[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 24 (Tuesday, February 27, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1349-S1353]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. LAUTENBERG:
  S. 1575. A bill to improve rail transportation safety, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.


                      The Rail Safety Act of 1996

 Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, today I introduce legislation, 
the Rail Safety Act of 1996, to improve railroad safety.
  Mr. President, over the last 2 weeks, there has been a rash of 
railroad accidents, including two involving large numbers of 
passengers. The first of these accidents occurred in my home State of 
New Jersey on Friday, February 9. In the middle of the morning rush 
hour, two New Jersey Transit commuter trains collided outside of 
Secaucus, NJ. The crash killed two engineers and one passenger, and 
injured more than 235 others. The trains were carrying more than 700 
passengers combined, and the death and injury toll easily could have 
been much higher.
  One week later, right here in the Capital area, 11 people lost their 
lives when a Maryland commuter train collided with an Amtrak train.
  These accidents have revealed significant gaps in rail safety and the 
failure to use existing technology to improve safety. I personally 
visited the site of the New Jersey crash and was chilled by the 
devastation. There is no way that one could see what happened in New 
Jersey and Maryland without feeling a great sense of responsibility 
about the need to improve the safety of our rail system.
  Each day, over half a million Americans use commuter railroads to get 
to work. Each year, Amtrak carries an additional 22 million passengers 
on its national routes. In addition to those who take the train are the 
millions of Americans who live near congested freight train routes 
which pose their own dangers during accidents, such as spills of 
hazardous materials and fires.
  I recognize that passenger rail service is among the safest forms of 
travel. And I think it important that we not scare the public into 
believing otherwise. At the same time, in my view, there is much we 
should be doing to make rail service more safe.
  Just consider our Nation's commitment to rail safety compared to our 
commitment to safety on commercial aircraft, which have the better 
safety 

[[Page S1350]]
record. On planes, there are elaborate safety procedures for each 
flight. Flight attendants explain emergency measures at the beginning 
of each trip. Automatic emergency mechanisms are required in each 
plane, highly sophisticated technology tells pilots when problems arise 
and emergency exits are well identified and easy to operate.
  By contrast, many of today's railroad safety signals and procedures 
date back almost to the last century. For some reason, the 
technological revolution seems to have left rail safety back at the 
station. Compounding matters, much of our railroad regulatory system 
has been unchanged for decades.
  Congress should act promptly to address this problem. We need to 
review a wide variety of laws and regulations, with one overriding 
philosophy: The safety of our Nation's rail passengers must come first.
  Just because railroad passengers only ride 32 inches off the ground 
does not mean they deserve less attention or protection than those who 
ride 32,000 feet above the ground. That does not mean we should rush to 
impose unrealistic mandates that would drive up costs beyond the 
capacity to support changes. But, it still requires that we search for 
ways to take on the issues that have been allowed to drag on for too 
many years, while rail passengers continue to be exposed to danger 
unnecessarily.
  The Rail Safety Act of 1996 proposes important steps that I think we 
should take immediately.
  One of the most critical matters that we should address is the 
current law that establishes the hours of service that rail engineers 
may work. This law was developed in 1907 and has changed very little 
over the past 90 years. Under the law, it is perfectly legal for a 
locomotive engineer to work 24 hours in a 32-hour period.
  Mr. President, those kinds of hours, combined with the demands and 
stresses of an engineer's job, is a recipe for disaster. We would never 
allow pilots or truck drivers to work these kinds of hours; 
restrictions on these operators are severe. Yet engineers, who are 
responsible for hundreds and hundreds of people at a time, continue to 
work under these archaic rules.
  The Federal Railroad Administration is in the process of studying the 
issue of fatigue, as is the industry. But those studies could be years 
from completion. The adverse effect of fatigue on the ability of an 
individual to perform their job is well documented. We should act now. 
I believe the FRA should have the ability to regulate hours of service 
for railroad engineers. The FAA has authority to regulate hours of 
service for pilots and the Office of Motor Carriers has the authority 
to regulate hours of service for commercial drivers. Why should the 
railroad industry be treated differently?
  My legislation would direct the Federal Railroad Administration, not 
later than 180 days after enactment of the bill, to promulgate 
regulations concerning limitations on duty hours of train employees. 
The bill does not prejudge the FRA's process. It encourages FRA to 
develop regulations in a negotiated rulemaking process so that the 
interests of all parties are fully represented. My bill protects 
railroad employees by prohibiting any FRA rules from being less 
stringent than the current hours of service law. This provision will 
ensure that a future Administration could not abuse its discretion by 
actually increasing the burdens on engineers, contrary to congressional 
intent.
  Beyond changing the hours of service requirements, we need to explore 
ways to use technology to prevent rail accidents. For more than 75 
years, automatic train control systems have been available that can 
warn engineers about a missed signal and automatically stop the train. 
These systems are right in the train cab. Both visually and audibly 
these automatic train control systems remind the engineer about their 
latest signal. In fact, such systems were installed on virtually our 
entire rail network years ago. Unfortunately, that technology has been 
removed from most tracks, and no related technology was in place to 
prevent the accidents in New Jersey and Maryland. This situation cannot 
be allowed to continue.
  Mr. President, I recognize that we should be careful before mandating 
the automatic train control system if more advanced, satellite-based 
technology will be available in the immediate future. But, we cannot 
continue to drift. Therefore, my bill directs the FRA, not later than 1 
year after the date of enactment, to determine the feasibility of 
satellite-based train control systems to provide positive train control 
for railroad systems in the United States. Positive train control 
systems use a constant flow of information to anticipate potentially 
dangerous situations and order the appropriate measures long before an 
accident might occur.
  Under this legislation, all rail systems would be required to install 
automated train control technology. However, this requirement would be 
waived for those systems that establish, to the satisfaction of the 
Department of Transportation, that they will install an effective 
satellite-based train control system not later than the year 2001. This 
seems a reasonable period to me, though I would invite comments from 
interested parties on whether a different period would be more 
appropriate.
  Mr. President, we need to make a judgment about the prospects for the 
new satellite-based train control technology, one way or the other. 
Otherwise, we will find ourselves back here again in another few years, 
asking the same questions while families grieve and others lie in pain 
in hospital beds.
  Another set of issues raised by the two passenger accidents is 
emergency escape, crash worthiness of passenger cars, fuel tank 
integrity, and signal placement. All have contributed to the loss of 
life and injury.
  My bill would direct the FRA to examine the possibility of developing 
automatic escape systems. Not later than 1 year after the date of 
enactment of my bill, the Department of Transportation would be 
required to complete a study of the technical, structural, and economic 
feasibility of automatic train escape devices. If the report is 
positive, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate regulations in this 
area.
  Mr. President, there is reliable, off-the-shelf technology that is 
used to inflate air bags during violent automobile accidents. That same 
technology could be used to automatically open escape routes in violent 
train accidents. Such technology might have saved the lives of 
passengers in the Maryland accident, who apparently survived the crash, 
but who were unable to escape the fire and smoke.
  Another step I am proposing is to have FRA establish minimum safety 
standards for locomotive fuel tanks. Not later than 180 days after the 
date of enactment of my bill, the Department of Transportation would be 
required to establish minimum safety standards for fuel tanks of 
locomotives that take into consideration environmental protection and 
public safety. The Secretary would be given the authority to limit the 
applicability of the standards to new locomotives.
  The Maryland accident demonstrated the terrifying nature of fuel-fed 
fires. Many in the industry already are investing in less vulnerable 
fuel tank configurations. But we need to ensure in the future that no 
locomotives have the kind of exposed, vulnerable fuel tank that 
contributed to the Maryland disaster.
  It is also important to ensure that passenger rail cars are produced 
and configured in a safe manner. Not later than 1 year after the date 
of enactment of my bill, the Department of Transportation would be 
required to determine whether to promulgate regulations to require 
crash posts at the corners of rail passengers cars, safety locomotives 
on rail passenger trains, and minimum crashworthiness standards for 
passenger cab cars.
  The death toll in both the New Jersey and Maryland accidents might 
have been less if the passenger compartments were stronger or if some 
had not been exposed by the lack of a locomotive at the front of the 
train. Amtrak is investigating the possibility of using decommissioned 
locomotives at the front of their push trains in order to provide 
engineers with a safe platform from which to work and to provide 
additional protection to the first passenger car in case of a 
collision. The National Transportation Safety Board has suggested that 
passenger cars be equipped with crash posts at the corner of each car. 

[[Page S1351]]


  The FRA is developing new safety standards for rail cars. My bill 
would direct the FRA to consider crash posts and safety locomotives, 
and to make a specific finding about these alternatives.
  Also, after touring the scene of New Jersey Transit's sideswipe 
accident, I am convinced that unprotected passenger cab cars should be 
held to a higher standard than other passenger cars. The bill therefore 
requires FRA to evaluate the possibility of establishing minimum 
crashworthiness standards for these passenger cab cars, and to issue a 
report about their conclusions.
  In addition, the bill directs the FRA to look into signal placement. 
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of my bill, the 
Department of Transportation would be required to determine whether 
regulations should be promulgated to require that a signal be placed 
along a railway at each exit of a rail train station; and if 
practicable, a signal be placed so that it is visible only to the train 
that the signal is designed to influence. If the study determines such 
regulations should be promulgated, the Department of Transportation is 
given the authority to promulgate those regulations. Signals should be 
positioned in the best places possible to minimize human error.
  Mr. President, I recognize that some in the rail community may object 
to the costs of additional safety measures. And these costs cannot be 
ignored. Last year, Federal operating and capital assistance to transit 
agencies was cut by some 20 percent from the previous year's funding 
level. This reduction represented the single largest cut of any 
transportation mode in the Transportation appropriations bill.
  Our Nation derives economic, social, and environmental benefits from 
public transit agencies. We expect these agencies to provide safe 
services. Yet, we cut their funding and then wonder why safety is 
affected. We must continue to support mass transit or else we will 
force commuters off relatively safe buses, subways, and trains and onto 
our Nation's roads, which annually cause the premature death of some 
40,000 Americans.
  Mr. President, it remains critically important to improve rail 
safety. I challenge skeptics to visit with the families of loved ones 
who died in New Jersey and Maryland. See first hand what it means when 
we compromise on safety. You will not come away unmoved.
  Mr. President, we in the Congress have an obligation to protect the 
public. After the Chase, MD, accident of 1987 Congress mobilized and 
quickly enacted sweeping rail safety legislation. As a result, untold 
Americans have been saved through the mandated use of automatic train 
controls on the Northeast corridor, the creation of minimum federal 
standards for licensing of railroad engineers, certification 
requirements for predeparture inspections and whistle blower 
protections for rail employees. I am proud of the part that I played in 
developing that legislation and believe that it has been very 
effective. However, more should be done. The lives and health of 
literally millions of Americans are at stake.
  Mr. President, both the Washington and the New York editorials of 
February 21, 1996, make the case for increasing rail safety. I ask 
unanimous consent that they be inserted in the Record as part of my 
statement.
  I hope my colleagues will support this legislation. I believe it is a 
responsible approach to rail safety that builds on the lessons we have 
learned from our Nation's recent rail safety accidents.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill and 
additional material be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1575

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Rail Safety Act of 1996''.

     SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

       For purposes of this Act, the following definitions shall 
     apply:
       (1) Administrator.--The term ``Administrator'' means the 
     Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration.
       (2) Passenger cab car.--The term ``passenger cab car'' 
     means the leading cab car on a passenger train that does not 
     have a locomotive or safety locomotive at the front of the 
     train.
       (3) Safety locomotive.--The term ``safety locomotive'' 
     means a cab-car locomotive (whether operational or not) that 
     is used at the front of a rail passenger train to promote 
     passenger safety.
       (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
     of Transportation.
       (5) Train employee.--The term ``train employee'' has the 
     same meaning as in section 21101(5) of title 49, United 
     States Code.

     SEC. 3. HOURS OF SERVICE.

       (a) In General.--
       (1) Regulations.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Administrator, shall promulgate regulations concerning 
     limitations on duty hours of train employees that contain--
       (A) requirements concerning hours of work for train 
     employees and interim periods available for rest that are no 
     less stringent than the applicable requirements under section 
     21103 of title 49, United States Code, as in effect on the 
     day before the effective date of subsection (b); and
       (B) any other related requirements that the Secretary 
     determines to be necessary to protect public safety.
       (2) Negotiated rulemaking.--
       (A) In general.--In promulgating regulations under this 
     subsection, the Secretary shall use negotiated rulemaking, 
     unless the Secretary determines that the use of that process 
     is not appropriate.
       (B) Procedures for negotiated rulemaking.--If the Secretary 
     determines under subparagraph (A) that negotiated rulemaking 
     is appropriate, the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Administrator, shall carry out the negotiated rulemaking in 
     accordance with the procedures under subchapter III of 
     chapter 5 of title 5, United States Code.
       (b) Repeal.--
       (1) In general.--Section 21103 of title 49, United States 
     Code, is repealed.
       (2) Effective date.--This subsection shall take effect on 
     the date on which the Secretary promulgates final regulations 
     under subsection (a).

     SEC. 4. SATELLITE-BASED TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, acting through the 
     Administrator, shall conduct a study to determine the 
     feasibility of requiring satellite-based train control 
     systems to provide positive train control for railroad 
     systems in the United States by January 1, 2001.
       (b) Time Frame for Operation; Automated Train Control 
     Systems.--
       (1) Regulations to cover impracticability of satellite-
     based train control systems.--Subject to paragraph (3), if, 
     upon completion of the study conducted under subsection (a), 
     the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, determines 
     that the installation of an effective satellite-based train 
     control system referred to in subsection (a) could not be 
     accomplished practicably by January 1, 2001, the Secretary 
     shall promulgate regulations to require, as soon as 
     practicable after the date of promulgation of the 
     regulations, the use of automated train control technology 
     that is available on that date.
       (2) Regulations to cover practicability of satellite-based 
     train control systems.--
       (A) In general.--Subject to paragraph (3), if upon 
     completion of the study conducted under subsection (a), the 
     Secretary, acting through the Administrator, determines that 
     the installation of an effective satellite-based train 
     control system referred to in subsection (a) could be 
     accomplished practicably by January 1, 2001, the Secretary, 
     in consultation with the Administrator, shall promulgate 
     regulations to require, as soon as practicable after the date 
     of promulgation of the regulations, the use of automated 
     train control technology that is available on that date.
       (B) Waivers.--If the appropriate official of a railroad 
     system establishes, to the satisfaction of the Secretary, and 
     in a manner specified by the Secretary, that the railroad 
     system will have in operation a satellite-based train control 
     system by January 1, 2001, the Secretary shall issue a waiver 
     for that railroad system to waive the application of the 
     regulations promulgated under subparagraph (A) for that 
     railroad system, subject to terms and conditions established 
     by the Secretary.
       (3) Conditions.--In promulgating regulations under this 
     subsection, the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Administrator, shall provide for any exceptions or conditions 
     that the Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator, 
     determines to be necessary.
       (4) Monitoring.--
       (A) In general.--If the Secretary issues a waiver for a 
     railroad system under paragraph (2)(B), the railroad system 
     shall, during the period that the waiver is in effect, 
     provide such information to the Secretary as the Secretary, 
     acting through the Administrator, determines to be necessary 
     to monitor the compliance of the railroad system with the 
     conditions of the waiver, including information concerning 
     the progress of the railroad system in achieving an 
     operational satellite-based train control system.
     
[[Page S1352]]

       (B) Revocation of waivers.--If, at any time during the 
     period that a waiver issued under paragraph (2)(B) is in 
     effect, the Secretary determines that the railroad system 
     issued the waiver is not meeting the terms or conditions of 
     the waiver, or is not likely to have in operation a 
     satellite-based train control system by January 1, 2001, the 
     Secretary shall revoke the waiver.

     SEC. 5. AUTOMATIC TRAIN ESCAPE DEVICE STUDY.

       (a) Study.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, acting through the 
     Administrator, shall conduct a study of the technical, 
     structural, and economic feasibility of automatic train 
     escape devices.
       (b) Report.--Upon completion of the study conducted under 
     this section, the Secretary, acting through the 
     Administrator, shall--
       (1) prepare a report that contains the findings of the 
     study; and
       (2) submit a copy of the report to the appropriate 
     committees of the Congress.
       (c) Regulations.--If, by the date specified in subsection 
     (a), the Secretary makes a determination (on the basis of the 
     findings of the study) that automatic train escape devices 
     should be required on rail passenger trains, the Secretary, 
     in consultation with the Administrator, shall, not later than 
     180 days after such date, promulgate regulations to require 
     automatic train escape devices on rail passenger trains as 
     soon as practicable after the date of promulgation of the 
     regulations.

     SEC. 6. LOCOMOTIVE FUEL TANKS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Administrator, shall establish, by regulation, minimum 
     safety standards for fuel tanks of locomotives of rail 
     passenger trains that take into consideration environmental 
     protection and public safety.
       (b) Applicability.--The Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Administrator, may limit the applicability of the regulations 
     promulgated under subsection (a) to new locomotives (as 
     defined by the Secretary, in consultation with the 
     Administrator) if the Secretary determines that the 
     limitation is appropriate.

     SEC. 7. PASSENGER CAR CRASH-WORTHINESS.

       (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Administrator, shall determine whether to promulgate 
     regulations, for the purpose of protecting public safety, 
     to--
       (1) require crash posts at the corners of rail passenger 
     cars;
       (2) require safety locomotives on rail passenger trains;
       (3) establish minimum crash-worthiness standards for 
     passenger cab cars; or
       (4) carry out any combination of paragraphs (1) through 
     (3).
       (b) Regulations.--If, the Secretary, acting through the 
     Administrator, determines that promulgating any of the 
     regulations referred to in subsection (a) are necessary to 
     protect public safety, the Secretary, in consultation with 
     the Administrator, shall, not later than 180 days after such 
     date, promulgate such regulations in final form, to take 
     effect as soon as practicable after the date of promulgation 
     of the regulations.
       (c) Report.--If the Secretary determines under subsection 
     (a) that taking any action referred to in paragraphs (1) 
     through (3) of such subsection is not necessary to protect 
     public safety, not later than the date of the determination, 
     the Secretary shall submit a report to the appropriate 
     committees of the Congress that provides the reasons for the 
     determination.

     SEC. 8. SIGNAL PLACEMENT.

       (a) Study.--Not later than 1 year after the date of 
     enactment of this Act, the Secretary, acting through the 
     Administrator, shall conduct a study of the placement of rail 
     signals along railways. In conducting the study, the 
     Secretary, acting through the Administrator, shall determine 
     whether regulations should be promulgated to require--
       (1) that a signal be placed along a railway at each exit of 
     a rail station; and
       (2) if practicable, that a signal be placed so that it is 
     visible only to the train employee of a train that the signal 
     is designed to influence.
       (b) Regulations.--If, upon completion of the study 
     conducted under subsection (a), the Secretary determines that 
     the regulations referred to in that subsection are necessary 
     for the protection of public safety, the Secretary shall, not 
     later than 180 days after the completion of the study, 
     promulgate those regulations.
       (c) Report.--If, upon completion of the study conducted 
     under subsection (a), the Secretary determines that 
     promulgating any of the regulations referred to in subsection 
     (a) is not necessary for the protection of public safety, not 
     later than the date of completion of the study, the Secretary 
     shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of the 
     Congress that provides the reasons for that determination.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Feb. 21, 1996]

                    Lessons From the Train Disaster

       The horrifying details of death by fire and smoke--of 
     people frantically seeking escape from a mangled commuter-
     train-turned-furnace Friday night--continue to prompt 
     questions about rail safety policies in general and about 
     what happened in Silver Spring specifically. Some answers 
     must await the findings of investigators from the National 
     Transportation Safety Board. But there are safety procedures, 
     policies and equipment that have been the subjects of debate 
     in the industry for years, and that haunt every autopsy of a 
     train wreck:
       Signals. What, if any, signals did engineer Richard Orr, 
     aboard Maryland commuter train 286, notice or remember in the 
     final miles before this train slammed into Amtrak's Capitol 
     Limited? Before arriving in Kensington, he passed a signal 
     that should have warned him to be prepared to stop. The 
     signal system is considered highly reliable. But there is a 
     more effective system that goes back to the 1920s: With it, 
     even if the engineer fails to spot or continue to remember 
     the warning signal, he sees a small light in his cab, and 
     each time his train goes through a restrictive signal he 
     hears a whistle. Should he fail to push a lever to 
     acknowledge the signal and then slow down or stop, the train 
     would do so automatically. Why isn't every train equipped 
     with this?
       They used to be--on any line that was to travel faster than 
     80 mph--under a 1947 Interstate Commerce Commission order. 
     But over time, railroads were permitted on a case-by-case 
     basis to remove the system, in part because the age of fast 
     passenger trains was seen as ending. Besides, railroads 
     argued that the systems were expensive and that the braking 
     systems caused other safety problems for freight trains. 
     Today's signal system for MARC, like those for most lines, 
     does not provide automatic train control.
       Although railroads today have a better safety record than 
     at any time in history, this history includes earlier 
     crashes--in Seabrook, Prince George's County, in 1978 and in 
     Chase, Md., in 1987--that prompted the NTSB to recommend that 
     all trains in the Northeast Corridor be equipped with 
     automatic stopping devices. They now are.
       Passenger Escape. Yesterday, federal regulators issued 
     emergency regulations that, in addition to setting 30 mph 
     limits on non-automatic control lines for trains between a 
     station stop and the first signal, included a call for more 
     visible exit signs on train cars. Visible, uncomplicated 
     instructions for opening windows, doors and escape routes 
     ought to be posted everywhere. How about instructions on the 
     back of every seat?
       Train Design. Though America's trains are among the 
     sturdiest pieces of equipment moving on land or in the skies, 
     there is the question of the Amtrak train's exposed diesel 
     fuel tanks, which splashed the fuel that ignited the terrible 
     fire. Newer models don't have this feature; the sooner the 
     old models are gone the better.
       ``Push-Pull.'' The MARC train was being pushed by its 
     locomotive, a common practice for quick back-and-forth runs. 
     Passengers may feel safer with a locomotive in front of them, 
     but there is no hard evidence that safety is compromised when 
     it is pushing instead of pulling.
       Another issue affects public confidence in railroad travel: 
     Maryland transit officials issued conflicting, inaccurate and 
     constantly changing reports on the accident for hours Friday. 
     At first they were telling television stations that no MARC 
     passengers were involved; they gave out a telephone number 
     that assured callers that no passengers on the train had been 
     injured. This was occurring as televised scenes and witness 
     accounts were indicating otherwise. Whatever MARC may have 
     had as an emergency preparedness plan, it failed. Amtrak, on 
     the other hand, seemed to be issuing as much information as 
     it could.
       More questions are sure to arise as the fact-finding 
     continues. A safe transportation system of any kind requires 
     more than the mere recitation of probability statistics. 
     Public confidence must be taken into account not only by 
     government regulators but also by the industry officials.
                                                                    ____


                [From the New York Times, Feb. 21, 1996]

                     In the Train Wrecks' Aftermath

       Two train collisions seven days apart have brought calamity 
     to the ordinarily quiet and safe commuter systems of New York 
     and Washington D.C. Federal and local officials are 
     responding with intense investigations and emergency 
     measures. They have already found some surprising soft spots 
     in the rail network's safety rules and practices.
       New Jersey Transit, responding to the metropolitan region's 
     worst commuter train crash in 38 years, quickly eliminated 
     the nighttime split shift that enabled an engineer to work 
     extra-long hours just before his train collided with another 
     on Feb. 9. There was no need to await final analyses of what 
     caused the accident to discontinue a work arrangement that 
     was inherently hazardous.
       The authorities are still investigating the accident, but 
     it appears that a train bound for Hoboken ran through yellow 
     and red lights that should have warned the engineer to stop 
     before entering tracks where an outbound train had the right 
     of way. The inbound train's engineer, John DeCurtis, was 
     operating during the morning rush hour at the end of a split 
     shift that had started 14\1/2\ hours earlier. He had a chance 
     to rest five hours during the middle of the night, but with 
     no cot or quiet space provided. Officials also need to weigh 
     whether Mr. DeCurtis's safety record, which included two 
     previous suspensions for running red lights, was a warning 
     that should have been heeded, and whether the installation of 
     automatic braking systems should be accelerated to prevent 
     such tragic accidents.
       Similarly in last Friday evening's collision between a 
     Washington-bound commuter 

[[Page S1353]]
     train and an Amtrak train headed north from Washington, the absence of 
     automatic train controls has already emerged as a safety gap 
     in the local system. Even more critically, the cars may have 
     lacked fully operational and clearly marked evacuation routes 
     with the kind of safety instructions that might have 
     prevented the death of eight young Job Corps trainees, who 
     were killed along with three crew members.
       The signal system on the Maryland track was inadequate. 
     There was a caution light just before a suburban station 
     where the train was stopping anyway, but no similar light 
     immediately after to remind the engineer not to accelerate to 
     a high speed. The train rounded a bend and slammed into the 
     Amtrak train that had been temporarily routed on the same 
     tracks.
       The Transportation Department responded yesterday with 
     belated but sensible stopgap rules. When a train leaves a 
     station, engineers must proceed no faster than 30 miles an 
     hour. They must call out to other crew members any warning 
     signal they see. All the nation's railroads are instructed to 
     test emergency exits and submit safety plans for Federal 
     review. Clearly, many safety hazards need examination and 
     correction as the result of these two tragedies.
                                 ______