up at the Denver airport. It tears up
the package, rips into the bags, and skirts it into the gears, stopping
everything.
So now, Mr. President, we have the business that can go ahead and get
its way on punitive damages--do not worry about any $250,000, keeping
it a secret, and then tell the trial judge later to start on his own
factual findings and everything else like that in violation of the
Constitution. Do not worry about any of that. Sue, like Pennzoil did
Texaco--get a $10 billion verdict, $10.2 billion. That is more than all
the product liability verdicts for injured matters in the last 20 years
put together--$10.2 billion. Add them up. One business.
The overwhelming majority of product liability is businesses suing
businesses. They believe when they get a bad product misrepresented,
they ought to have a cause of action. But they have done everything in
the world to put hurdles in this thing, unconstitutional provisions,
separating the injured parties, separating the businesses out, making
sure that the corporate heads and those of affluence get big economic
damages. They can get big verdicts; not women, not children, not senior
citizens who have retired. They have all of a sudden become second
class citizens.
That is the bill. It is a shame. I yield the floor.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I think a few brief moments in outlining
what this bill does and what it does not do may be particularly in
order at this stage in the debate.
If we were to take at face value what we have heard from my
distinguished colleague from South Carolina, coupled with his
colleagues from Massachusetts and California, we would entirely lose
sight of the fact that nothing in this bill limits in any respect the
ability of any individual to recover a verdict in any court for all of
the actual damages suffered by that individual as a result of what a
jury may determine to have been a defective product.
Let me repeat that. The Presiding Officer, if he is injured by a
defective product, will recover in the future, as he has in the past,
all of his actual and provable damages. Obviously, there will be a
difference in those damages from one person to another, even with
similar injuries.
Second, Mr. President, nothing in this bill limits the ability of an
injured person to recover as a result of a jury verdict all of the
damages that jury may attribute to pain and suffering or to noneconomic
damages.
I find the argument of the Senator from South Carolina particularly
curious. He says this is a terrible bill because an executive making $2
million a year can recover more than someone making the minimum wage.
Mr. President, that seems to me to be an argument that we ought to
impose caps, caps that we have not imposed. Perhaps the Senator from
South Carolina is suggesting a reform which no one, as far as I know,
has ever proposed anywhere in the United States. That is, that there
ought to be a cap on the economic damages that any individual can
receive, and that if an individual making $100,000 loses a year of
work, that person should not be able to recover any more than a person
who makes $20,000, or vice versa. But that is a change in the law that,
as far as I know, no one has ever proposed.
This bill allows you, Mr. President, to recover all of the actual
damages that you have suffered as a result of an accident that is the
fault of some product, including your lost wages, based on whatever
your wages are. Is that unequal justice because some people have higher
wages than others? I do not think so. It also allows the jury to award
you or anyone else whatever it may determine in the way of noneconomic
damages.
We did have a debate on this subject in this body the first time
around, not in connection with punitive damages but in connection with
medical malpractice. There was an attempt on the floor to put a ceiling
on the amount of noneconomic damages that could be recovered in a
medical malpractice case. That proposition lost on the floor of the
Senate, Mr. President, and ultimately the entire medical malpractice
section was taken out of the bill, to be dealt with separately.
This bill proposed no such limit in committee, no such limit on the
floor when it was being debated last year, and has no such limitations
now. What is limited in any respect is the imposition of punitive
damage awards--by definition, an award that is above and beyond all of
the damages caused by the defective product.
My distinguished friend and colleague who is so complimentary to me,
the Senator from West Virginia, has said that he would not vote for a
bill that had an absolute cap on punitive damages. This is a field in
which we disagree. I would. In fact, I do not believe, as an individual
Senator, that there is any place in the civil justice system for
punitive damages at all. They are not permitted in tort litigation in
the State of Washington and in a handful of other States.
There are very few serious arguments made that there is no justice
available for civil litigants as a result. There is an extremely strong
argument, it seems to me, against punitive damages at all. Why should
any individual recover more than a jury thinks that individual has
actually suffered, especially when there is no limitation on the
ability of the jury to make an award for pain and suffering for
noneconomic damages in addition to the proven actual damages in a case?
We have a system in this country that is peculiar with respect to
punitive damages designed as punishment without any limitations
whatever. Every criminal code, for every crime up to and including
first-degree murder and treason, has some kind of limitation. You
cannot be executed twice for two murders. But with respect to punitive
damages, in most places there are no limitations at all.
The Supreme Court of the United States has asked us to address this
issue. I think we ought to address this issue. We do address it in a
modest fashion in this bill, a very modest fashion, but only punitive
damages, not any of the actual losses to any plaintiff in a product
liability action whatever.
If you heard only the arguments on the other side of this case, you
would think everyone was being denied justice, that no one was going to
be able to recover their losses, their actual damages in a piece of
product liability litigation.
Why should there be some predictability, some limitation on punitive
damages? First, of course, because under the present system there can
be an infinite number of actions with respect to the same product. We
have a sentence, a punishment imposed, not with all of the protections
of the criminal code, not with the usual unanimous jury requirement,
but just at the total, complete and unfettered discretion of juries.
I think, as I say, that it is a terribly poor system. I did not
prevail in my debates with my allies on my own side of the aisle or
with my friend from West Virginia. I cannot remember what the views of
my friend from Connecticut are on the subject. So we have a form of
control which is not a cap. The Senator from West Virginia is entirely
correct with respect to that; however, nothing with respect to
requiring a company or an individual to pay its full share of the
damages that it has caused, whether noneconomic or economic.
[[Page S2568]]
Mr. President, this bill is about people. I spoke yesterday, and
speak again today, briefly, about young Miss Tara Ransom in the State
of Arizona who has spoken to Senator McCain and to people in my office
about her silicon-based shunt for hydrocephalus.
The great and deep concern that she and thousands of others have
about the availability of a medical device, which has literally given
her life and made that life worth living, is that it is increasingly
unavailable due to a present system of absolutely uncontrolled and
unlimited punitive damages.
The next to the last paragraph in the article about this young lady
from Arizona reads:
The good news is that there are reform efforts underway in
Arizona and at the Federal level. The Senate is planning to
vote, as early as today, on legislation to place reasonable
limits on punitive damages and eliminate unfair allocations
of liability in all civil cases. This would protect all
Americans --not just the manufacturers of medical products,
but also small businesses, service providers, local
governments, and non-profit groups. Above all, it would save
children like Tara.
This is about American business, and competitiveness, and low prices
for products. But it is even more about the people who use those
products.
Finally, Mr. President, we get this nonsense about drunk drivers,
this utter nonsense about the drunk drivers. Well, of course, nothing
in this bill has anything to do with suing drunk drivers. The
implication that it has something to do with suing the people who
supply them with alcohol negligently, the so-called dram stop
situation--well, this bill specifically says, ``A civil action for
negligent entrustment shall not be subject to the provisions of this
section but shall be subject to any applicable State law.''
That argument, Mr. President, is pure nonsense. This is a product
liability bill. It is not a negligent entrustment bill. It has nothing
to do with someone who deliberately sells a gun to someone to kill a
third person, or deliberately allow someone to become drunk and is sued
under dram stop statutes at all. It does have to do with product
liability, with people like Tara Ransom, with companies like Cessna,
with those who manufacture devices and therapeutic drugs, and a myriad
of other products for the American people. It does have to do with
giving them a better deal than the present system does, which is a
lottery for plaintiffs and a bonanza for those who represent them.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, I yield the distinguished Senator from
Alabama 15 or more minutes, as he may require.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alabama.
Mr. HEFLIN. Mr. President, I just found out that Senator Rockefeller
is going to vote for the conference report. Senator Gorton has said
that Senator Rockefeller could never vote for a bill if it had a cap in
it, a definite cap. And as I read it--now, maybe he can, in some way or
another, explain this language --we have a language on page 10 of the
report relating to punitive damages. First, the language in the report
says the ``greater'' of two times the sum of the amount awarded to a
claimant for economic loss and noneconomic loss, or $250,000. That is
not a definite cap because the amount of economic loss and noneconomic
loss is a variable. But language immediately thereafter says, ``special
rule.'' This applies to the rule on punitive damages for small
businesses where these corporations have 25 employees or less. I might
add that this language applies also to individuals. The ``special
rule'' provides that punitive damages shall not exceed the ``lesser''
of two times the economic loss and noneconomic loss, or $250,000. So
punitive damages cannot exceed, in any event, $250,000. So that is a
definite, established cap.
I am not going to hold Senator Rockefeller to that since he did not
make the statement to me. He must have made that statement to Senator
Gorton who is present on the floor. I would not want to put him in an
embarrassing situation. But I think this special rule shows very
definitely that there is a cap in the bill.
Now, that also points out that a lot of language in this bill is
slyly inserted, and so craftily placed, that I think some of its key
features have escaped a great number of people's attention. That is
true with regard to the biomaterials provision. The biomaterials
provisions, to which Senator Lieberman refers regarding raw materials,
also contains language regarding component parts. There are numerous
implants that have component parts. I mentioned before that I have a
pacemaker which has numerous component parts. There is a battery, and
there are various wires that go down into the chambers of the heart
that causes electrical charges to emit; it has various sensors and a
computer that records the history of my heartbeats over a period of
time. When doctors check it, they can check and see whether or not
there was some unusual rhythm or unusual activity taking place.
Basically under the provisions of title II, on an implant that has
component parts, there is complete immunity in regard to the supplier
of the component parts, or the raw materials of an implant.
Now, there is an exception in the event the manufacturer of the
component part is also the manufacturer of the entire device or also
the seller. But most medical devices are made from component parts,
such as the batteries, and people furnish those separately. Title II
gives complete immunity to suppliers with no chance to even discover
whether or not there was any negligence on the part of the supplier. It
is interesting to see where the crafty language is written. It
indicates that ``implant'' means--and this is the definition on page 17
of the conference report--
a medical device that is intended by the manufacturer of a
device to be placed into a surgically or naturally formed or
existing cavity of the body for a period of at least 30 days,
or to remain in contact with bodily fluids, or internal human
tissue through a surgically produced opening for a period of
less than 30 days.
Well, what is less than 30 days? I would assume that less than 30
days could mean 2 seconds or 1 second. It is very craftily designed.
What is a surgically produced opening? Well, there is no definition in
here, but a surgically produced opening would appear to me to be an
opening in which you use surgical tools. Of course, that would mean
that you normally think of a knife, of a scalpel, or of something like
that. But what about intravenous materials, one of these locks where
you tie it into you? You have devices where they put it in and out of
your body, and they can put fluids into the body such as a blood
transfusion. Consider a hypodermic needle--is that a surgical tube?
You have a situation where we find that title could have some
applicability with a blood transfusion. We should consider where a
blood transfusion occurs, and we know that blood has to be highly
inspected and is subject to the highest standard of care because of
AIDS and other matters. This bill is designed toward an interpretation
that could mean that AIDS in blood is subject--where someone has made a
mistake, who has been negligent or otherwise--to the provisions and the
limitations and protections that are put within this bill.
It is very carefully crafted, as I pointed out yesterday, in
inserting a comma in the definitions section of durable goods, now
within the purview of the report is any type of a product that has a
life of more than 3 years--baby cribs, lawn mowers, toasters, or
virtually any type of kitchen appliance.
There are a great number of provisions in the bill that disturb me,
in particular, the way that they are designed to favor the manufacturer
or the seller, and it puts the injured party at such a disadvantage.
For example, there is the misuse or alteration provision, which
provides that in a product liability action, the damages of a defendant
will be reduced by the percentage of responsibility for a claimant's
harm attributable to the misuse or alteration. But I see problems where
there could phantom defendants--the phantom defendants where there is
nobody there to be held responsible--and they can try to invoke the
several liability provisions in the report as to noneconomic damages.
These phantoms are the ones that are all at fault and there is nobody
left responsible for a claimant's injury.
Then we have a situation in regard to employer and coemployee, as to
whether or not they might have misused or
[[Page S2569]]
altered, or were at fault. So, in order to leave the impression on the
jury, this bill requires that that be the last issue that is presented
to a jury, because when they leave and go back to the jury room to
decide, that is the last thing that they heard. So they are trying to
put it off--the negligence or the lack of responsibility on the part of
the manufacturer--and impose it on someone else and to give it to that
person just as he goes into the jury room as the last thing that they
hear that will be predominantly on their mind. Is that fair to the
claimant?
There are numerous other aspects of that which disturb me. I suppose
one of the things that I just cannot understand at all in regard to
this is how--if it is good for the goose, why is it not good for the
gander? And they exempt business losses. One business suing another
business can bring his suit for commercial losses, losses of profit,
unlimited amount, unlimited amount relative to punitive damages, and
different statutes of limitation.
The Uniform Commercial Code, I assume, is uniform everywhere. I
understand there are a few differences in it. But in our State in
Alabama, you have a 4-year statute of limitations in regard to the
Uniform Commercial Code. The conference report imposes a shorter 2-year
statute of limitations.
The Senate-passed bill contained an exception to the 2-year statute-
of-limitation provision stating that if a civil action under the bill
is stayed or enjoined, the statute of limitation is suspended or tolled
until the end of the injunction. That provision was deleted from the
conference report. Is that fair? I think not.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Shelby). Who yields time?
Mr. GORTON. How much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Thirty-four minutes.
Mr. GORTON. How much of that time does the Senator from Connecticut
request?
I yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Connecticut.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. I thank my friend from the State of
Washington.
Mr. President, I have been thinking as I listened to the debate this
morning, and what preceded it yesterday and before that, that there is
a way of thinking around the Capitol that is not the way of thinking
that I hear back home in Connecticut. It is what I call either-or. You
know if an idea is put forward by a Republican, no Democrat shall be
for it. If an idea is put forward by a Democrat, no Republican should
be for it, or, in this case, if something is good for business, it has
to be bad for consumers. That does not figure, particularly if you look
at the overall effects of this bill.
What I want to contend here is that because of the extraordinary work
done by Senators Gorton and Rockefeller, and by the conferees from the
Senate and the House, this is a win-win bill.
This is a bill that is good for consumers and good for business. In
that sense, it is good for our country overall.
There is a way in which the opponents to the legislation approach it
with such skepticism, turning every word in the most potentially
damaging light and not considering the intentions of the sponsors and
the authors and the record that we have tried constantly to build on
the floor.
Everybody in America knows, at least most everybody knows, that our
civil justice system is not working well. I do not think anybody really
can stand up and defend the status quo of the litigation system in
America. Nothing is wrong with it. That is preposterous. The average
person on the street--I stop them in Hartford, New Haven, Bridgeport--
knows that lawsuits take too long; that people do not get justice in a
timely fashion; that too much of the money goes to lawyers. They know
that.
I think the question is, how are we going to make it better? Why
should we make it better? Because of the specific problems and
shortcomings of the current system I just referred to and also because
the public, the people have as little faith as the people of our
country do today in our system of justice. That is a profound problem
that goes beyond tort reform and anything else. It strikes at the very
heart of people's faith in the Government they have. Lord knows, we
know they have enough lack of confidence in the legislative branch,
maybe some in the executive, but it goes to the judicial as well.
I honestly believe, deeply believe that this bill--moderate, modest,
sensible, small, incremental reform--is a step in the direction of
beginning to restore some faith in the system, making it work for
people who are injured and making sure that it does not destroy faith
in the system by punishing people who are not guilty and letting those
who are guilty often off without being punished.
So I say this is win-win. It is good for business and it is good for
consumers. It will create jobs by removing a deterrent to innovation
and investment. It will reduce consumer prices by making litigation
less expensive. If 20 percent of the costs that we are paying for a
ladder is litigation-related costs, the cost of that ladder is going to
go down if we can reduce that litigation cost some, and it goes on and
on throughout the system.
I wish to talk particularly again about this biomaterials section of
the bill of which I am a cosponsor. It comes from something that is
very real that is threatening something very good. The very real
element here is that there is an unnatural shortage of raw materials.
Judge Heflin referred to it. Thank God, Judge Heflin is healthy and
well today because of the pacemaker he has. He is one of 8 million
people who have benefited from medical implants of one kind or another.
The device is put together by a manufacturer but it takes parts they
buy from people who do not make these parts particularly for this
purpose. They are not making much money on selling those parts.
Batteries are one. The information I put into the Record yesterday
shows that one of the manufacturers of batteries--a couple actually--
used in pacemakers have stopped selling to the manufacturers of
pacemakers because they are afraid they are going to get sued for
something that is not their fault. They would just as well sell the
batteries to somebody else where the chance of a lawsuit is not as
great. They are not worried about the negligence. They are worried
about what it is going to cost them if they get tied up in a lawsuit.
In the debate there is such skepticism expressed about these medical
devices and pharmaceutical companies, et cetera. Sometimes when I look
back and read history and I say, now, how far have we really come; how
much better is the human race? I wonder if we have ascended very far in
the way in which we deal with one another.
However, there is one way we can objectively show that there has been
extraordinary progress in human experience and that is in our health.
We are living longer. You can see it year-by-year. We are up, I guess,
in the mid-seventies now in terms of average life-span. A lot of that
has to do with pharmaceuticals, these wonder drugs that have been
invented. And a lot of it has to do with these medical devices that we
are trying to protect by making sure that the manufacturers can
continue to get the parts, the materials and the component parts, and
are not frightened out of supplying those parts because of the fear of
lawsuits.
I said yesterday, when I talked about the allegations, the opponents
of this bill keep lighting fires around the periphery to sort of stop
people from voting for the bill. Those of us who support it put out one
or two fires and there are three more burning over here. And one of the
fires has been lit about how this bill would affect the existing breast
implant procedure. I said at length yesterday--I will not repeat it
today--the bill will not impact this procedure. This is prospective,
only affects people who may file claims later. Breast implants are not
being done any more. They were stopped by the FDA, except for a small
number of clinical trials in 1992.
With regard to new products, you cannot escape liability under the
biomaterials section of this bill, if you are not just a supplier but
you are a manufacturer or a seller or what you have done is negligently
done in the sense that it violates either the contract requirements
that the manufacturer has given you for the raw material or component
part, which obviously would be for a part or material
[[Page S2570]]
that is not negligently made, or the specifications for that part that
are issued as part of the approval process. Every one of these medical
devices has to go through the FDA before it can be sold and used to
benefit people.
Senator Gorton has spoken about one young girl and the extraordinary
benefit to her life from the shunt that was put in her brain. We had
testimony at a hearing I conducted from a Mr. Martin Reily of Houston,
TX, about his young child, Thomas, who was discovered when he was 8
months old to have water on the brain, hydrocephalus. Mr. Reily said:
Jane and I will never forget the Saturday in late October
1985, when we learned that Thomas had hydrocephalus. We
initially were told that based on the level of fluid
accumulated on his brain and the resulting pressure, he would
surely have brain damage, probably severe. Surgery to place a
shunt in Thomas was scheduled for the first thing Monday
morning [2 days later]. The hours from late Saturday to
Monday morning were the longest and darkest we have ever
experienced.
The thought of waiting even 1 day to have the surgery was
almost unbearable, for each minute that passed the pressure
was building in Thomas' head, which could further damage him.
. . .
On Monday morning, Thomas received a shunt. Within hours,
he was showing improvement. His lethargy disappeared. He was
alert. He smiled again for the first time in weeks and even
stood up in his hospital crib. Within 36 hours, we were back
home with the new Thomas. How different the outcome would
have been for Thomas that day without the availability of the
medical device he so desperately needed.
What a miracle. Mr. Reily continues:
Six months after his original surgery, Thomas' shunt
clogged and required revision. In the 6 hours that Thomas
waited for his shunt revision surgery, he became violently
ill, vomiting continuously and finally becoming semi-
comatose. Mercifully, his revision was successful and
immediately he regained his old form, laughing and smiling
while playing games in his hospital bed. Again, how different
yet predictably sad and final would have been Thomas' fate
without this medical device. As I reflect on Thomas' brief
life, I see a child who has already overcome a lifetime of
medical difficulties.
* * * * *
Early on, Thomas' mother and I went through a grieving
process. We were grieving for the death of our vision of our
perfect child. It was not until we let that vision go that we
were able to see something much more beautiful; a young boy
with an indomitable yet loving spirit who will not let his
personal medical setbacks defeat him. I think that must be
surely God's spirit living inside him.
Mr. Reily concluded:
So I stand before you today, as the guardian of that
spirit, as Thomas' father, beseeching you to do everything in
your power to ensure that the biomaterials necessary for
Thomas' medical implant device be readily available and of
the highest quality. For some time in the future, perhaps
next month or next year, Thomas will wake me in the middle of
the night to tell me that his head hurts and that he thinks
his shunt has broken. He will ask if we can go to the
hospital to get a new one right away. I pray I will be able
to give him the only acceptable answer.
It is remarkable testimony. We had other testimony that day from a
most impressive woman, Peggy Phillips, who has worked for awhile as
chief of congressional affairs for the Air Force Surgeon General, going
to law school in the evening, getting home at 10 p.m., working until
midnight, and so on, office work, very busy. ``However, on November 26,
1986,'' as she says, ``my life changed. I am told that I collapsed as I
walked from my office to my car. I stopped breathing. I had no pulse. I
had no blood flow to my brain, I was clinically dead.''
The story ends happily. She agreed to have an automatic implantable
cardioverter defibrillator put into her stomach.
``Following a few minor adjustments,'' she says, ``life with the AICD
has not been much different than before.'' She goes on to document
changes that have occurred, and appeals to us to make sure that some of
the simple parts of that AICD, which keeps her going, monitors her
heartbeat, gives her a shock when there is a danger that her heart is
going to stop, keeping her alive--that flow of materials is not going
to stop.
These are consumers. Does this help business? It helps the businesses
that make the medical devices; it helps Thomas Reily; it helps Peggy
Phillips; it helps 8 million other people who are going to be kept
alive, allowed to live normally by these devices.
Earlier this morning my friend from California made some references
about the impact of this legislation--somewhat on breast implant cases
which I have spoken to earlier--but on women generally. I do want to
put into the Record a statement here. I am going quote from it.
Phyllis Greenburger, who is the executive director of a group called
the Society for the Advancement of Women's Health Research, testified
on April 4, 1995, to that same Senate subcommittee, that, `` * * * the
current liability climate is preventing women from receiving the full
benefits that science and medicine can provide. That,'' she says, ``is
the reason I am here before you today.''
She went on to say:
. . . there is evidence that maintaining the current
liability system harms the advancement of women's health
research.
She completed her testimony by stating:
Manufacturers of raw materials, unwilling to risk lawsuits,
are limiting, and in some cases, terminating the sale of
their product for use in an implantable medical device. . . .
The threat to health is further magnified in cases where
suitable substitute materials are not available.
Women may be disproportionately impacted by such a shortage
simply because they live longer than men, and as a result,
suffer more from chronic disease, increasing their chances of
needing a medical device, such as hip or joint replacements.
For those of us currently in good health, the loss of these
substances seems inconsequential. Yet for those like Peggy
Phillips . . . [Whom I spoke of before] and others suffering
from osteoporosis, heart disease, rheumatoid arthritis,
and other diseases, access to a full range of medical
devices is crucial.
I wonder if I might ask the Senator from Washington for 5 more
minutes?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GORTON. The Senator from Nebraska also wishes to speak on our
side. Will the Senator from Connecticut settle for 2?
Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will settle for 3.
Mr. GORTON. Fine.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. A study by the Committee for Contraceptive
Development, jointly staffed and administered by the National Research
Council and the Institute of Medicine, found that only one major U.S.
pharmaceutical company still invests in contraceptive research. Why?
The study blamed the legal climate, fear of lawsuits, for this
situation. H.R. 956, this bill before us, would make these drugs and
other medical devices more available.
We have said over and over again, this bill protects the right of an
injured plaintiff to get full recovery for damages, cost of medical
care, loss of wages, any other provable item. It goes beyond, and says
you can get recovery for noneconomic losses, intangibles like pain and
suffering, from those who are responsible for the negligence.
It simply puts a small limit on punitive damages. In doing so, yes,
it helps some businesses expand, provide the miraculous products I have
talked about, sell products for less; but it helps millions of other
people. In a way, the beneficiaries of this legislation are not so
visible. That is why I read from this testimony. But they, and millions
and millions of others of them, are counting on us to pass this bill to
bring balance and trust back to our legal system.
I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
There is a sufficient second.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, let me just for a minute respond.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I will yield to the distinguished Senator from
Nebraska.
The distinguished Senator from Connecticut is very persuasive and I
wanted to answer these pleading comments about ``walking down the
street'' and ``everybody knows the litigation system is in disrepair.''
Absolutely false, with respect to the civil justice system.
[[Page S2571]]
We have all seen the O.J. case and that jury of 12 let him go. But
the American public jury did not let him go. Everybody knows that.
We have, here, just this past week, March 18, U.S. News & World
Report:
In New York City, a movement is under way to impeach
Criminal Court Judge Laurin Duckman. A 33-year-old woman
sought court protection from a former boyfriend, a convicted
rapist, who had attacked her three times. Despite the
beatings, Judge Duckman coolly noted that the woman was
``bruised but not disfigured,'' lowered bail in the case and
suggested that the man would stop bothering the woman if she
gave back his dog. Three weeks later, the man shot her to
death.
In another case:
Police in a high-activity drug area at 5 a.m. noticed a
slowly moving car with out-of-state plates. The car stopped,
the driver popped the hood of the trunk and four men placed
two large duffel bags inside. When police approached, the men
moved away rapidly in different directions. One ran. Police
searched the trunk and found 80 pounds of cocaine. The
driver, a Michigan woman, confessed in a 40-minute videotaped
statement, saying that this was just one of more than 20
large drug buys she had made in Manhattan. But Judge Baer
ruled that police had conducted an unreasonable search. What
about the men bolting from the scene? Since residents in the
area regard cops as corrupt and abusive, opined the judge, it
would have been unusual if the men hadn't run away, so
fleeing was no cause for a search. In other words, the perps
had reason to be suspicious of police, but police had no
reason to be suspicious of the perps.
Come on. I ask unanimous consent to have this list of cases printed
in the Record
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. HOLLINGS. We are all disturbed about the criminal court system.
But not, where the distinguished Senator from Connecticut served as the
majority leader in the State legislature of Connecticut, he acts--
``walking down the street,'' that he is the only one walking down the
street talking.
Come on. We even had one former member went up as Governor and pull
an income tax on the people of Connecticut, Governor Weicker. The
people of Connecticut will respond, with leadership. And they do have a
product liability statute in that State.
But these folks come and talk about fair. ``Yes, I hope I can
certainly get this shot so I can continue breathing.'' I mean, grown
folks, men and women in the U.S. Senate, acting like this? That case
would be thrown out. Talking about what is not good for the consumer,
good for business.
I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record ``Suing For
Safety.'' It is by Thomas Lambert, Jr. I ask to have this printed in
the Record, included with the ``Stupid Court Tricks.'' Include them
both.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, that ``Suing for Safety'' gives case
after case after case where it had not been good for the consumer. The
consumer had to get a trial lawyer, had to go before 12 jurors in his
community, had to go up on appeal and pay all the court costs and
finally get a verdict.
Why is it good for the consumer and good for the business? On account
of product liability. We have it at the State level, and it is working.
That is why I put that case in the Record.
We know what business does. Some businesses will cut corners, they
will not give warnings, they try to save money. Everybody knows there
were a few dollars in the Pinto case. Now we see time and again, week
after week, recalls. They just recalled one of my cars to put another
safety device on.
Why do you think that was done? On account of the trial lawyers.
Product liability. That is why they have done it, and everybody in the
Senate knows it. But the little poll says get rid of the lawyers, like
Dick the Butcher in Henry VI, ``Kill all the lawyers.'' That is a
popular thing.
So that is what we have. I reserve the remainder of my time.
Exhibit 1
[From U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 18, 1996]
Stupid Court Tricks
(By John Leo)
Some judges and some judges' decisions are better than
others. Here are some others:
In New York City, a movement is under way to impeach
Criminal Court Judge Laurin Duckman. A 33-year-old woman
sought court protection from a former boyfriend, a convicted
rapist, who had attacked her three times. Despite the
beatings, Judge Duckman coolly noted that the woman was
``bruised but not disfigured,'' lowered bail in the case and
suggested that the man would stop bothering the woman if she
gave back his dog. Three weeks later, the man shot her to
death. In another domestic violence case, Judge Duckman
allowed a beater to go free hours after a jury had found him
guilty. Last month, the man was charged with another attack
on the same woman.
North of the border, the loopiest judicial decision of the
year came when the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that
drunkenness was a defense against rape charges. It ordered a
new trial for a Montreal man who had been convicted of
sexually assaulting a 65-year-old woman in a wheelchair. The
court predicted that the alcohol defense would be rare, but
within weeks drunks and addicts were being acquitted across
Canada. Sanity prevailed, however. Parliament passed a law
banning the drunkenness defense.
Judge Rosemary Barkett, a Clinton appointee, has brought
sexual harassment litigation into the fifth grade. Writing
for the majority on the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals last
month, she said that the mother of a fifth grader who was
repeatedly pestered by another fifth grader could sue the
school district under Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments. In a recent dissent in another case, Barkett
implied that a statute requiring drug tests for some state
jobs in Georgia may violate the First Amendment by seeking to
keep persons ``who might disagree with the current policy
criminalizing drug use'' out of government.
Another Clinton appointee, Judge Harold Baer, caused a
spreading uproar with his colorful botching of a drug case.
Police in a high-activity drug area at 5 a.m. noticed a
slowly moving car with out-of-state plates. The car stopped,
the driver popped the hood of the trunk and four men placed
two large duffel bags inside. When police approached, the men
moved away rapidly in different directions. One ran. Police
searched the trunk and found 80 pounds of cocaine. The
driver, a Michigan woman, confessed in a 40-minute videotaped
statement, saying that this was just one of more than 20
large drug buys she had made in Manhattan. But Judge Baer
ruled that police had conducted an unreasonable search. What
about the men bolting from the scene? Since residents in the
area regard cops as corrupt and abusive, opined the judge, it
would have been unusual if the men hadn't run away, so
fleeing was no cause for a search. In other words, the perps
had reason to be suspicious of police, but police had no
reason to be suspicious of the perps. Since the confession
stemmed from the search, Baer threw it out. The prevailing
New York opinion: Judge Baer is an idiot.
Can the state legally confiscate the property of innocent
people? The U.S. Supreme Court said yes this month in a
Detroit case. A 5-to-4 ruling allowed confiscation of a 1977
Pontiac half-owned by a woman after her husband was arrested
for having sex with a prostitute in the car. The Wayne County
prosecutor's office had sued to confiscate the car under
Michigan's public nuisance statutes. In a dry dissent,
Justice John Paul Stevens said that until this case, no state
had ``decided to experiment with the punishment of innocent
third parties.''
In a notably tortured decision, the federal 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a male prisoner who wishes to
become a female is not entitled to get hormone injections at
public expense under the 14th Amendment, but he may be
entitled to them under the Eighth Amendment, which bans cruel
and unusual punishment.
Much egg on is on the faces of federal judges of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals for their handling of the Rodney
Hamrick case. While serving prison time for threatening the
life of President Reagan, Hamrick built five bombs and
threatened to blow up a courthouse, an airplane and NAACP
headquarters. While serving more time for threatening to kill
the judge in his case, he built and mailed a bomb to a U.S.
attorney who had prosecuted him. The bomb fizzled, scorching
the envelope but not detonating. Hamrick was convicted, but a
three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed the
conviction on grounds that the bomb was not a deadly or
dangerous weapon because it had been badly built. This
decision flew in the face of a relevant Supreme Court ruling
that even an unloaded gun could be considered dangerous. For
some strange reason, Solicitor General Drew Days did not
request a rehearing on the Hamrick ruling by all the judges
of the entire Fourth Circuit. But the judges decided to do so
on their own, and they narrowly upheld Hamrick's conviction.
Eight judges thought that the faulty bomb qualified as
dangerous, while six judges disagreed. No word yet from Drew
Davis. Is anybody in charge here?
Exhibit 2
[From the Trial magazine, November 1983]
Suing for Safety
(By Thomas F. Lambert, Jr.)
It has been well and truly said, ``If you would plant for a
year, plant grain; for a decade, plant trees; but if you
would plant for eternity, educate a man.'' For nearly four
generations, ATLA has been teaching its men and women, and
they have been demonstrating to one another, that you can sue
for safety. Indeed, one of the most practical measures for
cutting down accidents and injuries in the field of product
failure is a successful lawsuit against the supplier of the
[[Page S2572]]
flawed product. Here, as well as elsewhere in Tort Law,
immunity breeds irresponsibility while liability induces the
taking of preventive vigilence. The best way to make a
merchant responsible is to make him accountable for harms
caused by his defective products. The responsible merchant is
the answerable merchant.
Harm is the tort signature. The primary aim at Tort Law, of
the civil liability system, is compensation for harm. Tort
law also has a secondary, auxiliary and supportive function--
the accident prevention function or prophylactic purpose of
tort law--sometimes called the deterrent or admonitory
function. Accident prevention, or course, is even better than
accident compensation, an insight leading to ATLA's
longstanding credo: ``A Fence at the Top of the Cliff Is
Better Than an Ambulance in the Valley Below.''
As trial lawyers say, however, ``If you would fortify,
specify.'' The proposition that you can sue for safety is
readily demonstratable because it is laced and leavened with
specifics. They swarm as easily to mind as leaves to the
trees.
accident prevention through successful suits in the products liability
field
(1) Case for Charcoal Briquets Causing Death from Carbon
Monoxide. Liability was imposed on the manufacturer of
charcoal briquets for the carbon monoxide death and injury of
young men who used the briquets indoors to heat an unvented
mountain cabin. The 10-pound bags read, ``Quick to Give Off
Heat'' and ``Ideal for Cooking in or Out of Doors.'' The
manufacturer was guilty of failure to warn of a lethal latent
danger. Any misuse of the product was foreseeable because it
was virtually invited. Next time you stop in at the local
supermarket or hardware store, glance at the label on the
bags of charcoal briquets. In large capital letters you will
find the following: ``WARNING. DO NOT USE FOR INDOOR HEATING
OR COOKING UNLESS VENTILATION IS PROVIDED FOR EXHAUSTING
FUMES TO OUTSIDE. TOXIC FUMES MAY ACCUMULATE AND CAUSE
DEATH.'' Liability here inspired and exacted a harder, more
emphatic warning, once again reducing the level of excessive
preventable danger.
(2) Case of the Exploding Cans of Draino. When granular
Drano is combined with water, its caustic soda interacts with
aluminum, another ingredient in its formula and produces
intensive heat converting any water into steam at a rapid
rate. If the mixture is confined, the pressure builds up
until an explosion results. The manufacturer's use of a
screw-on top in the teeth of such well known hazard was a
design for tragedy. The expectable came to pass (as is the
fashion with expectability). In Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., a 48-
year-old housewife suffered total blindness from the
explosion of a Drano can with a screw-on top, eventuating in
a $900,000 compensatory and $10,000 punitive award to the
wife and a $20,000 award to her husband for loss of conjugal
fellowship.
A high school chemistry student could see that what was
needed was a ``flip top'' or ``snap cap'' designed to come
off at a pressure of, say, 15-20 pounds per square inch.
After a series of adverse judgments, the manufacturer
substituted the safer flip top. Of course, even the Drano
flip top will be marked for failure if not accompanied by
adequate testing and quality control. Capers involved a suit
for irreversible blindness suffered by 10-year-old Joe Capers
when the redesigned flip top of a can of Drano failed to snap
off when the can fell into the bathtub and the caustic
contents spurted 8\1/2\ feet high impacting Joe in the face
and eyes with resulting total blindness. The shortcomings in
testing the can with the reformulated design cost the company
an award of $805,000. As a great Torts scholar has said,
``Defective products should be scrapped in the factory, not
dodged in the home.''
Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., is a grim and striking
companion case to the Drano decisions mentioned above, and it
underscores the same engineering verities of those cases: the
place to design out dangers is on the drawing boards or when
prescribing the chemical formula. A one-year-old black girl
suffered horrendous facial injuries, ``saponification'' or
fusion of her facial features, when an uncapped container of
Liquid-Plumr was inadvertently tipped over. At the time of
the accident, this excessively and unnecessarily caustic
drain cleaner was composed of 26 percent sodium hydroxide,
i.e., lye. No antidote existed because, as the manufacturer
knew, Liquid-Plumr would dissolve human tissue in a fraction
of a second. To a child (or any human being) a chemical bath
of this drain cleaner could be as disfiguring as falling into
a pool of piranha fish. Liquid-Plumr, mind you, was a
household product, which means that its expectable
environment of use must contemplate the ``patter of little
feet,'' as the children's hour in the American home
encompasses 24 hours of the day.
At the time of marketing this highly caustic drain cleaner,
having made no tests as to its effect on human tissue, within
the existing state of the art, the defendant could have
reformulated the design to use 5 percent potassium hydroxide
which would have been less expensive, just as effective and
much safer. After some 59 other Liquid-Plumr injuries were
reported to defendant, it finally reformulated its design to
produce a safer product. In Drayton the defendant was allowed
to argue in defense and mitigation that its management was
new, that it had learned from its prior claims and litigation
experience and that it had purged the enterprise of its prior
egregious misconduct.
To open the courtroom door is often to open a school door
for predatory producers.
(3) Case of the Tip-Over Steam Vaporizer. A tip-over steam
vaporizer, true to that ominous description, was upset by a
little girl who tripped over the unit's electric outlet cord
on the way to the bathroom in the middle of the night. The
sudden spillage of scalding water in the vaporizer's glass
jar severely burned the 3-year-old child. The worst injuries
in the world are burn injuries. The cause of the catastrophe
was a loose-lidded top which could have been eliminated by
adopting any one of several accessible, safe, practical,
available, desirable and feasible design alternatives, such
as a screw-on or child-guard top. The truth is that the
manufacturer, Hankscraft, had experienced a dozen prior
similar disasters. In the instant case, the little girl
recovered a $150,000 judgment against the heedless
manufacturer, impeaching the vaporizer's design because of
lack of a screw-on or child-guard top. When the manufacturer,
with icy indifference to the serious risks to infant users of
its household product refused to take its liability carrier's
advice to recall and redesign its loose-lidded vaporizer,
persisting in its stubborn refusal when over 100 claims had
been filed against it, the carrier finally balked and refused
to continue coverage unless the company would recall and
redesign. Then and only then did Hankscraft stir itself to
redeem and correct the faulty design of its product,
thereafter proudly proclaiming (and I quote), ``Cover-lock
top protects against sudden spillage if accidentally
tipped.'' Once again Tort Law had to play professor and
policeman and teach another manufacturer that safety does not
cost: It pays. Under what might be called the Cost-Cost
formula, the manufacturer will add safety features when it
comes to understand that the cost of accidents is greater
than the cost of their prevention. The Tip-Over Steam
Vaporizer case is the most graphic example known to use
showing that corporate management can be recalled to its
social responsibilities by threat of stringent liability,
enhanced by deserved civil punishment via punitive
damages, and that belief in such a proposition is more
than an ivory tower illusion.
A good companion case to the Tip-Over-Steam-Vaporizer case,
serving the same Tort Touchstone of Deterrence, is the
supremely instructive Case of the Remington Mohawk 600 Rifle.
While a 14-year-old boy was seeking to unload one of these
rifles, pushing the safety to the ``off'' position as
required for the purpose, the rifle discharged with the
bullet entering the boy's father's back, leaving him
paralyzed and near death for a long time. The agony of his
guilt, his feeling that he was to blame for his father's
devastating injuries, pressed down on the boy's brow like a
crown of thorns and almost unhinged his sanity. Assiduous
investigation by the family's lawyer unearthed expert
evidence of unsafe design and construction and lax quality
control of the safety selector and trigger assemblies of the
Mohawk 600.
The result of the exertions of the plaintiff's lawyer,
deeply and redoubtedly involved in challenging the safety
history of the rifle model, was a capitulation by Remington
and an agreement to settle the father's claim (he was a
seasoned and successful defense trial lawyer) for $6.8
million. Remington also wrote the son a letter, muting some
of his anguish by stating that the weapon was the whole
problem and that he was in no way responsible for his
father's injuries. Then, facing the threat of cancelled
coverage from its carriers for skyrocketing premiums in the
projection of other multimillion dollar awards, Remington
commendably served the public interest by announcing the
recall campaign in which we see another electrifying example
of Tort Law litigating another hazardous product feature from
the market.
Remington's nationwide recall program affected 200,000
firearms; notices in newspapers and magazines similar to this
one that appeared in the January 1979 issue of Field and
Stream cut back on the harvest of hurt and heartbreak:
``IMPORTANT MESSAGE TO OWNERS OF REMINGTON MODEL 600 AND 660
RIFLES, MOHAWK 600 RIFLES, AND XP-100 PISTOLS. Under certain
unusual circumstances, the safety selector and trigger of
these firearms could be manipulated in a way that could
result in accidental discharge. The installation of a new
trigger assembly will remedy this situation. Remington is
therefore recalling all Model 600 rifles except those with a
serial number starting with an `A' . . . Remington recommends
that prior to any further usage of guns included in the
recall, they be inspected and modified if necessary.
[Directions are then given for obtaining name and address of
nearest Remington Recommended Gunsmith who would perform the
inspection and modification service free of charge.].''
Tort Law forced Remington to look down the barrel and see
what it was up against. Once again Tort Law was the death
knell to excessive preventable danger.
For a wonderfully absorbing account of the Mohawk 600, see
Stuart M. Speiser's justly praised Lawsuit (Horizon Press,
New York, 1980) 348-55.
(4) Case of MER/29, the Anti-Cholesterol Drug Which Turned
out to Cause Cataracts. Many trial lawyers will recall the
prescription drug MER/29 marketed for its benign and
benevolent effect in lowering blood cholesterol levels and
treating hardening of the
[[Page S2573]]
arteries but which turned out to have an unpleasant and
unbargained-for effect on users, the risk of causing
cataracts. As Peter DeVries recently observed, ``There is
nothing like a calamity to help us fight our troubles.''
Blatant fraud and suppression of evidence from animal
experiments were proved on the manufacturer's part in the
marketing of this dangerous drug. Who did more--the federal
government or private trial lawyers--in getting this
dangerous drug off the market and compensating the numerous
victims left in its wake? The question carries its own
answer. The United States drug industry has annual sales of
16 billion dollars per year, while the Food and Drug
Administration has an annual budget of 65 million dollars to
oversee all drug manufacture, production and safety. How
can the foothills keep the Alps under surveillance? Worse,
as shown by the MER/29 experience, enforcement of the law
in that situation, far from being vigorous and vigilant,
was lame, limp and lack-luster. It was only private suits
advanced by trial lawyers that furnished the real muscle
of enforcement and sanction, compensation for victims,
deterrence of wrongdoing, and discouragement of corporate
attitudes toward the public recalling that attributed to
Commodore Vanderbilt.
As to the indispensible role and mission of the trial
lawyer in Suing for Safety, it should not be overlooked that
the current Administration has moved to sharply restrict the
regulation of product safety by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission. The 1982 budget for the commission was reduced by
30 percent in the first round of Reagan Administration budget
cuts and is marked for further cuts in the future.
As the Thalidomide, MER/29, Dalkon Shield, Asbestos, DES,
Slip-into-Reverse Transmissions and Fuel Tank scandals have
been starkly revealed, we have crime in the suites as well as
crime in the streets. Corporate culpability calls for
corporate accountability, and our society has developed no
better instrument to encourage socially responsible corporate
behavior than the vehicle of adverse judgments beefed up by
punitive damages. In the MER/29 situation, for example, the
criminal fines levied on the corporate producer and its
executives were slap-on-the-wrist trivial when contrasted
with the deterrent impact of punitive damage awards in
current uncrashworthiness cases where flagrant corporate
indifference to public safety was established.
Our leading scholar in the field of punitive damages,
writing with verve and virtuosity on that subject, concluded
in 1976 that punitive damages awards should be permitted in
appropriate products liability cases. Writing in 1982 with
the same unbeatable authority, Professor David G. Owen traces
the ferment and developments of doctrine in the ensuing years
and then delivers a conclusion informed by exhaustive
research, seasoned reflection, and an obvious morality of
mind. ``I remain convinced of the need to retain this tool of
legal control over corporate abuses. . . .''
(5) Case of the Infant Who Died from Drinking Toxic
Furniture Polish Where Manufacturer Failed to Warn Mother to
Keep Toxic Product out of Reach of Children. This is the
celebrated case of Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., in which a
14-month-old child reach over from his crib and pulled a
doily off a bureau, causing a bottle of Old English Red Oil
Furniture Polish, manufactured by the defendant, to fall into
the toddler's crib. During the few minutes his mother was out
of the room, the baby got the cap off the bottle and drank a
little bit of the polish. He was dead within two days of
resulting chemical pneumonia. The bottle had a separate
warning about combustibility in letters \1/8\ inch high, but
only in the midst of other text entitled ``Directions'' in
letters \1/32\ inch high did it say ``contains refined
petroleum distillates. May be harmful if swallowed,
especially by children.'' The mother testified that she saw
the warning about combustibility but did not read the
directions because she knew how to use furniture polish. In a
negligence action against the maker, the jury found that both
defendant and the baby's mother were negligent and awarded
wrongful death damages to the child's father and siblings but
not to the mother. The Fourth Circuit in keeping with the
grain of modern authority held that it was irrelevant that
the child's ingestion of the toxic polish was an unintended
use of the product. The jury could properly find that in the
absence of an adequate warning to the mother that she could
read and heed--to keep the polish out of the reach of
children--such misuse of the product was a foreseeable one.
The defect was to be tested not only by intended uses but by
foreseeable misuses.
The jury could find that the manufacturer's placement of
the warning was designed more to conceal than reveal,
especially in view of the grater prominence given the fire
warning (\1/8\ of an inch compared to the Lilliputian print,
\1/32\ of an inch, as to the contents containing ``refined
petroleum distillates''). The poison warning could be found
to fall short to what was required to convey to the average
person the dangerous nature of this household product. The
label suggested that harm from drinking the polish was not
certain but merely possible, while experts on both sides
agreed that a single teaspoon would be lethal to children.
The warning in short could properly be found to be
inadequate--too soft, mispositioned and not sufficiently eye-
arresting. Defendant admitted in answer to interrogatories
that it knew of 32 prior cases of poisoning from ingestion of
its ``Old English Red Polish.''
Did the imposition of liability in this seminal Spruill
case supra stimulate, goad or spur the manufacturer to take
safety measures against the foreseeable risk of ingestion by
innocent children? A trip to the local hardware store a
couples of days ago reveals that Old English Red Oil Polish
now sports the following on its label: ``DANGER HARMFUL OR
FATAL IF SWALLOWED. COMBUSTIBLE. KEEP OUT OF REACH OF
CHILDREN. SAFETY CAP.''
An error is not a mistake unless you refuse to correct it.
(6) Case Holding Manufacturer of PAM (Intended to Keep Food
from Sticking to Cooking Surfaces) Liable for Death of Teen-
Ager from Inhalation of PAM's Concentrated Vapors. Harless v.
Boyle-Midway Div. of Amer. Home Products, involved an
increasing number of teenagers who were dying of a ``glue-
sniffing syndrome,'' inhaling the concentrated vapors of PAM,
a household product intended to keep food from sticking to
cooking surfaces. Originally, the manufacturer used only a
soft warning on the can's label: ``Avoid direct inhalation of
concentrated vapors. Keep out of the reach of children.''
However, to the knowledge of defendant, the children
continued sniffing and dying. Then the manufacturer, as an
increasing number of lawsuits were pressed upon it for the
preventable deaths of such children, changed the warning on
its labels. shifting to harder warning: ``CAUTION: Use only
as directed, intentional misuse by deliberately concentrating
and inhaling the contents can be fatal.'' This was, of
course, a much harder and more emphatic warning. The Fifth
Circuit held that it was reversible error to exclude
plaintiff's evidence (in an action for the wrongful death of
a PAM-sniffing 14-year-old) that no deaths had occurred from
PAM sniffing after the defendant had hardened its warning by
warning against the danger of death, the ultimate trauma.
On remand the jury brought in a verdict for the boy's
estate in the amount of $585,000 with an additional finding
by the jury that the lad's administrator was entitled to an
award of punitive damages. Prior to the punitive damages
suit, the case was settled for a total of $1.25 million. It
was uncontested that prior to the lad's death the
manufacturer knew of 45 inhalation deaths from foreseeable
misuse of its product, and upon remand admitted to an
additional 68 from the same expectable cause.
If you will examine the label on the can of PAM on your
shelf, as the writer has just done, you will find: ``WARNING:
USE ONLY AS DIRECTED. INTENTIONAL MISUSE BY DELIBERATELY
CONCENTRATING AND INHALING THE CONTENTS CAN BE HARMFUL OR
FATAL.'' Once again the pressures of liability stimulated a
producer to avoid excessive preventable dangers in its
product's use by strengthening its warning label, thereby
enhancing consumer protection.
(7) Case of the Poisonous Insecticide Holding That Warnings
Must Contain Appropriate Symbols. Such as Skull and
Crossbones, Where Manufacturer knows That Product May Be Used
by Illiterate Workers (Spanish-Speaking Imported Puerto Rican
Laborers) Who Would Not Understand English. This is the
salutary holding in the celebrated case of Hubbard-Hall Chem.
Co. v. Silverman. The First Circuit upheld judgments entered
on jury verdicts for the wrongful death of two illiterate
migrant farm workers who were imported by a Massachusetts
tobacco farmer and killed by contact with a highly toxic
insecticide manufactured and distributed by defendant. Even
though the comprehensive and detailed danger warnings on the
sacks fully complied with label requirements of the
Department of Agriculture, the jury could properly find that
because of the lack of a skull or crossbones or other
comparable symbols the warning was inadequate. Use of the
admittedly dangerous product by persons who were of limited
education and reading ability was within the range of
apprehension of the manufacturer. While evidence of
compliance with governmental regulations was admissible, it
was not decisive. Governmental standards are ``minimums,'' a
floor not a ceiling, and so far as adequate precautions are
concerned, federal regulations do not oust the possibly
higher common-law standards of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts.
The steady, unflagging pressures of litigation against the
inertia, complacency and moral obtuseness of manufacturers
have not only resulted in enhanced safety in the field of
conscious design choices (substituting child-guard screw-on
tops on tip-over steam vaporizers or over-the-axle fuel tanks
for those mispositioned more vulnerably in front of the axle
or adding rear-view mirrors to blind behemothic earth-moving
machines whose design obstructs the vision of a reversing
operator, etc.) But also in inducing product suppliers to
reduce marketing defects in the products they sell by
strengthening the adequacy of the instructions and warnings
that accompany their products set afloat in the stream of
commerce.
The net effect of such benign and beneficial litigation has
been to improve the adequacy and efficacy of the educational
information given to consumers by producers via improvements
in the conspicuousness of warnings given; making them more
prominent, eye-arresting, comprehensive, complete and
emphatic; placing the warnings in more effective locations;
avoiding ambiguous warning; extending warnings to the safe
disposition of the product; and avoiding any dilution of the
warnings given. In short, the
[[Page S2574]]
bottom line, as indicated in the cited representative
sampling of cases, is that successful lawsuits operate as
safety incentives to ``inspire'' product suppliers to furnish
instructions and warnings that are in ratio to the risk and
in proportion to the perils attending foreseeable uses of the
marketed products.
Here, too, we see the conspicuous usefulness of the lawsuit
as the weapon for ferreting out marketing defects, whether
ingenious or ingenuous, in selling dangerously defective
products.
(8) Case of Marketing Carbon Tetrochloride Using Warnings
Found to Be Inadequate Because Inconspicuous. Suppose a
defendant sells carbon tetrachloride and places on all four
sides of the can, in large letters, the words ``Safety
Kleen,'' and then uses small letters (Lippiputian print) to
warn of the serious risk of using the cleaning fluid in an
unventialated place (of places the fine print warning only on
the bottom of the can). It requires no tongue of prophecy to
predict that this warning will be found inadequate because
too inconspicuous. It was so held in Maize v. Atlantic
Refining Co. Not only was the warning inadequate because
not conspicuous enough, but the representation of safety
(``Safety Kleen'') operated to dilute, weaken, and
counteract the warning. Moreover, in Tampa Drug Co. v.
Wait, the court upheld a judgment for the wrongful death
of a 38-year-old husband who died from carbon
tetrachloride poisoning after using a jug of the product
to clean the floors of his home. While the label warned
that the vapor from the liquid was harmful and that
prolonged breathing of it or repeated contact with the
skin should be avoided and that the product should only be
used in well ventilated areas, the court with laser-beam
accuracy ruled that the warning nonetheless could be found
inadequate because of its failure to warn with qualitative
sufficiency as to deadly effects or fatal potentialities
which might follow from exposure to its fumes.
Decisions such as Maize and Wait supra were the prologue
and predicate for the action taken by the FDA in 1970, under
the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, to ban and outlaw
carbon tetrachloride.
Torts archivists know that successful private lawsuits to
recover for harm from products simply too dangerous to be
sold at all, regardless of the completeness or urgency of the
warning given, frequently lead to a recall and reformulation
of the product's design or to a decision to ban the product
from the market. Life and limb are too important to trade off
against unmarketed inventory.
(9) Case of the 8-Year-Old Boy Who Choked to Death from
Strangling on a Quarter-Inch Rubber Rivet, Part of a Riviton
Toy Kit Given Him for Christmas. This case will indeed rivet
the attention (in the sense of attract, fasten and hold) of
concerned citizens who wish to understand how the threat of
liability operates as a spur to safety on the part of product
producers. The present example involves a toymaker whose work
is indeed ``child's play.''
Parker Brothers, a General Mills subsidiary headquartered
some 18 miles north of Boston, had big plans for Riviton.
This was a toy kit consisting of plastic parts, rubber rivets
and a riveting tool with which overjoyed children could put
together anything from a windmill to an airplane. In the
first year on the market in 1977, the Riviton set seemed on
its way to becoming one of those classic toys that parents
will buy everlastingly. However, one of the 450,000
Riveton sets bought in 1977 ended up under the Christmas
tree of an 8-year-old boy in Menomonee Falls, Wis. He
played with it daily for three weeks. Then he put one of
the quarter-inch long rubber rivets into his mouth and
choked to death. Ten months later, with Riveton sales well
on their way to an expected $8.5 million for the year, a
second child strangled on a rivet.
What should the company do? Just shrug off the two fatal
child strangulations, ascribe the deaths to freakish
mischance, try to shift the blame to parental failure to
supervise and police their children at play, or assign
responsibility to the child's abnormal misuse or abuse of
their product? Could not the company cap its disavowal of
responsibility by a bromidic disclaimer that, ``After all,
peanuts are the greatest cause of strangulation among
children and nobody advocates the banning of the peanut.''
However, as manufacturers, Parker Brothers well knew that
they would be held liable to an expert's skill and knowledge
in the particular business of toymaking and were bound to
keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge, discoveries
and hazards associated with toys in their expectable
environment of use by unsupervised children in the home. The
toymaker knew that the Riveton set must be so designed and
accompanied by proper instructions and warnings that its
parts would be reasonably safe for purposes for which it was
intended but also for other uses which, in the hands of the
inexperienced, impulsive and artless children, were
reasonably foreseeable. When you manufacture for children,
you produce for the improvident, the impetuous, the
irresponsible. As a seasoned judge put it: ``The concept of a
prudent child, God forbid, is a grotesque combination.'' Much
must be expected from children not to be anticipated when you
are dealing with adults, especially the propensity of
children to put dangerous or toxic or air-stopping objects
into their mouths. The motto of childhood seems to be: ``When
in doubt, eat it.'' Knowledge of such childish propensity is
imputed to all manufacturers who produce products, especially
toys, which are intended for the use of or exposure to
children. Cases abound to document this axiom.
Recently, Wham-O Manufacturing Co. of San Gabriel, Calif.,
voluntarily recalled its Water Wiggle, a garden hose
attachment that drowned a child when it jammed in its throat.
Still more recent, Mattel, Inc. of Hawthorne, Calif.,
initiated a recall of missiles fired by it Battlestar
Gallactica toys when a 4-year-old boy inhaled one and died.
The manufacturer of a ``Play Family'' set of toy figurines
would have been well advised to pull from the market and
redesign the small carved and molded figures in the toy set,
intended for children of the teething age. A 14-month-old
child swallowed one of the toy figures 1\3/4\'' high and \7/
8\'' in diameter, and before it could be extricated from his
throat at a hospital's emergency room, the child was reduced
to vegetable status as a result of irreversible brain damage
from the toy's windpipe blockage of air supply to the brain.
The manufacturer's dereliction of design and lack of product
testing were to cost it a $3.1 million jury verdict for the
child and his parents.\24\
Against the marketing milieu and the legal setting sketched
above, what should be the proper response of Parker Brothers,
manufacturers of the Riviton toy set, when its executives
learned of the second child's death from strangulation on the
quarter-inch rubber rivet in the toy kit? Should they have
tried to tough it out or luck it out in the well known
lottery called ``do nothing and wait and see''? The company
was sensitive not only to the constraints of the law
(liability follows the marketing of defective products), but
also to the imperatives of moral duty and social
responsibility, and the commercial value of an untarnished
public image. Parker Brothers decided to halt sales and
recall the toy. As the company president succinctly stated,
``Were we supposed to sit back and wait for death No. 3?''
Business, the Frenchman observed, is a combination of war
and sport. Tort Law pressures business to realize how
profitless it may provide to war against children or to
trifle and jest with their safety. The commendable conduct of
Parker Brothers in this case is one of the most striking
tributes we know to the deterrent value and efficacy of Tort
Law and the example would make a splendid case study for the
nation's business schools.
(10) Case of the Recycling Washing Machine That Pulled Out
a Boy's Arm. In Garcia v. Halsett, the plaintiff, an 11-year-
old boy, sued the owner of a coin-operated laundromat for
injuries inflicted while he was using one of the washing
machines in the launderette. He waited several minutes after
the machine had stopped its spin cycle before opening the
door to unload his clothing. As he was inserting his hand
into the machine a second time to remove a second handful of
clothes the machine suddenly recycled and started spinning,
entangling his arm in the clothing, causing him serious
resulting injuries. The evidence was clear that a common $2
micro switch--feasible, desirable, long available--would have
prevented the accident by automatically shutting off the
electricity in the machine when the door was opened. The
reviewing court held the launderette owner strictly liable
for defective design because the machine lacked a necessary
safety device, an available micro switch. Shortly thereafter
the defendant obtained 12 of these micro switches and
installed them himself on the machines. Once again, the
threat of tort liability serves to deter--the prophylactic
purpose of Tort Law at work. The deterrent function of Tort
Law is not just an idea in the air; it has landing gear, has
come down to earth and gone to work.
summary
The foregoing 10 cases and categories are merely random and
representative examples, not intended to be complete or
exhaustive, of the deterrent aim and effect of Tort Law in
the field of product failure or disappointment.
It needs to be emphasized that the preventive aim of Tort
Law is pervasive and runs like a red thread throughout the
entire corpus of Torts. For example, the private Tort
litigation system has served, continues to serve, as an
effective and useful therapeutic and prophylactic tool in
achieving better health care for our people by discouraging
and thereby reducing the incidence of medical mistakes,
mishaps and ``misadventures.'' An error does not become a
mistake unless you refuse to correct it. For example,
successful medical malpractice suits have induced
hospitals and doctors to introduce such safety procedures
as sponge counts, electrical grounding of anesthesia
machines, the padding of shoulder bars on operating
tables, and the avoidance of colorless sterilizing
solutions in spinal anesthesia agents. Remember, the
fraudulent butchery practiced on defenseless patients by
the notorious Dr. John Nork was not unearthed, pilloried
or ended by the vigilant action of hospital
administrators, peer review groups, or medical societies
but by successful, energetically pressed malpractice
actions prosecuted by trial lawyers in behalf of the
victimized patients.
So we come full circle and end as we began: Accident
Prevention Is Better Than Accident Compensation: ``A Fence at
the Top of the Cliff Is Better Than an Ambulance in the
Valley Below.'' A successful lawsuit and the pressures of
stringent liability are one of the most effective means for
cutting down on excessive preventable dangers in our risk-
beleaguered society.
[[Page S2575]]
My hero in the foregoing chronicle of good lawyering has
been the hard-working trial lawyer with his care, commitment
and concern for public safety, the civil religion of us all.
He more than any other professional has proved that we can
indeed Sue for Safety. My tribute to him is in words Raymond
Chandler used to salute his hero: ``Down these mean streets a
man must go who is not himself mean, who is neither tarnished
nor afraid.''
product liability does not extend to negligent entrustment
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Will the Senator from Washington yield for a
question about the applicability of the bill?
Mr. GORTON. Yes, I would be glad to do so.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, we have been seeing a lot of paper
about this conference reports' effects on so-called dram shop laws
which allow victims of drunk driving crashes to seek recovery from
those individuals or establishments who negligently sell, or serve,
alcoholic beverages to persons who are intoxicated or to minors who
subsequently kill or injure someone while driving under the influence.
Mr. GORTON. Yes, we have. I believe those laws can be valuable and
help enhance highway safety and antidrunk driving initiatives, as well
as encourage the responsible service of alcoholic beverages. Section
104 of the conference report is an example of a provision in the very
bill we are considering which tries, in a small way, to discourage
alcohol and drug abuse in this country. Section 104 tells persons that,
if they are drunk or on drugs and that is the principal cause of an
accident, they will not be rewarded through the product liability
system.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I agree. I am troubled that I continue to hear
opponents of product liability reform, claim that these laws will be
adversely affected by the proposed legislation.
Mr. GORTON. The short response, Senator, is these laws will not be
adversely affected or affected in any way. The Senate Commerce
Committee report, which has been adopted as the legislative history of
the conference report, states unequivocally at page 25, footnote 90:
[T]he provisions of the Act would not cover a seller of
liquor in a bar who sold to a person who was intoxicated or a
car rental agency that rents a car to a person who is
obviously unfit to drive or a gun dealer that sells a firearm
to a ``straw man'' fronting for children or felons. These
actions would not be covered by the Act, because they
involved a claim that the product seller was negligent with
respect to the purchaser and not the product. Such actions
would continue to be governed by state law.
Clearly, H.R. 956 will not in any way affect State law regarding the
liability of those individuals who serve additional alcohol to persons
who are obviously under the influence. Similarly, H.R. 956 will not
affect State law regarding the liability of a product seller who fails
to exercise reasonable care in selling a weapon, such as a handgun, to
a minor or known criminals. The legislation also will not affect State
law regarding the liability of a rental agency that fails to exercise
reasonable care by renting an automobile to someone who, at the time,
is obviously unfit to drive.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I think we should say to our
colleagues that the product seller provision's application does not
mean that these cases will be affected.
Mr. GORTON. The Senator is absolutely correct, these cases are not
affected. First and foremost, this is a product liability bill and it
applies to product liability actions. Product liability actions
generally involve harm caused by alleged product defect.
As all are aware, the harm in cases involving drunk drivers is often
severe, indeed, and may even mean the death of an innocent person or a
child. It is important, however, to avoid the misleading arguments by
those who oppose legal fairness and who intentionally attempt to
confuse product liability actions, which are covered by the conference
report, with negligent entrustment cases, which are not covered by the
legislation. As in the past, they use attention-getting, but totally
irrelevant examples, such as drunk driving cases and gun violence.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. And that remains true, regardless of the fact that
the applicability section of the conference report, says that the act
applies to ``any product liability action brought in any State or
Federal Court on any theory for harm caused by a product.'' Is that not
right?
Mr. GORTON. The reason for this broad definition is to assure that
the bill covers all theories of product liability, such as negligence,
implied warranty, and strict liability. It is not broadly defined in
order to extend to cases beyond product liability, and certainly not to
extend the bill to cases involving negligent entrustment, such as in
cases involving the sale of alcohol to an obviously intoxicated
individual or the sale of a gun to a known felon.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, section 103 of the bill, the so-
called product sellers provision, imposes liability when a product
seller fails to exercise reasonable care with respect to a product. If
a tavern owner fails to exercise reasonable care in selling alcohol to
an intoxicated person, would that case be subject to the bill?
Mr. GORTON. No. The case against the tavern owner is based on the
tavern owner's action; it is not based on an alleged defect in the
product, that is, the alcohol. Cases in which a tavern owner sells
alcohol to an intoxicated person involve negligent entrustment and are
not subject to the provisions of the conference report; State law
continues to apply.
To hold that such laws were affected by the bill would be a clear and
obvious misconstruction of the bill. To make this clear, one only need
look to the acts covered by product sellers in the conference report.
This appears in the definition of product seller, which is set forth in
sections 101(11)(B), 101(16)(A). H.R. 956 is applicable to product
sellers, ``but only with respect to those aspects of a product (or
component part of a product) which are created or affected when before
placing the product in the stream of commerce.'' The definition then
addresses those things where the product seller ``produces, creates,
makes, constructs, designs, or formulates * * * an aspect of the
product * * * made by another.'' This is classic product liability and
simply does not apply to the negligent tavern owner.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. And would you agree with me that the ``product
sellers'' provision, as it applies to rented or leased products
(section 103(c)(2)) in the conference report which states that a ``
`product liability action' means a civil action brought on any theory
for harm caused by a product or product use,'' cannot be interpreted to
mean use of alcohol, or use of a gun?
Mr. GORTON. The Senator is correct. First, the clarification is only
included in the rented or leased products portion of the product seller
provision. Thus, by way of example, in a situation where a car rental
agency has exercised reasonable care with respect to maintaining and
inspecting a vehicle, for example, the brakes, the engine, or the
tires, and the person who shows up at the desk to rent the vehicle has
an impeccable driving record, does not appear unfit to drive, and has a
valid driver's license. The renter then takes the car and is
subsequently involved in an accident. The product use language in
section 103(c)(2) holds that the rental company cannot be held
vicariously liable for the negligence of the renter simply because the
company owns the product and has given permission for its use.
In contrast, if the rental agency rented a car to an obviously
intoxicated person and that person was in a subsequent accident, then
the rental agency would have been negligent in renting, or in
negligently entrusting, the car to the person who was, at the time,
obviously intoxicated. As spelled out clearly in the legislative
history, ``Such actions would continue to be governed by State law,''
and are not subject to H.R. 956.
Thus, even in the renter and lessor context, the distinction comes
down to whether the seller was negligent as to the product, such as by
failing to inspect the brakes, or negligent as to the person, such as
by renting to a person with no driver's license and a notorious
criminal record. H.R. 956 covers product liability actions; it does not
cover negligent entrustment actions.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Thank you for that discussion. I hope it will help
counter some of the misinformation that has been circulating regarding
this provision. Is there any special provision of the bill that
emphasizes what you have said here today?
Mr. GORTON. In fact, in order to address these very concerns you have
[[Page S2576]]
thoughtfully raised, Senator, the product seller section specifically
provides that the conference report does not cover negligent
entrustment or negligence in selling, leasing or renting to an
inappropriate party. Section 103(d) expressly states: ``A civil action
for negligent entrustment shall not be subject to the provisions of
this Act, but shall be subject to any applicable State law.'' Frankly,
I believe this provision is superfluous, and for this reason, it does
not matter if, or where the provision appears in the conference report.
In sum, the product liability bill covers product liability, not
negligent entrustment or failure to exercise reasonable care with
regard to whom products are sold, rented or leased. H.R. 956 clearly
would not cover ``a seller of liquor in a bar who sold to a person who
was intoxicated or a car rental agency that rents a car to a person who
is obviously unfit to drive or a gun dealer that sells a firearm to a
`straw man' fronting for children or felons.''
Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today in support of H.R. 956, a
bill to reform product liability law.
A few months ago, the 104th Congress took the first momentous step
toward legal reform. Over President Clinton's veto, we passed H.R.
1056, a bill to reform securities litigation.
This legislation will significantly curb the epidemic of frivolous
lawsuits that are diverting our Nation's resources away from productive
activity and into transaction costs.
In passing H.R. 956, the Senate will be taking an equally important
second step on the road toward a sane legal regime of civil justice.
Our current legal system, under which we spend $300 billion or 4.5
percent of our gross domestic product each year, is not just broken, it
is falling apart.
This is a system in which plaintiffs receive less than half of every
dollar spent on litigation-related costs. It is a system that forces
necessary goods, such as pharmaceuticals that can treat a number of
debilitating diseases and conditions, off the market in this country.
This is a system in which neighbors are turned into litigants. I was
particularly struck by a recent example reported in the Washington
Post. This case involved two 3-year-old children whose mothers could
not settle a sandbox dispute--literally, a pre-school altercation in
the sandbox--without going to court.
Something must be done about this situation and this litigious
psychology, Mr. President, and this bill puts us on the road to real,
substantive reform.
It institutes caps on punitive damages, thereby limiting potential
windfalls for plaintiffs without in any way interfering with their
ability to obtain full recovery for their injuries.
It provides product manufacturers with long-overdue relief from
abusers of their products.
And it protects these makers, and sellers, from being made to pay for
all or most non-economic damages when they are responsible for only a
small percentage.
First, as to punitive damages. No one wants to see plaintiffs denied
full and fair compensation for their injuries. And this bill would do
nothing to get in the way of such recoveries.
Unfortunately, punitive damages have come to be seen as part of the
normal package of compensation to be expected by plaintiffs. George
Priest of the Yale Law School reports that in one county, Bullock, AL,
95.6 percent of all cases filed in 1993-94 included claims for punitive
damages.
Punitive damages are intended to punish and deter wrongdoing. When
they become routine--one might say when they reach epidemic
proportions--they end up hurting us all by increasing the cost of
important goods and services.
For example, the American Tort Reform Association reports that, of
the $18,000 cost of a heart pacemaker, $3,000 goes to cover lawsuits,
as does $170 of the $1,000 cost of a motorized wheelchair and $500 of
the cost of a 2-day maternity hospital stay.
We can no longer afford to allow this trend to continue. I am glad,
therefore, that this bill begins to cap punitive damages--although in
my judgment it only makes a beginning in that area.
I am particularly glad that the bill imposes a hard cap of $250,000
on punitive damages assessed against small businesses--the engine of
growth and invention in our Nation.
Of course, punitive damage awards are not the only things increasing
the costs of needed products.
Throughout the debate over civil justice reform I have been referring
to the case of Piper Aircraft versus Cleveland. I use that example
because it shows how ridiculous legal standards can literally kill an
industry--as they did light aircraft manufacturing in America--and cost
thousands of American jobs.
In Piper Aircraft, a man took the front seat out of his plane and
intentionally attempted to fly it from the back seat. He crashed, not
surprisingly, and his family sued and won over $1 million in damages on
the grounds that he should have been able to fly safely from the back
seat.
These are the kinds of decisions we must stop. Drunken plaintiffs,
plaintiffs who abuse and misuse products--plaintiffs who blame
manufacturers and sellers for their own misconduct--should not be
rewarded with large sums of money. They may deserve our concern and
sympathy, but we as a people do not deserve to pay for their misconduct
through the loss of entire industries.
I am happy that this bill establishes defenses based on plaintiff
inebriation and abuse of the product because I believe these defenses
will benefit all Americans.
Finally, it seems clear to me that no manufacturer should be held
liable for non-economic damages which that individual or company did
not cause.
In its common form, the doctrine of joint liability allows the
plaintiff to collect the entire amount of a judgment from any defendant
found partially responsible for the plaintiff's damages.
Thus, for example, a defendant found to be 1 percent responsible for
the plaintiff's damages could be forced to pay 100 percent of the
plaintiff's judgment.
This is unfair. And the unfairness is aggravated when noneconomic
damages are awarded.
Noneconomic damages are intended to compensate plaintiffs for
subjective harm, like pain and suffering, emotional distress, and
humiliation.
Because noneconomic damages are not based on tangible losses,
however, there are no objective criteria for calculating their amount.
As a result, the size of these awards often depends more on the luck of
the draw, in terms of the jury, than on the rule of law. Defendants can
be forced to pay enormous sums for unverifiable damages they did not
substantially cause.
This bill would reform joint liability in the product liability
context by allowing it to be imposed for economic damages only, so that
a defendant could be forced to pay for only his proportionate share of
noneconomic damages.
As a result, plaintiffs would be fully compensated for their out-of-
pocket losses, while defendants would be better able to predict and
verify the amount of damages they would be forced to pay.
This reform thus would address the most pressing concerns of
plaintiffs and defendants alike.
Mr. President, problems will remain with our civil justice system
after this bill is made into law--if this bill is signed by President
Clinton and made law.
Charities and their volunteers will remain unprotected from frivolous
lawsuits.
Our municipalities will remain exposed to profit-seeking plaintiffs.
And the nonproducts area of private civil law in general will remain
unreformed--3-year-olds and their mothers may still end up in court
over a sandbox altercation.
In the last session I and some of my colleagues fought for more
extensive, substantive, and programmatic reforms to our civil justice
system. These were consistently turned back.
I believe at this point it is time for us to consider more neutral,
procedural reforms, such as in the area of Federal conflicts rules, to
rationalize a system we cannot seem to tame.
But I am certain, Mr. President, that this bill marks an important
step toward a fairer, more reasonable and less expensive civil justice
system.
This is why I am frustrated that President Clinton has threatened to
veto this bill.
[[Page S2577]]
The President has stated repeatedly that he would support balanced,
limited product liability reform. He has been singularly unhelpful in
his opposition to more far-reaching reforms that would do more for
American workers and consumers. But he has claimed that he would
support product liability reform.
Now the President is claiming that this legislation is somehow
``unfair to consumers.''
Mr. President, is a system in which fifty-seven cents of every dollar
awarded in court goes to lawyers and other transaction costs fair to
consumers of legal services?
Is it really pro-consumer to have a system in which, as reported in a
conference board survey, 47 percent of firms withdraw products from the
marketplace, 25 percent discontinue some form of research, and 8
percent lay off employees, all out of fear of lawsuits?
Please tell me, Mr. President, are consumers helped by a system in
which, according to a recent Gallup survey, one out of every five small
businesses decides not to introduce a new product, or not to improve an
existing one, out of fear of lawsuits?
The clear answer, I believe, is that consumers are hurt by our out-
of-control civil justice system, a system which makes them pay more for
less sophisticated and updated goods.
I respectfully suggest that President Clinton look beyond the
interests of his friends among the trial lawyers to the interests of
the American people as a whole.
If he looks to that interest he will find a nation hungry for reform,
yearning to be freed from a civil justice system that is neither civil
nor just, seeking protection from egregious wrongs, but not willing to
sacrifice necessary goods, important public and voluntary services, and
the very character of their communities to a system that no longer
produces fair and predictable results.
If we in this chamber consult the interest of the people, Mr.
President, we will pass this bill. If President Clinton consults that
primary interest, he will sign the bill and make it law.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Ms. SNOWE. Mr. President, for those who were becoming skeptical, the
conference report before us demonstrates that bipartisanship is still
alive and well in the U.S. Congress.
First, I would like to express my appreciation to those who have
contributed so greatly to the completion of this legislation--not only
in the 104th Congress, but in some cases for more than a decade. The
chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Pressler, has been
instrumental in shepherding this legislation from the committee, to the
Senate floor, into conference, and now back to the Senate floor. Also,
Senator Rockefeller and Senator Gorton--whose commitment and leadership
on this issue have been unsurpassed in the Senate, and without whose
efforts we would not be voting on this conference report today--were
invaluable in crafting this legislation.
As I stated during the markup of S. 565 in the Senate Commerce
Committee, and later during consideration of the bill on the floor of
the Senate, I believe there is a compelling case for product liability
reform in this country.
I firmly believe the legislation the Senate adopted early last year
was a critical and long overdue first step to reforming an area of law
that touches each and every one of us as consumers in America.
Therefore, I am now eager to see a well-conceived and balanced bill
accomplishing this goal enacted during the 104th Congress. It is a goal
I think we can and should reach. I believe the conference report before
us is well-conceived and balanced, and am particularly pleased that it
contains the punitive damage cap I offered, and which was adopted,
during consideration of the Senate bill.
In my statement on product liability on the floor of the Senate many
months ago, I established my own personal checklist of critical issues
I believed this legislation ought to address to make the bill fair,
equitable, and effective. That is now also true for this conference
report.
First, we must allow safe consumer products to be developed to meet
consumer needs, and ensure that consumers can seek reasonable
compensation when injuries and damages occur.
Second, the law must dissuade consumers from filing frivolous
lawsuits, without discouraging Americans who have substantive
complaints from filing legitimate suits.
Third, a uniform law must encourage companies to police the safety of
their own products--both by providing incentives for excellence in
safety and strong punishment when product safety is breached.
Last, and perhaps most importantly, one of our fundamental goals must
be to ensure that this legislation protects the interests of the
average American consumer who makes hefty use of products, but knows
little of their innate safety or risk.
I believe that this conference report--like the Senate-passed bill--
meets these criteria. One component of this conference report that I
considered crucial to fulfilling these requirements is the cap on
punitive damages.
To understand the issue of a punitive damage cap, I think it is
valuable to remember what punitive damages are--and are not. I believe
this issue is particularly important before today's vote because of
recent reports in various news sources that have confused a cap on
punitive damages with a cap on pain-and-suffering, or a cap on economic
damages.
Punitive damages are punishment that serve an invaluable role in
deterring quasi-criminal behavior by businesses. They have nothing to
do with providing compensation to a person who has been harmed and are
not intended in any way to make the plaintiff. That purpose is served
by compensatory damages, which provide recovery for both economic
damages--which include lost wages and medical expenses--and noneconomic
damages, which include pain and suffering and other losses, such as
those cased by the loss of one's sight, appendage, or reproductive
organs.
One of the overriding problems in our current system is the absence
of any consistent, meaningful standards for determining whether
punitive damages should be awarded and--if so--in what amounts. The
absence of consistent standards not only leads to widely disparate and
runaway punitive awards, but it also affects the settlement process.
Individuals and companies that are sued often face a catch 22: pay high
legal fees to fight a case through trial, verdict, and appeal--or
simply settle out of court for any amount less than these anticipated
legal fees.
Even for the defendant who recognizes the cost of proving innocence
to be too great, or simply hopes to avoid the lottery nature of a
possible punitive award--seeking a settlement carries a hidden cost.
The lack of a uniform national standard--or simply the existence of
vague State standards--forces the defendant to include a punitive
premium in their settlements, even when the likelihood of a punitive
award is small or even nonexistent. In addition, the high reversal rate
of punitive damage awards underscores the absence of clear and
understandable rules.
Therefore, in establishing a cap, I considered it vital that the
measure we chose be fair, uniform, act as adequate punishment, and
serve as an adequate deterrent. I believe a cap based on compensatory
damages accomplishes all of these objectives, which is why I fought to
include such a measure in the Senate bill. This measure is fair because
it is blind to the socioeconomic position of the plaintiff. In
addition, because a punitive cap that includes noneconomic damages in
its formula is inherently unpredictable, one cannot argue that a
business with quasi-criminal intents will be able to predict the
ultimate cost of all possible punitive claims and make a financial
decision to produce a dangerous product.
At the same time, I do not believe that a cap based on a measure of
economic damages alone would accomplish all of these objectives in all
circumstances. Although such a measure might serve as adequate
punishment and act as an adequate deterrent in many cases, it relies
too greatly on the economic position of the plaintiff in establishing a
sufficient level of punishment.
While the Senate bill also included an additur provision that allowed
the judge to impose a higher punitive damage award in particularly
egregious circumstances--and this conference report also includes a
modified additur
[[Page S2578]]
provision--I believe the measure based on compensatory damages will
work for everyone and will subject egregious offenders to strong
punishment. This standard is fair and nondiscriminatory. It will apply
to all litigants equally--whether you are a man or woman, wealthy or
poor, a child or an adult. Therefore, I am particularly pleased that
the conference report before us maintains the Snowe amendment on
punitive damages. And while I believe that the additur will be proven
to be unnecessary due to the inherently even-handed and unpredictable
nature of total compensatory damages, I accept its inclusion in the
conference report as a means of providing the opportunity for
additional punishment in cases where a judge--staying within the
parameters set by the jury--deems it necessary.
Mr. President, the bill before us--as outlined by Senators Gorton and
Rockefeller--is a targeted bill that brings common sense and reform to
one class of lawsuits: those pertaining to product liability. I believe
this legislation is sound and will benefit consumers and businesses. As
a result, I share the disappointment of other Members of this body in
President Clinton's statement that he would veto this bipartisan
legislation. At the least, I found it surprising that President Clinton
opposes legislation that he endorsed as a member of the National
Governors' Association when he was Governor Clinton. I remain hopeful
that President Clinton will reconsider his opposition in the coming
days. I think a strong bipartisan vote in favor of this legislation is
just what the President needs in order to see the light on this issue.
Mr. President, we must be able to show the American people that we
not only considered this essential and historic legislation, but that
we passed it with strong bipartisan support as well. There is simply no
question that, if enacted, this reform will have a positive and wide-
ranging impact on millions of Americans. Thank you, Mr. President, I
yield the floor.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I continue to oppose the product liability
reform bill for two main reasons: it unnecessarily intrudes upon the
prerogatives of our State governments and the purported problem the
bill attempts to address--the impact of punitive damages--is
overstated.
For over two centuries, tort law has been developed by our common law
courts and State legislatures. The same is true for our contract law,
real property law, insurance law, and a host of other subjects. The
core principles of tort law are the same across the country, but each
State has adjusted its laws to suit its individual needs, experimented
with liability reforms, and attempted to strike a careful balance the
interests of business and consumers.
The Federal product liability bill would put an end to this era of
local experimentation and adjustment. Instead, it would contribute to
the trend of the last half century of centralizing power in Washington.
Unfortunately, the product liability bill will be only the first step
in this process. Once it is completed other interests will follow with
pleas for Federal intervention. And eventually the States will be
stripped of yet another area of authority. This trend runs entirely
counter to the generally accepted principle that the Federal Government
is too big and that more authority should be returned to the States and
localities.
Ironically, we are taking this step at a time when the States are
vigorously engaged in the topic of tort reform. Just this year, New
Jersey, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Texas have passed tort reform
legislation. In fact, since 1986, 31 States have altered their product
liability laws, 30 States limit the amount of punitive damages in some
manner and 41 States have changed or abolished the rule of joint and
several liability. With this much activity on the state level, there is
no justification for this sweeping, intrusive Federal bill.
I also believe that the case for tort reform has been exaggerated.
Unfortunately, the debate over this legislation has been driven more by
anecdote and horror stories than objective facts. Indeed, the dearth of
solid, unbiased research led the Wall Street Journal to conclude last
year that ``Truth Is the First Casualty of the Tort-Reform Debate.''
A review of some data collected by the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
a neutral arbiter on this topic, demonstrates that runaway jury
verdicts are not as great of a problem as the tort reform advocates
suggest. The study showed that courts in the 75 largest counties in the
country decided 762,000 civil cases in 1992. Punitive damages were
awarded in only 364 of these cases--.04 percent. Only 360 of the
762,000 cases involved product liability. Punitive damages were awarded
in only three of those cases. And the total amount of punitive damages
awarded was only $40,000.
The study also suggests that if we are looking to solve problems with
the application of punitive damages, perhaps we should be addressing
other areas of the law. Of the cases in which the plaintiff won a jury
verdict, punitive damages were awarded in 30 percent of all slander
cases, 21 percent of all fraud cases, but only 2 percent of all product
liability cases.
I do not deny that there have been abusive cases where excessive
awards have been made for minor injuries. But to address this problem,
we need to do more to punish attorneys who bring frivolous cases or use
the force of the legal system to coerce companies to settle meritless
claims. We also need to encourage judges to intervene when juries run
amok. Instead of taking these steps, this bill places caps on damages
and limits the ability of injured parties to collect judgments imposed
against wrongdoers. In essence, it limits the ability of those with
meritorious claims to gain full compensation in order to rid the system
of shameful cases that should have never been filed in the first place.
In my view, this is an unwise approach that will do damage to our
principle of federalism. I will vote against this conference report.
Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I would like to explain why I voted
against this product liability conference report.
All of us in this room have heard horrific stories about people who
got hurt when they did stupid or silly things with a product and then
recovered tremendous amounts of money from innocent businesses. Those
few stories have gotten a lot of mileage. They have gotten us to a
conference report that takes power from consumers and gives it to
corporations.
Mr. President, I am a mother who wants to be responsible for passing
laws that improve the chances for my children to live healthy, safe
lives. I am glad that victims have used the current State-based product
liability laws to force manufacturers to make safe toys, nonflammable
pajamas, and cars and trucks that don't explode. The current legal
system forced companies to be responsible or face the possibility of
significant financial loss.
I also want to be responsible for passing laws that provide the hard
working men and women of this country an opportunity to be fully
compensated for injuries that are a direct result of products they use
in the workplace. This conference report makes it much harder for our
workers to recover damages from those responsible for their injuries.
It is designed to give advantage to corporations and disadvantage to
our workers through its limits on joint liability for noneconomic
damages, on punitive damages, and on seller liability, as well as its
broadly drawn defenses to liability, such as the statute of repose.
In addition, I want to support legislation that allows our citizens
to trust that the medical devices they are receiving are safe. So many
women needlessly suffered when the maker of silicone gel breast
implants refused to heed initial warning signs that their product was
flawed. Today, there is no dispute that there is a strong correlation
between silicone breast implants and serious health disorders,
including joint and muscle pain, tremors, and autoimmune diseases. And,
unfortunately, not all of the victims of these implants are known. For
those who have not yet filed, this bill will block them from seeking
redress from this grossly negligent company. That is wrong.
Finally, I want to be responsible for legislation that improves our
citizens' quality of life. This bill could severely limit lawsuits
involving products that damage the environment, such as pesticides and
toxic chemicals. In particular, the provision addressing joint and
[[Page S2579]]
several liability could make it nearly impossible for victims to
receive full and fair compensation for harm caused by a mixture of
toxic substances where a victim is unable to prove the percentage of
damage caused by each chemical. Especially now, when we see efforts to
scale back Government's role in environmental protection, the civil
justice system is an even more important mechanism for deterring
environmental degradation.
I know that responsible businesses feel threatened by the current
system. I believe we should seek to reform and improve our system. But
this approach is too sweeping. We need to take smaller steps and make
more incremental reforms.
Mr. President, I have voted against this conference report for all of
the above reasons. I cannot support a products liability law that
shifts power from the States to the Federal Government and takes power
away from our children, the elderly and working people and gives it to
the companies that produce harmful products.
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, today I am pleased to support the
conference agreement on product liability litigation reform--reached
after tremendous efforts by my colleagues in both the House and Senate.
The Senator from Washington [Mr. Gorton], the Senator from Utah [Mr.
Hatch], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller] deserve a
lot of credit for putting together a thoughtful, bi-partisan approach
to solving the problems associated with products liability lawsuits.
This is a bill that President Clinton should sign.
I also must commend the House conferees, particularly the
distinguished chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Mr. Hyde, for
their willingness to reach a compromise on some of the more
controversial provisions in their bill, in order that we could
successfully pass a conference report that still will have a positive
impact on our products liability litigation system. There are some, and
I am among them, who would have liked to see a conference report which
went even further on some issues than the agreement we have before us.
However, I realize that we would have had a difficult time passing a
more expansive and comprehensive legal reform bill. Clearly some reform
is better than no reform at all. Our legal system needs it.
I have watched the products liability reform debate over the past
several months with great interest. There was a time when many believed
that this type of legal reform would not be possible. No one, least of
all me, underestimates the power of the trial lawyers to derail even
the most reasonable lawsuit reform efforts. Senator Dodd and I fought
for years to fix our Nation's securities class-action system, and late
last year the Congress overrode President Clinton's veto of the bill
and enacted comprehensive securities litigation reform. I hope that the
President will examine this bill closely, because if he does, the only
conclusion he should reach is that this is a reasonable, commonsense
approach to reform that is good for the country.
There can be no doubt that our current products liability system
extracts tremendous costs from the business community and from
consumers. The great expense associated with products liability
lawsuits drives up the cost of producing and selling goods, and these
costs are passed on to the American consumer. I have heard many tell me
about how half of the cost of a $200 football helmet is associated with
products liability litigation, and how $8 out of the cost of a $12
vaccine goes to products liability costs. We can no longer afford to
require our consumers to pay this tort tax.
Because of the high costs associated with products liability
litigation, American companies often find it difficult to obtain
liability insurance. The insurance industry has estimated that the
current cost to business and consumers of the U.S. tort system is over
$100 billion. Insurance costs in the United States are 15 to 20 times
greater than those of our competitors in Europe and Japan. Much of this
money ends up in the pockets of lawyers, who exploit the system and
reap huge fee awards while plaintiffs go under compensated. Meanwhile,
businesses which create jobs and prosperity in America suffer.
For companies involved in the manufacture of certain products, like
machine tools, medical devices, and vaccines, this means that
beneficial products go undeveloped, or after they are developed, they
do not make it to the marketplace out of fear of generating a products
liability lawsuit. This hampers our competitiveness abroad, and limits
the products available to consumers. Harvard Business School Prof.
Michael Porter has written about how products liability affects
American competitiveness. He has written:
In the United States . . . product liability is so extreme
and uncertain as to retard innovation. The legal and
regulatory climate places firms in constant jeopardy of
costly, and, as importantly, lengthy product liability suits.
The existing approach goes beyond any reasonable need to
protect consumers, as other nations have demonstrated through
more pragmatic approaches.
In the case of manufacturers of vaccines and other medical devices,
the cost of our unreasonable and certainly un-pragmatic products
liability litigation system often means that potentially life-saving
innovations never make it to the American public. Products liability
adds $3,000 to the cost of a pacemaker, and $170 to the cost of a
motorized wheelchair. It also has caused the DuPont Co. to cease
manufacturing the polyester yarn used in heart surgery out of fears of
products liability litigation. Five cents worth of yarn cost them $5
million to defend a case, and DuPont decided that they simply could not
afford further litigation costs. Now, foreign companies manufacture the
yarn, but will not sell it in the United States out of fear of also
being sued. These are products which could save lives and improve the
quality of living for all Americans.
In cases where a truly defective product has injured an individual,
the litigation process is too slow, too costly and too unpredictable.
This bill, because it creates a Federal system of products liability
law, will return some certainty to a system that now often
undercompensates those really injured by defective products and
overcompensates those with frivolous claims.
Those injured by defective products often must wait 4 or 5 years to
receive compensation. This leads some victims to settle more quickly in
order to receive relief within a reasonable time. Companies often must
expend huge amounts of money in legal fees to settle or litigate these
long, complicated cases. These again are resources that could be better
spent developing new products or improving the designs of existing
ones.
I believe that the most important reform in this conference report is
the way it treats punitive damages. As their name implies, punitive
damages are designed to punish companies and deter future wrongful
conduct. They are assessed in these cases in addition to the actual
damages suffered by injured victims.
Unfortunately, these damages do not do much, except line the pockets
of lawyers. They serve relatively little deterrent purpose and led
former Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell to describe them as inviting
``punishment so arbitrary as to be virtually random.'' Justice Powell
wisely has commented that because juries can impose virtually limitless
punitive damages, they act as ``legislator and judge, without the
training, experience, or guidance of either.'' Justice Powell is
absolutely correct, and I applaud the drafters of this bill for dealing
with the problems associated with these types of damages.
The Washington Post also agrees that punitive damages reform is
necessary. An editorial in support of the conference report printed
last week notes that ``there are no ground rules for judges and juries
in this area'' and that ``the whole thing is like a lottery, which is
terribly unfair.'' The editorial concludes that ``the compromise should
be accepted by both houses and signed by the President.''
Reform of punitive damages will return some common sense to the
system. Huge punitive damage awards threaten to wipe out small
businesses and charitable organizations and I applaud the conferees for
providing special protection for these important entities, which are
particularly vulnerable to legal extortion by trial lawyers.
By capping the amount of punitive damages available in product
liability cases and raising the legal threshold for an award of
punitive damages, the conference report will relieve some of
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the pressure on even the most innocent defendant to settle or face an
award which could potentially bankrupt the company. It however
reasonably allows judges some flexibility to go above the cap in truly
egregious cases, where increased punitive damages might be warranted.
The conferees also have taken the wise step to reform joint
liability, without limiting the ability of plaintiffs to recover their
economic damages. The new law will abolish joint liability for
noneconomic damages, like pain and suffering, but allows States to
retain it for economic damages like hospital bills. This will reduce
the pressure on defendants who are only nominally responsible for the
injury to settle the case or risk huge liability out of proportion to
their degree of fault, while ensuring that injured victims get
compensated for their out-of-pocket loss.
The compromise also limits liability in cases where the victim
altered or misused the allegedly defective product in an unforeseeable
way. It simply is unfair to hold manufacturers liable in cases where
consumers use products in ways for which they were not intended. It
also is unfair to hold defendants liable in cases where the plaintiff's
use of alcohol or drugs significantly contributed to their injury. I am
happy to see that the new law will provide an absolute defense in such
cases.
Mr. President, as I said earlier, I am no stranger to legal reform.
Many of those who are responsible for this important and well-crafted
legislation were cosponsors of the securities reform bill Senator Dodd
and I authored earlier this Congress. Our tort system is badly in need
of reform, and the conference report on products liability before us is
a step in the right direction. I support it, and I hope that my
colleagues and the President will as well.
Ms. MOSELEY-BRAUN. Mr. President, I voted for S. 565, the Senate
product liability bill, when it was before the Senate last May, and I
support this conference report, which is, in virtually all of its
essential provisions, identical to that bill. I supported the bill last
year, and I continue to support it now, because I believe that Federal
product liability reform makes sense for Americans, and because it
makes sense for America.
Lets be clear what product liability reform is and is not about. It
is not about an explosion of litigation that our courts physically
cannot handle. It is about the chilling effect that product liability
judicial decisions in one State can have on businesses across the
Nation.
It is not about making it more difficult for Americans injured by
products to get justice from those who injured them. It is about
reducing the number of frivolous suits and unnecessary legal costs.
It is not about tilting the playing field in favor of business and
against consumers or employees. It is about taking a step toward making
the playing field more level for consumers, employees and businesses
all across this Nation.
And it is not about taking powers away from States in order to
disadvantage ordinary Americans. Rather, it is a narrow, carefully
crafted approach to reform based on the realities of commerce today.
The basic fact that underlies this bill is that commerce is not
local, but national and international. Over 70 percent of what is
manufactured in Illinois is sold elsewhere, and Illinois is not unique
in that regard. Because commerce is national, and indeed, increasingly
international, the laws of any one State are simply not effective in
establishing product liability standards for manufacturers in that
State. Our Nation's Governors have recognized that fact, which is why
the National Governor's Association has three times unanimously
approved resolutions supporting Federal product liability reform.
Article I, section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
regulate interstate commerce. Given the interstate and international
nature of commerce, and the importance of having a healthy climate for
manufacturing here in the United States, reform is essential, both so
we can compete successfully in an ever-more competitive world
marketplace and so we can generate the kind of economic growth needed
to offer every American the opportunity to achieve the American Dream.
Achieving that dream depends on being able to find a good job at good
wages, jobs that make it possible for American families to purchase
their own homes and to send their children to college, and that
suggests a healthy climate for manufacturing--which tends to produce
the kinds of jobs Americans want and need--is in our national interest.
The current fragmented product liability system offers less certainty
than a casino. That lack of certainty means that the current product
liability system imposes costs far greater than the amounts awarded to
successful plaintiffs, or the costs involved in defending and pursuing
product liability cases. It adds costs to products, even when a company
has never been sued, and unnecessary higher costs hurt consumers, and
hurt job creation. And, while it is impossible to quantify, there is no
doubt that the current product liability system causes some companies
not to produce some products. That, too, means fewer good paying
manufacturing jobs.
I do not suggest that Americans who might be injured by products
should sacrifice their rights to redress for their injuries in order to
help our economy generate new, good paying jobs--and this bill does not
ask that of any American. But we must all remember that Americans
aren't just consumers; they don't have just one interest at stake.
Instead of dividing Americans from one another, therefore, we should be
working together for the kind of reform that is in all of our
interests.
By creating greater certainty, by reducing unnecessary cost, and by
addressing the inadvertent chilling effect the current system has on
new product creation, product liability reform will help generate new
economic growth, and new jobs. And reform will add to the
competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing, something that is essential in
this ever more competitive world economy.
Some continue to argue that we should leave this issue to the States
to address. However, the fact is that, given today's economic
realities--and tomorrow's--product liability, no less than health care
and other components of our social safety net, is a legitimate and
necessary subject for Federal action. And the fact is is that the right
kind of product liability reform, like the right kind of health care
reform, and the right kind of welfare reform, and expand opportunity,
and help create a brighter future for Americans individually and for
our Nation collectively.
While this bill is not perfect, I think that, in general, it is the
right kind of reform. It will bring greater uniformity to product
liability law. It will help cut out the unnecessary costs the current
product liability system imposes on businesses, consumers, and
employees. And it tries very hard to appropriately balance the
competing concerns involved.
I know that some Americans do not share the view that Federal product
liability reform is needed, and that there are a number of concerns
regarding specific provisions of the bill. I think it is worth noting,
however, that the conference report now before us is, with very modest
changes, the bill this Senate sent to conference. I ask unanimous
consent, Mr. President, that a table comparing the original Senate bill
and the conference report be printed in the Record at the conclusion of
my remarks.
I know the statute of repose has generated some controversy. I would
simply point out three things. First, the 15-year statute of repose
applies to workplace goods only.
Second, no State with a statute of repose provides a more liberal
time period than the one in the conference report; and
Third, the bill permits plaintiffs in every State to file a complaint
after she or he discovers or should have discovered both the harm and
its cause, a provision that is particularly important to plaintiffs who
have trouble identifying the cause of the injury they suffered. For
example, a person who developed a cancer many years after exposure to a
chemical would be able to file suit anytime up to 2 years after the
link between the chemical, and the harm he or she suffered, was
identified.
The punitive damages provision has also been controversial. However,
this
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provision is virtually identical to the bill as it passed the Senate
last year. And it is more proconsumer than the laws in about half of
the States.
Moreover, the bill does not put a hard cap on punitive damages. For
cases involving all but the smallest of businesses, it allows punitive
damages to be imposed up to the greater of $250,000 or twice the
plaintiff's economic and noneconomic damages, including pain and
suffering, and allows the judge in the case to increase the award by up
to double those limits--in other words, to go up to four times the
plaintiff's economic and noneconomic damages--if necessary ``to punish
the egregious conduct of the defendant.'' This approach was modeled on
a recommendation made by the American College of Trial Lawyers, and it
will permit huge punitive damages awards in cases where such awards are
justified by the nature of the conduct and the severity of the harm
involved, even when the harm is mostly noneconomic in nature.
As to the concerns regarding joint and several liability, I think it
is worth pointing out that the conference report, like the original
Senate-passed bill, only eliminates joint and several liability for
noneconomic damages. This formulation is already the law in California,
and it provides reasonable protection both for plaintiffs and for
businesses who have only a minor involvement in the harm suffered by
the plaintiff, but who can be held responsible for the entire amount of
damages if the other defendants in the case are not able to pay their
share of the amount awarded.
It is also worth noting that the conference report does not contain
the broad, unjustified preemption of State civil justice systems that
was in the House-passed bill, provisions that could of undermined the
civil rights of Americans, and which would have almost casually
overturned our whole State justice system. And it does not contain the
medical malpractice provisions that were in the House bill, provisions
that did not and do not belong in a product liability bill.
Moreover, the conference report does not contain the so-called FDA
excuse that I strongly opposed in the last Congress. The bill that
emerged from conference is the kind of narrow, carefully tailored
approach that was needed, and the only approach that I could possibly
support.
Mr. President, I said in 1994 that the problems present in our
product liability system are problems that this body must address. Last
year, when the product liability bill was before the Senate, I
reiterated my view that reform is necessary, and I supported S. 565 as
a reasonable approach to achieving that necessary reform. The
conference report before now before us does not contain the provisions
from the House bill that I believe have no place in this legislation.
And, as I said at the outset of my remarks, it is close to identical to
the bill I voted for last May. I therefore voted for cloture yesterday,
and will vote in favor of sending this conference report to the
President. I hope he will reconsider his position, and sign it, because
enacting this bill into law is in the interest of every American.
Mr. President, I want to conclude by congratulating Senators Gorton
and Rockefeller for their leadership in bringing the bill to this
point. I particularly want to thank my colleague from West Virginia. He
went to great lengths to consult with me, and with other Senators, and
to make all of us part of that conference, even though we technically
were not among the conferees. I greatly appreciate his commitment to
the kind of balanced, narrowly crafted reform that is so greatly needed
and so long overdue. I am pleased to have this opportunity to vote with
him, and with the other supporters on a set of reforms that are based
on common sense, and that make sense for America.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, our laws play an important role in
fostering a competitive economic environment by establishing ground
rules for fair competition and by helping to reduce the costs of doing
business. But our laws play an even more critical role in protecting
the rights of individuals, workers, and consumers. Congress, therefore,
has a special responsibility to ensure that the laws we write are
reasonable and fair.
The conference report on H.R. 956, the so-called Common Sense Product
Liability Reform Act of l996, fails the ``reasonable and fair'' test.
The conference report, if enacted, will take away the rights U.S.
citizens enjoy today in seeking redress for harm caused by unsafe
products while giving manufacturers no incentive to produce safer
products. This conference report is not fair to the working men and
women of this country. It is biased against low-income individuals,
women, and the elderly and it is plain dangerous for consumers. The
products liability conference report will overturn the laws of every
State and, I fear, will do great harm.
Consider that every year thousands of workers are injured or killed
as a direct result of defects in products they use in the workplace.
For many of them, the tort system is the only recourse for full redress
of their injuries. Yet, this conference report will make it harder for
workers to hold fully accountable those who cause the injury. The
limits on joint liability for non-economic damages, on punitive
damages, on seller liability and the greatly expanded coverage under
the statute of repose are all one-sided. Together, these provisions
clearly favor wealthy corporations at the expense of working Americans.
The 15-year statute of repose would affect more than one-half of the
products claims filed against machine tool manufacturers. Under the
conference report, workers injured by defective machinery 15 years
after first delivery would be prohibited from seeking to prove in court
that even a grossly negligent manufacturer was responsible for their
injury. On the other hand, the right of the business to pursue an
action against the same manufacturer for commercial loss would be fully
preserved.
The conference report would cap punitive damages at $250,000 or two
times compensatory damages, whichever is greater, except in cases
involving small businesses with fewer than 25 employees, where
punitives would be capped at $250,000 or two times compensatories,
whichever is the lesser amount. Such limits clearly undermine the
deterrent value of punitive damages.
The threat of punitive damages has in part contributed to the recall,
discontinuance, or change in the use of many dangerous and defective
products, including the Ford Pinto, asbestos, the Dalkon shield, the
Suzuki Samurai, heart valves, and silicone breast implants. Punitive
damages have also helped make products safer: the redesign of the Jeep
CJ-5; adding guards to chainsaws; the replacement of lap-belts with
rear-seat three-point safety belts in passenger cars; the use of roll
bars on farm tractors; warnings on toxic household chemicals; the use
of flame-retardant fabric in children's sleepwear; and the list goes on
and on. The conference report will defang the threat inherent in
punitive damages.
But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this legislation is that
Ford Motor calculated that it was cheaper under the current tort system
to settle rather than to try to protect the lives of every Pinto owner
with a recall. The manufacturers of silicone breast implants calculated
it was cheaper under the current tort system to continue selling
implants that their own sales force reported had leakage problems
rather than to alert the more than 1 million women in this country with
implants about the danger of the products. Playtex calculated it was
cheaper to continue to market its super-absorbent tampon than to try to
warn women about the deadly effects of toxic shock syndrome. If Ford
Motor, Dow, Playtex, and other major manufacturers failed to take
corrective action to make their products safer under the present tort
system, there is no reason to expect this conference report will
encourage them to act more responsibly.
Would anyone settle for $250,000 in exchange for losing a loved one
to death by a product that the manufacturer knew was unsafe? If this
conference report becomes law, no one would be able to get even
$250,000 because there is not a lawyer in this country who would take
the case. No law firm could afford to go up against companies like Ford
Motor or Dow or others with their host of attorneys and huge legal
budgets and an infinite ability to push motions and appeals to the
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limit and slow down the process to their advantage. It just would not
happen.
Proponents of this legislation stress that the current tort system is
biased against them: they point to insurance rates that disable
American manufacturers by forcing them to pay 10 to 50 times more for
product liability insurance than their foreign competitors; they claim
there is an ``explosion'' in products liability litigation, with
uncontrollable punitive damages awards; and they argue that the present
system of ``lottery'' liability, where liability differs from state to
state, does not enhance the safety of U.S. products. The proponents are
wrong on each of these points.
Over the past decade, products liability insurance cost 26 cents per
$100 of retail product sales, or about $26 on the price of a $10,000
automobile. Two recent reports by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners confirm there is no ``crisis'' in the cost of product
liability insurance. In fact, the Association reported in January l995
that earned premiums for product liability have steadily dropped from
more than $2.1 billion in l989 to $1.6 billion in l994--a drop of 26
percent. The Association pointed to shifts to self-insurance and
competition in the industry as reasons for the decline, but did not
mention tort reform as a factor. Moreover, the Association reported in
October l995 that the premium volume for product liability insurance
premiums has remained virtually flat from l986 through l994.
The so-called explosion in products cases is another myth. While
consumer products are responsible for some 39,000 deaths and 30 million
injuries each year, a l993 study by Boston's Suffolk University Law
School and Northeastern University found there were only 355 awards in
products suits from l965 through l990, and that half of these were
overturned or reduced. Indeed, the National Center for State Courts
reported that product liability cases accounted for .0036 percent of
the total civil case load in l992, and the Legal Times reported that
products claims in Federal courts declined by 36 percent from l985 to
l991. In my own state of Massachusetts, there were absolutely no
punitive damages awarded in products cases; punitive damages are only
permitted in wrongful death cases.
The conference report on H.R. 956 will not resolve the problem of 51
different products liability laws in the United States. On the
contrary, it will only serve to further complicate the tort system and
tilt it strongly in favor of manufacturers and against consumers. The
conference report contains only one-way preemption.
The conference report places caps on punitive damages in products
cases, yet allows the laws to stand in the 39 States where those laws
prohibit punitive damage awards or where they place more restrictions
on victims' rights. On the other hand, the conference report does not
require that these States award punitive damages.
The conference report preempts State law on misuse or alteration of a
product only to the extent state law is inconsistent with the
conference report, meaning that the 37 States that provide a complete
defense to liability in some cases of product misuse or alteration
would not be preempted.
The conference report prohibits lawsuits involving durable goods that
are more than 15 years old, but specifically preserves State laws with
shorter limitations.
The Products Liability Fairness Act, S. 565, will overturn the laws
of every State that enable people who have been harmed by unsafe or
faulty products from obtaining full and fair recovery. It will prevent
citizens from holding wrongdoers accountable. It will preempt
legitimate claims that deserve to be heard. It will strip citizens of
their rights and it should be rejected.
I cannot support legislation that would have placed limits on
punitive damages for the family of the 5-year-old boy in New Bedford,
MA, who died in a house fire after igniting a couch with matches. I
cannot support legislation that would have limited damages for the
family of the 8-month-old boy who suffered second and third degree
burns on his arms, legs and back in a house fire that started when the
bedding in his crib was ignited by a portable electric heater that had
been placed within 6 inches of his crib to keep him warm.
I surely cannot support legislation that would have limited the
liability of the big corporations in Woburn, MA, whose highly toxic
pollutants killed and injured children. The Woburn case, in which eight
working class families sued two of our Nation's biggest corporations
because they suspected the companies had polluted the water supply with
highly toxic industrial solvents, took 9 years. The young attorney that
pleaded the case spent $1 million of his own money on it. The jury
ultimately found one of the companies negligent, and the scientific
research done during the 9-year trial demonstrated the link between the
industrial solvents in the water supply and human disease. The company
is now helping to cleanup the polluted aquifer. The attorney has said
that if this bill were law today, he would never have considered the
case.
Mr. President, the conference report on H.R. 956 will take away the
right every American enjoys today through the jury box to force
accountability for dangerous, careless or reckless behavior. In the
jury box, every American can bring about positive change. If we take
away this fundamental right, we will have compromised our Nation's core
values.
The conference report promotes the interests of business at the
expense of the rights of consumers. It will create a nightmarish new
legal thicket that should be avoided rather than embraced. After we
have argued all the complicated points of law, after we have poured
over horror story after horror story, the issues boil down to one
simple point: this bill is not fair, it is not reasonable and it should
be rejected.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I rise in support of this legislation and
want to commend the efforts of Senators Rockefeller and Gorton on their
work. This legislation has been needed for a long time and I am pleased
that we will be taking this positive step forward today.
I have been concerned for years about our current product liability
system and I believe that meaningful reform is long overdue. I believe
that this bill will benefit both consumers and businesses. Under our
current system, manufacturers of products are subject to a patchwork of
varying State laws which contribute to unpredictable outcomes. In some
cases plaintiffs receive less than they deserve and in others,
plaintiffs receive too much. Because of the unpredictability, cases
that are substantially similar receive very different results.
The Congress is currently debating the proper role of the Federal
Government across a broad range of issue areas. Many believe that
functions now conducted at the Federal level should be moved to the
States. On this issue I believe that we need a more uniform system of
product liability and therefore Federal standards are necessary.
I believe this legislation will improve the competitiveness of our
industries which means jobs. I also believe that the biomaterials
provisions will help insure that much needed medical devices will
remain available to many Americans. Because of liability concerns many
products are becoming unavailable. Examples include materials used in
heart valves, artificial blood vessels, and other medical implants. In
Cincinnati, OH, Fusite, a part of Emerson Electric Co., has been in
business since 1943. They supply glass-to-metal sealed hermetic
terminals. One terminal body is used by the makers of implantable
batteries in heart pacemakers. In 1995, because of the liability
concerns, Fusite determined it would no longer supply this product.
The current system is unfair to consumers. Much too much money is
spent on litigation rather than compensation and the high cost of
product liability insurance means higher costs for consumers.
Without doubt an injured party deserves fair compensation, however
the cost of litigation is substantial. More and more is spent on legal
fees and less is spent on important areas such as research and
development. In some cases manufacturers decide not to invest in or
develop new products because of product liability concerns. Ultimately
this burden of product liability makes our companies less competitive
in world markets than foreign companies.
I have been particularly concerned that as we reform our product
liability
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laws we do not affect the rights of individuals to bring suits when
they have been harmed. On the contrary, it is my intent to bring
rationality to a system that has become more like a lottery. For me,
legal reform does not mean putting a padlock on the court house door.
There are several very important improvements that this legislation
will provide. A statute of repose of fifteen years is established.
Joint liability is abolished for noneconomic damages in product
liability cases. Defendants are liable only in direct proportion to
their responsibility for harm. Therefore, fault will be the controlling
factor in the award of damages, not the size of a defendant's wallet.
Another important area is punitive damages. Although I am concerned
about the establishment of caps on punitive damages, I believe that the
judge additur provision included in the bill will allow for appropriate
punitive damages in egregious cases.
Mr. President, not every provision in this legislation is written the
way I would have preferred, but I believe that it is significant reform
and urge its passage.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I would like to clarify an issue I
discussed in a lengthy, and frankly, rather confusing colloquy with my
colleague from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan.
Mr. Dorgan sought clarification of a provision on the Product
Liability Conference Report dealing with the way in which this
legislation will apply to utilities. Although I had characterized a
change made in conference as technical, he asserted that the change was
substantive.
The intent of the bill is to cover all products. This intent is
expressed in the comprehensive definition of a product found in section
101(14) of the conference report, which defines products to include
``any object, substance, mixture, or raw material in a gaseous, liquid,
or solid state * * *'' This definition clearly encompasses electricity,
water delivered by a utility, natural gas, and steam. To simplify this
discussion I will refer only to electricity.
Another goal of the legislation, however, is to leave in place state
determinations of when electricity is a product. Most States treat the
transmission of electricity as a service. For this reason, the Senate
bill excluded electricity from the definition of product. This
exclusion, however, overlooked the fact that once electricity has
passed through a customer's meter, many States consider it to be a
product, and subject it to a strict liability standard.
Because of this oversight, the Senate provision created an unintended
conflict between the two goals of this bill: First to cover all
products, and second, to leave undisturbed the state determination of
whether or not electricity is a product. The desire to meet both these
goals is reflected on page 24, footnote 86, of the Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Report on the Senate bill. But to
repeat, the language of the Senate did not do what it needed; it
exempted electricity, whether or not it was treated as a product by
state law and whether or not it was subject to a rule of strict
liability.
In conference, the statutory language was made explicitly consistent
with those dual intentions. That is to say, the bill should respect
state choice as to whether or not a utility is a product, but the bill
should apply evenly to all products. Consequently, language was added
to the conference report saying that electricity was excluded from the
definition of product, unless it was subject under State law to strict
liability, that is to say, is treated as a product.
Senator Dorgan is correct that the conference report does change the
substance of this provision. I think it does so wisely and in order to
make the legislation clearly express our intent.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, after extensive deliberation, on a very
close call, I have decided to vote against the conference report on
product liability legislation.
This is a close question for me because the conference report
corrects my concern on punitive damages and there is a need to make
American business more competitive in world markets to provide economic
expansion and job opportunities.
In the final analysis, my judgment is that the disadvantages of the
bill outweigh the advantages. For example, the 15-year statute of
repose would deny recovery to injured parties from products intended
for and used long after 15 years.
The changes in the law involving workmen's compensation make it more
difficult for plaintiffs to recover where a coworker or the employer is
at fault. That provision also limits the employer's traditional
subrogation rights leading to the opposition of homebuilders, workmen's
compensation insurance carriers and other business interests because
workmen's compensation costs will escalate.
The conference report further limits the manufacturers' liability in
cases where injuries result from a defective product where alcohol has
been used. A defective seat belt is supposed to protect the car's
driver regardless of his/her condition.
This vote against the conference report is consistent with my vote
yesterday for cloture. As I said in my statement on yesterday's vote, I
believe the Senate's final determination on product liability
legislation should be decided by majority vote rather than the super
majority of 60 required for cloture.
A decision on whether to support cloture depends upon a variety of
factors such as whether there should be more debate to fully air the
issue or whether a constitutional issue or some other fundamental issue
is involved which warrants a super majority of 60.
On this bill on the merits, I believe it should be decided by the
traditional majority vote because it is such a close question without
an underlying constitutional issue or some other fundamental matter. On
the merits of the bill, in my judgment the disadvantages outweigh the
advantages.
Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, today is a day of victory and celebration
for America's manufacturers, consumers, and taxpayers. Congress has
finally succeeded in taking the first important step in overhauling our
Nation's badly broken product liability system.
Mr. President, I would like to commend my colleagues, Senators Gorton
and Rockefeller for their endless hours of hard work and commitment to
enacting long-needed product liability reforms. This truly is a
significant accomplishment.
Unfortunately, the President has already issued his press release
stating that he will stop this important bill--dead in its tracks--with
his veto pen. Despite bipartisan support, he claims this bill fails to
``fairly balance the interests of consumers with those of manufacturers
and sellers.'' Mr. President, I disagree.
This bill is a good compromise; it's fair; and it does protect
sellers, manufacturers and most importantly, consumers.
Mr. President, too many people today are filing lawsuits in the hopes
that they will hit the jackpot even if there is little merit to their
case. The lawyers get wealthy, but under our current system, that
wealth comes at the expense of America's consumers.
Our society has become so accustomed to suing that a recent study
showed that 90 percent of all U.S. companies can expect to be named in
a product liability lawsuit. Furthermore, 89 percent of Americans
believe that ``too many lawsuits are being filed in America today.''
Mr. President, the price tag of lawsuits is astronomical. In fact,
some experts have estimated that the total cost of all lawsuits filed
in America exceeds $300 billion each year. And according to the Product
Liability Coordinating Committee, the cost of product liability
lawsuits, alone, ranges anywhere from $80 to $120 billion annually.
American consumers ultimately pay the price of frivolous lawsuits
which are paralyzing our country's economic growth and ability to
create new jobs. Instead, prices increase and jobs are eliminated when
businesses close, downsize or decline new product introduction for fear
of a frivolous lawsuit.
As a former small businessman, I understand how devastating the
threat of a potential lawsuit can be on any company. Our laws have
created a hostile business climate that has compromised the competitive
position of many companies, forcing them to reduce salaries or lay off
employees to avoid going out of business.
Companies who are sued have two choices: endure a lengthy and costly
trial in the hopes of proving their innocence or settle out of court to
save
[[Page S2584]]
trial costs. Small businesses don't have the time or resources to spend
countless days in a courtroom when they are struggling to make payroll
and meet customer needs.
Everyone agrees that an injured person should have a day in court,
and this legislation will not prevent legal recourse for justifiable
claims. However, it will put an end to the fishing expeditions that
trial attorneys use to extract huge, unwarranted settlements from
businesses fearful of protracted litigation costs.
Businesses, taxpayers, and consumers can no longer bear this burden,
making passage of this legislation critical. Americans understand that
our current system is a litigation lottery which increases the costs
consumers pay when they purchase a product. It even forces companies to
lay-off employees.
Far too often, the cost of meeting these outrageous judgments eats up
resources that could have gone toward new jobs and better salaries. The
President and the trial lawyers are kidding themselves if they believe
these costs are not passed on to you and me as consumers.
Appropriately, this is called the tort tax.
Mr. President, most of my colleagues know that I am a strong opponent
of tax increases of any kind. I believe the Product Liability
Conference Report will lessen the tort tax on America's consumers.
This legislation addresses many of the problems in our current
system. It limits manufacturer liability when a product is misused or
altered by the user; it caps punitive damages to twice the compensatory
damages or $250,000, whichever is greater; it allows judges the
flexibility to impose higher damages in extreme cases; and, it
eliminates joint and several liability for certain damages, such as
pain and suffering, so defendants pay only for the damages they cause--
not those caused by others.
In addition to the overall benefits consumers will enjoy after
enactment of this bill, Minnesota will see an additional benefit. The
reality is our current system is stifling technological innovation, in
particular, the production of medical devices.
Mr. President, Minnesota is a world leader in the development of
lifesaving medical technology and this industry is a vital part of
Minnesota's growing economy.
In 1994, there were 568 registered medical device establishments in
Minnesota. Furthermore, Minnesota ranks 2nd in the Nation with over
16,000 people employed in medical device manufacturing.
More than 11 million Americans rely on implanted medical technologies
to sustain or enhance the quality of their lives. Many of these
products are manufactured in my State including artificial joints,
cardiac defibrillators, drug infusion pumps and heart valves.
Unfortunately, many suppliers of the raw materials used to make
medical devices are restricting the use of their products in medical
implants for fear of exposing themselves to costly product liability
litigation.
Suppliers of raw materials play no role in the design or manufacture
of the medical device and courts have consistently found them free from
liability. Unfortunately, the costs of the lawsuit ``discovery''
process are surpassing the profits raw material suppliers will receive
from selling their products to device manufacturers.
If biomaterials suppliers refuse to sell their raw materials to
America's medical device companies, device manufacturers are forced to
either substitute another material, which many times is impossible, or
discontinue production of a device which is fulfilling a vital need for
patients.
A recent example was highlighted in the Wall Street Journal by a
mother whose daughter suffers from hydrocephalus, or water on the
brain. The only medical therapy that treats this is a surgically
implanted device, called a shunt, made of silicone.
Fifty-thousand Americans depend on shunts to keep them alive, but
because of recent lawsuits, companies who supply silicone for the
production of devices like shunts are no longer willing to sell the raw
materials. This situation is devastating to patients who desperately
need these lifesaving devices.
Essentially, this legislation's Biomaterials Access Assurance
provision would allow suppliers of the raw materials or biomaterials
used to make medical devices, to obtain dismissal, without extensive
discovery or other legal costs, in certain tort suits in which
plaintiffs allege harm from a finished medical device.
This provision would allow raw materials suppliers to be dismissed
from lawsuits if the generic raw material used in the medical device
met contract specifications, and if the biomaterials supplier cannot be
classified as either a manufacturer or seller of the medical device.
Most importantly, this provision would not affect the ability of
plaintiffs to sue manufacturers or sellers of medical devices.
As the chairman of the Senate's Medical Technology Caucus, I would
like to thank the Senator from Connecticut for all his hard work to
ensure that the Product Liability bill recognizes the urgency of
providing much-needed relief to suppliers of bio-materials who have no
direct role in the raw material's ultimate use as a ``biomaterial'' in
a medical device.
Mr. President, I would like to note that even President Clinton
recognizes this provision as ``a laudable attempt to ensure that
suppliers of biomaterials will provide sufficient quantities of their
products'' to medical device manufacturers.
The bill before us today is the first step in the right direction,
but certainly not the last. While we have made great progress toward
reforming our current system, I believe we should do more. We need to
extend protections to America's consumers in civil liability cases
which have devastated local girl scout troops, neighborhood little
leagues and community recreational organizations.
Furthermore, Congress should pass medical malpractice reforms to
ensure that the doctor-patient relationship is protected from lawyers.
Doctors complain that many times they are forced to order unnecessary
tests just to protect themselves against frivolous lawsuits. This
practice called ``defensive medicine'' costs our country over $15
billion each year.
Mr. President, the Senate should adopt this first step and continue
moving forward to reform our overall liability system. Failing to enact
this legislation will result in even higher costs to customers, fewer
products developed and fewer jobs as companies downsize to adjust to
increasingly high legal costs.
I urge my colleagues to recognize the positive impact this
legislation will have on countless businesses across our country.
Ultimately, it will benefit the employees whose jobs will be secured as
a result of enactment of this long overdue legislation, while at the
same time, we continue to protect consumers seeking judgements against
companies who have manufactured faulty products.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will vote on the
conference report on H.R. 956, the Common Sense Product Liability Legal
Reform Act of 1996. I intend to vote in favor of this legislation
because I believe that modest legislation in this area is necessary.
The issue of product liability reform is one of those circumstances
where I think there is some truth on both sides. Tort reform is by its
very nature controversial. The ability of citizens to seek redress
through the courts for harm caused to them is a very important right we
must respect and protect. At the same time, it is a fact that our court
system in the United States is deluged with a flood of lawsuits, many
of which have no merit.
Unfortunately, the excesses of some force a reaction that affects
everyone. I appreciate the sensitivity with which we in the Congress
must proceed in passing any Federal legislation that reforms tort laws.
I realize that because of our court system and because of the activism
of well meaning consumer advocates, our Nation does have safer cars,
toys, and other products. If it had not been for key cases that put the
fire to the feet of corporations who would rather cut corners to
enhance the bottom line than concern themselves with the safety of
consumers, I am convinced that there would be more exploding cars and
more dangerous toys that hurt children.
Deadly and dangerous products such as asbestos, flammable children's
pajamas, and exploding Ford Pintos were all removed from the market
only after action was taken in court to hold the
[[Page S2585]]
manufacturers of these products accountable. Because these cases
occurred, our lives are safer as a result. There have been many cases
where manufacturers were legitimately held liable for their negligent
or egregious actions.
However, these cases do not tell the entire story about our tort
system. Unfortunately, there are so many other cases that may have
little merit that are filed, not with the goal to seek fair
compensation or change the behavior of a manufacture, but are filed
with a goal to get rich quick. The result is that many manufacturers
and businesses are strangled in liability cases that defy common sense.
These cases don't help consumers.
It seems to me that Federal action is warranted in the area of
product liability suits. But, I believe that any Federal action in this
area must be modest and narrowly construed. Over the past few years, I
have been an active participant in the development of this legislation.
In the 103d Congress, I fought against a provision that would have
provided complete immunity to manufacturers of medical products and
aircraft manufacturers from all punitive damage awards. The FDA/FAA
defense provision, as it was called, took this reform effort way too
far in my judgment. That is why I fought to have the provision removed
and if this provision existed in the legislation before the Senate
today, I would be voting no.
Fortunatly, the bill sponsors saw fit to not include the FDA/FAA
defense provision in the conference report we are considering today. As
a result, we have a bill which I believe advances some modest reform
without closing the door on consumers who legitimately need to look to
the courts for compensation.
I believe it is important to advance this modest tort reform
legislation. It is my hope that if this legislation becomes law, it
will result in more reasonableness in our tort system.
I am under no illusions that this legislation is going to create a
perfect world in the courts. However, I hope this legislation will
create a better world that restores some moderation to excessive
litigation, while not destroying the rights of consumers to seek
redress for their grievances in the courts.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from
Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and thank my friend and
colleague from Washington. I signed the conference report with regard
to the product liability measure that is before us. I recommend that
the Senate accept this. I hope the President will not veto it, as he
has threatened.
I have been listening to the debate, and I have studied this issue
for a long, long time. Over 20 years ago, when I had the opportunity to
serve my State as Governor, we worked on and we enacted a piece of
legislation that is related to this whole area. It was with regard to
malpractice in the health care field. There were concerns about that. I
listened to both sides at that time. I finally decided, in the best
interest of Nebraska, that malpractice piece of legislation should go
into effect to provide adequate and better health care, to keep
everyone involved.
I must say, that was one of the early pieces of legislation with
regard to placing caps on malpractice legislation, and I must say that
it has been a resounding success in Nebraska.
I recognize and have heard the debate on both sides of the issue,
and, as so often is the case, Mr. President, we do not pass perfect
legislation here, but ignoring the problem that we have today, that we
have had for all of these years--this is as near a place we can solve
it with what I think is a reasonable piece of legislation, a piece of
legislation that where, if there is gross misconduct on the part of the
manufacturer or the inventor, there is some relief.
I think we accomplish very little by citing this case and citing that
case. If we continue with that kind of a proposition, we will simply
confuse the public at large, and maybe the House and Senate, that we
should do nothing. I think if there is one thing that is obvious, it is
that we have to do something. I think the ``something'' is this bill
that has been carefully crafted, that has been worked out in committee,
that has been worked out in the conference between the House and the
Senate, and I believe if there was ever a true workable compromise,
this is a principal example.
So, I simply salute the people who have provided the leadership in
this over the years. I hope the bill will be resoundingly approved by
the Senate with our vote around noontime today. Maybe we can get on
with solving this problem. There is a problem. No one can deny that. I
am sure many of my colleagues feel very strongly that this is a bad
piece of legislation. It is not a perfect piece of legislation, but it
is a piece of legislation that has been carefully crafted, compromised.
I think it is the best we can do under the circumstances, and I believe
we should do it.
I intend to vote enthusiastically in support of this legislation. I
thank the Chair and thank my friend from Washington.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from West
Virginia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator
from Washington. The debate now is about over, and we are about to
vote. We are about to vote on a bill which I think is profoundly
important, not only in the symbolism of it but in the reality. You
cannot have an engine in a car that is invented by 51 separate people
who do not communicate with each other and expect the engine to move
the car forward.
Similarly, you cannot protect and extend predictability and fairness
and consumer protection--for example, as witness the statute of
limitations--to help people in this country get justice from injury,
from defective products if the engine that they have to depend upon is
invented by 51 separate people who never talk to each other, and then
somebody turns the key on and who knows where the system goes, or where
the car goes. Probably nowhere.
We have a system that works particularly well for a few. We have,
however, a system that works particularly poorly for the most. It is
the job, it seems to me, of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. Congress to
try to improve the condition and the lot of our people in a fair and
balanced manner. One cannot reasonably come into this Chamber all the
time and say, ``I'm only going to do things which will help an injured
person but pay no attention to other aspects of their life,'' for
example, whether they are employed, whether they have a reasonable
expectation of having a job.
What we have tried to do in this product liability conference report
is to make a fair, reasonable balance between the interests of
consumers and business. We have done that. We have had asserted
constantly against us that we have not, assertions which are made every
year we discuss these things, which are wrong.
So now we are prepared to do something, and I fully expect the Senate
will adopt this conference report. It is an important bill. I repeat
that I hope the President of the United States, who I think very much
wants to sign a product liability reform bill--in fact, I am told very
directly that he wants to sign a product liability bill. The question
is what condition must it be in. I think we are presenting the
President with a fair bill, one in which the Senate did not try to
expand beyond products, one in which the Senate rejected virtually all
other suggestions in which the only basic change was the statute of
repose.
It is a very good bill. There is no other way to say it than that. I
also want to thank the Senator from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, for
his enormous role in all of this product liability debate, and his
chief of staff, Bill Bonvillian, who is also an extraordinary person,
who has been unbelievably kind and attentive to my legislative
director, Tamera Stanton, to whom I referred earlier, who is going
through a difficult situation just now.
This is fair. This is the way America ought to work. The bill, I
believe, will pass. I can only pray that the President will sign it. I
thank the President and yield the floor.
[[Page S2586]]
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
The Senator from South Carolina has 12 minutes.
Mr. HOLLINGS. How much, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 12 minutes.
Mr. HOLLINGS. I thank the distinguished Chair. I want to reserve time
for the distinguished minority leader, the Senator from South Dakota,
who just notified us he would like a little time here.
Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to reject this
legislation. The only thing that stands in the way of an act of
Congress overturning 200 years of State law and placing severe
restrictions on the civil rights of American citizens is the vote on
this conference report.
Some try to simplify this issue as a debate between trial lawyers and
manufacturers. But this issue is larger than that. This matter goes to
the heart of our Nation's constitutional federalism. I am convinced
that to the extent Congress can selectively preempt State law, override
State constitutions, overturn State legislative decisions, and dictate
to State judges and juries the standards they must follow on matters
that have nothing to do with Federal constitutional rights, then States
essentially have lost their sovereignty. Maintaining an independent
civil justice system is the essence of a free state. This freedom,
however, would be seriously eroded by this bill.
i. state sovereignty/dual federalism
The stated purpose of this bill is to erect barriers regarding the
use of the civil justice system for redress of injuries caused by
dangerous products. However, I would remind my colleagues that, unlike
the judicial systems of other countries, the American judicial system
is rooted in democratic principles of individual redress, the right to
a jury trial, and reliance on the people to resolve disputes. These
were principles established by the Founding Fathers when they adopted
the 7th and 10th amendments to the Constitution. Surely, issues such as
whether to limit access to courts, limit redress remedies, or penalize
citizens for merely bringing suits were considered by the Founding
Fathers, as well as the judges and State officials that have
administered our system of justice for over 200 years. But they decided
against such measures, and opted instead to maintain a system that
features free access to the courts, common law, and giving the people
the ultimate authority to resolve conflicts.
The supporters of this bill, however, are seeking to overturn this
longstanding American history and judicial precedent. They would prefer
to ram through this sweeping and unprecedented legislation.
I am, indeed, confounded that the Senate is even considering this
legislation. At the beginning of this Congress, Member after Member
came to the floor during consideration of S. 1, the unfunded mandates
bill, to declare that this would be the Congress of States' rights,
where Government would be returned to the people. The Jeffersonian
democracy of government was revived. If we've heard it once, we've
heard it a million times, that State and local governments know best
how to protect the health and safety of their citizens, and that they
do not need Congress telling them what to do. How many times did we
hear that the one clear message sent by the voters in November 1994 was
that the people wanted to get the Federal Government off their backs
and out of their pockets?
The 10th amendment, lost in the shuffle for many years, was given new
light. The majority leader himself, in his opening address to the new
Congress, proclaimed:
. . . America has reconnected us with the hopes for a
nation made free by demanding a Government that is more
limited. Reigning in our government will be my mandate, and I
hope it will be the purpose and principal accomplishment of
the 104th Congress.
. . . We do not have all the answers in Washington, D.C.
Why should we tell Idaho, or the State of South Dakota, or
the State of Oregon, or any other State that we are going to
pass this Federal law and that we are going to require you to
do certain things . . .
The majority leader went on to say:
. . . Federalism is an idea that power should be kept close
to the people. It is an idea on which our nation was founded.
But there are some in Washington--perhaps fewer this year
than last--who believe that our states can't be trusted
with power. . . . If I have one goal for the 104th
Congress, it is this: That we will dust off the 10th
Amendment and restore it to its rightful place.
If we are going to respect the 10th amendment, Mr. President, then we
must be consistent.
But consistency is not something in which this Congress seems to be
interested. The same Congress that has championed States rights
regarding welfare is now advancing the power of the Federal Government
over State civil courts. It appears that some believe the States have
all the answers when it comes to welfare and education, but for some
reason are incapable of running their own courts.
To the extent any reforms are needed, the States already have
instituted such measures. Since 1986, over 40 States have enacted tort
reform legislation. This includes my home State of South Carolina,
which enacted a major tort reform measure in 1988. The States--through
their work with members of the bar, the chamber of commerce, the
insurance industry, and consumer groups--have addressed concerns about
the tort system, and have crafted legislation they believe is in the
best interest of their citizens. The proponents of this bill, however,
would override the enormous and commendable efforts and time the States
have devoted to this issue, and force their own brand of reform on the
States.
Ironically, during the 1994 elections, when many of those who now so
vehemently champion States rights were elected, the people of Arizona
considered a State-wide tort reform referendum that consisted of many
of the initiatives in this conference agreement. By a 2-to-1 vote, the
people of Arizona rejected the referendum. Now some Members would like
to reward them by using their Federal power to force on the citizens of
Arizona the initiatives they soundly rejected at the ballot box.
II. Refutation of Claims Regarding Need of Legislation
The conference report contains a number of ``findings'' regarding the
need for this legislation. Most of the findings are repeats of the
various claims that have been made over the last decade. Nevertheless,
it is necessary again to set the record straight with the facts.
Finding No. 1 states:
Our nation is overly litigious, the civil justice system is
overcrowded, sluggish, and excessively costly and the costs
of lawsuits, both direct and indirect, are inflicting serious
and unnecessary injury on the national economy.
Rebuttal:
This is the old litigation explosion claim. However, there has never
been any evidence of a litigation explosion as the following data
demonstrate:
A 1991 Rand study found that only 2 percent of Americans injured by
products ever file a lawsuit.
A 1994 report by the National Center for State Courts found that
product liability cases are less than 1 percent of all civil filings.
A 1995 study by the National Center for State Courts found that, of
the 2 percent of lawsuits that are filed, 90 percent are disposed of by
nontrial, such as dismissals or settlements.
In June 1994, the New York Times featured a front page story on how
juries are growing tougher on plaintiffs. Citing the latest research by
Jury Verdicts Research, Inc., the Times stated that plaintiffs' success
rates in product liability cases have dropped from 59 to 41 percent
between 1989 and 1994. A 1995 report by the National Center for State
Courts shows that tort filings have declined 6 percent since 1991.
Profs. James Henderson, a supporter of State product liability
reform, and Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell University released a study
in 1992, which showed that product liability filings had declined by 44
percent by 1991. They concluded that by ``most measures, product
liability has returned to where it was at the beginning of the
decade,'' beginning in the 1980's.
business litigation
Where is the real litigation explosion? It is in the corporate board
rooms. According to professor Marc Galanter of the University of
Wisconsin Law School, the real litigation explosion in recent years has
involved businesses suing each other, not injured persons seeking
redress of their rights. He found that business contract filings in
Federal courts increased by 232 percent between 1960 and 1988, and
[[Page S2587]]
by 1988 comprised the largest category of civil cases in the Federal
courts.
In August 1995, the National Law Journal released the findings of its
study of judicial emergencies in Federal courts. The study found that
33 percent of the judicial emergencies involved business litigation.
Between 1989 and 1994, of the 83 largest civil damage awards
nationwide, 73 percent involved business suits. Between 1987 and 1994,
just 76 of the top business verdicts alone accounted for more than $10
billion. They included: Litton Systems versus Honeywell, a patent
infringement dispute--$1.2 billion; Rubicon Petroleum versus Amoco, a
breach of contract dispute--$500 million, including $250 million in
punitive damages; Amoco Chemical versus Certain Lloyds of London, a
breach of contract dispute--$425 million, including $341 million in
punitive damages; Avia Development versus American General Reality
Investment, a breach of contract--$309 million, including $262 million
in punitive damages. Of course, this does not include the greatest
verdict of them all--the $10.5 billion awarded in 1985 in the Pennzoil
versus Texaco case.
Notwithstanding the excessiveness of business suites, however, the
bill specifically exempts business litigation from the legislation.
ii. competitiveness
Finding No. 2 of the conference report states:
Excessive, unpredictable, and often arbitrary damage awards
and unfair allocations of liability have a direct and
undesirable effect on interstate commerce by increasing the
cost and decreasing the availability of goods and services.
Rebuttal:
To refute these unfounded claims about competitiveness, I simply cite
the comments of Mr. Jerry Jasinowski, president of the National
Association of Manufacturers [NAM], that appeared in the Washington
Post editorial section on Sunday, March 17, 1996. Mr. Jasinowski
severely decried those who have criticized American business
competitiveness.
According to Mr. Jasinowski: the American industrial renaissance over
the last 4 years has restored the United States ``to the top spot among
the world's economies.'' While some are ``busy berating our capitalist
system, the U.S. economy has become the envy of the industrialized
world.'' ``The American economy has quietly grown richer--gaining 8
million new jobs since 1992 and putting the unemployment rate at an
historically low 5.5 percent.'' ``In the past 25 years''--during the
midst of the so-called product liability crisis--``U.S. employment has
increased 59 percent and we have created more than 5 times as many net
jobs as all the countries of Europe combined.''
other studies on competitiveness
Mr. Jasinowski's editorial affirms other studies which have found no
evidence relating product liability to U.S. competitiveness.
A 1987 Conference Board survey of risk managers of 232 corportions
shows that product liability costs for most businesses are 1 percent or
less of the final price of products, and have very little impact on
larger economic issues such as market share or jobs.
The Rand Corporation found that less than 1 percent of U.S.
manufacturers are ever named in a product liability lawsuit, and that
``available evidence does not support the notion that product liability
is crippling American business.''
In 1991, the GAO released a study of the effects of product liability
on competitiveness, and stated that it could find ``no acceptable
methodology for relating product liability to competitiveness.''
findings on insurance costs
Finding No. 7 states:
The unpredictability of damage awards is inequitable to
both plaintiffs and defendants and has added considerably to
the high cost of liability insurance, making it difficult for
producers, consumers, volunteers, and nonprofit organizations
to protect themselves from liability with any degree of
confidence and at a reasonable cost.
Rebuttal:
The claim that there was an insurance crisis was one of the first
justifications put forth by supporters of the legislation in the
1980's. However, there is ample evidence that there never was, and is
not currently, a product liability insurance crisis.
A study released in March 1995 by Bob Hunter of the Consumer
Federation of America, who was formerly the Texas Insurance
Commissioner, shows that product liability insurance costs for U.S.
businesses amount to no more than 26 cents for every $100 of total
costs.
In January 1995, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
reported that between 1989 and 1993 product liability insurance
premiums declined by 26 percent.
According to the Insurance Information Institute, insurance
companies' surplus, assets minus liabilities, rose from $29 billion to
over $230 billion between 1977 and 1995. Surplus is the money available
after all losses and bills have been paid. These figures show that, to
the extent there was an insurance downfall, it sure was not felt by the
insurance industry.
Additionally, according to the testimony of the American Insurance
Association [AIA], the legislation will have no effect on insurance
rates anyway.
uniformity
Finding No. 10 states:
The rules of law governing product liability actions,
damage awards, and allocations of liability have evolved
inconsistently within and among the states, resulting in a
complex, contradictory, and uncertain regime that is
inequitable to both plaintiffs and defendants and unduly
burdens interstate commerce.
Rebuttal:
This finding is part of the proponents' claim regarding uniformity.
However, contrary to the proponents' claims, the bill does not, and is
not intended to, create uniformity. State law is preempted in this bill
only to the extent it favors defendant corporations. For example, with
respect to punitive damages, the legislation would not disturb the law
in the State of Washington since that State prohibits punitive damages,
but would preempt the law in South Carolina, which permits punitive
awards.
The Chief Justices of the States have indicated that the legislation
is likely to create considerable confusion, and lead to more
litigation, as a result of the varying interpretations and applications
of its provisions by different State courts.
The bill imposes its own set of rules on State courts without
imposing the same rules directly on the Federal courts. Because of the
absence of a Federal cause of action, Federal courts will hear cases
involving the legislation only if there is diversity of citizenship or
location of the parties.
CONFERENCE REPORT HURTS CONSUMERS MORE THAN SENATE BILL
Proponents continue to state that the conference report is not
expanded beyond the Senate amendment. However, the conference agreement
extends well beyond the Senate amendment in undercutting the rights of
victims. The bill now limits victims' rights to be compensated for harm
caused by energy and utility related disasters, such as hazardous gas
storage facilities, and negligent entrustment cases, including the
unlawful sale of dangerous products to minors. In addition, the statute
of repose has been reduced from 20 to 15 years. Once restricted to
workplace products, this provision has also been expanded to cover any
product that has an expected life span of more than 3 years. Further,
products now covered by the legislation include used cars, elevators,
children's toys, and medical devices made for handicapped citizens.
The bill has retained the abolition of joint liability for pain and
suffering damages. The restriction is applicable even if there is proof
that defendants worked together as a joint venture, or as parent and
subsidiary.
The bill has maintained discriminatory punitive damages caps. By
basing the cap on income and wealth, the bill permits higher punitive
awards for individuals with the most economic advantages. In an effort
to rectify the disparate treatment of high income and low income
victims, a provision was added on the Senate floor to permit judges to
increase punitive awards beyond the cap. Federal judges, and judges in
most State jurisdictions, however, are constitutionally prohibited from
increasing damages without the consent of the parties. Indeed, we find
it hard to believe that any defendant would consent to higher punitive
awards. The proponents stated the constitutional issue would be
resolved in conference. The conference agreement, however, has actually
enhanced the
[[Page S2588]]
power of judges to increase damages, all but ensuring the provision
will be deemed unconstitutional. The end result will be that additur
will be removed, and the discriminatory cap will remain. Additionally,
we question why Congress would pass a law it recognizes as unfair, and
then shift the responsibility to judges to rectify the problem.
CONCLUSION
Simply put, Mr. President, there is no product liability crisis.
Indeed, if there are problems that need to be examined in the tort
system, they already are being addressed by the States, where this
issue belongs.
This legislation is the epitome of congressional arrogance. It takes
away from the States an area of the law that has been reserved to the
States for 200 years.
What will this bill do? It will make it more difficult for consumers
to be compensated for their harm from products; it will shield from
liability manufacturers which consciously manufacture defective
products; it will take away from the States rules of law they have
carefully developed; and it will remove incentives for manufacturers to
make their products safe. These are some of the results of this bill,
results which are not in the best interests of our citizens.
I conclude by urging my colleagues to reject cloture on this
conference report. Despite years of effort, no case has ever been made
for Federal product liability law. The proponents move from claim to
claim about the need for this bill, because they know that this is a
sham. If there ever was special interest legislation, it is this bill.
It is special interest at the expense of the constitutional and civil
liberties of the American people. I urge my colleagues not to be misled
by the proponents' claims, and to vote against this conference report.
There are so many things to say in the limited time. But section
106(b)(3)(C) refers to a general aviation statute of repose limitation
period. It is for 18 years. That is the way the distinguished Senator
from Washington started talking about this bill yesterday. It was all
about Cessna and aviation and everything else like that.
All the provisions of the products bill apply to general aviation, so
there are no longer protections for people injured, of course, on the
ground or the air ambulance people, even though the 1994 law provided
those protections. But what I wonder about, if this general aviation
provision of 18 years has done such a remarkable revival of the
aviation industry, why are we limiting it? There we go.
No. The Senator from Nebraska says there is a real problem and
everybody knows it. That is absolutely false. We know that the States
have taken care of this problem. Yes, there is a political problem,
because Presidential politics has preempted everything up here in
Washington.
I saw some article in one of the magazines about the campaign
starting. The campaign started early last year. In 100 days we were
going to do this, get rid of everybody, 10 things in the Contract, we
are going to pass them in 100 days, and whoopee. And we were off, and
everything else of that kind--until reality set in.
But now there is the time of some embarrassment, since some of these
things have not been passed--and for very, very good reason. A good
reason, of course, assuming the truth of everything that the Senator
from Connecticut says, is that the State Legislature of Connecticut is
ready, willing, able, alert, and responsive. He was a majority leader
of it. The State of Connecticut has taken care of these problems. We
all take care of these problems in the several States.
But right to the point, this bill is a travesty, Mr. President. The
Presiding Officer knows it. It separates people. It separates them
according to their economic worth. That is a dastardly thing to do. I
cannot see people of good sense and reason voting for a thing of this
kind and hoping the President will sign it. The President knows the
facts. He has reiterated them in the letter. He said, if it is so good
and so fair, as they plead, then why does it not apply to business--the
very people who drew it up? This thing was drafted by business, of
business, for business, greedy business. That is what it has been for,
and the proponents all know it.
I say that advisedly. I have gotten every business award you can
find. I am proud of them. I work closely with business. We have more
business coming to our State than all these other States that these
Senators represent. I challenge them to compete with us on taking care
of business. That has been my 40-year record of public service.
So I know when they step over the line. The fact of the matter is,
there is a small segment, Victor Schwartz and his crowd, stepping over
the line that has picked up the political fever of ``kill all the
lawyers.'' It is the business of travesty that increases the legal
costs for those trying to really try their cases. They know that these
are contingency fees.
So if you get a good verdict, and it is a punitive damage verdict,
you do OK. We put in the Record where punitive damages have disciplined
these businesses. Thank heavens it has because we are all safer on
account of it. That is why we get the recalls, because the
manufacturers are put on notice. The proponents know that is why we are
getting the recalls in our society. But now they have to go through a
whole new hearing. And they talk about simplicity and transaction
costs.
How can they claim simplicity with all the different proceedings they
have here now, trying to limit legal costs? They tell the utilities
they can forget about strict liability, they can forget about the
highest degree of care. The Senator from North Dakota and the Senator
from Washington got into a very clear dialog about simple negligence.
Let the boilers blow up, let the gas blow up, let it explode. The
highest degree of care now is no longer required under this bill.
Yes, we put in the Record about the drunk drivers. I reiterate, in
the letter of MADD in opposition, Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, they
oppose this bill. They know and they read and they understand and they
stand by their particular opposition.
It encourages the lack of care with that statute of repose on
manufacturers. Manufacturers here are exercising the highest degree of
care. They are not in these other lands. But now the proponents want to
talk about global competition. I have touched on that. They are
competing with themselves. They want to take down the high degree of
care by overriding the strict liability. Punitive damages is another
thing that has given us safe products in this land, safe places to
work, safe places to sleep, safe drugs and food, and everything else of
that kind.
More than anything else, Mr. President, it is just patently
unconstitutional. Amendment VII:
In suits of common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States. . . .
This particular bill says reexamine it at the trial court level, but
keep it a secret. The judge is supposed to charge the jury under the
law, stay out of the facts. But this bill says, by gosh, reexamine it
in violation of amendment VII. Of course, it ignores amendment X that
the distinguished majority leader has run all over the entire United
States talking about, saying, ``I've got one thing here in my pocket,
the 10th amendment.''
These folks all come up here and act like they never heard of the
States from which they were sent. The States have acted on product
liability over the 15 years that the Senator from Rhode Island
complained about. They have acted very judiciously. It is not a
problem. It is a little political gimmick in the contract. It is a
shame and disgrace that we have taken up the time of the National
Congress on this matter that the States have taken care of.
I reserve the remainder of my time. How many minutes do I have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina has 3 minutes
30 seconds.
Mr. DASCHLE addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The minority leader.
Mr. DASCHLE. I thank the distinguished Senator from South Carolina
for yielding. I will use whatever leader time I may require to finish
my statement.
Let me commend the Senator from South Carolina for the arguments he
has again made in his summary on this
[[Page S2589]]
debate. I applaud him for the leadership and the effort he has put
forth. I very enthusiastically endorse his position. Let me also thank
the distinguished Senators from Washington and from West Virginia and
from Connecticut that have, as well as they have, brought this bill
closer to a bill that is reasonable.
As the distinguished Senator from South Carolina said, Mr. President,
it is ironic in the extreme that, in this era of devolution, in this
era of States rights, in this era of empowering States with more
opportunities to deal with issues at the local level, this Congress, of
all Congresses, would now pass a bill that says the Federal Government
knows better. It is especially ironic that this Congress would say the
Federal Government knows better on an issue as profound as this,
affecting victims in the worst set of circumstances.
I respect the Presiding Officer for his consistency in suggesting
that devolution and new Federalism, or whatever we call it, ought to be
sustained, regardless of the issue, that we ought not pick issues
depending on the special interests, that we really have a
responsibility to be consistent.
Certainly in this case it would require, I believe, a second look. We
can do better than this. We can do better than what we are going to be
voting on this afternoon.
I am very troubled by a couple of provisions. One in particular
troubles me. Mr. President, to say that someone working on a defective
piece of machinery is going to be protected if that machinery is
functional for 15 years, but not for 16 years, to me is amazing. To ask
people on the work line, to ask people on the combine, to ask people in
whatever set of working circumstances they face, to accept the risk
that this equipment is going to hold out after that period is more than
I can support. To ask American companies to live up to their
obligation, to understand how important it is that people working on
assembly lines or in a field have the protection and the certainty and
the opportunity to come to work knowing they will be able to come home
whole is not too much to ask. A 20-year statute of repose is not too
much to ask.
Mr. President, the other issue has to do with component parts. We
have gone through some terrible situations in the last several years
involving defective component parts. One example involves women who
were given breast implants that were defective, when it was well known
that a component of the breast implants posed severe health risks in
the body of a woman. Now to immunize from liability people who
manufacture defective component parts and to say we are going to,
through statute, give them our blessing is wrong. It is wrong.
Mr. President, we can do better than this. We have to do better than
this. Those of us opposing this bill will continue to do so. This fight
is not over. The President has said in no uncertain terms this bill
will be vetoed. I predict we will have more than enough votes to
sustain a veto.
Again, this fight is not over. We can do better than this. We ought
to do better than this. In working with the President, the Presiding
Officer and others, we will. I yield the floor.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from
Missouri.
Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Washington. I
commend the Senator from Washington and the Senator from West Virginia
for bringing to the floor of the Senate a reasonable, moderate product
liability bill which the President ought to sign.
The representations in this Chamber that we should do better and
could do better belie the current performance of this Chamber, which
for 15 years has sought to enact a bill like this, but never really
brought one forward that could be passed. This is a bill that can be
passed.
There can be debate about whether or not there is a litigation
explosion in this country. Some can say we have too much litigation or
too little. Let me give you a fact. The fact is that tort costs are 2.3
percent of the Gross Domestic Product in the United States, according
to the Tillinghast study. That is 2\1/2\ times the world average. In
short, we have the most expensive tort liability system in the world.
It is time for us to change that. We must stop wasting money by
exchanging it between the trial lawyers and punitive damage recipients
instead of using it to create the competitive and economic edge that
will allow us to be successful--to create jobs and build equipment, and
to grow this economy. We need to revitalize the industrial base of the
United States of America.
Uniform standards in product liability law would help return good
products to the markets, reduce the price of consumer goods, and break
the legal shackles on American businesses to help them become more
competitive internationally.
This bill will make products safer. Litigation, which we have had
plenty of, stifles innovation that makes products safe. Overall product
safety in the United States improved steadily in the first half of this
century, when a much more limited liability system was in effect. We
need to make sure that safety, not greed, is what is emphasized by our
laws in this area.
Let me make another point. We need to make this fundamentally clear:
No person will be denied the right to recover actual damages under this
bill. Every cent of damages, even damages for pain and suffering
previously that has been available, is available under this bill. The
bill has limits on punitive damages, but those are damages to punish.
Those are not damages to make a person whole for what has happened to
them.
One last point that I raise, this bill was pared down from what it
ought to be and what it should be--in an effort to accommodate the
President. We ought to really be extending some tort reform protection
to our charities. This bill does not provide protection to churches, to
voluntary and charitable organizations, which means there will be no
liability protection for volunteers in the Little League, the American
Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the American Cancer Society, for people
who run soup kitchens. We need an explosion of people helping solve
America's endemic social pathologies. What do we have in the United
States instead? A tort system which threatens everyone who tries to
help his neighbor with the potential of bankrupting liability.
Dick Aft, president of the United Way & Community Chest of
Cincinnati, put it this way, ``The litigious climate imposes a cost for
all charities, costs that can be measured in resigning trustees, lost
volunteer hours and sky-high insurance premiums. These are tough times
for charities. The last thing we need is a legal system that adds to
our burden.''
Mr. President, as long as our litigation system forces a would-be
volunteer to consider whether the risks of being sued outweigh the
benefits of contributing one's time and talent to charitable
organizations efforts to solve society's problems will continue to be
unnecessarily stymied.
In order to try to entice the President of the United States to go
back to his previous position supporting federal product liability
reform, the Senate has had to take the protections for non-profits out
of this bill. Then the President still comes out and opposes the bill.
As a result, I do not know how to trust the President on anything he
says. He previously said he supports it. Now he says he does not.
Maybe we should distrust his latest representation that he will veto
this. We should pass this legislation and give the President a chance
to flip-flop back to the right side of the agenda, and I do not mean
political right, I mean right versus wrong as a matter of good
government policy. This bill is right, it provides a reasonable
framework to do business in the United States. It will protect
consumers. I believe it should be enacted for the good of consumers and
the good of the country.
Mr. GORTON. I yield 30 seconds to the Senator from Virginia.
Mr. WARNER. I thank the distinguished managers of the bill. I
strongly support the bill and commend the managers of this bill.
Mr. President, this is a jobs bill. It throws a liferaft to small
business. Small business today is being buffeted in the turbulent seas
of lawsuits, yet it affords adequate protection in litigation for those
who are wrongfully hurt.
Mr. President, I rise in support of the Commonsense Product Liability
and Legal Reform Act of 1996. I do so because I believe that this bill
is strongly
[[Page S2590]]
proconsumer. The opponents of this bill may claim to be defending the
rights of the injured. Well, this bill not only defends their rights to
be fairly compensated for injuries caused by defective products, but
also defends the rights of the rest of us not to pay for the outrageous
verdicts, settlements, and insurance payments that American businesses
pass on to consumers because of our broken legal system.
It is important to remember what exactly this bill does. There are a
number of commonsense provisions which nobody besides the trial lawyers
could oppose. For example, no longer would companies be liable when the
injured party was drunk, on drugs, or otherwise responsible for their
own injuries, or when the consumer had altered the product. It also
would provide protection to companies producing biomaterials for use in
medical implants: These sections are necessary to allow these companies
to help save lives and to worry less about being sued for merely
providing raw materials which ended up in a heart valve or pacemaker.
Then there is the issue of punitive damages which have been the
subject of so much discussion. Again, it is important to remember what
punitive damages are. Imagine a plaintiff injured by a defective
product, say a car with faulty brakes which causes an accident. The
plaintiff will be able to recover every last penny of lost income,
medical costs, and financial losses he can demonstrate. In addition, he
will be entitled to recover for pain and suffering as the jury sees fit
and in relation to the injuries suffered. Then, on top of being
completely compensated, he can ask for punitive damages which may have
no relation to the amount he received for compensatory damages.
Sometimes punitive damages are granted, sometimes not: more often a
company is forced to settle a case to avoid the possibility of a
outrageous jury verdict. This is a pure lottery having nothing to do
with the injuries suffered by the plaintiff which mainly benefits the
lawyer working on a contingent fee. It is a crazy way to dispense
justice.
My State of Virginia has recognized this problem and placed a
reasonable cap on punitive damages. But Virginians buy products
produced in other States and pay for the costs of this legal lottery
created by the legal systems in other States. President Clinton says
that this bill usurps the power of the States. Commerce, however, is
nationwide and where States are placing undue burdens on interstate
commerce, Congress is correct to step in and make reforms.
Now remember also that when President Clinton was Governor, he
endorsed uniform legislation for punitive damages. Even the Washington
Post has recognized that the President and the opponents of this bill
are on the side of the trial attorneys, rather than American consumers
and businesses.
I urge that the Senate move to consideration of this badly needed
legislation and that it be enacted as soon as possible.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, article 1, section 8 of the Constitution
of the United States reads in part as follows: ``The Congress shall
have power to regulate commerce among the several States.'' The
purposes of this bill, as outlined in this bill, read as follows:
Based upon the powers contained in Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the 14th amendment of the United States
Constitution, the purposes of this act are to promote the
free flow of goods and services, to lessen burdens on
interstate commerce, and to uphold the constitutionally
protected due process by, (1), establishing certain uniform
legal principles of product liability which provide a fair
balance among the interests of product users, manufacturers
and product sellers; (2), placing reasonable limits on
damages over and above the actual damages suffered by a
claimant; (3), ensuring the fair allocation of liability in
civil actions; (4), reducing the unacceptable cost and delays
of our civil justice system caused by excessive litigation
which harm both plaintiffs and defendants; (5), establishing
greater fairness, rationality, and predictability, in the
civil justice system.
That is precisely what this bill is designed to do, Mr. President.
That is precisely what this bill does.
I yield the remaining 2 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the
Commerce Committee.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of this
legislation. I want to pay tribute to both Senator Rockefeller and
Senator Gorton who have had such great courage, leading this
controversial bill and bringing it here. This is perhaps one of the
most important pieces of legislation this Congress will consider
because of the benefits it will have for small business.
Senator Gorton, who has appeared before the Supreme Court 14 times,
is a legal expert. His expertise in explaining this bill, both in the
committee and on the floor, have been very, very valuable. This bill
would not be here without Senator Slade Gorton. He has been able to
explain this bill, the technical parts of it.
Senator Rockefeller, in my opinion has shown great courage. I wanted
to use my time to pay tribute to those two leaders who have fought so
long and hard through the committee.
I strongly support this legislation.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I simply would like to say after this
extended debate, not only over the period of the last 2 days but over
the period of the last year, and for that matter several Congresses,
that it is wonderful to have at least this phase of it completed. This
very important element in the reform of our country's legal system
would not have been completed with this degree of success without the
help of both many Members and a significant number of staff.
When one names names, one runs the risk of leaving out many people
who deserve credit, but particular credit from my perspective belongs
to Lance Bultena of the Commerce Committee staff, and my own Jeanne
Bumpus and Trent Erickson. Together they have put in so many hours on
this subject that it cannot possibly be measured, and have done a
wonderful job in educating and advising me.
For Senator Rockefeller, Jim Gottlieb, a magnificent and skilled
attorney, and Ellen Doneski have provided similar services. All of my
cosponsors I wish to thank. All those who voted with me, I wish to
thank. Most particularly, however, is the Senator from West Virginia
[Mr. Rockefeller]. We have come to be close personal friends during the
course of the many years that we have worked together on this subject.
He is a wonderful, thoughtful, and hard-working individual. In this
connection, he is a courageous individual with the willingness to take
on a majority of his own party and his own President.
His devotion to the public interest is not exceeded by any Member of
this body. The ability to become such a close personal friend has been
an important ancillary privilege of leading the debate on product
liability.
With that, Mr. President, I am sure it is time to move on.
Mr. President, I yield the remainder of our time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the conference
report to accompany H.R. 956.
The yeas and nays have been ordered.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Kerrey] is
necessarily absent.
The result was announced--yeas 59, nays 40, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 46 Leg.]
YEAS--59
Abraham
Ashcroft
Bennett
Bond
Brown
Burns
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cochran
Coverdell
Craig
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Faircloth
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Gramm
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Hatch
Hatfield
Helms
Hutchison
Inhofe
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kohl
Kyl
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Moseley-Braun
Murkowski
Nickles
Nunn
Pell
Pressler
Pryor
Rockefeller
Santorum
Smith
Snowe
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
NAYS--40
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Cohen
Conrad
D'Amato
Daschle
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Graham
Harkin
Heflin
Hollings
Inouye
Kennedy
Kerry
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Mikulski
Moynihan
Murray
Reid
Robb
Roth
Sarbanes
Shelby
Simon
Simpson
Specter
Wellstone
Wyden
[[Page S2591]]
NOT VOTING--1
Kerrey
So the conference report was agreed to.
Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. EXON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
____________________