[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 28, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E241-E243]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               MEMORANDUM ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

                                 ______


                           HON. FLOYD SPENCE

                           of south carolina

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, February 28, 1996

  Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, as you know, the President vetoed the 
defense authorization bill last December due primarily to the 
legislation's direction that a national defense system be deployed by 
the year 2003. As I commented during the veto override debate, on a 
political level, the veto did serve to more clearly define the stark 
differences between the Clinton administration and this Congress on key 
national security issues such as ballistic missile defense. It is 
unfortunate that an issue as fundamentally important as whether or not 
the American people should be defended against the threat of ballistic 
missiles in the decade ahead has become so controversial--but it is 
where we find ourselves.
  Adding further to the controversy, the Department of Defense 
announced last week that they do not intend to spend all of the funding 
appropriated for national missile defense programs this fiscal year, as 
well as the surprising decision to delay several of the most promising 
theater missile defense programs--an area in which I did not believe 
there was much controversy until now. The combination of the 
President's strong opposition to deploying a national missile defense 
and now, an apparently conscious decision to scale back theater missile 
programs leaves us plenty to begin sorting through.
  The National Security Committee has a responsibility to raise the 
visibility of important security issues and through discussion, debate 
and even disagreement, to hopefully inform and educate the citizens of 
this country. Today, we started that effort with the first in a series 
of full committee and subcommittee hearings on ballistic missile 
defense. In addition to hearings, I have prepared a short paper, 
``Memorandum on the Ballistic Missile Threat,'' which I distributed to 
the members of the National Security Committee yesterday.
  The text of the memorandum is as follows:

               Memorandum on the Ballistic Missile Threat

                    (By HNSC Chairman Floyd Spence)


                              INTRODUCTION

       As last year's debate and veto of the FT 96 National 
     Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1530) demonstrated, Ballistic 
     Missile Defense (BMD) has become a defining national security 
     issue. Today, the United States has no defense against even a 
     single ballistic missile. According to polls, this fact is 
     not appreciated by the American people, who continue to 
     believe that we have the means today to protect ourselves 
     against ballistic missile attack. Although the technology 
     exists to develop and field a limited defense against such 
     threats, the American people remain hostage to a national 
     strategy of conscious vulnerability, codified by the 1972 
     anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and reinforced by Cold 
     War notions of strategic stability.
       The debate over whether deployment of a national missile 
     defense is warranted ought to pivot in large part on forward 
     looking assessments of the ballistic missile threat to the 
     United States. In his December 28 veto message, the President 
     stated that H.R. 1530's call for a national missile defense 
     system addresses a long-range missile threat ``that our 
     Intelligence Community does not foresee in the coming 
     decade.'' The purpose of this memorandum is to address this 
     issue and to provide a better understanding of the missile 
     threats facing the United States now and in the future.


                       A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

       The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that the 
     shorter-range, or theater, ballistic missile threat is real 
     and growing. Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated 
     that ballistic missiles ``are clearly becoming a common 
     battlefield weapon.'' \1\ More than 15 countries currently 
     possess ballistic missiles. Most are based on Soviet-derived 
     designs like the SCUD, which was used by Iraq during the 1991 
     Gulf War. However, the types of theater missiles being sought 
     and acquired by third countries today are of increasing 
     range, lethality, and sophistication.
      Footnotes at the end of article.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
       In addition, more than 25 countries currently possess, or 
     are seeking to acquire, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
     including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 
     According to unclassified estimates, some 24 countries 
     currently have ongoing chemical weapons programs. \2\ Ten 
     countries are reportedly pursuing biological weapons 
     research.\3\ At least as many are reported to be 
     interested in developing nuclear weapons.\4\ The trend 
     toward proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
     the missiles that can carry them is ``decidedly 
     negative,'' with ``no limits on the ambitions of unstable 
     actors to acquire the most advanced and deadly weapons 
     available, either through internal or external sources.\5\
       The Administration is less convinced, however, of the 
     threat posed by longer-range missiles. In particular, a 
     recently completed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), 
     prepared by the intelligence community, concludes that the 
     threat to the United States posed by long-range ballistic 
     missiles is lower than previously believed.\6\ A letter by 
     the CIA's Director of Congressional Affairs to Senators Levin 
     and Bumpers, written on behalf of the Director of Central 
     Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, asserts that the previous 
     intelligence community estimate of the missile threat to the 
     United States, as reflected in the language of H.R. 1530, 
     ``overstates what we currently believe to be the future 
     threat.'' The letter states that it is ``extremely unlikely'' 
     any nation with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
     would be willing to sell them; declares that the U.S. early 
     warning capability is ``sufficient to provide many years in 
     advance of indigenous development''; and judges the prospect 
     of an operational North Korean ICBM within the next five 
     years to be ``very low.'' \7\
       The Administration's conclusions on these issues are 
     seemingly at odds with previous intelligence community 
     estimates; are at variance with the view of other responsible 
     experts within and outside the intelligence community; and 
     have raised troubling questions concerning the politicization 
     of intelligence.\8\


                    the allure of ballistic missiles

       There are numerous reasons why a growing number of nations 
     seek to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
     destruction. Such weapons provide a military edge against 
     regional adversaries and serve as symbols of national power 
     and prestige. Ballistic missiles offer small and medium 
     powers--for the first time--a strategic weapon potentially 
     capable of deterring great powers militarily and politically. 
     An adversary armed with ballistic missiles and WMD may deter 
     the United States from undertaking certain actions for fear 
     of retaliation against U.S. regional assets of allies. Long-
     range ICBMs are even more attractive assets for hostile 
     powers wishing to deter the United States from exercising its 
     power projection capabilities by placing U.S. territory 
     directly at risk and threatening our most valued asset: the 
     American people. Importantly, the lack of any effective 
     defenses against ballistic missiles may actually serve to 
     encourage hostile states to acquire missile capabilities and 
     makes them the weapon of choice for nations seeking to 
     threaten others. As the International Institute for Strategic 
     Studies in London has concluded, ``the ballistic missile, 
     mainly on account of its range, speed and cost relative to 
     that of a manned aircraft, is a favored delivery means for 
     proliferating states and is likely to remain so until a 
     proven anti-ballistic missile defense system has been 
     deployed.'' \9\
       The proliferation of these weapons heightens the risk that 
     adversaries will seek to use them or threaten their use 
     against the U.S. or American allies and interests. For 
     instance, in the Gulf War, Iraq used SCUD missiles against 
     Israel as political weapons in an attempt to draw Israel into 
     the conflict and fracture the allied coalition. Libya 
     recently declared its willingness to fire ballistic missiles 
     at Naples, Italy, the home of the U.S. 

[[Page E242]]
     Sixth Fleet.\10\ In fact, Libya launched ballistic missiles against a 
     NATO base in Italy in 1986. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has 
     spoken of his desire to acquire ``a deterrent--missiles that 
     can reach New York,'' and has stated, ``We should build this 
     force so that they [the U.S.] and others will no longer think 
     about an attack.'' \11\ Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu 
     Abbas warned ominously in 1990 that ``some day we will have 
     missiles that can reach New York.'' \12\ And Iranian 
     President Hashemi Rafsanjani has called missiles ``the most 
     important and the most essential weapons of the world.\13\ 
     Clearly, the incentive to develop or otherwise acquire these 
     weapons is enhanced by the lack of defenses against them.


                    intelligence community analysis

       The conclusions expressed in the CIA letter referred to 
     above have required the intelligence community to adopt a 
     number of benign assumptions about the ballistic missile 
     threat to the United States that are not supported by 
     previous intelligence estimates or independent analyses.\14\ 
     For example:
       An assumption that nations will be limited to their 
     indigenous industrial and technological base when developing 
     ICBMs and that foreign assistance will be minimal or 
     nonexistent. By discounting the likelihood that ICBM 
     components or entire missiles may be purchased from more 
     advanced nations, the intelligence community appears to place 
     faith in a universal adherence to the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime (MTCR) or in self-imposed restraints on trade 
     of such items. However, the MTCR, which establishes 
     guidelines for controlling the transfer of missile equipment 
     and technology, is a voluntary effort, lacks the force of 
     international law, contains no enforcement mechanisms, and 
     has been repeatedly violated. For example, Russia has 
     transferred critical missile components, in contravention of 
     MTCR guidelines, to India and Brazil.\15\ More recently, 
     missile guidance components capable of being used in an ICBM 
     were intercepted in Jordan in transit from Russia to 
     Iraq.\16\ Regardless of whether this particular transfer was 
     sanctioned by the Russian government or was a ``rogue 
     operation,'' the incident is troubling and demonstrates that 
     the MTCR provides no guarantee against the transfer of ICBM 
     technology.
       In addition, several known proliferant states--such as 
     China and North Korea--are not members of the MTCR. Chinese 
     sales of intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia and 
     North Korean exports of SCUD missiles and production 
     technology to Iran and Syria are clear indicators that arms 
     control regimes like the MTCR cannot halt potentially 
     dangerous transfers of missile technology.
       Furthermore, the assertion in the December 1995 CIA letter 
     that sales of ICBMs are ``extremely unlikely'' is seemingly 
     at odds with the assessment by Larry Gershwin, former 
     National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs at the 
     CIA, who stated in 1993, ``We also remain concerned that 
     hostile nations will try to purchase from other states 
     ballistic missiles capable of striking the United 
     States.''\17\ Indeed, Russia has aggressively marketed 
     variants of the SS-25 and SS-19 ICBMs for space launch 
     purposes.\18\ A recent change in the START I Treaty would 
     allow Russia to transfer a missile to any other country as 
     long as it is called a ``space launch vehicle'' and it 
     remains under Russian control.\19\ However, as a practical 
     matter, the United States has no ability to verify that such 
     a missile will be used to launch a satellite (as compared to 
     a warhead), or that Russians ``control'' it.
       The intelligence community's focus on indigenous production 
     also discounts the possibility that the ``import'' of 
     scientific expertise acquired from other nations may 
     accelerate the indigenous development of potentially hostile 
     states of long-range missile capabilities. Former DCI James 
     Woolsey has testified that ``the acquisition of key 
     production technologies and technical expertise would speed 
     up ICBM development.'' \20\ Given Russia's dire economic 
     situation, the prospect that Russian scientific and technical 
     talent will seek work elsewhere (the ``brain drain'' factor) 
     is troubling.
       In short, the compliance problems and loopholes intrinsic 
     to arms control agreements, the increasing availability of 
     foreign expertise, the strong incentives that exist for 
     missile and component sales by states in need of hard 
     currency, and the geopolitical desirability of long-range 
     missiles, justify a more sober assessment of the likely 
     future missile threat to the United States.
       An assumption that countries with the capability to develop 
     ICBMs will not do so. The recent intelligence community 
     assessment reflects an apparent and questionable conclusion 
     that those nations most technically competent to develop 
     ICBMs, such as Japan, Ukraine, and India, have little motive 
     to acquire ICBM acquisition could easily and rapidly change, 
     and it is prudent to assume relations and attitudes among 
     nations will be relatively constant in the international 
     order in the coming decade. Indeed, few predicted the 
     monumental changes in the strategic environment that have 
     occurred over the past 5-10 years. At a minimum, any analysis 
     that assumes continuity must be balanced with an equity valid 
     analysis that postulates alternative futures.
       It is conceivable, for example, that India might want ICBMs 
     to deter the United States or other powers from becoming 
     involved in any future India-Pakistan conflict. Ukraine might 
     want ICBMs if it finds, once Keiv is bereft of all nuclear 
     weapons now based on its territory, that the United States 
     loses interest in Ukraine's future, or if Ukraine wishes to 
     increase its leverage in future dealings with Moscow. And 
     Japan may look at some future point to acquire long-range 
     missile capabilities for deterrence purposes if it no longer 
     has faith in U.S. security assurances, or if China or Russia 
     assumes more aggressive international or regional stances.
       It is important to note that existing SLVs in these and 
     other countries could be transformed into ICBMs in reasonably 
     short order. In fact, there is no practical ability to 
     distinguish between an ICBM and SLV for verification 
     purposes--thereby denying the United States ``timely 
     warning'' of a new missile threat. A report of the 
     Proliferation Study Team, chaired by former National Security 
     Agent Director LTG Williams Odom (USA, Ret.), noted in 1993 
     that ``[t]he conclusion that the probability is quite low for 
     the emergence of new ballistic missile threat to the United 
     States during this decade or early in the next decade can be 
     sustained only if plausible but unpredicted developments, 
     such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or 
     considered of negligible consequence.'' \21\ Moreover, 
     according to the study team's report, the transfer and 
     conversion of SLVs would require ``relatively modest 
     effort.'' \22\
       The System Planning Corporation found in a 1992 report that 
     conversion of SLVs to military ballistic missiles would be 
     ``fairly straightforward'' and that extending the range of 
     missiles has already been achieved by China, North Korea, 
     Iraq, and Israel.\23\ Additionally, a report prepared in 1992 
     by Science International Corporation concluded: ``The 
     increasing availability of space launch vehicles and space 
     launch services could result in the ability of certain Third 
     World countries to threaten the continental U.S. with United 
     States with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological 
     payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.'' \24\
       An assumption that there is a low risk of deliberate, 
     unauthorized, or accidental missile launch by Russia or 
     China. According to Russian sources and U.S. experts, the 
     Russian General Staff may have operational control of the 
     strategic nuclear forces and could launch those forces 
     without President Yeltsin's permission. Given the elevated 
     emphasis being placed on nuclear weapons in Russia's new 
     military doctrine, this is a particularly worrisome prospect. 
     Russian General Geliy Batenin, former commander of an SS-18 
     ICBM division and a military advisor to President Yeltsin, 
     has warned that the General Staff and even individual ICBM 
     flight crews could execute an unauthorized missile launch. 
     Batenin has also warned that Russian nuclear submarines may 
     carry launch codes that would allow a submarine commander to 
     conduct an unauthorized launch of SLBMs.\25\
       Russian political instability, the erosion of Russian 
     military discipline, and the deterioration of technical 
     infrastructure, including radar and early warning systems, 
     are conditions that increase the possibility of unauthorized 
     or accidental nuclear use.\26\ Brookings Institution analyst 
     Bruce Blair has testified that ``The world remains unsafe as 
     long as there are thousands of launch-ready nuclear weapons 
     at the fingertips of a Russian command system that is 
     tottering on the edge of civil collapse.''\27\ The Russian 
     General Staff's unauthorized nuclear alert during the August 
     1991 coup attempt, the October 1993 Parliamentary crisis, the 
     January 1995 nuclear alert in reaction to Norway's launch of 
     a meteorological rocket, and recent nuclear sabre rattling 
     against proposed NATO expansion, should cause more than a 
     little concern about the Russian nuclear threat.\28\ It is 
     disturbing the extent to which knowledgeable Russians are 
     apparently more worried about the possibility of unauthorized 
     or accidental use of Russian nuclear weapons than the US 
     intelligence community.\29\
       The solidity of China's command and control system is also 
     in question. Based on admittedly limited knowledge, it 
     appears that technical control over China's ICBM force is 
     significantly less structured than that of either Russia or 
     the United States. Also, China's willingness to use ballistic 
     missiles for political purposes was evident in the recent 
     series of Chinese missile launches against ``targets'' off 
     the coast of Taiwan. And the reported Chinese warnings to the 
     United States that it would consider nuclear strikes against 
     American cities to deter U.S. involvement in a possible 
     future conflict with Taiwan reinforce the conclusion that 
     China believes ballistic missiles carry both political and 
     military utility.\30\


                          summary conclusions

       The desire of nations to acquire ballistic missiles that 
     can threaten the United States or U.S. and allied interests 
     has not abated. In fact, the absence of ballistic missile 
     defenses may actually encourage other states to acquire such 
     weapons. Perhaps the only way Third World nations can 
     directly challenge the United States in the next ten to 
     twenty years given overall U.S. military capabilities is by 
     developing or acquiring missiles capable of deterring U.S. 
     action or making the ``price'' of such action exceedingly 
     high.
       The ability of other nations to acquire ballistic missile 
     capabilities will expand and under any circumstances is 
     unlikely to be halted by arms control regimes like the MTCR. 
     The countries of greatest proliferation concern are either 
     not members of these regimes or have failed to abide by their 


[[Page E243]]
     international nonproliferation obligations under them.
       Indigenous development of ICBM capabilities is one way, but 
     not the only or even most probable way, for other nations to 
     acquire long-range missile capabilities. Given the 
     willingness of regimes such as North Korea to trade in 
     missiles and components, and Russia's refusal or inability to 
     control the flow of missile components as well as scientific 
     and engineering talent to Third World countries, the trend is 
     clearly in the direction of more proliferation rather than 
     less.
       The Russian military is not immune to the tremendous 
     societal strains currently underway in Russia. These strains, 
     along with changes in military doctrine that increase 
     reliance on nuclear weapons, call into question the sanguine 
     assessment that the risk of a deliberate, accidental, or 
     unauthorized ballistic missile launch from Russia remains 
     low. Likewise, Chinese threats to use ballistic missiles 
     raise troubling political and military concerns.
       The intelligence community's recent downgrading of the 
     long-range missile threat is premised on assumptions that are 
     highly questionable. The latest intelligence community 
     estimate of the long-range missile threat to the United 
     States is at variance with previous intelligence estimates, 
     the public testimonies and statements of acting and former 
     U.S. intelligence officials, and the analysis of respected 
     non-governmental experts.
       The American people remain entirely vulnerable to a 
     ballistic missile attack. As recent focus groups have 
     reaffirmed, Americans are surprised and angered when 
     presented with the knowledge that they remain unprotected 
     against this threat.


                               footnotes

     \1\ Secretary of Defense, ``Annual Report to the President 
     and the Congress,'' February 1995, p. 241.
     \2\ Testimony of R. James Woolsey, Director of Central 
     Intelligence, before the Senate Governmental Affairs 
     Committee, 24 February 1993.
     \3\ Cited in ``Proliferation, Potential TMD Roles, 
     Demarcation and ABM Treaty Compatibility,'' report prepared 
     by the National Institute for Public Policy, September 1994, 
     p. 7.
     \4\ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
     ``Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the 
     Risks,'' August 1993, p. 64.
     \5\ Institute for National Strategic Studies, ``Strategic 
     Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition,'' 
     National Defense University, 1995, p. 116.
     \6\ Director of Central Intelligence, ``Emerging Missile 
     Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,'' NIE 95-
     19, November 1995. 
     \7\ Letter dated 1 December 1995. In a similar vein, the 
     former Deputy Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
     Organization (BMDO), William Evers, has described the view of 
     the intelligence community this way: ``Russia, the former 
     Soviet states, and China will not use [ICBMs] intentionally, 
     will not launch them accidentally, and will not sell them.'' 
     (Comments at a conference sponsored by the Institute for 
     Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 28 April 1995, reported in 
     John Donnelly, ``House Panel to Examine Russian Command and 
     Control Issues,'' Defense Week, 26 June 1995, p. 1+.)
     \8\ Because NIEs are classified, a detailed discussion of 
     their findings is not possible here. However, a comparative 
     analysis of past and present NIEs indicates that the official 
     assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United 
     States has been downgraded. The issue of politicization of 
     intelligence is highlighted in Rowen Scarborough and Bill 
     Gertz, ``Missile-Threat Report `Politicized,' GOP Says,'' 
     Washington Times, 30 January 1996, p. A1+.
     \9\ International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``The 
     Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 281.
     \10\ ``Libya: Gadhafi Ready to Use Missiles,'' Minneapolis 
     Star Tribune, 1 January 1996, p. 4.
     \11\ Speech on 18 April 1990, reported by Tripoli Television 
     Service, 19 April 1990, and translated in Foreign Broadcast 
     Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia, 
     FBIS-NES-90-078, 23 April 1990, p. 8.
     \12\ Cited in ``A Terrorist Talks About Life, Warns of More 
     Deaths,'' The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1990, p. 1.
     \13\ Cited in Thomas L. McNaughter, ``Ballistic Missiles and 
     Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War, 
     International Security, Fall 1990, p. 6.
     \14\ See footnote 8.
     \15\ See, for example, R. Jeffrey Smith, ``U.S. Waives 
     Objection to Russian Missile Technology Sale to Brazil,'' 
     Washington Post, 8 June 1995, p, A23; Fred Hiatt, ``Russian 
     Rocket Sale Strains U.S. Ties,'' Washington Post, 24 June 
     1993, p. A29.
     \16\ See R. Jeffrey Smith, ``U.N. Is Said to Find Russian 
     Markings on Iraq-Bound Military Equipment,'' Washington Post, 
     15 December 1995, p. A30. According to a U.S. official, 
     Iraq's missile program ``poses a threat to all of Europe.'' A 
     U.N. official, noting that Iraq is seeking to develop a 
     longer-range missile, stated, ``Should Saddam build such a 
     missile, it could easily reach London or Moscow.'' See 
     Stewart Stogel, ``Missile Plans by Iraq May Aim at Europe,'' 
     Washington Times, 16 February 1996, p. A1+.
     \17\ Speech before the American Defense Preparedness 
     Association, 18 May 1993.
     \18\ See, for examply, Anna Bakina, ``Strategic Missile Under 
     Conversion Into Space Booster,'' ITAR-TASS, 17 July 1995, 
     cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service , ``FBIS 
     Report: Arms Control and Proliferation Issues,'' FBIS-TAC-95-
     004, 8 August 1995, pp. 38-39 ``RSA To Turn Swords Into 
     Plowshares,'' Kommersant Daily, 7 July 1995, p. 9, cited in 
     Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ``SS-19s To Be 
     Converted into Rokot Space Carrier Rockets'', FBIS Report: 
     ``Arms Control and Proliferation,'' FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 4 
     August 1995, p. 97; Vitaly Chukseyev ``Russia to Supply 
     Boosters For U.S. Missiles,'' ITAR-TASS, 13 October 1995, 
     cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ``Daily 
     Report: Central Eurasia,'' FBIS-SOV-95-198, 13 October 1995. 
     p.30.
     \19\ See Bill Gertz, ``U.S. Relaxes START, Raising Missile 
     Fears,'' Washington Times, 9 November 1995, p. A1+.
     \20\ Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
     Subcommittee on International Security, International 
     Organizations, and Human Rights, 28 July 1993.
     \21\ The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United 
     States'' February 1993, p.1.
     \22\ ibid, p.1.
     \23\ Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat,'' 
     1992, pp. 26-28
     \24\ Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate. ``GPALs and 
     Fforeign Space Launch Vehicle Capabilities,'' SAIC February 
     1992, p. 18.
     \25\ See Allen Levine's interview of Russian General Batenin, 
     in ``Soviet General Says Unrest May Spark Nuclear Terror,'' 
     Atlanta Constitution, 16 October 1991, p. 2.
     \26\ See Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller, and 
     Charles Zraket, ``Soviet Fission: Control of the Nuclear 
     Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union,'' Center for 
     Strategic and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School 
     of Government, Harvard University, November 1991.
     \27\ Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
     Subcommittee on European Affairs, reported in Rowen 
     Scarborough, ``Russia Losing Nuke Control, Senators Told,'' 
     Washington Times, 23 August 1995, p. A1+.
     \28\ On the Russian nuclear alert in January 1995, see 
     ``Norwegian Science Rocket Puts Russian Defense On Alert,'' 
     Washington Times, 26 January 1995, p. 16; ``Russian Radars 
     Alert Moscow After Detecting Missile Launch,'' Agence France-
     Presse, 25 January 1995; Vasiliy Kononenko, ``Yeltsin Leaves 
     Chechnya Behind in Lipetsk, But Takes the `Black Attache 
     Case' With Him,'' Izvestiya, 27 January 1995, p. 1; Nikolay 
     Devyanin, ``Football: All That Has Happened, Alas, Had to 
     Happen,'' Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 7, 29 January-5 February 
     1995, pp. 1, 12.
     \29\ See, for example, Alexei Arbatov, ``The Mysteries of the 
     Nuclear Button,'' Moscow New Times, No. 4, January 1992, pp. 
     20-23.
     \30\ See Patrick E. Tyler, ``As China Threatens Tawian, It 
     Makes Sure U.S. Listens,'' New York Times, 24 January 1996, 
     p. 1+.

                          ____________________