[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 22 (Friday, February 23, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S1285-S1290]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the relationship 
between the United States and China.
  Last summer the Aspen Strategy Group--cochaired by Ken Dam and 
myself--under Director Michael Armacost and Associate Director Bruce 
Berkowitz met in Aspen, CO, for 4 days. We had an intensive and 
productive discussion with a number of China experts participating, 
including Michel Okensberg, Chas. Freeman, and Stapleton Roy. The views 
of all three of these American China experts and my subsequent 
discussions with Michel Oksenberg, Charles Freeman, and others have 
been very helpful in my own analysis of United States-China relations.
  I also made a recent trip to Asia that included a stimulating and 
informative forum in Malaysia sponsored by the Asia Policy Group under 
the leadership of Doug Paal and hosted by the Deputy Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim. during this conference--attended by Senator 
Kit Bond, Senator Bill Cohen, and myself from the Congress--we had 
broad and stimulating 

[[Page S1286]]
discussions with government and business leaders from the ASEAN 
countries and the entire Pacific region. Some of those discussions 
included China, but the agenda was much broader than just China.
  I have greatly benefited from these meetings and discussions with 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and the other leaders from 
throughout the region and with Doug Paal, who led our group. During my 
trip to Asia, I joined Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator John Glenn 
in China for a series of meetings with top Chinese leadership.
  Mr. President, the growing importance of China in world affairs 
demands a purposeful, coherent, and consistent American policy toward 
China. History is littered with the uninformed and ineffective 
responses of an established power toward a rising power. often the 
rising power suffered from its own ambitions seeking to accelerate its 
rise through military means. In modern history, we need only recall the 
pre-World War II rise of Germany and Japan and the former Soviet Union 
and the opportunities and mistakes our country and the free world made 
in coping with their rise.
  History should teach us that established powers must provide 
consistent and credible signals about their expectations and set forth 
reasonable terms on which they are willing to incorporate the rising 
power into the international system.
  We are now watching the rise of China--a development of at least 
equal historical significance and implication as the rise of Russia, 
Germany, and Japan. This is occurring with the important background of 
the rapid industrialization of Asia. Within 25 to 50 years, Mr. 
President, the lives of 3.5 billion people who live in the arc from 
Korea to India to Pakistan are being transformed. This development is 
as significant for humanity and for the citizens of our country as the 
Renaissance or the Industrial Revolution which transformed our people 
into the most productive, wealthy, and free people on Earth. At the 
center of Asia's rise is China, a nuclear power with the largest 
military forces in terms of manpower, in the world, and a permanent 
member of the U.N. Security Council. China is a nation with 1.2 billion 
people, an economy growing at nearly 10 percent a year for over the 
last decade, and as we too often forget--a distinctive civilization of 
great antiquity.

  China is in the midst of four major transitions:
  First, from a planned economy to a state-guided market economy.
  Second, from rule by the Long March revolutionaries who established 
the Communist regime to a rule by bureaucrats, technocrats, and 
military professionals.
  Third, from a rural agricultural society to an urban, industrial 
society.
  Fourth, from a largely self-sufficient, largely isolated economy to 
one that is moving into the international economy and is increasingly 
dependent upon it.
  Each of these alone is an enormous transformation. These transitions 
are occurring at varying speeds and with a scope unprecedented in 
history.
  The process and outcome of China's transformations are unknown. Much 
about the Chinese future is unknown. What will the nature of the 
political system be a decade or a generation hence? Will the succession 
to Deng Xiaoping continue to be an orderly one? Will there be 
widespread social disorder? What about China's military? What will be 
its force structure a decade hence? How is its military doctrine likely 
to evolve as it acquires new weaponry? What are and will be China's 
foreign policy proclivities? Will the Communist Party remain in power? 
What are the chances for democratization in China? Can the Central 
Government remain in control or will China fragment or break apart, as 
we saw with the former Soviet Union? What would happen to its nuclear 
arsenal under such a situation? There is no consensus on the answers to 
these questions among the experts, either in or outside the Government.
  The uncertainty about the Chinese future has several important 
implications. In light of China's growing importance, it is imperative 
that our country make a maximum effort to understand it. This entails 
ensuring that our Government has sufficient means to collect and 
analyze information about China, including extensive contact with 
Chinese leaders and bureaucrats at the national and provincial levels, 
and certainly people-to-people programs with the Chinese people 
themselves. President, our Nation must prepare itself intellectually 
for China's more extensive involvement in world affairs. This is 
absolutely essential.

  It is difficult to conceive of the international community 
effectively addressing a number of pressing issues such as the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery, international terrorism, and narcotrafficking, environmental 
challenges, and the regulation of trade, without China's participation.
  Because of the profound Chinese transition, American engagement is 
essential. We are not likely to significantly affect events over the 
short run, but--by engaging in dialog about our mutual interests and 
our grievances, by speaking in clear terms in this dialog; by 
participating in China's development; by greater military transparency 
between our countries; by helping to educate China's next generation of 
intellectuals, which we are doing by assisting it in alleviating some 
of its economic and institutional problems--its evolution is more 
likely to be in directions favorable to peace and stability in the 
Pacific as well as to American interests.
  China's transition is likely to be protracted. The experts do agree 
on one point: Uncertainty is a permanent quality of modern China. Even 
were China to embark a process that we would call democratization, the 
development would be a lengthy one. History shows it takes a long time 
to create a legal system, guarantees for private property, a 
parliamentary system, a vigorous and free press, and the political 
culture that can sustain a pluralistic and tolerant civil society. As 
the American and British experience demonstrates and as we can now see 
in the former Soviet Union, that process takes decades. Not only must 
our expectations be realistic, but we cannot wait to engage extensively 
with China until it has become more like us or until it has settled 
down and its future is more certain.
  Realistically, we must engage with China and its current leaders now 
rather than remaining aloof from this vast, complex, ancient, and proud 
civilization until it becomes to our liking. In short, China's 
transition and its potential impels America, insofar as possible, to be 
actors on the scene.
  Mr. President, as I mentioned earlier, I visited China last month 
with Senators Dianne Feinstein and John Glenn. We had an opportunity to 
meet with President Jiang Zemin, Executive Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, 
Minister of National Defense General Chi Haotian, Vice Foreign Minister 
Li Zhaoxing, and others within China's leadership. We had cordial, 
informative and frank discussions on a number of issues relating to the 
relationship between our two countries and stability in the entire 
region. Our discussions were greatly facilitated by Senator Feinstein's 
longstanding friendship with President Jiang Zemin, a friendship that 
grew out of their being mayors of sister cities--San Francisco and 
Shanghai at the same time. They had many visits during that period.

  In recent weeks, China has stepped up its military exercises in areas 
close to Taiwan. It has mobilized a large number of forces on the 
mainland across from Taiwan. There have been credible reports that 
China has provided nuclear technology to Pakistan in contravention of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its solemn treaty obligations 
to over 150 state parties to the treaty. If those reports are verified, 
sanctions would be triggered automatically under U.S. law, unless they 
are waived by the President.
  In recent months, China's behavior has raised concerns in Asia and in 
the United States. The concerns which have been expressed not only in 
this country, but also in Asia include:
  China's military expenditures continue to rise along with its 
economy. It continues to test nuclear weapons despite the protests of 
its neighbors. It has made territorial claims far into the South China 
Sea. It has adopted an unyielding posture toward Hong Kong and has 
repeatedly threatened Taiwan. Its record on missile sales to Pakistan 
is troubling and in probable violation 

[[Page S1287]]
of its assurances to both the Bush and Clinton administrations that it 
would respect the missile technology control regime [MTCR] even though 
it is not a member. Its human rights record, including the sentencing 
of Wei Jingsheng, raises basic human rights concerns, affronting 
American sense of fairplay as well. And its inability to crack down on 
violations of trade agreements, including intellectual property 
violations, raise serious trade concerns. It is certainly possible that 
these developments which are troubling, are also harbingers of 
difficult relations between our Nation and China in the months to come.
  But there are also developments on the other side of the ledger that 
are too often ignored. China has not obstructed U.N. and NATO 
peacekeeping operations and sanctions even though it openly doubted 
their appropriateness or efficiency. It has made important 
contributions to maintaining stability in Korea and in settling the 
Cambodian civil war. It continues to expand economic and cultural 
relations with Taiwan and, until 1995, it was regularly expanding 
people to people ties to Taiwan and reducing military tensions in the 
strait. It is in the process of opening itself to foreign direct 
investment and to wide-spread consumption of U.S. consumer goods in 
ways that go well beyond the opportunities many other Asian countries 
allow. It has announced the reduction of tariffs by 34 percent and 
plans further reductions to the average of developing countries in the 
region.

  It has modified its social and cultural control over its people, so 
that its authoritarian government, while still harsh, has moved far 
from the reign of terror of the cultural revolution days. While far 
from acceptable by our present standards, by every conceivable measure, 
China's treatment of its own people in 1996 is far better than at the 
time of President Nixon's opening in 1972 and President Carter's 
normalization in 1979. In the last 10 years, an enormous number of 
Chinese people have moved from poverty to a decent standard of living. 
I will have more to say on the subject of human rights in China in the 
weeks ahead.
  Mr. President, China has pledged to cease nuclear testing, but not 
before the negotiation and entry into effect of a comprehensive test 
ban treaty. It has played a quiet but positive role in assisting our 
quest--a very important quest--for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In 
the Middle East, the Chinese have now developed ties with the moderate 
states, including Israel.
  This combination of welcome and troublesome developments requires a 
United States policy that is carefully managed. Unfortunately, the U.S. 
Government, the executive branch, as well as Congress, currently have 
not developed such a policy toward the most populous and the most 
rapidly developing country on Earth. To allow this vacuum to continue 
would be both irresponsible and dangerous.
  As we begin to think about a China policy, perhaps we should begin, 
not just with our litany of concerns about China, but also with some 
understanding of their concerns about us. China has its own list of 
grievances about the United States. Although I believe that most of 
these complaints are due to misperceptions and misunderstandings, we 
must be aware that if China's leaders conclude rightly or wrongly that 
the United States looks upon them as adversaries, they will respond in 
kind. We have a right to demand that the Chinese keep their 
agreements--we must also keep ours.
  America is seen by many in China as attempting to isolate, divide, 
encircle, and contain China. They cite, among others, the following 
list of grievances:
  First, delay on China's application for membership in the World Trade 
Organization which they believe is a violation of our 1992 bilateral 
agreement on market access.
  Second, refusing to grant China permanent, unconditional, most 
favored nation treatment.
  Third, constant U.S. criticism on human rights.
  Fourth, preventing China from hosting the 2000 Summer Olympics.
  Fifth, 1992 sale of F-16's to Taiwan.
  Sixth, visits to Taipei of U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills in 
the Bush administration and Transportation Secretary Pena in the 
Clinton administration.

  Seventh, visit of Taiwan's head of state to the United States, after 
being assured by top U.S. officials that the visit would not occur.
  Beyond these frequently cited grievances, the leaders of China have 
several broader concerns about the United States. They are concerned 
that the United States wishes permanently to separate Taiwan from the 
mainland and perhaps to foster an independent Taiwan. They question 
whether the United States wishes them to be a full participant in the 
establishment of the post-cold-war order. They cite Washington's 
reluctance to see them as a member of the World Trade Organization or 
to invite them to join other groupings that formulate policy for the 
international community.
  Perhaps most important, though these words are seldom spoken 
directly, with communism dead as an ideology and with no real 
democratic process conveying power and legitimacy, the Chinese 
leadership is vulnerable to nationalistic sentiment at home if they 
yield to what is seen as American pressure and demands. As a result, 
China is reluctant to undertake the responsibilities that the United 
States expects her to fulfill as an emerging great power.
  We should not, however, underestimate American strength in Chinese 
eyes--economically, militarily, and ideologically. They understand and 
respect our military strength. They understand the importance of 
China's access to the American market. They admire our technology, and 
assuming a positive relationship, I believe the Chinese prefer buying 
from Americans over both Japanese and Europeans. I think we need to 
take that sentiment into account in our own trade posture and our own 
export posture.
  Thoughtful Chinese know the United States is not seeking to contain 
China--I want to underscore that--but there are many in China who do 
not see it that way. We have welcomed over 40,000 Chinese students now 
enrolled in our universities. We are one of China's principal export 
markets. American businesses have invested $9.45 billion in China since 
1978. We have welcomed Chinese participation in the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and regional multilateral organizations. 
With our Government's encouragement hundreds of American foundations, 
philanthropic organizations, and education and research institutes now 
have wide-ranging exchanges with counterpart Chinese institutions. This 
is the record of a partner, not an adversary, in world affairs.
  China would like to build a stronger military-to-military 
relationship, and though it does not say so openly, it understands the 
stability that the United States military force presence brings to 
Northeast Asia. I believe that with some notable exceptions, including 
Taiwan, the Chinese military is more open to warmer United States-China 
ties than some other elements of the Chinese leadership and these 
inclinations have been strengthened by the visit and the leadership of 
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. Thus, America has many strengths in 
dealing with China, yet there are serious limits on our ability fully 
to utilize these strengths. We need to also understand that.
  First, China is embedded in Asia, politically and economically, and 
the United States cannot pursue a successful policy toward China in 
isolation from the rest of the region. Our allies in Asia would not be 
prepared or willing to follow America's lead if we decided to isolate 
China nor are they willing to employ economic sanctions. Our friends in 
Europe and Japan will be most delighted to fill any Chinese need which 
develops if the United States employs economic sanctions.
  America is still viewed in China and in Asia as a land of wealth and 
opportunity. But, in China and elsewhere in Asia, among even United 
States friends, many believe and privately say, that we are a declining 
power economically and culturally. The attraction of American society 
has eroded not only in China, but elsewhere in Asia, primarily, in my 
view, as a result of our own social ills, which are publicized all over 
the world. In Asia, as elsewhere, perceptions matter.
  The Chinese see much that is attractive in the Asian model of 
development pursued by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 

[[Page S1288]]

  The United States had a relationship with China that expanded and 
prospered from 1972 to 1989. We worked together in areas of common 
interest, exchanged views, tried to harmonize our views whenever we 
could, sought common policies, and sought to narrow and contain 
differences. Since 1989, we have been deferring discussion of common 
interests and emphasizing differences. To continue down this path is a 
prescription for posturing, animosity, brinkmanship, and danger.

  Mr. President, our Nation must develop a purposeful, coherent and 
consistent American policy toward China and a strategy to implement our 
policy. We must also explain in clear terms to both our own citizens 
and to the Chinese the underlying rationale for our policy and our 
actions.
  In the absence of a clear policy, it is inevitable that we in the 
Congress will chase off in separate directions with different 
priorities, while the executive branch lurches from one transitory 
issue to the next, addressing each problem in an ad hoc fashion. In the 
absence of an overall policy framework, policy becomes fragmented, the 
captive of single issue constituencies.
  Those in the executive branch bear the primary responsibility for 
enunciating our policy, but as we see from Taiwan's President Li's 
visit to the United States, the actions of Congress often influence 
U.S. policy, for better or worse. United States policy towards China 
must be developed in close consultation with the congressional 
leadership of both parties.
  In the immediate future, we should begin a dialog between China and 
the United States at all levels, including the highest levels--to 
discuss and where appropriate to act in unison in addressing these 
areas. Both the United States and China must get away from the current 
practice of diatribe and criticism. This dialog should not be portrayed 
as resolving our differences but rather beginning to find common ground 
and to reserving our different views for those issues that cannot be 
immediately resolved. Similarly, established channels for dialogue 
between Washington and Taipei must be utilized and strengthened so that 
there is a clear understanding of our respective views.
  And may I remind my colleagues that 7 years have passed since an 
American President or Vice President has journeyed to Beijing or the 
President or Premier of China has been in Washington. During that time, 
the leaders of China have been to every major capital in the world, and 
the leaders of other major countries have visited Beijing on many 
occasions. Misunderstandings and misperceptions are bound to flourish 
in the absence of dialog. Meetings do not guarantee agreement. But they 
reduce the chance of conflict through miscalculation.
  It would be irresponsible and dangerous for the United States 
and China to continue on our present course. It is time to end the 
period of estrangement between the United States and China. President 
Clinton's meeting in New York with President Jiang Zemin was a 
beginning down that road, and I hope we can greatly intensify those 
visits to the top level and, indeed, the working level.

  This dialog can inspire mutual confidence and understanding, but only 
if we display an unambiguous willingness to be firm when China's 
leaders do not meet their responsibilities and commitments, as well as 
a meticulous management of our China policy to ensure that we adhere to 
our commitments.
  Mr. President, I do not pretend today to offer a comprehensive China 
policy, but I do offer a few observations and suggestions.
  First, the Clinton administration should develop a broader policy 
framework regarding United States-China relations and stability in 
Northeast Asia and a strategy to advance that policy.
  Regarding this framework, I believe some of its components--and I am 
not pretending to name them all this morning--are clearly visible: a 
continued and robust American military presence in Asia is fundamental 
to the stability of Northeast Asia and peace in the region; and we 
should approach China in close coordination with Japan, Korea, and our 
Asian partners. We cannot pursue a successful China policy unless that 
policy is supported in the region. We must make clear that the 
cooperation we seek from our traditional allies and friends is not for 
the purpose of confronting or containing China, but for involving China 
more extensively and constructively in regional affairs. We should 
strengthen the linkages between China, the United States, and the rest 
of Asia so that China becomes firmly integrated with the United States 
in the emerging Pacific community. We must reverse a widespread 
perception that America's role in the region is in decline.
  Second, we should make it clear that we are prepared to facilitate 
China's participation in the international economy and international 
security arrangements in the expectation that China will abide by the 
norms of those international regimes. The incorporation of China in the 
world community will entail some mutual adjustments, but China cannot 
expect to derive the benefits without bearing the burdens of its newly 
acquired status. China's admission to the various international 
institutions will be facilitated and accelerated if they are able to 
demonstrate a solid record of compliance with their international 
commitments, including trade agreements, the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty and the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, 
which they were not part of formulating, but they have agreed to the 
basic principles of it. In the nonproliferation arena, China should be 
involved in formulating the policies we expect them to abide by. Our 
strategy should be to welcome and incorporate China in the world 
community at a relatively early stage in its rise, with the explicit 
Chinese commitment to abide by international standards and to develop 
the domestic institutional capacity to do so.
  This approach should serve not only America and international 
interests, but China's interests. Our strategy should be intended to 
elicit Chinese cooperation rather than to compel Chinese behavior.
  Third, a framework with China must be based upon mutual dignity and 
mutual respect. We must seek to identify our important mutual interests 
and make progress in these areas while striving to ensure that our 
points of disagreement do not dominate every agenda. If we proceed in 
this fashion, the areas of disagreement are likely to be put into a 
broader perspective where progress can be made toward resolution over 
time. In spite of our recent disagreements, there are clearly crucial 
areas of strong mutual interests between the United States and China, 
including avoiding an arms race in Northeast Asia; avoiding 
confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and preventing a nuclear weapons 
buildup by either North or South Korea.
  Also, avoiding the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Persian 
Gulf area; avoiding the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery; easing tensions in South Asia 
between India and Pakistan; maintaining stability in Northeast Asia and 
the general area of the Pacific; maintaining stability in Southeast 
Asia, including the emergence of a peaceful Vietnam and ending and 
healing the conflict in Cambodia.

  Also, enhancing the efforts of the U.N. Security Council to maintain 
international peace and security; keeping sea lanes open for commerce; 
addressing transnational problems, such as illegal narcotics and 
terrorism; protecting the environment, including the seas; enhancing 
the rule of law in China; and, finally, maintaining the prosperity of 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. This is clearly in the interests of China, as 
well as the United States.
  Our two nations will not always agree on how to address these 
interests, but we have enough mutuality to find significant areas of 
common approach and cooperation. Without this framework for the 
discussion of mutual interests, little progress is likely to be made on 
the issues where we differ. With this framework, I believe that 
progress can be made even in difficult areas of disagreement.
  Finally, Congress should pass no laws or concurrent resolutions on 
China or Taiwan at least until after the elections in Taiwan which take 
place on March 23--in just a few weeks. I believe that Members of 
Congress should speak their views on these issues frankly and candidly, 
but in the present tense atmosphere congressional legislation or 
resolutions are likely to create more 

[[Page S1289]]
heat than light. I also hope that our China policy will not become a 
partisan political issue during the United States Presidential election 
campaign. Each time that has happened in past Presidential campaigns, 
our China policy has been the victim rather than the beneficiary of 
that kind of partisanship.
  Mr. President, we have a number of important differences and 
misunderstandings with China which must be discussed firmly and frankly 
within our overall strategic framework. These issues include arms 
proliferation, trade disputes, and human rights concerns, which I will 
discuss in the coming weeks.
  The most dangerous of these differences is the issue of Taiwan.
  The Chinese leaders by their words and by their actions make it 
abundantly clear that any attempt by Taiwan to establish its 
independence from the mainland will result in a confrontation with the 
mainland. It is clear that the Chinese do not desire a military clash, 
but it is also clear that they believe that their national sovereignty 
and national pride are at stake on the question of Taiwan's future. 
Neither America nor Taiwan should take lightly this Chinese position. 
Beijing has drawn a firm line on this question.
  It is essential that America also should make our policy and our 
intentions clear. The framework for American policy on Taiwan already 
exists in the three joint communiques under President Nixon in 1972, 
President Carter in 1979, and President Reagan in 1982 and the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979. The joint communiques establish that the 
Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal 
government of China, that there is but one China, that the United 
States acknowledges China's claim that Taiwan is part of China, and 
that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out 
peacefully by the two sides themselves. This is America's solemn 
agreement with China entered into by Presidents Nixon, Carter, and 
Reagan and followed as United States policy by Presidents Ford, Bush, 
and Clinton.
  President Reagan stated our policy very clearly in his letters of 
April 5, 1982, to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and Premier Zhao Ziyang. 
In his letter to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, President Reagan stated 
``There is only one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations 
between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our 
commitment to this principle.'' In his letter to Premier Zhao Ziyang, 
President Reagan stated, ``The differences between us are rooted in the 
long-standing friendship between the American people and the Chinese 
people who live on Taiwan. We will welcome and support any peaceful 
resolution to the Taiwan question.''
  The Chinese should understand that the Taiwan Relations Act is the 
law of our land. This act, passed in 1979, underscores that America's 
relations with the People's Republic of China rest upon the expectation 
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; that we 
would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to 
peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the 
United States. This act also declared it to be our policy to provide 
Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the 
capability of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people of Taiwan.
  This framework of the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act 
has served both sides of the Taiwan Strait as well as the United States 
and the Pacific region well for almost 17 years. For example, it made 
possible the relaxation of tensions in the strait which allowed trade 
and interaction of the two sides to take place.

  It encouraged Taiwan to abolish martial law and become a prosperous 
democracy.
  It made available to the Chinese on the mainland the talents and 
capital of the people on Taiwan.
  It played a major role in the success of China's drive for 
modernization.
  It produced a sense of security that allowed the emergence of 
critical conditions in which both Taiwan and the mainland could 
prosper.
  Americans have applauded the building of economic and people-to-
people ties across the strait. These ties have not just been between 
individuals and families but also between businesses and academic 
institutions. We have applauded the efforts of both sides to build on 
those ties toward an expanded relationship. Such an expanded 
relationship advances the realization of longstanding American hopes 
for the peaceful settlement of the dispute between the people on both 
sides of the Taiwan Strait.
  A military confrontation between China and Taiwan would harm both 
China and Taiwan. It would have long-term consequences for Northeast 
Asia and the Pacific and would likely set off a serious arms race in 
Asia as Charles Freeman pointed out in his op-ed piece in the New York 
Times last week, a war in the Taiwan Strait ``would not only threaten 
Taiwan's democracy but also finish any hopes of America's building a 
constructive relationship with China.'' And, in commenting upon a 
United States decision to either intervene or not do anything in the 
case of a war, he stated that ``the results in either case would 
probably be Japanese rearmament, military rivalry between Tokyo and 
Beijing, a loss of confidence between Tokyo and Washington and alarm 
throughout Asia.'' And as Michel Oksenberg points out, while war is not 
the primary danger at this point, a protracted military confrontation 
could produce many of these same results. It would also disrupt the 
economies of China and Taiwan and would result in a tragic loss of life 
and property. Surely we all wish to avoid a repeat of Quemoy-Matsu 
tension, which lasted for a long time, to the detriment of the people 
on both the mainland and Taiwan.
  Americans feel very close to the people of Taiwan. We are very proud 
of their accomplishments. The people of Taiwan have made enormous 
strides economically as well as politically. There are an example to 
much of the developing world.
  It is important for the United States, as a friend, to be clear with 
the Taiwanese that they must not misjudge China on the question of 
Taiwan independence.
  It is important that the people of Taiwan understand that a 
unilateral declaration of Taiwan's independence would be inconsistent 
with United States foreign policy as set forth and followed by 
President Nixon, President Ford, President Carter, President Reagan, 
President Bush, and President Clinton.
  It is also important for the Chinese to understand that the United 
States values its friendship and its relationship with the people on 
Taiwan. It is crucial that the Chinese understand that if China uses 
force to resolve the Taiwan issue, the United States will not stand 
idly by but will surely respond.
  For our part, the United States should make it very clear that we 
will oppose either side's attempt to change the status quo either by 
the use of force by Beijing or by unilateral declaration of 
independence by Taiwan. The United States position should be clear that 
we are prepared to live with any outcome negotiated in good faith 
between China and Taiwan. The future of Taiwan must be settled by 
mutual agreement between the parties, not by the unilateral actions of 
either. For that to happen, Taipei must stop its political provocations 
and Beijing must stop its military provocations.
  The people of China and the people of Taiwan should resume a high-
level dialog to foster clear understandings and increased cooperation. 
Enormous progress has been made in economic cooperation and people-to-
people contacts as well as visits on both sides of the strait. While 
economic development and people-to-people cooperation are emphasized, 
political questions are complicated and emotional and their resolution 
will require a long-term effort. This will involve a trait for which 
the Chinese people are famous--patience.
  I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleagues.
  Mr. BREAUX addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DeWine). The Senator from Louisiana.
  Mr. BREAUX. Let me inquire of the Chair of the time situation. I know 
time is allotted to both sides. How much is remaining on this side? 

[[Page S1290]]

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair advises the Senator from Louisiana 
that the minority has 19 minutes 54 seconds remaining.
  Mr. BREAUX. I thank the Chair.

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