[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 39 (Wednesday, March 20, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2386-S2389]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




    READY TOMORROW: DEFENDING AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as we near the end of this century, we 
must be prepared to deal with the changing realities of the post-cold-
war world and to meet the new challenges of the 21st century. My 
purpose in speaking today to the Senate is to open a debate on the 
continuing need to reshape our national security strategy and military 
force structure to address those new challenges.
  We have already made several attempts to deal with these new 
realities. The Base Force and Bottom Up Review processes were laudable 
early efforts. However, we have not yet made the difficult decisions to 
adapt to the challenges created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the Warsaw Pact. Our current strategy and force plans are not 
structured to meet the challenges of the future.
  The potential threats to our national security interests today and in 
the future are different from those of the cold war; they are less 
deterrable by traditional means and often less easily defeated. We no 
longer face a superpower threat from the former Soviet Union, although 
we must be ``prepared to prepare'' to defend against an emerging major 
power threat. We must deal with a wide range of lesser threats 
throughout the world, including: regional and ethnic conflicts in which 
the United States could easily become involved; the rise of extremist 
and radical movements; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them; the increasing capability of individuals 
and nations to attack us through our dependence on technology, 
particularly information and communications systems; and finally, both 
domestic and international terrorism.
  As has been all too common in the past, our military planning focuses 
on maintaining the force structure that proved effective in winning the 
last war, while too little attention has been given to the changing and 
uncertain nature of future conflicts.
  We must now undertake another effort to reshape our strategy and 
force structure, an effort which is innovative and forward-thinking 
rather than constrained by the accepted principles of the past. A key 
focus of this effort must be ensuring that our defense strategy and 
military forces are flexible and capable of quickly evolving to meet 
any new threats.
  In this effort, we cannot ignore the fiscal realities of our debt-
ridden Federal Government. Planning for our future 
military capabilities must be tempered by a realistic view of fiscal 
constraints on future defense budgets, without allowing those 
constraints to become the dominant factor in our decisions about future 
defense requirements. We must be prepared to accept the cost of being a 
world power. In short, we must focus on the most cost-effective means 
of maintaining the military capabilities necessary to ensure our future 
security.

  Mr. President, we now face a significant gap between our force plans 
and the resources available to implement them. By 1995, the defense 
budget had been cut by more than 35 percent in real, inflation-adjusted 
dollars in just 10 years. Independent assessments of the cost of the 
BUR force show that it exceeds the funding levels dedicated by the 
current administration in the Future Years Defense Program [FYDP] by 
$150 billion to $500 billion.
  As a result, we have been confronted by a series of Hobson's choices. 
We have had to choose among cutting force strength, maintaining 
readiness, or funding force modernization within the constraints of 
continually declining defense budgets. The result has been reductions 
in all three areas.
  Over the past 5 years, we have reduced our military manpower levels 
by more than half a million people. After a dangerous trend 3 or 4 
years ago of declining military readiness, there is now broad agreement 
that we have restored current levels of operational activity and 
readiness of the smaller BUR force. However, we have done so by 
foregoing the modernization programs required to ensure the 
effectiveness of that small force.
  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has repeatedly warned that 
procurement accounts are seriously underfunded, and the Vice Chairman 
has said we face a ``crisis'' in weapons procurement.
  Because of the modernization crisis, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
has set a procurement funding goal of $60 billion per year. However, 
the President's fiscal year 1997 defense budget

[[Page S2387]]

includes only $39 billion for procurement--nearly $5 billion less for 
procurement than was projected in the previous year's budget and far 
short of the Chairman's target. The administration now projects the $60 
billion procurement funding goal will not be reached until the year 
2001--3 years beyond the Chairman's target.

  Mr. President, there is a dangerous long-term impact of postponing 
essential force modernization programs. America's future military 
readiness hinges on our ability to retain technological superiority 
over any potential adversaries. We have already seen some reduction in 
United States capabilities to fight in a single contingency such as the 
Persian Gulf. The continuing failure to invest wisely in military 
modernization programs has put our future readiness at risk.
  We must reverse the alarming practice of postponing essential weapons 
modernization programs. To do this, we need to do one of two things--
either increase the overall defense budget, or spend our available 
defense resources more wisely.
  Last year, the Congress added $7 billion to the President's request 
for national defense and projected adding $14 billion to the planned 
fiscal year 1997 defense budget. However, the President requested $9 
billion less for defense in fiscal year 1997 than Congress provided in 
fiscal year 1996.
  Mr. President, I strongly support much-needed efforts in Congress to 
slow the too-rapid decline in defense spending. However, with 
continuing pressure to balance the Federal budget and alleviate our 
Nation's long-term fiscal crisis, there is, in my view, little 
realistic prospect of significant, sustained increases in defense 
spending in the future.
  Therefore, it is imperative that we--the Congress and the 
administration--begin a debate to develop new ideas to ensure the best 
possible U.S. military force, capable of meeting the challenges of the 
future, within the fiscal constraints of today's defense budgets. 
Today, I want to offer my thoughts on the issues that must be 
considered in that debate.
  Mr. President, our national security strategy must complement a 
credible foreign policy. The United States can and should use diplomacy 
to guide the course of world events, rather than simply observing and 
acquiescing in them. Indecision, hesitation, and vacillation in the 
conduct of our foreign policy only encourage aggression by our 
potential adversaries, possibly leading to conflict.
  A strong military force is essential to maintaining the credibility 
of our foreign policy. The existence of capable and ready military 
forces, combined with the credible threat of their use when necessary 
to defend our national security interests, serves to deter the outbreak 
of conflict. If deterrence fails, those forces must be prepared to 
react early and decisively to prevail in war. Without both a credible 
foreign policy and a strong military force, the ability of the United 
States to shape the future course of world events is severely hampered.
  As I noted earlier, our Nation's fiscal situation makes it likely 
that the defense budget will, at best, remain at the current level, 
despite recent efforts in Congress to increase the defense budget. This 
level is widely recognized as inadequate to fund the force structure 
necessary to support our current strategy of engagement and 
enlargement, based on a capability to fight and win two nearly 
simultaneous major regional contingencies [MRCs].
  Further, the two-MRC strategy is focused too narrowly on large 
conventional conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Korea. It must be 
broadened to ensure attention to all possible conflict scenarios, not 
just the current military capabilities of Iraq and North Korea.
  Current fiscal reality, which makes unlikely future significant 
increases in defense spending, as well as an overly narrow focus of our 
current strategy demand that we reassess both our strategy and our 
force structure. Therefore, many U.S. planners, including senior 
planners on the Joint Staff and the military staffs of the Armed 
Services, are already in the process of considering a single MRC 
strategy in which the United States would only be able to fight one 
major conflict at a time.
  In conducting a reassessment of our future force requirements, we 
should focus on a flexible contingency strategy supported by an 
affordable, flexible force. Our force planning should provide, at a 
minimum, sufficient levels to decisively prevail in a single, generic 
MRC. At the same time, we must recognize the existence of many lesser 
threats and maintain the capability to inflict unacceptable damage on 
an adversary should one or more of these threats materialize.
  This more realistic approach to future force planning will eliminate 
the gap between our current strategy and fiscal reality. While planning 
for a flexible force with the ability of fighting a single MRC, 
possibly together with one or more lesser threats, may necessitate the 
acceptance of some additional risk in certain areas, it is far better 
than to plan for forces and capabilities that will never materialize 
within the limits of likely future defense budgets.


                         future force structure

  The nature of foreseeable conflicts requires that we continue to 
provide for a force structure containing air, land, and see elements 
that are flexible enough to adapt quickly to unforeseeable situations. 
Our warfighting forces must be capable of responding quickly and 
effectively to any potential challenge and should be designed to 
supplement the military forces of our allies in order to provide the 
greatest military capability in the future at the lowest possible cost.
  Very briefly, let me describe the principal warfighting capabilities 
that must be maintained to ensure our readiness in the future.
  Naval forces: Our naval forces are at the forefront of our forward 
presence, crisis response, and power projection capability. They are 
among the most likely to be called to respond to a crisis and the most 
likely to be used in the early phases of any regional conflict.
  Naval vessels should be self-sustaining and have significant 
offensive capability while providing for their own defense. Automation 
of weapon systems and support equipment aboard these vessels should be 
pursued to minimize the number of personnel required to produce an 
efficient, lethal fighting platform.
  Much of our power projection capability will continue to be provided 
by carrier-based air power, increasingly supplemented by cruise 
missiles and other long-range strike systems. Political uncertainties, 
making the use of forward air bases problematic, mean that we cannot 
always rely upon these assets in a crisis situation. One only has to 
remember the United States bombing of Libya in 1986, and the 
restrictions on over-flights of certain countries, to realize that we 
must maintain a sufficient force of aircraft carriers if we want to 
provide the capability of ever-ready air power.
  Marine expeditionary forces will continue to fill a critical role in 
any future force structure because of their flexibility and the ease 
with which they can be dispatched to regional hot spots. These forces 
must be supported with sufficient lift, mine warfare capability, and 
shore fire support.
  Our submarine force will continue to play an important role. We must, 
however, re-examine the numbers and mix of the planned post-cost war 
realities. Today's threats make it possible to scale back plans to 
replace the current, very capable attack submarine force with an all-
new class of stealthy, high-technology submarines.

  Air power: Air power that can be quickly deployed and engage the 
enemy with devastating effect is a critical element of any future force 
structure. Our air assets must be maintained at the forefront of 
technology in order to pose a viable threat to our enemies.
  Our tactical aircraft must have the capability to deliver precision 
weapons on enemy targets. Multimission platforms and maximum firepower 
per platform should be absolute requirements, as the cost of aircraft 
continues to climb at an enormous rate. Precision-guided stand-off 
weapons, such as cruise missiles, will increasingly become the weapon 
of choice for their ability to attack enemy targets without endangering 
air crews and expensive platforms.
  Procurement of self-protection equipment is both necessary and cost-
effective. Every effort should be made to build upon existing 
electronic and

[[Page S2388]]

other countermeasures, including expendables.
  At the same time, we should explore opportunities to increase the use 
of remotely piloted vehicles [RPVs] and unmanned aerial vehicles 
[UAVs]. Both RPVs and UAVs offer great potential to provide a cheaper, 
more effective means of gathering information and delivering ordnance, 
while minimizing risk to our air crews.
  We must act now to resolve the issue of strategic versus tactical 
bombers. We must maintain a viable offensive capability at an 
affordable cost. Therefore, we must carefully consider cost versus 
capabilities in assessing the effectiveness of our strategic and 
tactical bombers in a conventional role. Current information supports a 
decision to cap the B-2 bomber program at its present fleet size and 
give higher priority to precision-guided munitions and improved 
tactical fighter/bomber forces.
  Ground forces: As our overseas basing continues to decline, we must 
reassess our requirement for large ground-based forces. This will 
require greater emphasis on allied capabilities for ground combat 
missions. U.S. ground forces must be readily deployable, requiring a 
reassessment of the balance between heavy and light forces. Greater 
emphasis and reliance on smaller, lighter, and more automated systems 
may be appropriate.
  We need to retailor both our active and reserve forces to concentrate 
our resources on forces we can rapidly deploy or move forward within a 
few months. We do not need units, bases, reserves, or large stocks of 
equipment that we cannot project outside the United States without a 
year or more of mobilization time.

  Information technology will continue to revolutionize the 
battlefield, giving ground commanders unprecedented levels of 
situational awareness on the battlefield. We must ensure that resources 
are dedicated to providing these essential technological enhancements.
  Our ground forces must be properly equipped to maintain superior 
offensive and defense capabilities. Increased night warfighting 
capabilities, increased survivability of tanks and heavy artillery, and 
improvements in antiarmor defenses are particularly important. 
Increased capability to detect, defend, and survive in a biological or 
chemical warfare environment is absolutely essential.
  Special Operations Forces: We must continue to maintain the 
capability to conduct special military operations in a variety of 
missions. Special operations forces expand the range of options 
available to decisionmakers by confronting crises and conflicts below 
the threshold of war. These forces must be able to respond to 
specialized contingencies across the conflict spectrum with stealth, 
speed, and precision.
  Strategic Lift: We must continue to focus on improving our ability to 
move personnel and equipment overseas. The limits we face on the 
forward deployment of our forces, in a world where our forces could be 
required in any region of the globe, means that strategic lift has 
become increasingly important. We must increase our efforts to procure 
the necessary lift capacity to maximize the mobility of our forces.
  National Guard and Reserves: The Reserve and Guard components of the 
Armed Forces should be tasked primarily with those mission areas which 
support rapid power projection and require little training prior to 
deployment. Combat arms units in the Guard and Reserves that cannot be 
mobilized within a very short period of time cannot play a decisive 
role in conflict resolution. By restricting the Guard and Reserves to 
those areas where proficiency can be maintained with minimal unit 
training time, we can minimize the risk that essential military forces 
will not be prepared if they are called upon in a crisis situation.
  The missions most appropriate to the Guard and Reserves, commonly 
referred to as combat support or combat service support, are those 
directly related to a civilian occupation, such as transportation 
specialists, medical support, public affairs, and computer and 
information specialists.
  There are, however, certain military missions which should not be 
assigned to the Reserves or Guard. These missions, such as heavy armor 
and infantry, require constant physical conditioning and training in 
large unit exercises, and are best left to the active forces which can 
be maintained in a ready state for rapid deployment.
  Other force capabilities: Other high-priority force capabilities 
include cost-effective theater and national missile defense systems, 
effective counter-proliferation and proliferation detection 
capabilities, safe and reliable nuclear deterrent forces, and 
technologically superior, maintainable space-based systems.
  These essential force capabilities will not exist in the future 
without sufficient investment in modernization programs. Our ability to 
counter future threats will not depend on stealthy submarines or more 
long-range bombers. Instead, we should emphasize the capabilities most 
effective in likely future conflicts; namely, adequate strategic sea 
and air lift, enhanced amphibious capability, next-generation tactical 
aircraft, deployable light ground forces, and improved command, 
control, and communications systems. Investment now in these high-
priority programs will ensure our future readiness.


                         tiered force readiness

  Mr. President, during the 1970's, the United States allowed its 
military to become hollow by failing to dedicate adequate resources to 
the day-to-day operational readiness of our Armed Forces. Defense 
budget increases in the 1980's restored the readiness and morale of our 
forces and provided much-needed investment funding.
  Because of the continuous decline in defense budgets since the mid-
1980's, however, we heard warnings from our highest-ranking military 
officers of a similar readiness crisis in the early 1990's. We heeded 
those warnings and managed to reverse the alarming trends toward 
another hollow force by dedicating increasing shares of our smaller 
defense budgets to the readiness of our forces.
  Today, we are permitting our forces to become hollow in a different 
way. We are shortchanging military modernization, as we did in the 
1920's and 1930's. Then, our military forces were antiquated and 
inadequately equipped, requiring several years and many millions of 
dollars before they were prepared to fight our enemies in World War II. 
Because of our failure to adequately fund the investment accounts, our 
forces today face a future armed with rapidly aging equipment which is 
difficult and expensive to maintain and operate.
  We must stop postponing essential modernization programs. To maintain 
the force capabilities I have described, and to keep them modernized, 
we must look for savings elsewhere in the defense budget.
  There are many approaches to streamlining defense operations and 
activities that could result in cost savings and which should be done 
to ensure the best value to the American taxpayer. We should consider 
revisiting our infrastructure requirements, modernizing and making more 
efficient cross-service activities, and greater privatization on 
nonmilitary activities. However, the magnitude of savings from these 
efficiencies is negligible in comparison to the funding required to 
modernize and maintain a ready military force.
  Another approach we should consider, which would save scarce defense 
resources and make available needed funding for critical modernization 
programs, would be to reevaluate the readiness requirements of our 
military forces. Although, to a limited extent, the Military services 
currently maintain forces at varying readiness levels, a comprehensive, 
force-wide review must be performed to ensure the future overall 
readiness of our forces.
  Criticality of forces in any future crisis should be the determining 
factor of the degree of day-to-day readiness that each military unit 
should maintain. An evaluation should include two key factors: First, 
the likelihood that forces will be called upon to respond to a military 
crisis, and second, the timeframe in which those forces would be 
deployed. Forces could then be categorized by readiness tiers based on 
the degree of day-to-day readiness at which they should be maintained.
  It is important to differentiate this proposed tiering of readiness 
requirements from the current fluctuations in unit readiness which are 
caused by training or operational deployments. For example, our Navy 
carrier forces

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are maintained at the highest readiness level while on cruise, fall 
back to a very low level when they first return to homeport, and then 
gradually regain their readiness as they prepare for the next 
deployment. The proposal outlined above for tiered force structure 
readiness would categorize units based on their criticality to a crisis 
situation, not on these normal training fluctuations.

  The following delineation of our forces at three different levels of 
military readiness is proposed as the starting point for a discussion 
of the concept of tiered readiness.
  Tier I--Forward-Deployed and Crisis Response Forces: In peacetime, 
our forward-deployed military forces support our diplomacy and our 
commitments to our allies. Our forward military presence takes the form 
of fixed air and ground bases that are home to U.S. forces overseas, 
and our forward-deployed carriers, surface combatants, and amphibious 
forces. Some special operations forces are also forward-deployed, both 
at sea and ashore. Reserves become part of the equation through our 
military exercise programs.
  In the event of a crisis, these forward-deployed forces are most 
often called upon to respond first to contain the crisis. In addition, 
our crisis response forces must be able to get to the region quickly 
and be able to enter the region using force, since we cannot assume 
that ports or airfields will be available. These qualifications limit 
the types of forces that must be ready to respond quickly in a crisis:
  Air forces are limited to aircraft that can make a round trip from a 
secure base.
  Land forces include airborne units.
  Sea forces include carriers, surface combatants, and amphibious 
forces within a range of a few days.
  The Army afloat brigade and naval maritime prepositioning forces can 
respond quickly and, supported by airborne and amphibious forces, can 
expect to have a secure port and airfield in the region when they 
arrive.
  Because they must be able to respond effectively within a matter of 
days, forward-deployed and crisis response forces must be maintained at 
the highest state, or tier, of readiness.
  Tier II--Force Buildup: History shows that crises can usually be 
resolved or contained by the deployment of only a small portion of our 
military capability. In the past 50 years, the United States 
has responded militarily to crises throughout the world over 300 times, 
but we have deployed follow-on forces in anticipation of a major 
regional conflict only 5 times. These include the forward deployment of 
United States troops in Europe at the onset of the cold war; the 
deployment of forces to Korea in 1950; the deployment of forces in 
response to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962; deployment to Vietnam in 
the 1960's; and deployment to Southwest Asia in 1990.

  Although follow-on forces have been used only rarely, we must still 
maintain the forces necessary to halt an escalating crisis.
  Buildup forces are those that can deploy and achieve combat-ready 
status within a matter of weeks rather than days. These follow-on 
forces require permissive access to the theater of operations. There 
must be airfields available for land-based tactical aviation, ports 
available to receive land forces and logistics support, and property 
available for assembly and training areas and supplies and maintenance 
activities.
  Unlike initial response forces, these forces may be maintained at a 
lower level, or tier, of readiness since they will not be required in 
the theater of operations until after the initial stages of the 
conflict. They must, however, maintain the ability to return to a high 
state of readiness within a short time.
  Tier III--Conflict Resolution: In only three of the cases mentioned 
above--Korea, Vietnam, and Southwest Asia--were we engaged in sustained 
conflict, requiring a large-scale deployment of United States forces.
  Forces that seldom deploy must be maintained and available to ensure 
that we have the force superiority to prevail in any conflict. Conflict 
resolution forces include those that deploy late in the conflict 
because of limited airlift or sealift, and the finite capacity of the 
theater to absorb arriving forces. Also included are the later-arriving 
heavy ground forces, naval forces that have not already deployed, and 
air forces that become supportable as airfields and support capability 
in theater expands.
  These combat units should be maintained at a third, or lowest, tier 
of readiness. They would not be required in the theater of operations 
until after about the sixth month of the conflict and would, therefore, 
have sufficient time to make ready for deployment.
  Finally, we must reexamine the practice of maintaining combat units 
for which there is either no identified requirement under our national 
military strategy, or which cannot be deployed to a theater of 
operations until after a time certain following the outbreak of a 
conflict--perhaps 9 months to a year. We should not be spending scarce 
defense funds on combat forces which do not significantly enhance our 
national security.

  Adjusting the readiness requirements of our military forces requires 
a thorough reassessment of our warfighting strategy and tactics. We 
must recognize that maintaining force readiness at different levels, or 
tiers, may increase the potential risk in the near term. However, the 
alternative is an antiquated force of the future which would not be 
capable of effectively protecting our national interests. The resources 
saved by tiering readiness could be reinvested in modernization and 
recapitalization of most needed capabilities. The long-term result of 
tiered readiness may very well be a more capable force for the future, 
and a force which is affordable under foreseeable fiscal constraints.
  The ideas presented in this paper are designed to spur a much-needed 
debate about U.S. national security strategy and military force 
structure for the 21st century. The President and the Congress share in 
the responsibility of providing adequate military forces, properly 
trained and equipped to deal with whatever consequences a changing 
world holds for the United States.
  We have an opportunity to chart a new course for national security, 
and we cannot afford inaction when offered a chance to abandon 
``business as usual.'' If we ignore the difficult issues facing us 
today, we will fail in our most basic responsibility--protecting the 
security of the American people.
  I thank my friend from New Mexico, my neighbor. I know how important 
the issue is that he brings before the Senate. I appreciate his 
indulgence.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Mexico.
  Mr. DOMENICI. I say to Senator McCain, might I just comment that not 
only what he spoke of is vitally important but, as I reviewed the 
President's budget--not for the details as it pertains to these areas 
where the Senator finds deficiencies but in terms of the funding--I 
find that it is $14 billion in budget authority under what was 
requested in our budget resolution after long negotiations between the 
House and the Senate. I do not believe that would help any of that. It 
would only make it somewhat worse. But I wanted to make that comment.

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