[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 28, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1395-S1397]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                  SECRETARY PERRY'S WEHRKUNDE ADDRESS

 Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, earlier this month, I again had the 
honor of leading the U.S. delegation to the annual Wehrkunde conference 
on security policy in Munich. This conference serves as a valuable 
opportunity for policymakers, security analysts, and defense industry 
leaders from both sides of the Atlantic to exchange views on pressing 
European security issues and to build the relationships that are the 
sinews of an alliance.
  This year's conference was notable both because it was held as NATO 
forces were breaking new ground with the IFOR mission in Bosnia and for 
the participation of senior officials from Central Europe and Russia, 
including the Russian Deputy Defense Minister, which provided for 
productive, if sometimes heated, dialog on NATO enlargement.
  The conference thus offered an appropriate setting for a speech by 
Secretary of Defense Perry in which he outlined a vision for the future 
of the Atlantic alliance and its relationship with Russia, based on the 
accomplishments of the past and the current cooperation in Bosnia. 
Secretary Perry is to be commended for laying out a thoughtful and 
challenging agenda for addressing the issues currently facing the 
Alliance. I also want to commend him for not only weaving the words of 
T.S. Eliot into his remarks, but for ferreting out the little known 
fact that Eliot was on the stage half a century ago when George 
Marshall gave the speech that became the Marshall plan.
  Mr. President, I think all Senators would benefit from reading 
Secretary Perry's Wehrkunde address and ask that it be printed in the 
Record.
  The address follows:

            Remarks by Secretary of Defense William J. Perry

       Behind my desk at the Pentagon hangs a portrait of the 
     great statesman, George C. Marshall. Marshall, who was the 
     third Secretary of Defense in the United States, is a role 
     model of mine. He had a great vision for Europe--a Europe 
     which from the Atlantic to the Urals was united in peace, 
     freedom and democracy; and a strong trans-Atlantic 
     partnership sustained by bipartisan political support in the 
     United States.
       Marshall not only had this vision, he also had a plan to 
     make this vision a reality in post-war Europe. And in a 
     famous speech at Harvard University in 1947, he outlined what 
     came to be called the Marshall Plan.
       A little known fact is that joining Marshall on the dais 
     that day was the famous poet, T.S. Eliot, who 10 years 
     earlier had written:

     Footfalls echo in the memory
     Down the passage we did not take
     Towards the door we never opened.

       These words by T.S. Eliot foreshadowed the fate of 
     Marshall's plan in Eastern and Central Europe. Because on 
     that day, 50 years ago, as the footfalls of World War II 
     still echoed across a shattered continent, the Marshall Plan 
     offered Europe a new passage toward reconstruction and 
     renewal. Half of Europe took this passage, and opened the 
     door to prosperity and freedom. Half of Europe was denied 
     this passage when Joseph Stalin slammed the door on 
     Marshall's offer. And for 50 years, the footfalls of what 
     might have been echoed in our memories.
       Today, as the Cold War becomes an echo in our memory, we 
     have a second chance to make Marshall's vision a reality: To 
     go down the passage we did not take 50 years ago, towards the 
     door we never opened. Behind that door lies George Marshall's 
     Europe. To open this door, we do not need a second Marshall 
     Plan, but we do need to draw on Marshall's vision.
       Marshall recognized that peace, democracy and prosperity 
     were ultimately inseparable. And Marshall understood that if 
     you identify what people desire most, and provide them with a 
     path to reach it, then they will do the hard work necessary 
     to achieve their goals.
       In the late 1940s what Western European countries desired 
     most was to rebuild their societies and economies. And the 
     Marshall Plan provided a path for achieving this goal. By 
     taking this passage, the nations of Western Europe built an 
     economic powerhouse. And along the way, they built strong 
     democracies and a strong security institution called NATO.
       Today, countries in the other half of Europe are struggling 
     to rebuild their societies and economies, and the one thing 
     they all desire is greater security. NATO's challenge is to 
     provide these Europeans a path for achieving their security 
     goal. And along the way, we want them very much to develop 
     strong democracies and strong economies.
       This other half of Europe includes the nations of Central 
     and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. It 
     includes Russia. And it includes the nations of the former 
     Yugoslavia. Today, NATO is reaching out to all three areas 
     and providing a path to Marshall's Europe.
       The primary path NATO has provided is the Partnership for 
     Peace. Just as the Marshall Plan worked because it was rooted 
     firmly in the self-interest of both the United States and 
     Europe, so too does the Partnership for Peace work because it 
     is rooted firmly in the self-interest of both NATO and the 
     Partner nations.
       PFP is bringing the newly free nations of Europe and the 
     former Soviet Union into the security architecture of Europe 
     as a whole. Our nations are working and training together in 
     military joint exercises. But make no mistake, the 
     Partnership for Peace is more than just joint exercises. Just 
     as the Marshall Plan had an impact well beyond the economies 
     of Western Europe, PFP is echoing beyond the security realm 
     in Central and Eastern Europe, and into the political and 
     economic realms as well.
       Just as the Marshall Plan used economic revival as the 
     catalyst for political stabilization--and ultimately the 
     development of the modern Europe--the PFP uses security 
     cooperation as a catalyst for political and economic reform.
       PFP members are working to uphold democracy, tolerate 
     diversity, respect the rights of minorities and respect 
     freedom of expression. They are working to build market 
     economies. They are working hard to develop democratic 
     control of their military forces, to be good neighbors and 
     respect the sovereign rights outside their borders. And they 
     are working hard to make their military forces compatible 
     with NATO. 
     
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       For those Partner countries that are embracing PFP as a 
     passage to NATO membership, these actions are a key to 
     opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration to 
     NATO membership has become the rock on which all major 
     political parties base their platforms. It is providing the 
     same overlapping consensus that NATO membership engenders in 
     NATO countries, making compromise and reconciliation 
     possible.
       In Hungary, all six major political parties in the 
     Parliament united to pass a resolution in support of IFOR, 
     the Bosnia peace implementation force, by a vote of 300 to 1. 
     In Poland, the new President--a former member of the former 
     communist party--re-affirmed Poland's NATO aspirations. In 
     Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, governments are quietly 
     resolving border disputes, and putting into place protection 
     for ethnic minorities. For these countries, the Partnership 
     for Peace is becoming a passage to democracy and market 
     reform, as well as a passage to security cooperation with the 
     West.
       But even those countries that do not aspire to NATO 
     membership are realizing many of the same political and 
     social gains from active participation in the PFP. Moreover, 
     PFP is providing them the tools and the opportunities to 
     develop closer ties to NATO, and learn from NATO--even as 
     they choose to remain outside the Alliance. And PFP is 
     building bonds among the Partner nations--even outside the 
     framework of cooperation with NATO.
       That is why defense ministers from many Partner nations 
     have said to me that even if, or when, they eventually join 
     NATO, they want to sustain their active participation in PFP. 
     In short, by creating the Partnership For Peace, NATO is 
     doing more than just building the basis for enlargement. It, 
     is in fact, creating a new zone of security and stability 
     throughout Europe.
       That is why I believe that the creation of the Partnership 
     for Peace has been one of the most significant events of the 
     post-Cold War era. By forging networks of people and 
     institutions working together to preserve freedom, promote 
     democracy and build free markets, the PFP today is a catalyst 
     for transforming Central and Eastern Europe, much as Marshall 
     Plan transformed Western Europe in the '40s and '50s. It is 
     the passage this half of Europe did not take in 1947; it is 
     the door that we never opened.
       To lock in the gains of reform, NATO must ensure that the 
     ties we are creating in PFP continue to deepen and that we 
     actually proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady, 
     process of outreach and enlargement to the East. NATO 
     enlargement is inevitable. And if NATO enlargement is a 
     carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot 
     continually out of reach. So it is critical that we implement 
     the second phase of NATO enlargement agreed upon at the NAC 
     Ministerial Meeting in December.
       And even as some countries join NATO, it will be important 
     to keep the door open for others down the road. We must make 
     sure that PFP continues to provide a place in the security 
     architecture of Europe so that we keep the door open to 
     Marshall's Europe even for those nations that do not aspire 
     to become NATO members.
       For Marshall's vision to be truly fulfilled, one of the 
     nations that must walk through this door is Russia. Russia 
     has been a key player in Europe's security for over 300 
     years. It will remain a key player in the coming decades, for 
     better or for worse. Our job is to make it for the better.
       Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Russia today 
     has chosen to participate in the Partnership for Peace. And 
     in the spirit of Marshall, we welcome Russia's participation, 
     and hope that over time it will take on a leading role in PFP 
     commensurate with its importance as a great power.
       But for Russia to join us as a full and active partner in 
     completing Marshall's vision, NATO and Russia need to build 
     on our common ground, even when we don't agree with each 
     other's conclusions. It is fair to say that most members of 
     Russia's political establishment do not welcome or even 
     accept NATO's plans for enlargement. Anybody that doubted 
     that yesterday, if you heard Mr. Kokoshin's speech, realized 
     the extent of the opposition to NATO enlargement in Russia.
       When I was in Russia last June, I had a number of 
     conversations with Russian government leaders and Duma 
     members about the future of European security. I offered them 
     a series of postulates about that future. I told them if I 
     were in Russia's shoes, I would want the future security 
     picture in Europe to have the following characteristics:
       First, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want the 
     United States to be involved in the security of Europe. They 
     agreed with that postulate.
       Then, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want to 
     see Germany an integrated part of the European security 
     structure. And they agreed with that postulate.
       And third, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want 
     Russia to be in the security architecture of Europe, not 
     isolated outside of it. They agreed with this postulate also.
       Finally, I asked them how could a Russian leader best 
     achieve these goals?
       I concluded they could only be achieved through a healthy 
     and vibrant NATO. That is NATO, far from being a threat to 
     Russia, actually contributes to the security of Russia, as 
     well as to the security of its own members.
       When I reached that conclusion most of the Russians I 
     talked to fell off the cliff. They agreed with each of my 
     premises--but they did not agree with my conclusion. But in 
     the absence of NATO and its partnership arrangements, I do 
     not see any way of achieving those goals--our shared goals--
     of a safe and peaceful Europe.
       I have to tell you that I did not persuade my Russian 
     colleagues with my argument. But, I do believe that as Russia 
     deepens its involvement with NATO, it will come to believe in 
     the truth of my conclusion, as well as my premises. And I 
     believe that Russia will want to have a cooperative relation 
     with NATO and a leading role in the Partnership for Peace. 
     And that Russia will come to understand that enlargement 
     means enlarging a zone of security and stability that is very 
     much in Russia's interest, not a threat to Russia.
       But the way for this new understanding to occur is for NATO 
     to continue to reach out to Russia not only from the top down 
     but from the bottom up. Last year at Wehrkunde, I proposed 
     that NATO and Russia begin a separate plan of activities, 
     outside the Partnership for Peace. Since then, we have all 
     discussed and even agreed upon this proposal in principle, 
     but we have not yet put it on paper. We must do so. We cannot 
     let disagreements over the ``theology'' of building NATO-
     Russia relations get in the way of ``here and now'' 
     opportunities to work together where our interests clearly 
     overlap. Instead of letting theology dictate our practice, we 
     should let our practice shape our theology.
       One example of where the United States is already doing 
     this is with our program of bilateral training exercises with 
     Russia. We have held four such exercises in the last year, 
     each a great success, and each conducted in a spirit of trust 
     and goodwill. This summer, the United States and Russia will 
     move beyond the bilateral and jointly participate in a major 
     regional Partnership For Peace exercise with forces from 
     Ukraine, Russia, United States and other regional powers.
       Our bilateral contact program with Russia is not confined 
     to joint exercises or even to just the security field. 
     Through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it extends to the 
     fields of science and technology, space, defense conversion, 
     business development, the environment, health care and 
     agriculture.
       Just this past week the Commission met in Washington, and 
     Mr. Kokoshin and I both participated in the defense 
     conversion program of this Commission. I urge all NATO 
     nations to build on this model. These contacts provide 
     important exchanges of information. They help break down 
     years of distrust and suspicion. They weave the Russians into 
     the kind of personal and professional networks that have long 
     characterized relations among all of the Allies. These are 
     the kind of activities that will build trust between Russia 
     and NATO. And these are the kind of activities that will keep 
     Russia on the passage toward integration with Europe, to pass 
     through that open door.
       Mr. Grachev and I attended the joint U.S. exercise in 
     Kansas last October. And we met after the exercise with the 
     American and the Russian soldiers conducting that exercise, 
     and talked to them. He told the Russian soldiers what they 
     were doing was very important, that they should extend their 
     friendship and cooperation with the American soldiers, and 
     that this was the basis for creating a peaceful world for 
     their children. The American soldiers were as much interested 
     in what he was saying as the Russians were, I can assure you.
       Ironically, the place where a distinct NATO-Russia 
     relationship is occurring in practice is in Bosnia. Today, as 
     we speak, a Russian brigade is serving in the American 
     Multinational Division of IFOR. It took an enormous amount of 
     work to make this happen. Minister Grachev and I met four 
     times over a two month period to iron out the details. 
     Generals Joulwan and Nash work closely every day with their 
     counterparts, General Shevtsov and Colonel Lentsov. NATO and 
     Russia do have a special relationship today in Bosnia, and 
     Russia is demonstrating its commitment to participating in 
     the future security architecture of Europe.
       The reason we are all working so hard to make this 
     relationship successful is not just because of the additional 
     troops Russia brings to Bosnia, but because Russia's 
     participation in Bosnia casts a very long shadow that will 
     have an impact on the security of Europe for years to come. 
     When we deal with the most important security problem which 
     Europe has faced since the Cold War was over, we want to have 
     Russia inside the circle, working with us, not outside the 
     circle, throwing rocks at us.
       Indeed, the more you think about what NATO and Russia are 
     doing together in Bosnia, the more amazing it becomes. I can 
     only imagine what General Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, would 
     think if he saw a General from Russia sitting with General 
     Joulwan, today's SACEUR, at the SHAPE compound reviewing a 
     secret NATO OPLAN. We need to build on this model, to 
     institutionalize it, and expand it to cover the entire range 
     of NATO and Russia's overlapping security interests. By so 
     doing, NATO and Russia can move forward as full partners in 
     completing Marshall's version.
       Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in 
     Bosnia, so too is the future of NATO itself. I was in Bosnia 
     several weeks ago. I was struck by the dedication and 
     professionalism of every unit from every country that is 
     participating. I was also struck by the stark contrast 
     between the devastation and suffering I saw in Sarajevo, and 
     the 

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     rebirth and renewal I have seen in the other capitals of Central and 
     Eastern Europe.
       Bosnia is what happens when newly independent nations focus 
     on old hatreds instead of new challenges. Four years ago, 
     some people in the former Yugoslavia chose not to join 
     Marshall's Europe. And the death and bloodshed that resulted 
     will long echo in our memory. But today the door to 
     Marshall's Europe is open again for them--and holding that 
     door open are NATO, Russia and the newly free peoples of 
     Central and Eastern Europe.
       The success or failure of IFOR is crucial to whether or not 
     we will complete Marshall's vision. It is in Bosnia where we 
     are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the 
     future security and stability of Europe will be built. It is 
     in Bosnia where NATO is first reaping the benefits of joint 
     peacekeeping training with our new Peace Partners. It is in 
     Bosnia where future NATO members are showing themselves ready 
     and able to shoulder the burdens of membership. And it is in 
     Bosnia where we are showing that we can work as partners with 
     Russian forces. Bosnia is not a peacekeeping exercise. It is 
     the real thing.
       Bosnia is also teaching us important lessons about the kind 
     of NATO that Marshall's Europe will require. Ever since the 
     end of the Cold War, NATO has struggled to develop a 
     mechanism for executing the new missions using NATO assets 
     with the voluntary participation of NATO members.
       In the conference room, we have so far failed to come up 
     with an agreement on a Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF. But 
     in the field, we have cut through these theological arguments 
     and put together IFOR, which is CJTF. As with the NATO-Russia 
     relationship, we need to take the practical lessons learned 
     in putting IFOR together and extrapolate back until we have a 
     CJTF that works.
       Bosnia also casts in sharp relief something we have 
     suspected for some time: that it is time for NATO to adapt 
     itself internally to deal with the new challenges of this new 
     era. NATO was not well structured for the Bosnia mission. At 
     a time when our political and geostrategic thinking has been 
     completely reoriented, symbolized by our partnership in 
     peacekeeping with former adversaries, and at a time when our 
     individual military forces have streamlined and modernized 
     for the battlefield of the future, NATO's command and 
     decision-making structure is still geared for the challenges 
     and the battlefields of the past. The time has come to 
     streamline and modernize NATO, recognizing that our challenge 
     is no longer simply to execute a known plan with already 
     designated forces, as it was during the Cold War.
       We must make NATO's command structure more responsive and 
     more flexible, and streamline the planning and force 
     preparation process, and simplify and speed-up the entire 
     decision-making process. And we must complete the task of 
     giving NATO's European members a stronger identity within the 
     alliance. These kinds of internal changes will ready NATO for 
     enlargement, and will allow us to better respond to the 
     future challenges to European security and stability.
       It is in this context that we welcome the French decision 
     to participate more fully in NATO's military bodies. And we 
     look forward to working with France as we transform the 
     Alliance and realize Marshall's vision of a Europe united in 
     peace, freedom and democracy.
       In 1947, Marshall told America that it must ``face up to 
     the responsibility which history has placed upon our 
     country.'' Today, it is not only America, but also Russia; is 
     not only NATO nations, but all of Europe--all of us must face 
     up to the responsibility which history has placed upon us. 
     This means reaching out to each other not only in the spirit 
     of friendship, but also in the spirit of self-interest. This 
     means working towards our goals not only from the top-down, 
     but also the ground-up. And it means recognizing that when 
     the outside world changes, we must look inside our 
     institutions and see what changes are needed there.
       If we do these things, then next year, when we commemorate 
     the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, we will be able to 
     say that we made Marshall's vision our own. That Partnership 
     for Peace is a strong, permanent pillar of Europe's security 
     architecture. That NATO and Russia have a relationship where 
     trust, understanding and cooperation are givens, not goals. 
     That all the nations of the former Yugoslavia are adding, not 
     detracting, from Europe's security. And that we have taken 
     the passage to a new Europe and opened the door to a new era 
     of peace, freedom and democracy.
       Thank you very much.

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