[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 14 (Thursday, February 1, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H1202-H1204]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
THINK TWICE, COMMUNIST CHINA, BEFORE YOU USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the diplomatic recognition of the government
in Beijing in 1979 did not end our relationship with Taiwan. The Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 formally reiterated United States support for the
people of Taiwan. Since 1979, U.S. relations have grown steadily closer
with both the People's Republic and the Republic of China within the
framework of ``One China, Two Systems.'' Despite the growing
interaction of the United States with both governments, a dark cloud
hangs over future peaceful development. This dark cloud is the refusal
of the Beijing Government to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.
Beijing still regards Taiwan as a renegade province that is destined
to return to the motherland of China--by peaceful means if possible, by
force if necessary. If the people of Taiwan freely and fairly choose to
reunite with the mainland--which they have not yet done--then that is
their business. If the people of Taiwan are forced to reunite with the
mainland--or are intimidated into doing so--then that situation will
become the business of the whole world, including the United States of
America. The people of Taiwan are friends of the United States, as we
are friends with them. We respect the aspirations of the Taiwanese and
support them in the pursuit of their dreams.
Increasingly, the people of Taiwan also seek a role in governing
themselves--a dream that will be fully realized on March 23 when they
freely elect their own president and national assembly. This free
election is the culmination of years of reform in the political process
in Taiwan. It is an obvious contradiction to those who say that Asian
cultures cannot and do not support widespread democratic reforms. That
is the view by many of the autocrats of Asia. Sadly, it is also the
view within some Western circles. March 23 will be an historic date in
the advance of freedom during this troubled century.
There is no freedom for the 1.1 billion people of mainland China.
There is growing economic freedom. But the aging Communist oligarchy
that rules the People's Republic of China is out of step with the
aspirations of its own dynamic citizenry.
Now, in recent weeks, officials of the government in Beijing have
recklessly escalated their rhetoric, threatening the lives of not only
the people of Taiwan, but even the United States. In an appalling turn,
the veiled threat of nuclear destruction has been leveled against
Taiwan and the United States. Apparently, the mainland Chinese believe
that the people of the United States, and Congress, will be cowed by
their bluster. They are wrong.
Shortly before the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, it was
suggested by the American Secretary of State that the Korean peninsula
was outside of direct United States interests. This played a large part
in encouraging the leaders of North Korea that the United States would
not interfere with their plans to reunify Korea by force. The recently
dedicated memorial on the Mall to the thousands of Americans who died
to prevent aggression is proof that they were wrong. It would be a
tragic mistake for the current leaders in Beijing to make the same
mistake that their then allies in North Korea made nearly a half
century ago. It is time for the President to clarify a somewhat stealth
China policy that could invite disaster for the people of China,
Taiwan, and the United States.
The United States supports peace, and will welcome the opportunity to
discuss and resolve our current differences with the people of China.
The people of the United States have no dispute with the Chinese. We
share many of the same interests. We agree on many important issues. It
would be foolish to throw away years of careful progress. That progress
has led to mutual friendship and mutual respect. That progress should
not stop over aggressive moves that threaten peace. Unfortunately,
recent actions by the
[[Page H1203]]
Government of the People's Republic of China suggest that these hopes
are not important to that current government.
This, however, begs an important question: Is this situation
important to the Chinese people? Do the people of China support the
bellicose statements of their government? We have no way of knowing
because, of course, their government has not asked them, and does not
care what its own people think. This is why the United States supports
Taiwan, and that is a fundamental reality that those in Beijing cannot
ignore.
Mr. Speaker, I ask consent to include the House Republican Policy
Committee statement concerning ``Communist China's Taiwan Invasion
Threat.''
Communist China's Taiwan Invasion Threat
On January 30, Communist China's Premier Li Peng emphasized
that in trying to absorb Taiwan as ``a region of China . . .
in the final analysis, we cannot promise to give up the use
of force.''
This statement is the latest example of the PRC ratcheting
up unsubtle threats against Taiwan. In recent weeks, Chinese
Communist leaders told American visitors that the PRC was
preparing a plan for a sustained attack on Taiwan should it
pursue a policy that they deemed too ``independent.'' These
threats against Taiwan were coupled with threats of attack on
the U.S. should we seek to protect Taiwan--a remarkable slap
in the face to the President after three years of the
Administration's ``engagement'' policy, and in a region the
Administration has highlighted as its top foreign policy
priority.
While a number of observers have been startled by Communist
China's most recent provocations, its threats against Taiwan
are part of a pattern aggressive behavior in territorial
deputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Communist
China's economy and military structure have recently
undergone enormous changes, including a sustained nine-
percent economic growth rate and dramatic--and ominous--
transformation of the military's force structure and
doctrine. This recent growth and modernization of the
Communist Chinese military threatens vital U.S. national
security interests in Asia.
a growing people's liberation army
Trends in People's Liberation Army (PLA) expenditures for
foreign military technology over the last decade reveal an
emphasis on force projection through air and naval power,
with a 2:3:5 ration for the Communist Chinese Army, Navy, and
Air Force respectively. In 1992, Admiral Liu Hauqing, Vice-
Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the PRC's
highest ranking military officer, publicly affirmed that the
PLA Air Force and Navy would remain primary recipients of
funding for foreign military technology and weapon systems.
Recent notable purchases include: 26 Su 27 Soviet fighters
from Russia (with an additional 26 under negotiation); 24 Mil
Mi 17 helicopters from Soviet Union; 10 I1-76 heavy transport
planes from Russia; In-flight refueling technology; 100
Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles and four mobile
launchers; Rocket engines and missile guidance technology
from Russia; Uranium enrichment technology and nuclear
reactors from Russia; Airborne Early Warning (AEW) technology
from Israel; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the U.S.;
100 Klimov/Sarkisov RD33 jet engines from Russia; Avionics
from US for F-8II fighters; Artillery munitions production
equipment from the U.S.; Mark 46 MOD 2 anti-submarine
torpedoes from U.S.; 50 T-72 tanks from Russia; and 2-4
Kilo-class conventional submarines from Russia.
The PLA has recently given a greater degree of attention to
development of combined arms, rapid deployment units, air
mobility, and a blue-water naval capability. Doctrinal
changes, weapon systems modernization, and imports of
advanced foreign weapons systems indicate an interest in
increasing the PRC's ability to project power beyond its
borders. Similarly, Beijing has announced its plans to
develop two 45,000-ton aircraft carriers within the next
decade, and the PLA is already capable of conducting military
actions in close proximity to China's borders.
The PLA's greater emphasis on force project through the
development of naval and air power resulted in substantial
changes in budget allocations. The PRC's official defense
budget has expanded every year since 1989, for an increases
of 141 percent. The annual increase are as follows: 1989,
13%; 1990, 15.5%; 1991, 12%; 1992, 13.8%; 1993, 13.9%; 1994,
20.3%; and 1995, 25%.
Beijing argues that these six years of hikes were offset by
130 percent inflation. Yet the PRC's stated defense budget
does not include research and development, military
education, and extra-budgetary appropriations, such as the
1992 purchase of 26 Shukhoi-27 fighters from Russia. Modest
salaries, free housing, and free medical services represent
far lower outlays for pay and benefits for military personnel
than in the West; hence, more of the PRC's defense budget
goes to hardware.
Assessing the real value of Communist China's defense
budget is extraordinarily difficult because of the
aforementioned vehicles, unknown levels of civilian
production from the PRC's military-industrial complex, and
Beijing's reluctance to publish accurate statistics. As a
result, comparative analyses of the PRC's defense budget
range from $18 to $90 billion.
chinese communist aggression in disputes with taiwan and elsewhere
The recent PLA buildup in land, sea, and air forces and the
overall increase in military spending in the last six years
are fueling the fears of Communist China's neighbors--
especially Taiwan. The buildup aggravates a number of
longstanding disputes in Asia involving the PRC. series of
overt Communist Chinese provocations have further heightened
tensions in the region.
One of Asia's most volatile strategic issues is the
relationship between the PRC and Taiwan. Beijing has
repeatedly declared its intent to use military force against
Taiwan should the latter move toward independence. The PLA
regularly holds large-scale combined air and naval exercises
in close proximity to Taiwan. The most recent exercises
coincided with Taiwan's national legislative elections and
were designated to browbeat the Taiwanese electorate and show
that Beijing is serious about using force in the event the
island chooses an independent course. The PRC fired six
nuclear-capable missiles in July 1995 about 100 miles north
of Taiwan, shortly after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's
visit to his alma mater, Cornell University.
The PRC's belligerence has recently been raised to a new
plane. Chinese Communist political and military leaders told
former Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman that the
PRC had drafted plans to attack Taiwan with conventional
missile strikes for 30 days if President Less refuses to
desist in his calls for international recognition.
Beijing's threatening statements and actions towards
Taiwan are profoundly troubling, at a time when Taiwan
prepares to fully enter the worlds family of democracies
by holding its first free presidential election in March
1996.
Ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands is one of the
most contentious territorial issues in Asia. The
strategically-located Spratly Islands extend some seven
hundred miles south of mainland China and hold oil and
natural gas reserves of an estimated 45 billion tons, valued
at $1.5 trillion. The island chains are claimed by seven
nations (the PRC, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and the Philippines), with five (all but Brunei
and Indonesia) deploying military forces in the area.
In July 1992, Vietnam signed a contract for Spratly Island
oil exploration rights with the Mobil Oil Corporation.
Exploration was blocked by PLA naval forces. And in February
1995, Communist China was discovered to have established an
outpost on Mischief Reef, located in part of the Spratly
Islands claimed by the Philippines. In March, the Philippine
Navy responded by destroying small structures and concrete
markers the PRC had erected on three reefs. Since then, PLA
and Philippine warships have provoked each other, and both
nations have detained the other's fishing ships in the area.
Communist China has additional territorial disputes with
Japan over the Senkaku-Shoto Islands and with India
concerning the Himalayan frontier, a dispute that led to
armed conflict between India and China in 1962. Moreover, the
Communist regime faces separatist movements in the
northwestern provinces of Xinjiang, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia
and Tibet. The PLA build-up has ominous implications for how
the PRC might employ expanded military capabilities both
abroad and at home.
u.s. interests and clinton administration vacillation
The U.S. has an immense economic stake in stability in the
Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for more than 36 percent
of U.S. international trade. Seventy percent of Asia-Pacific
oil transits the South China Sea and the Spratly Island
chain. Communist China's bellicose approach to territorial
disputes in that region could affect a significant part of
American foreign commerce.
The United States has a substantial stake in supporting
fledgling and established democracies in Asia, and a special
stake in supporting Taiwan. Taiwan is America's sixth largest
trading partner, with hard currency reserves of over $90
billion. Also, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 implies a
commitment of U.S. assistance in the event of foreign
aggression.
Recently, as a sign of its commitment to Taiwan, the
Congress initiated legislation to permit the sale of F-16
aircraft to that nation and to support Li Teng-hui's visit to
the U.S. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has made
its commitment to supporting Taiwan anything but crystal
clear. In the event of military attack by the PRC on Taiwan,
a senior State Department official was quoted by U.S. News &
World Report on October 30, 1995 as saying, Clinton
Administration policy is ``meant to be ambiguous. . . . You
don't really know what would happen until you get there . . .
we would not be in a position to react with force. We would
not elect to do that I'm sure.'' Such a posture seems quite
unambiguous, and it's small wonder that the Chinese Communist
leaders view the Administration's policy as a green light to
bully Taiwan--or worse. One Chinese leader told Chas Freeman
that the PRC does not fear retribution from the U.S. because
American leaders ``care more about Los Angeles than they do
about Taiwan,'' which the former Clinton Administration
official interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons
against the U.S. should it defend Taiwan.
[[Page H1204]]
Clinton's Taiwan policy is not an isolated case of weakness
encouraging the PRC's bellicosity. The Clinton Administration
has squandered U.S. credibility through a dizzying series of
policy flip-flops and retreats in the region. The most
noticeable reversal to the PRC was on most-favored nation
(MFN) trade status. Candidate Clinton excoriated President
Bush for kowtowing to the PRC's leadership after the
Tianenmen massacre of June 1989. In May 1993, Clinton issued
an Executive Order formally linking the PRC's MFN status to
progress on human rights in Communist China, which he had
charged Bush with overlooking. Then, on May 26, 1994--almost
exactly one year after the Executive Order--President Clinton
tore up the Order, separating MFN trade status from human
rights.
Another Asian policy cave-in that did not go unnoticed in
the PRC followed the Administration's May 16, 1995 threat to
slap 100 percent tariffs on luxury cars exported by Japan to
the United States as a result of a Section 301 unfair trade
practices case involving sale of autoparts in Japan. On June
28, 1995, the Administration cast aside its threat in a
``compromise'' in which Japan made no commitments to
particular numbers of foreign autoparts it had to buy or of
dealerships that would sell foreign cars. And yet again
Clinton's vow not to allow the North Korean tyranny to retain
nuclear weapons was promptly followed by the August 12, 1995
``framework agreement,'' in which the Administration rewarded
Communist North Korea for its nuclear weapons program with
aid and reactor technology. Whatever the merits of Clinton's
ultimate position, the fact that he was so willing to alter
his policies in the face of any resistance has not been lost
on the Chinese Communists.
conclusion
Asian nations are concerned because the Chinese Communist
leadership has historically shown a willingness to use
military force to settle disputes within what it regarded as
its sphere of influence. The PLA has seen battle at least 11
times since the inception of the Chinese Communist
dictatorship in 1949. China's build-up of naval forces is
designed to expand this sphere by enhancing its ability to
project force; this program has already spawned a naval arms
race among Asian nations. These developments have created
mounting regional instability.
Its vast size, population, economy, and air and naval force
projection capabilities make Communist China a tremendous
regional power. The PRC's growing force-projection
capabilities are further destabilizing the Asia-Pacific
region. The rising military profile of Communist China in
that region--in terms of both capability and aggressive
intent--necessitates policies to protect American economic
interests and the democracies in the region. And the greatest
danger is to the Taiwanese democracy--which the PRC is now
threatening to attack or invade. Despite repeated claims that
the Asia-Pacific region is its top priority, the Clinton
Administration has unwittingly encouraged Communist Chinese
imperialism, and has completely failed to promote robust
policies to counter these ominous trends.
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