[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 24 (Tuesday, February 27, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H1298-H1305]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
MISSILE DEFENSE
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of May
12, 1995, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Weldon] is recognized
for 60 minutes.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I rise this evening to
speak, perhaps not for an hour but certainly for some time, on the
issue of missile defense and partially in response to the
administration's announcement of a little over a week ago in regard to
their missile defense program for this fiscal year and the request to
Congress which we anticipate receiving in the next several weeks.
tribute to mc lean stevenson
Mr. Speaker, before I get into that, let me make a few comments about
the unfortunate passing during the February work period of McLean
Stevenson. Most of our colleagues in this Congress and most of the
people around the country know McLean Stevenson as a Hollywood star who
made his fame primarily through the program ``M.A.S.H.''
However, I want to speak briefly about McLean Stevenson and his
commitment to fire and life safety issues. McLean Stevenson, at a young
age, was rescued from a house fire by a group of firefighters in his
hometown, and because of that incident had a lifelong interest in
promoting the welfare of firefighters in general and promoting the
[[Page H1299]]
issue of fire and life safety. It was not until he retired from the
M.A.S.H. series that he devoted his full time to working on these
issues.
In that context, many of us who are involved in the fire and
emergency services caucus here on the Hill came to know McLean
Stevenson. For the past 3 years he has been a regular attendee at our
national fire and emergency services dinner. We have held seven of them
here in the Nation's capital, and in the last three of those dinners
McLean Stevenson was not just an attendee but one of our speakers, and
for the most part one of our most popular and funny speakers. He
intertwined with his humor the basic lessons of life safety and
concern, the importance of installing smoke detectors in individual
residences and multifamily dwellings and talked about his effort
nationwide to promote these issues to people both young and old.
McLean Stevenson was to have been, again, a guest at our dinner at
the end of April this year, as he was last year when we had President
Clinton as our keynote speaker, and honored the Oklahoma City Fire
Department for their heroic efforts in response to the Oklahoma City
disaster.
{time} 1815
Unfortunately, McLean Stevenson died on the operating table. He was a
friend, he was someone who was beloved by the entire fire service of
this country, and whose true mark in terms of his life will be
remembered in terms of the lives that he helped save by his efforts in
promoting fire and life safety issues.
So it is with a deep sense of sadness that I rise to wish his family
well and to say that certainly McLean Stevenson has left his mark on
all of us. At our dinner in April we will pay appropriate tribute to
our friend McLean Stevenson.
Mr. Speaker, I rise tonight, in addition, to respond to the
administration's press conference of a little over a week ago, which in
itself was a travesty. Many of us had been in contact with the
administration in terms of the fiscal year 1997 budget request for
missile defense and where the priorities would be in terms of programs.
I in fact wrote to both Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary
Kaminski, as well as to General O'Neill expressing my interest in
meeting with them before any final decisions were made from a program
standpoint relative to missile defense funding for this next fiscal
year. In fact, that issue was repeated both verbally and in written
form.
What really bothered me, Mr. Speaker, was that the administration saw
fit, Secretary Perry and Dr. Kaminski, to hold a press conference at 3
o'clock on a Friday afternoon right before a 3-day holiday break,
giving no advance word to Members of Congress except for an attempted
phone call to myself the day before and other senior members of the
defense committee and a call that I received on the day of the
conference by General O'Neill. So there was no attempt in a bipartisan
way to reach out to this Congress to work together on the issue of
missile defense.
That is especially troubling, Mr. Speaker, because the single biggest
change to the Clinton defense budget made by this body and the other
body last year was in the area of missile defense. We plussed up the
missile defense accounts by approximately $800 million because of the
threat, both the near-term threat and long-term threat. We plussed up
the national missile defense accounts, the theater missile defense
accounts, as well as ballistic missile defense and Brilliant Eyes,
space-based sensing program.
Those changes were made with strong bipartisan support in this House.
In fact, when the bill left committee, it had the strongest vote in the
10 years I have been here, 478 to 3. When the bill was brought up on
the House floor, for the first time in my 10 years we had 300 Members
of the body vote in favor of the defense authorization bill, and that
is with the significant changes from the Clinton administration
relative to missile defense. So we thought it would be important to
establish this new year in a bipartisan tone, working with the
administration to try to find common areas.
Unfortunately, that did not occur. The press announcement that was
held basically announced this administration's continuing policy to
decimate defense spending as it relates to missile proliferation and
the threat of missile attack, either accidently or deliberately. The
mismatch relates between rhetoric and reality, and it is large and
growing.
In fact, and I hate to make the statement on the House floor, but
after looking at this issue as I have as a member of the National
Security Committee and the chair of the Military Research and
Development Subcommittee, I am firmly convinced this administration has
no commitment to defend America whatsoever and under President Clinton
never has. Even the sacred programs now that the Clinton administration
said it supported, namely the theater missile defense programs, have
been plundered to pay for other modernization needs.
The outrage here, Mr. Speaker, is that we have boxed our Joint Chiefs
into a corner. As we have decimated defense spending, we have driven
the leaders of each of our services to look to cut other areas beyond
those programs that are important, parochially important to their own
services. That has in fact caused the Joint Chiefs to come in and make
recommendations, to have draconian cuts in the vital programs important
to our national security from the standpoint of missile proliferation.
In addition, the press conference and the announcements of the
program by Secretary Perry in fact are in major violation with the law
that this Congress passed, most specifically section 234, which
provides for specific dates relative to theater missile defense
systems. In fact, we right now on the committee are considering whether
or not to take legal action in suing the administration over these
disconnects with the law.
Mr. Speaker, the concern that I have is that this administration has
just not been serious in dealing with the American people and this body
on the growing threat that is posted to this Nation and other free
nations from the threat of missile proliferation. That is in spite of
requests by the leaders of this administration.
Mr. Speaker, also during the February break there was an article in
the Washington Times, which I will include as a part of my statement.
The article that was in the Times, Mr. Speaker, cites a letter that was
sent, a communications by General Luck. General Luck, Gary Luck, is our
commanding officer in Korea. He sent a letter to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, pleading for an enhanced
funding profile for the THAAD missile defense system.
Why did he make this plea? Because there are serious concerns on his
part as our commanding officer in South Korea relative to the threat
posed by North Korea as they develop their state of the art missile
systems, the No Dong and the Taepo Dong-II systems. These systems are
sophisticated and pose a real and genuine threat, not just to South
Korea and our troops in South Korea, but in fact as Secretary Deutch,
the head of the CIA, mentioned in Senate testimony last week, even to
the State of Alaska by the year 2000 and beyond.
General Luck made the case to General Shalikashvili that we needed to
be able to deploy at least two batteries of THAAD systems at the
soonest possible time. General Shalikashvili wrote back to General
Luck, and this article which I have asked to put in the Record has the
exact quotations from General Shalikashvili, that he is not able to
fully fund the THAAD Program at what they thought was going to be the
deployment program established last year by the Congress, and also a
priority of this administration, because of the budgetary pressures and
the need to fund other priorities in the military.
So here we have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr.
Speaker, acknowledging in a letter to General Luck in South Korea that
we cannot give hem the resources he needs, not because they are not
warranted, and General Shalikashvili even mentions he fully supports
the THAAD development, but because we have boxed the leadership of the
military into a corner where they cannot fund the most basic
priorities, and therefore have to cut wherever possible.
[[Page H1300]]
Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous. In fact, this communications and
this request by General Luck and the negative response by General
Shalikashvili reminds me of a situation that occurred several years
ago. That situation was when our commanding general in Somalia sent a
communique back to the Pentagon, which ultimately went to then
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. That communique, Mr. Speaker, said that
the commanding officer in Somalia said that he needed additional backup
support to protect the welfare of our troops.
That request for additional support was denied. It was only after 18
of our young troops were killed in a massacre in Mogadishu that
Secretary Aspin came up on the Hill along with Secretary of State
Warren Christopher and addressed a bipartisan group of over 300 Members
of the House and Senate assembled in one of the Capital meeting rooms,
and under questioning Secretary Aspin said that he denied the
additional support for the troops requested by the command officer in
Somalia because of the political climate in Washington. This is the
first time, Mr. Speaker, since Vietnam, that we have had an
administration say that it has denied the support to protect American
troops for a political reason.
That is exactly what we are seeking here in Korea. Out commanding
officer in South Korea is concerned about the safety of our troops. He
has communicated that to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, and
the response by the administration is we agree with you, we would like
to help you, but there is just not enough money, so we will have to
risk the lives of those troops in terms of protection from a missile
attack by the North Koreans. Mr. Speaker, that is outrageous.
Mr. Speaker, during the debate of the defense authorization bill last
year, we went to great lengths to work with the administration on
missile defense. Mr. Speaker, as the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Research and Development, I made sure that at every possible
opportunity we were not forcing something down the administration's
throat that they could not live with.
Some in my party, Mr. Speaker, as you know, wanted to have language
in the defense bill that would have immediately caused a problem with
the ABM treaty. They wanted multiple site language for deployment of a
national missile defense system in the bill. I argued against that, Mr.
Speaker.
The ultimate compromise bill that we presented to the President did
not contain any language that would have violated the ABM treaty. In
fact, everything we did in our bill, Mr. Speaker, General Malcolm
O'Neill, the administration's point person on missile defense,
acknowledged publicly would be in compliance with the ABM treaty. But
what did President Clinton do when he vetoed the bill? He said that he
had concerns about the possible impact of our bill on the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Speaker, that statement was absolutely outrageous. What we did in
the bill is said that we should look to those threats that are there
now. The most immediate threats, Mr. Speaker, are those posed by
countries that either have the capability now, like North Korea and
China with the SCSS-2 and SCSS-4, that have the potential in a few
short years to have their missiles reach the shores of Alaska or
Hawaii; or to have the threat posed by the Russians aggressively
selling off the SS-25 architecture, which is currently their mainstay
in their missile system.
An SS-25 has a range of 10,000 kilometers and it is mobilly launched.
The Russians are now actively marketing that system to any nation that
will buy it as a space launch vehicle. Once a rogue nation gets an SS-
25, Mr. Speaker, without the nuclear tip on it, bit perhaps with a
chemical, biological or conventional weapon, that poses an immediate
threat to the mainland United States for which we have no system today
that can shoot down one of those missiles. The American people, when
you tell them that, they are amazed. They cannot believe that with our
focus on defending this country, we today have no capability to shoot
down an incoming ICBM. But the fact is, Mr. Speaker, we do not.
{time} 1830
A further outrage is the Russians do. Under the ABM Treaty, each of
the two signatory countries is allowed to have an operational ABM
system that can be operated from a single site. The Russians have had
an operational ABM system around Moscow that protects 80 percent of
their population for the last 15 years. In fact, Mr. Speaker, the
Russians have upgraded that system several times.
When I was in Moscow last month, I asked to visit one of the ABM
sites. They told me if I came back a week later, I could visit it, but
they would not let me visit it the week I was there. But we all know
and they know and acknowledge publicly they have an operational ABM
system. We do not, Mr. Speaker. We do not have an operational ABM
system. We have no capability if, in fact, a rogue nation deliberately
or accidentally launches one missile aimed at America.
Now, it doesn't matter whether it is aimed at New York and hits
Miami, the fact is that we have no protection against a rogue launch
against this Nation. Now, the administration said they didn't want to
support the bill because it would violate the ABM Treaty. So we were
very careful and we came up with provisions in the bill that said, OK,
two branches of our services today have acknowledged publicly that they
can build a system compliant with the ABM that, in fact, would protect
all 50 States. Nothing in the way of violating the ABM Treaty. And that
is exactly what we called for in the bill.
It wasn't until after President Clinton vetoed the Defense
authorization bill the first time that Mal O'Neill, the head of BMDO
for the Clinton administration, came out publicly and verified what I
had been saying all along. And that is, yes, the Army has a variant of
an existing single-site system. And the Air Force has a variant of the
current Minuteman system at Grand Forks, ND, that with a modest upgrade
over 4 years can provide a limited protection for all 50 States.
Totally treaty compliant.
Cost? The administration and President Clinton has railed on about
numbers in the $20 and $30 billion range. Mr. Speaker, I have had
briefings. The Army says it can deploy a modified system in 4 years for
a cost of less than $5 billion. The Air Force says they can modify the
Minuteman, again a single-site system, again deployable in 4 years for
a cost of less than $3 billion.
Mr. Speaker, there you have it. Working with the administration's own
leadership and the military, we put together a scenario where we can
protect the American people and we can do it at a cost of less than $4
to $5 billion and deploy it within 4 years. Each of those systems would
provide a thin layer of protection against incoming missiles up to 10
with a 90-percent effective rate. Today we have no such system. And
under the administration's revised program, we won't have a system.
They are talking about a 3-year option and then making a decision and
maybe 3 years down the road. Mr. Speaker, we can't wait 6 years. We
can't wait 6 years, Mr. Speaker.
When the administration finally realized that we had, in fact, dealt
with the ABM compliance issue and that we had, in fact, offered in our
bill language to take existing technology, which the Air Force and the
Army says they can do for the cost that I have mentioned, they realized
they no longer had an ABM issue, even though President Clinton got up
and said that. Everyone who knows the issues technically knew that he
didn't know what he was talking about, and the ABM Treaty was not, in
fact, jeopardized by our actions in the bill. Even his own people said
so. So they raised a new issue, Mr. Speaker.
They then said through people like Bob Bell for the National Security
Council at the White House, they said, well, there is no threat, we
don't see a threat emerging. In fact, for the first time since I have
been here, they politicized an intelligence study that was released
early to minority Members in the other body that said that the Defense
authorization bill had overstated the threat. Now, that was in early
December, Mr. Speaker. On December 15--actually before December 15, I
requested the briefing, the closed briefing, security briefing of the
NIA, the updated assessment from our intelligence community.
I was so embarrassed by the briefing and so outraged by the lack of
depth in the briefing, and I had staffers from both the National
Security Committee
[[Page H1301]]
and the intelligence committee with me, that I got up and said to the
briefer, Dave Lazius from the CIA, that it was not worth my time to sit
through.
They did not answer the most fundamental questions upon which the
results of the briefing were based. In fact, Secretary Deutch later
agreed with me the briefing was not what it should have been and has
asked me to sit through a rebrief which I have agreed to do.
Mr. Speaker, the brief, parts of which have been leaked to the media,
not by the Congress but by the administration itself, made the case
that there is really no threat, we don't have to worry.
Less than a week after the administration deliberately in a political
manner leaked out parts of that what is supposed to be a secret brief
on intelligence relative to the threat from rogue nations. Less than a
week later, the Washington Post, on December 15, ran a story.
Now, Mr. Speaker, this story is important. It is important because it
gets to the heart of what we are talking about here. The Washington
Post story documented that the Jordanian intelligence agency, working
with the Israeli intelligence agency, had intercepted a shipment of
sophisticated advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes. Now what is so
important about a shipment of advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes?
And I can't divulge the exact number. It is a classified number. But we
know how many were confiscated in this country.
Mr. Speaker, those advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes were going
from Russia to Iraq. In fact, that is where they were intercepted. Mr.
Speaker, the items in question can only be used for a long-range ICBM.
Now Mr. Speaker, we have been told that there is no threat from a long-
range intercontinental ballistic missile coming from Iraq. Then why
would there be advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes going to Iraq
from Russia? And should we not question the Russians about why this
technology transfer was taking place? Because if, in fact, they were
taking place, that is a violation of the missile control technology
regime.
So Mr. Speaker, when I was in Russia for a week back in January, on
my seventh trip there, meeting in the Kremlin with Yeltsin's key
defense advisers, Mr. Kortunov and others and meeting with Ambassador
Pickering and our staff at the Embassy in Moscow, I asked the question,
what is the Russian response to the technology transfer of equipment
that can be used for a long-range ICBM from Moscow to Baghdad?
Ambassador Pickering said we haven't asked them yet. And the Russians
said, we don't know what you are talking about, even though it was a
story in the Washington Post, even though we had the devices now in our
hands since they had been confiscated by the intelligence community in
both Jordan and Israel, that no one knows about this.
I can't believe it, Mr. Speaker. Here we have a technology transfer
that is a direct violation of the missile technology control regime
that only has one fundamental end purpose, and that is to give the
Iraqis the capability for the long-range missile that we know Saddam
has been after for a decade and we haven't even asked the Russians how
it happened.
Now here is the problem, Mr. Speaker. If those items were stolen from
Russia, that is a problem because that means the Russians don't have
adequate controls over the advanced technology that would help Iraq or
another nation build a long-range ICBM. But, Mr. Speaker, if the
Russians did know they were being transferred and being sold to Iraq,
that is a problem because that is not allowable under the MTCR.
And perhaps, Mr. Speaker, that is why the administration hasn't asked
the question. Because this administration, back in August and September
of last year, without a lot of fanfare, very quickly, without much
attention from this Congress, although I asked questions of the
administration at that time, rushed Russia into the MTCR. Because they
wanted Russia to become a player of those countries who would abide by
the controls put into place by the missile technology control regime.
The problem this administration knows, Mr. Speaker, is if they ask
the question about the technology being transferred, they then have no
recourse but to apply economic sanctions against Russia. And if they
apply economic sanctions against Russia, that means we undermine Boris
Yeltsin's leadership and perhaps cause turmoil inside of Russia and
instability in this, an election year.
Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely the worst reason not to question the
Russians about the transfer of technology that could ultimately pose a
threat to our country. And it further undermines our confidence in the
intelligence community assessing for us in a logical way without
sanitization which is really occurring in terms of missile
proliferation and technology proliferation around the world. I wrote a
three-page letter to President Clinton asking him, and I would ask
unanimous consent at this time, Mr. Speaker, to include my letter in
the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection.
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Asking the President some very specific
questions about the technology transfer and I am still waiting for a
response 1 month later. I also, Mr. Speaker, had a three-page letter
drafted to the intelligence community asking for specific responses to
questions about the upgraded intelligence assessment that was used by
the minority party in the Senate to say we don't really have a threat
to worry about.
Now, Mr. Speaker, some listening to this might think well, here is a
Member of Congress who only wants to stick it in the eye of the
Russians, he doesn't really care about relations with the former Soviet
Union, he just wants us to build a bigger and bigger defense industrial
base. First of all, Mr. Speaker, let me make this point. I have no
parochial interest in missile defense. There were no contractors in my
district, I don't have a military base in my district. I do chair the
R&D committee.
Let me make one additional point, Mr. Speaker. I will match my record
on Russian-American relations with any Member of this body. For the
past 3 years I have cochaired the Russian-American energy caucus where
I have worked with Members of the Russian Duma on joint energy deals,
two of which are now in place, Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II with Mobil,
Marathon, and McDermott Corporations. Western companies will invest
between $50 and $70 billion in Russia to help them develop their energy
resources. We are now working on Sakhalin III. In fact, the Russian
Duma last December passed a new production sharing agreement which will
encourage other projects of this type to help Russia stabilize the
economy. Just 2 weeks ago, I was the only Member of the Congress in
attendance at a luncheon with Mr. Chernomyrdin and the Energy Minister
from Russia Mr. Shafranik where we talked about joint cooperation in
terms of energy investment. Secondarily, Mr. Speaker, I work with
Russia on environmental issues, Nikolai Vorontsov, a member of the
Duma, has chaired the globe task force in Russia on environmental
issues. I have worked with him as a member of globe U.S.A., in fact,
was in St. Petersburg leading the effort on the part of our Navy to put
funding in to help the Russians clean up their nuclear waste in the
Arctic Ocean and in the Sea of Japan. As a member of the National
Security Commission have fought for the past several years to get
additional funding to help the Russians deal with their terrible
environmental problems, working with Bob Colangelo and Vartov to
establish joint Russian-American energy initiatives. In fact, just in
December of last year had the leading Russian environmental activist in
our country testifying before my subcommittee on ways that we can work
with the Russians on environmental initiatives. Mr. Speaker, we are
doing a ton of work with the Russians on the environment. Mr. Speaker,
we have also proposed establishing a new Russian-American Duma to
Congress forum. In January of this year when I was in Russia, I carried
a letter from you, Mr. Speaker, which I delivered to the new speaker of
the Russian Duma, Mr. Seleznyov. This letter suggested that both
speakers should support the establishment of a formal process where
Members of Congress and the Duma company meet at least twice a year
focusing on specific issue areas; namely, the environment, energy,
defense, foreign policy, and relations, as well as other issues that
are going to
[[Page H1302]]
come up in the forefront, like the economy, health care, adoption laws,
and so forth. That letter from you, Mr. Speaker, was delivered to Mr.
Seleznyov by me. In addition, I met with members of the four major
political parties in Moscow to convince them that it was in their
interest to have more formal relationships with Members of the
Republican and Democrat Parties in the Congress. I met with the Yabakov
Party, Zhirinovsky's party, the Communist Party and Yavlinsky's party,
and Mr. Speaker, the response was overwhelmingly positive from all of
them.
But you know, Mr. Speaker, and we expect, by the way the Ambassador,
the Washington Ambassador from Russia will be in my office tomorrow
where I will meet with him, Ambassador Aleksey Arbatov where we will
discuss the Russian administration, Mr. Seleznyov's response to your
letter, Mr. Speaker, to establish this new forum, as well as your
letter also outlining a proposal to establish a direct internet linkage
where Members of Congress and members of the Russian Duma can
communicate through simultaneous translation in a written form back and
forth on an instantaneous basis. These are concrete proposals that we
have made. These are concrete actions, Mr. Speaker, that we are taking
on an ongoing basis. Last year I have hosted over 100 members of the
Duma in my office. My goal is the same goal as President Clinton and
that is to build a solid relationship between Russia that encourages
economic growth, that encourages democratization and encourages the
reforms you have been seeing in Russia. But the difference, Mr.
Speaker--and this is a key difference, this administration wants to
sanitize and ignore the realities of the Russian military threat.
{time} 1845
The key thing that we have to understand, Mr. Speaker, is that the
leaders of the Russian military are the same leaders who led the Soviet
military; they have not changed. They are not a part of the reform
movement and many of the actions being proposed by the leadership of
the Russian military potentially pose a threat to this country's
security.
Mr. Speaker, I think the Russian people want us to call their
military leadership when things occur which they even cannot ask in
their own country about, yet this administration tends to want to put
its head in the sand and not acknowledge issues that occur like the
transfer of technology of the Acceleramas, like the effects of the
morale problems in the Russian military, like threats posed by the
transfer of the SS-25 technology and the threat that poses to the
United States in terms of a rogue nation getting that capability.
It reminds me, Mr. Speaker, the Clinton's administration policy
reminds me of my first amendment that I offered on the floor of the
House in 1987. At that time there was a debate in this Congress that
was going on about the ABM Treaty much like there is now, and on that
debate, Mr. Speaker, the liberals were saying that we should adhere to
the strictest interpretation of the ABM Treaty. My amendment was very
simple. It said the Russians in fact were in violation of the ABM
Treaty because they had installed a large fader-phased radar system in
a town called Krasnoyarsk. My amendment passed the House 418 to zero;
no Member voted against it. But many of the liberals who voted for it
stood up on this floor, Mr. Speaker, and they said it is not an
important issue. The Russians just built that radar for space tracking
purposes. They do not plan to use it in violation of the ABM Treaty;
that has never been their intent. It is an accidental location. Yes, it
is a technical violation of the ABM, but it does not really matter
because it is not going to be used for battle management and certainly
would not be used against the United States.
That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker. In 1995, General Voitinsev in the
Russians' Military Historical Journal was interviewed. Now General
Voitinsev for 18 years was the commander of Russian air and space
defenses for the entire Soviet Union. In the interview he was asked
about Krasnoyarsk radar, Mr. Speaker, and in response to the question
he said he was ordered to place the Krasnoyarsk radar where it was by
at-that-time General Ogarkov. General Ogarkov was ordered to place it
there by the Politburo, the ruling body in the Communist Party and in
the Soviet Union. So here we have the 18-year commander of air and
space defense command for the Soviet Union now admitting in a public
record in Russia that he was ordered to place the radar where it was in
direct violation of the ABM that would eventually allow the Soviet
Union to break out of the ABM Treaty and have battle management
capability that would directly threaten the United States.
So, Mr. Speaker, we have to understand the context in which the
Russian military operates. There are some in our Congress and there are
some in the White House who want to do whatever they can to bolster up
Boris Yeltsin, and what I am saying is, Mr. Speaker, we have got to be
candid and frank with the Russians. When they violate a treaty, we have
got to call them on it. When they violate by sending equipment or
technology to Iraq, we have got to call them on it. When they want to
send SS-25 technology out around the world as a space launch
capability, we have got to call them on that.
Mr. Speaker, that is in our interest and it is in the interest of the
Russian people that we understand what is going on and that we want
them to be as compliant as we expect ourselves to be. But Mr. Speaker,
that is not happening in this administration. This administration wants
to lift up the rug, bury everything under the rug and say do not worry,
everything is OK. Mr. Speaker, it is not OK, and I am not about
advocating massive increases in funding in these areas. Every dollar
that we plused up, Mr. Speaker, last year was done so with the request
of Gen. Malcolm O'Neill. General O'Neill is President Clinton's point
person on missile defense.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, General O'Neill is retiring this May. Right
before our break in January I got wind that he was retiring. I talked
to him, tried to convince him to stay on because I have confidence in
him. I think he is a great American and a great leader. I put together
a letter, Mr. Speaker, asking Secretary Perry to reconsider and ask
General O'Neill to reconsider and stay on as head of BMDO. Within 1
hour I was able to get 22 Members of this body who were the leaders on
defense issues to sign that letter asking that General O'Neill stay on,
12 Democrats and 10 Republicans. Everyone from Jack Murtha to Floyd
Spence to the key leaders on both sides of the aisle on defense issues
signed that letter asking to keep General O'Neill on board. Why?
Because we in a bipartisan way have confidence in him. he did not do
that. He decided and announced this past week that he is going to
retire and I got the word, Mr. Speaker, through the grapevine of the
Pentagon that the administration, to further downplay the whole
potential threat for missile defense, that they were going to replace
General O'Neill, who is a three-star general, with a two-star, and the
notion was that if Bill Clinton won the election by lowering it to a
two-star position there would not be as much visibility. But if a
Republican won the Presidential election, then the Pentagon would
elevate it back up to three-star to give it the visibility it warrants.
Mr. Speaker, that is outrageous.
I will say that when I raised this issue with Dr. Kaminski he said he
would not support that and felt that the appropriate level of support
that has been displayed by General O'Neill as a three-star should be
continued by whoever replaces him.
But, Mr. Speaker, the turmoil continues. The program outlined by this
administration is not logical, it is not based on threat, it is not
based on reality and we are going to counter that with every ounce of
energy in our bodies this year, Mr. Speaker. In fact, tomorrow we will
have our first missile defense hearing. Thursday I was supposed to have
General O'Neill come in along with the Air Force and the Army. I am
still scheduled to have that hearing on Thursday, where they can talk
about their national missile defense capabilities. But, Mr. Speaker,
unfortunately I heard in a phone call from General O'Neill yesterday
that he is being told by superiors not to come before my committee.
Perhaps there is something that he cannot say or perhaps the
administration does not want
[[Page H1303]]
it on the record again that, in fact, the people who are responsible
for these programs are going to say directly opposite of what the
Commander in Chief said, that in fact we can deploy a system that is
not in violation of the ABM Treaty.
Well, I can tell you this, Mr. Speaker. I am having a hearing on
Thursday, and I am having a hearing with General O'Neill and with
General Garner from the Army and with the general from the Air Force to
talk about it and if they are not there, we will have empty seats, and
we will let the people of America decide.
Now, the Pentagon said we are sure we want them to come in because
Dr. Kaminski has not briefed the Congress on program needs for this
year. Mr. Speaker, that hearing has nothing to do with program needs.
All we are talking about is what capability do we have now, what
capability do we have now, and can we in fact deploy systems in the Air
Force and in the Army using existing capabilities at a low cost that
can give us some protection.
So, Mr. Speaker, if there is anyone in the Pentagon listening
tonight, we are going to have the hearing on Thursday and I hope you
show up because if you do not show up, we are going to have the hearing
anyway.
Mr. Speaker, beyond that hearing we are going to have 10 hearings
this year on the threat from missile proliferation, on the Russian
command and control problems. We are going to have a hearing on joint,
dual American-Russian cooperation in missile defense programs. We are
going to have a hearing on the standpoint of political implications of
the ABM from Russia's standpoint, just as I have asked the Speaker,
their Duma, on the political implications of the ABM from our
standpoint. We are going to have the most aggressive debate in this
country's history on the threat to our people from a proliferation of
missiles, and I would hope in the end, Mr. Speaker, that when we have
to make a final decision on a defense bill that it will be based on
fact and not rhetoric.
It troubles me though, the direction I see the administration going.
The week before we left for the February work break, Mr. Speaker, we
were called in as members of the Committee on National Security and we
were told the administration was going to ask for a $3 billion
reprogramming request from this year's defense bill. Now this
administration, who is telling the American people we do not have
enough money for defense, we do not have enough money for the
priorities of missile defense, General Shalikashvili's letter to
General Luck saying we would like to help you, but we do not have
enough money for that and to protect our troops in Korea, this
administration asked for a reprogramming, Mr. Speaker. One of the items
was to reprogram $80 million of DOD money to train the police force in
Haiti. Now, Mr. Speaker, to me that is outrageous.
I live near Philadelphia. Philadelphia could use $80 million for its
police force. So could New York. I think Washington, DC, could use $80
million to train its police force. But this administration wants to
reprogram $80 million of this year's DOD money to pay to train the
Haitian police force, and they are telling us they do not have enough
money for their priorities. This administration wants us to reprogram
$200 million to pay the Jordanians for the peace agreement that
President Clinton signed, $200 million out of this year's defense bill
to assist Jordan in coming to the peace table; not coming out of State
Department funds, not being appropriated publicly, but in a
reprogramming request coming from this administration out of this
year's DOD dollars.
Third, the administration wants to reprogram money for nation
building in Bosnia. Now we are not asking the Germans to put money up,
or the French or any other NATO country. We are going to reprogram
money from out DOD budget to nation build in Bosnia.
Mr. Speaker, those are some of the outrages that I feel, but one that
really got my attention during the break more than anything else dealt
with the B-2 bomber. Mr. Speaker, I chair the Research and Development
Subcommittee for the Committee on National Security, and I have
consistently opposed the B-2 bomber this past year despite intense
pressure from my party leadership, and the reason is not that I think
the technology is bad, it is not. It is because we cannot afford it. In
the current budget environment we cannot afford to buy more B-2's. But
that battle was fought on the floor and those that supported the B-2,
some of the most liberal Members who hate defense spending voted for it
and we funded it. I think it was a mistake. But the ultimate goal of
this President to go out to southern California, Mr. Speaker, just this
past month and have a press conference and say to the workers working
on the B-2, I think we ought to take another look at whether or not to
build more B-2 bombers: Mr. Speaker, that is absolutely outrageous.
Talk about hypocrisy, Mr. Speaker, that a President who says that we
put too much money into the defense bill, that we plused up programs we
should not have plused up is now talking about a study to determine
whether or not we should build more B-2's. For those poor workers out
in California who may be watching, Mr. Speaker, I would ask them to ask
the President when that study is expected back. I would tell them it is
probably the week after the November election and that is when the
report will come back, no more B-2's.
Mr. Speaker, what I am saying in summary is it is time to stop
playing politics with the defense of our country. Missile defense and
the programs and priorities we have are not a Republican issue. Every
gain that we made last year was done with support from my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle. They were in the forefront of this debate.
They were in the forefront on the committee, on the House floor, in the
Senate, as well as the House of Representatives. This is a bipartisan
issue that should be based on fact. If Neil Abercrombie's Hawaii is
threatened by a missile from North Korea, every one of us needs to pay
attention, and that is exactly the situation, Mr. Speaker, just as if
Don Young's Alaska is threatened from a missile that can potentially
hit parts of Alaska from North Korea.
This year, Mr. Speaker, we are going to lay the facts on the table
through the extensive series of hearings that we are going to have, 10
in the subcommittee, 2 in the full committee, starting tomorrow,
through briefings we are going to have. We are going to make the case
that it is in our interest to work aggressively toward missile defense;
it is in our interest to work with the Russians to convince them that
they have more of a threat from missile proliferation than even we do.
In the end we have got to work together to only defend the people of
America, the people of Russia and freedom loving people everywhere,
just as we are doing with Israel.
Mr. Speaker, we have helped Israel build the prototype for what will
be their national missile defense system; it is called the Aero
Program. The taxpayers of this country have put a half a billion
dollars into that program and it is justified, it is a good program,
and it is good to give Israel the security they deserve. Why do not the
American people deserve the same security? Why should we build a system
that can protect the people of Israel from a missile attack and leave
the people of America vulnerable?
That is the question we have to answer, Mr. Speaker, and we can do it
without massive increases in funding, we can do it with a very careful
and deliberate approach that builds upon the technology we have today
that will deal with the threat we have today and build and allow us the
options down the road to build a more elaborate defense capability, a
more robust defense capability.
{time} 1900
Does this mean that eventually the ABM treaty may have to be
renegotiated? Absolutely. Mr. Speaker while I am not willing to take
the treaty on this year, I am one who is firmly convinced the treaty
has outlived its usefulness. But we need to understand the political
considerations in Russia if we attack that treaty head on. My proposal
is to grab the hand of the Russians and work with them to show them
that we are no longer in a bipolar world with just two countries, with
offensive military missile capability. We now have North Korea, we have
Communist China, we have Iraq trying to get long-range missile
capabilities, and it is in our interest to work together.
[[Page H1304]]
That should be the approach we use this year. Mr. Speaker, that will
be the approach that I use as we begin our hearing process, and as we
move forward to provide security for the people of this country with
our fiscal year 1997 budget request.
Mr. Speaker, I include for the Record the Washington Times article of
February 15, 1996, and the letter to President Clinton of January 30,
1996.
The material referred to follows:
[From the Washington Times, Feb. 15, 1996]
Plea for Missile Defense in Korea Fails
(By Bill Gertz)
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has declined to
back the commander of U.S. forces in Korea in seeking to
reverse a Pentagon decision to delay a new missile-defense
system urgently needed in Korea to protect U.S. troops from
North Korean missile attack.
Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, in a cable told Gen. Gary Luck, the commander in
Korea, that the Pentagon plans to scale back funds for the
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to pay for other
weapons modernization programs.
The Shalikashvili cable calls into question Clinton
administration support for building effective regional anti-
missile systems.
``Five years after 28 Americans were killed in the Gulf war
by an Iraqi Scud, we still have no effective theater missile
defense, which the administration has said is its top defense
priority,'' said Heritage Foundation defense expert Tom
Moore, commenting on the cable.
``It is absolutely reprehensible that the administration is
leaving American forces abroad exposed to these growing
threats,'' he said.
A spokesman for Gen. Luck had no comment. A spokesman for
Gen. Shalikashvili said no final decision on the missile-
defense funding has been made since the cable to Korea was
sent.
Mr. Shalikashvili was responding to an earlier cable from
Gen. Luck, who warned the threat of North Korean missiles is
growing and that two THAAD batteries--18 launchers--are
needed as soon as possible.
Delays in fielding THAAD, the first modern anti-missile
system in decades, could have serious consequences for
defending the peninsula against attack from the north, Gen.
Luck stated in a Dec. 11 cable to Gen. Shalikashvili,
Gen. Luck wrote to seek the chairman's support for
reversing the Pentagon's decision in October to hold up a new
phase of THAAD development.
In his reply cable, Gen. Shalikashvili said that ``I
understand your concern,'' but he did not say he supported
efforts by Gen. Luck to reverse the decision placing a hold
on THAAD's engineering and manufacturing development program,
a new stage that would move the system closer to deployment.
Instead, the four-star general indicated THAAD may not be
deployed at all. In 2002 or 2003, the Pentagon will put it in
a ``shoot-off'' competition with a Navy wide-area missile
defense system, he said.
Until the shoot-off, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council, which sets priorities for defense spending and
weapons programs, ``is recommending THAAD funding at a
minimum level,'' Gen. Shalikashvili stated.
``A final decision has not been made,'' he said. ``Will
keep you advised.''
North Korea has deployed scores of modified Soviet-design
Scuds, like those fired against U.S. troops during the
Persian Gulf war, and reportedly is in the early stage of
deploying a longer-range missile known as the No Dong.
The Shalikashvili cable also indicates that Pentagon
missile defense policy is not in line with new provisions of
the 1996 defense authorization bill, signed into law Saturday
by President Clinton.
The authorization law orders the defense secretary to
restructure regional missile defense programs to make Patriot
PAC-3, THAAD and two Navy systems, known as lower and upper
tier, top-priority programs. The law sets specific dates--all
by 1999--for deploying the first models of the systems. Full-
scale deployment must begin by 2000 for THAAD, and by 2001
for upper tier.
Gen. Shalikashvili stated in the cable that the primary
objective of the internal review of missile defense needs to
to ``free up dollars for critically underfunded areas of
recapitalization.''
The proposed competition in 2002 or 2003 between THAAD and
Navy upper tier could delay production of the wide-area
defense system by three to five years, Gen. Shalikashvili
said.
More than a dozen Senate Republicans, including top party
leaders, wrote to Defense Secretary William Perry last fall
urging him not to delay THAAD.
Any slowdown in THAAD development would be considered ``a
declaration by the administration of a lack of commitment to
theater missile defense,'' the senators stated in a Nov. 7
letter to Mr. Perry.
Missile Defense
[Excerpts of a cable sent to Gen. Gary Luck, commander of U.S. forces
in Korea, from Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, on Jan. 19.]
In response to Ref. A [a cable from Gen. Luck of Dec. 11],
Ballistic Missile Defense programs are under internal DoD
review to evaluate the cost-effectiveness strategies for
meeting validated theater missile defense requirements. The
primary objective is to free up dollars for critically
underfunded areas of recapitalization. For this reason the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is recommending
THAAD funding at a minimum level necessary to continue
development toward a shoot-off with the Navy theater-wide
ballistic missile defense system in 2002-2003.
``My execptation is that this JROC plan, if adopted, will
possibly delay an upper tier production decision three to
five years. Full impacts of the JROC course of action under
consideration are to be assessed by the services and Office
of the Secretary of Defense Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization. I understand your concern. A final decision has
not been made. Will keep you advised.
____
Congress of the United States,
Washington, DC, January 30, 1996.
President William Clinton,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President: I am writing to express my concern
about the recent attempted shipment of Russian missile
components to Iraq. While this shipment, which included
gyroscopes and accelerometers designed for use in long-range
missiles, was intercepted in Jordan, it raises serious
questions about the Russian government's willingness or
ability to halt proliferation.
Reports of this shipment, in contravention of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), surfaced publicly in
December, several months after Russia was admitted as a full
member of the MTCR regime. Whether the Russian government
sanctioned the shipment or not, the events which transpired
underscore the fact that Russia is at best unable or at worst
unwilling to fulfill its MTCR obligations.
Recently, I travelled to Russia and met with members of the
Duma, defense advisors to President Yeltsin and officials of
Rosvooruzheniye, the main Russian state arms export company.
Russian government officials with whom I raised the issue
denied all knowledge of this highly reported incident.
Rosvooruzheniye officials were aware of the attempted
transfer, but denied any involvement. I also met with
Ambassador Pickering, who indicated that the United States
neither sought nor received any information or explanation
from the Russian government about the attempted transfer.
This recent incident is not the first time that Russia has
transferred missile technology to non-MTCR states. In 1993,
Russia sold an associated production technology for cryogenic
rocket engines to India. Recently, Russia transferred missile
components to Brazil. To this very day, Russia continues to
aggressively market a variant of its SS-25 missiles under the
guise of a ``space launch vehicle.''
If nonproliferation agreements are to have any meaning,
they must be aggressively enforced through careful monitoring
and the application of sanctions for violations. I believe
that the Russian shipment of missile components deserves a
forceful response from the United States, and I am deeply
troubled by the U.S. government's apparent inaction in this
regard. I would appreciate answers to the following questions
in that regard:
1. Has the United States demanded from the Russian
government a detailed explanation of the attempted shipment
of gyroscopes and accelerometers to Iraq? If so, when did
this occur and through what channels? If not, why not?
2. Has the Russian government responded, and what was the
substance of the response? Does the Administration find it
credible?
3. Do you believe that this shipment occurred with or
without the knowledge of the Russian government, and what
does your answer imply about Russia's willingness or ability
to advance the U.S. nonproliferation agenda?
4. Why have sanctions not been imposed on Russia as a
result of this attempted transfer of MTCR-prohibited missile
components? What does the failure to impose sanctions, as
required by U.S. law, say about the Administration's
commitment to ensure the viability of the MTCR regime? Why
wouldn't this set a dangerous precedent for others that might
seek to circumvent or violate MTCR guidelines?
5. Russia's ascension to the MTCR regime as a full member
imposes certain obligations on it that this incident
demonstrates Russia is unwilling or unable to fulfill. What
does that Administration intend to do to ensure full Russian
compliance with its MTCR obligations in the future? Without
acting firmly now in response to the attempted component
transfer to Iraq, why should Russia believe that similar
transfers will carry severe consequences in the future?
6. Please provide the dates and topic considered by the
Missile Trade Analysis Group since the Russian shipment was
reported.
7. Please list and describe all instances which raised U.S.
concerns regarding compliance with the MTCR, all instances
since 1987 in which the U.S. government considered imposing
sanctions on a ``foreign government or entity,'' whether
sanctions were in fact imposed and against whom; how long
those sanctions remained in effect, and the reason why they
were lifted.
[[Page H1305]]
Thank you for responding to these serious issues.
Sincerely,
Curt Weldon,
Member of Congress.
____________________