[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 14 (Thursday, February 1, 1996)]
[House]
[Pages H1202-H1204]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




   THINK TWICE, COMMUNIST CHINA, BEFORE YOU USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from California [Mr. Horn] is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. HORN. Mr. Speaker, the diplomatic recognition of the government 
in Beijing in 1979 did not end our relationship with Taiwan. The Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979 formally reiterated United States support for the 
people of Taiwan. Since 1979, U.S. relations have grown steadily closer 
with both the People's Republic and the Republic of China within the 
framework of ``One China, Two Systems.'' Despite the growing 
interaction of the United States with both governments, a dark cloud 
hangs over future peaceful development. This dark cloud is the refusal 
of the Beijing Government to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.
  Beijing still regards Taiwan as a renegade province that is destined 
to return to the motherland of China--by peaceful means if possible, by 
force if necessary. If the people of Taiwan freely and fairly choose to 
reunite with the mainland--which they have not yet done--then that is 
their business. If the people of Taiwan are forced to reunite with the 
mainland--or are intimidated into doing so--then that situation will 
become the business of the whole world, including the United States of 
America. The people of Taiwan are friends of the United States, as we 
are friends with them. We respect the aspirations of the Taiwanese and 
support them in the pursuit of their dreams.
  Increasingly, the people of Taiwan also seek a role in governing 
themselves--a dream that will be fully realized on March 23 when they 
freely elect their own president and national assembly. This free 
election is the culmination of years of reform in the political process 
in Taiwan. It is an obvious contradiction to those who say that Asian 
cultures cannot and do not support widespread democratic reforms. That 
is the view by many of the autocrats of Asia. Sadly, it is also the 
view within some Western circles. March 23 will be an historic date in 
the advance of freedom during this troubled century.
  There is no freedom for the 1.1 billion people of mainland China. 
There is growing economic freedom. But the aging Communist oligarchy 
that rules the People's Republic of China is out of step with the 
aspirations of its own dynamic citizenry.
  Now, in recent weeks, officials of the government in Beijing have 
recklessly escalated their rhetoric, threatening the lives of not only 
the people of Taiwan, but even the United States. In an appalling turn, 
the veiled threat of nuclear destruction has been leveled against 
Taiwan and the United States. Apparently, the mainland Chinese believe 
that the people of the United States, and Congress, will be cowed by 
their bluster. They are wrong.
  Shortly before the invasion of South Korea in June, 1950, it was 
suggested by the American Secretary of State that the Korean peninsula 
was outside of direct United States interests. This played a large part 
in encouraging the leaders of North Korea that the United States would 
not interfere with their plans to reunify Korea by force. The recently 
dedicated memorial on the Mall to the thousands of Americans who died 
to prevent aggression is proof that they were wrong. It would be a 
tragic mistake for the current leaders in Beijing to make the same 
mistake that their then allies in North Korea made nearly a half 
century ago. It is time for the President to clarify a somewhat stealth 
China policy that could invite disaster for the people of China, 
Taiwan, and the United States.
  The United States supports peace, and will welcome the opportunity to 
discuss and resolve our current differences with the people of China. 
The people of the United States have no dispute with the Chinese. We 
share many of the same interests. We agree on many important issues. It 
would be foolish to throw away years of careful progress. That progress 
has led to mutual friendship and mutual respect. That progress should 
not stop over aggressive moves that threaten peace. Unfortunately, 
recent actions by the 

[[Page H1203]]
Government of the People's Republic of China suggest that these hopes 
are not important to that current government.
  This, however, begs an important question: Is this situation 
important to the Chinese people? Do the people of China support the 
bellicose statements of their government? We have no way of knowing 
because, of course, their government has not asked them, and does not 
care what its own people think. This is why the United States supports 
Taiwan, and that is a fundamental reality that those in Beijing cannot 
ignore.
  Mr. Speaker, I ask consent to include the House Republican Policy 
Committee statement concerning ``Communist China's Taiwan Invasion 
Threat.''

                Communist China's Taiwan Invasion Threat

       On January 30, Communist China's Premier Li Peng emphasized 
     that in trying to absorb Taiwan as ``a region of China . . . 
     in the final analysis, we cannot promise to give up the use 
     of force.''
       This statement is the latest example of the PRC ratcheting 
     up unsubtle threats against Taiwan. In recent weeks, Chinese 
     Communist leaders told American visitors that the PRC was 
     preparing a plan for a sustained attack on Taiwan should it 
     pursue a policy that they deemed too ``independent.'' These 
     threats against Taiwan were coupled with threats of attack on 
     the U.S. should we seek to protect Taiwan--a remarkable slap 
     in the face to the President after three years of the 
     Administration's ``engagement'' policy, and in a region the 
     Administration has highlighted as its top foreign policy 
     priority.
       While a number of observers have been startled by Communist 
     China's most recent provocations, its threats against Taiwan 
     are part of a pattern aggressive behavior in territorial 
     deputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, Communist 
     China's economy and military structure have recently 
     undergone enormous changes, including a sustained nine-
     percent economic growth rate and dramatic--and ominous--
     transformation of the military's force structure and 
     doctrine. This recent growth and modernization of the 
     Communist Chinese military threatens vital U.S. national 
     security interests in Asia.


                   a growing people's liberation army

       Trends in People's Liberation Army (PLA) expenditures for 
     foreign military technology over the last decade reveal an 
     emphasis on force projection through air and naval power, 
     with a 2:3:5 ration for the Communist Chinese Army, Navy, and 
     Air Force respectively. In 1992, Admiral Liu Hauqing, Vice-
     Chairman of the Central Military Commission and the PRC's 
     highest ranking military officer, publicly affirmed that the 
     PLA Air Force and Navy would remain primary recipients of 
     funding for foreign military technology and weapon systems. 
     Recent notable purchases include: 26 Su 27 Soviet fighters 
     from Russia (with an additional 26 under negotiation); 24 Mil 
     Mi 17 helicopters from Soviet Union; 10 I1-76 heavy transport 
     planes from Russia; In-flight refueling technology; 100 
     Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles and four mobile 
     launchers; Rocket engines and missile guidance technology 
     from Russia; Uranium enrichment technology and nuclear 
     reactors from Russia; Airborne Early Warning (AEW) technology 
     from Israel; Stinger anti-aircraft missiles from the U.S.; 
     100 Klimov/Sarkisov RD33 jet engines from Russia; Avionics 
     from US for F-8II fighters; Artillery munitions production 
     equipment from the U.S.; Mark 46 MOD 2 anti-submarine 
     torpedoes from U.S.; 50 T-72 tanks from Russia; and 2-4 
     Kilo-class conventional submarines from Russia.
       The PLA has recently given a greater degree of attention to 
     development of combined arms, rapid deployment units, air 
     mobility, and a blue-water naval capability. Doctrinal 
     changes, weapon systems modernization, and imports of 
     advanced foreign weapons systems indicate an interest in 
     increasing the PRC's ability to project power beyond its 
     borders. Similarly, Beijing has announced its plans to 
     develop two 45,000-ton aircraft carriers within the next 
     decade, and the PLA is already capable of conducting military 
     actions in close proximity to China's borders.
       The PLA's greater emphasis on force project through the 
     development of naval and air power resulted in substantial 
     changes in budget allocations. The PRC's official defense 
     budget has expanded every year since 1989, for an increases 
     of 141 percent. The annual increase are as follows: 1989, 
     13%; 1990, 15.5%; 1991, 12%; 1992, 13.8%; 1993, 13.9%; 1994, 
     20.3%; and 1995, 25%.
       Beijing argues that these six years of hikes were offset by 
     130 percent inflation. Yet the PRC's stated defense budget 
     does not include research and development, military 
     education, and extra-budgetary appropriations, such as the 
     1992 purchase of 26 Shukhoi-27 fighters from Russia. Modest 
     salaries, free housing, and free medical services represent 
     far lower outlays for pay and benefits for military personnel 
     than in the West; hence, more of the PRC's defense budget 
     goes to hardware.
       Assessing the real value of Communist China's defense 
     budget is extraordinarily difficult because of the 
     aforementioned vehicles, unknown levels of civilian 
     production from the PRC's military-industrial complex, and 
     Beijing's reluctance to publish accurate statistics. As a 
     result, comparative analyses of the PRC's defense budget 
     range from $18 to $90 billion.


   chinese communist aggression in disputes with taiwan and elsewhere

       The recent PLA buildup in land, sea, and air forces and the 
     overall increase in military spending in the last six years 
     are fueling the fears of Communist China's neighbors--
     especially Taiwan. The buildup aggravates a number of 
     longstanding disputes in Asia involving the PRC. series of 
     overt Communist Chinese provocations have further heightened 
     tensions in the region.
       One of Asia's most volatile strategic issues is the 
     relationship between the PRC and Taiwan. Beijing has 
     repeatedly declared its intent to use military force against 
     Taiwan should the latter move toward independence. The PLA 
     regularly holds large-scale combined air and naval exercises 
     in close proximity to Taiwan. The most recent exercises 
     coincided with Taiwan's national legislative elections and 
     were designated to browbeat the Taiwanese electorate and show 
     that Beijing is serious about using force in the event the 
     island chooses an independent course. The PRC fired six 
     nuclear-capable missiles in July 1995 about 100 miles north 
     of Taiwan, shortly after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's 
     visit to his alma mater, Cornell University.
       The PRC's belligerence has recently been raised to a new 
     plane. Chinese Communist political and military leaders told 
     former Assistant Secretary of Defense Chas Freeman that the 
     PRC had drafted plans to attack Taiwan with conventional 
     missile strikes for 30 days if President Less refuses to 
     desist in his calls for international recognition. 
     Beijing's threatening statements and actions towards 
     Taiwan are profoundly troubling, at a time when Taiwan 
     prepares to fully enter the worlds family of democracies 
     by holding its first free presidential election in March 
     1996.
       Ownership of the Paracel and Spratly Islands is one of the 
     most contentious territorial issues in Asia. The 
     strategically-located Spratly Islands extend some seven 
     hundred miles south of mainland China and hold oil and 
     natural gas reserves of an estimated 45 billion tons, valued 
     at $1.5 trillion. The island chains are claimed by seven 
     nations (the PRC, Brunei, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
     Indonesia, and the Philippines), with five (all but Brunei 
     and Indonesia) deploying military forces in the area.
       In July 1992, Vietnam signed a contract for Spratly Island 
     oil exploration rights with the Mobil Oil Corporation. 
     Exploration was blocked by PLA naval forces. And in February 
     1995, Communist China was discovered to have established an 
     outpost on Mischief Reef, located in part of the Spratly 
     Islands claimed by the Philippines. In March, the Philippine 
     Navy responded by destroying small structures and concrete 
     markers the PRC had erected on three reefs. Since then, PLA 
     and Philippine warships have provoked each other, and both 
     nations have detained the other's fishing ships in the area.
       Communist China has additional territorial disputes with 
     Japan over the Senkaku-Shoto Islands and with India 
     concerning the Himalayan frontier, a dispute that led to 
     armed conflict between India and China in 1962. Moreover, the 
     Communist regime faces separatist movements in the 
     northwestern provinces of Xinjiang, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia 
     and Tibet. The PLA build-up has ominous implications for how 
     the PRC might employ expanded military capabilities both 
     abroad and at home.


         u.s. interests and clinton administration vacillation

       The U.S. has an immense economic stake in stability in the 
     Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for more than 36 percent 
     of U.S. international trade. Seventy percent of Asia-Pacific 
     oil transits the South China Sea and the Spratly Island 
     chain. Communist China's bellicose approach to territorial 
     disputes in that region could affect a significant part of 
     American foreign commerce.
       The United States has a substantial stake in supporting 
     fledgling and established democracies in Asia, and a special 
     stake in supporting Taiwan. Taiwan is America's sixth largest 
     trading partner, with hard currency reserves of over $90 
     billion. Also, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 implies a 
     commitment of U.S. assistance in the event of foreign 
     aggression.
       Recently, as a sign of its commitment to Taiwan, the 
     Congress initiated legislation to permit the sale of F-16 
     aircraft to that nation and to support Li Teng-hui's visit to 
     the U.S. Unfortunately, the Clinton Administration has made 
     its commitment to supporting Taiwan anything but crystal 
     clear. In the event of military attack by the PRC on Taiwan, 
     a senior State Department official was quoted by U.S. News & 
     World Report on October 30, 1995 as saying, Clinton 
     Administration policy is ``meant to be ambiguous. . . . You 
     don't really know what would happen until you get there . . . 
     we would not be in a position to react with force. We would 
     not elect to do that I'm sure.'' Such a posture seems quite 
     unambiguous, and it's small wonder that the Chinese Communist 
     leaders view the Administration's policy as a green light to 
     bully Taiwan--or worse. One Chinese leader told Chas Freeman 
     that the PRC does not fear retribution from the U.S. because 
     American leaders ``care more about Los Angeles than they do 
     about Taiwan,'' which the former Clinton Administration 
     official interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons 
     against the U.S. should it defend Taiwan.
     
[[Page H1204]]

       Clinton's Taiwan policy is not an isolated case of weakness 
     encouraging the PRC's bellicosity. The Clinton Administration 
     has squandered U.S. credibility through a dizzying series of 
     policy flip-flops and retreats in the region. The most 
     noticeable reversal to the PRC was on most-favored nation 
     (MFN) trade status. Candidate Clinton excoriated President 
     Bush for kowtowing to the PRC's leadership after the 
     Tianenmen massacre of June 1989. In May 1993, Clinton issued 
     an Executive Order formally linking the PRC's MFN status to 
     progress on human rights in Communist China, which he had 
     charged Bush with overlooking. Then, on May 26, 1994--almost 
     exactly one year after the Executive Order--President Clinton 
     tore up the Order, separating MFN trade status from human 
     rights.
       Another Asian policy cave-in that did not go unnoticed in 
     the PRC followed the Administration's May 16, 1995 threat to 
     slap 100 percent tariffs on luxury cars exported by Japan to 
     the United States as a result of a Section 301 unfair trade 
     practices case involving sale of autoparts in Japan. On June 
     28, 1995, the Administration cast aside its threat in a 
     ``compromise'' in which Japan made no commitments to 
     particular numbers of foreign autoparts it had to buy or of 
     dealerships that would sell foreign cars. And yet again 
     Clinton's vow not to allow the North Korean tyranny to retain 
     nuclear weapons was promptly followed by the August 12, 1995 
     ``framework agreement,'' in which the Administration rewarded 
     Communist North Korea for its nuclear weapons program with 
     aid and reactor technology. Whatever the merits of Clinton's 
     ultimate position, the fact that he was so willing to alter 
     his policies in the face of any resistance has not been lost 
     on the Chinese Communists.


                               conclusion

       Asian nations are concerned because the Chinese Communist 
     leadership has historically shown a willingness to use 
     military force to settle disputes within what it regarded as 
     its sphere of influence. The PLA has seen battle at least 11 
     times since the inception of the Chinese Communist 
     dictatorship in 1949. China's build-up of naval forces is 
     designed to expand this sphere by enhancing its ability to 
     project force; this program has already spawned a naval arms 
     race among Asian nations. These developments have created 
     mounting regional instability.
       Its vast size, population, economy, and air and naval force 
     projection capabilities make Communist China a tremendous 
     regional power. The PRC's growing force-projection 
     capabilities are further destabilizing the Asia-Pacific 
     region. The rising military profile of Communist China in 
     that region--in terms of both capability and aggressive 
     intent--necessitates policies to protect American economic 
     interests and the democracies in the region. And the greatest 
     danger is to the Taiwanese democracy--which the PRC is now 
     threatening to attack or invade. Despite repeated claims that 
     the Asia-Pacific region is its top priority, the Clinton 
     Administration has unwittingly encouraged Communist Chinese 
     imperialism, and has completely failed to promote robust 
     policies to counter these ominous trends.

                          ____________________