[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 29 (Wednesday, March 6, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1601-S1603]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. Kerrey):
  S. 1593. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to provide 
for the appointment of two Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence, to 
strengthen the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence over 
elements of the Intelligence Community, and for other purposes; to the 
Select Committee on Intelligence.


               the intelligence organization act of 1996

  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I seek recognition, reasonably briefly, 
to introduce legislation proposed by the Brown Commission on the 
reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community.
  The Brown Commission, which filed its report last Friday, March 1, 
today testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee, which I 
chair, and, as a courtesy, Senator Kerrey, the distinguished vice 
chairman of the committee, and I are introducing their legislative 
package.
  The Brown Commission came to some very important conclusions, many of 
which I agree with, some of which I do not agree with.
  I think they made an important statement on the need for continuing 
U.S. intelligence activities because there are still many dangers in 
the world, notwithstanding the demise of the Soviet Union. They have 
taken a step to eliminate secrecy by their recommendation on the 
disclosure of the total Intelligence Committee budget, a position 
adopted on the floor of this body several years ago but overturned in 
conference. The suggestion, I think, is very, very important as a start 
on declassification. My sense has been, in so many documents that 
crossed my desk as chairman of the Intelligence Committee, many are 
classified that need not be classified. As we have seen from the recent 
slush fund in the NRO, the National Reconnaissance Office, there is a 
need for public scrutiny, investigative reporting, so we have a better 
idea as to what is going on in the intelligence community. Where there 
is a need for secrecy--and I think the presumption ought to be in favor 
of secrecy, but it ought not to be absolute--if there is a need for 
secrecy, then let us maintain that secrecy, but let us not do so as a 
matter of rote, only as a matter of reason.
  The Brown Commission came to the conclusion that the Director of 
Central Intelligence needs to have his or her hand strengthened. 
Senator Kerrey and I agree with that. But there is considerable feeling 
on the Intelligence Committee that we need to go further on that 
particular line.
  When the Brown Commission says that an enormous amount of 
intelligence community work ought to stay in the Department of Defense, 
I have grave reservations about that. It is true that the Department of 
Defense is the customer and the Department of Defense provides a great 
deal of the resources. But, if you have agencies like NRO, NSA, and so 
much of HUMINT--human intelligence--remaining under the Department of 
Defense, it does not give the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency the authority that he needs to really be able to operate.
  One of the very serious problems in the intelligence community today 
is an attitudinal problem. We saw that in the Aldrich Ames matter. We 
have seen it in the investigation on Guatemala, where, in a hearing, 
one of our Members, Senator Cohen, was very blunt in an open hearing 
saying that the CIA had lied in withholding information from the 
oversight committee.
  Testimony was taken by the committee from a veteran of the CIA on the 
issue of Soviet domination in sending tainted material back to the CIA, 
which the CIA had known to be tainted, controlled by Soviet sources, 
and yet that information was passed on to the highest levels, one key 
bit of information going to the White House in January of 1993 for both 
the President and the President-elect.
  When questioned by the Intelligence Committee, this ranking, ex-CIA 
official said, ``Well, we pass it on. We know better than the 
customers. If we told them it was tainted, they wouldn't use it.'' 
Really, an incomprehensible sort of a situation.
  I think Director Deutch has done a very good job in his few months at 
the CIA. He faces a very, very difficult situation. When he concurred 
in testimony before the commission as to a Guatemala incident, that 
there had been willful failure to disclose, he later changed that view 
in a letter to the Intelligence Committee a few days later, showing the 
difficulties of being the Director of the CIA compared with a more 
independent role or at least a different role than the Senate 
Intelligence Committee has.
  We also heard testimony today from former Senator, former majority 
leader Howard Baker of a very important nature, including Senator 
Baker's recommendation that there be a combination of the Senate and 
the House Intelligence Committees, a recommendation that at least 
preliminarily I agree with. We will have to pursue it and have 
hearings. But it is more than worth considering. It is something that 
really is an idea whose time, probably, has come. I am just limiting 
the final decision until we do have a hearing process and collaborate 
with our counterparts in the House of Representatives.
  Mr. President, to reiterate, today Senator Robert Kerrey and I are 
introducing legislation as a courtesy to the Commission on the Roles 
and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community. In August 
1994, the Senate adopted a provision establishing this Commission to 
``review the efficacy and appropriateness of the activities of the 
United States Intelligence Community in the post-cold-war global 
environment.'' On March 1, 1996, the Commission submitted its report, 
entitled ``Preparing for the 21st Century, An Appraisal of U.S. 
Intelligence.'' In addition, the Commission submitted proposed 
legislation to implement some of its proposals. We are introducing the 
Commission's proposed legislative package today at their request. It is 
our hope that other Members of the Senate and the public at large can 
participate fully in the upcoming debate on this important issue. 
Moreover, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence intends to use 
this legislation, and other Commission recommendations, as a basis for 
additional proposals of the committee.
  The legislation proposed by the Commission would make a number of

[[Page S1602]]

changes in the way the intelligence community is organized and managed. 
First, it replaces the current Deputy Director of Intelligence with two 
new Deputies: one to manage the community and one to manage the Central 
Intelligence Agency. In addition, it amends the National Security Act 
to require DCI concurrence with respect to the appointment by the 
Secretary of Defense of the heads of the National Security Agency 
[NSA], the Central Imagery Office [CIO], and the National 
Reconnaissance Office [NRO]. In addition, its requires consultation 
with the DCI by the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Energy, as well 
as the Director of FBI, before the appointment of the heads of the 
intelligence elements within these agencies. This bill also mandates 
that the DCI provide to the Secretary of Defense an evaluation of the 
performance of the heads of NSA, NRO and the proposed National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency. The Commission's legislation also replaces the 
National Intelligence Council with a National Assessments Center that 
would remain under the purview of the DCI but would be located outside 
the CIA to take advantage of a broader range of information and 
expertise.
  The most extensive aspect of this legislation is that which addresses 
personnel issues. The Commission is proposing new legislative authority 
for the most severely affected intelligence agencies, for 1 year, to 
``rightsize'' their work forces to the needs of their organization. 
Agencies wishing to downsize by at least 10 percent over and above the 
current congressionally mandated levels would identify positions to be 
eliminated ``in order to achieve more effectively and efficiently the 
mission of the agencies concerned.'' The incumbents of such positions, 
if close to retirement, would be allowed to retire with accelerated 
eligibility. If not close to retirement, they would be provided 
generous pay and benefits to leave the service of the agency concerned, 
or, with the concurrence of the agency affected, exchange positions 
with an employee not in a position identified for elimination who was 
close to retirement and would be allowed to leave under the accelerated 
retirement provisions. This bill also creates a single ``senior 
executive service'' for the intelligence community under the overall 
management of the DCI.
  The Commission did an excellent job identifying the key issues and 
the Vice Chairman and I agree with some of their recommendations, 
particularly regarding institutional mechanisms for getting the 
policymakers more involved in identifying and prioritizing their 
information needs and for addressing transnational threats, ways to 
improve intelligence analysis, and the need to enhance accountability 
and oversight--to include declassifying the aggregate amount 
appropriated for the intelligence budget. The committee also will 
consider the Commission's recommendation to make the Select Committee 
on Intelligence a standing committee. However, I believe that the 
Commission did not go far enough in some areas.
  The changes brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union have 
dramatic implications for U.S. intelligence efforts. The demands for 
rapid responses to diverse threats in a rapidly changing world 
necessitate a steamlined intelligence community and a DCI with clear 
lines of authority. This is lacking in the intelligence bureaucracy 
that emerged during the bipolar world of the cold war.
  As the Commission noted: ``The Intelligence Community * * * has 
evolved over nearly 50 years and now amounts to a confederation of 
separate agencies and activities with distinctly different histories, 
missions, and lines of command.'' Recognizing the pitfalls of 
decentralized intelligence--less attention devoted to non-Defense 
requirements, waste and duplication, the absence of objective 
evaluation of performance and ability to correct shortcomings, and loss 
of synergy--the Commission supported centralized management of the 
intelligence community by the DCI. The Commission concluded, however, 
that the DCI has all the authority needed to accomplish this objective 
of centralized management, if only he spent less time on CIA matters 
and had the budget presented to him in a clearer fashion.
  It is my sense that the current disincentives for intelligence to 
operate as a community, reduce unnecessary waste and duplication, and 
become more effective and efficient in meeting the Nation's needs can 
only be overcome by enhancing the DCI's statutory authority over the 
budget and administration of all nontactical intelligence activities 
and programs. A key issue for congressional oversight of the 
intelligence community is accountability. It has become increasingly 
clear that a single manager, the DCI, must be accountable for the 
success or failure of the intelligence community. Therefore, the DCI 
must be given the authorities he needs to carry out this 
responsibility.
  For example, the Commission recommends that the DCI concur in the 
appointment or recommendation of the heads of national intelligence 
elements within the Department of Defense, and be consulted with 
respect to the appointment of other senior officials within the 
intelligence community. We believe the DCI should recommend the 
appointment of all national agency heads, with concurrence from the 
heads of the parent organizations. Along these lines, the heads of the 
major collection agencies should be confirmed to that position; today 
they are confirmed only with respect to their promotion to the rank 
designated for each position.
  The Commission noted in its report: ``The annual budgets for U.S. 
intelligence organizations constitute one of the principal vehicles for 
managing intelligence activities, * * *. How effectively and 
efficiently the intelligence community operates is to a large degree a 
function of how these budgets are put together and how they are 
approved and implemented.'' I agree with this assessment and conclude 
that the DCI must have ultimate control over the formulation and 
execution of these budgets if he or she is to effectively manage the 
intelligence community.
  The Select Committee on Intelligence will consider these and other 
alternative proposals over the upcoming weeks as we move toward mark-up 
of legislation to renew and reform the U.S. intelligence community to 
meet the challenges of our changing world.
  Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, I rise today to join with Chairman Specter 
to introduce legislation. We are embarking on a course to change the 
U.S. intelligence community, and this legislation is the chart upon 
which we will be marking that course.
  Over a year ago, Congress created a Presidential commission to 
evaluate the intelligence community's ability to respond to a rapidly 
changing world. Sadly, the commission's first chairman, the Honorable 
Les Aspin, passed away after he had ably established the Commission and 
they had started their work. We owe many debts of gratitude to Les 
Aspin, and this legislation is one more example of the fine work he did 
in the service of his country.
  Chairman Harold Brown and our former colleague, Vice Chairman Warren 
Rudman, quickly took the helm, and the Commission embarked on almost a 
year's evaluation of the U.S. Government's intelligence needs and the 
intelligence community's ability to meet those needs. We are especially 
grateful to our able colleagues, Senator John Warner and Senator Jim 
Exon, who played important and active roles in the Commission's work. 
Their broad base of experience coupled with the other Commission 
members' outstanding credentials permitted a wide variety of views and 
ideas to come together. There are no assumptions here. They looked wide 
and deep. They interviewed over 200 experts and received formal 
testimony from 84 witnesses. It was a remarkable effort which has 
produced a significant report. I do not concur with all their 
recommendations, and there are some areas in which they do not go as 
far as I would. I look on their report as a solid base upon which 
Congress and the administration can build.
  For me, one of the most important results of their evaluation is 
their reaffirmation of the need for intelligence. Intelligence 
contributes heavily to most of our national decisions about foreign 
policy, law enforcement, and military matters. I am convinced 
intelligence is the edge we must have in the face of stiff global 
competition for leadership, and as our Government fulfills its 
responsibility to protect Americans in an increasingly dangerous world. 
The Brown Commission clearly explains why this is so.

[[Page S1603]]

  The Brown Commission recognized the world today is very different 
from the world which existed while the Intelligence Community was 
growing up. Confronted with the overwhelming military threat of the 
Soviet Union, the intelligence community responded by organizing itself 
to examine every part of that military threat as best as it could. 
While some critics argue that the intelligence community missed the big 
ones--the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet economy--
there is no question the United States was ably informed on the 
Soviet Union's military threat. But that threat, while still capable of 
attacking us, is receding.

  Today, the threats, facing the United States do not initially present 
themselves as military threats--although if we fail to recognize them 
in time, we have to deploy our military when nothing else works. The 
erosion of nation-state power in many places, the rise of transnational 
movements and global crime, and the fierce economic competition we 
face, have together created a new set of threats that are not military 
soluble.
  Insight and predictive analysis is as important in charting the 
American course in this new world as it was in the old world of 
superpower military confrontation. We must make sure the intelligence 
community is optimally organized for this new world. That is why I urge 
consideration of the Brown Commission report, and why the Intelligence 
Committee will take up these and other reform proposals in the months 
ahead.
  The Brown Commission establishes three recurring themes about 
intelligence: The need to better integrate intelligence into the policy 
community; the need for intelligence agencies to operate as a 
community; the need to create greater efficiency. These themes are 
clearly discernible and they also are quite consistent with a large 
segment of the public's view on intelligence: Something is wrong. If 
everything was all right, we wouldn't have a heinous spy like Aldrich 
Ames; we wouldn't have missed the fall of the wall or the collapse of 
the Soviet Union; we wouldn't have a palace for an NRO headquarters 
building; we wouldn't have unspent billions of NRO dollars sitting 
around unused and waiting for a rainy day. I agree that we need to 
better integrate intelligence with policy, enhance the effectiveness of 
the community and improve its efficiency. The time for reorganization 
is upon us.
  The Brown Commission has made many important recommendations that 
address each of these themes. The Intelligence Committee will evaluate 
them closely. But I have already concluded that in some areas the 
Commission did not go far enough to ensure intelligence is integrated, 
effective, and efficient in a world continuing to evolve. In my view, 
the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence need to be 
strengthened beyond what the Commission recommended, and the many 
agencies of the Intelligence Community need to be pulled into a closer 
relationship. There is no other way to make sure both the national and 
military customer get what they need, and there is also no other way to 
wring redundancy and excess cost out of the system.
  I do not want leave the impression that U.S. intelligence is broken. 
Something is wrong, but the Nation is well-served by the men and women 
of the intelligence agencies serving around the world. Their patriotism 
and technical competence is unquestioned. Moreover, the director of 
Central Intelligence, John Deutch, has brought outstanding leadership 
to the community. Working closely with Secretary Perry, he already has 
set a new course for intelligence. The corporate culture which allowed 
an Aldrich Ames to continue is being dismembered. Congressional 
notification of significant intelligence activities has never been more 
prompt and complete. We need to institutionalize these changes and the 
superb cooperative relationship that exists between Director Deutch and 
Secretary Perry. Intelligence must and will serve all of its customers 
with timely, comprehensive, and hard-hitting analysis. The Brown 
Commission's recommendations have provided us with the basis to make 
this happen.
  In conclusion, I want to thank Chairman Specter for his leadership on 
this issue. His close attention to the challenges facing the 
intelligence community and their solutions has created an environment 
where the committee can draft this legislation in a thoughtful, 
informed environment.
                                 ______