[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 35 (Thursday, March 14, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S2080-S2081]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
TAIWAN RESOLUTION
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, there has been some conversation here on
the floor which I caught on my television as I went home about the so-
called Taiwan resolution.
Since I was the one who put an objection into the unanimous-consent
consideration of that resolution, I wanted to tell my colleagues what
my problems were with that issue and why I object to the unanimous-
consent consideration of that resolution.
Mr. President, with the thrust of the resolution, I have no problem.
I do not agree, really, with all of the wording of it. But you never
can always embrace every jot and tittle in words and mood swings. But
with the general thrust--which is to strongly condemn the People's
Republic of China for, in effect, saber rattling in the Strait of
Taiwan--Mr. President, with that I have no problem.
But, Mr. President, we have gotten into a situation where the United
States now has two of our largest aircraft carriers in the Strait of
Taiwan. We have the largest country in the world, one of the fastest
growing countries in the world, soon to be the largest market in the
world, clearly the linchpin of stability in all of Asia, and we are in
a very dangerous situation with them.
How in the world did we get there, Mr. President? We got there, in my
judgment, because of the fault of the United States Congress, because
of the fault of the People's Republic of China, because of the fault of
this administration, and because of the fault of Taiwan and their
President Li Teng-hui.
The fact that this fault is shared does not diminish or ameliorate
the fact that we have two carrier groups in the Strait of Taiwan in a
situation that could lead, probably not to war, but, Mr. President, it
could lead to great difficulties. It could lead to an incident--two
ships bump in the night, a rocket goes astray and hits on Taiwanese
territory. And there will be those in the Congress who would say, ``Let
us go. Let us attack. Let us get the smell of grapeshot. Boy, the blood
is running. Let us go over and fight.''
Mr. President, we are playing with fire with the largest country in
the world. I am old enough to remember when we egged on the people in
Hungary to revolt. Remember those broadcasts? Some of you will
remember. They went across the border. We wanted them to revolt, and
they revolted. They wanted to know where the United States was, and we
were nowhere to be found. I remember women pulling open their shirts in
front of tanks and daring them to shoot.
Mr. President, before we get our macho up too much, I believe we
ought to rationally consider this question. I believe we ought to
consider the basis of our relationships with China and with Taiwan and
cool our rhetoric a little bit--and yes; condemn the People's Republic
of China for what they are doing, but at the same time realize that it
is the Shanghai Communique with its reaffirmations which was begun by
President Richard Nixon, to the applause of Republicans, to the
applause of Democrats, and to the applause of the country back in 1972,
and reaffirmed by five Presidents. We have to understand that that
communique, a one-China policy, two systems, peaceful reunification, is
the basis of our relationship with China.
My problem with this resolution is not that it condemns the People's
Republic of China. for saber rattling. I agree with that. But it
misstates, I believe, the basis of our relationship with China.
In paragraph 5 on page 2, it says, ``Relations between the United
States and the People's Republic of China rest upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be settled solely by peaceful means.''
As far as that goes, it is correct. It has always been our expectation
that it be by peaceful means, and we ought to reaffirm that. But by
leaving out the Shanghai Communique we are suddenly shifting ground.
Mr. President, I believe anyone who thinks that we can shift ground
from the Shanghai Communique, the one-China policy to which Taiwan has
repeatedly adhered and stated that they were for, that anyone who
thinks we can go to a two-China policy and independent Taiwan without a
great deal of difficulty does not know anything about the Far East and
about what is going on.
If we are to do that, Mr. President, let us do it with our eyes wide
open, and let us also do it with our pocketbooks wide open because here
comes the new cold war if we are going to do that.
That is my objection to this, Mr. President. It is a subtle shift.
I asked the author, could we put in some words there, keep everything
the same and just put in some words that say, in effect, we recognize
the Shanghai Communique. The author told me he had no objection. But
the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Helms, does, and
other Members on that side of the aisle have objection to that. You
see, that is the problem.
There is an intention in this body to shift ground to retreat from
the Shanghai Communique, to go to a subtle recognition of Taiwan as an
independent country. That is why I voted against the visit of Li Teng-
hui to this country, Mr. President. I was the only Member of either
body to vote against that visit. Oh, it was a sentimental return to his
alma mater, Cornell, and we like Li Teng-hui. I met him, and I like him
very much. I find him to be a very attractive leader. He is entitled to
a lot of credit. He has brought Taiwan to a democratic system. It is a
prosperous country. They do business with my State. I am for him. I
think he is great.
But anybody who thinks that was an innocent little visit to the old
alma mater and that is all it was about, Mr. President, did not read
the press. You know he promised no press conference. But they put out
the word subtly that, ``If you reporters will be hiding behind the
bushes when he walks around the Elipse, you just may be able to get an
answer to your questions.''
When he campaigns in Taiwan, he is stating things that, on the one
hand, are ambiguous and, on the other hand, are promoting or moving his
country in the direction of independence.
Maybe, Mr. President, at some time this body will consider that
question and come to a different answer. I do not think so. I think if
we had hearings and fully considered the question, we would say that
President Nixon was right, President Carter was right, President Ford
was right, President Bush was right, President Reagan was right, and
now President Clinton is right. Indeed, Taiwan was right to go along
with the Shanghai communique.
Mr. President, I do not propose to fight this resolution because to
fight the resolution itself would be to indicate that I somehow have
some approval of what the People's Republic of China is doing in the
strait.
I do not. I think it ought to be condemned. When Vice Foreign
Minister Liu was here 3 days ago and the distinguished Senator from
California and I had a luncheon for him and had a long discussion with
10 Senators there, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu made it clear
that the friendship of the United States and Taiwan is indelible, there
should be no cause for alarm. China does not mean to go to war. But the
United States needs to understand, Vice Minister Liu said, that
independence for Taiwan is inadmissible, that all other issues are
simple compared to this issue.
I think it bears repeating every time we have a chance that we should
not by indirection allow ourselves to get into a situation where we are
shooting out there in the strait of Taiwan and people are scratching
their heads and saying, ``How did we get there?''
Now, I said the administration was at fault, and they were because
they indicated to Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that there would be no
visit by Li Teng-hui, and they changed, and after the Congress almost
unanimously agreed with the resolution inviting Li Teng-hui to the
United States we might understand that, but the Chinese, frankly, did
not, because they had been assured, they thought, that there would be
no such visit.
I believe the Congress was at fault, even though I am the only one
apparently, only one who voted that way and one of only a few who
shared the view that I thought it was a political visit because Li
Teng-hui treated it as a political visit, the world treated it as a
political visit, and indeed the Foreign Relations Committee chairman
and other members there have put in resolutions saying that we ought to
admit
[[Page S2081]]
Taiwan to the United Nations--that is reserved only for independent
countries--that that ought to be done.
So, Mr. President, I do not plan to oppose this resolution, but if it
is brought up tonight I will want to question the authors of it as to
their intent with respect to the Shanghai communique. It is very
important that the Shanghai communique not be departed from.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I wonder if I might ask my friend a question.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?
Mr. JOHNSTON. I will yield to the Senator from Georgia for a
question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana has the floor.
Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes.
Mr. NUNN. Is the Senator saying if we are going to consider a
resolution on this sensitive subject that we ought to hear every word
of exactly what we are doing, not do it at this hour of the night when
people are not paying attention and understand what we say on the floor
of the Senate?
Sometimes we do not take it seriously but other countries do. I have
reservations about the way this resolution is worded. It is not what is
in it. It is what is not in it. There is not much I disagree with, but
it leaves out the whole history of the United States relationship with
China, how it evolved under President Nixon, what happened when we
normalized, the Reagan communique in 1982. All of that is left out of
it. We are all concerned about what is going on in China, but we do not
further the cause of stability and peace in that area of the world by
ignoring what we have agreed to, by ignoring the history of President
Nixon's visit, by ignoring the one-China policy which was adhered to
not only by the United States when we said that we would respect
China's view that that was their policy but also by the people on
Taiwan. For years that is what has brought stability and prosperity to
that part of the world.
If they are going to change that policy politically by Taiwan or
certainly by military force by China, then we ought to oppose both. We
ought to oppose it vigorously because that is going to cause turmoil in
that part of the world for a long time to come.
So if the Senator from Louisiana is saying let us go slow, let us do
not pass this tonight, I am with him. I think he is absolutely right.
We are not going to solve anything. This is more heat than it is light.
And we need to be very careful.
I would be glad to work with Senators on that side of the aisle in
carefully wording and making sure we reflect the history, making sure
we have an overall perspective, making sure we understand the U.S.
agreements, what we have agreed to. We have not always lived up to what
we said we were going to do either. I think we all have deep concern
about the dangerous situation developing there. We have deep friendship
for the people on Taiwan and deep admiration.
So I would just ask the Senator, have I captured the essence of the
point he is making here?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, the Senator from Georgia has captured
precisely the point, precisely the point. It is not what it says. It is
what it leaves out. It is a subtle shift of ground. It is the mood of
abandonment of the Shanghai communique and its progeny that are the
problem here, and I wish we would just take some time in committee, as
the Senator from Georgia points out, to carefully word on a bipartisan
basis a resolution that, yes, condemns the use of force in Taiwan; yes,
reaffirms our commitment to a peaceful settlement of this problem but,
Mr. President, one that, as the Senator from Georgia says, fully
reveals the content of our policy with China.
We are in this soup right now with two carrier groups in the Strait
of Taiwan because we acted hastily and treated the visit of Li Teng-hui
as if it were simply a visit to the alma mater. I think we realize now
that it was a whole lot more. It has gotten us with two carrier groups
over there. That is what led to it.
And so, Mr. President, I say let us go slowly. I do not oppose what
it says. But let us work it out so it truly reflects American policy.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I wonder if my colleague will yield for a question.
Mr. LOTT. Parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority whip is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I will yield to the Senator.
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