[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 30 (Thursday, March 7, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1656-S1657]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                            REFORM IN RUSSIA

 Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, on February 5, Russia's 
Commission on Human Rights of the Russian Federation issued its report, 
``On the Observance of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in the Russian 
Federation.'' The report covers the years 1994-1995 and its conclusion 
is troubling: ``the human rights situation in the Russian Federation 
has remained extremely unsatisfactory.'' The commission observed that 
constitutional guarantees for human rights and civil liberties ``remain 
largely rhetorical'' and that ``in many aspects of civil and political 
rights and liberties there has been a distinct retreat from democratic 
achievements.''
  In support of its finding, the commission noted, inter alia: an 
increasing militarization of society; growth in the jurisdiction and 
powers of the security forces; the use of force to resolve domestic 
affairs, as in Chechnya; aggravation of racial and ethnic intolerance 
and discrimination; and the termination of state support for human 
rights organizations and offices. ``Political expediency,'' the 
commission charges, ``increasingly takes precedence over fundamental 
principles of law and respect for human rights and dignity,'' a cause 
``for grave concern.''
  Mr. President, only this past week the former head of the commission, 
Sergei Kovalev, was in Washington to testify before the Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], also known as the Helsinki 
Commission and on which I have recently been appointed to serve. Mr. 
Kovalev was president of Russia's Commission on Human Rights from its 
inception in October 1993 until he submitted his resignation on January 
23 of this year. The commission's report bears his stamp. His 
resignation was in protest over the very matters I have just noted: the 
fear that Russia's leaders are paying only lip service to democratic 
and economic reform and contemplating a return to the worst features of 
Soviet-era authoritarian rule.
  Mr. Kovalev's testimony last week focused on the fighting in 
Chechnya, about which I will comment further below, but he has a long 
history of fighting for human rights, including as a political prisoner 
in the former Soviet Union. His voice is among the most respected in 
Russia; he maintained his seat in Russia's State Duma despite the 
resurgence of the Communists in December's parliamentary elections.
  In his letter of resignation to President Yeltsin, Mr. Kovalev wrote:

       Even though you continue to proclaim your undying devotion 
     to democratic ideals, you have at first slowly, and then more 
     and more abruptly, changed the course of your government 
     policy. Now your government is trying to turn the country in 
     a direction completely contrary to the one proclaimed in 
     August 1991.

  He then goes on to analyze President Yeltsin's swing toward 
authoritarianism. Mr. Kovalev questions President Yeltsin's commitment 
to the basic hallmarks of democracy, when he has ``virtually halted 
judicial reform'', and thwarted transparency and accountability with 
the creation of secret institutions and constant issuing of secret 
decrees.
  Mr. President, in the past 6 years, we have witnessed amazing 
democratic

[[Page S1657]]

and economic transformations in Russia. While these radical changes 
have borne some difficult and unfortunate challenges both in Russia and 
the international arena, Russia had been on a course of reform that we 
embraced. We counted on President Yeltsin, whose own personal 
metamorphosis had apparently paralleled his nation's, to lead Russia 
through these challenges. But now there are troubling signs of erosion 
of Yeltsin's genuine commitment to reform which, if continued, could 
have detrimental consequences for the U.S. national interest. Our 
interest lies in the continuation of reform in Russia--whether led by 
President Yeltsin or not.
  As we wait for more reform in Russia, President Yeltsin has tried to 
reassure the international community with positive words and uplifting 
promises. But some of the actions we have seen in recent weeks, 
including the sacking of his respected economic advisor and other 
Cabinet-level reformers, lend pause. The replacements have been Soviet-
era hardliners resistant to reform and internationalism. Many people 
have voiced reservations about President Yeltsin's authoritarian 
tendencies, and hope that it may just be election year posturing, a 
response to the decidedly antireform results of last month's 
parliamentary elections in Russia. The question we must ask is how far 
on the slippery slope do we go with President Yeltsin? When do his 
attempts to appease hardline critics leave Russia in the same boat he 
claims to want to avoid?
  Mr. Kovalev testified about the excessive use of force in Chechnya 
and I join in his condemnation of practices repugnant to human dignity. 
It is clear that the fighting in Chechnya is war; the combatants on 
both sides are committed to a cause. But even in war, there are 
standards of respect for human rights and for civilized conduct. These 
have been violated on both sides of the conflict and both deserve 
condemnation.
  But Russia, as a sovereign state, and as a member of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has a special obligation to 
avoid civilian casualties during hostilities on its own territory. The 
practice of calling in indiscriminate airstrikes on Chechnyan villages 
must end, just as surely as the Chechnyan practice of terrorism must 
stop.
  The overall slowing and, in fact, apparent retreat by Russia's 
leadership in human rights and reform brings into question the future 
direction of United States-Russia relations, as well as Russia's place 
in post-cold war alliances, in doubt. President Clinton and Secretary 
Christopher are right to do all they can to work with the new Russian 
officials and offer constructive support wherever we can to advance the 
cause of reform. But we must keep our eye on the ball: our goal is 
reform--democratic, economic, and military reform--and support for 
President Yeltsin to the extent that he will deliver those reforms.
  I conclude by quoting from Mr. Kovalev's March 6 testimony to the 
CSCE in which he, in turn, drew on the wisdom of one of Russia's 
leading proponents of democracy and human rights, Andrei Sakharov:

       the West should have a two-track policy (towards Russia): 
     assistance and pressure. Assist, and effectively assist--the 
     growing civil society and democratic movement in (our) 
     country. Exert pressure, and strong pressure--on those forces 
     that oppose peace, human rights and progress.

     

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