[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 35 (Thursday, March 14, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E355-E357]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 LOCKHEED-MARTIN CHAIRMAN DANIEL TELLEP RECEIVES 1996 JAMES FORRESTAL 
                             MEMORIAL AWARD

                                 ______


                      HON. G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY

                             of mississippi

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 14, 1996

  Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to 
congratulate Daniel M. Tellep, chairman of the board of Lockheed-
Martin, who was honored this week with the 1996 James Forrestal 
Memorial Award. The 1996 annual awards dinner was cohosted by the 
National Security Industrial Association [NSIA] and the American 
Defense Preparedness Association. This year, the NSIA presented its 
Forrestal Award at the dinner held here in Washington.
  I wanted to share with my colleagues the remarks Mr. Tellep made in 
accepting this prestigious award.

                         Shall We Wait and See?

                  (Forrestal Award Acceptance Speech)

       I thank you from the bottom of my heart for this most 
     special award,
       I feel honored . . . humbled . . . and deeply appreciative;
       Honored when I think of the names of others to whom you've 
     conferred this award and
       Humbled to join their ranks. I'm
       Appreciative because this award also reflects the shining 
     achievements of the men and women I work with.
       James Forrestal himself also provides excellent perspective 
     on an occasion like this.
       He once said in reference to himself:
       ``You can't make a hero out of a man in a business suit. 
     I'm just a businessman trying to do a job and that's the 
     whole story.''
       That's also my whole story. I, too, am just a businessman 
     and it has been my privilege for the past 41 years trying to 
     do a job in the aerospace and defense industry in support of 
     our military services.
       As a businessman, I returned last night from an eleven-day 
     trip to the mid-east. . .
       A volatile, vitally important region.
       The trip was a kaleidoscope of countries, cultures, 
     cuisines, people, and events.
       During the trip I also tried to stay abreast of the news in 
     this country. The Republican primaries, for example.
       Flying home and thinking ahead to my remarks this evening I 
     thought: ``How can I make something coherent and relevant out 
     of over two dozen meetings in that complex, turbulent 
     region?'' Looking back, there was a common thread to the 
     discussions in each of the countries. Invariably, we 
     discussed three topics:
       Economics . . . peace . . . and . . . military 
     preparedness.
       What I found was consistent, clear logic on these topics. 
     In each country, their philosophy was basically the same. 
     They said this:
       First . . . we desire economic growth and development . . . 
     but that depends on peace and political stability.
       Second, peace and political stability depend as much on 
     military preparedness as diplomacy.
       Third, military preparedness deserves high priority because 
     it is inextricably linked to national political and economic 
     goals.
       As I listened to these recurring themes, I felt that there 
     were great similarities to attitudes in this country on the 
     desire for economic growth and peace.
       But there is also a difference here at home on the priority 
     to accord military preparedness. . . compared to what I found 
     abroad.
       In our country we continue to search for a fresh national 
     security policy.
       And we debate the proper level of defense expenditures.
       Lately, however, these issues appear secondary to the 
     presidential campaign.
       This is Super Tuesday and along the way, we've witnessed 
     the ups and downs and then the shakeout of the Republican 
     candidates. As we did, it struck me that something vital was 
     missing from the debates and the news coverage;
       Something beyond a flat tax, the deficit, immigration, 
     abortion and trade policy.
       What has been missing is any serious discussions of the 
     candidates' views on defense and national security.
       This morning's Washington Post, for example, has 115 column 
     inches of space devoted to the election but not one mention 
     of defense.
       This diffuse, lower key focus on defense here in the U.S. 
     is strikingly different than what I encountered on my trip.
       Abroad, defense is seen as a guarantor for economic health. 
     Here, defense is often seen as a source of budget to be 
     tapped for other purposes.
       This is disconcerting since we are about to elect not just 
     our president. . . but also our Commander-in-Chief.
       Defense should be a front-burner topic but it isn't and it 
     is a profound reflection of our times.
       The fact that defense isn't very high on the political or 
     national agenda is easy to explain.
       With the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War, 
     we are having difficulties in seeing threats to our national 
     interests.
       For a moment, think back to the Cold War.
       Volumes of policy statements could be conveniently 
     distilled into two galvanizing words . . . 
       These two words telegraphically described a single grave 
     threat, provided continuity of support for a national policy 
     . . . and underpinned our national will.

[[Page E356]]

       Those words were, of course, Contain Communism.
       Today we lack those two or three words which serve as 
     shorthand for a broadly supported . . . focussed national 
     security program.
       It's not ``be prepared'' and it's not ``dial 911 U.S.A.''
       What it is, is still emerging.
       I assert that peacekeeping and nation building aren't it 
     either, because although our military forces can and do 
     perform such missions under special circumstances, this is 
     not what we are trained for and not something which justifies 
     current levels of defense expenditures.
       Does our inability to provide a succinct phrase to describe 
     threats to our national interests mean there aren't any? 
     Hardly.
       I'll return to this in a moment, but first let's review the 
     course we've been on for the past seven years.
       Basically, we've downsized and we've continued to conduct 
     studies to help define our force structure.
       I don't have to remind you of the downsizing.
       The defense budget is down by some 40 percent in constant 
     dollars since its peak in the late 1980's.
       The procurement account is down 72 percent in real 
     purchasing power for $138 billion in 1985 to $39 billion in 
     the fiscal year 1997 request.
       Our force structure--including Army divisions, warships, 
     carriers, and fighter squadrons--has already been reduced by 
     at least one-third in just over six years. And more cuts are 
     on the way.
       In contrast to other areas of the budget where cuts are in 
     the context of reducing the rate of growth, these are deep, 
     real reductions.
       I also think that the comportment of the military services 
     and our industry during this massive downsizing has been 
     remarkable. To their credit, the services ``saluted'' and the 
     industry ``got with it.''
       The question is, ``when have you gone too far in downsizing 
     and when do you stop?''
       Here are a couple of perspectives worth considering. 
     History shows that five times in this century America's 
     military forces have fought major wars. Following each of the 
     previous four, filled with the promise of peace, America 
     proceeded to dismantle its military capability . . . only to 
     be disappointed to find itself once again engaged in war a 
     few years later.
       New York Times columnist, A.M. Rosenthal, recently 
     observed, ``the deep reductions in the armed forces . . . 
     could turn out to be the essence of wisdom. It could also 
     turn out to be the greatest misjudgment since the U.S. 
     disarmed itself after World War II knowing that Stalin would 
     not be stupid enough to bother us.''
       To answer the question on how deep the downsizing should 
     be, we have a penchant for analysis and modelling.
       We do bottom up reviews and define MRC's . . . Major 
     Regional Conflicts.
       It is almost as if we hope that somewhere in the computer 
     we can find the answer.
       Now, I'm not against modelling or computer studies . . .
       But it is not a substitute for something more basic--the 
     sort of deep inner conviction President Reagan felt when he 
     launched the Strategic Defense Initiative.
       That brings us back to the issue of the threat.
       Frankly, I don't think we--the collective ``we''--have done 
     a good job in conveying to the American public the worldwide 
     spectrum of threats to our national security and economic 
     interests.
       But all it takes is newspapers, a map and a compass.
       The public press is a rich source of information on the 
     military activities and postures of nations worldwide. The 
     headlines hardly suggest a peaceful world and an era of 
     tranquility.
       We know for example, that the Mediterranean is a virtual 
     stew of over 80 submarines from as many as 12 nations.
       We know that over 20 countries are building ballistic 
     missiles . . . and China is flexing its muscles with them in 
     the Taiwan Straits. We know that there are at least a half 
     dozen nuclear ``wannabees'' in addition to the eight 
     countries that already possess nuclear weapons.
       We know that modern high technology weapons are available 
     worldwide.
       For example more than 400 MiG 29's--the equivalent of our 
     front-line fighters--are in the service of 22 foreign 
     countries.
       We know that Russia recently sold four modern diesel 
     submarines to Iran.
       In a sense, the soviet arms threat is still there * * * 
     it's just more geographically distributed.
       This list goes to include terrorism which can be the spark 
     for a major conflict in a region where we have vital 
     interests.
       All this and more just from the public press.
       If newspaper reports don't fully convey the picture of a 
     world laced with threats, a map and a compass help.
       Take a compass, a world globe, and strike arcs of 500 or 
     1,000 or 1,500 miles from countries possessing ballistic 
     missiles to countries which could be the intended targets. It 
     soon becomes apparent that much of the world falls under the 
     sinister umbrella of potential missile attacks.
       The threat also extends to the men and women from our 
     services stationed in countries of threatened allies--as they 
     were in the Gulf War.
       We saw in Desert Storm that the single event which caused 
     the greatest casualties among U.S. troops, was when a Scud 
     impacted barracks housing our soldiers.
       Do we need any more analyses to tell us that we need 
     upgraded missile defenses to protect our troops and our 
     allies now and not five or more years from now?
       In discussing the pervasive nature of threats--a situation 
     in many ways much worse than when we faced the monolithic 
     Soviet threat--I'm reminded of another conversation during my 
     mid-east trip.
       A high ranking defense official explained his views this 
     way:
       Despite a situation which you and I would call reasonably 
     clear, he said:
       ``We don't really know what the threat will be and when it 
     will occur. Intelligence has failed us.'' He want on to say:
       ``We don't try to react to a narrowly defined threat, 
     instead we look at the size and balance of the forces we 
     want.
       We use the most advanced technology because it gives us the 
     qualitative edge.
       When we have a qualitative edge, we don't coast. We try to 
     add to it. This saves lives.
       If we don't use our forces, we've succeeded through 
     deterrence.
       Besides, it's always good insurance, something we must 
     have.
       This clear view makes sense for us as well.
       Now, despite the frustrations I've expressed and which many 
     of you must share, I believe there is room for optimism.
       Optimism that we may be on the threshold of arresting, if 
     not reversing the protracted decline in defense budgets * * * 
     and the downsizing and force reductions.
       I point to recent remarks by two highly respected defense 
     leaders--our Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry, and the Head 
     of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Owens.
       Recently Bill Perry took an unequivocal public stand that 
     the basic strategic underpinnings of the administration--the 
     ability to fight two full-scale theater conflicts at once--
     isn't possible without increasing the defense procurement 
     budget over the next five years to somewhere in the range of 
     $50-60 billion per year from today's level of $39 billion.
       Admiral Owens' remarks echo those of Secretary Perry's. He 
     also rejected the thought of further cuts in combat forces 
     and focussed on reducing fixed costs to improve the tooth-to-
     tail ratio of our forces.
       In addition to Perry, Owens and other military leaders, 
     there is also a substantial block is Congress who believe it 
     is time to halt the decline in defense.
       But I'm not sure it will happen unless we can help the 
     American public understand the basics which are so obvious to 
     us:
       That we are in an era of ``come-as-you-are'' wars.
       That the equipment which performed so well in the Gulf War 
     was the technology of the 60's * * * the development of the 
     70's * * * the production of the 80's.
       That this equipment won't do for the year 2010 and that the 
     real debate is over the capability we want our military 
     forces to have past the turn of the century.
       That defense is different than fast foods--you can't just 
     order it and get it because lead times are measured in years, 
     and the systems for the year 2010 should be in development 
     today.
       That relations among nations rise and fall on a much 
     shorter time scale than that required to equip and train an 
     armed force.
       That it is unacceptable to fight wars of parity--in effect 
     winning by one point in double overtime. The fact that the 
     last person left standing on the battlefield is an American 
     does not constitute victory.
       That because of our high regard for the lives of our men 
     and women in service, we need sustained investments in 
     advanced technologies to minimize casualties when conflict is 
     unavoidable.
       That we should not let the fact that the bright 
     incandescent light of the Soviet threat has gone dim blind us 
     to dozens of glowing embers which can ignite anywhere at any 
     time.
       I believe that the American public will accept these basics 
     and that even in the face of other pressing issues, they will 
     support a strong defense.
       I also believe they do not want to disregard the lessons of 
     history and have us make the grave error of undermining 
     America's military capability--leaving it to future 
     generations to pay the price not in dollars but in lives. . .
       The columnist I referred to earlier also asked a profound 
     question in connection with the observation that an enormous 
     chemical weapons plant is nearing completion in Libya.
       He observed that conventional wisdom is that Quadafi would 
     never be mad enough to use these weapons against the west or 
     our allies in the mid-east.
       Mr. Rosenthal then simply asked the rhetorical question, 
     ``He would not be mad enough to do that . . . would he? 
     ``Shall we wait and see?''
       Whether it is Libya's chemical weapons or any one of dozens 
     of potential threats to our national interests . . . shall we 
     wait and see?
       I'm on the side of Bill Perry, Admiral Owens, our service 
     leaders, and those in Congress who say, no.
        . . . That it is time to arrest and reverse the decline in 
     defense . . . rather than wait and see.
       I also believe that the time is now...in the fiscal year 
     1997 budget, rather than in future years.
       Looking ahead there are several immediate things we can and 
     must do:

[[Page E357]]

       First, we must make a better case to the American public on 
     the global nature of threats and our current defense posture. 
     On this note a recent poll shows that two-thirds of the 
     American public believe that we are now protected by a 
     ballistic missile system--despite the fact that no such 
     system exists.
       Second, we must take steps to see that defense becomes an 
     issue in the current election cycle, with a focus on Fiscal 
     Year 1997 defense budget.
       Third, we must reestablish the firewalls around the defense 
     budget so that it does not become a checkbook for the rest of 
     the federal budget.
       Fourth, we must continue to spend each dollar for defense 
     more efficiently by continuing the DOD's excellent start on 
     acquisition reform and by improving the tooth-to-tail ratio 
     of our armed forces by shedding ourselves of excess depot 
     capacity.
       We can do this and arrest the protracted decline or we can 
     wait and see.
       Again . . . Forrestal's words ring true.
       Advising President Truman in 1945 when Stalin began 
     breaking the agreements reached at Yalta, Forrestal said:
       ``We might as well meet the issue now as later on.''
       For us, some fifty years later, we might as well meet the 
     issue in our next cycle of defense budgets and not wait and 
     see.

                          ____________________