[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 26 (Thursday, February 29, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1449-S1451]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                    INTERNATIONAL DRUG CERTIFICATION

  Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, I rise to draw a line--a line that divides 
our nation from those countries who have fallen prey to the obscene 
influence of international drug cartels.
  This week, the President will offer his decision--drawing his line--
about which countries have cooperated sufficiently with United States 
counter-narcotics efforts to justify all the benefits of a full 
partnership with our Nation. This year, some of our neighbors have 
crossed the line and should not be ``certified'' as fully cooperating 
with the U.S. drug enforcement effort. Others of our neighbors are 
coming perilously close to crossing this line.
  Before offering my specific views on which countries I believe have 
crossed this line, I want to offer my general views of this drug 
certification process. Foremost, the certification process does not 
seek to shift the full blame for the drug scourge solely to the drug-
producing and transit countries. In fact, the comprehensive drug 
strategies I have offered call on the U.S. government and the U.S. 
people to remain vigilant and committed to attacking the drug problem 
at home.
  But, as I have always recognized, slowing the flow of drugs into the 
U.S. must be an integral part of a comprehensive drug strategy. And 
this effort to cut the literally hundreds of tons of drugs flowing 
toward American shores must be assisted by all countries if they are to 
continue as our full partners in the family of nations.
  Mr. President, let me make it real simple--any nation that wishes to 
enjoy the benefits of American friendship must do everything they can 
to help America fight the scourge of drugs. This is not an impossible 
task. We are not being unreasonable. We do not ask that the nations 
that have literally been held hostage by the drug cartels end the 
supply of drugs coming from their shores. That would be unreasonable--
many of these nations just cannot eliminate all drug cartels, just as 
we cannot eliminate all of the mafia here in the U.S.
  Still, America has the right to ask what is reasonable--no more but 
also no less. That has been my longstanding test, not only in the area 
of drug policy but also in other important questions of foreign policy, 
such as arms control.
  To be more specific, I have long believed that a United States policy 
of support and cooperation with our friends in Latin America is the 
best way to counter the drug threat. While it might make us feel 
better, isolation and incrimination of other countries rarely helps us 
meet our ultimate objectives. Particularly in the drug interdiction 
task, cooperation and shared intelligence are absolutely essential to 
an effective strategy because drugs can be hidden in any of the 
billions of legal containers that cross our border every year. And with 
no intelligence, we can never hope to stop these drugs.
  Nevertheless, despite the fact that cooperation is usually the best 
policy, there are grave circumstances where both morality and 
practicality require America to draw the line.
  I regret to conclude that for Colombia that line has been crossed. 
The United States should not certify that Colombia has done everything 
possible to curb the operations and influence of the illicit drug 
trade, primarily because of the corruption at the highest levels of the 
Colombian government.
  I also conclude that for Mexico, that line is close to being crossed. 
This requires the U.S. to send a clear warning--just as we did last 
year to Colombia. Let me also point out that totally cutting off 
cooperation could make a bad situation very much worse, and it is 
simply not in our national interest to do so. Therefore, I recommend 
that a vital national interest waiver or similarly strong, unambiguous 
warning be sent to the Mexican government.
  Even as I call for our nation to decertify Colombia, I recognize the 
immense challenges that the drug trade poses in that country. I admire 
the courage of the men and women in Colombian law enforcement--leaders 
such as the National Police Chief, General Serrano--who endure violent 
threats and even actual assaults on their Government institutions. 
Hundreds of honest, hard-working Colombians sacrificed their lives last 
year in the struggle against drug traffickers.

  But, how can we assured of the Government's commitment against drug 
trafficking when the President himself almost surely benefited from the 
drug trade? The extent and level of official drug corruption in 
Colombia is the single most glaring failure --and the overriding reason 
I must recommend decertification.
  President Ernesto Samper has been charged with accepting $6 million 
in campaign funds from the Cali cartel-- and may soon be impeached 
because of it. In addition, at least 20 members of congress are also 
under investigation for accepting drug funds.
  I have long stated that such official corruption cannot be tolerated. 
Even if a nation is overwhelmed by the horrible powers of international 
drug cartels, as long as their leaders remain committed to fighting 
these cartels they deserve our support. But, once a nation's leaders 
have fallen under the corrupt influence of the drug cartels, morality 
and practicality require that they cannot be given our support. 

[[Page S1450]]

  This has been my test for certification for years. In 1989, I voted 
to overrule President Bush's decision to certify the Bahamas. I 
believed then that the Bahamas should have been decertified because 
drug corruption had permeated the highest levels of their Government.
  Let me also point out that the current leadership of Colombia has 
already been given the benefit of the doubt--given chances--given 
tests--but, ultimately, their leaders have failed. The Senate was first 
faced with reports of the Samper campaign's alleged connection to the 
Cali cartel during the summer of 1994. I and every Senator voted to 
condition U.S. aid on progress in fighting drug operations and 
corruption. But, with no clear evidence of corruption against Mr. 
Samper available at the time, this provision was dropped when the final 
foreign operations bill was negotiated with the House of 
Representatives.
  At the time of President Samper's inauguration in August 1994, I and 
the majority of Senators voted against a measure to place further 
counter 
narcotics conditions on United States aid to Colombia. We voted, in 
effect, to give the new President time to demonstrate his commitment to 
fighting the drug cartels. President Samper personally assured me that 
he would remain faithful to the struggle against drugs. The evidence is 
clearer every day that he has not lived up to his word.
  Last year's certification of Colombia on vital national interest 
grounds was the clearest possible--and first ever--official United 
States warning that the leaders of Colombia must remain absolutely free 
from the corrupt influence of the drug cartels. In response to this 
warning, we did see an unprecedented series of raids--Colombian 
authorities, cooperating with the of DEA, captured six leaders of the 
Cali cartel.
  But just last month, one of those key traffickers walked out of 
prison and reliable reports indicate that the cartel kingpins who 
stayed in prison continue to run their drug operations from their plush 
prison cells.
  Finally, and unpardonably, charges of corruption have coincided with 
a marked diminution of efforts to slow the drug trade--as last year 
Colombian seizures of cocaine decreased by 24 percent last year. And, 
supplies of Colombian heroin are also on the rise--becoming more pure, 
less expensive, and taking over the streets of America.
  Even as I recommend decertification, I recognize that this issue 
can--under the law--be revisited during the coming year. The Samper 
government may soon be replaced. It may even prove that the charges of 
corruption are groundless.
  So, let me be crystal clear. If a new Colombian Government 
demonstrates a commitment to fighting the drug cartels and an absolute 
freedom from corrupt influence of the drug cartels, then the United 
States should revisit the decertification decision. The Foreign 
Assistance Act allows the President to reconsider a decertification 
decision if there has been a fundamental change of government or a 
fundamental change in the reasons for decertification. A new 
government--free of the corrupt influence of the drug cartels--would be 
such a fundamental change.
  But, until then, I cannot recommend to the President that he do 
anything other than decertify Colombia.
  The story for Mexico is different than Colombia's--at least so far. 
The key difference is the antinarcotics leadership of the current 
Mexican administration. Still, the growing threat to the United States 
of drugs grown, produced, or traveling through Mexico is too serious 
for Mexico to be granted full certification. Therefore, the correct 
course to take this year with Mexico is the step we took last year with 
Colombia. In other words, we must send a warning--such as granting a 
national interest waiver.
  Let me point out, Mexico's problems are in some ways the result of 
successes in interdiction in the transit zone--the Caribbean. Our 
success at pushing the drug traffickers out of the transit zone means 
that the drug cartels needed a new route--the natural choice is the 
overland route that passes directly through Mexico. This has been the 
key opportunity for Mexican traffickers to gain control more phases of 
cocaine operations. Reports from the field indicate that Mexican drug 
kingpins actually accept payments in the form of cocaine--1 free kilo 
from the Colombian kingpins for every kilo the Mexican traffickers 
smuggle to the United States.
  This 2-for-1 sale has had such a severe impact that now more than 
two-thirds of all the cocaine in this country now comes through Mexico. 
And, it means that Mexican drug cartels are poised to become much 
richer, more powerful and more deadly than ever before. What is worse, 
all this is on top of longstanding Mexican trafficking in heroin, 
marijuana, methamphetamine, and one of the newest drugs of abuse--
rohypnol.
  Let me also point out that Mexico's large geographic size and their 
limited resources mean that fighting the drug traffic is simply an 
overwhelming task.
  Last year, for example, we heard that traffickers landed fast-flying 
jumbo jets with multi-ton shipments of cocaine in rural Mexico. 
Sometimes using dry riverbeds or dirt roads as landing strips, 
obviously ruining these planes--literally abandoning planes worth 
upwards of $10 million . Of course, it's worth it to the drug cartels--
these tons of cocaine are worth literally hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Such tactics seriously test the capacity of Mexico's anti-drug 
personnel and resources.
  But with all these problems, I believe Mexico has a President who is 
on our side. President Zedillo has taken sincere and important steps on 
the drug front, including judicial reforms and the appointment of an 
attorney general who is from the opposition party dedicated to weeding 
out corruption. The recent arrest of Juan Abrego--leader of the Mexican 
gulf cartel--was an example of United States-Mexican cooperation.
  Mexico's demonstrated leadership amidst the growing drug threat is 
the fundamental reason I do not propose decertification for Mexico. 
Frankly, if we destroy Mexico's moral, political or practical resolve 
against the drug traffickers we will only have succeeded in making a 
bad situation very much worse.
  Still, in rejecting no-strings-attached full certification for 
Mexico, we must send a clear and strong warning that the Mexican drug 
trade must be a priority in our bilateral relations and that we expect 
results. Nevertheless, continued cooperation between the United States 
and Mexico on drugs is critical with such a close and important 
neighbor. Last year, we sent a warning to the Colombian government--
they did not heed this warning--and this year I call for them to pay 
the price. This year, we must send a warning to the Mexican 
government--and if they do not heed it, they will pay the price.
  We cannot expect a quick fix to the drug problem in Mexico. But we 
must be clear about areas where we think a strong, honest government 
can make a difference--starting with reforms in the institutions and 
laws that are both governable by their national leadership and 
vulnerable to the narcotics industry.
  For example, more can and must be done to curb the problem of money 
laundering in Mexico's financial sector. More can and must be done to 
control precursor chemicals of methamphetamine, as Mexican traffickers 
become key players in the manufacturing and distribution of this drug. 
And, more can and must be done to work together to control the new 
challenge posed by the flow of rohypnol across the border.
  In 1993, I supported the North American Free Trade Agreement--and 
vowed to monitor carefully how the agreement with Mexico was 
functioning. And last year, I did not protest when President Clinton 
decided to lend Mexico money to help alleviate the peso crisis. My call 
to end the full no-strings-attached certification for Mexico means that 
my continued support for NAFTA will depend in great measure on an 
aggressive Mexican response to the growing drug threat. In doing so, I 
am following the same prudent course I followed for Colombia--a clear 
warning, a chance to comply, with failure to comply resulting in 
action.
  Mr. President, I understand that both Mexico and Colombia are making 
efforts in counter-narcotics--but the standard for certification is 
full cooperation. Given the massive scourge of drugs confronting us, it 
is in the interest of the United States to raise the 

[[Page S1451]]
level of expectations and attention given to the drug trade by our 
southern neighbors. This is what the certification process allows, and 
this is what our Nation must do.

                          ____________________