Congressional Record, Volume 142 Issue 11 (Friday, January 26, 1996)

[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 11 (Friday, January 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S461-S484]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

TREATY WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE START II TREATY)

The PRESIDING OFFICER. As in executive session, the Senate will now
consider the ratification of the START II treaty.
The clerk will state the resolution of ratification.

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring
therein), That (a) The Senate advise and consent to the
ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on
January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and
memorandum of understanding, all such documents being
integral parts of and collectively referred to as the ``START
II Treaty'' (contained in Treaty Document 103-1), subject to
the conditions of subsection (b) and the declarations of
subsection (c):
(1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of
Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo
Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(also known as the ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
(2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy
Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and
the Russian Federation Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Exhibitions and
Inspections Protocol'').
(3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution
and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
(also known as the ``Memorandum on Attribution'').
(b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to
the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the
following conditions, which shall be binding upon the
President:
(1) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a
party to the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on
July 3, 1991 (in this resolution referred to as the ``START
Treaty'') or the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that
is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the respective
Treaty or is in violation of either the START or START II
Treaty so as to threaten the national security interests of
the United States, then the President shall--
(A) consult with and promptly submit a report to the Senate
detailing the effect of such actions on the START Treaties;
(B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest
diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the
objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
(C) in the event that a party other than the Russian
Federation is determined not to be in compliance--
(i) request consultations with the Russian Federation to
assess the viability of both START Treaties and to determine
if a change in obligations is required in either treaty to
accommodate the changed circumstances; and
(ii) submit for the Senate's advice and consent to
ratification any agreement changing the obligations of the
United States; and
(D) In the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate
resolution of support of continued adherence to one or both
of the START Treaties, notwithstanding the changed
circumstances affecting the object and purpose of one or both
of the START Treaties.
(2) Treaty obligations.--Ratification by the United States
of the START II Treaty--
(A) obligates the United States to meet the conditions
contained in this resolution of ratification and shall not be
interpreted as an obligation by the United States to accept
any modification, change in scope, or extension of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (commonly
referred to as the ``ABM Treaty''), and
(B) changes none of the rights of either party with respect
to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, in particular, Articles
13, 14, and 15.
(3) Financing implementation.--The United States
understands that in order to be assured of the Russian
commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must
maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation
of the START II Treaty. The costs of implementing the START
II Treaty should be borne by both parties to the Treaty. The
exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II
Treaty shall not be contingent upon the United States
providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of
commitments by Russia under the START II Treaty.
(4) Exchange of letters.--The exchange of letters--
(A) between Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, dated December
29, 1992, regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the
territory of Kazakstan,
(B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, and
December 31, 1992, regarding heavy bombers, and
(C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Secretary
of Defense Richard Cheney, dated December 29, 1992, and
January 3, 1993, making assurances on Russian intent
regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers
of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
(all having been submitted to the Senate as associated with
the START II Treaty),

are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the
START II Treaty. The United States shall regard actions
inconsistent with obligations under those exchanges of
letters as equivalent under international law to actions
inconsistent with the START II Treaty.
(5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles composed
of items that are limited by the START Treaty or the START II
Treaty shall be subject to the obligations undertaken in the
respective treaty.

[[Page S462]]

(6) NTM and Cuba.--The obligation of the United States
under the START Treaty not to interfere with the national
technical means (NTM) of verification of the other party to
the Treaty does not preclude the United States from pursuing
the question of the removal of the electronic intercept
facility operated by the Government of the Russian Federation
at Lourdes, Cuba.
(7) Implementation Arrangements.--(A) The START II Treaty
shall not be binding on the United States until such time as
the Duma of the Russian Federation has acted pursuant to its
constitutional responsibilities and the START II Treaty
enters into force in accordance with Article VI of the
Treaty.
(B) If the START II Treaty does not enter into force
pursuant to subparagraph (A), and if the President plans to
implement reductions of United States strategic nuclear
forces below those currently planned and consistent with the
START Treaty, then the President shall--
(i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such
reductions on the national security of the United States; and
(ii) take no action to reduce United States strategic
nuclear forces below that currently planned and consistent
with the START Treaty until he submits to the Senate his
determination that such reductions are in the national
security interest of the United States.
(8) Presidential Certification and Report on National
Technical Means.--Within 90 days after the United States
deposits instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty,
the President shall certify that United States National
Technical Means are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring
of Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty
governing the capabilities of strategic missile systems. This
certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate
of the United States indicating how United States National
Technical Means, including collection, processing and
analytic resources, will be marshalled to ensure effective
monitoring. Such report may be supplemented by a classified
annex, which shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on
Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
(c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the
following declarations, which express the intent of the
Senate:
(1) Cooperative Threat Reductions.--Pursuant to the Joint
Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the
Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to in Moscow, May
10, 1995, between the President of the United States and the
President of the Russian Federation, it is the sense of the
Senate that both parties to the START II Treaty should attach
high priority to--
(A) the exchange of detailed information on aggregate
stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile
materials, and on their safety and security;
(B) the maintenance at distinct and secure storage
facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of fissile materials
removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to
national security requirements for the purpose of confirming
the irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons
reduction; and
(C) the adoption of other cooperative measures to enhance
confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material
stockpiles.
(2) Asymmetry in Reductions.--(A) It is the sense of the
Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the
START or START II Treaty, the President should, within the
parameters of the elimination schedules provided for in the
START Treaties, regulate reductions in the United States
strategic nuclear forces so that the number of accountable
warheads under the START and START II Treaties possessed by
the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable
number of accountable warheads possessed by the United States
to an extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the
national security interests of the United States results.
(B) Recognizing that instability could result from an
imbalance in the levels of strategic offensive arms, the
Senate calls upon the President to submit a report in
unclassified form to the Committees on Foreign Relations and
Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of
each year beginning with January 31, 1997, and continuing
through such time as the reductions called for in the START
II Treaty are completed by both parties, which report will
provide--
(i) details on the progress of each party's reductions in
strategic offensive arms during the previous year;
(ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in
compliance with the terms of the START II Treaty or specifies
any act of noncompliance by the Russian Federation; and
(iii) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance
endangering the national security interests of the United
States exists.
(3) Expanding Strategic Arsenals in Countries Other Than
Russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that, if during the
time the START II Treaty remains in force or in advance of
any further strategic offensive arms reductions the President
determines there has been an expansion of the strategic
arsenal of any country not party to the START II Treaty so as
to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States,
then the president should consult on an urgent basis with the
Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II Treaty
remains in the national interest of the United States.
(4) Substantial Further Reductions.--Cognizant of the
obligation of the United States under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of July 1,
1968 ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at
any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control'', and in anticipation of the
ratification and entry into force of the START II Treaty, the
Senate calls upon the President to seek further strategic
offensive arms reductions to the extent consistent with
United States national security interests and calls upon the
other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early
consideration to corresponding reductions of their own
nuclear arsenals.
(5) Missile Technology Control Regime.--The Senate urges
the President to insist that the Republic of Belarus, the
Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation
abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control
Regime [MTCR]. For purposes of this paragraph, the term
``Missile Technology Control Regime'' means the policy
statement between the United States, the United Kingdom,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada,
and Japan, announced April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive
missile-relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and
any amendments thereto.
(6) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.--The Senate
declares its intention to consider for approval international
agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or
limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a
militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty
power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution.
(7) Treaty Interpretation.--The Senate affirms the
applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based
principles of treaty interpretation set forth in the
Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect
to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term
``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short Range
Missiles, together with the related memorandum of
understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May
27, 1988.
(8) Compliance.--(A) Concerned by the clear past pattern of
Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and
continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation,
the Senate declares that--
(i) the START II Treaty is in the interests of the United
States only if both the United States and the Russian
Federation are in strict compliance with the terms of the
Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent
to ratification, such compliance being measured by
performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to
comply; and
(ii) the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be in
strict compliance with its obligations under the terms of
START II Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification;
(B) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate
expects the executive branch of government to offer regular
briefings, but not less than four times each year, to the
Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on
compliance issues related to the START II Treaty. Such
briefings shall include a description of all United States
efforts in United States/Russian diplomatic channels and
bilateral fora to resolve the compliance issues and shall
include, but would not necessarily be limited to, a
description of the following:
(i) Any compliance issues the United States plans to raise
with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Implementation
Commission, in advance of such meetings.
(ii) Any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral
Implementation Commission, within thirty days of such
meetings.
(iii) Any Presidential determination that the Russian
Federation is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in
a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the
START II Treaty, within 30 days of such a determination, in
which case the President shall also submit a written report,
with an unclassified summary, explaining why it is in the
national security interests of the United States to continue
as a party to the START II Treaty.
(9) Submission of Future Agreements as Treaties.--The
Senate declares that, following Senate advice and consent to
ratification of the START II Treaty, any agreement or
understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or
reinterprets United States or Russian obligations under the
START II Treaty, including the time frame for
implementation of the Treaty, should be submitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
(10) Nature of Deterrence.--(A) On June 17, 1992,
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a Joint Understanding and
a Joint Statement at the conclusion of their Washington
Summit, the first of which became the foundation for the
START II Treaty. The second, the Joint Statement on a Global
Protection System, endorsed the cooperative development of a
defensive system against ballistic missile attack and
demonstrated the belief

[[Page S463]]
by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation that
strategic offensive reductions and certain defenses against
ballistic missiles are stabilizing compatible, and
reinforcing.
(B) It is, therefore, the sense of the Senate that:
(i) The long-term perpetuation of deterrence based on
mutual and severe offensive nuclear threats would be outdated
in a strategic environment in which the United States and the
Russian Federation are seeking to put aside their past
adversarial relationship and instead build a relationship
based upon trust rather than fear.
(ii) An offense-only form of deterrence cannot address by
itself the emerging strategic environment in which, as
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in January 1994,
proliferators acquiring missiles and weapons of mass
destruction ``may have acquired such weapons for the express
purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a
fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence.
. . . New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new
strategies should deterrence fail.''.
(iii) Defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for
new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should
deterrence fail. Because deterrence may be inadequate to
protect United States forces and allies abroad, theater
missile defense is necessary, particularly the most capable
systems of the United States such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier,
and the Space and Missile Tracking System. Similarly, because
deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States
against long-range missile threats, missile defenses are a
necessary part of new deterrent strategies. Such defenses
also are wholly in consonance with the summit statements from
June 1992 of the Presidents of the United States and the
Russian Federation and the September 1994 statements by
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who said, ``We now
have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not
on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on
another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''.
(iv) As the governments of the United States and Russia
have built upon the June 17, 1992, Joint Understanding in
agreeing to the START II Treaty, so too should these
governments promptly undertake discussions based on the Joint
Statement to move forward cooperatively in the development
and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.
(11) Report on Use of Foreign Excess Ballistic Missiles for
Launch Services.--It is the sense of the Senate that the
President should not issue licenses for the use of a foreign
excess ballistic missile for launch services without first
submitting a report to Congress, on a one-time basis, on the
implications of the licensing approval on nonproliferation
efforts under the Treaty and on the United States space
launch industry.
(12) United States Commitments Ensuring the Safety,
Reliability, and Performance of Its Nuclear Forces.--The
Senate declares that the United States is committed to
ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its
nuclear forces. To this end, the United States undertakes the
following additional commitments:
(A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a
robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining
nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that
will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the
United States nuclear arsenal at the START II levels and meet
requirements for hedging against possible international
developments or technical problems in conformance with United
States policies and to underpin deterrence.
(B) The United States is committed to reestablishing and
maintaining sufficient levels of production to support
requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of
United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain
production capabilities and capacities.
(C) The United States is committed to maintaining United
States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core
nuclear weapons competencies therein.
(D) As tritium is essential to the performance of modern
nuclear weapons, but decays radioactively at a relatively
rapid rate, and the United States now has no meaningful
tritium production capacity, the United States is committed
to ensuring rapid access to a new production source of
tritium within the next decade.
(E) As warhead design flaws or aging problems may occur
that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve, the
United States reserves the right, consistent with United
States law, to resume underground nuclear testing if that is
necessary to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons
stockpile. The United States is committed to maintaining the
Nevada Test Site at a level in which the United States will
be able to resume testing within one year following a
national decision to do so.
(F) The United States reserves the right to invoke the
supreme national interest of the United States to withdraw
from any future arms control agreement to limit underground
nuclear testing.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when I brought the START II Treaty to the
floor last month, I did so in my capacity as the manage for the Foreign
Relations Committee. In my opening statement, I sought to lay out for
the body the key provisions of the START II Treaty, the assessment of
the treaty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the force structure
implications of the treaty for both the Russian Federation and the
United States, and the reasons why this treaty is, on balance, in the
national security interests of the United States.
But, Mr. President, I have also approached consideration of the START
II Treaty from the vantage point of my membership on the Select
Committee on Intelligence. I have spent a great deal of time analyzing
United States capabilities to monitor compliance with arms control
treaties and the START II Treaty in particular.
I want to share with my colleagues my major findings and explain each
of them briefly.
First, no aspects of the START II Treaty text are likely to cause
compliance issues because of the manner in which they are worded.
I repeat, I have found no aspects of the START II Treaty text that
are likely to cause compliance issues because of the manner in which
they are worded. Indeed, START II, by banning test-flights and
deployment of MIRV'd ICBM's after 2003, may lessen the likelihood of
compliance issues regarding the number of re-entry vehicles with which
an ICBM is equipped or tested. It should generally be easier to
determine the presence or absence of MIRV's than the determine--or
agree upon--whether a numerical limit has been exceeded.
Second, U.S. national technical means are generally sufficient to
monitor compliance with both START Treaties. United States capabilities
could be insufficient, however, if competition for scarce collection
and analytic resources were intense and if Russian practices were to
change in ways designed to impede United States monitoring.
As in the case with START I monitoring, the United States will rely
upon a combination of capabilities--including imagery, signals
intelligence, human intelligence, open-source information and the
verification provisions of the START I and START II Treaties--to
monitor compliance with the provisions of START II. Despite the
strapped resources as well as systems and personnel reductions thus far
in the post-cold-war era, the intelligence community assesses a high
probability of detecting questionable activity that might be contrary
to the treaty.
I agree with the intelligence community that U.S. national technical
means are generally sufficient to monitor compliance with both START
Treaties. I have concerns, however, that U.S. capabilities could be
insufficient if competition for scarce collection and analytic
resources were to intensify and if Russian practices were to change in
ways designed to impeded U.S. monitoring. I support the recommendation
that the President be required to certify the sufficiency of U.S.
monitoring capabilities regarding those START II provisions relating to
ICBM and SLBM capabilities and to report to Congress on how such
sufficiency will be assured. I would also urge the executive branch to
pursue a firm policy regarding Russian actions that may violate the
terms of START I or START II, including the verification provisions of
those treaties.
Third, I have recommended that the resolution of ratification be
conditioned on a requirement that the President certify and, within 90
days of exchanging the instruments of ratification, submit to the
Congress a plan for ensuring continued, adequate monitoring of Russian
ICBM and SLBM capabilities. This condition has been included in the
manager's package of amendments to the resolution of ratification,
accepted by the Senate last month.

The intelligence community's monitoring confidences reflect a vastly
changed world from that of a decade ago. The end of the cold war has
brought a substantial refocusing of United States intelligence from the
old Soviet Union to a much wider variety of threats to the national
security. Indicative of this change is the fact that in the fiscal year
1996 budget process, the Department of Defense opposed funding the
COBRA DANE radar. In order to protect that important arms control
monitoring system, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]
stepped in and took responsibility for its funding. The Congress,
instead, restored full funding for the COBRA DANE platform in the
fiscal

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year 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act, an action that was sustained
in the Defense appropriations bill.
Some other systems that monitor Russian missile tests face uncertain
funding futures or are increasingly diverted to other intelligence
priorities, like Bosnia and North Korea, or even to nonintelligence
functions. Although intelligence officials remain confident of overall
U.S. monitoring capabilities, they have acknowledged that these actions
affect those capabilities.
I find it totally unacceptable that coverage by National Technical
Means of Russian strategic missiles--still the systems with by far the
greatest capability to effect the nuclear destruction of United States
territory--should be available only at the expense of other important
intelligence priorities. That is why I recommend that the resolution of
advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty be
conditioned on a requirement that the President certify and, within 90
days of exchanging instruments of ratification, submit to the Congress
a plan for ensuring, continued adequate monitoring of Russian ICBM and
SLBM capabilities.
Fourth, it is imperative that the executive branch exercise its START
II Treaty right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into
each Russian SS-18 silo that is to be converted.
The intelligence community judges that it can monitor with virtual
certainty the elimination or conversion of declared items and the
number of deployed silo-based ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers that
remain in the Russian force. Treaty provisions designed to enhance
verification play important roles in augmenting U.S. National Technical
Means in this regard. The 10 annual reentry vehicle inspections
permitted under START I will help assure, over time, that those silos
are not being used for MIRV'ed missiles, and the 4 extra reentry
vehicle inspections at converted SS-18 silos that are provided for in
START II will add assurance regarding heavy ICBM's.
One particularly important aspect of START II verification would be
the on-site inspection of SS-18 heavy ICBM silo conversions, to guard
against a breakout scenario involving speedy reconversion of SS-18
silos. U.S. inspectors can either physically witness the pouring of the
5 meters of concrete in the bottom of the silo or measure silo depth
before and after the concrete was poured. In order to guard against
improper implementation of the conversion procedures, it is imperative
that the executive branch exercise its START II Treaty right to observe
the entire process of pouring concrete into each SS-18 silo that is to
be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.
Fifth, I urge the firmest practicable policy regarding compliance
with START I provisions on the transmission and provision of missile
flight test telemetry and interpretive data.
The intelligence community generally expects to be able to monitor
the ban on flight-testing of MIRV'd ICBM's after 2003, assuming it
receives the good telemetry data mandated by START I. The importance of
the START I provisions regarding the transmission and provision of
missile flight-test telemetry and interpretative data cannot be
overestimated, and the executive branch must adopt the firmest
practicable policy regarding Russian compliance with those provisions.
Sixth, monitoring missile production and storage and, consequently,
the number of nondeployed missiles is inherently difficult. As the
Director of Central Intelligence has stated, it is possible that some
undeclared missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities. In
other words, the possible existence of covert, nondeployed mobile
missiles must remain an important U.S. intelligence target.

Monitoring missile production and storage and, consequently, the
number of nondeployed missiles is inherently difficult. At facilities
where the United States conducts continuous perimeter and portal
monitoring, the intelligence community's uncertainties are low.
Uncertainties are higher, however, in estimates of missiles production
at facilities not subject to continuous monitoring or on-site
inspection.
A cheating scenario involving covert production and deployment of
mobile ICBM's--and especially of MIRV'ed ICBM's--and their launchers
would be particularly worrisome. For that reason, the possible
existence of covert, nondeployed mobile missiles must remain an
important U.S. intelligence target.
Uncertainties in the estimates of numbers of nondeployed missiles
will make it difficult for the intelligence community to determine
whether all SS-18 airframes have been declared and eliminated as
required by START II. On the other hand, SS-18 missiles and canisters
are not mobile, are the largest ballistic missile system in the Russian
force, and require substantial equipment for handling and transport.
Storing and maintaining a covert force of any significant size would be
a major undertaking and would increase the risk of detection. As SS-18
silos are destroyed or coverted, moreover, the military utility of any
undeclared missiles should steadily diminish. The intelligence
community is quite confident of its ability to monitor the essentially
irreversible conversion of SS-18 silos.
Seventh, it will be difficult to determine whether Russian heavy
bombers are equipped with more than the number of nuclear weapons they
are declared to carry. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that
cheating scenarios that involve heavy bombers and air-launched cruise
missiles generally pose little risk of militarily significant
violations.
Mr. President, because heavy bomber weapon loadings can easily be
changed, the intelligence community will find it difficult to determine
whether Russian heavy bombers are equipped with more than the number of
nuclear weapons they are declared to carry. When this matter was
considered in the START I context, the executive branch emphasized that
heavy bombers are inherently stabilizing, and play a more important
role in the U.S. strategic force structure than in the Russian. General
Curtin of the Joint Staff noted at the time that cheating scenarios
that involve heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles generally
pose little risk of militarily significant violations. He noted that
heavy bombers and air-launch cruise missiles are slow flyers which
offer little potential for a surprise attack.
Eighth, the disincentives for Russia to cheat are substantial. I urge
the intelligence community, however, to base its collection and
analysis priorities upon a cautious appreciation of the record of
Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements.

The disincentives for Russia to cheat on START II are substantial.
Many cheating scenarios, such as the reconversion of converted SS-18
silos, would risk U.S. detection. The most feasible cheating scenarios
would yield only small gains. Thus, covertly reMIRVing all the 105
single-RV SS-19's allowed under START II would increase the number of
Russian reentry vehicles by only about 15 percent. And such scenarios
as the covert production of large numbers of ICBM's and their launchers
would require a considerable investment of scarce resources.
Despite these disincentives, however, I repeat that the intelligence
community needs to base its collection and analysis priorities upon a
more cautious appreciation of the record of Soviet and Russian
compliance with arms control agreements.
Last, the counterintelligence challenges inherent in START II will be
no greater than those of past treaties, and U.S. agencies are capable
of handling these challenges.

conclusion

Mr. President, let me close by reaffirming the conclusion I set forth
last month when I introduced the START II Treaty on this floor.
The START II Treaty is the result of a bipartisan effort, negotiated
by a Republican administration and submitted by a Democratic one. Three
Secretaries of State and Defense have supported it. START II represents
a substantial step forward in attempting to codify strategic stability
at greatly reduced levels of armaments. Final reductions must be
completed by January 1, 2003--namely, to levels of 3,000 to 3,500 total
warheads, of which no more than 1,750 can be based on submarines. It
has been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, with the 3,500
warheads allowed under this treaty, the United States would remain
capable of holding at risk a broad enough range of high value political
and military targets to

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deter any rational adversary from launching a nuclear attack against
the United States or against its allies.
START II removes the most destabilizing segment of nuclear
inventories--namely MIRV warheads and heavy ICBM's. Elimination also
includes all deployed heavy ICBM silos and all test and training
launchers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the verification
procedures are adequate to ensure that the United States will be able
to detect any significant violations. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff also believe that the verification provisions are sufficiently
restrictive to protect the United States against unnecessary intrusion
by Russian inspectors.
It is my belief that, on balance, the START II Treaty is in the
national security interests of the United States, and I would hope that
the Senate, having expressed its concerns and advice in the Resolution
of Ratification, would consent to the treaty by an overwhelming margin.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, this is indeed a fine day for the U.S.
Senate. The Senate has just given its advice and consent to
ratification of the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms, known as the START II Treaty.
Mr. President, the START II Treaty was considered thoroughly in
hearings that I chaired in May and June 1993, and that my colleague
from Indiana chaired in January, February, and March 1995. Witnesses
included Secretary of State Warren Christopher; former Secretary of
State Lawrence Eagleburger; Secretary of Defense William Perry; Gen.
John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; John Holum,
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ambassador Linton
Brooks, chief negotiator of the treaty; Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Director of
Central Intelligence, Mr. James Woolsey and Douglas MacEachin, Deputy
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Nongovernmental
witnesses included Steven Hadley, an attorney with Shea and Gardner;
Sven Kraemer, president, Global 2000; Michael Krepon, president, Henry
L. Stimson Center, and Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms
Control Association.
When it is considering treaties such as this, the committee makes a
particular point to receive the considered and independent judgment of
the Nation's military leaders for whom it is of critical importance
that there be no missteps in arms control. General John M.
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unequivocal
of his endorsement of the treaty:

The START Treaty offers a significant contribution to our
national security. Under its provisions, we achieve the long-
standing goal of finally eliminating both heavy ICBMs and the
practice of MIRVing ICBMs, thereby significantly reducing the
incentive for a first strike. For decades, we and the
Russians have lived with this dangerous instability. With
this treaty, we can at long last put it behind us.
The Joint Chiefs and I have carefully assessed the adequacy
of our strategic forces under START II. With the balanced
triad of 3500 warheads that will remain once this Treaty is
implemented, the size and mix of our remaining nuclear forces
will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against
any known adversary and under the worst assumptions. Both
American and Russian strategic nuclear forces will be
suspended at levels of rough equivalence; a balance with
greatly reduced incentive for a first strike. By every
military measure, START II is a sound agreement that will
make our nation more secure. Under its terms, our forces will
remain militarily sufficient, crisis stability will be
greatly improved, and we can be confident in our ability to
effectively verify its implementation. This Treaty is clearly
in the best interests of the United States.
On the behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend
that the Senate promptly give its advice and consent to the
ratification of the START II Treaty.

The resolution that the Senate has approved today reflects a careful,
bipartisan effort within the Committee on Foreign Relations. It also
deals with concerns raised by non-committee Members in amendments
approved on the Senate floor on December 22, 1995.
Senate consideration and consent to ratification has taken about 3
years. This is longer than I and others would have wished, but I would
remind others that the Senate has a long history of moving deliberately
on arms control treaties. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war, took 5 decades
for the Senate to approve.
Our action this evening comes at a most propitious moment. The
Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, will arrive in Washington
this weekend for the first top-level United States meetings since the
Russian elections in December. Approval of the START II Treaty should
prove a fortuitous move if it serves to spur comparable action in the
Russian Duma. There is to be a G-7 summit meeting in Moscow in April. I
would hope very much that the newly constituted Duma can act on the
treaty by that time, so as to permit exchange of instruments of
ratification and entry into force.
Mr. President, the START II Treaty is a major achievement by itself,
but it cannot be viewed alone. It must be seen as part of a critically
important continuum that began with SALT I, continued through SALT II
and led to START I and START II. There have been related agreements
such as the INF Treaty, which required the elimination of the
intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the United States and the Soviet
Union. There are complementary efforts such as the safe and secure
dismantlement program in Russia and attempts to negotiate a missile
material production control regime.

It can truly be said now that arms control has become an integral
part of our national security. We have learned well that the control
and reduction of weapons and the maintenance of a sound defense
structure are key ingredients of our national security. Our own efforts
in such ventures as START II serve to demonstrate to the world that we
are committed to the reduction of nuclear arms and are pursuing a path
that could lead to their elimination.
In closing, I would point out that the resolution of ratification
adopted by the Committee in an 18 to 0 vote recalls the obligation
undertaken by the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states
``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament and on a treaty on general complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control'', and states clearly that
``the Senate calls upon the parties to the START II Treaty to seek
further strategic offensive arms reductions consistent with their
national security interests and calls upon the other nuclear weapon
states to give careful and early consideration to corresponding
reductions of their own nuclear arsenals.''
Mr. President, we should be well pleased with our action today, but
we must not be satisfied. We must be both steadfast and unrelenting in
our efforts to spare our citizens and the world from the terrible
catastrophe of war, particularly war through means of weapons of mass
destruction.
Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the ratification of the
START II Treaty by the Senate. The case for ratification is, I believe,
overwhelming. Both the START I Treaty, negotiated under President
Reagan, and the START II Treaty, negotiated under President Bush, are
the end-products of bipartisan arms control support by both the
Congress and the American people.
Ratification of the START II Treaty is supported by the President, as
well as by Secretary of Defense Perry and General Shalikashvili, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense is
satisfied that the START II Treaty will be fully verifiable, and that
ratification and entry into force are in our national interest. The
START II Treaty is a continuation of the substantial reductions in
strategic weaponry brought about by the signing of the START I Treaty.
The signing of the START I Treaty occurred after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, at the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
and the development of democratic movements and free elections in the
countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These events have transformed the
longstanding bipolar relationship between the United States and the
now-vanished Soviet Union.
Given these historic changes, ratification of the START II Treaty is
the

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next logical step. Upon entry into full force, the START II Treaty will
further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads held in the
active inventories of the United States and Russia from about 8,000
weapons at START I levels by more than 50 percent. By the time START II
is fully implemented, the START I and START II Treaties will have led
to more than a three-fold reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear
warheads on line.
Moreover, the entry into force of this treaty will eliminate all of
the land-based, multiple-warhead, or MIRV'd, inter-continental
ballistic missiles from the arsenals of both sides. It has long been a
goal of U.S. arms control policy, under both Republican and Democratic
Presidents and Congresses, to eliminate these poised-for-instant-launch
MIRV'd ICBM's from the inventories of both sides. Elimination of these
land-based ICBM missiles, a required measure under the START II Treaty,
will help both to avoid a return to hair-trigger strategic postures on
both sides, and to put an end to any conceivable incentive for a
``bolt-from-the-blue'' attack.
Ratification of the START II Treaty is a highly cost-effective way to
reduce the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by nuclear
weapons. It will eliminate some 5,000 warheads from the Russian force
posture. Our modest verification cost will be dwarfed by the U.S.
defense budget savings that will flow from the retirements of our
excess strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the ratification of
the START II Treaty today, and to work to build support and
understanding of the advantages of the START II Treaty among the
members of the Russian Duma, prior to their consideration of the treaty
later this year. We need to take every opportunity to explain to the
new Duma the advantages that will accrue to Russia from the entry into
force of this treaty.
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, 3 years ago President George Bush and
President Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow to sign a second Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty. At that time, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
made it possible to achieve additional reductions in our nuclear
arsenals beyond those provided in the START I Treaty, thereby advancing
United States security and further reducing the threat of nuclear
proliferation. On December 5, 1994, President Clinton and the leaders
of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan convened in Budapest to
finalize the entry into force of START I, clearing the way for the
ratification of START II.
It has thus been a full year since START II has been ready for Senate
advice and consent to ratification, and I am pleased that it is finally
being considered by the full Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee
has held eight hearings on the treaty, in open and closed session, with
administration and private witnesses. On December 12, the treaty was
reported favorably on a unanimous vote of 18 to 0.
Let me elaborate on the substance of this treaty and its benefits to
U.S. security. Building upon START I, the START II Treaty advances our
interests by eliminating the most threatening and destabilizing types
of weapons in the Russian arsenal. Under the treaty, Russia has agreed
to destroy all of its heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles
[ICBM's], including all its SS-18 missiles, which were the centerpiece
of the former Soviet Union's strategic nuclear force. The treaty also
ends the practice of putting multiple warheads on (or ``MIRVing'')
ICBM's, a practice which had led to exponential increases in the number
of deployed nuclear warheads and heightened the threat of a first
nuclear strike. START II requires each side to reduce its deployed
warheads from the 6,000 allowed under START I to 3,500 by the year
2003. This will mean a significant reduction in Russia's deployed
nuclear warheads, which numbered over 10,000 when the Start Treaty went
into force.
In addition, START II limits the number of warheads deployed on
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBM's], and expands the
stringent verification regime put into place by START I. New
verification measures, including on-site inspections of SS-18 silo
conversions and missile elimination procedures, along with the
inspection for all heavy bombers, were added to START II to reduce the
risk of non-compliance.
Taken together, the two START treaties will reduce the deployed
strategic offensive arms of the United States and Russia by
approximately two-thirds by the year 2003. Two out of every three
weapons that were once aimed against the United States are going to be
dismantled or destroyed over a period of less than 10 years. The United
States will retain a credible nuclear deterrent while increasing our
ability to verify Russian compliance with its treaty obligations.
During the Committee proceedings, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General John Shalikashvili, gave the following testimony in
support of ratification:

Let me say at the outset that, on the basis of detailed
study of our security needs and careful review of the Treaty,
it is my judgment, and the unanimous opinion of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, that the START II Treaty is in the best
interests of the United States. I recommend the Senate
provide its advice and consent to START II's ratification.

President George Bush stated in his January 15, 1993 Letter of
Transmittal to the Senate--

The START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the
United States and represents a watershed in our efforts to
stabilize the nuclear balance and further reduce strategic
offensive arms. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt
and favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its
Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to give its
advice and consent to ratification.

Then-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger concluded in his letter
of submittal to President Bush--

This Treaty is truly an historic achievement. By
significantly reducing strategic offensive arms, and by
eliminating those that pose the greatest threat to stability,
the START II Treaty will enhance the national security of the
United States. It is in the best interest of the United
States of America, the Russian Federation, and, indeed, the
entire world that this Treaty enter into force promptly. I
strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice
and consent to ratification.

Mr. President, ratification of START II not only will lock in
reductions that benefit U.S. security directly, it will send an
important signal to other countries that the United States is serious
about nuclear non-proliferation. It will encourage other nations to
join us in the process of limiting weapons of mass destruction and will
lay the foundation for future arms control agreements. As Spurgeon
Keeny, Jr., President of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
warned, ``Failure to complete Senate action promptly could delay for
years the entry into force of these agreements with great disadvantage
to United States security.''
I think the risks of inaction are grave indeed, and I urge my
colleagues to join in giving prompt advice and consent to ratification.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me start off by saying that there is
nothing wrong with arms control in principle, but there are a lot of
reasons to oppose the START II treaty. The treaty does not destroy a
single Russian warhead. It talks about downgrading, reducing,
downloading, retiring, converting--all actions that can be reversed.
The Russians do not have to destroy the warheads.
I wondered also what would happen to those warheads if Russia should
decide to comply with the START II treaty--this is a big ``if,'' since
they have not complied with other treaties--but if they did, what would
happen to those warheads if they were, for example, to download them?
We all know the financial needs of the former Soviet Union, Russia in
particular. And we also know that there is a market for those warheads
in hostile areas of the world--in the Middle East, North Korea, China,
all throughout the world. You have to ask: what would happen to those
warheads? We are looking at an agreement that allows Russia to continue
modernization, build heavy missiles for 7 more years, and new
submarine-launched missiles, and new land missiles, including a hard-
to-find mobile missile that even the United States does not have. It
allows them to conduct aggressive military exercises and to increase
anti-U.S. intelligence.
I feel that no effective verification or enforcement could be put in
place with this treaty, even if the Russians should comply with it. But
let us look at the

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history. People assume they are going to comply with the START II
treaty but they did not comply with the START I treaty, they did not
comply with the biological weapons convention, with the chemical
weapons convention, the INF treaty, the ABM Treaty. Just around
Christmastime Pavel Grachev, who is the Minister of Defense for Russia,
made a statement that they did not intend to comply with our
Conventional Forces Europe treaty, the CFE treaty.
Their reason for not complying, he said, was that the CFE Treaty was
not a treaty made between the United States and Russia, but between the
United States and the USSR. I would ask why, if that is true, are we so
compelled to comply with the ABM Treaty, which also was not between the
United States and Russia, but was ratified in 1972 when Russia was
still the Soviet Union? So I have to ask the question, why is it so
important, at this particular time, to have the START II treaty?
Let us look at what has happened just recently. I know we all
rejoiced just a few years ago when Boris Yeltsin and the reformers took
control. But look what happened just in the last election, last
December, of the Duma. The Communists, now, have 157 seats; Boris
Yeltsin and the Reform Party, only 55 seats; the person I think most
people here dread more than anyone else, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, his
party, the Ultranationalists, took 51 seats. So he is almost even with
Yeltsin's party, and it is just one-third of what the Communists now
have. So, it is a totally different environment right now in Russia
from 1993, when the START II treaty was signed by President Bush and
President Yeltsin.
I think, when you realize that we are ratifying a flawed agreement
with a country that has never lived up to previous agreements, and that
we are accepting Russia's demands that we remain naked to missile
attacks from all over the world, that this is wrong.
On December 28 President Clinton vetoed the defense authorization
bill. His prime objection to this bill was that we were spending money
on a national missile defense system. In his message he declared that
this might violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prevents the deployment
of a multiple-site missile defense system in the United States. Clinton
stated that the missile defense plan ``* * * puts the United States
policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty and puts at risk
continued Russian implementation of the START I treaty and Russian
ratification of the START II treaty.''
Our President rejects a national missile defense system. He says that
U.S. national security in the post-cold-war world rests on two
treaties, the ABM Treaty and the START treaty, both negotiated at the
height of the cold war. That is the linkage the President is making. We
can argue whether or not there is a linkage between the ABM Treaty and
the START II treaty, but in fact the President thinks there is. He has
stated that there is, and he accepts the Russians' linkage between
these treaties, which says that we must abide by one, the ABM Treaty,
to get the other, the START treaty.
You might ask yourself the question: why is it that Russia is so
interested in those two treaties? First of all, I have serious doubts
that they would comply with the START II treaty. Maybe they have doubts
that they would, too. But it seems to me they are bent on our agreeing
to reduce our nuclear capability, which they would do to, and at the
same time they are even more interested in the ABM Treaty. I think this
is something we really have not talked about enough.

The ABM Treaty was one that was put together in a Republican
administration. It was Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's project. Dr.
Kissinger was the architect of the ABM Treaty of 1972. In 1972 we had
two superpowers in this world. Mr. President, we could identify who the
enemy was. At that time it seemed to be a good idea. I did not agree
with it at the time, but I certainly did not question the wisdom of
President Nixon and of Dr. Kissinger, because it seemed that a policy
of mutual assured destruction was in the best interests of the United
States. Simply put, that is a policy that says: we agree not to defend
ourselves and not to implement a national missile defense system if you
agree to do the same thing. That way, the risk of complete destruction
keeps us from attacking each other.
You may believe that this was not a good idea at the time. I did not
think it was a good idea. But there is certainly some justification for
it.
That is not the environment that we are in today. In fact, Henry
Kissinger himself has said that it is insane to continue with this type
of policy in today's environment when you have the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction all throughout the
world. It was Kissinger who said, and this is a direct quote: ``It is
nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.''
People have made several references to the fact that President Reagan
actually started some of the START negotiations. But I would recall the
1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland. It was really the defining
moment in the cold war. Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all nuclear
weapons and everyone was all excited. But then he established the
condition that President Reagan would have to kill the Strategic
Defense Initiative, a plan for a national missile defense system. In
other words, he said we will agree to doing away with and destroying
all nuclear weapons if you agree to make yourself vulnerable to an
attack.
Reagan walked away from the bad agreement in order to save the United
States missile defense program. We are faced with the same choice. Our
President currently is embracing that very notion that Reagan rejected,
even though, since 1986, the missile threat has greatly increased and
Russia has violated treaty after treaty. We have to ask, what is so
good about the tradeoff now?
Mr. President, I will make this brief because I have made this
statement on the floor so many times before. I have deep concern about
what is happening right now with our attitude toward a national missile
defense system. It is kind of interesting--all these people who come in
and want to talk about how bad a national missile defense system is
always use such words as ``Star Wars,'' trying to make it look like
something that is mythical, something that is science fiction. In fact,
anyone who was watching TV during the Persian Gulf war knows that the
technology of knocking missiles down with missiles is something that is
alive and well.
President Clinton appointed Jim Woolsey to be CIA Director, and he
was certainly privileged to more information, or as much as anyone else
in the world, concerning this Nation's defense. And he said that there
are between 20 and 25 nations around the world who currently have, or
are developing, weapons of mass destruction, either nuclear, chemical,
or biological, and are developing the missile means to deliver those
weapons of mass destruction.
So there is a greater threat. Most people who are watching the
security scene today believe there is a greater threat facing America
today than there was during the cold war, because now we are not
talking about one enemy, we are talking about 25 or so countries that
are developing this technology.
If anyone is comfortable in what is happening right now, I suggest
that you read last Wednesday's New York Times. I will not submit this
for the Record because I did so yesterday when I first read it. I was
still in some degree of shock. The New York Times provides fresh
evidence of the folly of leaving America vulnerable to ballistic
missile attack.
In an article entitled--listen to this--``As China threatens Taiwan,
it makes sure United States listens--'' the Times reports on ominous
information recently passed to National Security Adviser Anthony Lake
concerning measures being taken by Beijing to facilitate military
action against Taiwan, and points to statements intended to detour the
United States from coming to Taipei's assistance. Referring to Charles
Freeman--he is a former U.S. Ambassador to China, now Assistant
Secretary of Defense--the article reports that ``A Chinese official
told him of the advanced state of military planning and that
preparations for a missile attack on Taiwan and the target selection to
carry it out have been completed and await final decision by the
politburo in Beijing.'' Freeman reportedly told Lake that ``A Chinese
official asserted that China could act

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militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the United
States because American leaders `care more about' ''--listen to this--
``Los Angeles than they do Taiwan.'' That statement Mr. Freeman
characterized as an indirect threat by China to use nuclear weapons
against the United States.
Mr. President, this is the environment we are in today. Today the
Senate is considering a treaty, START II, that will further endanger
our country because the President and the Russians link it to the ABM
Treaty, which precludes our country from defending itself against
missile attack.
I would like to submit something for the Record. It was in the Wall
Street Journal, in an editorial called, ``The ABM Treaty's Threat,'' on
January 2.
I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1996]

The ABM Treaty's Threat

With his veto of the 1996 defense bill last week, President
Clinton just made the world a more dangerous place. If
there's a silver lining, it is that it sets down an important
political marker for this year's presidential campaign. GOP
upstart Steve Forbes also put down a marker last week,
castigating Bob Dole and the Senate for their apparent
willingness to ratify the Start II treaty--a ``further
pretext,'' Mr. Forbes said, for the ``policy of leaving the
American people vulnerable to missile attack.
Given the current Senate, the President's veto is almost
certain to be sustained, hamstringing the effort to build
critically needed defenses against ballistic missile attack.
Millions of Americans may pay for his decision with their
lives, when some future commander-in-chief lacks the means to
shoot down a ballistic missile heading on a lethal trajectory
for an American city. By vetoing the bill, Mr. Clinton also
shows that he has no viable strategy for dealing with the
changed nuclear realities of the post-Cold War world--
realities that are discussed nearby by former Reagan Defense
official Fred C. Ikle.
The Administration, to the extent it's thinking at all
instead of repeating Democratic Party rote, remains mired in
an obsolete mindset that sees Moscow as our main foe and
regards arms control and ``mutual assured destruction'' as
the centerpiece of policy. Mr. Clinton's principal objection
to the GOP defense bill is that by requiring deployment of a
missile-defense system by 2003 it would violate the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty under which the U.S. and the
Soviet Union agreed not to defend themselves against missile
attack.
The Republican bill is ``on a collision course with the ABM
treaty,'' Mr. Clinton said in his veto message. That, as we
see it, is precisely the point. The ABM Treaty is a grave
danger to national security and the United States ought to
exercise its prerogative to withdraw. If any progress toward
defense is to be made, every Republican Presidential
candidate ought to pledge to give the required notice on his
first day in office.
We thought back in 1972 that agreeing not to defend against
missile attack was a reckless promise, but today any vestige
of a rationale has vanished. More than two-dozen nations
already possess ballistic missiles and a number will soon
have missiles capable of reaching across the Atlantic or the
Pacific. It's not hard to imagine that Washington or San
Francisco would make tempting targets for a lunatic leader in
one of the Iraqs or North Koreas of the world. When that
happens, it will be too late to start building a missile
defense.
The ABM Treaty is just one relic of the Cold War that Mr.
Clinton is intent on preserving. He further objects that it
would derail his arms-control efforts, keeping the Russian
Duma from ratifying Start II, under which Russia would reduce
its nuclear arsenal to 3,500 warheads from about 8,000.
Whatever the Duma does, it looks likely that the U.S. Senate
will ratify Salt II three years after it was signed by
Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. Perfunctory debate ended last
week and a vote is expected soon. Mr. Forbes, free of the
impact of past habit, is one of the few Republican voices
urging against ratification.
Yet with few exceptions, Republicans do believe that
defending America against missile attack ought to be a
national priority. Their Congress has put forward a workable
and affordable plan toward that goal. On the other hand, we
have a President who's decided that it is more important to
the security of the United States to reduce the number of
Russian nuclear warheads than to have the capability to
defend ourselves against missile attack from the madmen of
the world.
As for Start II, somehow we don't find it very comforting
to contemplate a world in which the Russians have 4,500 fewer
scary things tucked away in their arsenal but a Saddam
Hussein has one that he intends to use on us. Clearly it's
time for a new security strategy. It will require more, but
missile defense will be a cornerstone. Mr. Ikle argues that
to wake the world to this obvious need may well take a
nuclear explosion, either accidental or deliberate.
Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will quote one sentence, which says:

As for START II, somehow we don't find it very comforting
to contemplate a world in which the Russians have 4,500 fewer
scary things tucked away in their arsenal but a Saddam
Hussein has one that he intends to use on us.

So, in conclusion, I say, Mr. President, that passing of this treaty
right now may be important to the President's agenda. But if this
treaty is really important, why are we rushing through it with so
little debate?
This morning we had a meeting in my office at 9 o'clock. It was with
the 11 freshmen that were elected to this body in 1994. At that time we
did not even know this was going to be on the agenda today. This was
put on 10 hours ago before we had a chance to come out, debate it, get
people together to really be concerned and to understand the full
ramifications of this treaty and how it provides a chance of making us
vulnerable--10 hours. That is all the time we had.
What kind of a message will the rogue countries in the world get if
we pass, on the same day, a defense bill recently stripped of missile
defense and a START II Treaty on Russia's terms? Just to satisfy
Russia, President Clinton was willing to veto the defense bill that
attempted to protect Americans from missile attack.
Yes, we are getting the Russians down to 3,500 missiles, if they
comply. But we are giving Russia a practical veto on our ability to
defend ourselves. We have countries out there--China we just talked
about, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya--any number of countries that are
a direct threat to this country, and they are not constrained by any of
the provisions in the START II agreement or in the ABM Treaty.
My simple proposition is this: Missile defense should be our highest
national security priority. If the President believes that our highest
priority must be sacrificed to gain Russia's approval of START II, I
say it is too high a price to pay.
Mr. President, every time I come out here and we talk about this
treaty or we talk about the ABM Treaty or we talk about the missile
defense of this country, I remember the days following the April 19
bombing in Oklahoma City in my beautiful State of Oklahoma. I had very
close friends with daughters and sons and mothers and fathers who were
in that building, the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City,
hoping day after day and hour after hour that they would find them
still to be alive until finally all hope was given up. We lost 169
lives in the most brutal terrorist attack in the history of America. I
saw those things. My son, an orthopedic surgeon, was practicing with a
doctor who went in and amputated the leg of a woman in order to extract
her from the bomb site.
When I think about that, I remember that the bomb which blew up the
Federal building was rated at 1 ton of TNT, and the smallest nuclear
warhead known today is rated at 1 kiloton of TNT, or 1,000 times the
size of the bomb that exploded in Oklahoma City.
That is why I stated on this floor last week that if the vote is 98
to 1, I will be the one to oppose the ratification of the START II
agreement because, Mr. President, it is the right thing to do for
America.
I yield the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote to ratify
the START II agreement. By ratifying this treaty, the Senate will be
taking a major step toward eliminating the menace of nuclear arms from
the face of the Earth.
Since the dawn of the nuclear age at the end of World War II, nuclear
arms control has been our highest priority. One of President Kennedy's
proudest achievements was the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. which
banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under
water. Many of us today continue to attempt to build on that
achievement by enacting a comprehensive test ban treaty to ban all
nuclear tests.
In recent decades, we have made progress toward reducing covert
nuclear arsenals. Negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
began in 1982, at one of the most difficult points in our cold war
relationship with the Soviet Union. Although the first years of the
START process

[[Page S469]]
saw only sporadic progress, our goal of achieving significant,
verifiable reductions in the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals
never wavered.
When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, our long-standing efforts
were rewarded with the signing of the START I Treaty by President Bush
in 1991 and its ratification by Congress the following year.
Now, nearly 3 years after the signing of START II by President Bush
in Moscow, we are achieving another milestone in the process by
ratifying this far-reaching agreement.
This second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty lives up to its name--it
bring about dramatic reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of
the United States and Russia. The United States and the Soviet Union
had arsenals with over 10,000 nuclear warheads when the Berlin Wall
came down. START I is bringing the level down to between 6,000 and
7,000. START II will cut the arsenals in half again--to between 3,000
and 3,500 nuclear warheads by the year 2003. It has been more than 40
years since Russia's nuclear threat to the United States has been this
small. We are moving in the direction of eliminating the nuclear menace
that threatens our national survival.

In addition to reducing the size of the United States and Russian
arsenals, the treaty before us will restructure the strategic forces of
both nations to create a more stable nuclear relationship.
First, the treaty eliminates multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles [MIRV's] from the land-based missile forces of both
nations. This step achieves a goal that many of us have sought for over
two decades--to eliminate the incentive for either side to strike at
the other's multiple-warhead land-based missiles in a time of crisis.
Another major accomplishment of the treaty is to eliminate heavy
ICBM's from the arsenals of both countries. The SS-18 missile in the
Russian arsenal, which caused such concern for the United States for so
long, will be scrapped.
Another strength of this treaty is in the area of verification. START
II builds on the ground-breaking verification regime established by the
START I Treaty. This regime includes extensive onsite inspections,
notifications, and the use of national technical means of verification,
our network of intelligence satellites and sensors. In ways like these,
the ratification regime gives us a high degree of confidence that we
can accurately assess Russian compliance with this treaty.
In addition to the verification procedures included in the treaty,
the greater openness in current-day Russian society, compared to the
closed nature of the Soviet Union, gives much wider information about
Russian strategic behavior and intentions.
START II is also a major part of the effort to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations. During review of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last spring, many of the nations which
voted with us for a permanent extension of that treaty conditioned
their vote on progress in United States-Russian arms reduction,
specifically the approval of START II.
If the United States is to lead a worldwide effort to eliminate the
threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, we need to take
steps to reduce the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. This
treaty represents the single largest step in that direction in history.
It earns us the credibility and respect necessary to enable President
Clinton to conclude negotiations in 1996 of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, outlawing nuclear explosions around the globe. This
achievement, which is within our grasp, will be the most important step
toward limiting worldwide nuclear proliferation since the NPT was
negotiated nearly three decades ago.
The end of the cold war has recast the international security
landscape. Before the Berlin Wall fell, there was little hope of
cutting nuclear arsenals this deeply. Now, we have a unique opportunity
to reduce the nuclear threat to all nations.
The NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban, and the two START treaties are
pillars of an evolving strategy that relies increasingly on cooperation
and consensus to achieve security from nuclear threats, even as we
continue to maintain the forces necessary for a stable deterrent.
One of our greatest challenges is to continue this progress, to
pursue arms control as vigorously as we can, to bring other nations
into cooperative security regimes, to do all we can to prevent nuclear
weapons from reaching the hands of terrorists, and to develop more
effective means for peaceful resolution of international conflicts.
These efforts, if tenaciously pursued, will allow us to reduce, and
perhaps one day, to eliminate, weapons of mass destruction from the
face of the Earth. I urge my colleagues to ratify this treaty.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the START II Treaty
and the conditions and declarations outlined in the resolution of
ratification.
Last month's Russian parliamentary elections, in which opponents of
free market reform and conciliation with the West made shocking gains,
and the resignations from President Yeltsin's administration of several
important reformers have created an atmosphere of great uncertainty in
United States-Russian relations, I daresay there is no one in this body
that has failed to see the significance in these events. I am sure that
they will figure prominently in the foreign policy debates of the
coming year.
These developments, however, as disturbing as they are, should not
preclude us from moving forward with arms control agreements. We have
reached arms control agreements with Russia in days much darker than
these. We cannot base an issue of such monumental importance to our
security as the quantity and quality of weapons possessed by the
world's second largest nuclear power on the intricacies and
imponderables of Russian politics.
What is going on inside Russia today, and what we can do to turn it
to our advantage will be debated for years. We should lock in the
reductions in START II made possible by the collapse of the Soviet
Union while we have the opportunity.
I am not going to go into too much detail. My colleagues are all
familiar with the treaty. I do, however, want to point out a number of
its more salient and compelling provisions. If fully implemented, START
II will limit the United States and Russia to 3,500 deployed warheads
each--a reduction by half of our START I limits and an overall
reduction of two-thirds; it will ban all land-based, multiple warhead
missiles; and it will eliminate all of Russia's heaviest missiles.
In addition, I believe the Foreign Relations Committee and the
managers of the resolution have added crucial conditions which improve
upon the treaty. I find two of these conditions most striking: One
concerning noncompliance and the other the ABM Treaty.
The record of Russian compliance with other treaties, the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Biological Weapons
Convention, are not entirely reassuring. Compounding the problem of
noncompliance, the administration's efforts to bring the Russians into
compliance have been no more reassuring. In the case of the CFE Treaty,
the administration made substantive changes in Russia's obligations,
without Senate consent, in an effort to gain Russian compliance.
Despite this effort, months later, the administration was forced to
declare Moscow in violation of the very targets designed to accommodate
it. An article in this week's Washington Post by Thomas Lippman
illustrates a similar problem related to Russian START I compliance. I
ask that it be printed in the Record.

The Foreign Relations Committee has wisely seen fit to deal with this
problem. According to a condition passed by the Foreign Relations
Committee before sending the resolution of ratification to the floor,
the President must report to the Senate on noncompliance and submit
changes in the obligations of the parties to the Senate. The Senate has
every right to review changes in the obligations and trade-offs to
which it agrees. In the case of persistent noncompliance, the President
must return to the Senate to seek its consent to continue U.S.
adherence.
The committee is to be commended for taking responsible action on an
issue so potentially and justifiably damaging to the treaty's
prospects.
With regard to the ABM Treaty, the tortuous process by which
agreement

[[Page S470]]
was finally reached on the DOD authorization bill was a reminder that
it remains a hotly contested issue not soon to be resolved. The Foreign
Relations Committee, again commendably, has acted to preclude linking
the futures of the START II and ABM Treaties. After all, these treaties
were reached in different eras and are separated by 20 years. The
Foreign Relations Committee has included a condition stating that
Russian ratification of START II should not be contingent on continued
adherence by the United States to Russian interpretation of the ABM
Treaty. The managers amendment makes this more explicit by declaring
that nothing in the START II Treaty changes the rights of either party
to the ABM treaty.
Like NAFTA, START II is a Republican treaty--inspired by Ronald
Reagan and negotiated by President Bush. Ronald Reagan came to office
pledging ``peace through strength'' and left office having concluded
the first strategic weapons reduction treaty in history. START II
builds on these historic reductions. The Senate should follow through
on President Reagan's vision and ratify the START II Treaty.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1996]

Russia Balks at Arms Accord; Failure To Implement Clinton-Yeltsin
Agreements Frustrates U.S. Officials

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

Russia has balked at implementing any of the nuclear
security and weapons inspection agreements announced by
President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin at their summit
meeting last May, throwing up a major roadblock to U.S-
Russian cooperation in key security issues, U.S. officials
said.
After a promising start on discussions aimed at carrying
out the agreements, the Russians pulled back and have
essentially suspended the talks, according to several
officials who said they were perplexed and frustrated by the
developments.
Officials at the State Department, the White House and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said it is unclear why
the Russians have backed away and there may be multiple
reasons. What is clear, they said, is that the mutual
inspections and data exchanges on weapons and nuclear
materials--which the presidents said would happen--are not
about to happen.
The failure to carry through on the agreements does not by
itself threaten U.S. security or U.S.-Russian relations,
officials said. But in the context of other recent
developments in Russia such as the removal of almost all pro-
Western reformers from Yeltsin's government and the
appointment of a Russian nationalist, Yevgeny Primakov, as
foreign minister, it adds to a troubling recent pattern that
has clouded Washington's relations which Moscow.
``We hope to implement all the agreements presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin arrived at during their Moscow summit,''
State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said. ``Over the
past couple of years we have found that some of these arms
agreements are very difficult, and it is sometimes necessary
to bring in senior officials because the bureaucracy in both
countries can only take them so far,'' Burns said. He added
that the United States and Russia are cooperating on many
other issues, such as the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
Clinton and Yeltsin on May 10 issued a ``Joint Statement on
the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of
Reducing Nuclear Weapons,'' containing measures by which each
country could assure itself that the other was carrying out
promised nuclear weapons reductions.
They said the two countries would ``exchange on a regular
basis'' detailed information on their stockpiles of weapons
and nuclear materials. They also said the two countries would
undertake ``reciprocal monitoring'' of the facilities where
they store nuclear materials removed from dismantled
warheads. And they said they would ``seek to conclude in the
shortest possible time'' a legal agreement ensuring
protection of the exchanged data.
None of it has happened. The legal agreement was never
negotiated, making it impossible to exchange classified data
and develop the ``chain of custody'' agreement sought by the
United States. And the United States refused to allow Russian
officials to inspect the only U.S. nuclear weapons
dismantlement facility, the Pantex plant near Amarillo, Tex.,
because Russia would not allow U.S. inspectors to visit a
comparable plant there.
In the same joint declaration, Clinton and Yeltsin ``urged
progress'' in carrying out a 1994 agreement by which Russia
was to cease producing plutonium, the key building block of
nuclear weapons. That has not happened either, officials
said, but for different reasons: The United States has been
able to come up with the money to replace the electric power
and heat generated by the Russian plutonium-producing
reactors, so the reactors still are operating.
Discussions on this issue are to resume later this month,
Energy Department officials said.
The failure to implement the agreements contributes to
widespread suspicion in Congress about the ability and will
of the Russian defense establishment to carry out such
accords.
That suspicion was manifest when the Senate began
consideration of the START II arms reduction treaty on the
Friday before Christmas. In that session, which attracted
little notice because of the timing, the Senate approved a
Resolution of Ratification that directs the president to
follow specific procedures in the event of Russian
noncompliance.
``In the event that noncompliance persists'' after
diplomatic approaches, the resolution says, the president
must return to the Senate for a determination of whether the
United States will continue to be bound by the treaty.
``Obviously we all hope and require that the Russians fully
comply with START II,'' said Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.).
``But their record and the record of the former Soviet
Union with respect to compliance with arms control agreements
is somewhat dubious. I will note just a few of the areas of
violation in the past: the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Chemical Weapons agreements, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, START I and the conventional forces in Europe
treaties. All of these agreements have provisions that Russia
has in one way or another failed to comply [with],'' Kyl
said.
The START II treaty, signed in 1991, requires the United
States and Russia to make further deep cuts in their nuclear
arsenals and delivery systems by 2003. During the pre-
Christmas discussion, senators of both parties made clear
that they will ratify it by an overwhelming vote, but the
resolution they adopted specified that this country will not
be bound by its terms until it has been ratified by the
Russian Duma, a much more dubious proposition.
Russian ratification is not imminent, several analysts
said, because of strong opposition in the recently elected
Duma, or lower house of parliament, where many members
reportedly regard its terms as skewed in favor of the United
States.
The Senate resolution called on ``both parties to the START
II treaty to attach high priority'' to implementation of the
May 10 joint declaration so that compliance with START I and
START II can be verified, but did not make implementation a
condition of START II ratification.
U.S. officials involved in the ``transparency and
irreversibility'' issue offered several explanations of what
might be holding up an agreement on the Russian side.
``The Russians have essentially told us they are doing a
reassessment. It probably has to do with the political
situation there,'' one said. ``They have a lot of communists
and nationalists in the Duma.''
The Russians ``have very limited interagency
communication,'' another source said. ``Their vertical
communication is relatively poor. And there's the fiefdom
problem,'' an indirect allusion to the prickly and
independent Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov.
``We're talking about letting out information about the crown
jewels,'' another U.S. official said. ``Both sides are pretty
nervous about it, but especially them.''

Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise today to express my unqualified
support for ratification of the START II Treaty. I am happy that the
Senate is finally considering this measure and believe the
implementation of this treaty is another step on the road to
eliminating the most destabilizing strategic weapons.
In January 1993, President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin
signed the treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation
on further reduction and limitation of strategic arms. Their
determination and cooperation helped build upon the progress that was
achieved from the START I Treaty. The result of START II will mean
greater reductions in strategic nuclear forces.
Ratification of this treaty today is critical, as it continues a
process begun by START I. This treaty will help enhance U.S. and
international security and substantially reduce the number of strategic
warheads currently deployed by both countries. In early December, I
joined a number of my Senate colleagues in sending a letter to the
majority leader urging that both START II and the Chemicals Weapons
Convention [CWC] be brought before the Senate for action. Shortly
thereafter, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to
approve ratification of START II. This issue has bipartisan support.
Today we have an opportunity to act on that.
Mr. President, this treaty has many important provisions. It will
eliminate around 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons from the arsenal of
the former Soviet Union. Specifically, it will eliminate all Russian
heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], and all multiple-
warhead ICBM's. Eliminating

[[Page S471]]
these weapons would greatly reduce the threat of first strike in the
event of renewed hostilities with the former Soviet Union. By
eliminating this capability, United States-Russian strategic relations
will be strengthened.
Another important aspect of START II is that it strengthens our
ability to verify information, conduct on-site inspections, and deter
possible violations of the treaty. This will help ensure compliance and
allow monitoring of the progress being made to reduce these weapons.
Under this treaty, reduction of arms will take place over a 5- to 7-
year period. When these reductions are completed, the United States and
Russia will each be limited to between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed
strategic warheads. It is my hope that ratification of this treaty
today will help encourage Russia to complete its own START II
ratification efforts.
Mr. President, since the end of the cold war, our world has undergone
a tremendous transformation. There is less fear and worry about nuclear
war. We have made substantial efforts to reduce nuclear weapons.
President Clinton has made nonproliferation and arms reduction a major
priority. But the weapons are still here. Ratification of this treaty
clearly represents significant progress with regard to reducing nuclear
arms. However, there is still work yet to be done.
Last year 187 nations voted to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty [NPT] with a commitment to work on a Comprehensive
Test Ban [CTB] Treaty. I am extremely encouraged by this action and
believe that we must work to reach an agreement on a CTB in the near
future. In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] is also
awaiting ratification by the United States. The CWC bans the
development, production, stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as a
weapon. Clearly, we must eliminate these weapons of mass destruction.
By addressing these issues, it is my hope that other countries will be
more likely to follow the U.S. example and end their reliance on a
nuclear deterrent.
Mr. President, today we have an opportunity to ratify a treaty that
is vital to U.S. strategic interests. We have an opportunity to help
make the world a safer place to live--a safer place for our children.
START II has strong support from the American public, the national
security community and many Members of this body. We must continue with
our efforts to reduce these weapons of mass destruction, and
ratification of START II is a critical step toward this end.
I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, 3 years after its signing by the United
States and the Soviet Union, the second landmark Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty has finally come to the floor of the Senate for
consideration. I want to join the overwhelming majority of my
colleagues in strongly supporting the ratification of START II, and
hope it will move quickly into force. Indeed, this treaty is key to our
national and international security, and will help set the tone for
what should be a more peaceful era.
Mr. President, the risk of detonation of a nuclear device in Western
Europe or the United States may have actually increased since the end
of the Cold War. There are literally tens of thousands of weapons, and
mass quantities of nuclear materials, in Russia's stockpile, and their
safety and security are in question. Just one of those has to get into
the hands of a rogue nation or a high-paying terrorist to threaten or
destroy Washington, Bonn, London, or any other major metropolis.
When START II goes into force, however, 8,000 strategic weapons--
4,000 from both Russia and the United States--will be tabbed for
destruction. This will include the abolition of the core of the Russian
nuclear arsenal--the deadly SS-18--and the multiple independent re-
entry vehicles [MIRV's], significantly reducing the likelihood of
either side launching a nuclear first strike. START II, however, does
leave intact our defensive, second strike capability.
Implementation of START II, moreover--coupled with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty the United States signed earlier this year--would
reflect monumental reform of our nuclear posture. Not only will these
two treaties help reduce the possibility of an accidental launch or the
sabotage of nuclear weapons and materials, they will establish a new
approach toward global non-proliferation. As the United States and
Russia will downsize their stockpiles, other nuclear countries could
proceed with reduction of their arsenals. This will bring us several
steps closer to successful conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test
ban treaty.
Perhaps the most significant achievements of START II would be the
consecration of an international alliance against the scourge of
nuclear war, rather than continuation of the build-up by nations which
could each independently threaten a nuclear explosion.
Mr. President, the post-cold war era brings an opportunity to reshape
U.S. defense posture and policy. No longer will we have to rely on the
threat of nuclear weapons nor, I believe, permanently deploy United
States combat forces abroad, except in limited and rare occasions, in
order to protect our interests.
While we can all agree on the need--indeed the moral imperative--of
ending the threat of nuclear war, there is an equal need for debate on
where we go from here. For example, the mission and, indeed, the
necessity of alliances such as NATO--anchored in nuclear doctrine and
massive retaliation--are only now being reconsidered. The Bosnia
operation is the most recent example of an unfortunate tendency to
address, by a rather ad hoc process, questions regarding our role,
mission and methods in the new era.
The Congress, and particularly the Senate, will play a pivotal role
in that debate, Mr. President. I have made clear my view that it will
be incumbent on this body to assert its constitutional prerogative in
shaping the future of our national security posture.
Ratifying the START II treaty will be an important step in accepting
and asserting our responsibilities. Time is of the essence, Mr.
President. The Russian Duma will not ratify the Treaty until the Senate
does, and, as we saw in last month's parliamentary elections in Russia,
the Duma could become more anti-Western and regressive. We must lock in
these reductions, and begin implementation of START II as soon as
possible.
The Senate has dallied long enough on issues of paramount importance
to national security. START II and the equally vital Chemical Weapons
Convention have unfortunately been held hostage by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. This has reflected badly on this Senate, and badly
served US interests. Therefore, I am gratified that we are finally here
today, debating START II, and would urge swift ratification of this
treaty and the CWC. We must consolidate the gains the new era affords
us, lest we revert back to the dangers and antiquated thinking of the
cold war.
Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to ratify the
second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by an overwhelming vote. This
treaty will receive bipartisan support because it makes an enormous
contribution to our security. That is why I am glad to be part of a
large group of Senators who support this treaty.
President Bush and President Yeltsin of Russia signed the START II
Treaty in January of 1993, in one of the greatest achievements of the
Bush administration. Once President Clinton agreed on the
implementation of the first START Treaty with the leaders of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine, START I came into force in
December 1994, and the way was cleared for ratification of this START
II Treaty by the Senate and the Russian Duma.
I will not dwell on why it has taken so long for the Senate to take
up this treaty. I will only note that the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee conducted no business meetings for 4\1/2\ months. It took
courage for the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, to block
other Senate business in order to free the START II Treaty from a
committee that had been shut down. So I want to congratulate him on the
fact that the Senate is now debating this treaty. He has made a great
contribution to our national security and our future by ensuring that
this treaty come to the floor.

[[Page S472]]

Mr. President, the START II Treaty is the single greatest step in the
history of arms control. It aims to eliminate ``first strike''
capability. It is the fear of a nuclear first strike--sometimes called
a bolt out of the blue--that keeps the nuclear powers on hair trigger
alert and encourages the nuclear arms race. But the START II treaty
would enable the United States and the Russian Federation to rest
assured that neither can knock the other out with a surprise attack.
Each would retain enough of a deterrent to inflict punishing
retaliation after a first strike, which means that a first strike would
be a losing strategy. The United States would also retain a hedge
against a breakout from the treaty in the event of a military coup or
other reversal of democracy in Russia. The remaining U.S. arsenal would
also defend us against rogue nations that might conceivably seek to
threaten us or our allies with limited weapons of mass destruction.
Even as we strive for peace and stability, we must not let our guard
down. That is why it is essential that we retain a robust force of
Minuteman III's, B-52 bombers and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.
It is important to note that the START II Treaty would eliminate the
backbone of the Russian nuclear deterrent, the massive SS-18 land-based
missile. The Russians have 188 of them, with 10 warheads each. If
ratified, START II will require the SS-18's to be destroyed. More than
2,000 other Russian warheads would also be destroyed.
START II embodies the principle that the cold war is over. We built
up our nuclear capability in order to outweigh the Soviet Union's
numerical superiority in conventional weapons, especially in Europe.
The Soviet Union is gone; the Berlin Wall is no more; Europe is no
longer divided by Communist tyranny. Much of our nuclear arsenal has
lost its purpose. By ratifying START II, the Senate would recognize
that we have entered a new era.
Ratification will also demonstrate American leadership. It will show
the Russian Duma that the United States Senate is serious about arms
control. It will lead the way for other nuclear powers to cut their own
stockpiles of weapons. And it will demonstrate to nonnuclear states
that the United States is living up to the commitment made when we
signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, that we would work for an
end to the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament.
The START II Treaty would reduce the likelihood of an accidental
launch or terrorist attack. Fewer nuclear weapons means better control
over those weapons by a country's civilian leadership. Better control
means a lesser likelihood that those weapons will fall into the wrong
hands.
Lastly, the START II Treaty is verifiable. The treaty continues the
stringent START I verification regime of satellites and other
intelligence, data exchange, notification, exhibition, and onsite
inspection to detect and deter possible breaches of the treaty. But
START II includes new verification measures, including observation of
silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions, and
inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads, and
exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to
confirm their observable differences.
We North Dakotans know about nuclear weapons. After all, with our two
Minuteman wings and our B-52 bombers, it has been said that North
Dakota is the third strongest nuclear power in the entire world, after
the United States and Russia. We have been a cold war arsenal for
decades. We remain ready to help ensure peace in a new world.
At the same time, North Dakotans are glad to see the nuclear shadow
lightening. It is time to ratify the START II Treaty. Coupled with a
strong defense, it will help build our national security. I urge my
colleagues to support START II.
Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate has had the opportunity to review
and consider the START II Treaty for almost three years, and it is now
offering its advice and consent to that treaty. I am pleased to endorse
this treaty, which will substantially reduce the nuclear threat that
has hovered for so many years like a dark cloud over both the United
States and Russia. The START II Treaty builds on twenty years of arms
control efforts ranging from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM Treaty), through the SALT I, SALT II, and START I treaties.
The START II Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on January
3, 1993, commits the United States and Russia to deeper reductions in
strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and goes beyond the START I Treaty
to include warheads on heavy bombers. The START II Treaty also
establishes a limit of 3,500 deployed warheads, a ban on all land-
based, multiple warhead ballistic missiles, and limitations on the
number of warheads deployed on all submarine launched ballistic
missiles. When taken together and fully implemented by January 1, 2003,
START I and START II will have cut the deployed strategic weapons of
the United States and Russia by approximately two-thirds.
The Arms Control Observer Group, which I co-chair with the
distinguished Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, has offered a
package of nine amendments to the treaty document. These amendments
address a number of concerns. Most importantly, one amendment states
that nothing in START II changes the rights of either party to the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Another states the requirement for
Senate advice and consent to any possible future amendments to START
II. I commend Senator Stevens and all of the members of the Arms
Control Observer Group for their efforts to review this important
treaty.
The START II Treaty is an important step forward for arms control.
Arms control measures are a more sensible and cost effective means of
addressing the actual threats to U.S. national security than are some
of the costly and theoretical ballistic missile defense programs on
which billions of taxpayer dollars have been lavished. I much prefer to
spend money to destroy actual missiles and missile silos outright, than
to spend money on exotic technologies of only hypothetical
effectiveness. Reducing the threat by such concrete measures is the
cornerstone of effective threat reduction, which also reduces the need
to spend, spend, spend, on more and more costly and dangerous weapons.
Mr. President, the nuclear sword of Damocles has hung by a thread
over the lives of every U.S. citizen since we entered the nuclear age.
Arms control measures like this START II Treaty do not remove that
menacing sword, but each arms control treaty strengthens the thread
suspending the sword, weaving it into a sturdy, and safer, cord.
Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise to offer some personal reflections
on both the substance of this treaty and the process by which the
Senate is considering it.
Frankly, I am troubled by the casual, disengaged manner in which the
Senate is exercising its advice and consent responsibilities. Clearly,
there are numerous issues of importance to the country which demand our
attention these days. But national security policy is not something
that we can set aside and deal with only when it is convenient.
Maintaining a strong and effective national security policy requires
our constant vigilance. It requires that we rise above the kind of
partisan politics which are so prevalent in Washington today. It
requires that we submit prospective arms accords to rigorous
examination and analysis to ensure that these treaties are verifiable,
enforceable, and supportive of our national interests.
But where has this scrutiny been? How many of my colleagues have
actually sat down and reviewed the details of this treaty? How many of
my colleagues have examined the verification regime, the intelligence
assessments, the Russian strategic modernization program, and the
political transition that is ongoing in Russia. With all due respect,
other than select members of the Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and
Armed Services Committees, I would say very few. That does not speak
well for this institution. It does not speak well for those of us who
have been elected to uphold the Constitution.
Mr. President, I want to raise a number of issues that trouble me
about this

[[Page S473]]
treaty. First off, I am concerned by loopholes in the treaty that allow
thousands of systems and warheads to avoid destruction. The treaty
establishes central limits on deployed systems and accountable
warheads, but it does not require destruction of many of these systems.
Either side is permitted to retain a vast stockpile of nondeployed
missiles, launchers, and warheads; but with the exception of the SS-18,
only deployed systems are accountable. This can hardly be considered
legitimate arms reduction.
I am also troubled by the intelligence community's lack of confidence
in its ability to verify Russian compliance. Although the
administration has touted the effectiveness of the START verification
regime, which START II continues, the intelligence community has been
less convincing. In its report on the START Treaty, the Senate
Intelligence Committee stated:

Members of the Senate should understand, however, that U.S.
intelligence will have less than high confidence in its
monitoring of such areas as nondeployed mobile ICBM's,
the number of reentry vehicles actually carried by some
ICBM's and SLBM's, and some provisions relating to cruise
missiles and the heavy bombers that carry them.

The Intelligence Committee's report continues, saying ``this
committee remains deeply concerned, moreover, that Russia's former, and
perhaps continuing, biological weapons program may indicate that the
Russian military is capable of mounting or continuing a START
violation, either in contravention of the wishes of Russia's civilian
authorities, or with the knowledge or support of at least part of that
leadership.''
Mr. President, these are very sobering appraisals and they focus on a
key point. Without full, unconditional compliance, no arms control
agreement is worth the paper it is printed on. The former Soviet Union
consistently violated every arms control agreement it was a party to.
Indeed, on an annual basis, successive administrations cited Soviet
violations of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, the CFE Treaty, the INF
Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
But this pattern did not end with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. Today Russia is in violation of the Biological Weapons
Convention and the CFE Treaty. They are also refusing to implement any
of the nuclear security and weapons inspection agreements announced by
President Clinton and Boris Yeltsin at their summit meeting last May.
I have heard many of the treaty's supporters brush off the
noncompliance issue as an effort to revive outdated cold war rhetoric.
But how does one explain this continuing pattern of noncompliance in
the so called ERA of glasnost? We are not talking about events that
occurred 10 years ago, we are talking about the Russian's violating the
CFE Treaty today by failing to destroy tanks, armor and other weapons
based east of the Ural mountains. We are talking about Russia's failure
to honor its commitments made less than a year ago in the joint
statement on the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms
reductions.
And what about the recent Duma elections in which the nationalists
and Communists in Russia gained 33 percent of the lower house seats?
What about Boris Yeltsin's removal of virtually all pro-Western
democratic reformers from his government? What about the continuing
onslaught in Chechnya where innocent civilians are being routinely
slaughtered in their homes and in the streets?
If Russia is engaging in such ruthless behavior, and is continuing to
violate its existing treaty obligations, all under the stewardship of
Boris Yeltsin and the more liberal, pro-democratic forces, how can we
realistically expect its behavior to improve with the hardliners now
taking power. The truth is there is absolutely no indication that the
Russian legislature will even ratify START II, let alone comply. In
fact, according to administration officials, the Russians have
essentially told us that they are delaying consideration of START II
indefinitely while they reassess the treaty.

At the same time, the Russians are trying to manipulate the START II
ratification issue to coerce financial and military concessions from
the United States. Specifically, the Russians have stated that unless
we suspend NATO expansion, unless we continue to adhere unconditionally
to the ABM Treaty, and unless we increase financial aid to Russia, they
will not ratify START II. Where I come from that is called extortion.
And it is wrong.
Yet advocates of the treaty, in both the administration and Congress,
are going along with these Russian threats, and using them as a
rationale to slow NATO expansion, prevent the United States from
defending itself against ballistic missiles, and increase foreign aid.
But what about our sovereignty? What about the security of our Nation?
What about the security of NATO and the newly independent democracies
in Eastern Europe? How can we possibly bow to such extortion and allow
Russia to effectively wield a veto over our national defense policies?
It is morally, ethically, and strategically misguided.
Mr. President, I am particularly troubled by the bogus linkage that
has been drawn between the START II Treaty and national missile
defense. There is no legitimate linkage between the two issues. The ABM
Treaty was crafted during the cold war and is premised on the outdated
doctrine of mutual assured destruction. But the world is now
multipolar. The monolithic Soviet threat has been replaced by numerous
regional threats. Mutual assured destruction is neither relevant to, or
capable of deterring, these threats. The only responsible way to
counter ballistic missile threats to our homeland is to develop and
deploy national missile defenses.
The truth is, missile defenses do not threaten Russia. If Russia and
the United States are no longer adversaries, and are no longer
targeting nuclear weapons against each other, how could the deployment
of a limited defense against other potential adversaries threaten
Russia in any way? How are we provoking Russia or undermining
cooperation if we defend the American people against the likes of Kim
Jong-Il, Saddam Hussein, or Moammar Khadafi?
Those who say that any decision to protect the American people
against ballistic missiles will kill the START II Treaty are engaging
in pure fear mongering. It is irresponsible and unsupportable.
Mr. President, against the current backdrop of political, economic
and military turmoil in Russia, against the backdrop of continuing
noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, and against the
backdrop of uncertainty over the verification regime, why are we rubber
stamping this treaty with very little consideration in the Senate? With
so many questions unanswered, it seems to me that the most responsible
course of action would be for the Senate to delay action until we have
a better understanding of the military and political situation that is
unfolding in Russia. We also should demand full compliance with all
existing arms control accords before ratifying a new, major treaty. In
my view, to ratify START II now, when Russia remains in noncompliance
with other accords, would legitimize their behavior and thoroughly
undermine our national security. We would, in effect, be rewarding
their defiance. That can only encourage more violations, and further
jeopardize our security.

I urge my colleagues to carefully consider these issues. The
Constitution clearly calls upon us to safeguard the interests of the
Nation through the advice and consent process. While I support the
initiatives recommended by the arms control observer group to help
strengthen the resolution of ratification, they alone do not address
the plethora of issues that remain outstanding. We do the Constitution
and the American people a disservice if we fail to more thoroughly
evaluate these issues prior to ratification. For these reasons I must
oppose ratification.
Mr. President, I ask that several articles be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1996]

Russia Balks at Arms Accord--Failure To Implement Clinton-Yeltsin
Agreements Frustrates U.S. Officials

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

Russia has balked at implementing any of the nuclear
security and weapons inspection

[[Page S474]]
agreements announced by President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin
at their summit meeting last May, throwing up a major
roadblock to U.S.-Russian cooperation in key security issues,
U.S. officials said.
After a promising start on discussions aimed at carrying
out the agreements, the Russians pulled back and have
essentially suspended the talks, according to several
officials who said they were perplexed and frustrated by the
developments.
Officials at the State Department, the White House and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said it is unclear why
the Russians have backed away and there may be multiple
reasons. What is clear, they said, is that the mutual
inspections and data exchanges on weapons and nuclear
materials--which the presidents said would happen--are not
about to happen.
The failure to carry through on the agreements does not
itself threaten U.S. security or U.S.-Russian relations,
officials said. But in the context of other recent
developments in Russia, such as the removal of almost all
pro-Western reformers from Yeltsin's government and the
appointment of a Russian nationalist. Yevgeny Primakov, as
foreign minister, it adds to a troubling recent pattern that
has clouded Washington's relations with Moscow.
``We hope to implement all the agreements presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin arrived at during their Moscow summit.''
State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said. ``Over the
past couple of years we have found that some of these arms
agreements are very difficult, and it is sometimes necessary
to bring in senior officials because the bureaucracy in both
countries can only take them so far,'' Burns said. He added
that the United States and Russia are cooperating on many
other issues, such as the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
Clinton and Yeltsin on May 10 issued a ``Joint Statement on
the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of
Reducing Nuclear Weapons,'' containing measures by which each
country could assure itself that the other was carrying out
promised nuclear weapons reductions.
They said the two countries would ``exchange on a regular
basis'' detailed information on their stockpiles of weapons
and nuclear materials. They also said the two countries would
undertake ``reciprocal monitoring'' of the facilities where
they store nuclear materials removed from dismantled
warheads. And they said they would ``seek to conclude in the
shortest possible time'' a legal agreement ensuring
protection of the exchange data.
None of it has happened. The legal agreement was never
negotiated, making it impossible to exchange classified data
and develop the ``chain of custody'' agreement sought by the
United States. And the United States refused to allow Russian
officials to inspect the only U.S. nuclear weapons
dismantlement facility, the Pantext plant near Amarillo,
Tex., because Russia would not allow U.S. inspectors to visit
a comparable plan there.
In the same joint declaration, Clinton and Yeltsin ``urged
progress'' in carrying out a 1994 agreement by which Russia
was to cease producing plutonium, the key building block of
nuclear weapons. That has not happened either, officials
said, but for different reasons: The United States has been
unable to come up with the money to replace the electric
power and heat generated by the Russian plutonium-producing
reactors, so the reactors still are operating.
Discussions on this issue are to resume later this month,
Energy Department officials said.
The failure to implement the agreements contributes to
widespread suspicion in Congress about the ability and will
of the Russian defense establishment to carry out such
accords.
That suspicion was manifest when the Senate began
consideration of the START II arms reduction treaty on the
Friday before Christmas. In that session, which attracted
little notice because of the timing, the Senate approved a
Resolution of Ratification that directs the president to
follow specific procedures in the event of Russian
noncompliance.
``In the event that noncompliance persists'' after
diplomatic approaches, the resolution says, the president
must return to the Senate for a determination of whether the
United States will continue to bound by the treaty.
``Obviously we all hope and require that the Russians fully
comply with START II,'' said Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.).
``But their record and the record of the former Soviet
Union with respect to compliance with arms control agreements
is somewhat dubious. I will note just a few of the areas of
violation in the past: the Biological Weapons Convention, the
Chemical Weapons agreements, the Missile Technology Control
Regime, START I and the conventional forces in Europe
treaties. All of these agreements have provisions that Russia
has in one way or another failed to comply [with],'' Kyl
said.
The START II treaty, signed in 1991, requires the United
States and Russia to make further deep cuts in their nuclear
arsenals and delivery systems by 2003. During the pre-
Christmas discussion, senators of both parties made clear
that they will ratify it by an overwhelming vote, but the
resolution they adopted specified that this country will not
be bound by its terms until it has been ratified by the
Russian Duma, a much more dubious proposition.
Russian ratification is not imminent, several analysts
said, because of strong opposition in the recently elected
Duma, or lower house of parliament, where many members
reportedly regard its terms as skewed in favor of the United
States.
The Senate resolution called on ``both parties to the START
II treaty to attach high priority'' to implementation of the
May 10 joint declaration so that compliance with START I and
START II can be verified, but did not make implementation a
condition of START II ratification.
U.S. officials involved in the ``transparency and
irreversibility'' issue offered several explanations of what
might be holding up an agreement on the Russian side.
``The Russians have essentially told us they are doing a
reassessment. It probably has to do with the political
situation there,'' one said. ``They have a lot of communists
and nationalists in the Duma.''
The Russians ``have very limited interagency
communication,'' another source said. ``Their vertical
communication is relatively poor. And there's the fiefdom
problem,'' an indirect allusion to the prickly and
independent Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov.
``We're talking about letting out information about the crown
jewels,'' another U.S. official said. ``Both sides are pretty
nervous about it, but especially them.''
____

[From the Defense News, Jan. 22-28, 1996]

CTBT Talks Hinge on China Test Stance

The upcoming round of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), which begins Jan. 22 in Geneva, will be
the most crucial in the 38-nation talks, experts said last
week.
An agreement on a draft text is necessary by the end of the
10-week session to meet a September U.N. deadline, John
Holum, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, said Jan. 19.
China's insistence that a CTBT treaty allow so-called
peaceful nuclear explosions is considered a key obstacle in
the talks, which are ruled by consensus. The other major
nuclear powers have rejected China's stance.
____

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1996]

Japanese Foreign Minister Delivers Message of Commitment to the United
States

(By Thomas W. Lippman)

Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, in office barely
a week, raced through high-level Washington in the past few
days with a message of friendship, reassurance and commitment
to the U.S.-Japan security partnership in Asia.
In meetings with President Clinton and his senior foreign
policy and national security advisers, Ikeda said the United
States and its troops in Japan are ``vital'' to the security
of a potentially unstable region.
That Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sent him here on
short notice on his first official mission reflects the
Japanese government's view that the United States represents
``our most important bilateral relationship,'' Ikeda said
yesterday.
In the past such views might have been unremarkable. But
the alleged abduction and rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by
U.S. servicemen on Okinawa last year have led to questions
here and in Asia about the desirability of keeping nearly
50,000 U.S. troops in Japan.
Essays have been streaming out of foreign policy think
tanks suggesting that the vigorous, economically strong
countries of the region should assume more responsibility for
their own security and the U.S. role perhaps should be
reduced.
Absolutely not, said Ikeda, a former director general of
Japan's defense agency. In the absence of a regional
security framework such as NATO, he said, the United
States and its bilateral security agreements with Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan are the ``pivot''
of Asia-Pacific stability.
In a statement issued as he took office Jan. 11, Hashimoto
said ``the Japan-United States relationship is vital for the
peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as
for the entire world.''
Ikeda used similar language yesterday in a meeting with
Washington Post editors and reporters. The United States and
Japan, he said, will make ``the utmost effort to try to
prevent the Okinawa incident from becoming an obstacle to the
vital U.S. role in the region.''
Clinton is scheduled to make a state visit to Japan in
April. On Friday, Ikeda and Secretary of State Warren
Christopher agreed to accelerate the work of a joint
commission studying the grievances of Okinawans about the
U.S. troop presence in the hope of devising a solution by the
time Clinton visits, according to State Department spokesman
Nicholas Burns.
It may well take longer, Ikeda said yesterday. ``A solution
is very difficult to find,'' he said. ``The Okinawan people
want the troop presence drastically reduced. But the security
of Japan has to be considered as well. . . . We have to allow
the United States to perform its obligation.''
About 26,000 U.S. troops, or more than half the forces in
Japan, are on Okinawa. Ikeda said possible outcomes include
the redeployment of some troops from Okinawa to other parts
of Japan, smaller U.S. bases and increased local input into
decisions by U.S. commanders.
As potential sources of instability in East and Southeast
Asia, Ikeda cited economic

[[Page S475]]
chaos and political instability in North Korea, the presence of Russian
troops in the Pacific basin, military buildups in Southeast
Asian nations and territorial disputes such as the
overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands.
He also noted that China's defense spending has been
increasing by about 20 percent a year. ``Japan is not
defining China as a threat or a risk,'' he said, but
Beijing's military buildup must be taken into account as ``an
objective fact.''
In a paper published Friday urging the United States to
resist calls for reduction of its military presence in Asia,
former undersecretary of state Arnold Kanter said: ``So long
as the United States is seen to be both committed to
maintaining robust military forces in the region and reliable
in honoring in commitments, China's neighbors see less need
to respond to changes in its capabilities. This stabilizing
role performed by the U.S. presence also helps to reassure
countries in Southeast Asia about Japan, and Japan and South
Korea about each other.''
Ikeda agreed. ``Other nations enjoy indirectly the benefits
of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, he said.
____

[From the U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 29, 1996]

Conversation With the President: The View From the Oval Office

(President Clinton met for an hour in the Oval Office last week with
U.S. News White House correspondents Kenneth T. Walsh and Bruce B.
Auster. Excerpts of their conversation.)

Bosnia. I'm more than satisfied with the troops.
I have some concerns. I want them to hurry up and do
whatever we can to continue to improve [troop] living
conditions. We've got to get the laundry set up, better food.
That's a big part of morale. They're over there in a strange
place in a cold winter with a lot of mud, and I want them to
know that we're doing everything we can for the quality of
life.
We have to supervise the separation of forces. After that,
as we monitor those areas, I'm still concerned, although
we're making good progress, about all the demining efforts. I
don't want to lose anybody to those mines.
I'm just hoping that we have enough time to move this
civilian reconstruction effort fast enough so that people
will begin to see and feel the benefits of peace.
____

[From the Defense News, Dec. 4-10, 1995]

Russia Builds Up Nuclear Arsenal as Prospects for START II Fade

(By Anton Zhigulsky)

Moscow.--As prospects dim for U.S. and Russian ratification
of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), Moscow is
quietly, yet steadily, bolstering its nuclear arsenal with
new and upgraded missiles and strategic bombers from its
neighboring Cold War client state of Ukraine.
In addition to the 32 SS-19 intercontinental ballistic
missiles that Moscow intends to acquire from Kiev, Russia's
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is working to increase the life
span of its silo-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles by
25 years.
Moreover, Russian Defense Ministry sources say the
potential threat posed by expansion of NATO could accelerate
development and production of a new multipurpose battlefield
missile with a range of 400 kilometers. Earlier this year,
the Defense Ministry announced that the new missile was
successfully tested and could be deployed within two years.
As for bombers, Moscow has decided to buy 19 Tu-160
Blackjacks and 25 Tu-95 Bears from Ukraine, Pyotr Deinekin,
Russian Air Force commander, said in a Nov. 28 interview.
The Tu-160 bombers are sleek, thin-nosed aircraft that can
carry 12 air-to-surface missiles and fly 12,000 kilometers
without refueling, while the Tu-95 can carry up to four
thermonuclear bombs and fly 8,285 kilometers without
refueling.
Deinekin said Moscow also is planning to receive more than
3,000 cruise missiles from Ukraine, but he refused to provide
further details about the potential cruise missile transfer.
U.S. and Russian diplomats are gloomy about the chances for
ratification of the 1993 START II by the Russian parliament.
Neither the Russian Duma nor the U.S. Congress has ratified
START II, which would limit Moscow and Washington to between
3,000 and 3,500 nuclear warheads each.
The START II treaty is languishing in the Duma as Russian
lawmakers gear up for scheduled Dec. 17 elections, according
to Russian and U.S. diplomats. No Russian lawmaker has
anything to gain from pushing the treaty, as nationalist
sentiment among the Russian public is running at a
fever pitch, these officials said.
Sergey Rogov, director of the Institute of USA and Canada
in Moscow, said Nov. 16 that hard-line politicians also are
linking ratification of START II to key Western policy
decisions: no NATO expansion and no U.S. move to deploy
theater ballistic missile systems considered by Moscow to
violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Rogov spoke
at a conference sponsored in Washington by the National
Defense University, Fort McNair.
In another sign of the faltering U.S.-Russian strategic
relationship, Russian officials last week canceled planned
negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement to provide mutual
access to classified access to information about ongoing
nuclear disarmament efforts. The talks, known as the
Consultations on Safeguards, Transparency and
Irreversibility, were scheduled to take place here Nov. 27-
28.
While a State Department spokesman said Nov. 30 the talks
were canceled due to ``mutual inconvenience,'' other U.S.
government officials said last week the talks have been at a
complete impasse for some months. Russia's Atomic Energy
Ministry officials have been loath to provide access to
certain data U.S. nuclear experts consider crucial to
verifying dismantlement activities, U.S. experts said.
Meanwhile, the acquisition of SS-19 missiles from Ukraine
should maintain Russia's nuclear potential through 2009, Col.
Gen. Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of strategic forces,
told Interfax news agency on Nov. 24.
Russia now has 150 silo-based SS-19 missiles, each with six
warheads; while the Ukraine has 90. Kiev inherited 130 of
these missiles after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
but has been sending warheads to Russian for dismantling, as
required by international disarmament agreements.
A Ukrainian Defense Ministry source said all nuclear
warheads would be removed from Ukraine by the end of 1998. In
a Nov. 28 interview, he noted that Ukraine already has
transferred 40 percent of its 1,600 warheads to Russia for
dismantling.
____

[From the Worldwide Weekly Defense News; Nov. 20-26, 1995]

Hard-Line Russians Tout Nukes To Match West

(By Theresa Hitchens and Anton Zhigulsky)

Moscow.--A renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons is among the
elements of a new, more aggressive strategic posture toward
the West by hard-line politicians and military leaders in
Russia, who grow increasingly strident as planned
parliamentary and presidential elections near, and the health
of President Boris Yeltsin reportedly declines.
Former Communists and populist party officials here said
the development of new strategic missiles is needed to
counter alleged Western conventional superiority. Moscow also
should reject a number of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control
treaties, according to party leaders.
Gen. Boris Gromov, Russian deputy foreign minister and head
of one of the most popular parties in the partliamentary race
scheduled for Dec. 17, said Nov. 14 that Moscow's strategic
policy inevitably will change after the elections.
``The United States remains Russia's main opponent in all
regions of the world, and the strategy should be changed
considering this fact,'' Gromov told a news conference here.
Gromov's views are echoed by another prominent military
leader-turned popular politician, Gen. Alexander Lebed. The
platform of Lebed's party, Congress of Russian Communities,
promises to ``give back to Russia its former greatness.''
Many of the new strategic concepts being embraced by hard-
liners have been distilled in a new report being circulated
within the Russian Defense Ministry as an alternative to
current military doctrine. Called ``Conception of
counteracting Strategy Against Main Threats to the National
Security of Russia,'' the paper was written by Anton Surikov,
an analyst at the Moscow-based USA and Canada Institute of
the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am pleased to lend my voice to those of
my colleagues supporting the passage of the treaty between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on further reductions and
limitations of strategic offensive arms, known more commonly as START
II.
The original START Treaty mandated United States and former Soviet
Union reductions to 6,000 strategic offensive nuclear weapons
incorporated in intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.
START II goes further by limiting each country to 3,500 accountable
warheads on strategic offensive nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles,
and nuclear weapons on bombers in each country.
This is a reduction of one-third of the number of deployed nuclear
weapons each country managed in 1990.
START II significantly reduces the United States and Russian nuclear
arsenal. I am satisfied that the treaty provides an inspection regime
that will verify compliance with the treaty, and that the United States
will continue to have a nuclear response capability appropriate for any
possible future threat.
I recommend the Senators on the Arms Control Observer Group for their
bipartisan investment in dialogue and compromise that has brought us to
this moment. I also recognize the tireless efforts of the Arms Control
Observer Group staff, and the members and staff of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in making START II a reality.

[[Page S476]]
And I would be remise if I did not recognize President Bush for his
foresight in negotiating this Treaty and signing it in January 1993.
With the world awash in turmoil, Mr. President, we should all be very
encouraged by the action of the Senate today in moving this treaty. The
United States is the world's only superpower. And it is appropriate for
the rest of us to bring leadership to the rest of the world,
particularly with regards to the issue of weapons of mass destruction.
I encourage the Senate to move the START II Treaty today with the
knowledge that the future of mankind is more secure because of it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, today marks a truly historic moment in our
Nation's history. Today we raise our voices in affirmation of peace and
security not just for our generation, but for generations to come.
Today we embark on a voyage toward sustained peace and nucelar
stability.
The START II Treaty is the single most comprehensive weapons
reduction measure in modern history. It will forever end the continued
proliferation of our nuclear stockpile and limit the level of those
weapons to a fixed and verifiable number. I can think of no greater
solution to the nuclear dilemma than that which is before us today.
As a matter of history, let me remind my colleagues that this treaty
is a product of strong bipartisan effort spanning three
administrations, both Republican and Democratic. And as a member of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am humbled to stand here this day
and participate in this important event.
Finally, we must remember that today's action in no way reduces our
national strength or resolve. Our vigilance remains strong, and our
commitment to peace even stronger.
This is the dawning of a new chapter in American strategic strength
and peace, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this
historic measure.
Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will provide its long-
overdue advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty. I
believe that this may be the most significant accomplishment that this
body will have in this Congress. That will depend on whether our action
is followed by similar action in the Russian Duma in the months ahead.
I regret that we were not able to take this action months ago. At the
end of last March Senator Lugar predicted that the treaty would be
ready for Senate debate in May. It should have been, but it wasn't
through no fault of the Senator from Indiana. I hope that the 8 months
delay has not hurt the treaty's prospects in the Duma. It clearly is
overwhelmingly in Russia's interest, as well as our own, that this
treaty go into force as soon as possible.
Mr. President, this treaty will truly reduce the nuclear danger in
ways unimaginable when I entered this body in 1983. Then we argued
about nuclear freezes and nuclear build-downs at levels far above those
stipulated in START II. Now the United States and Russia are truly
reducing their nuclear stockpiles under the START I Treaty that went
into force in December 1994 and we will reduce far further under START
II. Land-based multiple warhead missiles, the most destablizing weapon
of the cold war, will be eliminated. Arsenals in both sides will be
reduced to 3,500 warheads and bombs. Far more of the strategic nuclear
threat will be eliminated by this arms control agreement than anyone
ever contemplated countering through missile defenses, even at the
height of the exaggerated claims of the SDI program. President Bush was
right to be proud of this treaty and his role in negotiating it.

Mr. President, today's action will allow Vice President Gore to press
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin next week to accelerate the Duma's
consideration of the treaty. Newly appointed Foreign Minister Primakov
has said that the Duma would await Senate action on the treaty. Now
they not need wait any longer. I hope that they will complete their
deliberations promptly.
As the President pointed out in his State of the Union message the
other night, this could be the year in which truly significant strides
are made in arms control and in defining a safer, more stable world. I
hope that our action today will be followed by a similar overwhelming
vote by this body on ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in the
spring and by conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty among the
nuclear weapon states by summer.
If all that is accomplished and then fully implemented, our children
and grandchildren will remember 1996 as a watershed year in the post-
cold-war era. And these accomplishments, if they can be achieved, will
be remembered far longer, I suspect, than anything that comes out of
the endless budget debate in which we have been engaged.
I yield the floor.
Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, the Senate is debating whether to give
its consent to a treaty between the United States and the Russian
Federation that will significantly reduce the number of strategic
nuclear weapons on each side. This is a solemn responsibility that our
Constitution vests in the Senate, and nobody in this body undertakes
this task lightly.
The Senate has taken nearly 3 years to consider this agreement, which
was transmitted to us in the last days of the Bush administration. Both
the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee have
conducted hearings on the treaty and have carefully reviewed its
provisions. We have heard from negotiators, foreign policy experts,
military officers, and many other analysts. We have heard many
thoughtful arguments pro and con.
Based on that record, I believe implementation of the second
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START II] is strongly in the national
interest of the United States. This treaty, if implemented, will
represent, in the words of President Bush, ``a watershed in our efforts
to stabilize the nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive
arms.''
Let me be clear that the START II agreement, while important, leaves
unresolved many difficult aspects of the cold war's nuclear legacy. We
must find ways to secure and, ultimately, to destroy the fissile
material from the dismantled arsenals of the United States and former
Soviet Union. We must prevent proliferation both of nuclear materials
and of delivery systems. We must pay the environmental price of
cleaning up weapons sites.
Above all, we must continue to adapt our defense and national
security strategies to our times and to strengthen the relationship
between ourselves and the Russians: We must ensure that those nuclear
weapons that do remain on both sides will never be used.
All of these difficult tasks lie outside the limited reach of the
START II Treaty. But this treaty will meet one decade-old problem head
on. It will significantly reduce the number of nuclear warheads on the
Eurasian land mass that are capable of striking the United States. For
that reason, I support it.
The cold war is over, but the task of safely destroying much of the
bloated nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United
States has yet to be completed. The START II Treaty, which entered into
force 1 year ago in December, takes us in that direction. Already we
have begun to see its results. In October, in a ceremony broadcast by
many television news programs, Defense Secretary Perry and the Russian
Defense Minister traveled to Whiteman Air Force Base near Kansas City
to watch the destruction of United States intercontinental ballistic
missile in accordance with START I, and Secretary Perry has attended a
similar ceremony in the former Soviet Union.
But START I alone is not enough. START II will carry on the
unfinished business of dismantling the cold war's legacy of terror and
strategic nuclear instability.
Several of my colleagues have outlined in detail the treaty's
requirements. In sum, I believe it is fair to say that START II serves
America's national security interests in two basic ways.
First, it would cap at 3,500 the number of accountable nuclear
warheads that each side may possess. The START I limit is 6,000
warheads on each side, and that agreement is not yet fully implemented.
In practical terms, implementing START II means

[[Page S477]]
the Russians will have to destroy roughly 4,000 nuclear weapons that
today are in their arsenal.
I, for one, believe that even START II will not complete the
important work of nuclear arms control, and I would hope the
administration will vigorously explore the option of pursuing a third
strategic arms treaty to reduce further the allowable number of
warheads and to include not only the United States and Russia but the
other nuclear powers as well.
Second, the START II Treaty would prohibit the use of multiple
warheads [MIRV's] on missiles. The United States long has sought this
important goal, which is key to a stable nuclear balance.
I commend the majority leader, Senator Dole, for his decision to
bring this important treaty before the Senate. Of course, the process
of putting this agreement into force does not stop with the U.S.
Senate. The treaty also must be approved by both houses of the Russian
legislature. Significant political changes are underway in Russia,
particularly in light of December's parliamentary elections and the
coming Presidential election. It would be unfortunate, indeed, if this
important agreement became entangled in Russia's internal political
debates.
For that reason, I believe the Senate must send a strong message of
support. We must make clear that the United States is strongly
committed to reducing our nuclear arsenal in the responsible manner
outlined by START II as long as the Russians will do the same. I urge
my colleagues to vote in favor of the resolution of ratification.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the vote that will occur later this
afternoon on the resolution of ratification for the START II Treaty is
a truly historical event in the course of man's attempt to curtail
conflict and violence and resolve differences by peaceful means. It is
an especially historical event in the much briefer but arguably more
frightful history of the world's effort to prevent use in anger of the
terrifying power of nuclear fission and fusion, power that was
initially unleashed only five decades ago.
When the Senate took up this this treaty on the floor on December 22,
I spoke at some length concerning the potential benefits of this treaty
for the United States, Russia, and, indeed, the entire world. I spoke
of the great leap forward that this treaty represents as it is added to
the foundation of earlier arms control agreements, notably including
the original START Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian
Federation in 1991 that provided for the first real reductions, rather
than just limits on further growth, of strategic offensive arms of both
nations. The leap forward that START II represents will increase the
stability of the nuclear balance, ban deployment of the most
destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system--land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently
targetable nuclear warheads [or MIRVs], and reduce the number of
nuclear weapons the United States and Russia each possess to 3,500.
The debate on December 22 is a part of the Record, and lays out
clearly the history of this treaty, its importance to enhancing
stability and reducing the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons in
anger, and the specific provisions of the treaty. This information is
contained in the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr.
Lugar] who served with distinction as a former chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, the remarks of the distinguished ranking member of
the Committee, Mr. Pell, who also served admirably as a previous
chairman of the committee, and my remarks and those of the other
Senators who participated in that debate. It is not necessary to take
the time of the Senate today to repeat or embellish those remarks. The
treaty's record is clear. Its benefits are clear. It will pass
overwhelmingly this afternoon.
I am gratified that I was able to play a role in bringing us to this
point by reaching an agreement with the chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, Mr. Helms to release for Senate floor action the
treaty, which he was holding hostage until he could obtain floor action
on the annual reauthorization bill for the State Department and its
activities which he chose to use as a vehicle for provisions to
dramatically reduce the structure of, and funding for, the agencies
that implement our Nation's foreign policy and represent the U.S.
interests to the rest of the world. The START II Treaty was and is too
important to have been used in such a manner. While it should have been
possible for the Senate to act on it much earlier than today, I am
relieved that at least our action was not delayed beyond today, and am
pleased to have played a role in liberating it so the Senate can give
it ringing endorsement.
Once again, Mr. President, I compliment Senator Lugar, Senator Pell,
and all other Senators who have labored through the analytical and
hearing processes to demonstrate conclusively that START II will
significantly benefit the United States. I am fervently hopeful that
the Russian Duma will act expeditiously and favorably on the treaty,
sharing our recognition that it is strongly in the best interests of
both nations, and that we do not discover that the delay in Senate
consideration, during which Russia has experienced considerable
political flux and has elected a number of new members to the Duma, has
fatally injured the treaty. The treaty's ability to increase stability
and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict will be even more important to
the extent Russia's political unrest continues or accelerates.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, Although I have reservations concerning
the START II Treaty, I intend to support the resolution of ratification
reported from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Many of my
concerns have been addressed in the package of amendments the Senate
adopted on December 22, 1995, which were drafted by the Arms Control
Observer Group.
In addition to a number of hearings held by the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted two hearings on the
military and national security implications of ratification of START
II.
The START II Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January
1993, will hopefully contribute to the positive change in the
relationship between the United States and the States of the former
Soviet Union. If ratified and implemented by the United States and the
Russian Federation, START II will represent a continuation of the
unprecedented reduction of the strategic arsenals of both sides. But we
must always keep in mind that reductions for the sake of reductions do
not necessarily contribute to stability. Unless these reductions
contribute to strategic stability, they can actually undermine our
national security. If START II is implemented and complied with, I do
believe that it will be stabilizing. If, however, its terms are
modified to allow, for example, the retention of heavy, multiple-
warhead ICBM's, then this agreement could actually be destabilizing. As
I stated back in 1992, when the committee considered the military
implications of ratifying START I, I believe that stabilizing
reductions in nuclear weapons are in the best interest of this Nation
and humanity.
Whether START II will contribute to or undermine stability will also
be determined by other factors. For example, the United States must
fully exercise its rights to maintain a survivable and reliable
strategic deterrent force. In my view, we must also begin to rethink
the basic concepts underlying deterrence. As the sides reduce their
forces below START I levels, we must be concerned about the long-term
survivability of the force in an offense-only configuration. In my
view, we must begin to modify our strategic policy to incorporate a
more balanced mix of strategic offensive and strategic defensive
forces. In the long run, as the cold war confrontation fades, we may
even make a complete change to a defense dominant posture.
The long-term value of START II also depends on the sides' complying
with its terms. In this regard, there is reason for concern. Russia has
continued, to a very disturbing degree, the Soviet pattern of violating
or circumventing the terms of various arms control agreements. Russia's
failure to implement the agreements reached at last May's summit
meeting is yet another reason for concern.
If ratified, fully implemented, and complied with, START II will
achieve three principal objectives: First, the

[[Page S478]]
reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to a level at or below 3,500--
more than a two-third reduction over current levels; second, ban the
deployment of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles; and
third, obligate Russia to destroy all its SS-18 heavy ICBM's and to
destroy or convert all its silo launchers for these missiles. If this
last objective is not achieved, however, the stabilizing impact of
START II will be seriously eroded.
During the Armed Services Committee's consideration of the military
implications of ratification of START II, I raised a number of
concerns, including concern about whether Russia would ratify the
treaty with amendments that would allow them to keep their MIRVd ICBMs,
in particular the SS-18's. I was also concerned by administration
efforts to unilaterally implement START II reductions prior to Russian
ratification of START II. To date, Russia has not ratified START II,
and I am not sure when it will. Until this happens and it is clear that
START II will be implemented by both sides, I do not believe that the
United States should take any irreversible actions to go below START I
levels.
In September 1994, the administration concluded a review of U.S.
nuclear policy and its nuclear force posture to determine the
appropriate strategic nuclear force for the United States in the year
2003, when START II limits are supposed to be reached. The nuclear
posture review [NPR] concluded that the United States would continue to
rely on a ``Triad'' of strategic nuclear forces and a policy of nuclear
deterrence to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access
to strategic nuclear weapons, and as a hedge against a reversal in
political reforms in Russia, which made START II possible in the first
place.
In essence, the Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the United
States continue to maintain its nuclear triad, that it would maintain
its mix of land, air and sea-based strategic nuclear delivery systems--
while reducing the number of warheads to bring the U.S. into compliance
with START II provisions. However, that recommended level would be
below the level authorized under START II.
In addition to 20 B-2 bombers and 450-500 single warhead Minuteman
III ICBMs, the NPR recommended that the U.S. triad include 14 Trident
ballistic missile submarines versus 18 permitted under START II, and 66
B-52H bombers versus 94 permitted under START II. The NPR also directed
DoD and DoE to maintain a nuclear weapons capability without
underground nuclear testing and without producing fissile material. In
order to accomplish this requirement, the NPR directed that a number of
actions take place: development of a stockpile surveillance engineering
base; and the maintenance of capabilities that include the ability to
refabricate and certify weapons types, design, fabricate and certify
new nuclear warheads (if necessary), and maintenance and support of a
science and technology base.
Mr. President, given budget constraints, I remain concerned about the
ability of the United States to maintain an adequate strategic nuclear
force that would enable us to deter a nuclear attack. With regard to
the future nuclear stockpile, I am concerned about the ability of DoD
and DoE to meet its supply responsibilities. Quite frankly, I do not
see how they will maintain the stockpile without underground nuclear
testing.
As directed by the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will
continue to require and depend on its strategic forces for the
foreseeable future to deter a broad range of threats. In order to do
this, we will have to move away from an offense-only policy of
deterrence, which will require the United States to work cooperatively
with Russia.
As I stated during the Committee's hearing on May 6, we must move
beyond the mindset of the ABM Treaty that equates vulnerability with
stability. If we are to continue reducing our strategic nuclear
forces--which is already the subject of interagency discussions--we
must integrate defense into our deterrence policy and break the linkage
between such reductions and the ABM Treaty.
I have been troubled by the Administration's careless linkage of
START II with U.S. missile defense programs and the ABM Treaty.
Although I certainly agree that there is a relationship between
strategic offensive forces and strategic defensive forces, I believe
that the Administration is dangerously misguided in its
characterization of this relationship. Not only is ballistic missile
defense not a threat to deterrence and strategic arms control; it is
complimentary and may even be essential if we proceed with further
reductions. There is no reason why the United States and Russia cannot
agree on a stabilizing plan to transition from Mutual Assured
Destruction, which is fundamentally still our unstated policy, to a
world of assured security through defensive deployments.
We must come to terms with the fact that the ABM Treaty is outdated
and must be revised and eventually replaced. By constantly reinforcing
the mutual vulnerability logic that underlies the ABM Treaty, this
Administration has simultaneously reinforced those in Russia who are
most insistent on maintaining their destabilizing strategic offensive
forces. Rather than trying to hold on to the Cold War relationship, the
Administration should attempt to nurture U.S.-Russian cooperation in
the area of missile defense and defensive stability.
Before closing, I would like to amplify for purpose of this debate,
my deep concern about actions taken by the Administration in the
various arms control consultative commissions.
The role of the consultative commissions is to enable implementation
of arms control treaties. The consultative commissions are to provide a
forum for the parties to make technical and administrative changes to
the Treaty so that the provisions of the Treaty can be implemented. Or,
if there is a disagreement, to provide a forum for the parties to
discuss compliance questions.
However, over the past couple of years, the Administration has used
the consultative commissions of a number of Treaties, such as the
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces
in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and START, to make a number of changes that I
would define as more than just technical or administrative changes. In
fact, I view these changes as substantive in nature, modifying the
Treaties in a way which changes the original understanding under which
the Senate provided its advice and consent.
The defense budget funds most of the costs of implementing arms
control treaties, and as a result, to the extent it can, the Armed
Services Committee has been monitoring these actions. As a result of
some of these actions, the Committee has included language in the
statement of managers for the defense authorization bills since 1993,
requiring the Department of Defense to report to the Congress 30 days
in advance of any agreement that would result in an increase in the
costs of implementing the arms control agreements. DoD and
administration efforts to inform the Congress prior to concluding these
agreements, as well as recommending these changes, have been erratic at
best.
It is my view that the President should notify the Congress 30 days
in advance of concluding an agreement in the consultative commission,
any change to interpretations of provisions, or implementation
modifications and obligations that result in increases to
implementation costs, or differ from the Senate's understanding when it
provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty. As an
example of what I am referring to, let me ask unanimous consent that a
copies of two September 1994 letters regarding a policy agreement on
implementation of inspections under START, from the Secretary of
Defense be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, even though I have concerns about a number of issues,
as I stated earlier, with the inclusion of the Arms Control Observer
Group amendments, I will support START II.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

September 21, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to inform the Committee
concerning an important issue that has arisen as we prepare
for the implementation of the 1991 START Treaty in the new,
multilateral context that has followed the breakup of the
Soviet Union.

[[Page S479]]

The START Treaty, like the INF Treaty before it, provides
for certain inspection costs to be borne by the inspected
Party. This was based on the assumption that the U.S. and the
Soviet Union would conduct extensive inspections of each
other's territory, whereby one side's inspection costs would
be offset by the other party's inspection costs. This was
done with the expectation that there would be an essential
balance between the START inspections conducted by the two
sides.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine proposed in the START Treaty's Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to have these
inspection costs shifted to the inspecting Party. Given that
they had little, if any, interest in inspecting U.S.
facilities, they believed that such a change would be fair
and appropriate, whereas the U.S. intended to carry out fully
its inspection rights on their territories. They were
concerned, therefore, that START cost provisions would impose
on them an unbalanced cost burden.
In the JCIC, the U.S. side has refused to shift these
costs. We have emphasized that we did not want any changes to
the Treaty's obligations. Russia likewise has refused this
proposal in the JCIC. Since Russia intends to carry out
extensive inspections of U.S. facilities, Russia, too, wanted
no change in these obligations.
The approach that we are developing in the JCIC in order to
resolve this issue in the START context is similar to the
understanding that was worked out in the Special Verification
Commission (SVC) for the INF Treaty, which is the subject of
a separate letter to you. Under this approach, which is
consistent with the Treaty and the interests of the United
States, each inspected Party will be responsible for
inspection costs. However, for each six-month period in which
Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine chooses not to exercise its
right to notify and conduct inspections of U.S. facilities
under START, the U.S. will, as a matter of policy, reimburse
certain costs for supporting U.S. inspections conducted on
that Party's territory during the same period. These costs
would be reimbursed using funds appropriated to the
Department of Defense for treaty implementation purposes. If,
however, one of those Parties notifies and conducts an
inspection of a U.S. facility, thereby incurring host nation
costs for the United States (aside from one initial multi-
party baseline inspection), the U.S. will not provide
reimbursement for any of its inspections on that Party's
territory during the given six-month period.
This understanding will be reflected in an exchange of
policy statements between the U.S. and each of these three
Parties. We believe this represents an equitable solution
that serves the interests of all five START Parties, both
those (the U.S. and Russia) planning to make full use of
their inspection rights and those (Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine) that do not intend to do so.
During the START Treaty's four-month period for baseline
inspections following entry into force of the Treaty,
seventeen inspections (four in Belarus, four in Kazakhstan,
and nine in Ukraine) would be required. Following the
baseline period, the United States probably would conduct a
total of between nine to thirteen inspections per year in
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. OSIA estimates that future
START Treaty inspections would run at most about $10,000.00
per inspection.
I want to emphasize that the exchange of policy statements
is strictly a policy understanding. It will not be legally
binding and no Treaty provision will be changed. The terms of
the START Treaty will have their full force and effect, and
each of these three Parties will have to carry out all of its
Treaty obligations. This understanding will bring no change
in the implementation of the START Treaty, which will be
carried out in full accordance with the advice and consent
already provided by the Senate. The Administration would not
consider this to be a precedent for any other area of START
implementation.
We attach considerable importance and urgency to the need
to conclude this policy understanding with Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine. With the prospect of START entry into
force possibly occurring this fall, the priority objective of
the United States at the coming session of the JCIC is to
reach agreement among the five START Parties on all advance
preparations needed to ensure that START enters into force
smoothly and is carried out effectively. Reaching this
understanding on reimbursements with Belarus, Kazakhstan
and Ukraine will be essential to the achievement of this
overriding U.S. objective.
I want to assure you that we will continue to keep the
Committee informed of key developments affecting START
implementation.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.
____

The Secretary of Defense,

Washington, DC, September 21, 1994.
Hon. Sam Nunn,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to bring the Committee up
to date on an important issue that we have encountered in
seeking to preserve and implement the 1987 Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in the new, multilateral context
that has followed the breakup of the Soviet Union.
As you are aware, the INF Treaty provides for certain
inspection costs to be borne by the inspected Party. This was
based on the assumption that the U.S. and the Soviet Union
would conduct extensive inspections of each other's
facilities, whereby one side's inspection costs would be
offset by the other party's inspection costs. The inspection
regime of the START Treaty was also based on this same
premise, namely, that there would be an essential balance
between the inspections conducted by the two sides.
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States
took steps to ensure that the twelve states of the former
Soviet Union would be bound by the prohibitions of the Treaty
and that the INF inspection regime would continue. Moreover,
the successor states themselves, meeting at Bishkek on
October 9, 1992, also made their own declaration expressing
their commitment to the Treaty.
Of the four key successor states whose cooperation is
required to ensure the continued implementation of the INF
inspection regime, three of them, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the
Ukraine proposed, in the INF Treaty Special Verification
Commission (SVC), the forum for dealing with compliance and
implementation issues, to have these inspection costs shifted
to the inspecting Party. Given that they had little, if any,
interest in inspecting U.S. facilities, they believed that
such a change would be fair and appropriate, whereas the U.S.
intended to carry out fully its inspection rights on their
territories. They were concerned that INF cost provisions
impose on them an unbalanced cost burden. Indeed, Belarus,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan have not conducted a single inspection
of the United States' facilities since the demise of the
Soviet Union.
The U.S. refused to shift these costs, making it clear that
the United States did not want to change the Treaty's
obligations. Russia likewise refused this proposal. Since
Russia intended to carry out extensive inspections of U.S.
facilities, Russia, too, wanted no change in these Treaty
obligations.
This impasse was one of the factors behind the initial
delays in the U.S. being able to carry out its INF Treaty
inspection rights in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine after
the breakup of the Soviet Union. To resolve the issue, we
have worked out with each of these three Parties in the SVC
an understanding consistent with the Treaty and the interests
of the United States. Each inspected Party will bear the
costs of each inspection. However, for each six-month period
in which Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine, as a matter of
policy, does not exercise its right to notify and conduct
inspections of U.S. facilities, the U.S., as a matter of
policy, will reimburse certain costs for supporting U.S.
inspections conducted on their territory during that period.
These costs would be reimbursed using funds appropriated to
the Department of Defense for treaty implementation purposes.
If, however, one of those Parties notifies and conducts an
inspection of U.S. facilities, thereby incurring costs for
the U.S., the U.S. will not provide reimbursement for any of
its inspections on that Party's territory during the given
six-month period.
This INF understanding was reflected in an exchange of
policy statements between the U.S. and each of these three
Parties intended to cover the remaining period of the INF
inspection regime, through May 31, 2001. We believe this
represents an equitable solution that serves the interests of
all five Parties, both those (the U.S. and Russia) planning
to make full use of their inspection rights and those
(Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) that do not intend to do
so. I want to emphasize that these policy statements are not
legally binding and that no Treaty obligations are being
changed. The terms of the Treaty remain in full force and
effect, and each of these three Parties must carry out all of
its Treaty obligations. There is no change in the
implementation of the Treaty regime, which is being carried
out in full accordance with the advice and consent provided
by the Senate in 1988. The Administration would not consider
this to be a precedent for any other area of Treaty
implementation.
Following the exchange of policy statements, the U.S. was
able to resume its conduct of INF inspections on the
territories of the three Parties. We recently suspended such
inspections in order to consult with key Congressional
Committees on this matter.
The United States has conducted seven INF inspections in
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The costs for these
inspections was about $4,000.00 for each inspection. The
United States intends, in any given year, to conduct seven
total inspections in the combined territories of Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. OSIA estimates that future
inspections would run at most about $10,000.00 per
inspection.
We place considerable importance on continuing U.S. INF
inspection activity in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Full
implementation of U.S. Treaty rights in these three key
successor states is essential not only to the preservation of
the INF inspection regime, but also in establishing the basis
for the effective implementation of the START Treaty with
these states.
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also have proposed, in the
START Treaty Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
(JCIC), a similar understanding for the START Treaty, which--
as in INF--would not be legally binding and would leave all
Treaty

[[Page S480]]
obligations fully in force. The U.S. side wishes to exchange such START
policy statements in the JCIC so as to be prepared for entry
into force of the START Treaty in the near future. We will
provide to you a separate letter describing the understanding
that is under consideration for START.
Let me assure you that we will continue to keep the
Committee informed of key developments in both INF and START
implementation.
Sincerely,
William J. Perry.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the Senate is about to vote on the START II
Treaty. START II is an example of the bipartisan way in which foreign
and defense policy should be conducted. President Bush negotiated it
and President Clinton is seeking the Senate's advise and consent.
In response to those who are now saying that the Senate is rushing
into giving its advice and consent to this treaty, I would point out
that this treaty came to the floor and is being considered under the
provisions of several unanimous consent agreements reached over the
course of the past 2 months.
The Senate arms control observer group worked on a package of
conditions and declarations to the resolution of ratification which
were agreed to prior to Christmas. These conditions and declarations
will not require any changes to the START II Treaty, however, they are
the binding terms under which the Senate gives its advice and consent
to this treaty.
START II has received widespread bipartisan support because, if
faithfully implemented by both the United States and Russia, it is in
the United States interest. The treaty provides for further reductions
in United States and Russian missiles and warheads. These reductions
will be stabilizing because the treaty also, and most importantly,
provides for the de-MIRVing of land-based missiles and the elimination
of heavy ICBM's such as the Russian SS-18. These were U.S. arms control
objectives throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations.
Unquestionably, de-mirving and eliminating heavy ICBM's are the
principal benefits of START II.

We must keep in mind, Mr. President, that the Russian Federation must
still take a number of actions to make the START II Treaty a reality.
First, the Russian Duma must offer its consent to ratification. The
prospects for such action are more uncertain after the recent
elections--since Communists and extreme nationalists now represent more
than a third of the Duma. Furthermore, the Russians and the Clinton
administration must firmly commit not to backtrack on START II
provisions. There is already talk of alleviating some of START II's
burden on Russia in a follow on agreement. We will need to carefully
watch out for the so-called nuclear summit next spring and its possible
results.
Mr. President, I would like to comment on the conditions
and declarations to the resolution of ratification unanimously agreed
to by the Senate on December 22. These address the strategic
environment in which this treaty will operate and which it will help
shape.

The fact is that the strategic environment has changed since
President Bush negotiated START II. In particular, the threat of the
proliferation of ballistic missiles has sharply escalated. When, on
June 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed upon the foundations
for START II, they also issued a joint statement on a global protection
system endorsing United States-Russian cooperation on missile defenses.
Since the beginning of the Clinton administration, however, talks on
this idea have lapsed and our National Missile Defense Program has
languished.
Today, I would urge President Clinton once again to resume these
discussions with Russia on cooperation on defenses. Let us recall that
it was President Yeltsin who called for such cooperation in his January
29, 1992 speech to the United Nations. Let us see what might be
possible, while recognizing that talking does not give Moscow a veto
over our programs.
The Congress provided clear direction and substantial additional
funding for missile defense programs. Unfortunately, President Clinton
vetoed the defense authorization bill the first time around, precisely
because it set out a course toward providing a national missile defense
system.

In my view--with Russian cooperation or without--it is high time to
move forward on a missile defense system which protects America--from
Alaska to Florida, and Hawaii to Maine. Included in the package of
amendments we have adopted is a declaration which states that missile
defenses are necessary and complementary to START II reductions.
And so, as we give advice and consent to the START II Treaty we must
be crystal clear: our vote in favor of START II is not in any way a
reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. Conversely--for those who would argue
that the Senate should not give its advice and consent to the START II
Treaty--withholding our consent to START II does not in any way affect
the terms of the ABM Treaty or how the administration applies these
terms.
One of the binding conditions the Senate has approved unequivocally
states that nothing we do here in any way alters our rights and
obligations under the ABM Treaty. In other words, we can propose
changes to the ABM Treaty or, if necessary, withdraw from the
ABM Treaty in order to defend America.

There are a few other pieces of the bigger picture we must keep in
mind, including political developments in Russia. The amendment I
offered--which was included in the manager's package--is a condition to
the resolution of ratification which stipulates that the United States
will not be legally bound by the START II Treaty if the Russian
Federation does not ratify it. Furthermore, the condition requires the
President to consult with the Senate if he decides to make reductions
in our strategic forces below those currently planned. In that event he
must also certify that such reductions are in the U.S. national
security interest.
With respect to concerns about treaty compliance, it is no secret
that Russian generals and politicians are saying openly and privately
that they will not implement the START II Treaty if ratified. Let us
not forget that the track record of compliance of the former Soviet
Union and Russia is seriously marred.
The Soviet Union claimed to hold the ABM Treaty sacrosanct, but,
wantonly violated it. For a long time, we have been worried about
Soviet and Russian violations of the biological weapons convention.
And, at present, Russia is in violation of the Conventional Forces in
Europe [CFE] Treaty. One of the declarations to the resolution of
ratification addresses the concern of potential violations to START II
and requires the administration to brief and report regularly on
Russian compliance with START II.
Finally, we can reduce our missiles and nuclear weapons to START II
levels. But we need to preserve the reliability, safety and security of
the strategic weapons we retain. The United States needs to develop a
new post cold war nuclear doctrine in this era where we are faced with
multiple threats from different regimes. It may be time to update our
aging nuclear force with new weapons designs.
The Clinton administration is dismantling our nuclear weapons
infrastructure and driving us toward a comprehensive test ban.
Meanwhile, Russia is spending scarce resources on strategic
modernization and updating its nuclear doctrine to include potential
use against former Soviet States. I am pleased that one of the
declarations included in the resolution of ratification speaks to the
need to ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of our nuclear
forces--which are and will remain, the cornerstone of our deterrent.

Mr. President, I would like to remind my colleagues that it was the
Bush administration which negotiated START II. And START II, like the
first start treaty, was an outgrowth of the strategic arms reduction
goals set by the Reagan administration. But, strategic arms control--
under both the Bush and Reagan administrations was part of a smart,
judicious and comprehensive approach to our national security--not the
centerpiece of U.S. national security policy. Since the Clinton
administration came to office, there has been an overreliance on
arms control and a penchant for clinging to outdated cold war era
thinking.

Mr. President, I am amazed at this administration, as well as some of
my colleagues, and Moscow for their willingness to link the START II
Treaty with the antiquated and hopelessly

[[Page S481]]
outdated Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty. Missile defense for
America must be priority one at a time when ballistic and cruise
missiles are coming into the possession of more and more countries.
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the North Koreans are
currently working on a missile that will be able to hit Alaska and
Hawaii. Iran, India, and others are also working on their own programs.
Missile defense is not a threat to the Russians. It offers protection
to us--and potentially to the Russians--during a time when the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is escalating.
Mr. President, I support START II. However, the Clinton
administration and Moscow must not backtrack on de-MIRVing missiles and
getting rid of the heavy SS-18's. The Clinton administration must also
support the restoration of our aging nuclear infrastructure--almost
two-thirds of which dates from before the mid-1970's. The President
must also seek the strictest compliance from a Russia which is
changing--and given the Duma elections, not for the better. Especially
in light of the recent Russian elections, we must safeguard at all
costs against unilateral U.S. implementation of START II. Furthermore,
I urge the Clinton administration to join the Senate to reiterate--
loudly and clearly--the traditional U.S. position: START II and the ABM
Treaty are in no way linked. START II is a good treaty for us and
Moscow, but it should not--and must not--be used to keep us from
pursuing a national missile defense system.

Mr. President, notwithstanding the reservations, I think the Senate
did the right thing this evening in overwhelmingly ratifying the START
II Treaty.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first I just want to compliment Senator
Dole, the majority leader, for his support of START II. As he pointed
out, this was negotiated and supported by three Presidents, two
Republicans and one Democrat. The majority leader's support of this
treaty, bringing it forward in the way he has in the great bipartisan
tradition of the U.S. Senate. I just want to add my thanks to him for
his work in this area.
Mr. President, the START II Treaty is overwhelming in our national
interest. It deserves our full and strong support. It will require the
reduction of thousands of nuclear weapons that could otherwise pose a
threat to our security. It will eliminate the most destabilizing
weapons. There is a military threat more fearsome than nuclear weapons.
They alone have the capability to destroy entire cities and to cause
unparalleled destruction of anything in their path.
The prospects of a nuclear war are so terrifying that they are hard
to imagine. That is why every President since President Truman has made
it one of the Nation's highest priorities to control nuclear weapons
and to prevent nuclear war. We came frighteningly close during the
Cuban Missile Crisis to using nuclear weapons. There have been several
nuclear crises since.
That is why Defense Secretary Bill Perry, in testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee last March, quoted Andrei Sakharov saying:

Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war
carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.

Probably the best way to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war is to
reduce nuclear weapons below the excessive levels of the cold war,
particularly those systems that made the United States and the Soviet
Union most insecure. Secretary Perry agreed with Sakharov's assessment
and noted that the START II Treaty is about reducing the risk of
nuclear war.
The START II Treaty that is before us achieves what no other arms
agreement has: It will eliminate all multiple warhead land-based
missiles, known as MIRV missiles for their multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles. It will eliminate all of the Russian heavy
SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the ICBM's that have
particularly concerned our defense officials for so long.
Those systems, those heavy SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles,
those MIRV, multiple warhead missiles are considered to be
destabilizing and caused deep concern that in a crisis it would create
pressures to use nuclear weapons, and to use them first. Eliminating
these weapons is considered the most important single achievement of
the treaty.

Mr. President, I know that this treaty has broad and indeed vast
support in this Senate, but we should not forget the historic nature of
today's vote.
This treaty was worked on for long periods of time, by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, and then strongly supported by President Clinton. This
is a historic day in the ratification of this treaty and should not go
unnoticed because the Senate was so busily occupied in a whole host of
other important matters.
It not only will reduce and remove the most threatening of the
missiles and the most destabilizing of the missiles, it also reduces
the overall level of deployed long-range warheads to about two-thirds
below the previous cold war levels. It will require the United States
and Russia each to reduce to a level of some 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear
weapons instead of the more than 10,000 long-range warheads at the end
of 1990. This is a dramatic reduction.
Finally, Mr. President, I want to comment briefly about the
military's strong support for the ratification of the START II Treaty.
The senior defense and military officials in this country are
overwhelmingly supportive of the START II Treaty and for many months
have urged us to act as quickly as possible to provide our advice and
consent, to ratify the treaty so it can enter into force as soon as
possible.
The overwhelming, unanimous support in the military includes the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, all of the Chiefs of Staff and their civilian and military
colleagues at the Pentagon.
This is what General Shalikashvili said now almost a year ago, March
1 of last year, before the Foreign Relations Committee. He said:

On the basis of detailed study of our security needs and
careful review of the Treaty, it is my judgment, and the
unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the
START II Treaty is in the best interests of the United
States. I recommend the Senate provide its advice and consent
to START II's ratification.

Then at the same hearing General Shalikashvili explained his view of
the value of START II, in part, in this way:

As you well know [he said], START II builds on the progress
of START I, but goes beyond it, because it will restructure
our nuclear forces to eliminate instabilities that have
always been matters of great concern to military planners and
to our citizens alike. By this [he said], I'm of
course referring to the elimination of all land-based
missiles with multiple independently targeted re-reentry
vehicles, as well as the last of the land-based heavy
ICBM's, the Russian SS-18's.
As Secretary Perry mentioned, [he went on,] we have always
been convinced that these particular systems are
intrinsically the most dangerous and unstable elements of our
strategic arsenals. Because they are vulnerable to a first
strike from the other side, they could impose a use-or-lose
decision that would be a very unstable factor in any crisis.
Eliminating these systems makes both of our nuclear forces
more stable deterrents.

Finally, he said:

More specifically, we concluded that the START II/NPR
force--

The force that is left after the START II Treaty--

is sufficient to prevent any foreseeable enemy from achieving
his war aims against us or our allies, not matter how a
nuclear attack against us is designed.
In practice, this means that our nuclear forces must be
robust enough to sustain the ability to support an
appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable range of
response options, even in the event of a powerful first
strike that attempts to disarm our nuclear forces.

He said in conclusion:

Our analysis shows that, even under the worst conditions,
the START II force levels provide enough survivable forces,
and survivable, sustained command and control to accomplish
our targeting objectives.

No matter what the attack is after START II, no matter how an attack
is designed, it cannot succeed. That is one of the many accomplishments
of the treaty.
Its ratification today will not be noted in much of the media because
of the huge number of other issues which are being debated in
Washington, but for us in the U.S. Senate, looking at the ratification
of a treaty worked so hard upon by three Presidents, it will be a
banner day, not just for us, but, more important, for humanity that
there has been such a huge reduction approved and that the most
destabilizing nuclear weapons which we have

[[Page S482]]
faced, which were the subject of years and years and decades of agony
by President after President facing these forces so destabilizing to
the world, that we have taken a major step today in bringing this to
the floor for ratification.
Now we must hope that the Duma in Russia will do the same, that they
also will consent to the ratification of this treaty so that it can
take full force and effect.
When the Joint Chiefs of Staff try to imagine the worst possible
military disaster, the worst possible nuclear attack upon the United
States and our nuclear forces, they can come up with some horrible
possibilities. That's their job, and they are consumate professionals.
They have no doubt that the START II Treaty will leave us with more
than enough nuclear forces to meet our security needs. That, Mr.
President, is very powerful testimony and should erase any doubt that
START II will permit adequate forces.
In conclusion, General Shali had this to say:

When both the United States and Russian strategic nuclear
forces are reduced to the levels established by this treaty,
our forces will remain roughly equivalent, but without the
unstable pockets that have troubled us for decades. This,
beyond even the considerable reductions to our nuclear
forces, is the beneficial hallmark of this treaty--a security
gain that is as positive for the Russians as it is for the
Americans.
The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have
no reservations towards this treaty, about the strategic
force reductions it entails, or about our ability to properly
verify that the Russians are complying with its provisions.
I, thus, encourage you to promptly give your advice and
consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty.

Mr. President, this is compelling evidence from our Nation's senior
officer that the START II Treaty is a good deal for American security.
Few, if anybody, know more about the military perspective of our
security requirements than General Shalikash-vili.

START I implementation and relationship

The START II Treaty is based on the START I Treaty, which was
negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the
Soviet Union dissolved, START I was expanded to include Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus--in addition to Russia--as the new inheritors
of the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union.
One crucial aspect of this expanded START I process that people
should understand is that when the Soviet Union collapsed, it produced,
overnight, four nuclear weapon nations where there was just one before.
And two of those overnight nuclear weapon powers--Ukraine and
Kazakhstan--had larger nuclear arsenals than Britain, France, and China
combined. As part of START I, the three newest nuclear weapon states
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonweapon states and pledged to
eliminate all their nuclear weapons and be totally nuclear-free. That
is a great nonproliferation success story, and those nations are all
well on the way to eliminating their nuclear forces, as I will outline
below.
The START II Treaty is built upon the START I Treaty, and uses it as
a foundation. START I provides the basic framework for START II,
including definitions, rules, data exchanges, monitoring and inspection
provisions, elimination processes, and so on. START I, which entered
into force on December 5, 1994, provides a good example of what we can
expect under START II, so it is useful to review START I briefly and
how its implementation is proceeding.
START I was the first arms reduction treaty, that is, it called for
actual reductions in nuclear forces. It required overall cuts of about
one third in United States and Soviet arsenals, and also calls for a
50-percent cut in so-called heavy ICBM's, namely the SS-18. START I
requires reductions in accountable weapons, that is, numbers agreed
upon for purposes of the treaty, whether or not they are the real
numbers. START I provided for limits on both the ``strategic nuclear
delivery vehicles''--otherwise known as land-based and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and bombers--and for accountable warheads.
The treaty required reductions to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000
warheads by the end of a 7-year period of implementation.
The reductions must be made according to a schedule of limits in two
phases before reaching the final limits: Phase I permits no more than
2,100 delivery vehicles and 9,150 warheads by December 5, 1997; Phase
II permits no more than 1,900 delivery vehicles and 7,950 warheads by
December 5, 1999. At the time of the data exchange for START I in
September 1990, the United States had 2,246 strategic delivery vehicles
and 10,563 warheads, while the Soviet Union had 2,500 delivery vehicles
and 10,271 START accountable warheads. That is the baseline against
which to measure implementation.
In May 1995, Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe testified
before the Armed Services Committee about START I implementation, just
5 months after the treaty entered into force:

U.S. implementation of START I continues to proceed
smoothly. We have deactivated all of our forces to be
eliminated under START I, by removing over 3,900 warheads
from ballistic missiles and retiring heavy bombers to
elimination facilities. We have already eliminated over 300
missile launchers and over 240 heavy bombers, putting us
below the first START I intermediate ceiling that will not
come into effect until December 1997.

Secretary Slocombe also stated that:

Our START I Treaty partners in the former Soviet Union are
also making great strides. Russia has moved rapidly on
launcher eliminations. Like the United States, the former
Soviet Union has already met the first intermediate ceiling
on launchers, with over 600 missile launchers and heavy
bombers eliminated thus far, in fact, it is very close to
meeting the second intermediate limit on launchers that will
not take effect until December 1999. The implementation of
START I and NPT obligations by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine continues to proceed, as over 2,700 strategic
warheads in these three countries have been deactivated, and
over 2,100 have been returned to Russia. Over 1,000
additional warheads have been deactivated in Russia itself.
The success of START I implementation thus far leaves us
confident that START II's limits can be achieved on schedule.

More recently, the State Department provided my office with the most
up to date information available on START I implementation. As of
September 1, 1995, the United States had 1,727 START accountable
deployed nuclear delivery vehicles--ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers--
compared to 2,246 in September of 1990. The United States had 8,345
START accountable warheads, compared to 10,563 5 years earlier. The
former Soviet Union [FSU] parties--Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine--collectively had 1,799 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles--of
which 1,513 are Russian--compared to 2,500 5 years before. The FSU
Parties had 8,859 START accountable warheads--of which 6,769 are
Russian--compared to 10,271 warheads in 1990.
Both sets of parties are below the Phase I limits that will not come
into effect until December 1997. In addition, both the United States
and the former Soviet Union are below their Phase II launcher limits
that will not come into effect until December 1999. So implementation
of START I is going very well, and well ahead of schedule. Given the
close relationship between START I and START II, there is every reason
to expect that START II will be an equal success, as the states.

verification and cheating concerns

Mr. President, every arms control treaty raises concerns about
verification and compliance--our ability to check that the other party
isn't cheating. START II has the most comprehensive and intrusive
verification provisions of any nuclear arms control treaty ever
negotiated, a system that our defense and military leaders are
confident will work well.
When Defense Secretary Perry was asked in a Senate hearing why he
felt confident that cheating would not be a problem in START II, he
gave the following explanation.

There are three factors which make cheating, I think,
improbable in START II. The first is just the general
openness of communication and exchange of personnel which now
exist between our two countries. For example, I have myself
been to the Russian test range at Baikonur. I have been to
the ICBM operational site at Pervomaysk. I've examined the
missiles in their control centers in great detail. I have
discussed detailed issues about these programs with the
scientists in the program and with the operational officers
in the strategic rocket force. That kind of communication
makes it very difficult to execute successfully a cheating
program.
Second, there are in START I very comprehensive
verification procedures that go well beyond national
technical means. They

[[Page S483]]
require the sharing of telemetry data. They require various kinds of
cooperative measures, displaying the forces. They involve
continuous monitoring. They involve on-site inspection. This
is an exceedingly comprehensive form of inspection. So that's
the second reason that I think cheating is exceedingly
improbable.

The third is that we have added on START II additional on-site
inspections and exhibitions specifically pointed out verifying the
configuration of the SS-18 silos and the actual bomber loadings. All
three of these together, I think, give us a high degree of confidence
that we are not going to be subject to cheating.
General Shalikashvili reinforced Secretary Perry's answer with the
following comment:

Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Perry mentioned, START II
verification rests essentially on three pillars--intrusive
inspections, data exchanges and national technical means.
START II has 14 types of intrusive on-site inspections, 10
from the START I treaty and four new ones. Both treaties
require very detailed exchanges of data of strategic systems.
And certainly you're familiar with the ability of our
national technical means to oversee that.
Given these factors, I would say, first of all, that I'm
very confident, and so are the joint chiefs, that the treaty
is effectively verifiable. Second, we think that it's very
difficult to picture a scenario that would give an advantage
to the Russians to cheat. They have already under this treaty
the ability to successfully accomplish deterrence and
accomplish the military task of covering necessary targets.
So any cheating would at best give them some ability to
increase their reserve. And the cost of being caught at
cheating would far outweigh any of that advantage. So
therefore, I see very little incentive for them to cheating,
but I'm also very confident that should they, we would be
in a very good position, through the inspections and
verification procedures, to detect that.

It does not get much clearer than that. The Secretary of Defense and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff all agree that the START II Treaty is
effectively verifiable. Furthermore, they can't even imagine a credible
situation in which the Russians would have any incentive to cheat; they
would not gain any appreciable advantage, and we would detect such a
violation and would be able to respond if necessary. This is the first
time I have ever heard our military say they cannot imagine a situation
in which the other party could or would want to cheat on an arms
control treaty.
Before the Armed Services Committee last May, Gen. Wesley Clark,
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff, testified
that: ``Both during and after the Treaty negotiations, we have examined
multiple ways that the Russians could conceivably violate the Treaty to
augment their forces. It is difficult to come up with a militarily
relevant cheating scenario.'' The monitoring and verification
provisions of the Treaty would prevent either side from violating the
Treaty without being detected, but the Joint Chiefs cannot see an
incentive for Russia to cheat because the Treaty will leave Russia with
more than enough nuclear forces for its security needs. As General
Clark explained it:

Even at fewer than 3,500 warheads, Russia will have
sufficient warheads to cover their U.S. targets and still
maintain a reserve. Because of this, additional warheads
generated by cheating would only have marginal effect on
damage expectancy or would be used to increase sides' reserve
force. Since these additional warheads would have only
marginal effect on a Russian attack and would be very
embarrassing if detected, we can find little incentive to
carry out a military significant violation.

I cannot think of a better combination of positive factors about a
nuclear arms reduction treaty than we have in START I: It requires deep
cuts--two-thirds below the 1990 levels--and eliminates the most
destabilizing nuclear systems on both sides. It leaves both sides with
adequate forces to protect their security. Its monitoring and
verification provisions assure that START II is effectively verifiable.
Finally, the treaty provides neither side with an incentive to cheat.
It has been endorsed without reservation by the civilian and military
leaders in the Pentagon, who have all urged numerous times that we
promptly give our advice and consent to ratification. That makes it
pretty plain that we should vote overwhelmingly for ratification and
move the treaty closer to implementation.

SENATE ACTION ON START II

Mr. President, the Senate has spoken clearly on its desire to act on
the START II Treaty. For example, on February 2, 1993, Senator Dole,
our current majority leader, cosponsored Senate Resolution 54,
commending President Bush on the conclusion of the START II Treaty.
That resolution stated that the Senate ``intends to take up the Treaty
at the earliest possible moment in pursuit of its constitutional duty
to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties.''
On September 5, 1995, the Senate adopted unanimously an amendment to
the Defense authorization bill urging prompt ratification of the START
II Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. This amendment stated:

It is the sense of the Senate that the United States and
all other parties to the START II Treaty and the Chemical
Weapons Convention should promptly ratify and fully
implement, as negotiated, both treaties.

This provision was adopted by the conference on the Defense
authorization bill, and appears in the conference report, so it will be
part of the final Defense Authorization Act.
Mr. President, on December 5 of last year, 35 of our colleagues
joined with myself and the senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. Simon] in
a letter to the majority leader urging that the Senate complete action
on the START II Treaty during the first session of the 104th Congress
in 1995. So it is clear that the Senate is on record in various ways as
favoring prompt action on the START II Treaty.
The Senate came very close to completing action on START II at the
end of last year. That was a result of a unanimous-consent agreement
worked out between the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr.
Helms, and Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. That agreement called for
the treaty to be brought up for Senate consideration before adjournment
of the 1st session of this Congress. And last month, on December 22,
the Senate did take up the treaty, but did not complete action on it.
Although we did not vote on the treaty, we did agree on several
issues. We adopted a manager's package of amendments to the resolution
of ratification, and agreed that when we return to the treaty there
would be no other amendments in order. We also agreed that debate would
be limited to 6 hours, with additional time for Senator Thurmond. But
it was clear that the purpose of our action was to try to complete
final action on the treaty as quickly as possible. That was certainly
the spirit of the effort of the Arms Control Observer Group that came
together to work out a package of amendments to the Foreign Relations
Committee resolution of ratification.
The Arms Control Observer Group, which is composed of members from
the various committees of jurisdiction on arms control matters,
gathered just before the end of last year to consider a series of
amendments proposed by majority members in an effort to reach both a
time agreement and secure a vote by Friday, December 22. The members
acted in good faith, upon exceptionally short notice and, after
considerable effort, reached agreement on the amendments as a means to
complete action on the treaty before we adjourned for the year.
Unfortunately, we only got a partial time agreement and no date certain
for a vote. That was a disappointment. We failed to vote on the treaty
before the end of the 1st Session of 104th Congress, and before the end
of 1995, as had been the stated goal of the Senate.
Now we have the opportunity, at long last, to vote in favor of the
resolution of ratification and move this treaty toward entry into force
and implementation. I believe that the Russian Government, and
especially its Parliament, will have the wisdom to ratify this treaty
because it is also so strongly in their security interest to do so.

Next steps in Arms Reductions

Mr. President, the START II Treaty is an extremely important step to
improve our security and reduce the danger of nuclear weapons and
nuclear war. It will result in reductions of some two-thirds of the
deployed long-range nuclear weapons of the cold war superpowers, and
will restructure the remaining arsenals into more stable
configurations. These are the most ambitious nuclear weapon reductions
undertaken by the United States and the former Soviet Union. But they
are not sufficient. There will remain after all the required START II
reductions, as many as 3,500 long range warheads deployed by each side,
and even more

[[Page S484]]
warheads not deployed. That is far more than we need for our security,
and poses more of a danger than we should accept. We need to continue
the reductions begun by the START process, and reduce to the lowest
level possible, including the other nuclear weapon states in the
process at the appropriate time.
At the hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary
Perry was asked about further reductions in nuclear forces. He stated
that further reductions are desirable and planned: ``I have always
believed that we should reduce to the maximum extent we can, compatible
with the threats and the potential threats from other countries. I
think we can make dramatic reductions, though, beyond where we are
today, if we have favorable political developments continu[ing] as they
have been in the last 5 years or more.''
Secretary Perry was then asked when he envisioned the nuclear weapon
reduction process, which has been bilateral so far, involving the other
acknowledged nuclear weapon countries to conclude further reductions.
Secretary Perry gave the following reply:

At the time when we start getting down to levels of nuclear
arms which are on the same order of magnitude of the levels
of the other nations. So far, even at the level of 3,000, we
have many, many more nuclear weapons than any--we and
Russia--than any other country. But we certainly envision
deeper cuts beyond the level of 3,000 to 3,500. And as we
start going down in the hundreds instead of in the thousands
of nuclear weapons, then I think it's not only appropriate;
it would be necessary to bring in the other countries who
have nuclear weapons.

When asked what specific steps he envisioned to get to further
nuclear weapon reductions, he stated the following:

The sequence of events which I see is, first, we need to
get START II ratified in the Senate and the Duma. Secondly,
we need to get an agreement on implementation--on
accelerating the implementation between ourselves and the
Russians. Third, we need to mutually phase together the
accelerated draw-down. Fourth, we begin a discussion of START
III, which has enabled us to make further deep reductions.
We've already looked at those deep reductions, have pretty
good feelings about how far we can go. We believe they ought
to be bilateral. I think it is appropriate, at that stage,
though, to begin discussions with other countries, because if
the START III reductions are deep enough we're going to get
down to levels where we need to be talking with other
countries about this.

conclusion

Mr. President, the evidence is both compelling and overwhelming: The
START II Treaty is unquestionably in our security interest. It is long
overdue for Senate action, and I welcome the opportunity for this body
finally to ratify this treaty. I know the outcome will be very strong
support for the treaty, and I hope the Russian Duma can take it up soon
and then we can begin implementing the treaty soon.
I would like to close by quoting the conclusion of General
Shalikashvili's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on
March 1, 1995:

The START II Treaty offers a significant contribution to
our national security. Under its provisions, we achieve the
long-standing goal of finally eliminating both heavy ICBM's
and the practice of MIRVing ICBM's, thereby significantly
reducing the incentive for a first strike. For decades, we
and the Russians have lived with this dangerous instability.
With this treaty, we can at last put it behind us.
The Joint Chiefs and I have carefully assessed the adequacy
of our strategic forces under START II. With the balanced
triad of 3,500 warheads that will remain once this treaty is
implemented, the size and mix of our remaining nuclear forces
will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against
any known adversary and under the worst assumptions. Both
American and Russian strategic nuclear forces will be
suspended at levels of rough equivalence; a balance with
greatly reduced incentive for a first strike. By every
military measure, START II is a sound agreement that will
make our Nation more secure. Under its terms, our forces will
remain militarily sufficient, crisis stability will be
greatly improved, and we can be confident in our ability to
effectively verify its implementation. This treaty is clearly
in the best interests of the United States.
On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend that
the Senate promptly give its advice and consent to the
ratification of the START II Treaty.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I make a request that I understand may be
objected to. I was going to ask, as in executive session, that the yeas
and nays on the resolution of ratification accompany START II be
vitiated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object----
Mr. NUNN. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard. There is 1 minute for
debate.
Mr. DOLE. I yield the time back.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on
agreeing to the resolution of ratification. The yeas and nays have been
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell],
the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr.
Domenici], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Faircloth], the Senator
from Texas [Mr. Gramm], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], and the
Senator from Alabama [Mr. Shelby] are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from
Colorado [Mr. Campbell] would vote ``yea.''
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr.
Hollings] is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). Are there any other Senators
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 87, nays 4, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 6 Leg.]

YEAS--87

Abraham
Akaka
Baucus
Bennett
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Chafee
Cochran
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
Craig
D'Amato
Daschle
DeWine
Dodd
Dole
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Frist
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Grams
Grassley
Gregg
Harkin
Hatch
Hatfield
Heflin
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Lugar
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Mikulski
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murkowski
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Pell
Pressler
Pryor
Reid
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Santorum
Sarbanes
Simon
Simpson
Snowe
Specter
Stevens
Thomas
Thompson
Thurmond
Warner
Wellstone

NAYS--4

Ashcroft
Helms
Inhofe
Smith

NOT VOTING--8

Campbell
Coats
Domenici
Faircloth
Gramm
Hollings
Kyl
Shelby
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas are 87; the nays are 4; two-thirds of
the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of
ratification is agreed to.
Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.

____________________