[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 30 (Thursday, March 7, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1624-S1630]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     TEMPORARY DEBT LIMIT EXTENSION

  Mr. LOTT. Therefore, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senate now proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 3021 just 
received from the House.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       A bill (H.R. 3021) to guarantee the continuing full 
     investment of Social Security and other Federal funds in 
     obligations of the United States.

  The Senate proceeded to consider the bill.
  Mr. LOTT. Therefore, Mr. President, I announce there will be two 
votes, then, at approximately 5 minutes before 2 o'clock. We hope to 
begin on time. I believe the managers of the bill are in the area and 
are prepared to begin immediately. We will have the votes starting at 5 
minutes before 2 o'clock.
  While we wait on the managers to come to the floor, I want to say 
that I think this is a good agreement under the circumstances. This 
would provide for a short-term debt ceiling extension to March 29. The 
purpose of this short-

[[Page S1625]]

term extension is so that we can continue to work, as requested by the 
bipartisan Governors, with the leaders in Congress and with the 
administration to see if we can come to a broader bipartisan agreement 
on the budget or, in the alternative, come to some agreement on the 
entitlement reform that we would like to be able to include in this 
debt ceiling legislation, which would be for the longer period of time.
  I am pleased we have reached this point. I am delighted to yield the 
floor so the managers can begin consideration of this bill.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Burns). The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, as best I understand, we have a 30-
minute time period running. Inasmuch as the Senator from New York 
suggested the absence of a quorum, I fear that in 4 minutes time our 
opportunity to debate the matter will have expired. I wonder if I might 
ask unanimous consent--I am sure my esteemed friend from Delaware would 
not mind--if I could ask that the next 10 minutes be charged to the 
majority.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I rise to ask my colleagues to join me in 
supporting H.R. 3021, a bill to extend the current debt ceiling until 
March 30, 1996. Under current law, the debt ceiling would be reached on 
March 15. This bill is intended to give the Secretary of the Treasury 
ample authority to ensure the full investment of all Federal funds and 
trust funds, including the Social Security trust fund, until March 30, 
1996.
  Mr. President, I am told that the Secretary of the Treasury, Robert 
Rubin, supports this legislation and that President Clinton intends to 
sign it.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
the letter received from Secretary Rubin.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                   Department of the Treasury,

                                    Washington, DC, March 7, 1996.
     Hon. Robert Dole,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: Over the past several days, Treasury and 
     Congressional staff have had constructive discussions 
     regarding new legislation to raise the ceiling on the 
     Nation's debt. The resulting bill, H.R. 3021, is up for 
     consideration in the House today. The Administration 
     continues to believe that a long-term straightforward debt 
     ceiling increase should be enacted as soon as possible. 
     Clearly, this is the preferable course of action. 
     Nevertheless, at this juncture, I urge that this interim bill 
     be approved by Congress this week.
       As a reminder of the events that would transpire without 
     Congressional action, I have attached a letter from Under 
     Secretary Hawke. In it he states that the lack of prompt 
     action by Congress could result in non-investment of incoming 
     trust fund receipts and could hamper our ability to auction 
     and settle securities later in the month, thereby prompting a 
     default.
       We also continue to believe the commitment you articulated 
     together with Speaker Gingrich and Majority Leader Armey in 
     your February 1 letter is the right one. We should resolve 
     the debt limit impasse by enacting legislation that is 
     ``acceptable to both [the President] and the Congress in 
     order to guarantee the government does not default on its 
     obligations.''
       We look forward to working with you to achieve enactment of 
     a long-term straightforward debt ceiling bill.
           Sincerely,
                                                  Robert E. Rubin.

  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, therefore, I believe that we must act 
swiftly in passing this critical bill.
  Let me reiterate my position regarding the debt limit issue. It is 
this Senator's intention to work toward passage of a long-term debt 
limit extension later this month. We will not default on our debts. 
What this legislation does is simply allow a few more weeks to work out 
a few unresolved issues with the Governors proposals on Medicaid and 
welfare.
  Let me just take a few moments to summarize the bill for my 
colleagues. Section 1(a) of the bill provides the Secretary with the 
authority to invest receipts received by a trust fund or other Federal 
fund until March 30, 1996. Obligations issued under this authority 
shall not count toward the public debt limit. This is to ensure the 
full establishment and maintenance of income to Social Security and 
other Federal funds that by law are authorized to invest in Federal 
obligations and securities.
  Section 1(b) defines the term Federal fund as a trust fund or account 
to which the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue Federal 
obligations for investment purposes.
  Section 1(c) extends the current authority--Public Law 104-103--to 
incur debt, not subject to the public debt limit for purposes of 
guaranteeing timely payment of Social Security and other Federal 
payments, from March 15, 1996 until March 30, 1996.
  Mr. President, I hope that the Senate expeditiously enacts this 
critically important piece of legislation to preserve the full faith 
and credit of the U.S. Government.
  Mr. President, I yield back the floor.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I wish to join my esteemed chairman, the Senator from 
Delaware, in stating that, indeed, this legislation is necessary. It is 
in fact urgent, a fact which in and of itself speaks to the awkwardness 
with which Congress has approached the most elemental of duties, which 
is to ensure the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government. Here we 
are in a fiscal year that began October 1. We can look out the Senate 
doors and there in the park between here and the Supreme Court we see 
spring rains; we see spring buds; the daffodils are all but upon us; 
and we still have not extended the debt ceiling, which we will have to 
do.
  We are now in an extraordinary pattern of putting in jeopardy the 
world's primary currency, the world's largest economy but also the 
world's largest debtor nation. The full faith and credit of the United 
States is of interest not just to Americans but to the world itself.
  I hope we will, indeed, make this extension.
  I believe my esteemed chairman placed Mr. Rubin's letter in the 
Record. Mr. Rubin's letter was accompanied by a letter from the 
Honorable John D. Hawke, Jr., who is the Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Domestic Finance, explaining in detail why this particular 
extension is urgent and must not be put off. I ask unanimous consent 
that the letter be printed in the Record so that it will be seen out in 
the rest of the world that at least the Treasury Department knows what 
the problem is.
  There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

                                   Department of the Treasury,

                                Washington, DC, February 26, 1996.
     Hon. Robert Dole,
     Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Leader: Because the Congress will shortly be 
     considering legislation to increase the public debt ceiling, 
     Secretary Rubin has asked me to provide you with information 
     concerning the Treasury's expected cash and debt positions 
     for the next several weeks. We share the view expressed in 
     the Leadership's February 1 letter to the President that it 
     is of great importance for Congress to resolve the 
     uncertainties surrounding the debt limit by promptly enacting 
     an increase acceptable to both Congress and the President.
       In his letter to you of January 22, Secretary Rubin 
     described the remaining three actions that he believed to be 
     legal and prudent, and that would provide funds with which to 
     pay the country's financial obligations. He estimated at that 
     time that these actions would be sufficient to carry us 
     through February 29 or March 1. On February 1, Congress 
     passed H.R. 2924, which was signed into law on February 8 as 
     Public Law 104-103, granting authority to Treasury to issue 
     an additional $29 billion in debt that would be temporarily 
     exempt from the debt limit. The debt limit exemption for 
     these securities expires on the earlier of March 15 or the 
     enactment of a new debt limit increase by the Congress. As 
     the Secretary informed you on February 20, on Friday we 
     issued $29 billion in bills under this new authority, and 
     with this action, and the auctions scheduled for this week, 
     the payment of all benefits

[[Page S1626]]

     and other disbursements scheduled for March 1 has been 
     assured.
       In addressing our expected future cash and debt positions 
     in the light of these recent actions, I must caution that 
     there are inherent uncertainties in such predictions. Our 
     projections are revised every day to reflect the actual 
     volume of receipts and disbursements we experience, and the 
     results that are ultimately realized three to four weeks 
     hence may well vary by several billion dollars in either 
     direction from the numbers we currently estimate.
       On March 5, Treasury is scheduled to announce the amount of 
     13- and 26-week bills that will be auctioned on March 11 and 
     issued in exchange for payment on March 14. Treasury sells 
     13- and 26-week bills every week, and this schedule follows 
     the normal pattern. While we project that there will just be 
     room under the debt limit on March 14 to issue these 
     securities, we currently estimate that the cash balance on 
     March 14, after the securities are issued, will be less than 
     the $5 billion that we consider a prudent minimum. Moreover, 
     because we estimate that the debt limit leeway remaining 
     after the bills are issued will be less than $1 billion, we 
     see no room to increase the size of the bill auction to 
     improve the cash balance, and because of our cash needs we 
     will not be able to decrease the size of the auction 
     significantly to preserve debt limit leeway.
       Similarly, on March 12, Treasury is scheduled to announce 
     the amount of 13- and 26-week bills to be auctioned on March 
     18 and issued in exchange for payment on March 21. If there 
     is no debt limit increase, or assurance of a debt limit 
     increase, by March 12, that announcement will have to be 
     conditional: that is, it will state that the March 18 auction 
     will be held only if Treasury has assurance of its ability to 
     issue the bills on March 21 without exceeding the debt limit. 
     We strongly prefer not to make such a conditional 
     announcement because the effect is to prevent ``when-issued'' 
     trading in the securities until the final announcement is 
     made. Secondary market trading usually begins on a when-
     issued basis immediately after the announcement of an 
     auction, and is important because it affords precaution price 
     discovery. Truncating the when-issued trading period tends to 
     increase the Government's cost of borrowing.
       By March 13 or 14, if there is no debt limit increase, we 
     project that our cash balances will be below our prudent 
     minimum of $5 billion and that there will be less than $1 
     billion in leeway under the debt limit. If the actual debt 
     level on March 13 or 14 is $1 billion more than we currently 
     forecast, Treasury would be out of debt limit room and would 
     not be able to issue sufficient securities to the trust funds 
     to enable all trust fund receipts to be invested on those 
     dates.
       On March 15, under the terms of Public Law 104-103, the $29 
     billion of securities we issued Friday will become subject to 
     the debt limit, if no debt limit increase is enacted prior to 
     that date. As a consequence, the amount of Treasury debt 
     outstanding would then be well over the limit. Of course, all 
     the outstanding debt will have been validly issued, and no 
     action to reduce debt will be mandated. Nevertheless, 
     Treasury will immediately be disabled from issuing any new 
     securities, since outstanding debt already will be in excess 
     of the debt limit. Therefore, Treasury would be unable to 
     issue securities to any trust funds either to invest their 
     incoming receipts or to roll over maturing investments. We 
     estimate that on March 15 this would leave approximately $9.8 
     billion of trust fund assets uninvested, including 
     approximately $2.0 billion of assets of the Social Security 
     and Medicare trust funds--a result I am sure we all want to 
     avoid.
       These trust funds, unlike the Civil Service Retirement and 
     Disability Fund and the so-called G Fund, do not have 
     statutory protection in the form of an automatic restoration 
     of interest not earned during a period in which new debt 
     cannot be issued. Thus, a subsequent Act of Congress would be 
     required to restore that lost interest. Based on past 
     experience in similar situations, we expect that Congress 
     would act to restore lost interest.
       In addition, because savings bonds count against the debt 
     limit, new sales of savings bonds would have to be suspended 
     on March 15. This would affect approximately 45,000 banks and 
     payroll offices that act as issuing agents, and would disrupt 
     the savings programs of millions of individual investors.
       Because March 15 is a tax payment date, cash balances will 
     improve through March 20. However, on March 21 a total of 
     $16.6 billion of trust fund assets, including $8.8 billion of 
     Social Security and Medicare receipts, would remain 
     uninvested. Moreover, on March 21 Treasury bills totaling 
     $25.5 billion will mature. If the debt limit has not been 
     increased before that time, it is unlikely, based on current 
     estimates, that the Treasury will be able to issue enough new 
     securities to raise the cash needed to pay these bills. It is 
     conceivable that our cash balance on March 21 might be as 
     much as the amount by which outstanding debt exceeds the debt 
     limit, and that we could use the cash, plus a small bill 
     auction, on that date to pay the maturing bills. However, our 
     most recent projections do not show this occurring. In any 
     event, such an action would exhaust Treasury's cash on that 
     date, and we project that on March 22 cash flow will be 
     negative.
       As I cautioned, these projections reflect current estimates 
     only and are all subject to changes--which could be favorable 
     or unfavorable--to reflect our actual day-to-day experience 
     with receipts and disbursements. The Secretary has asked that 
     I continue to keep you informed if and as changes in the 
     projections affect the sequence of events I have set forth.
           Sincerely,

                                           John D. Hawke, Jr.,

                                            Under Secretary of the
                                    Treasury for Domestic Finance.

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. With that, Mr. President, I would simply say I feel 
that while the 2-week extension is urgent and absolutely indispensable, 
we ought to do more. And with the conclusion of this part of our 
debate, I will proceed, when the chairman is ready, to offer an 
amendment that would in fact extend us to the spring of 1997 when we 
have a new cycle in American Government and a new fiscal year.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time on the bill has now expired.


                           Amendment No. 3465

              (Purpose: To increase the public debt limit)

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from New York [Mr. Moynihan] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 3465:
       Strike all matter after the enactment clause and insert the 
     following:

                       TITLE  --PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT

     SEC.  01. INCREASE IN PUBLIC DEBT LIMIT.

       Subsection (b) of section 3101 of title 31, United States 
     Code, is amended by striking the dollar amount contained in 
     the first sentence and inserting ``$5,400,000,000,000''.

  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair. And as you have observed, this is a 
succinct matter. We are simply taking the debt ceiling now at $4.9 
trillion and raising it to $5.4 trillion. The statutory limit on the 
total outstanding public debt of the United States subject to that 
limit will be reached on March 15, 1996 or shortly thereafter.
  Might I make the point here that when we speak of the public debt, we 
include here all the debt owed to the various trust funds of the 
Federal Government as, for example, Social Security trust funds which 
are really internal financing arrangements that do not represent debt 
held by private investors.
  Today is the third time in this fiscal year that I have offered an 
amendment to extend the permanent debt ceiling. On November 9, I 
proposed simply raising it to $4.967 trillion in order to provide time 
to complete action on the budget reconciliation bill. The amendment was 
tabled 49 to 47. On January 26, I offered an amendment to raise the 
debt ceiling to $5.4 trillion, which would have taken us beyond the 
November elections to about May of next year. And that amendment was 
also tabled by a very close vote, Mr. President, 46 to 45. And the 
amendment I have just sent does the same thing. It would bring us to 
about May 31, 1997. Anything sooner than that gets us involved with a 
Presidential election which will have occurred, a State of the Union 
Message, a February recess. It seems to me that taking this issue up 
next May is an orderly way to do it, a way to tell financial markets 
that this country is not in jeopardy of default.
  The very idea of default has not existed in the vocabulary of 
American politics.
  I made the point, Mr. President, that in 1814 the British invaded 
Washington, burned the White House, burned the Treasury Building, 
burned the Capitol; but the interest on the national debt continued to 
be paid out of the sub-Treasury in Manhattan. The thought of default 
never occurred to us. Here we are, talking about 3 weeks until 
doomsday. Three weeks until doomsday? That is no way for a grownup, 
mature, solvent nation to behave.
  The General Accounting Office has produced a report, ``Information on 
Debt Ceiling Limitations and Increases,'' which was prepared at my 
request, and reports that we are in the 21st debt ceiling crisis or 
debt issuance suspension period since 1946. All these crises, save 
four, have occurred since 1980-- 17 since 1980. And it is, therefore, 
no coincidence that we have closed down the Federal Government 11 times 
since 1981--something unthinkable in previous years. But we do it.
  The current debt ceiling crisis, which began on November 15, has 
already lasted 114 days. Prior to this crisis, the longest one was 100 
days; that was 1985.

[[Page S1627]]

  So, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the General 
Accounting Office report be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         U.S. General Accounting Office, Accounting and 
           Information Management Division,
                                Washington, DC, February 23, 1996.
     Hon. Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
     U.S. Senate.
       Dear Senator Moynihan: Your January 16, 1996, letter 
     requested information on past debt ceiling limitations and 
     actions that the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has 
     taken to avoid defaulting on government obligations. In our 
     January 26, 1996, letter to you, we discussed actions taken 
     by Treasury during debt ceiling crises since September 30, 
     1984.\1\ As agreed with your office, the enclosure to this 
     letter provides information on (1) when the outstanding debt 
     subject to the statutory debt limit was within $25 million 
     \2\ of the public debt limit between July 1, 1954, and 
     September 30, 1984, (2) the debt ceiling crises occurring 
     between September 30, 1984, and February 15, 1996, and (3) 
     when the statutory debt ceiling has been revised since June 
     26, 1946.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \1\ Debt Ceiling Limitations and Treasury Actions (GAO/AIMD-
     96-38R, January 26, 1996).
     \2\ During the current crisis, Treasury has maintained a $25 
     million difference between the outstanding debt and the debt 
     limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


                      Changes in the debt ceiling

       The federal government began with a public debt of about 
     $78 million in 1789 and since then the Congress has attempted 
     to control the size of the debt by imposing ceilings on the 
     amount of public debt that can be issued. Until 1941, the 
     Congress set ceilings on the various types of Treasury 
     securities that could be issued. In February 1941, the 
     Congress set an overall ceiling of $65 billion on all types 
     of Treasury securities that could be outstanding at any one 
     time. This ceiling was raised several times between February 
     1941 and June 1946 when a ceiling of $275 billion was set and 
     remained in effect until August 1954. At that time, the 
     Congress imposed the first temporary debt ceiling which added 
     $6 billion to the $275 billion permanent ceiling. Since that 
     time, the Congress has enacted numerous temporary and 
     permanent increases in the debt ceiling which currently 
     stands at $4.9 trillion.


        relationship of the debt ceiling to the outstanding debt

       As shown in the following chart, the relationship between 
     the public debt limit and the amount of outstanding debt is 
     very close. \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     \3\ These figures are nominal dollars. They are not adjusted 
     for inflation or for growth in the economy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       (Chart not reproducible in Record.)
       In order to determine when a debt ceiling crisis may have 
     arisen, we reviewed historical Treasury documents for the 
     period July 1, 1954, through February 15, 1996, and 
     identified 21 periods when the outstanding debt subject to 
     the statutory debt limit was within $25 million of the debt 
     ceiling.
       If you have any questions regarding the information in this 
     letter, please call me at (202) 512-9510, or Gary Engel, 
     Assistant Director, at (202) 512-8815.
           Sincerely yours,
                                              Gregory M. Holloway,
                                  Director, Governmentwide Audits.
       Enclosure.

 Information on when the outstanding debt was within $25 million of the 
       debt ceiling, debt ceiling crises, and debt ceiling changes      
                                                                        
                 Dates                         Situation or event       
                                                                        
June 26, 1946.........................  Debt ceiling set at $275        
                                         billion.                       
Aug. 28, 1954.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $281     
                                         billion.                       
July 9, 1956..........................  Debt ceiling lowered to $278    
                                         billion.                       
Feb. 26, 1958.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $280     
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 2, 1958.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $288     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1959..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $295     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1960..........................  Debt ceiling lowered to $293    
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1961..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $298     
                                         billion.                       
Mar. 13, 1962.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $300     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1962..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $308     
                                         billion.                       
Apr. 1, 1963..........................  Debt ceiling lowered to $305    
                                         billion.                       
May 29, 1963..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $307     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1963..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $309     
                                         billion.                       
Nov. 27, 1963.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $315     
                                         billion.                       
June 29, 1964.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $324     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1965..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $328     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1966..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $330     
                                         billion.                       
Mar. 3, 1967..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $336     
                                         billion.                       
June 30, 1967.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $358     
                                         billion.                       
July 1, 1968..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $365     
                                         billion.                       
Apr. 7, 1969..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $377     
                                         billion.                       
June 30, 1970.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $395     
                                         billion.                       
Mar. 17, 1971.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $430     
                                         billion.                       
Mar. 15, 1972.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $450     
                                         billion.                       
Oct. 27, 1972.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $465     
                                         billion.                       
Dec. 1-2, 1973........................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
Dec. 3, 1973..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $475.7   
                                         billion.                       
June 30, 1974.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $495     
                                         billion.                       
Feb. 19, 1975.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $531     
                                         billion.                       
June 30, 1975.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $577     
                                         billion.                       
Nov. 14, 1975.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $595     
                                         billion.                       
Feb. 27-Mar. 14, 1976 1...............  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
Mar. 15, 1976.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $627     
                                         billion.                       
June 30, 1976.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $636     
                                         billion.                       
Oct. 1, 1976..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $682     
                                         billion.                       
Apr. 1, 1977..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $700     
                                         billion.                       
Oct. 1-3, 1977........................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
Oct. 4, 1977..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $752     
                                         billion.                       
Aug. 1-2, 1978 2......................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
Aug. 3, 1978..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $798     
                                         billion.                       
Apr. 2, 1979 2........................  Debt ceiling raised to $830     
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 29, 1979........................  Debt ceiling raised to $879     
                                         billion.                       
May 30-June 11, 1980 1................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
June 28, 1980.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $925     
                                         billion.                       
Dec. 19, 1980.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $935.1   
                                         billion.                       
Jan. 30-Feb. 2, 1981..................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
Feb. 7, 1981..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $985     
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 30, 1981........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,079.8 
                                         billion.                       
June 3-6, 1982........................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
June 28, 1982.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,143.1 
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 30, 1982........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,290.2 
                                         billion.                       
May 26, 1983..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,389   
                                         billion.                       
Nov. 21, 1983.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,490   
                                         billion.                       
Apr. 4, 1984..........................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
May 1-16, 1984 1......................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
May 25, 1984..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,520   
                                         billion.                       
June 4-July 5, 1984 1.................  Outstanding debt within $25     
                                         million of ceiling.            
July 6, 1984..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,573   
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 4-Oct. 12, 1984 1, 3............  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Oct. 13, 1984.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,823.8 
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 3-Dec. 11, 1985 1, 3............  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Nov. 14, 1985.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $1,903.8 
                                         billion.                       
Dec. 12, 1985.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,078.7 
                                         billion.                       
Aug. 1-20, 1986 1.....................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Aug. 21, 1986.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,111   
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 30-Oct. 20, 1986................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Oct. 21, 1986.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,300   
                                         billion.                       
May 15, 1987..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,320   
                                         billion.                       
July 18-29, 1987......................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Aug. 7-9, 1987........................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Aug. 10, 1987.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,352   
                                         billion.                       
Sept. 24-28, 1987.....................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Sept. 29, 1987........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,800   
                                         billion.                       
Aug. 1-6, 1989 1......................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Aug. 7, 1989..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $2,870   
                                         billion.                       
Nov. 1-7, 1989........................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Nov. 8, 1989..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $3,122.7 
                                         billion.                       
Aug. 9, 1990..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $3,195   
                                         billion.                       
Oct. 19-27, 1990 1....................  Debt ceiling crisis.            
Oct. 28, 1990.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $3,230   
                                         billion.                       
Nov. 5, 1990..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $4,145   
                                         billion.                       
Apr. 6, 1993..........................  Debt ceiling raised to $4,370   
                                         billion.                       
Aug. 10, 1993.........................  Debt ceiling raised to $4,900   
                                         billion.                       

[[Page S1628]]

                                                                        
Nov. 15, 1995-Feb. 15, 1996...........  Debt ceiling crisis.            
                                                                        
1 On one or more days during this period, the difference between the    
  amount of debt subject to the limit and the debt limit was greater    
  than $25 million. As noted in the letter, we were unable to           
  specifically identify the debt ceiling crisis prior to September 30,  
  1984. Therefore, in order to better estimate the periods when Treasury
  may have had difficulty in performing its normal financing operations,
  we assumed that Treasury's difficulties continued if the following    
  occurred: the outstanding debt subject to the limit fell below the $25
  million threshold and then rose to the $25 million threshold during a 
  14-day period.                                                        
2 Specific actions taken by Treasury during these periods are discussed 
  in the following GAO report: A New Approach to the Public Debt        
  Legislation Should Be Considered (FGMSD-79-58, September 7, 1979).    
3 Specific actions taken by Treasury during these debt ceiling crisis   
  are discussed in the following GAO reports: Civil Service Fund:       
  Improved Controls Needed Over Investments (GAO/AFMD-87-17, May 7,     
  1987) and Treasury's Management of Social Security Trust Funds During 
  the Debt Ceiling Crisis (GAO/HRD-86-45, December 5, 1985).            


  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank the Chair.
  Again to say, a default by the Treasury would have disastrous 
consequences for the domestic economy of the United States and for 
global financial markets. I make the point that during the 1980's, we 
became a debtor nation, the world's largest debtor nation. To 
jeopardize the full faith and credit of that debt is to jeopardize the 
well-being of the Nation.
  I have, Mr. President, one last thing to say, a point to make, a 
positive point. I know that there are many persons who legitimately 
feel that in extending the debt ceiling we are only somehow extending 
the tendency to spend more than we have in the way of income, to be 
excessive and improvident and, in consequence, debt ridden.
  Mr. President, this is not the case. Owing in large measure--or so I 
choose to believe--to the budget measures, tax and spending measures we 
took in 1993, we are now in a very solid cash-flow situation for the 
first time since the late 1960's. We are seeing the legacy of debt but 
also the consequence of legitimate behavior.
  In this period, 1994-97, for the first time since the administrations 
of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, the Federal Government will have 
more revenue than expenditure on programs and procurement. This also 
went through to the first years of President Nixon. We had a very small 
surplus, tiny, $3.1 billion in the first half of the decade; $2.3 
billion in the second half. Then there was the period of the Nixon 
administration when matters were just even, properly so.
  Then with the onset of President Ford's administration, then 
President Carter's, with the great increase in oil prices, inflation, 
things of that kind, we began to borrow money to pay for ongoing 
programs, $22 billion, then $13 billion.
  The first years of the Reagan administration we borrowed $80 billion 
to pay for ongoing programs. Some of it is investment, but it was 
ongoing. Then in the administration of the latter years of Mr. Reagan, 
it dropped to $21 billion.
  Then Mr. Bush had the misfortune of a recession, which reduced 
revenues, and in some ways raised outlays, and you have a big deficit, 
back to a $64.8 billion shortfall between revenues and outlays.
  Mr. President, we are now at a $56.7 billion surplus. That means what 
we call the deficit is entirely accounted for by interest on the debt 
we accumulated in this period. We have our budget in balance, save for 
what we borrowed in the 1980's.
  There were those who had in mind that is what we should do--that 
deficits would end up choking the life out of the Federal Government 
and its programs. They had a phrase for it called ``starve the beast.'' 
They were not wrong. It was the idea that you could not argue this 
program out of existence and that program out of existence; just starve 
the Government of revenues. And you are then forced to do things you 
would have never dreamed of previously. For example, the present 
administration proposed a 7-year balanced budget glidepath which had 
enormous reductions in discretionary spending. Now you seem to have no 
alternative because of the debt service.
  But I do say, Mr. President, we can see our way out of this. We have 
cut our outlays. Our revenues are solid. If we stay on this path, we 
will get to the point where the debt begins to decline. Then it can be 
a very rapid event.
  I say this to those Members of the House, really, who themselves had 
the good sense in 1979 to make the debt ceiling extension automatic. 
Passage of the budget resolution automatically increased the debt 
ceiling by the necessary amount. I say to them that, if they see an 
increase in the debt ceiling as being an invitation to spend moneys you 
do not have, that you have been forced to borrow--that may indeed have 
been the case in the 1980's; it is not the case today. We are beginning 
to act in a mature and open and defensible way.
  Let us put this debt ceiling behind us. Let us not have 3 weeks of 
saying, my God, in 3 weeks it is doomsday. No. Let us not put this off 
and let us do the right thing--pay our bills until next May. In the 
interval there will be a Presidential election. We will hear a lot 
about this subject. We will have a new administration. I hope we will 
have the same President, but he will be in his second term. If we do 
not, we will have the distinguished majority leader, one-time chairman 
of the Finance Committee, a man who will know what to do. We are on the 
right path. Let us do the right thing.
  With that, Mr. President, reserving the remainder of my time, I yield 
the floor. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum and ask 
that the time be equally divided.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to speak with regard to 
the proposed debt increase issue for 3 or 4 minutes.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, how much time remains?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator from Delaware 
that he has 13 minutes remaining, and the Senator from New York has 1 
minute, 26 seconds.
  Mr. ROTH. I yield the Senator 3 minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the floor manager.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska is recognized for 3 
minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I have grave concerns about the 
proposal to increase the debt without having a mandate in place to 
address a balanced budget. For this body to vote to increase the debt 
without having a budget that can be achievably balanced is 
irresponsible.
  What we are doing here, I think, is extraordinarily irresponsible. We 
are losing the leverage that we have--and the leverage that we have is 
the ability to affect just how much spending occurs. Mr. President, 
this body cannot face an authorization to increase the debt unless this 
body has found a way to ensure that the debt is not going to continue 
uncontrolled. This is the realization that we must not be afraid to 
face: the Government simply does not have the discipline to control its 
spending; the Government does not have the discipline and constraints 
to control its spending as is dictated in the private sector.
  What should this body be doing? Well, Mr. President, this body should 
be doing the only responsible thing to do when one incurs too much 
debt--and that is decrease expenses. It is not responsible to the debt 
without taking corrective action.
  The greatest concern this country has is too much debt, and now we 
are being asked to accumulate that debt further by increasing the debt 
ceiling from $4.9 trillion to somewhere in the area of $5.4 trillion. 
What is the rationale for this? The argument is that we simply have to. 
I am not arguing with the reality that we have to pay our bills, but to 
suggest that we go ahead with this authorization without first having 
addressed a mandatory balanced budget is absolutely irresponsible.
  To suggest that we are up against some time frame of tomorrow or the 
next day is not necessarily true. We know that the Secretary of the 
Treasury has continued to borrow from funds, and likely can do so for a 
limited period of time. So, why not take

[[Page S1629]]

this opportunity--when there is a need now that is greater than it has 
ever been before--to establish a methodology to achieve a balanced 
budget?
  Mr. President, interest currently is about 16 percent of our total 
expenditure. Mr. President, that is a cost that we have absolutely no 
control over; it is an automatic cost that continues to grow and does 
not disappear. It's like having a horse--and the Senator from Montana 
knows about horses. You may feed a horse and watch him eat, but that 
horse continues to eat when you're not around--that horse eats while 
you sleep. A horse's eating cannot be controlled and neither can this 
country's interest expenditures. In Canada, 20 percent of the budget is 
interest on the debt. They cannot afford their health care. If you look 
at Central America countries, South America countries, what put them 
under was too much debt.
  Currently our interest costs are more than our annual deficit. We are 
broke, yet we just keep spending. And to suggest that we are on the 
right track without having mandatory discipline is absolutely 
unrealistic.
  Some may suggest the problem will fix itself--the economy will expand 
or the tax base will increase, and so forth. Those are all fine. But we 
have not addressed a responsible method to curtail this runaway debt, 
and here we are today prepared to increase the debt ceiling without 
having taken the corrective action, and this Senator from Alaska is 
going to vote against it.
  The rationale is obvious: We have to be disciplined. We better face 
up to it because we are going to be right back here again in a year, 18 
months, more or less, increasing the debt ceiling again. Will we have 
the leverage then? Well, we have the leverage now, and that leverage is 
to enact a mandatory balanced budget. Only then will I vote for the 
debt ceiling, but not until. I appreciate the floor manager allowing me 
this time.
  Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Delaware.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I respectfully rise in opposition to the 
Moynihan amendment. I am sure he recalls, as I do, that when George 
Mitchell was the distinguished majority leader of this Senate, he often 
said the perfect is the enemy of the good when Republicans offered 
amendments from time to time.

  I just want to reiterate that, as I stated earlier, it is this 
Senator's intention, hopefully upon the successful enactment of the 
legislation before us, without the Moynihan amendment, it is this 
Senator's intention to work toward passage of a long-term debt ceiling 
extension later this month. As I have said, we cannot and will not 
default on our debts, and I know that is a matter with which the 
distinguished Senator from New York agrees.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. There is no disagreement.
  Mr. ROTH. Let me suggest that the problem with the Moynihan amendment 
is that I think we do make it possible for there to be a default if we 
do not move successfully on the legislation before us. The House, I 
just want to point out, passed the legislation, H.R. 3021, by a vote of 
362 to 51. Most of the ``no'' votes came from Republicans. The House 
leadership says that the Moynihan amendment would not pass on the House 
side. So it is unlikely that a straightforward debt limit bill will 
pass. The House wishes, as you know, to combine that with entitlement 
reform, and we intend to vote on that later this month.
  The point I want to emphasize is that we are running the risk that, 
if the Moynihan amendment should be adopted, it will not be agreed upon 
on the House side, and time is not on our side.
  As I said earlier, the amendment before us really jeopardizes the 
ability of Treasury to manage the public debt. We may not have until 
March 21 or even March 15, as I understand the situation. Treasury has 
informed us that next week, cash levels will be imprudently low, 
something under $1 billion. I think that is the first time that 
situation has arisen where we are running that kind of a risk.
  The distinguished Senator, my good friend and colleague, asked for 
the letter from John D. Hawke, Jr., the Under Secretary of the Treasury 
for Domestic Finance, to be printed as part of the Record.
  I want to read one paragraph from that letter where the Under 
Secretary says:

       By March 13 or 14, if there is no debt limit increase, we 
     project that our cash balances will be below our prudent 
     minimum of $5 billion and that there will be less than $1 
     billion in leeway under the debt limit.
       If the actual debt level on March 13 or 14 is $1 billion 
     more than we currently forecast, Treasury would be out of 
     debt limit room and would not be able to issue sufficient 
     securities to the trust funds to enable all trust fund 
     receipts to be invested on those dates.

  So that, in my judgment, is why we wish and need to enact H.R. 3021 
now, unamended, so that this danger of running out of funds can be 
averted.
  Mr. President, I strongly urge my friends and colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle to reject the so-called Moynihan amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. ROTH. I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from Minnesota.
  Mr. GRAMS. Mr. President, I want to make a few remarks to go along 
with Senator Murkowski's remarks on a lot of reservations some of us 
have about extending the debt limit without tying it to a responsible 
balanced budget amendment, so that we do not literally give Congress an 
open checkbook to go ahead and spend and spend and spend.
  I wanted to clarify that we are here today to consider a short-term 
extension to this debt ceiling, to give us time for 2 weeks to work out 
a further extension of this. What are we asking today? We are asking to 
be able to borrow more money. For what? To pay interest.
  I tell people back home, it is like if you go to one banker to borrow 
money so you could pay interest to another banker you owe on another 
loan. If you get into that position, you are in financial trouble. That 
is what we are doing here, borrowing more money year after year, and it 
does nothing but cover up a history of mismanaging this country's 
finances. This is without going back and addressing the problem.
  We have to get our finances in order. We have to agree on a balanced 
budget within the next 7 years. This should not be viewed as a 
political excuse to put off balancing this budget. The debt ceiling 
should only be passed, and I will only vote for it, if it has some 
specific instructions on how we are going to achieve a balanced budget 
and not to just say, well, we are going to borrow some more and add to 
the debt, which is going to put our children even deeper into their 
financial problems, so we can go on and continue business as usual here 
in Washington. We cannot do that any longer.
  We need to have some real reforms when it comes to the problems of 
the entitlements, welfare, Medicare, and Medicaid. We have been working 
toward this, and, hopefully, within the next couple of weeks, we can 
work out something that will put us on that glidepath.
  I am going to propose what I call the ``taxpayer protection 
lockbox,'' which means that if revenues exceed even our spending 
forecasts, those extra dollars will not be given to Congress to spend 
on even a larger Government. But if there are additional revenues 
available, they will be returned to either the taxpayer in the form of 
tax relief, or they can only be spent to reduce the debt. But once we 
set this spending level, we want to make sure that, if additional 
revenues do come in, Congress does not have an open checkbook to spend 
even more.
  So I wanted to respectfully ask that we examine this problem and make 
sure that any extension in the debt limit is tied to a balanced budget.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York has 1 minute 24 
seconds.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, first, let me say to my friend from 
Minnesota that he is quite right that we spent moneys we did not have. 
We spent them in the 1980's. This is clear and inexorable. This table 
shows it in these bar charts. We have finally gotten to the point where 
we have revenues above the levels of outlays. We did this in 1993 with 
a vote on which not a single vote was found on the other side of the 
aisle to do so. But we did it. Now, can we not put this argument aside, 
resolve our remaining legislative matters, and get on with the 
Presidential election, rather than holding the full faith and credit of 
the United States at jeopardy?

[[Page S1630]]

  I want to thank my esteemed chairman for the clarity and tone of his 
remarks. Whichever way this vote will go, we will manage to get through 
this. But that we are doing this for the 17th time since 1980 suggests 
that we better look to our procedures in the future.
  Mr. President, with thanks to the chairman, I yield back the 
remainder of my time.
  Mr. ROTH. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute?
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Roth may have 1 
minute.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New 
York for his remarks. I must, once again, urge the defeat of the so-
called Moynihan amendment. If it should carry, I think it is critically 
important that it be recognized that we would be jeopardizing the 
ability of the Treasury to manage the public debt.
  As I said earlier, we may not have until March 21, or even March 15. 
Treasury, again, has informed us that next week cash levels will be 
imprudently low and under $1 billion. That is the reason it is 
critically important that we enact H.R. 3021 without amendment. As I 
have assured the distinguished Senator from New York, then we will look 
at the longer term and work together.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?
  There is a sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. GORTON (after having voted in the affirmative). Mr. President, on 
this vote I have a pair with the distinguished Senator from Kansas [Mr. 
Dole]. If he were present and voting, he would vote ``nay.'' If I were 
at liberty to vote, I would vote ``yea.'' I withdraw my vote.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Missouri [Mr. Ashcroft], 
the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell], the Senator from New York 
[Mr. D'Amato], the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Dole], the Senator from 
Florida [Mr. Mack], and the Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain] are 
necessarily absent.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye], the 
Senator from California [Mrs. Boxer], and the Senator from Illinois 
[Ms. Moseley-Braun] are necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Santorum). Are there any other Senators in 
the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The result was announced--yeas 43, nays 47, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 24 Leg.]

                                YEAS--43

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Conrad
     Daschle
     Dodd
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Mikulski
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Wellstone
     Wyden

                                NAYS--47

     Abraham
     Bennett
     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Coverdell
     Craig
     DeWine
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Frist
     Gramm
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Inhofe
     Jeffords
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kyl
     Lott
     Lugar
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Pressler
     Roth
     Santorum
     Shelby
     Simpson
     Smith
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner

       PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED--1

       
     Gorton, for
       

                             NOT VOTING--9

     Ashcroft
     Boxer
     Campbell
     D'Amato
     Dole
     Inouye
     Mack
     McCain
     Moseley-Braun
  So the amendment (No. 3465) was rejected.
  Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was rejected.
  Mr. LOTT. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the third reading and 
passage of the bill.
  The bill (H.R. 3021) was ordered to a third reading, was read the 
third time, and passed.
  Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
bill was passed.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________