[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 25 (Wednesday, February 28, 1996)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E228-E231]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




 RUSSIA AND THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES [NIS]: PROMOTING U.S. INTERESTS

                                 ______


                          HON. CHRISTOPHER COX

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                       Tuesday, February 27, 1996

  Mr. COX of California. Mr. Speaker, at a recent executive session of 
the House Republican Policy Committee, which I chair, the Salvatori 
Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation, Dr. 
Ariel Cohen, made a presentation on the state of affairs in Russia and 
implications for American foreign policy. He offered an analysis of the 
December 1995 legislative elections and the presidential elections 
scheduled for next June, focusing on the growing influence of 
Communists and ultranationalists. His observations about Russia's 
stalled economic liberalization, military onslaught against the 
citizens of Chechnya, and sale of nuclear reactors to Iran force one to 
reconsider American economic assistance programs for Russia. His 
briefing report follows.

 Russia and the New Independent States [NIS]: Promoting U.S. Interests

       Briefing to the House Republican Policy Committee, Hon. 
     Christopher Cox, (R-CA), Chairman


                               the issues

       The Future of U.S.-Russian Relations Remains Uncertain. The 
     future of U.S.-Russian relations is uncertain. Much depends 
     upon the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia, 
     currently scheduled for the summer of 1996. In December 1995, 
     elections communists, nationalists and their allies captured 
     over 50 per cent of the popular vote to the Duma (the lower 
     house of the Russian parliament). Currently, President 
     Yeltsin is trailing the pack of presidential candidates, with 
     his popular support in single digits. The most popular 
     candidate is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, an anti-American ultra-
     nationalist. Another dangerous contender is Gennady Zyuganov, 
     leader of the unreformed communist party. He, too, could win 
     the presidency of the second largest nuclear power on earth. 
     Victory for either Zhirinovsky or Zyuganov would gravely 
     endanger Russia's young democracy and market reforms. A 
     communist or a nationalist at Russia's helm could eventually 
     place that country, with its considerable military power, on 
     a collision course with the United States in Central Europe 
     or the Middle East.
       Yeltsin's Presidency Faltering. President Yeltsin's own 
     prospects look grim. He has all but announced that he is 
     about to run for the presidency, but his health is failing, 
     and Russia's internal economic and political crisis continues 
     unabated. The war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya, and 
     economic difficulties are eroding the popularity of Yeltsin's 
     administration.
       No one knows who will rule in Moscow by the end of 1996, 
     but the period of romantic partnership with the U.S. and the 
     West is over. Russia is striking out on its own, taking a 
     path that has already led toward confrontation with the West. 
     In fact, Russia is in the midst of a political turbulence 
     fraught with dangers for the West. The chances are good that 
     the next American president will have to deal with a new set 
     of players in Moscow, different from the current team. The 
     U.S. cannot afford to appear partisan. Washington should be 
     firm in expressing American support for democracy, elections, 
     free markets and the support of individual rights in Russia. 
     But the continuous and unquestionable support that the 
     Clinton administration is providing Boris Yeltsin makes less 
     and less sense. Questions about how closely and for how much 
     longer Yeltsin should be embraced need to be addressed.
       From Sphere of Influence to Empire? Anti-Western, anti-
     American, and xenophobic sentiments are growing in Russia. 
     Moscow is attempting to re-establish its influence in 
     neighboring regions that were once a part of the Soviet 
     Union. The Kremlin is employing combination of economic, 
     diplomatic and military means to achieve a sphere of economic 
     and military influence in what Moscow calls its ``near 
     abroad.'' Yeltsin's newly appointed foreign minister, 
     Yevguenii Primakov, and other influential policy makers 
     insist that the West scale down relations with former Soviet 
     states, including Ukraine, and conduct these ties via Moscow. 
     But in fact, preventing the emergence of a Russian empire in 
     the lands of the former Soviet Union should be a top Western 
     priority. Nothing less than Russian democracy and a future 
     threat to vital Western interests are at stake. Moreover, an 
     anti-Western policy may lead Russia to forge alliances with 
     anti-Western forces in Iran, Iraq, China and Lybia.
       The War in Chechnya. One of the main goals of the Russian 
     attack on the quasi-independent republic of Chechnya in 
     December of 1994 was to ensure control of a vital oil 
     pipeline and stem illegal activities, such as drug-
     trafficking and smuggling, that were being conducted or 
     condoned by the former administration in the Chechen capital 
     of Grozny led by President Jokhar Dudayev. Russia launched 
     massive but covert military actions to support Dudayev's 
     opponents. In 1994, Dudayev turned to radical Islamic 
     elements in the Middle East and Central Asia for support. 
     This exacerbated the religious aspect of the conflict between 
     the Muslim Chechens and Christian Orthodox Russians. Overt 
     Russian military action began on December 12, 1994, when the 
     army marched on Grozny. The city was destroyed by a brutal 
     aerial, tank and artillery assault. Since the start of the 
     campaign, over 30,000 people have been killed, and more than 
     300,000 became refugees. Hostilities continue, with hostage 
     taking crises having erupted in July of 1995 and January of 
     1996. The southern border region of the Russian Federation 
     increasingly resembles Lebanon or Yugoslavia, replete with 
     hostages, refugees and vendettas.
       The sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. The Islamic regime in 
     Teheran has launched a bid to acquire nuclear weapons. It is 
     buying two Russian-made nuclear reactors that will produce 
     radioactive plutonium which can be enriched to become 
     weapons-grade raw material for the manufacture of atomic 
     bombs. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself does 
     not support this sale, which could endanger both Russian and 
     Western security. Iran, with its formidable oil and gas 
     resources, does not need nuclear power. If Teheran wants an 
     additional source of electricity, Russia could sell 
     electrical power from its own ample resources. In addition, 
     to compensate Russia for the lost reactor sales, the U.S. 
     could increase its Russian uranium quota, or cooperate in 
     building safer nuclear reactors on Russian soil.
     
[[Page E229]]

       Aid to Russia. The Bush and the Clinton administrations 
     have provided over $4 billion dollars in aid to Russia since 
     1992. Over $20 billion has been provided by the International 
     Monetary Fund, the World Bank, Western governments and 
     multilateral organizations, such as the European Bank for 
     Reconstruction and Development. Combined aid monies and loans 
     to the USSR and Russia for the period 1985-1995 amounted to 
     over $100 billion. The results of these aid programs have 
     been mixed. The primary agency which implements aid is the 
     U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID), which 
     often disregards Russia's real needs and pushes its own 
     ``development'' agenda, utilizing personnel with expertise 
     gained in Third World countries. The AID approach is 
     hardly appropriate for Russia.
       Technical assistance in the transition to free markets and 
     democracy is vital. It should be administered by an 
     independent board of U.S. policy makers, Russian area 
     experts, and U.S. business representatives, and with guidance 
     from the U.S. Department of State. The Russians need training 
     in Western-style finance, accounting, management, law, and 
     many other issues. They also need support in the development 
     of the democratic institutions of an emerging civil society, 
     as well as student and scientist exchanges.


                   arms control treaties with russia

       Four treaties were signed by the USSR and the Russian 
     Federation that require improvement, revision, rethinking. 
     These are:
       Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II). This treaty, 
     limiting the number of strategic nuclear weapons on both 
     sides, was signed between President George Bush and the last 
     leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1990, and has not 
     yet been ratified by the U.S. Senate or the Russian Duma. In 
     the U.S., START II is facing a challenge in the Senate. The 
     senators understand that START II makes sense in Washington 
     only if the treaty is compatible with a sound and rational 
     policy that includes missile defense. But the main obstacles 
     to START II ratification are not in Washington. They are in 
     Moscow, where a majority of deputies in the newly elected 
     Duma will probably refuse to ratify. While raising objections 
     based on American intentions to build a missile defense, the 
     real reason for the Russian intransigence lies elsewhere. The 
     Russian military establishment wants to keep large, land-
     based multiple warhead missiles, such as the SS-18, SS-19 and 
     especially the mobile SS-24. The reason for that is twofold. 
     First and foremost, the Russian elite mistakenly thinks that 
     these are the attributes of a superpower, and that with these 
     tools of destruction Russia will retain the place of its 
     predecessor, the USSR. Secondly, the Ministry of Defense 
     wants to retain the level of investments that were made 
     during the Soviet era. Such old thinking indicates that the 
     lessons of the past have not been learned. Russia cannot 
     become a superpower through such a muscle-bound strategy. 
     Only a democratic Russia with freedom, prosperity and 
     opportunity for all can build wealth and strength 
     commensurate with superpower status.
       Ballistic Missile Defense/Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
     Treaty. In an era of nuclear proliferation, the American 
     mainland needs to be defended from accidental or terrorist 
     missile launches. This is especially pertinent with Russia 
     selling nuclear reactors and China selling ballistic missiles 
     and technology to the extremist regime in Teheran. The 
     efforts of Saddam Houssein to develop a nuclear ballistic 
     missile capability are also well documented.
       Ballistic Missile Defense is a limited and achievable goal 
     for the U.S. It should not be thwarted by the obsolete 1972 
     ABM Treaty signed with the USSR, a country that no longer 
     exists. Russia today claims to be heir to the now-defunct 
     Soviet Union, and is demanding that the U.S. abide by the 
     1972 treaty.
       Senators James Inhofe (R-OK) and Robert Smith (R-NH) have 
     informed Majority Leader Robert Dole that they will ``object 
     to any unanimous consent agreement that would call up START 
     II for final Senate action'' if either the treaty or the 
     Clinton administration prevent the U.S. from deploying a 
     ballistic missile defense system.
       Despite what critics in Moscow and Washington say, a BMD 
     will not cause a new upward spiraling arms race. The 
     deployment of a defense system will lessen reliance on 
     offensive missiles and will allow the U.S. to achieve lower 
     levels of strategic arms as delineated in START I and II. The 
     limited National Missile Defense will not be aimed against 
     Russia. It is a purely defensive system, and, as President 
     Reagan envisaged, America can cooperate with Russia and its 
     Western allies on developing and deploying such a system.
       Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Russia joined the CWC 
     and expects the U.S. to do the same. America should support 
     the creation of an arms control regime in the area of 
     chemical weapons. However, such a regime needs to be 
     enforceable and verifiable. Unfortunately, this is not the 
     case with the current CWC, and therefore, the Congress should 
     oppose it and refuse to ratify. The CWC is not verifiable 
     because of the nature of chemical weapons. The ease of secret 
     production, low tech equipment--all make verification 
     extremely difficult. Secondly, the convention is 
     unenforceable, as it places this authority in the hands of 
     the U.N. Security Council, which would be hampered from doing 
     an effective job as all of its permanent members have veto 
     power. It is easy to foresee this body becoming deadlocked 
     precisely when incidents of serious violation arise. Instead, 
     the U.S. should propose a different regime, similar to the 
     NPT, which will divide countries (including the permanent 
     members of the Security Council) into weapon states and non-
     weapon states. Such a regime would circumvent the issue to 
     veto power in the Security Council.
       Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE). This treaty places 
     limits on the numbers of conventional weapons, such as tanks 
     and cannon, permitted in the European theaters of operation. 
     It was signed with the now-defunct USSR in 1990, after more 
     than two decades of negotiations. In the fall of 1995, the 
     U.S. agreed to Russia's unilateral revision upwards of the 
     limits imposed by the CFE on the northern and southern flanks 
     of Russia. However, the threat to Russia used to justify 
     these revisions is far from obvious. Beefing up the numbers 
     of tanks and cannon on the borders of Russia's neighbors, be 
     it the Baltics or in the Caucasus, raises questions about 
     Moscow's intentions. This is especially relevant with all the 
     rhetoric currently circulating in Moscow about 
     reconstituting the Soviet Union and denunciations of the 
     accords which led to the dissolution of the USSR. 
     Moreover, Russia is far behind on meeting the weapons 
     system destruction targets stipulated by the CFE.


                other issues on the u.s.-russian agenda

       Peacekeeping in Bosnia. Many conservatives have misgivings 
     about sending American troops to enforce peace in Bosnia. But 
     if the U.S. has to do it, it is better to keep Russia in than 
     out. The Russian military will gain experience interacting 
     with NATO in Bosnia. This is a positive development. Peace in 
     the region is in the interests of both the U.S. and Russia. 
     However, this peacekeeping mission has to have clearly 
     defined goals and objectives. It must neither exacerbate 
     differences on the ground between NATO and Russian commanders 
     nor magnify them into a political confrontation. It is 
     important to guarantee that the command and control system in 
     Bosnia ensure a close interaction between NATO and Russia. 
     Such a structure should be able to withstand the stresses and 
     strains of a ``worst case scenario,'' and keep tactical 
     disagreements in check.
       The Partnership for Peace (PFP). This is a gateway for 
     NATO-Russian cooperation. Through the PFP, Russia and NATO 
     can learn to work together, and learn about each other. It 
     goes without saying that after the end of the Cold War the 
     security architecture in Europe is going to be redesigned, 
     and that a democratic and peaceful Russia should have a place 
     of honor at the European table. NATO will feel more 
     comfortable with a Russia that is not entangled in a bloody 
     war in Chechnya, with a more democratic military without the 
     hazing of recruits, and with a strong professional component.
       U.S.-Russian security cooperation and NATO Enlargement. The 
     issue of NATO enlargement to include Poland, Hungary, and the 
     Czech Republic has become a bone of contention in U.S.-
     Russian relations. NATO expansion does not threaten Russia 
     and is not a move toward encirclement. It is not a new cordon 
     sanitaire. Simply stated, Central and Eastern Europe is that 
     area of the European continent where bitter confrontations 
     between the Slavs and the Germans have taken place over the 
     last several hundred years. Two world wars have started 
     there. If NATO is not expanded, Russia and Germany will find 
     themselves locked in a new race aimed at dominating this key 
     area. In this century the West abandoned the Poles, the 
     Czechs and the Hungarians, first, to Hitler's aggression, and 
     next, to Stalin's tyranny. This should not and must not 
     happen again. These sovereign countries have the right to 
     apply for membership in NATO, and NATO members should decide 
     when and how new members will be accepted. Moscow cannot have 
     veto power over this decision. The Republican Party has 
     decided to include NATO expansion in its Contract with 
     America, which was enthusiastically endorsed by the American 
     people in the elections of 1994. There will be support in the 
     U.S. Congress for NATO enlargement. And in the future, when 
     the time is right, Russia, too, can explore the possibility 
     of full membership in NATO.
       The alleged promise that the Clinton administration gave to 
     Russia not to expand NATO in order to secure Russian military 
     cooperation in Bosnia is a mistake. If a hardliner comes to 
     power in Russia or the Bosnian operation concludes, the U.S. 
     should work to accept the three Central European states into 
     NATO and keep the doors open for others if and when they are 
     ready.
       Crime and Corruption. Russia and other New Independent 
     States (NIS) have become leading ``exporters of crime,'' 
     together with Columbia, Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, 
     and others. Law and order in Russia has collapsed; organized 
     crime is merging with ``legal'' government structures, and it 
     is difficult to say where the mafiosi end the government 
     begins.
       The main export items are weapons, drugs, and illegally 
     obtained raw materials, such as oil, gasoline, timber and 
     lumber, and precious metals. Today, organized crime 
     syndicates are taking over whole manufacturing companies with 
     tens of millions of dollars in sales. The total criminal 
     exports from the NIS is in the billions of dollars.
       Many Russian and Eurasian criminal organizations operate 
     internationally, including 

[[Page E230]]
     in the United States and Western Europe. Russian organized criminals 
     and corrupt officials have access to weapons and technology 
     of mass destruction, including uranium, chemical and 
     biological weapons and the raw materials and components for 
     their manufacture, as well as scientists with specific 
     weapons-related expertise.


                                 facts

       On August 17, 1991, hardline elements of the Communist 
     Party of the Soviet Union, the Russian army, and the KGB 
     attempted a coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. 
     The coup was repelled by the Russian people under the 
     leadership of Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian 
     Federation, who had been elected only two months earlier. The 
     coup leaders were put on trial and jailed--but were released 
     in 1993. Yeltsin emerged as the strongest political leader in 
     the USSR.
       The Soviet Union dissolved on December 25, 1991. Russia, 
     Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other Newly Independent States (NIS) 
     appeared on the map instead of the USSR.
       On September 21, 1993, Boris Yeltsin disbanded the Supreme 
     Soviet of the Russian Federation (the Soviet-era parliament). 
     The recalcitrant Supreme Soviet became the site of intense 
     opposition to Yeltsin and his market reforms. After a week-
     long standoff, Yeltsin ordered the Russian to shoot at the 
     parliament building (the ``White House''). At least 130 
     people were killed. The new parliament (the Duma) was elected 
     on December 12, 1993.
       Today, Boris Yeltsin's health is failing. He has had two 
     heart attacks in four months. His behavior is sometimes 
     erratic; and intelligence services report that he has a heavy 
     drinking problem.
       Presidential elections are scheduled for June, 1996, but it 
     is not certain whether they will take place. Hard-line 
     nationalist and communist forces are on the rise, and the 
     democratic reformers are retreating. The main contenders 
     include President Boris Yeltsin; ultra-nationalist leader 
     Vladimir Zhirinovsky; economist Grigory Yavlinsky (a moderate 
     reformer); retired General Alexander Lebed (an authoritarian 
     and charismatic nationalist); and Gennady Ziuganov (leader of 
     the communist party).
       During the Bush and Clinton administrations, Russia 
     received over $4 billion in direct US aid, over $20 billion 
     total in Western aid, and over $50 billion in loans from the 
     G-7 countries and multilateral financial organizations, such 
     as the IMF, the World Bank and EBRD. Together with the Soviet 
     debt, Russia owes just under $130 billion.
       In 1994, Russia started a war in the break-away republic of 
     Chechnya, that has to date killed over 30,000 people, made 
     over 300,000 others refugees, and cost over $6 billion.
       In the spring of 1995, Russia joined the Partnership for 
     Peace (PFP), a ``halfway house for some to join NATO.'' 
     However, today there is little likelihood that Russia will 
     join in any time soon. Russia's reaction to NATO expansion 
     East has been shrill and hostile. Most Russian politicians 
     are erroneously claiming that NATO has aggressive designs 
     against Russia and are using the NATO expansion issue to 
     build up nationalism and anti-Western sentiments at home.
       Russia agreed to cooperate with NATO in a peacekeeping 
     mission in Bosnia, allegedly in exchange for a Clinton 
     administration promise not to expand NATO, acquiescence to an 
     increase in the number of conventional weapons in place on 
     Russia's northern and southern flanks in violation of the CFE 
     treaty, and freedom of action in the former Soviet area. 
     Russia has over 2,000 peacekeepers in Bosnia.
       Russia's unilateral violation of the CFE treaty, signed in 
     1990, threatens other former Soviet states, such as Ukraine, 
     the Baltic countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The 
     build-up also jeopardizes the oil resources of the Caspian 
     Sea.
       Russia has signed agreements to supply at least two nuclear 
     power reactors to the militant Islamic regime in Iran, which 
     is implementing a nuclear weapons program.
       Trafficking in radioactive materials and chemical weapons 
     by corrupt Russian officials is well documented. Germany 
     alone has made over 100 arrests related to nuclear material 
     components exported from the NIS. General Anatoly Kuntsevich, 
     head of the Russian Presidency's Chemical Weapons Department, 
     illegally sold over 1600 pounds of chemical weapons 
     components to a Middle Eastern country. Kuntsevich was 
     subsequently fired and is currently under investigation.
       One of the top Russian mafiosi, nicknamed ``Yaponets,'' is 
     in U.S. custody on racketeering charges.
       Russian organized crime in the U.S. netted over $1,000,000 
     in medical insurance fraud and hundreds of millions in 
     gasoline tax fraud from 1992-1995. A large portion of these 
     illegal proceeds is invested in Western and off-shore banks 
     and real estate in California, Florida, and other locations.
       The Russian mob is successfully building ties to the 
     Chinese ``triad'' gangs, Japan's Yakuza, the Sicilian La Cosa 
     Nostra and Central Asian mafias. The strategic airlift 
     capabilities of the former Soviet army are often used for 
     illicit transactions, such as drug smuggling and stolen car 
     transportation.


                               the record

       President Clinton has made relations with Boris Yeltsin too 
     personal. As Yeltsin's popularity plummeted, Clinton fed the 
     flames of Russian resentment toward the U.S. with his 
     unequivocal support of the Russian president, especially 
     after the dramatic shooting at the Parliament building in 
     October of 1993 and the beginning of the Chechen war. As a 
     result, the U.S. is now perceived by many in the Russian 
     political elite as partisan and uncritically supportive of 
     Yeltsin's faltering policies, such as the Chechen war. The 
     Clinton policy has endangered the ability of the U.S. to 
     maintain relationship with segments of the Russian society 
     that oppose President Yeltsin.
       The Clinton administration has also been too slow to 
     recognize the importance of countries other than Russia. For 
     example, without Ukraine, the Russian empire cannot be 
     recreated and will have only limited access to the heart of 
     Europe. Azerbaijan controls vital oil and gas reserves, while 
     Georgia is situated in a strategically crucial location in 
     the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration has 
     often neglected these countries, promoting a ``Russia-first'' 
     policy.
       The Clinton administration failed to prevent the sale of 
     nuclear reactors to Iran, despite America's share in the 
     massive financial aid provided to Moscow by the International 
     Monetary Fund, The World Bank, and other multilateral 
     financial institutions. The reactors are a vital component in 
     the Iranian bid to acquire ``Islamic'' nuclear weapons.
       U.S. assistance to the reform efforts in Russia and other 
     former Soviet states has been poorly executed. Much of the 
     $4.1 billion dollars in U.S. assistance allocated to date has 
     been wasted. The Bush and Clinton administrations made an 
     error in choosing the U.S. Agency for 
     International Development as the main implementing agency 
     for assistance. AID has its expertise in the developing 
     world, not in post-communist transitional economies.
       The organized crime from the former Soviet Union is 
     becoming a global threat. In FY 1995, Congress funded and the 
     FBI established a law enforcement academy in Budapest, 
     Hungary where law enforcement officials from the region will 
     train. There is now a small FBI liaison office in Moscow. The 
     FBI is allocating more resources towards countering the 
     Russian mafia than previously.


                           what to do in 1997

       To promote democracy and the interests of the United States 
     in Russia, The U.S. should:
       Develop a Russian policy based on the support ideas and 
     interests, not on the fate of individual politicians. The 
     U.S. should support democracy and free markets, as well as 
     political forces advocating these ideas, not controversial 
     individual politicians such as Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin is the 
     elected president of Russia and was a key figure in bringing 
     about the collapse of the Soviet communism. However, today 
     some of his policies and his personal style are 
     controversial, and his popularity is plummeting. Moreover, 
     there are other reform-oriented politicians in Russia with 
     whom a dialogue should be maintained.
       Advocate broad-based cooperation with Russia and other NIS 
     members to ensure their integration into global markets and 
     the democratic community of nations. The U.S. should continue 
     selective and targeted technical assistance programs and 
     provide support to prodemocracy forces and nascent market 
     institutions in the NIS. The U.S. must design and implement 
     trade, investment and assistance programs for Russia and the 
     NIS that reduce inflation, lower market barriers and 
     stimulate growth. Congress should support these programs. 
     Thriving Russian and Eurasian markets would create jobs and 
     export opportunities for American businesses. U.S. assistance 
     programs should be taken away from AID and given to an 
     independent board of policy makers, area specialists and 
     business representatives. Such a board can be jointly 
     appointed by the president and Congress.
       Condemn Russia's interference in the affairs of its 
     neighbors. The survival, sovereignty and territorial 
     integrity of all NIS countries are important to future peace 
     and prosperity in Eurasia. The U.S. should support the 
     independence of Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Central 
     Asian states, many of which are being drawn into the Russian 
     orbit against their will. Washington should intensify its 
     ties with Ukraine, the Baltic states, and countries in the 
     Caucasus and Central Asia. The West should provide them with 
     support in developing foreign and domestic policy decision 
     making bodies and mechanisms, training their bureaucracies, 
     and increasing security cooperation. Technical assistance in 
     privatization of industry and agriculture should also be 
     provided.
       Make clear to Moscow that the use of brutal force against 
     states or areas of the former Soviet Union, based on the 
     model of Chechnya, is unacceptable and will trigger Western 
     retaliation against Russian economic and political interests. 
     While the U.S. should support the territorial integrity of 
     the Russian Federation, the West should oppose the brutal 
     methods of the Russian military in handling internal dissent, 
     such as in Chechnya. The Clinton administration should cease 
     issuing declarations of support for Russia's actions in 
     Chechnya and boost OSCE efforts to resolve the Chechen crisis 
     peacefully. A high profile OSCE mission to Chechnya and 
     Russia, followed by a mediation effort, is in order.
       Maintain Dialog with Moscow over NATO Expansion. The U.S. 
     should maintain a constant dialog with Russia on this topic, 
     pointing out possibilities for Russian-NATO cooperation and 
     stressing that NATO is not a 

[[Page E231]]
     threat to Russian security. While NATO enlargement will occur, Russian 
     participation in the Partnership for Peace and the dialogue 
     with Brussels should be expanded simultaneously. A secure 
     Western border is in the interests of Russia, Belorus and 
     other Eastern European countries.
       Oppose Russian moves, such as sale of nuclear reactors to 
     Iran, that threaten international security and the interests 
     of U.S. allies in Eurasia. The U.S. should take all the steps 
     at its disposal to prevent Iran, Iraq and other rogue states 
     from gaining nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities. For 
     example, voluntary export controls, similar to the COCOM 
     regime during the Cold War, on technology sales to these 
     countries should be put in place. Pressure should be applied 
     against the governments arming rogue states, up to and 
     including the imposition of selective economic sanctions. At 
     the same time, other options, such as an increase in Russian 
     uranium sales and civilian space launches, should be explored 
     with Moscow, that may bring about a voluntary cancellation of 
     the reactor deal. The U.S. should also cooperate with pro-
     Western circles in Turkey and Azerbaijan to promote democracy 
     and oppose radical Islam in Eurasia.
       Assist Russia and other NIS countries in fighting against 
     organized crime and corruption. This can include help with 
     writing comprehensive criminal and criminal procedure codes. 
     Some of the old Soviet legislation lacks important legal 
     concepts, such as conspiracy to commit a crime. In addition, 
     U.S. law enforcement agencies should cooperate, to the degree 
     possible, with trustworthy and reliable law enforcement 
     personnel in the East. In particular, they can assist in 
     developing a witness relocation program. They should strive 
     to track and penetrate Russian and NIS criminal rings dealing 
     in weapons of mass destruction and narcotics. American law 
     enforcement agencies should monitor East-West financial 
     transactions more closely. Deposits that originate in the NIS 
     should be carefully screened and the legitimacy of earnings 
     established.


                         questions and answers:

       Why should we provide aid to Russia?
       The window of opportunity for the West in Russia may be 
     closing. While there is still time, we should provide aid 
     that strengthens free markets and free minds. Communism 
     destroyed both of these for seventy years. Many Russians 
     still want to learn about democracy and capitalism, and we 
     should provide them with a fighting chance before it is too 
     late.
       What if hard-liners take Yeltsin's place?
       We should act now to strengthen relations with all 
     countries in the region, which will be under even more threat 
     than the West if hardliners come to power in Moscow. We 
     should expand NATO to include Poland, the Czech republic and 
     Hungary, and prevent any U.S. or international assistance to 
     an aggressive, anti-American or anti-Western government in 
     Moscow, should one emerge. We should still maintain a 
     dialogue with Moscow, explaining what we will see as 
     unacceptable policies and clarifying what price Russia may 
     pay if ``red lines'' are crossed. Eventually, if the need 
     arises, we may need to plan for military contingencies.
       Doesn't NATO expansion endanger Russia?
       No, it does not. NATO enlargement is aimed at creating a 
     zone of stability and security in Eastern and Central Europe, 
     and to hasten the integration of the Czech Republic, Poland 
     and Hungary into the West. NATO expansion is also aimed at 
     preventing competition between Germany and Russia in the area 
     which triggered the two world wars. NATO is a defensive 
     alliance, and its posture in Central Europe should remain 
     defensive.
       Why shouldn't we be more cooperative with Russia? After 
     all, the cold war is over; Russia is a democracy and a great 
     power, too. Why shouldn't we allow Moscow a greater role in 
     policing unstable regions, such as the Caucasus or Central 
     Asia?
       We can cooperate with those in Russia who are interested in 
     building a market economy and democratic polity. Democracy is 
     still struggling for survival in Russia. More time needs to 
     pass before we are sure that it is there to stay. As for 
     Russia's role in the region, it will always be considerable 
     due to Russia's sheer size and economic, political and 
     cultural weight. However, there are forces in Russia that 
     dream of re-establishing the Soviet Union or the Russian 
     Empire. These circles are anti-Western and anti-American. 
     They cannot be ignored. We should oppose Russia's heavy-
     handed interference into the affairs of its neighbors and 
     attempts to violate their sovereignty and territorial 
     integrity.
       In view of Chechnya, what should the U.S. do to prevent 
     Russia from invading its neighbors?
       We should boost our relations with Ukraine, the Baltic 
     States, and countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. There 
     are as many people there as there are in Russia. We should 
     draw ``lines in the sand'' and stick to them. For example, we 
     should tell Moscow that we will block all IMF and World Bank 
     assistance if an NIS country is invaded. We should clarify to 
     Russia that the U.S. will lead the international diplomatic 
     campaign to restore the independence of a violated country. 
     If Russia crosses these lines, we should consider imposing 
     restrictions on exchanges and economic and trade sanctions 
     against Russia. We should also demand from Moscow that the 
     war in Chechnya stop.
       What about organized crime in Russia?
       There is wide-spread crime and corruption in Russia. Crime 
     undermines reforms. People mistakenly think that the cause of 
     crime is free market capitalism, but this is, of course, not 
     true. Crime is rampant because there is no rule of law in 
     Russia. Moreover, real democracy barely exists there, and the 
     country still has a long way to go before a free market 
     system is fully established.
       Is Russian organized crime a threat to U.S. and Western 
     security?
       Yes, it is, because Russian criminals are very 
     sophisticated, well-educated, and well-connected world-wide. 
     They often boast advanced college degrees, KGB and special 
     forces training. There is great potential danger in the 
     merger of former communist, KGB and criminal elements in that 
     part of the world. In particular, access of organized 
     criminals to weapons of mass destruction and technology to 
     produce those makes this threat particularly acute.
       How can we stop the Russian ``mafia?''
       The Russian government will have to deal with its own 
     criminal organizations one day, but many in the current 
     Russian government, including law enforcement officials, are 
     themselves corrupt. Until such time as NIS governments are 
     able to effectively combat criminal organizations, the West 
     has to apprehend and prosecute criminals from Russia and the 
     NIS affecting its interests.
       Are all people from the former Soviet Union criminals?
       No, because many of them travel for legitimate business, 
     education and tourism purposes.

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