[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 28, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E241-E243]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MEMORANDUM ON THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT
______
HON. FLOYD SPENCE
of south carolina
in the house of representatives
Wednesday, February 28, 1996
Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, as you know, the President vetoed the
defense authorization bill last December due primarily to the
legislation's direction that a national defense system be deployed by
the year 2003. As I commented during the veto override debate, on a
political level, the veto did serve to more clearly define the stark
differences between the Clinton administration and this Congress on key
national security issues such as ballistic missile defense. It is
unfortunate that an issue as fundamentally important as whether or not
the American people should be defended against the threat of ballistic
missiles in the decade ahead has become so controversial--but it is
where we find ourselves.
Adding further to the controversy, the Department of Defense
announced last week that they do not intend to spend all of the funding
appropriated for national missile defense programs this fiscal year, as
well as the surprising decision to delay several of the most promising
theater missile defense programs--an area in which I did not believe
there was much controversy until now. The combination of the
President's strong opposition to deploying a national missile defense
and now, an apparently conscious decision to scale back theater missile
programs leaves us plenty to begin sorting through.
The National Security Committee has a responsibility to raise the
visibility of important security issues and through discussion, debate
and even disagreement, to hopefully inform and educate the citizens of
this country. Today, we started that effort with the first in a series
of full committee and subcommittee hearings on ballistic missile
defense. In addition to hearings, I have prepared a short paper,
``Memorandum on the Ballistic Missile Threat,'' which I distributed to
the members of the National Security Committee yesterday.
The text of the memorandum is as follows:
Memorandum on the Ballistic Missile Threat
(By HNSC Chairman Floyd Spence)
INTRODUCTION
As last year's debate and veto of the FT 96 National
Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1530) demonstrated, Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) has become a defining national security
issue. Today, the United States has no defense against even a
single ballistic missile. According to polls, this fact is
not appreciated by the American people, who continue to
believe that we have the means today to protect ourselves
against ballistic missile attack. Although the technology
exists to develop and field a limited defense against such
threats, the American people remain hostage to a national
strategy of conscious vulnerability, codified by the 1972
anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and reinforced by Cold
War notions of strategic stability.
The debate over whether deployment of a national missile
defense is warranted ought to pivot in large part on forward
looking assessments of the ballistic missile threat to the
United States. In his December 28 veto message, the President
stated that H.R. 1530's call for a national missile defense
system addresses a long-range missile threat ``that our
Intelligence Community does not foresee in the coming
decade.'' The purpose of this memorandum is to address this
issue and to provide a better understanding of the missile
threats facing the United States now and in the future.
A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER
The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that the
shorter-range, or theater, ballistic missile threat is real
and growing. Secretary of Defense William Perry has stated
that ballistic missiles ``are clearly becoming a common
battlefield weapon.'' \1\ More than 15 countries currently
possess ballistic missiles. Most are based on Soviet-derived
designs like the SCUD, which was used by Iraq during the 1991
Gulf War. However, the types of theater missiles being sought
and acquired by third countries today are of increasing
range, lethality, and sophistication.
Footnotes at the end of article.
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In addition, more than 25 countries currently possess, or
are seeking to acquire, weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
According to unclassified estimates, some 24 countries
currently have ongoing chemical weapons programs. \2\ Ten
countries are reportedly pursuing biological weapons
research.\3\ At least as many are reported to be
interested in developing nuclear weapons.\4\ The trend
toward proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
the missiles that can carry them is ``decidedly
negative,'' with ``no limits on the ambitions of unstable
actors to acquire the most advanced and deadly weapons
available, either through internal or external sources.\5\
The Administration is less convinced, however, of the
threat posed by longer-range missiles. In particular, a
recently completed National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
prepared by the intelligence community, concludes that the
threat to the United States posed by long-range ballistic
missiles is lower than previously believed.\6\ A letter by
the CIA's Director of Congressional Affairs to Senators Levin
and Bumpers, written on behalf of the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI), John Deutch, asserts that the previous
intelligence community estimate of the missile threat to the
United States, as reflected in the language of H.R. 1530,
``overstates what we currently believe to be the future
threat.'' The letter states that it is ``extremely unlikely''
any nation with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
would be willing to sell them; declares that the U.S. early
warning capability is ``sufficient to provide many years in
advance of indigenous development''; and judges the prospect
of an operational North Korean ICBM within the next five
years to be ``very low.'' \7\
The Administration's conclusions on these issues are
seemingly at odds with previous intelligence community
estimates; are at variance with the view of other responsible
experts within and outside the intelligence community; and
have raised troubling questions concerning the politicization
of intelligence.\8\
the allure of ballistic missiles
There are numerous reasons why a growing number of nations
seek to acquire ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction. Such weapons provide a military edge against
regional adversaries and serve as symbols of national power
and prestige. Ballistic missiles offer small and medium
powers--for the first time--a strategic weapon potentially
capable of deterring great powers militarily and politically.
An adversary armed with ballistic missiles and WMD may deter
the United States from undertaking certain actions for fear
of retaliation against U.S. regional assets of allies. Long-
range ICBMs are even more attractive assets for hostile
powers wishing to deter the United States from exercising its
power projection capabilities by placing U.S. territory
directly at risk and threatening our most valued asset: the
American people. Importantly, the lack of any effective
defenses against ballistic missiles may actually serve to
encourage hostile states to acquire missile capabilities and
makes them the weapon of choice for nations seeking to
threaten others. As the International Institute for Strategic
Studies in London has concluded, ``the ballistic missile,
mainly on account of its range, speed and cost relative to
that of a manned aircraft, is a favored delivery means for
proliferating states and is likely to remain so until a
proven anti-ballistic missile defense system has been
deployed.'' \9\
The proliferation of these weapons heightens the risk that
adversaries will seek to use them or threaten their use
against the U.S. or American allies and interests. For
instance, in the Gulf War, Iraq used SCUD missiles against
Israel as political weapons in an attempt to draw Israel into
the conflict and fracture the allied coalition. Libya
recently declared its willingness to fire ballistic missiles
at Naples, Italy, the home of the U.S.
[[Page E242]]
Sixth Fleet.\10\ In fact, Libya launched ballistic missiles against a
NATO base in Italy in 1986. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has
spoken of his desire to acquire ``a deterrent--missiles that
can reach New York,'' and has stated, ``We should build this
force so that they [the U.S.] and others will no longer think
about an attack.'' \11\ Palestine Liberation Front leader Abu
Abbas warned ominously in 1990 that ``some day we will have
missiles that can reach New York.'' \12\ And Iranian
President Hashemi Rafsanjani has called missiles ``the most
important and the most essential weapons of the world.\13\
Clearly, the incentive to develop or otherwise acquire these
weapons is enhanced by the lack of defenses against them.
intelligence community analysis
The conclusions expressed in the CIA letter referred to
above have required the intelligence community to adopt a
number of benign assumptions about the ballistic missile
threat to the United States that are not supported by
previous intelligence estimates or independent analyses.\14\
For example:
An assumption that nations will be limited to their
indigenous industrial and technological base when developing
ICBMs and that foreign assistance will be minimal or
nonexistent. By discounting the likelihood that ICBM
components or entire missiles may be purchased from more
advanced nations, the intelligence community appears to place
faith in a universal adherence to the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) or in self-imposed restraints on trade
of such items. However, the MTCR, which establishes
guidelines for controlling the transfer of missile equipment
and technology, is a voluntary effort, lacks the force of
international law, contains no enforcement mechanisms, and
has been repeatedly violated. For example, Russia has
transferred critical missile components, in contravention of
MTCR guidelines, to India and Brazil.\15\ More recently,
missile guidance components capable of being used in an ICBM
were intercepted in Jordan in transit from Russia to
Iraq.\16\ Regardless of whether this particular transfer was
sanctioned by the Russian government or was a ``rogue
operation,'' the incident is troubling and demonstrates that
the MTCR provides no guarantee against the transfer of ICBM
technology.
In addition, several known proliferant states--such as
China and North Korea--are not members of the MTCR. Chinese
sales of intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia and
North Korean exports of SCUD missiles and production
technology to Iran and Syria are clear indicators that arms
control regimes like the MTCR cannot halt potentially
dangerous transfers of missile technology.
Furthermore, the assertion in the December 1995 CIA letter
that sales of ICBMs are ``extremely unlikely'' is seemingly
at odds with the assessment by Larry Gershwin, former
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs at the
CIA, who stated in 1993, ``We also remain concerned that
hostile nations will try to purchase from other states
ballistic missiles capable of striking the United
States.''\17\ Indeed, Russia has aggressively marketed
variants of the SS-25 and SS-19 ICBMs for space launch
purposes.\18\ A recent change in the START I Treaty would
allow Russia to transfer a missile to any other country as
long as it is called a ``space launch vehicle'' and it
remains under Russian control.\19\ However, as a practical
matter, the United States has no ability to verify that such
a missile will be used to launch a satellite (as compared to
a warhead), or that Russians ``control'' it.
The intelligence community's focus on indigenous production
also discounts the possibility that the ``import'' of
scientific expertise acquired from other nations may
accelerate the indigenous development of potentially hostile
states of long-range missile capabilities. Former DCI James
Woolsey has testified that ``the acquisition of key
production technologies and technical expertise would speed
up ICBM development.'' \20\ Given Russia's dire economic
situation, the prospect that Russian scientific and technical
talent will seek work elsewhere (the ``brain drain'' factor)
is troubling.
In short, the compliance problems and loopholes intrinsic
to arms control agreements, the increasing availability of
foreign expertise, the strong incentives that exist for
missile and component sales by states in need of hard
currency, and the geopolitical desirability of long-range
missiles, justify a more sober assessment of the likely
future missile threat to the United States.
An assumption that countries with the capability to develop
ICBMs will not do so. The recent intelligence community
assessment reflects an apparent and questionable conclusion
that those nations most technically competent to develop
ICBMs, such as Japan, Ukraine, and India, have little motive
to acquire ICBM acquisition could easily and rapidly change,
and it is prudent to assume relations and attitudes among
nations will be relatively constant in the international
order in the coming decade. Indeed, few predicted the
monumental changes in the strategic environment that have
occurred over the past 5-10 years. At a minimum, any analysis
that assumes continuity must be balanced with an equity valid
analysis that postulates alternative futures.
It is conceivable, for example, that India might want ICBMs
to deter the United States or other powers from becoming
involved in any future India-Pakistan conflict. Ukraine might
want ICBMs if it finds, once Keiv is bereft of all nuclear
weapons now based on its territory, that the United States
loses interest in Ukraine's future, or if Ukraine wishes to
increase its leverage in future dealings with Moscow. And
Japan may look at some future point to acquire long-range
missile capabilities for deterrence purposes if it no longer
has faith in U.S. security assurances, or if China or Russia
assumes more aggressive international or regional stances.
It is important to note that existing SLVs in these and
other countries could be transformed into ICBMs in reasonably
short order. In fact, there is no practical ability to
distinguish between an ICBM and SLV for verification
purposes--thereby denying the United States ``timely
warning'' of a new missile threat. A report of the
Proliferation Study Team, chaired by former National Security
Agent Director LTG Williams Odom (USA, Ret.), noted in 1993
that ``[t]he conclusion that the probability is quite low for
the emergence of new ballistic missile threat to the United
States during this decade or early in the next decade can be
sustained only if plausible but unpredicted developments,
such as the transfer and conversion of SLVs, are dismissed or
considered of negligible consequence.'' \21\ Moreover,
according to the study team's report, the transfer and
conversion of SLVs would require ``relatively modest
effort.'' \22\
The System Planning Corporation found in a 1992 report that
conversion of SLVs to military ballistic missiles would be
``fairly straightforward'' and that extending the range of
missiles has already been achieved by China, North Korea,
Iraq, and Israel.\23\ Additionally, a report prepared in 1992
by Science International Corporation concluded: ``The
increasing availability of space launch vehicles and space
launch services could result in the ability of certain Third
World countries to threaten the continental U.S. with United
States with ICBMs carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological
payloads in the mid- to late-1990s.'' \24\
An assumption that there is a low risk of deliberate,
unauthorized, or accidental missile launch by Russia or
China. According to Russian sources and U.S. experts, the
Russian General Staff may have operational control of the
strategic nuclear forces and could launch those forces
without President Yeltsin's permission. Given the elevated
emphasis being placed on nuclear weapons in Russia's new
military doctrine, this is a particularly worrisome prospect.
Russian General Geliy Batenin, former commander of an SS-18
ICBM division and a military advisor to President Yeltsin,
has warned that the General Staff and even individual ICBM
flight crews could execute an unauthorized missile launch.
Batenin has also warned that Russian nuclear submarines may
carry launch codes that would allow a submarine commander to
conduct an unauthorized launch of SLBMs.\25\
Russian political instability, the erosion of Russian
military discipline, and the deterioration of technical
infrastructure, including radar and early warning systems,
are conditions that increase the possibility of unauthorized
or accidental nuclear use.\26\ Brookings Institution analyst
Bruce Blair has testified that ``The world remains unsafe as
long as there are thousands of launch-ready nuclear weapons
at the fingertips of a Russian command system that is
tottering on the edge of civil collapse.''\27\ The Russian
General Staff's unauthorized nuclear alert during the August
1991 coup attempt, the October 1993 Parliamentary crisis, the
January 1995 nuclear alert in reaction to Norway's launch of
a meteorological rocket, and recent nuclear sabre rattling
against proposed NATO expansion, should cause more than a
little concern about the Russian nuclear threat.\28\ It is
disturbing the extent to which knowledgeable Russians are
apparently more worried about the possibility of unauthorized
or accidental use of Russian nuclear weapons than the US
intelligence community.\29\
The solidity of China's command and control system is also
in question. Based on admittedly limited knowledge, it
appears that technical control over China's ICBM force is
significantly less structured than that of either Russia or
the United States. Also, China's willingness to use ballistic
missiles for political purposes was evident in the recent
series of Chinese missile launches against ``targets'' off
the coast of Taiwan. And the reported Chinese warnings to the
United States that it would consider nuclear strikes against
American cities to deter U.S. involvement in a possible
future conflict with Taiwan reinforce the conclusion that
China believes ballistic missiles carry both political and
military utility.\30\
summary conclusions
The desire of nations to acquire ballistic missiles that
can threaten the United States or U.S. and allied interests
has not abated. In fact, the absence of ballistic missile
defenses may actually encourage other states to acquire such
weapons. Perhaps the only way Third World nations can
directly challenge the United States in the next ten to
twenty years given overall U.S. military capabilities is by
developing or acquiring missiles capable of deterring U.S.
action or making the ``price'' of such action exceedingly
high.
The ability of other nations to acquire ballistic missile
capabilities will expand and under any circumstances is
unlikely to be halted by arms control regimes like the MTCR.
The countries of greatest proliferation concern are either
not members of these regimes or have failed to abide by their
[[Page E243]]
international nonproliferation obligations under them.
Indigenous development of ICBM capabilities is one way, but
not the only or even most probable way, for other nations to
acquire long-range missile capabilities. Given the
willingness of regimes such as North Korea to trade in
missiles and components, and Russia's refusal or inability to
control the flow of missile components as well as scientific
and engineering talent to Third World countries, the trend is
clearly in the direction of more proliferation rather than
less.
The Russian military is not immune to the tremendous
societal strains currently underway in Russia. These strains,
along with changes in military doctrine that increase
reliance on nuclear weapons, call into question the sanguine
assessment that the risk of a deliberate, accidental, or
unauthorized ballistic missile launch from Russia remains
low. Likewise, Chinese threats to use ballistic missiles
raise troubling political and military concerns.
The intelligence community's recent downgrading of the
long-range missile threat is premised on assumptions that are
highly questionable. The latest intelligence community
estimate of the long-range missile threat to the United
States is at variance with previous intelligence estimates,
the public testimonies and statements of acting and former
U.S. intelligence officials, and the analysis of respected
non-governmental experts.
The American people remain entirely vulnerable to a
ballistic missile attack. As recent focus groups have
reaffirmed, Americans are surprised and angered when
presented with the knowledge that they remain unprotected
against this threat.
footnotes
\1\ Secretary of Defense, ``Annual Report to the President
and the Congress,'' February 1995, p. 241.
\2\ Testimony of R. James Woolsey, Director of Central
Intelligence, before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, 24 February 1993.
\3\ Cited in ``Proliferation, Potential TMD Roles,
Demarcation and ABM Treaty Compatibility,'' report prepared
by the National Institute for Public Policy, September 1994,
p. 7.
\4\ U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,
``Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the
Risks,'' August 1993, p. 64.
\5\ Institute for National Strategic Studies, ``Strategic
Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition,''
National Defense University, 1995, p. 116.
\6\ Director of Central Intelligence, ``Emerging Missile
Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years,'' NIE 95-
19, November 1995.
\7\ Letter dated 1 December 1995. In a similar vein, the
former Deputy Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO), William Evers, has described the view of
the intelligence community this way: ``Russia, the former
Soviet states, and China will not use [ICBMs] intentionally,
will not launch them accidentally, and will not sell them.''
(Comments at a conference sponsored by the Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 28 April 1995, reported in
John Donnelly, ``House Panel to Examine Russian Command and
Control Issues,'' Defense Week, 26 June 1995, p. 1+.)
\8\ Because NIEs are classified, a detailed discussion of
their findings is not possible here. However, a comparative
analysis of past and present NIEs indicates that the official
assessment of the ballistic missile threat to the United
States has been downgraded. The issue of politicization of
intelligence is highlighted in Rowen Scarborough and Bill
Gertz, ``Missile-Threat Report `Politicized,' GOP Says,''
Washington Times, 30 January 1996, p. A1+.
\9\ International Institute for Strategic Studies, ``The
Military Balance 1995-1996, p. 281.
\10\ ``Libya: Gadhafi Ready to Use Missiles,'' Minneapolis
Star Tribune, 1 January 1996, p. 4.
\11\ Speech on 18 April 1990, reported by Tripoli Television
Service, 19 April 1990, and translated in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, Daily Report: Near East and South Asia,
FBIS-NES-90-078, 23 April 1990, p. 8.
\12\ Cited in ``A Terrorist Talks About Life, Warns of More
Deaths,'' The Wall Street Journal, 10 September 1990, p. 1.
\13\ Cited in Thomas L. McNaughter, ``Ballistic Missiles and
Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War,
International Security, Fall 1990, p. 6.
\14\ See footnote 8.
\15\ See, for example, R. Jeffrey Smith, ``U.S. Waives
Objection to Russian Missile Technology Sale to Brazil,''
Washington Post, 8 June 1995, p, A23; Fred Hiatt, ``Russian
Rocket Sale Strains U.S. Ties,'' Washington Post, 24 June
1993, p. A29.
\16\ See R. Jeffrey Smith, ``U.N. Is Said to Find Russian
Markings on Iraq-Bound Military Equipment,'' Washington Post,
15 December 1995, p. A30. According to a U.S. official,
Iraq's missile program ``poses a threat to all of Europe.'' A
U.N. official, noting that Iraq is seeking to develop a
longer-range missile, stated, ``Should Saddam build such a
missile, it could easily reach London or Moscow.'' See
Stewart Stogel, ``Missile Plans by Iraq May Aim at Europe,''
Washington Times, 16 February 1996, p. A1+.
\17\ Speech before the American Defense Preparedness
Association, 18 May 1993.
\18\ See, for examply, Anna Bakina, ``Strategic Missile Under
Conversion Into Space Booster,'' ITAR-TASS, 17 July 1995,
cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service , ``FBIS
Report: Arms Control and Proliferation Issues,'' FBIS-TAC-95-
004, 8 August 1995, pp. 38-39 ``RSA To Turn Swords Into
Plowshares,'' Kommersant Daily, 7 July 1995, p. 9, cited in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ``SS-19s To Be
Converted into Rokot Space Carrier Rockets'', FBIS Report:
``Arms Control and Proliferation,'' FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 4
August 1995, p. 97; Vitaly Chukseyev ``Russia to Supply
Boosters For U.S. Missiles,'' ITAR-TASS, 13 October 1995,
cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, ``Daily
Report: Central Eurasia,'' FBIS-SOV-95-198, 13 October 1995.
p.30.
\19\ See Bill Gertz, ``U.S. Relaxes START, Raising Missile
Fears,'' Washington Times, 9 November 1995, p. A1+.
\20\ Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights, 28 July 1993.
\21\ The Emerging Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States'' February 1993, p.1.
\22\ ibid, p.1.
\23\ Ballistic Missile Proliferation: An Emerging Threat,''
1992, pp. 26-28
\24\ Sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate. ``GPALs and
Fforeign Space Launch Vehicle Capabilities,'' SAIC February
1992, p. 18.
\25\ See Allen Levine's interview of Russian General Batenin,
in ``Soviet General Says Unrest May Spark Nuclear Terror,''
Atlanta Constitution, 16 October 1991, p. 2.
\26\ See Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, Steven Miller, and
Charles Zraket, ``Soviet Fission: Control of the Nuclear
Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union,'' Center for
Strategic and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University, November 1991.
\27\ Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on European Affairs, reported in Rowen
Scarborough, ``Russia Losing Nuke Control, Senators Told,''
Washington Times, 23 August 1995, p. A1+.
\28\ On the Russian nuclear alert in January 1995, see
``Norwegian Science Rocket Puts Russian Defense On Alert,''
Washington Times, 26 January 1995, p. 16; ``Russian Radars
Alert Moscow After Detecting Missile Launch,'' Agence France-
Presse, 25 January 1995; Vasiliy Kononenko, ``Yeltsin Leaves
Chechnya Behind in Lipetsk, But Takes the `Black Attache
Case' With Him,'' Izvestiya, 27 January 1995, p. 1; Nikolay
Devyanin, ``Football: All That Has Happened, Alas, Had to
Happen,'' Moskovskiye Novosti, No. 7, 29 January-5 February
1995, pp. 1, 12.
\29\ See, for example, Alexei Arbatov, ``The Mysteries of the
Nuclear Button,'' Moscow New Times, No. 4, January 1992, pp.
20-23.
\30\ See Patrick E. Tyler, ``As China Threatens Tawian, It
Makes Sure U.S. Listens,'' New York Times, 24 January 1996,
p. 1+.
____________________