[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 13 (Wednesday, January 31, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S666-S668]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                      U.S. TROOPS AS PEACEKEEPERS

 Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. President, I rise today to address America's 
role in implementing peace accords around the world, and in providing 
peacekeeping troops to enforce them. As we all know, President Clinton 
decided unilaterally to send American ground troops to Bosnia. During 
our debate on that decision, I argued that our troops have too high a 
political profile and 

[[Page S667]]
represent too powerful a nation to successfully implement the Dayton 
Accord.
  This is not to say, Mr. President, that our troops can never succeed 
as peacekeepers. In my opinion there have been and will continue to be 
occasions when our participation in peacekeeping efforts will advance 
U.S. strategic and political interests. But we do a disservice to our 
troops and to our Nation if we do not examine such operations coolly 
and dispassionately to determine whether we should, in fact, engage in 
them. Because we are likely to receive requests for American 
peacekeepers from a variety of sources in the future, Mr. President, I 
would like to further clarify my views on the criteria we should apply 
before putting our sons and daughters in harm's way.
  In my view it is our duty in dealing with such requests to assess the 
nature of the conflict and determine if our troops are appropriate. We 
also, however, must assess how directly events in the area impact on 
our interests. We then must determine whether in fact a peace exists 
which we can help keep, and whether our relations with any of the 
parties to the conflict are sufficiently close that we would be willing 
to assume this greater responsibility.
  Therefore, let me express an overall theme which I believe warrants 
specific elaboration. When we previously considered the issue of 
peacekeeping and U.S. troop deployments, I felt many in this body were 
searching for some absolute, universal theories to guide our actions. I 
do not believe that is necessary. In fact, I would argue that decisions 
such as these require us to accept that our national interests vary 
from region to region and from situation to situation. We must 
therefore consider our options on a case-by-case basis. These 
situations almost never call for black-or-white, do-or-die, absolute 
decisions. Instead we are usually presented with a sliding scale of 
U.S. interests, transitory levels of progress toward establishing a 
just and lasting peace, and fluid relationships with the parties 
involved. It may be possible to develop a theoretical model to address 
these gradations, and give us a quantitative output as to whether or 
not we should intercede, but I doubt such a model would be workable if 
it could even be developed. Therefore, I believe we must accept that 
these situations are best analyzed on an individualized and prudential 
basis, where the sliding scales of U.S. national interests, the 
probability of success, and the current state of U.S. international 
relations are all measured against one another.
  Having said that, Mr. President, let me now discuss one area where I 
believe some generalizations can be made regarding the deployment of 
U.S. troops as peacekeepers. I believe American troops are singularly 
ill-suited to serve in traditional peacekeeping roles, and that their 
deployment in such roles should be the exception rather than the rule. 
Because our national interests are so extensive and widespread, we 
almost always will be seen as an interested party, taking sides in the 
conflict rather than serving as neutral arbiters. Traditional 
peacekeeping demands objectivity and strict neutrality. Peacekeeping 
troops themselves may be forced to take action against one side or the 
other in particular circumstances, but they must be perceived as being, 
on the whole, scrupulously neutral.
  Our troops are the fighting forces of the world's sole remaining 
superpower. This means that they bring to the field their status as 
fighting forces for the world's sole remaining superpower, and the 
living representation of our Nation's political will. Because our 
influence and interests are so far-flung, the mere presence of our 
troops in a particular area is a political statement. Both sides will 
see our troops as potential allies or enemies who can decide the 
outcome of a continued conflict. Therefore, I believe traditional 
peacekeeping is best conducted by smaller countries who are not 
perceived to have any vested interest in the outcome of a conflict; 
who, because their country's interests are marginal in the area of 
conflict, are undeniably neutral.
  However, even if circumstances favor use of American peacekeepers we 
must keep in mind that our ability to deploy troops is not sufficient 
reason to do so. In my view this administration has too willingly 
committed our troops and national resources to foreign hot spots on the 
naive assumption that we can and should develop a world police force. 
Mr. President, I believe we must remember that a peacekeeping mission 
is not just another peacetime deployment overseas. It is a dangerous 
situation in which troops are intentionally placed among warring 
parties in order to construct some sense of order and discipline.
  American troops are highly visible and so will be especially at risk 
in these conditions. This makes it our duty, as policy makers, to 
commit troops only where our vital interests are at stake. We neither 
can nor should subordinate our interests to those of any abstract, 
world-wide organization beholden to dictators who see us as enemies. 
Rather, in deciding whether to deploy U.S. troops to a particular area, 
we first must weigh the extent to which success in that area will 
advance our national interests. Only where vital national interests are 
at stake should we expose our troops to extraordinary danger.
  Mr. President, please let me also reiterate my earlier statement as 
to the sliding-scale of interests that usually lay before us. The more 
directly and significantly our national interests are effected by 
instability in a particular area, the greater will be the argument for 
the deployment of U.S. troops. Again, I do not believe that there is 
some definitive level of American interests that signals the call for 
U.S. involvement, but rather, the effect upon our interests must be 
measured against the degree to which the other criteria I have 
established are impacted.
  Which brings me to my second criteria--the probability of success in 
furthering our national interests. It makes little sense to me to 
undertake a mission that has little or no chance of success unless the 
threats to our national interests are so great, that such a high level 
of risk is justified. With peacekeeping, compared to other, more 
traditional military missions, the risk should be low given 
the relatively low return we can expect from a mission, which by 
definition, is supposed to be nonconfrontational. I will repeat again 
that there is not, in my opinion, some definitive level of risk which 
we should not cross in a peacekeeping mission; the measurement of that 
risk should be weighed along the sliding scale of national interests 
and broader international relations we maintain with the various 
parties to the conflict.

  Furthermore, the probability of success will, in my opinion, be much 
greater for those conflicts where a peace is already at hand, arrived 
at by the parties themselves from a true desire to end the conflict and 
find some common ground from which to build a future. In those 
situations, a peacekeeping force from a trusted friend may be just the 
step necessary to allay fears and allow the peace process to continue. 
But when the United States, from a position of superiority or 
paternalism, attempts to impose a peace upon warring factions in an 
essentially unresolved conflict, the underlying issues continue to 
smolder, and the chances for success drop dramatically.
  There is, however, a third factor which I believe must be considered 
in any decision to deploy U.S. forces: the degree to which our 
relationships with the countries of the region will be improved by our 
participation. At times, for example, while both sides of a conflict 
wish for peace, one side or the other is so frightened that only 
American assurances will be sufficient to quiet them. Furthermore, 
there are countries who are such trusted friends and allies, that their 
security is a national interest for us too. And just as I have stated 
earlier regarding the sliding scale with which I believe we should make 
such analyses, the closer and more significant our relations are with 
the countries of the region, the more willing we should be to deploy 
our troops in support of a peace accord.
  But in such a case we must not seek merely to mimic traditional 
peacekeepers like the Swedes or Fijians, following some inflexible 
policy of impartiality. Rather, we should, in my view, make clear that 
we will not tolerate threats to our interests, or to the interests of 
our friends. Precisely because we always are perceived as choosing 
sides, such a statement of interest, if backed up by military presence, 
will be believed.
  Two cases where we have become involved may shed some light on how I 

[[Page S668]]
  think we should apply these criteria. In the Sinai, America saw the 
confluence of vital national security interests, a strong probability 
of success emerging from a peace accord initiated and completed by 
Egypt and Israel, and a conflict where two of our close allies 
requested our involvement. The Middle East conflicts of the last 50 
years have repeatedly placed the United States at odds with the Arab 
world. The threats to the vital energy supplies of the West's 
industrial base threatened our most significant national interests. 
Indeed, the world-wide economic recessions of the late 1970's and early 
1990's are both directly attributable to the oil shocks of 1973 and 
1990.
  The threats to our national security alone were sufficient to warrant 
our involvement. But, in this case, the criteria of our international 
relations with the involved countries was also met through our ties 
with Egypt and Israel. The Camp David Accord was a consummation of a 
growing United States-Egyptian relationship, heralding a breakthrough 
in United States-Arab relations. Started with the shuttle diplomacy of 
Henry Kissinger, and culminating in the extensive military-to-military 
relationship developing through our assistance programs, the deployment 
of American troops to the Sinai helped cement our emerging relationship 
with Egypt. Furthermore, our commitment to Israeli sovereignty and 
security has always been a cornerstone of United States Middle East 
policy. Our participation in the Sinai multinational observer force 
directly improved our relationship with both countries, helped 
stabilize the Middle East, and directly represented our commitment to 
the success of the Camp David Accords. It is doubtful our close 
relations with either country, the successful establishment of 
Palestinian authority, or the Israeli-Jordanian Peace Agreement, would 
have been possible without our peacekeeping pledge.
  Finally, the probability of success for the Camp David Accord was 
particularly high given that the combatant states themselves initiated 
the process and had the most to lose by its failure. It was apparent 
from the start that both Anwar Sadat and Menachim Begin wanted peace, 
but needed assistance in finding a way to protect their vital national 
security interests. In such a situation, the good offices provided by 
the United States, and the assurances to Israeli security provided by 
the presence of our troops, were the critical elements in securing the 
Accord.
  The Dayton agreement, on the other hand, in my view represents a 
situation in which an American peacekeeping presence is not justified. 
As I stated during the authorization debate, there is a American 
interest in resolving the Balkan conflict arising from the threat of 
broader European instability, the strain the conflict places on our 
relationships with our NATO allies, and the friction it causes between 
Eastern and Western Europe. But none of these threats is so far along 
the scale of national interest that they warrant our involvement in and 
of their own right. In fact, when measured against the other criteria 
of success probability and our relationships with the regional states, 
I believe a compelling case is made for the United States to 
participate in a peacekeeping mission.
  As I just explained, I believe American troops are particularly ill 
suited to serve as traditional, impeccably neutral peacekeepers. They 
present too ripe a political target and bring too much political 
baggage simply because of the flag they fly. Because there are 
alternatives to United States ground involvement, including the 
provision of air and naval forces, logistical support, and financial 
resources to support other nations' forces, I believe it is wiser to 
use smaller, more traditional peacekeeping forces from areas such as 
Scandinavia, Africa, and Asia.
  Furthermore, I am not convinced the Dayton Accord was anything other 
than an imposed peace by a paternalistic Clinton administration. 
Whereas both the Israelis and Egyptians had concluded that further use 
of arms was fruitless and counterproductive, the Balkan parties, in my 
opinion, believe force may still be a legitimate tool to achieve their 
political aims. In fact, the Washington Times of 31 January 1996 quoted 
a draft version of a new national intelligence estimate as stating, 
``the former combatants share a deep, mutual distrust and will continue 
to seek achievement of their fundamental goals, rather than 
accommodation, even as the Dayton agreement proceeds * * *. They will 
see compromise as a zero-sum game and attempt to divide and manipulate 
the international community in the way the accords are implemented.'' 
Until all sides truly want peace, I am doubtful that any peace 
agreement, no matter how elegantly crafted, will hold in the long run. 
An imposed peace is, to me, only conflict delayed. Once we leave, I 
believe the conflict will start anew.
  Mr. President, I wish we could decide when and where to deploy 
American troops in support of peacekeeping missions by consulting a 
checklist of clearly definable and easily quantifiable criteria. 
Unfortunately, the world is not so simplistic. Each conflict, each 
situation that begs our involvement, each call for America to serve as 
policeman or arbiter of justice, presents an enormous range of national 
security concerns. Along the broad scales of national interests, 
international relations, and mission success feasibility, we must 
identify the net result for each situation and determine what action 
will best advance our national goals. It is not easy, it is not clean, 
but we must do it. Often times, I believe we will discover that our 
national interests are not sufficiently implicated to warrant the 
disproportionate risk under which our military must labor simply 
because they are the highly visible political force of the world's only 
superpower. But at other times, especially when our interests do lie 
with the protection of one or more parties to a conflict, the 
deployment of U.S. peacekeepers may reasonably advance our national 
interests. At times like these, we must be ready and willing to make 
such a commitment to assisting our friends and allies in achieving true 
and lasting peace.

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