[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 29 (Wednesday, March 6, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E294-E295]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




       INTRODUCTION OF THE INFECTIOUS AGENTS CONTROL ACT OF 1996

                                 ______


                         HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

                            of massachusetts

                    in the house of representatives

                        Wednesday, March 6, 1996

  Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I am introducing today the Infectious Agents 
Control Act of 1996, which will address the need to keep infectious 
agents that could pose a serious threat to the public health and safety 
out of the hands of dangerous people while ensuring that these 
substances remain available to scientists with a legitimate research 
need for them.
  By now, most of Members of this body have probably read news reports 
about Larry Wayne Harris, the Ohio white-supremacist who ordered 
bubonic plague through the mail last summer. It is frightening to think 
that just about anybody with a 32-cent stamp and a little chutzpah 
could get a hold of any number of potentially dangerous infectious 
substances. The Ohio case may be an isolated incident or

[[Page E295]]

it may not be--we really don't know. Why? Because the Federal 
Government has no system in place today to regulate the transfer of 
these agents within the United States. I think that's a situation that 
needs to be corrected, and I am introducing legislation today to do so.
  Why worry about the flow of potentially dangerous infectious agents 
within our borders? Let me read you a few lines from an article on the 
threat posed by these agents when they are converted into biological 
weapons, written by U.S. Navy Commander Stephen Rose for the Naval War 
College Review. Cmdr. Rose writes that:

       Science can now reshuffle the genetic deck of micro-
     organisms to produce a theoretically unlimited number of 
     combinations, each with its own unique blend of toxicity, 
     hardness, incubation period, etc. In short, it is becoming 
     possible to synthesize biological agents to military 
     specifications. Thus, the world lies on the threshold of a 
     dangerous era of designer bugs as well as designer drugs.

  Biological weapons have been called the poor man's atomic bomb. They 
are relatively cheap to produce, and you get an appallingly big bang 
for your buck. In fact, experts report that some of the supertoxins 
that have been developed in recent years are ten thousand times more 
potent than the nerve gases we are more accustomed to, which have been 
described as mere perfume in comparison to some of their biological 
competitors. The Office of Technology Assessment reports that some 15 
nations, including Libya, North Korea, and Iraq, are suspected of 
having biological weapons development programs.
  Clearly, the potential of biological weapons to rain devastation down 
upon their victims should give those charged with preventing 
international terrorist attacks on our Nation cause for serious 
concern. However, the lesson we learned from the tragedy at Oklahoma 
City is that we cannot be satisfied to only look outward for terrorist 
threats. We must also be vigilant against home-grown threats from 
paramilitary groups within our borders, which could use biological or 
chemical weapons against their fellow Americans to further their 
radical anti-government agendas.
  On the morning of March 20, 1995, the Japanese Government was faced 
with just such a situation. A home-grown Armageddon-group called Aum 
Shinrikyo released sarin gas--a deadly nerve agent that is 500 times 
more toxic than cyanide gas--in the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 
people and injuring thousands more. According to a staff report on the 
incident prepared by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, the Aum sect had its own chemical weapons manufacturing 
plant, for the production of sarin gas, and was trying to develop 
biological weapons, including botulism and anthrax. To get a sense of 
power of those weapons, consider this: 3 billionths of an ounce of 
botulism toxin would be enough to kill me.
  Incidentally, the staff report concluded that the Aum sect was ``a 
clear danger to not only the Japanese Government but also to the 
security interests of the United States,'' which was the target of much 
of the Aum leader's rhetoric.
  In an effort to reduce the risk of a similar attack in the United 
States, I am introducing legislation directing the Centers for Disease 
Control to develop a regulatory regime to control access to those 
infectious agents that could pose the greatest threat to public health 
if they fell into the wrong hands. It is my understanding that a 
working group including representatives of CDC, the Department of 
Justice, and other relevant Federal agencies already has begun to 
develop such a regime. My bill would ensure that that work is completed 
and the system is in place within 1 year of its enactment. I am pleased 
to be joined in this effort by Budget Chairman John Kasich and 
Representative Joseph P. Kennedy II.
  I am hopeful that this legislation will be given the swift attention 
that the issue it addresses demands in the House, and that the Senate 
will take up similar legislation soon.

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