[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 11 (Friday, January 26, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S461-S484]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




TREATY WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION 
           OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (THE START II TREATY)

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. As in executive session, the Senate will now 
consider the ratification of the START II treaty.
  The clerk will state the resolution of ratification.

       Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring 
     therein), That (a) The Senate advise and consent to the 
     ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of 
     America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on 
     January 3, 1993, including the following protocols and 
     memorandum of understanding, all such documents being 
     integral parts of and collectively referred to as the ``START 
     II Treaty'' (contained in Treaty Document 103-1), subject to 
     the conditions of subsection (b) and the declarations of 
     subsection (c):
       (1) The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of 
     Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo 
     Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between the 
     United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
     Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
     (also known as the ``Elimination and Conversion Protocol'').
       (2) The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy 
     Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States and 
     the Russian Federation Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
     Offensive Arms (also known as the ``Exhibitions and 
     Inspections Protocol'').
       (3) The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution 
     and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the 
     United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
     Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms 
     (also known as the ``Memorandum on Attribution'').
       (b) Conditions.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     the ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
     following conditions, which shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) Noncompliance.--If the President determines that a 
     party to the Treaty Between the United States of America and 
     the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
     Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed at Moscow on 
     July 3, 1991 (in this resolution referred to as the ``START 
     Treaty'') or the START II Treaty is acting in a manner that 
     is inconsistent with the object and purpose of the respective 
     Treaty or is in violation of either the START or START II 
     Treaty so as to threaten the national security interests of 
     the United States, then the President shall--
       (A) consult with and promptly submit a report to the Senate 
     detailing the effect of such actions on the START Treaties;
       (B) seek on an urgent basis a meeting at the highest 
     diplomatic level with the noncompliant party with the 
     objective of bringing the noncompliant party into compliance;
       (C) in the event that a party other than the Russian 
     Federation is determined not to be in compliance--
       (i) request consultations with the Russian Federation to 
     assess the viability of both START Treaties and to determine 
     if a change in obligations is required in either treaty to 
     accommodate the changed circumstances; and
       (ii) submit for the Senate's advice and consent to 
     ratification any agreement changing the obligations of the 
     United States; and
       (D) In the event that noncompliance persists, seek a Senate 
     resolution of support of continued adherence to one or both 
     of the START Treaties, notwithstanding the changed 
     circumstances affecting the object and purpose of one or both 
     of the START Treaties.
       (2) Treaty obligations.--Ratification by the United States 
     of the START II Treaty--
       (A) obligates the United States to meet the conditions 
     contained in this resolution of ratification and shall not be 
     interpreted as an obligation by the United States to accept 
     any modification, change in scope, or extension of the Treaty 
     Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
     Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic 
     Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972 (commonly 
     referred to as the ``ABM Treaty''), and
       (B) changes none of the rights of either party with respect 
     to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, in particular, Articles 
     13, 14, and 15.
       (3) Financing implementation.--The United States 
     understands that in order to be assured of the Russian 
     commitment to a reduction in arms levels, Russia must 
     maintain a substantial stake in financing the implementation 
     of the START II Treaty. The costs of implementing the START 
     II Treaty should be borne by both parties to the Treaty. The 
     exchange of instruments of ratification of the START II 
     Treaty shall not be contingent upon the United States 
     providing financial guarantees to pay for implementation of 
     commitments by Russia under the START II Treaty.
       (4) Exchange of letters.--The exchange of letters--
       (A) between Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and 
     Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, dated December 
     29, 1992, regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers now on the 
     territory of Kazakstan,
       (B) between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Minister of 
     Foreign Affairs Kozyrev, dated December 29, 1992, and 
     December 31, 1992, regarding heavy bombers, and
       (C) between Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and Secretary 
     of Defense Richard Cheney, dated December 29, 1992, and 
     January 3, 1993, making assurances on Russian intent 
     regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers 
     of RS-20 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
     (all having been submitted to the Senate as associated with 
     the START II Treaty),

     are of the same force and effect as the provisions of the 
     START II Treaty. The United States shall regard actions 
     inconsistent with obligations under those exchanges of 
     letters as equivalent under international law to actions 
     inconsistent with the START II Treaty.
       (5) Space-launch vehicles.--Space-launch vehicles composed 
     of items that are limited by the START Treaty or the START II 
     Treaty shall be subject to the obligations undertaken in the 
     respective treaty.
     
[[Page S462]]

       (6) NTM and Cuba.--The obligation of the United States 
     under the START Treaty not to interfere with the national 
     technical means (NTM) of verification of the other party to 
     the Treaty does not preclude the United States from pursuing 
     the question of the removal of the electronic intercept 
     facility operated by the Government of the Russian Federation 
     at Lourdes, Cuba.
       (7) Implementation Arrangements.--(A) The START II Treaty 
     shall not be binding on the United States until such time as 
     the Duma of the Russian Federation has acted pursuant to its 
     constitutional responsibilities and the START II Treaty 
     enters into force in accordance with Article VI of the 
     Treaty.
       (B) If the START II Treaty does not enter into force 
     pursuant to subparagraph (A), and if the President plans to 
     implement reductions of United States strategic nuclear 
     forces below those currently planned and consistent with the 
     START Treaty, then the President shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such 
     reductions on the national security of the United States; and
       (ii) take no action to reduce United States strategic 
     nuclear forces below that currently planned and consistent 
     with the START Treaty until he submits to the Senate his 
     determination that such reductions are in the national 
     security interest of the United States.
       (8) Presidential Certification and Report on National 
     Technical Means.--Within 90 days after the United States 
     deposits instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty, 
     the President shall certify that United States National 
     Technical Means are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring 
     of Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty 
     governing the capabilities of strategic missile systems. This 
     certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate 
     of the United States indicating how United States National 
     Technical Means, including collection, processing and 
     analytic resources, will be marshalled to ensure effective 
     monitoring. Such report may be supplemented by a classified 
     annex, which shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign 
     Relations, the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on 
     Armed Services and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate.
       (c) Declarations.--The advice and consent of the Senate to 
     ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
     following declarations, which express the intent of the 
     Senate:
       (1) Cooperative Threat Reductions.--Pursuant to the Joint 
     Statement on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the 
     Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons, agreed to in Moscow, May 
     10, 1995, between the President of the United States and the 
     President of the Russian Federation, it is the sense of the 
     Senate that both parties to the START II Treaty should attach 
     high priority to--
       (A) the exchange of detailed information on aggregate 
     stockpiles of nuclear warheads, on stocks of fissile 
     materials, and on their safety and security;
       (B) the maintenance at distinct and secure storage 
     facilities, on a reciprocal basis, of fissile materials 
     removed from nuclear warheads and declared to be excess to 
     national security requirements for the purpose of confirming 
     the irreversibility of the process of nuclear weapons 
     reduction; and
       (C) the adoption of other cooperative measures to enhance 
     confidence in the reciprocal declarations on fissile material 
     stockpiles.
       (2) Asymmetry in Reductions.--(A) It is the sense of the 
     Senate that, in conducting the reductions mandated by the 
     START or START II Treaty, the President should, within the 
     parameters of the elimination schedules provided for in the 
     START Treaties, regulate reductions in the United States 
     strategic nuclear forces so that the number of accountable 
     warheads under the START and START II Treaties possessed by 
     the Russian Federation in no case exceeds the comparable 
     number of accountable warheads possessed by the United States 
     to an extent that a strategic imbalance endangering the 
     national security interests of the United States results.
       (B) Recognizing that instability could result from an 
     imbalance in the levels of strategic offensive arms, the 
     Senate calls upon the President to submit a report in 
     unclassified form to the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
     Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of 
     each year beginning with January 31, 1997, and continuing 
     through such time as the reductions called for in the START 
     II Treaty are completed by both parties, which report will 
     provide--
       (i) details on the progress of each party's reductions in 
     strategic offensive arms during the previous year;
       (ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in 
     compliance with the terms of the START II Treaty or specifies 
     any act of noncompliance by the Russian Federation; and
       (iii) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance 
     endangering the national security interests of the United 
     States exists.
       (3) Expanding Strategic Arsenals in Countries Other Than 
     Russia.--It is the sense of the Senate that, if during the 
     time the START II Treaty remains in force or in advance of 
     any further strategic offensive arms reductions the President 
     determines there has been an expansion of the strategic 
     arsenal of any country not party to the START II Treaty so as 
     to jeopardize the supreme interests of the United States, 
     then the president should consult on an urgent basis with the 
     Senate to determine whether adherence to the START II Treaty 
     remains in the national interest of the United States.
       (4) Substantial Further Reductions.--Cognizant of the 
     obligation of the United States under Article VI of the 
     Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 
     1968 ``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective 
     measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at 
     any early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on 
     general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
     international control'', and in anticipation of the 
     ratification and entry into force of the START II Treaty, the 
     Senate calls upon the President to seek further strategic 
     offensive arms reductions to the extent consistent with 
     United States national security interests and calls upon the 
     other nuclear weapon states to give careful and early 
     consideration to corresponding reductions of their own 
     nuclear arsenals.
       (5) Missile Technology Control Regime.--The Senate urges 
     the President to insist that the Republic of Belarus, the 
     Republic of Kazakstan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation 
     abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control 
     Regime [MTCR]. For purposes of this paragraph, the term 
     ``Missile Technology Control Regime'' means the policy 
     statement between the United States, the United Kingdom, 
     the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Canada, 
     and Japan, announced April 16, 1987, to restrict sensitive 
     missile-relevant transfers based on the MTCR Annex, and 
     any amendments thereto.
       (6) Further Arms Reduction Obligations.--The Senate 
     declares its intention to consider for approval international 
     agreements that would obligate the United States to reduce or 
     limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a 
     militarily significant manner only pursuant to the treaty 
     power as set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the 
     Constitution.
       (7) Treaty Interpretation.--The Senate affirms the 
     applicability to all treaties of the constitutionally based 
     principles of treaty interpretation set forth in the 
     Condition (1) of the resolution of ratification with respect 
     to the INF Treaty. For purposes of this declaration, the term 
     ``INF Treaty'' refers to the Treaty Between the United States 
     of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
     Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Short Range 
     Missiles, together with the related memorandum of 
     understanding and protocols, approved by the Senate on May 
     27, 1988.
       (8) Compliance.--(A) Concerned by the clear past pattern of 
     Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and 
     continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation, 
     the Senate declares that--
       (i) the START II Treaty is in the interests of the United 
     States only if both the United States and the Russian 
     Federation are in strict compliance with the terms of the 
     Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent 
     to ratification, such compliance being measured by 
     performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to 
     comply; and
       (ii) the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be in 
     strict compliance with its obligations under the terms of 
     START II Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification;
       (B) Given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate 
     expects the executive branch of government to offer regular 
     briefings, but not less than four times each year, to the 
     Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on 
     compliance issues related to the START II Treaty. Such 
     briefings shall include a description of all United States 
     efforts in United States/Russian diplomatic channels and 
     bilateral fora to resolve the compliance issues and shall 
     include, but would not necessarily be limited to, a 
     description of the following:
       (i) Any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Implementation 
     Commission, in advance of such meetings.
       (ii) Any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral 
     Implementation Commission, within thirty days of such 
     meetings.
       (iii) Any Presidential determination that the Russian 
     Federation is in noncompliance with or is otherwise acting in 
     a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
     START II Treaty, within 30 days of such a determination, in 
     which case the President shall also submit a written report, 
     with an unclassified summary, explaining why it is in the 
     national security interests of the United States to continue 
     as a party to the START II Treaty.
       (9) Submission of Future Agreements as Treaties.--The 
     Senate declares that, following Senate advice and consent to 
     ratification of the START II Treaty, any agreement or 
     understanding which in any material way modifies, amends, or 
     reinterprets United States or Russian obligations under the 
     START II Treaty, including the time frame for 
     implementation of the Treaty, should be submitted to the 
     Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
       (10) Nature of Deterrence.--(A) On June 17, 1992, 
     Presidents Bush and Yeltsin issued a Joint Understanding and 
     a Joint Statement at the conclusion of their Washington 
     Summit, the first of which became the foundation for the 
     START II Treaty. The second, the Joint Statement on a Global 
     Protection System, endorsed the cooperative development of a 
     defensive system against ballistic missile attack and 
     demonstrated the belief 

[[Page S463]]
     by the governments of the United States and the Russian Federation that 
     strategic offensive reductions and certain defenses against 
     ballistic missiles are stabilizing compatible, and 
     reinforcing.
       (B) It is, therefore, the sense of the Senate that:
       (i) The long-term perpetuation of deterrence based on 
     mutual and severe offensive nuclear threats would be outdated 
     in a strategic environment in which the United States and the 
     Russian Federation are seeking to put aside their past 
     adversarial relationship and instead build a relationship 
     based upon trust rather than fear.
       (ii) An offense-only form of deterrence cannot address by 
     itself the emerging strategic environment in which, as 
     Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in January 1994, 
     proliferators acquiring missiles and weapons of mass 
     destruction ``may have acquired such weapons for the express 
     purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a 
     fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence. 
     . . . New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new 
     strategies should deterrence fail.''.
       (iii) Defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for 
     new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should 
     deterrence fail. Because deterrence may be inadequate to 
     protect United States forces and allies abroad, theater 
     missile defense is necessary, particularly the most capable 
     systems of the United States such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, 
     and the Space and Missile Tracking System. Similarly, because 
     deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States 
     against long-range missile threats, missile defenses are a 
     necessary part of new deterrent strategies. Such defenses 
     also are wholly in consonance with the summit statements from 
     June 1992 of the Presidents of the United States and the 
     Russian Federation and the September 1994 statements by 
     Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who said, ``We now 
     have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not 
     on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on 
     another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''.
       (iv) As the governments of the United States and Russia 
     have built upon the June 17, 1992, Joint Understanding in 
     agreeing to the START II Treaty, so too should these 
     governments promptly undertake discussions based on the Joint 
     Statement to move forward cooperatively in the development 
     and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.
       (11) Report on Use of Foreign Excess Ballistic Missiles for 
     Launch Services.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
     President should not issue licenses for the use of a foreign 
     excess ballistic missile for launch services without first 
     submitting a report to Congress, on a one-time basis, on the 
     implications of the licensing approval on nonproliferation 
     efforts under the Treaty and on the United States space 
     launch industry.
       (12) United States Commitments Ensuring the Safety, 
     Reliability, and Performance of Its Nuclear Forces.--The 
     Senate declares that the United States is committed to 
     ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its 
     nuclear forces. To this end, the United States undertakes the 
     following additional commitments:
       (A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a 
     robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining 
     nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that 
     will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the 
     United States nuclear arsenal at the START II levels and meet 
     requirements for hedging against possible international 
     developments or technical problems in conformance with United 
     States policies and to underpin deterrence.
       (B) The United States is committed to reestablishing and 
     maintaining sufficient levels of production to support 
     requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of 
     United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain 
     production capabilities and capacities.
       (C) The United States is committed to maintaining United 
     States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core 
     nuclear weapons competencies therein.
       (D) As tritium is essential to the performance of modern 
     nuclear weapons, but decays radioactively at a relatively 
     rapid rate, and the United States now has no meaningful 
     tritium production capacity, the United States is committed 
     to ensuring rapid access to a new production source of 
     tritium within the next decade.
       (E) As warhead design flaws or aging problems may occur 
     that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve, the 
     United States reserves the right, consistent with United 
     States law, to resume underground nuclear testing if that is 
     necessary to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons 
     stockpile. The United States is committed to maintaining the 
     Nevada Test Site at a level in which the United States will 
     be able to resume testing within one year following a 
     national decision to do so.
       (F) The United States reserves the right to invoke the 
     supreme national interest of the United States to withdraw 
     from any future arms control agreement to limit underground 
     nuclear testing.

  Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when I brought the START II Treaty to the 
floor last month, I did so in my capacity as the manage for the Foreign 
Relations Committee. In my opening statement, I sought to lay out for 
the body the key provisions of the START II Treaty, the assessment of 
the treaty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the force structure 
implications of the treaty for both the Russian Federation and the 
United States, and the reasons why this treaty is, on balance, in the 
national security interests of the United States.
  But, Mr. President, I have also approached consideration of the START 
II Treaty from the vantage point of my membership on the Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I have spent a great deal of time analyzing 
United States capabilities to monitor compliance with arms control 
treaties and the START II Treaty in particular.
  I want to share with my colleagues my major findings and explain each 
of them briefly.
  First, no aspects of the START II Treaty text are likely to cause 
compliance issues because of the manner in which they are worded.
  I repeat, I have found no aspects of the START II Treaty text that 
are likely to cause compliance issues because of the manner in which 
they are worded. Indeed, START II, by banning test-flights and 
deployment of MIRV'd ICBM's after 2003, may lessen the likelihood of 
compliance issues regarding the number of re-entry vehicles with which 
an ICBM is equipped or tested. It should generally be easier to 
determine the presence or absence of MIRV's than the determine--or 
agree upon--whether a numerical limit has been exceeded.
  Second, U.S. national technical means are generally sufficient to 
monitor compliance with both START Treaties. United States capabilities 
could be insufficient, however, if competition for scarce collection 
and analytic resources were intense and if Russian practices were to 
change in ways designed to impede United States monitoring.
  As in the case with START I monitoring, the United States will rely 
upon a combination of capabilities--including imagery, signals 
intelligence, human intelligence, open-source information and the 
verification provisions of the START I and START II Treaties--to 
monitor compliance with the provisions of START II. Despite the 
strapped resources as well as systems and personnel reductions thus far 
in the post-cold-war era, the intelligence community assesses a high 
probability of detecting questionable activity that might be contrary 
to the treaty.
  I agree with the intelligence community that U.S. national technical 
means are generally sufficient to monitor compliance with both START 
Treaties. I have concerns, however, that U.S. capabilities could be 
insufficient if competition for scarce collection and analytic 
resources were to intensify and if Russian practices were to change in 
ways designed to impeded U.S. monitoring. I support the recommendation 
that the President be required to certify the sufficiency of U.S. 
monitoring capabilities regarding those START II provisions relating to 
ICBM and SLBM capabilities and to report to Congress on how such 
sufficiency will be assured. I would also urge the executive branch to 
pursue a firm policy regarding Russian actions that may violate the 
terms of START I or START II, including the verification provisions of 
those treaties.
  Third, I have recommended that the resolution of ratification be 
conditioned on a requirement that the President certify and, within 90 
days of exchanging the instruments of ratification, submit to the 
Congress a plan for ensuring continued, adequate monitoring of Russian 
ICBM and SLBM capabilities. This condition has been included in the 
manager's package of amendments to the resolution of ratification, 
accepted by the Senate last month.

  The intelligence community's monitoring confidences reflect a vastly 
changed world from that of a decade ago. The end of the cold war has 
brought a substantial refocusing of United States intelligence from the 
old Soviet Union to a much wider variety of threats to the national 
security. Indicative of this change is the fact that in the fiscal year 
1996 budget process, the Department of Defense opposed funding the 
COBRA DANE radar. In order to protect that important arms control 
monitoring system, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] 
stepped in and took responsibility for its funding. The Congress, 
instead, restored full funding for the COBRA DANE platform in the 
fiscal 

[[Page S464]]
year 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act, an action that was sustained 
in the Defense appropriations bill.
  Some other systems that monitor Russian missile tests face uncertain 
funding futures or are increasingly diverted to other intelligence 
priorities, like Bosnia and North Korea, or even to nonintelligence 
functions. Although intelligence officials remain confident of overall 
U.S. monitoring capabilities, they have acknowledged that these actions 
affect those capabilities.
  I find it totally unacceptable that coverage by National Technical 
Means of Russian strategic missiles--still the systems with by far the 
greatest capability to effect the nuclear destruction of United States 
territory--should be available only at the expense of other important 
intelligence priorities. That is why I recommend that the resolution of 
advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty be 
conditioned on a requirement that the President certify and, within 90 
days of exchanging instruments of ratification, submit to the Congress 
a plan for ensuring, continued adequate monitoring of Russian ICBM and 
SLBM capabilities.
  Fourth, it is imperative that the executive branch exercise its START 
II Treaty right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into 
each Russian SS-18 silo that is to be converted.
  The intelligence community judges that it can monitor with virtual 
certainty the elimination or conversion of declared items and the 
number of deployed silo-based ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers that 
remain in the Russian force. Treaty provisions designed to enhance 
verification play important roles in augmenting U.S. National Technical 
Means in this regard. The 10 annual reentry vehicle inspections 
permitted under START I will help assure, over time, that those silos 
are not being used for MIRV'ed missiles, and the 4 extra reentry 
vehicle inspections at converted SS-18 silos that are provided for in 
START II will add assurance regarding heavy ICBM's.
  One particularly important aspect of START II verification would be 
the on-site inspection of SS-18 heavy ICBM silo conversions, to guard 
against a breakout scenario involving speedy reconversion of SS-18 
silos. U.S. inspectors can either physically witness the pouring of the 
5 meters of concrete in the bottom of the silo or measure silo depth 
before and after the concrete was poured. In order to guard against 
improper implementation of the conversion procedures, it is imperative 
that the executive branch exercise its START II Treaty right to observe 
the entire process of pouring concrete into each SS-18 silo that is to 
be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring.
  Fifth, I urge the firmest practicable policy regarding compliance 
with START I provisions on the transmission and provision of missile 
flight test telemetry and interpretive data.
  The intelligence community generally expects to be able to monitor 
the ban on flight-testing of MIRV'd ICBM's after 2003, assuming it 
receives the good telemetry data mandated by START I. The importance of 
the START I provisions regarding the transmission and provision of 
missile flight-test telemetry and interpretative data cannot be 
overestimated, and the executive branch must adopt the firmest 
practicable policy regarding Russian compliance with those provisions.
  Sixth, monitoring missile production and storage and, consequently, 
the number of nondeployed missiles is inherently difficult. As the 
Director of Central Intelligence has stated, it is possible that some 
undeclared missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities. In 
other words, the possible existence of covert, nondeployed mobile 
missiles must remain an important U.S. intelligence target.

  Monitoring missile production and storage and, consequently, the 
number of nondeployed missiles is inherently difficult. At facilities 
where the United States conducts continuous perimeter and portal 
monitoring, the intelligence community's uncertainties are low. 
Uncertainties are higher, however, in estimates of missiles production 
at facilities not subject to continuous monitoring or on-site 
inspection.
  A cheating scenario involving covert production and deployment of 
mobile ICBM's--and especially of MIRV'ed ICBM's--and their launchers 
would be particularly worrisome. For that reason, the possible 
existence of covert, nondeployed mobile missiles must remain an 
important U.S. intelligence target.
  Uncertainties in the estimates of numbers of nondeployed missiles 
will make it difficult for the intelligence community to determine 
whether all SS-18 airframes have been declared and eliminated as 
required by START II. On the other hand, SS-18 missiles and canisters 
are not mobile, are the largest ballistic missile system in the Russian 
force, and require substantial equipment for handling and transport. 
Storing and maintaining a covert force of any significant size would be 
a major undertaking and would increase the risk of detection. As SS-18 
silos are destroyed or coverted, moreover, the military utility of any 
undeclared missiles should steadily diminish. The intelligence 
community is quite confident of its ability to monitor the essentially 
irreversible conversion of SS-18 silos.
  Seventh, it will be difficult to determine whether Russian heavy 
bombers are equipped with more than the number of nuclear weapons they 
are declared to carry. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that 
cheating scenarios that involve heavy bombers and air-launched cruise 
missiles generally pose little risk of militarily significant 
violations.
  Mr. President, because heavy bomber weapon loadings can easily be 
changed, the intelligence community will find it difficult to determine 
whether Russian heavy bombers are equipped with more than the number of 
nuclear weapons they are declared to carry. When this matter was 
considered in the START I context, the executive branch emphasized that 
heavy bombers are inherently stabilizing, and play a more important 
role in the U.S. strategic force structure than in the Russian. General 
Curtin of the Joint Staff noted at the time that cheating scenarios 
that involve heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles generally 
pose little risk of militarily significant violations. He noted that 
heavy bombers and air-launch cruise missiles are slow flyers which 
offer little potential for a surprise attack.
  Eighth, the disincentives for Russia to cheat are substantial. I urge 
the intelligence community, however, to base its collection and 
analysis priorities upon a cautious appreciation of the record of 
Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements.

  The disincentives for Russia to cheat on START II are substantial. 
Many cheating scenarios, such as the reconversion of converted SS-18 
silos, would risk U.S. detection. The most feasible cheating scenarios 
would yield only small gains. Thus, covertly reMIRVing all the 105 
single-RV SS-19's allowed under START II would increase the number of 
Russian reentry vehicles by only about 15 percent. And such scenarios 
as the covert production of large numbers of ICBM's and their launchers 
would require a considerable investment of scarce resources.
  Despite these disincentives, however, I repeat that the intelligence 
community needs to base its collection and analysis priorities upon a 
more cautious appreciation of the record of Soviet and Russian 
compliance with arms control agreements.
  Last, the counterintelligence challenges inherent in START II will be 
no greater than those of past treaties, and U.S. agencies are capable 
of handling these challenges.


                               conclusion

  Mr. President, let me close by reaffirming the conclusion I set forth 
last month when I introduced the START II Treaty on this floor.
  The START II Treaty is the result of a bipartisan effort, negotiated 
by a Republican administration and submitted by a Democratic one. Three 
Secretaries of State and Defense have supported it. START II represents 
a substantial step forward in attempting to codify strategic stability 
at greatly reduced levels of armaments. Final reductions must be 
completed by January 1, 2003--namely, to levels of 3,000 to 3,500 total 
warheads, of which no more than 1,750 can be based on submarines. It 
has been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, with the 3,500 
warheads allowed under this treaty, the United States would remain 
capable of holding at risk a broad enough range of high value political 
and military targets to 

[[Page S465]]
deter any rational adversary from launching a nuclear attack against 
the United States or against its allies.
  START II removes the most destabilizing segment of nuclear 
inventories--namely MIRV warheads and heavy ICBM's. Elimination also 
includes all deployed heavy ICBM silos and all test and training 
launchers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the verification 
procedures are adequate to ensure that the United States will be able 
to detect any significant violations. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff also believe that the verification provisions are sufficiently 
restrictive to protect the United States against unnecessary intrusion 
by Russian inspectors.
  It is my belief that, on balance, the START II Treaty is in the 
national security interests of the United States, and I would hope that 
the Senate, having expressed its concerns and advice in the Resolution 
of Ratification, would consent to the treaty by an overwhelming margin.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, this is indeed a fine day for the U.S. 
Senate. The Senate has just given its advice and consent to 
ratification of the Treaty Between the United States and the Russian 
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, known as the START II Treaty.
  Mr. President, the START II Treaty was considered thoroughly in 
hearings that I chaired in May and June 1993, and that my colleague 
from Indiana chaired in January, February, and March 1995. Witnesses 
included Secretary of State Warren Christopher; former Secretary of 
State Lawrence Eagleburger; Secretary of Defense William Perry; Gen. 
John Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; John Holum, 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ambassador Linton 
Brooks, chief negotiator of the treaty; Thomas Graham, Jr., Acting 
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Director of 
Central Intelligence, Mr. James Woolsey and Douglas MacEachin, Deputy 
Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. Nongovernmental 
witnesses included Steven Hadley, an attorney with Shea and Gardner; 
Sven Kraemer, president, Global 2000; Michael Krepon, president, Henry 
L. Stimson Center, and Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms 
Control Association.
  When it is considering treaties such as this, the committee makes a 
particular point to receive the considered and independent judgment of 
the Nation's military leaders for whom it is of critical importance 
that there be no missteps in arms control. General John M. 
Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was unequivocal 
of his endorsement of the treaty:

       The START Treaty offers a significant contribution to our 
     national security. Under its provisions, we achieve the long-
     standing goal of finally eliminating both heavy ICBMs and the 
     practice of MIRVing ICBMs, thereby significantly reducing the 
     incentive for a first strike. For decades, we and the 
     Russians have lived with this dangerous instability. With 
     this treaty, we can at long last put it behind us.
       The Joint Chiefs and I have carefully assessed the adequacy 
     of our strategic forces under START II. With the balanced 
     triad of 3500 warheads that will remain once this Treaty is 
     implemented, the size and mix of our remaining nuclear forces 
     will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against 
     any known adversary and under the worst assumptions. Both 
     American and Russian strategic nuclear forces will be 
     suspended at levels of rough equivalence; a balance with 
     greatly reduced incentive for a first strike. By every 
     military measure, START II is a sound agreement that will 
     make our nation more secure. Under its terms, our forces will 
     remain militarily sufficient, crisis stability will be 
     greatly improved, and we can be confident in our ability to 
     effectively verify its implementation. This Treaty is clearly 
     in the best interests of the United States.
       On the behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend 
     that the Senate promptly give its advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the START II Treaty.

  The resolution that the Senate has approved today reflects a careful, 
bipartisan effort within the Committee on Foreign Relations. It also 
deals with concerns raised by non-committee Members in amendments 
approved on the Senate floor on December 22, 1995.
  Senate consideration and consent to ratification has taken about 3 
years. This is longer than I and others would have wished, but I would 
remind others that the Senate has a long history of moving deliberately 
on arms control treaties. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits 
the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war, took 5 decades 
for the Senate to approve.
  Our action this evening comes at a most propitious moment. The 
Russian Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, will arrive in Washington 
this weekend for the first top-level United States meetings since the 
Russian elections in December. Approval of the START II Treaty should 
prove a fortuitous move if it serves to spur comparable action in the 
Russian Duma. There is to be a G-7 summit meeting in Moscow in April. I 
would hope very much that the newly constituted Duma can act on the 
treaty by that time, so as to permit exchange of instruments of 
ratification and entry into force.
  Mr. President, the START II Treaty is a major achievement by itself, 
but it cannot be viewed alone. It must be seen as part of a critically 
important continuum that began with SALT I, continued through SALT II 
and led to START I and START II. There have been related agreements 
such as the INF Treaty, which required the elimination of the 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the United States and the Soviet 
Union. There are complementary efforts such as the safe and secure 
dismantlement program in Russia and attempts to negotiate a missile 
material production control regime.

  It can truly be said now that arms control has become an integral 
part of our national security. We have learned well that the control 
and reduction of weapons and the maintenance of a sound defense 
structure are key ingredients of our national security. Our own efforts 
in such ventures as START II serve to demonstrate to the world that we 
are committed to the reduction of nuclear arms and are pursuing a path 
that could lead to their elimination.
  In closing, I would point out that the resolution of ratification 
adopted by the Committee in an 18 to 0 vote recalls the obligation 
undertaken by the United States and the other nuclear-weapon states 
``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating 
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament and on a treaty on general complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control'', and states clearly that 
``the Senate calls upon the parties to the START II Treaty to seek 
further strategic offensive arms reductions consistent with their 
national security interests and calls upon the other nuclear weapon 
states to give careful and early consideration to corresponding 
reductions of their own nuclear arsenals.''
  Mr. President, we should be well pleased with our action today, but 
we must not be satisfied. We must be both steadfast and unrelenting in 
our efforts to spare our citizens and the world from the terrible 
catastrophe of war, particularly war through means of weapons of mass 
destruction.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the ratification of the 
START II Treaty by the Senate. The case for ratification is, I believe, 
overwhelming. Both the START I Treaty, negotiated under President 
Reagan, and the START II Treaty, negotiated under President Bush, are 
the end-products of bipartisan arms control support by both the 
Congress and the American people.
  Ratification of the START II Treaty is supported by the President, as 
well as by Secretary of Defense Perry and General Shalikashvili, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense is 
satisfied that the START II Treaty will be fully verifiable, and that 
ratification and entry into force are in our national interest. The 
START II Treaty is a continuation of the substantial reductions in 
strategic weaponry brought about by the signing of the START I Treaty. 
The signing of the START I Treaty occurred after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, at the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
and the development of democratic movements and free elections in the 
countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These events have transformed the 
longstanding bipolar relationship between the United States and the 
now-vanished Soviet Union.
  Given these historic changes, ratification of the START II Treaty is 
the 

[[Page S466]]
next logical step. Upon entry into full force, the START II Treaty will 
further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads held in the 
active inventories of the United States and Russia from about 8,000 
weapons at START I levels by more than 50 percent. By the time START II 
is fully implemented, the START I and START II Treaties will have led 
to more than a three-fold reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear 
warheads on line.
  Moreover, the entry into force of this treaty will eliminate all of 
the land-based, multiple-warhead, or MIRV'd, inter-continental 
ballistic missiles from the arsenals of both sides. It has long been a 
goal of U.S. arms control policy, under both Republican and Democratic 
Presidents and Congresses, to eliminate these poised-for-instant-launch 
MIRV'd ICBM's from the inventories of both sides. Elimination of these 
land-based ICBM missiles, a required measure under the START II Treaty, 
will help both to avoid a return to hair-trigger strategic postures on 
both sides, and to put an end to any conceivable incentive for a 
``bolt-from-the-blue'' attack.
  Ratification of the START II Treaty is a highly cost-effective way to 
reduce the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by nuclear 
weapons. It will eliminate some 5,000 warheads from the Russian force 
posture. Our modest verification cost will be dwarfed by the U.S. 
defense budget savings that will flow from the retirements of our 
excess strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the ratification of 
the START II Treaty today, and to work to build support and 
understanding of the advantages of the START II Treaty among the 
members of the Russian Duma, prior to their consideration of the treaty 
later this year. We need to take every opportunity to explain to the 
new Duma the advantages that will accrue to Russia from the entry into 
force of this treaty.
  Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, 3 years ago President George Bush and 
President Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow to sign a second Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty. At that time, the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
made it possible to achieve additional reductions in our nuclear 
arsenals beyond those provided in the START I Treaty, thereby advancing 
United States security and further reducing the threat of nuclear 
proliferation. On December 5, 1994, President Clinton and the leaders 
of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan convened in Budapest to 
finalize the entry into force of START I, clearing the way for the 
ratification of START II.
  It has thus been a full year since START II has been ready for Senate 
advice and consent to ratification, and I am pleased that it is finally 
being considered by the full Senate. The Foreign Relations Committee 
has held eight hearings on the treaty, in open and closed session, with 
administration and private witnesses. On December 12, the treaty was 
reported favorably on a unanimous vote of 18 to 0.
  Let me elaborate on the substance of this treaty and its benefits to 
U.S. security. Building upon START I, the START II Treaty advances our 
interests by eliminating the most threatening and destabilizing types 
of weapons in the Russian arsenal. Under the treaty, Russia has agreed 
to destroy all of its heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles 
[ICBM's], including all its SS-18 missiles, which were the centerpiece 
of the former Soviet Union's strategic nuclear force. The treaty also 
ends the practice of putting multiple warheads on (or ``MIRVing'') 
ICBM's, a practice which had led to exponential increases in the number 
of deployed nuclear warheads and heightened the threat of a first 
nuclear strike. START II requires each side to reduce its deployed 
warheads from the 6,000 allowed under START I to 3,500 by the year 
2003. This will mean a significant reduction in Russia's deployed 
nuclear warheads, which numbered over 10,000 when the Start Treaty went 
into force.
  In addition, START II limits the number of warheads deployed on 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles [SLBM's], and expands the 
stringent verification regime put into place by START I. New 
verification measures, including on-site inspections of SS-18 silo 
conversions and missile elimination procedures, along with the 
inspection for all heavy bombers, were added to START II to reduce the 
risk of non-compliance.
  Taken together, the two START treaties will reduce the deployed 
strategic offensive arms of the United States and Russia by 
approximately two-thirds by the year 2003. Two out of every three 
weapons that were once aimed against the United States are going to be 
dismantled or destroyed over a period of less than 10 years. The United 
States will retain a credible nuclear deterrent while increasing our 
ability to verify Russian compliance with its treaty obligations.
  During the Committee proceedings, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General John Shalikashvili, gave the following testimony in 
support of ratification:

       Let me say at the outset that, on the basis of detailed 
     study of our security needs and careful review of the Treaty, 
     it is my judgment, and the unanimous opinion of the Joint 
     Chiefs of Staff, that the START II Treaty is in the best 
     interests of the United States. I recommend the Senate 
     provide its advice and consent to START II's ratification.

  President George Bush stated in his January 15, 1993 Letter of 
Transmittal to the Senate--

       The START II Treaty is clearly in the interest of the 
     United States and represents a watershed in our efforts to 
     stabilize the nuclear balance and further reduce strategic 
     offensive arms. I therefore urge the Senate to give prompt 
     and favorable consideration to the Treaty, including its 
     Protocols and Memorandum on Attribution, and to give its 
     advice and consent to ratification.

  Then-Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger concluded in his letter 
of submittal to President Bush--

       This Treaty is truly an historic achievement. By 
     significantly reducing strategic offensive arms, and by 
     eliminating those that pose the greatest threat to stability, 
     the START II Treaty will enhance the national security of the 
     United States. It is in the best interest of the United 
     States of America, the Russian Federation, and, indeed, the 
     entire world that this Treaty enter into force promptly. I 
     strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice 
     and consent to ratification.

  Mr. President, ratification of START II not only will lock in 
reductions that benefit U.S. security directly, it will send an 
important signal to other countries that the United States is serious 
about nuclear non-proliferation. It will encourage other nations to 
join us in the process of limiting weapons of mass destruction and will 
lay the foundation for future arms control agreements. As Spurgeon 
Keeny, Jr., President of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 
warned, ``Failure to complete Senate action promptly could delay for 
years the entry into force of these agreements with great disadvantage 
to United States security.''
  I think the risks of inaction are grave indeed, and I urge my 
colleagues to join in giving prompt advice and consent to ratification.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, let me start off by saying that there is 
nothing wrong with arms control in principle, but there are a lot of 
reasons to oppose the START II treaty. The treaty does not destroy a 
single Russian warhead. It talks about downgrading, reducing, 
downloading, retiring, converting--all actions that can be reversed. 
The Russians do not have to destroy the warheads.
  I wondered also what would happen to those warheads if Russia should 
decide to comply with the START II treaty--this is a big ``if,'' since 
they have not complied with other treaties--but if they did, what would 
happen to those warheads if they were, for example, to download them?
  We all know the financial needs of the former Soviet Union, Russia in 
particular. And we also know that there is a market for those warheads 
in hostile areas of the world--in the Middle East, North Korea, China, 
all throughout the world. You have to ask: what would happen to those 
warheads? We are looking at an agreement that allows Russia to continue 
modernization, build heavy missiles for 7 more years, and new 
submarine-launched missiles, and new land missiles, including a hard-
to-find mobile missile that even the United States does not have. It 
allows them to conduct aggressive military exercises and to increase 
anti-U.S. intelligence.
  I feel that no effective verification or enforcement could be put in 
place with this treaty, even if the Russians should comply with it. But 
let us look at the 

[[Page S467]]
history. People assume they are going to comply with the START II 
treaty but they did not comply with the START I treaty, they did not 
comply with the biological weapons convention, with the chemical 
weapons convention, the INF treaty, the ABM Treaty. Just around 
Christmastime Pavel Grachev, who is the Minister of Defense for Russia, 
made a statement that they did not intend to comply with our 
Conventional Forces Europe treaty, the CFE treaty.
  Their reason for not complying, he said, was that the CFE Treaty was 
not a treaty made between the United States and Russia, but between the 
United States and the USSR. I would ask why, if that is true, are we so 
compelled to comply with the ABM Treaty, which also was not between the 
United States and Russia, but was ratified in 1972 when Russia was 
still the Soviet Union? So I have to ask the question, why is it so 
important, at this particular time, to have the START II treaty?
  Let us look at what has happened just recently. I know we all 
rejoiced just a few years ago when Boris Yeltsin and the reformers took 
control. But look what happened just in the last election, last 
December, of the Duma. The Communists, now, have 157 seats; Boris 
Yeltsin and the Reform Party, only 55 seats; the person I think most 
people here dread more than anyone else, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, his 
party, the Ultranationalists, took 51 seats. So he is almost even with 
Yeltsin's party, and it is just one-third of what the Communists now 
have. So, it is a totally different environment right now in Russia 
from 1993, when the START II treaty was signed by President Bush and 
President Yeltsin.
  I think, when you realize that we are ratifying a flawed agreement 
with a country that has never lived up to previous agreements, and that 
we are accepting Russia's demands that we remain naked to missile 
attacks from all over the world, that this is wrong.
  On December 28 President Clinton vetoed the defense authorization 
bill. His prime objection to this bill was that we were spending money 
on a national missile defense system. In his message he declared that 
this might violate the 1972 ABM Treaty, which prevents the deployment 
of a multiple-site missile defense system in the United States. Clinton 
stated that the missile defense plan ``* * * puts the United States 
policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty and puts at risk 
continued Russian implementation of the START I treaty and Russian 
ratification of the START II treaty.''
  Our President rejects a national missile defense system. He says that 
U.S. national security in the post-cold-war world rests on two 
treaties, the ABM Treaty and the START treaty, both negotiated at the 
height of the cold war. That is the linkage the President is making. We 
can argue whether or not there is a linkage between the ABM Treaty and 
the START II treaty, but in fact the President thinks there is. He has 
stated that there is, and he accepts the Russians' linkage between 
these treaties, which says that we must abide by one, the ABM Treaty, 
to get the other, the START treaty.
  You might ask yourself the question: why is it that Russia is so 
interested in those two treaties? First of all, I have serious doubts 
that they would comply with the START II treaty. Maybe they have doubts 
that they would, too. But it seems to me they are bent on our agreeing 
to reduce our nuclear capability, which they would do to, and at the 
same time they are even more interested in the ABM Treaty. I think this 
is something we really have not talked about enough.

  The ABM Treaty was one that was put together in a Republican 
administration. It was Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger's project. Dr. 
Kissinger was the architect of the ABM Treaty of 1972. In 1972 we had 
two superpowers in this world. Mr. President, we could identify who the 
enemy was. At that time it seemed to be a good idea. I did not agree 
with it at the time, but I certainly did not question the wisdom of 
President Nixon and of Dr. Kissinger, because it seemed that a policy 
of mutual assured destruction was in the best interests of the United 
States. Simply put, that is a policy that says: we agree not to defend 
ourselves and not to implement a national missile defense system if you 
agree to do the same thing. That way, the risk of complete destruction 
keeps us from attacking each other.
  You may believe that this was not a good idea at the time. I did not 
think it was a good idea. But there is certainly some justification for 
it.
  That is not the environment that we are in today. In fact, Henry 
Kissinger himself has said that it is insane to continue with this type 
of policy in today's environment when you have the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction all throughout the 
world. It was Kissinger who said, and this is a direct quote: ``It is 
nuts to make a virtue out of our vulnerability.''
  People have made several references to the fact that President Reagan 
actually started some of the START negotiations. But I would recall the 
1986 Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Iceland. It was really the defining 
moment in the cold war. Gorbachev proposed to eliminate all nuclear 
weapons and everyone was all excited. But then he established the 
condition that President Reagan would have to kill the Strategic 
Defense Initiative, a plan for a national missile defense system. In 
other words, he said we will agree to doing away with and destroying 
all nuclear weapons if you agree to make yourself vulnerable to an 
attack.
  Reagan walked away from the bad agreement in order to save the United 
States missile defense program. We are faced with the same choice. Our 
President currently is embracing that very notion that Reagan rejected, 
even though, since 1986, the missile threat has greatly increased and 
Russia has violated treaty after treaty. We have to ask, what is so 
good about the tradeoff now?
  Mr. President, I will make this brief because I have made this 
statement on the floor so many times before. I have deep concern about 
what is happening right now with our attitude toward a national missile 
defense system. It is kind of interesting--all these people who come in 
and want to talk about how bad a national missile defense system is 
always use such words as ``Star Wars,'' trying to make it look like 
something that is mythical, something that is science fiction. In fact, 
anyone who was watching TV during the Persian Gulf war knows that the 
technology of knocking missiles down with missiles is something that is 
alive and well.
  President Clinton appointed Jim Woolsey to be CIA Director, and he 
was certainly privileged to more information, or as much as anyone else 
in the world, concerning this Nation's defense. And he said that there 
are between 20 and 25 nations around the world who currently have, or 
are developing, weapons of mass destruction, either nuclear, chemical, 
or biological, and are developing the missile means to deliver those 
weapons of mass destruction.
  So there is a greater threat. Most people who are watching the 
security scene today believe there is a greater threat facing America 
today than there was during the cold war, because now we are not 
talking about one enemy, we are talking about 25 or so countries that 
are developing this technology.
  If anyone is comfortable in what is happening right now, I suggest 
that you read last Wednesday's New York Times. I will not submit this 
for the Record because I did so yesterday when I first read it. I was 
still in some degree of shock. The New York Times provides fresh 
evidence of the folly of leaving America vulnerable to ballistic 
missile attack.
  In an article entitled--listen to this--``As China threatens Taiwan, 
it makes sure United States listens--'' the Times reports on ominous 
information recently passed to National Security Adviser Anthony Lake 
concerning measures being taken by Beijing to facilitate military 
action against Taiwan, and points to statements intended to detour the 
United States from coming to Taipei's assistance. Referring to Charles 
Freeman--he is a former U.S. Ambassador to China, now Assistant 
Secretary of Defense--the article reports that ``A Chinese official 
told him of the advanced state of military planning and that 
preparations for a missile attack on Taiwan and the target selection to 
carry it out have been completed and await final decision by the 
politburo in Beijing.'' Freeman reportedly told Lake that ``A Chinese 
official asserted that China could act 

[[Page S468]]
militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the United 
States because American leaders `care more about' ''--listen to this--
``Los Angeles than they do Taiwan.'' That statement Mr. Freeman 
characterized as an indirect threat by China to use nuclear weapons 
against the United States.
  Mr. President, this is the environment we are in today. Today the 
Senate is considering a treaty, START II, that will further endanger 
our country because the President and the Russians link it to the ABM 
Treaty, which precludes our country from defending itself against 
missile attack.
  I would like to submit something for the Record. It was in the Wall 
Street Journal, in an editorial called, ``The ABM Treaty's Threat,'' on 
January 2.
  I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

            [From the Wall Street Journal, January 2, 1996]

                        The ABM Treaty's Threat

       With his veto of the 1996 defense bill last week, President 
     Clinton just made the world a more dangerous place. If 
     there's a silver lining, it is that it sets down an important 
     political marker for this year's presidential campaign. GOP 
     upstart Steve Forbes also put down a marker last week, 
     castigating Bob Dole and the Senate for their apparent 
     willingness to ratify the Start II treaty--a ``further 
     pretext,'' Mr. Forbes said, for the ``policy of leaving the 
     American people vulnerable to missile attack.
       Given the current Senate, the President's veto is almost 
     certain to be sustained, hamstringing the effort to build 
     critically needed defenses against ballistic missile attack. 
     Millions of Americans may pay for his decision with their 
     lives, when some future commander-in-chief lacks the means to 
     shoot down a ballistic missile heading on a lethal trajectory 
     for an American city. By vetoing the bill, Mr. Clinton also 
     shows that he has no viable strategy for dealing with the 
     changed nuclear realities of the post-Cold War world--
     realities that are discussed nearby by former Reagan Defense 
     official Fred C. Ikle.
       The Administration, to the extent it's thinking at all 
     instead of repeating Democratic Party rote, remains mired in 
     an obsolete mindset that sees Moscow as our main foe and 
     regards arms control and ``mutual assured destruction'' as 
     the centerpiece of policy. Mr. Clinton's principal objection 
     to the GOP defense bill is that by requiring deployment of a 
     missile-defense system by 2003 it would violate the 1972 
     Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty under which the U.S. and the 
     Soviet Union agreed not to defend themselves against missile 
     attack.
       The Republican bill is ``on a collision course with the ABM 
     treaty,'' Mr. Clinton said in his veto message. That, as we 
     see it, is precisely the point. The ABM Treaty is a grave 
     danger to national security and the United States ought to 
     exercise its prerogative to withdraw. If any progress toward 
     defense is to be made, every Republican Presidential 
     candidate ought to pledge to give the required notice on his 
     first day in office.
       We thought back in 1972 that agreeing not to defend against 
     missile attack was a reckless promise, but today any vestige 
     of a rationale has vanished. More than two-dozen nations 
     already possess ballistic missiles and a number will soon 
     have missiles capable of reaching across the Atlantic or the 
     Pacific. It's not hard to imagine that Washington or San 
     Francisco would make tempting targets for a lunatic leader in 
     one of the Iraqs or North Koreas of the world. When that 
     happens, it will be too late to start building a missile 
     defense.
       The ABM Treaty is just one relic of the Cold War that Mr. 
     Clinton is intent on preserving. He further objects that it 
     would derail his arms-control efforts, keeping the Russian 
     Duma from ratifying Start II, under which Russia would reduce 
     its nuclear arsenal to 3,500 warheads from about 8,000. 
     Whatever the Duma does, it looks likely that the U.S. Senate 
     will ratify Salt II three years after it was signed by 
     Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. Perfunctory debate ended last 
     week and a vote is expected soon. Mr. Forbes, free of the 
     impact of past habit, is one of the few Republican voices 
     urging against ratification.
       Yet with few exceptions, Republicans do believe that 
     defending America against missile attack ought to be a 
     national priority. Their Congress has put forward a workable 
     and affordable plan toward that goal. On the other hand, we 
     have a President who's decided that it is more important to 
     the security of the United States to reduce the number of 
     Russian nuclear warheads than to have the capability to 
     defend ourselves against missile attack from the madmen of 
     the world.
       As for Start II, somehow we don't find it very comforting 
     to contemplate a world in which the Russians have 4,500 fewer 
     scary things tucked away in their arsenal but a Saddam 
     Hussein has one that he intends to use on us. Clearly it's 
     time for a new security strategy. It will require more, but 
     missile defense will be a cornerstone. Mr. Ikle argues that 
     to wake the world to this obvious need may well take a 
     nuclear explosion, either accidental or deliberate.
  Mr. INHOFE. Mr. President, I will quote one sentence, which says:

       As for START II, somehow we don't find it very comforting 
     to contemplate a world in which the Russians have 4,500 fewer 
     scary things tucked away in their arsenal but a Saddam 
     Hussein has one that he intends to use on us.

  So, in conclusion, I say, Mr. President, that passing of this treaty 
right now may be important to the President's agenda. But if this 
treaty is really important, why are we rushing through it with so 
little debate?
  This morning we had a meeting in my office at 9 o'clock. It was with 
the 11 freshmen that were elected to this body in 1994. At that time we 
did not even know this was going to be on the agenda today. This was 
put on 10 hours ago before we had a chance to come out, debate it, get 
people together to really be concerned and to understand the full 
ramifications of this treaty and how it provides a chance of making us 
vulnerable--10 hours. That is all the time we had.
  What kind of a message will the rogue countries in the world get if 
we pass, on the same day, a defense bill recently stripped of missile 
defense and a START II Treaty on Russia's terms? Just to satisfy 
Russia, President Clinton was willing to veto the defense bill that 
attempted to protect Americans from missile attack.
  Yes, we are getting the Russians down to 3,500 missiles, if they 
comply. But we are giving Russia a practical veto on our ability to 
defend ourselves. We have countries out there--China we just talked 
about, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya--any number of countries that are 
a direct threat to this country, and they are not constrained by any of 
the provisions in the START II agreement or in the ABM Treaty.
  My simple proposition is this: Missile defense should be our highest 
national security priority. If the President believes that our highest 
priority must be sacrificed to gain Russia's approval of START II, I 
say it is too high a price to pay.
  Mr. President, every time I come out here and we talk about this 
treaty or we talk about the ABM Treaty or we talk about the missile 
defense of this country, I remember the days following the April 19 
bombing in Oklahoma City in my beautiful State of Oklahoma. I had very 
close friends with daughters and sons and mothers and fathers who were 
in that building, the Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, 
hoping day after day and hour after hour that they would find them 
still to be alive until finally all hope was given up. We lost 169 
lives in the most brutal terrorist attack in the history of America. I 
saw those things. My son, an orthopedic surgeon, was practicing with a 
doctor who went in and amputated the leg of a woman in order to extract 
her from the bomb site.
  When I think about that, I remember that the bomb which blew up the 
Federal building was rated at 1 ton of TNT, and the smallest nuclear 
warhead known today is rated at 1 kiloton of TNT, or 1,000 times the 
size of the bomb that exploded in Oklahoma City.
  That is why I stated on this floor last week that if the vote is 98 
to 1, I will be the one to oppose the ratification of the START II 
agreement because, Mr. President, it is the right thing to do for 
America.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote to ratify 
the START II agreement. By ratifying this treaty, the Senate will be 
taking a major step toward eliminating the menace of nuclear arms from 
the face of the Earth.
  Since the dawn of the nuclear age at the end of World War II, nuclear 
arms control has been our highest priority. One of President Kennedy's 
proudest achievements was the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. which 
banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under 
water. Many of us today continue to attempt to build on that 
achievement by enacting a comprehensive test ban treaty to ban all 
nuclear tests.
  In recent decades, we have made progress toward reducing covert 
nuclear arsenals. Negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
began in 1982, at one of the most difficult points in our cold war 
relationship with the Soviet Union. Although the first years of the 
START process 

[[Page S469]]
saw only sporadic progress, our goal of achieving significant, 
verifiable reductions in the superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals 
never wavered.
  When the Berlin Wall came down in 1989, our long-standing efforts 
were rewarded with the signing of the START I Treaty by President Bush 
in 1991 and its ratification by Congress the following year.
  Now, nearly 3 years after the signing of START II by President Bush 
in Moscow, we are achieving another milestone in the process by 
ratifying this far-reaching agreement.
  This second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty lives up to its name--it 
bring about dramatic reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of 
the United States and Russia. The United States and the Soviet Union 
had arsenals with over 10,000 nuclear warheads when the Berlin Wall 
came down. START I is bringing the level down to between 6,000 and 
7,000. START II will cut the arsenals in half again--to between 3,000 
and 3,500 nuclear warheads by the year 2003. It has been more than 40 
years since Russia's nuclear threat to the United States has been this 
small. We are moving in the direction of eliminating the nuclear menace 
that threatens our national survival.

  In addition to reducing the size of the United States and Russian 
arsenals, the treaty before us will restructure the strategic forces of 
both nations to create a more stable nuclear relationship.
  First, the treaty eliminates multiple independently targetable re-
entry vehicles [MIRV's] from the land-based missile forces of both 
nations. This step achieves a goal that many of us have sought for over 
two decades--to eliminate the incentive for either side to strike at 
the other's multiple-warhead land-based missiles in a time of crisis.
  Another major accomplishment of the treaty is to eliminate heavy 
ICBM's from the arsenals of both countries. The SS-18 missile in the 
Russian arsenal, which caused such concern for the United States for so 
long, will be scrapped.
  Another strength of this treaty is in the area of verification. START 
II builds on the ground-breaking verification regime established by the 
START I Treaty. This regime includes extensive onsite inspections, 
notifications, and the use of national technical means of verification, 
our network of intelligence satellites and sensors. In ways like these, 
the ratification regime gives us a high degree of confidence that we 
can accurately assess Russian compliance with this treaty.
  In addition to the verification procedures included in the treaty, 
the greater openness in current-day Russian society, compared to the 
closed nature of the Soviet Union, gives much wider information about 
Russian strategic behavior and intentions.
  START II is also a major part of the effort to prevent the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations. During review of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last spring, many of the nations which 
voted with us for a permanent extension of that treaty conditioned 
their vote on progress in United States-Russian arms reduction, 
specifically the approval of START II.
  If the United States is to lead a worldwide effort to eliminate the 
threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, we need to take 
steps to reduce the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. This 
treaty represents the single largest step in that direction in history. 
It earns us the credibility and respect necessary to enable President 
Clinton to conclude negotiations in 1996 of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty, outlawing nuclear explosions around the globe. This 
achievement, which is within our grasp, will be the most important step 
toward limiting worldwide nuclear proliferation since the NPT was 
negotiated nearly three decades ago.
  The end of the cold war has recast the international security 
landscape. Before the Berlin Wall fell, there was little hope of 
cutting nuclear arsenals this deeply. Now, we have a unique opportunity 
to reduce the nuclear threat to all nations.
  The NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban, and the two START treaties are 
pillars of an evolving strategy that relies increasingly on cooperation 
and consensus to achieve security from nuclear threats, even as we 
continue to maintain the forces necessary for a stable deterrent.
  One of our greatest challenges is to continue this progress, to 
pursue arms control as vigorously as we can, to bring other nations 
into cooperative security regimes, to do all we can to prevent nuclear 
weapons from reaching the hands of terrorists, and to develop more 
effective means for peaceful resolution of international conflicts. 
These efforts, if tenaciously pursued, will allow us to reduce, and 
perhaps one day, to eliminate, weapons of mass destruction from the 
face of the Earth. I urge my colleagues to ratify this treaty.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the START II Treaty 
and the conditions and declarations outlined in the resolution of 
ratification.
  Last month's Russian parliamentary elections, in which opponents of 
free market reform and conciliation with the West made shocking gains, 
and the resignations from President Yeltsin's administration of several 
important reformers have created an atmosphere of great uncertainty in 
United States-Russian relations, I daresay there is no one in this body 
that has failed to see the significance in these events. I am sure that 
they will figure prominently in the foreign policy debates of the 
coming year.
  These developments, however, as disturbing as they are, should not 
preclude us from moving forward with arms control agreements. We have 
reached arms control agreements with Russia in days much darker than 
these. We cannot base an issue of such monumental importance to our 
security as the quantity and quality of weapons possessed by the 
world's second largest nuclear power on the intricacies and 
imponderables of Russian politics.
  What is going on inside Russia today, and what we can do to turn it 
to our advantage will be debated for years. We should lock in the 
reductions in START II made possible by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union while we have the opportunity.
  I am not going to go into too much detail. My colleagues are all 
familiar with the treaty. I do, however, want to point out a number of 
its more salient and compelling provisions. If fully implemented, START 
II will limit the United States and Russia to 3,500 deployed warheads 
each--a reduction by half of our START I limits and an overall 
reduction of two-thirds; it will ban all land-based, multiple warhead 
missiles; and it will eliminate all of Russia's heaviest missiles.
  In addition, I believe the Foreign Relations Committee and the 
managers of the resolution have added crucial conditions which improve 
upon the treaty. I find two of these conditions most striking: One 
concerning noncompliance and the other the ABM Treaty.
  The record of Russian compliance with other treaties, the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Biological Weapons 
Convention, are not entirely reassuring. Compounding the problem of 
noncompliance, the administration's efforts to bring the Russians into 
compliance have been no more reassuring. In the case of the CFE Treaty, 
the administration made substantive changes in Russia's obligations, 
without Senate consent, in an effort to gain Russian compliance. 
Despite this effort, months later, the administration was forced to 
declare Moscow in violation of the very targets designed to accommodate 
it. An article in this week's Washington Post by Thomas Lippman 
illustrates a similar problem related to Russian START I compliance. I 
ask that it be printed in the Record.

  The Foreign Relations Committee has wisely seen fit to deal with this 
problem. According to a condition passed by the Foreign Relations 
Committee before sending the resolution of ratification to the floor, 
the President must report to the Senate on noncompliance and submit 
changes in the obligations of the parties to the Senate. The Senate has 
every right to review changes in the obligations and trade-offs to 
which it agrees. In the case of persistent noncompliance, the President 
must return to the Senate to seek its consent to continue U.S. 
adherence.
  The committee is to be commended for taking responsible action on an 
issue so potentially and justifiably damaging to the treaty's 
prospects.
  With regard to the ABM Treaty, the tortuous process by which 
agreement 

[[Page S470]]
was finally reached on the DOD authorization bill was a reminder that 
it remains a hotly contested issue not soon to be resolved. The Foreign 
Relations Committee, again commendably, has acted to preclude linking 
the futures of the START II and ABM Treaties. After all, these treaties 
were reached in different eras and are separated by 20 years. The 
Foreign Relations Committee has included a condition stating that 
Russian ratification of START II should not be contingent on continued 
adherence by the United States to Russian interpretation of the ABM 
Treaty. The managers amendment makes this more explicit by declaring 
that nothing in the START II Treaty changes the rights of either party 
to the ABM treaty.
  Like NAFTA, START II is a Republican treaty--inspired by Ronald 
Reagan and negotiated by President Bush. Ronald Reagan came to office 
pledging ``peace through strength'' and left office having concluded 
the first strategic weapons reduction treaty in history. START II 
builds on these historic reductions. The Senate should follow through 
on President Reagan's vision and ratify the START II Treaty.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1996]

   Russia Balks at Arms Accord; Failure To Implement Clinton-Yeltsin 
                  Agreements Frustrates U.S. Officials

                         (By Thomas W. Lippman)

       Russia has balked at implementing any of the nuclear 
     security and weapons inspection agreements announced by 
     President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin at their summit 
     meeting last May, throwing up a major roadblock to U.S-
     Russian cooperation in key security issues, U.S. officials 
     said.
       After a promising start on discussions aimed at carrying 
     out the agreements, the Russians pulled back and have 
     essentially suspended the talks, according to several 
     officials who said they were perplexed and frustrated by the 
     developments.
       Officials at the State Department, the White House and the 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said it is unclear why 
     the Russians have backed away and there may be multiple 
     reasons. What is clear, they said, is that the mutual 
     inspections and data exchanges on weapons and nuclear 
     materials--which the presidents said would happen--are not 
     about to happen.
       The failure to carry through on the agreements does not by 
     itself threaten U.S. security or U.S.-Russian relations, 
     officials said. But in the context of other recent 
     developments in Russia such as the removal of almost all pro-
     Western reformers from Yeltsin's government and the 
     appointment of a Russian nationalist, Yevgeny Primakov, as 
     foreign minister, it adds to a troubling recent pattern that 
     has clouded Washington's relations which Moscow.
       ``We hope to implement all the agreements presidents 
     Clinton and Yeltsin arrived at during their Moscow summit,'' 
     State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said. ``Over the 
     past couple of years we have found that some of these arms 
     agreements are very difficult, and it is sometimes necessary 
     to bring in senior officials because the bureaucracy in both 
     countries can only take them so far,'' Burns said. He added 
     that the United States and Russia are cooperating on many 
     other issues, such as the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
       Clinton and Yeltsin on May 10 issued a ``Joint Statement on 
     the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of 
     Reducing Nuclear Weapons,'' containing measures by which each 
     country could assure itself that the other was carrying out 
     promised nuclear weapons reductions.
       They said the two countries would ``exchange on a regular 
     basis'' detailed information on their stockpiles of weapons 
     and nuclear materials. They also said the two countries would 
     undertake ``reciprocal monitoring'' of the facilities where 
     they store nuclear materials removed from dismantled 
     warheads. And they said they would ``seek to conclude in the 
     shortest possible time'' a legal agreement ensuring 
     protection of the exchanged data.
       None of it has happened. The legal agreement was never 
     negotiated, making it impossible to exchange classified data 
     and develop the ``chain of custody'' agreement sought by the 
     United States. And the United States refused to allow Russian 
     officials to inspect the only U.S. nuclear weapons 
     dismantlement facility, the Pantex plant near Amarillo, Tex., 
     because Russia would not allow U.S. inspectors to visit a 
     comparable plant there.
       In the same joint declaration, Clinton and Yeltsin ``urged 
     progress'' in carrying out a 1994 agreement by which Russia 
     was to cease producing plutonium, the key building block of 
     nuclear weapons. That has not happened either, officials 
     said, but for different reasons: The United States has been 
     able to come up with the money to replace the electric power 
     and heat generated by the Russian plutonium-producing 
     reactors, so the reactors still are operating.
       Discussions on this issue are to resume later this month, 
     Energy Department officials said.
       The failure to implement the agreements contributes to 
     widespread suspicion in Congress about the ability and will 
     of the Russian defense establishment to carry out such 
     accords.
       That suspicion was manifest when the Senate began 
     consideration of the START II arms reduction treaty on the 
     Friday before Christmas. In that session, which attracted 
     little notice because of the timing, the Senate approved a 
     Resolution of Ratification that directs the president to 
     follow specific procedures in the event of Russian 
     noncompliance.
       ``In the event that noncompliance persists'' after 
     diplomatic approaches, the resolution says, the president 
     must return to the Senate for a determination of whether the 
     United States will continue to be bound by the treaty.
       ``Obviously we all hope and require that the Russians fully 
     comply with START II,'' said Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.).
       ``But their record and the record of the former Soviet 
     Union with respect to compliance with arms control agreements 
     is somewhat dubious. I will note just a few of the areas of 
     violation in the past: the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
     Chemical Weapons agreements, the Missile Technology Control 
     Regime, START I and the conventional forces in Europe 
     treaties. All of these agreements have provisions that Russia 
     has in one way or another failed to comply [with],'' Kyl 
     said.
       The START II treaty, signed in 1991, requires the United 
     States and Russia to make further deep cuts in their nuclear 
     arsenals and delivery systems by 2003. During the pre-
     Christmas discussion, senators of both parties made clear 
     that they will ratify it by an overwhelming vote, but the 
     resolution they adopted specified that this country will not 
     be bound by its terms until it has been ratified by the 
     Russian Duma, a much more dubious proposition.
       Russian ratification is not imminent, several analysts 
     said, because of strong opposition in the recently elected 
     Duma, or lower house of parliament, where many members 
     reportedly regard its terms as skewed in favor of the United 
     States.
       The Senate resolution called on ``both parties to the START 
     II treaty to attach high priority'' to implementation of the 
     May 10 joint declaration so that compliance with START I and 
     START II can be verified, but did not make implementation a 
     condition of START II ratification.
       U.S. officials involved in the ``transparency and 
     irreversibility'' issue offered several explanations of what 
     might be holding up an agreement on the Russian side.
       ``The Russians have essentially told us they are doing a 
     reassessment. It probably has to do with the political 
     situation there,'' one said. ``They have a lot of communists 
     and nationalists in the Duma.''
       The Russians ``have very limited interagency 
     communication,'' another source said. ``Their vertical 
     communication is relatively poor. And there's the fiefdom 
     problem,'' an indirect allusion to the prickly and 
     independent Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov. 
     ``We're talking about letting out information about the crown 
     jewels,'' another U.S. official said. ``Both sides are pretty 
     nervous about it, but especially them.''

  Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. President, I rise today to express my unqualified 
support for ratification of the START II Treaty. I am happy that the 
Senate is finally considering this measure and believe the 
implementation of this treaty is another step on the road to 
eliminating the most destabilizing strategic weapons.
  In January 1993, President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin 
signed the treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation 
on further reduction and limitation of strategic arms. Their 
determination and cooperation helped build upon the progress that was 
achieved from the START I Treaty. The result of START II will mean 
greater reductions in strategic nuclear forces.
  Ratification of this treaty today is critical, as it continues a 
process begun by START I. This treaty will help enhance U.S. and 
international security and substantially reduce the number of strategic 
warheads currently deployed by both countries. In early December, I 
joined a number of my Senate colleagues in sending a letter to the 
majority leader urging that both START II and the Chemicals Weapons 
Convention [CWC] be brought before the Senate for action. Shortly 
thereafter, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted unanimously to 
approve ratification of START II. This issue has bipartisan support. 
Today we have an opportunity to act on that.
  Mr. President, this treaty has many important provisions. It will 
eliminate around 4,000 strategic nuclear weapons from the arsenal of 
the former Soviet Union. Specifically, it will eliminate all Russian 
heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's], and all multiple-
warhead ICBM's. Eliminating 

[[Page S471]]
these weapons would greatly reduce the threat of first strike in the 
event of renewed hostilities with the former Soviet Union. By 
eliminating this capability, United States-Russian strategic relations 
will be strengthened.
  Another important aspect of START II is that it strengthens our 
ability to verify information, conduct on-site inspections, and deter 
possible violations of the treaty. This will help ensure compliance and 
allow monitoring of the progress being made to reduce these weapons. 
Under this treaty, reduction of arms will take place over a 5- to 7-
year period. When these reductions are completed, the United States and 
Russia will each be limited to between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed 
strategic warheads. It is my hope that ratification of this treaty 
today will help encourage Russia to complete its own START II 
ratification efforts.
  Mr. President, since the end of the cold war, our world has undergone 
a tremendous transformation. There is less fear and worry about nuclear 
war. We have made substantial efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. 
President Clinton has made nonproliferation and arms reduction a major 
priority. But the weapons are still here. Ratification of this treaty 
clearly represents significant progress with regard to reducing nuclear 
arms. However, there is still work yet to be done.
  Last year 187 nations voted to indefinitely extend the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty [NPT] with a commitment to work on a Comprehensive 
Test Ban [CTB] Treaty. I am extremely encouraged by this action and 
believe that we must work to reach an agreement on a CTB in the near 
future. In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] is also 
awaiting ratification by the United States. The CWC bans the 
development, production, stockpiling, and use of toxic chemicals as a 
weapon. Clearly, we must eliminate these weapons of mass destruction. 
By addressing these issues, it is my hope that other countries will be 
more likely to follow the U.S. example and end their reliance on a 
nuclear deterrent.
  Mr. President, today we have an opportunity to ratify a treaty that 
is vital to U.S. strategic interests. We have an opportunity to help 
make the world a safer place to live--a safer place for our children. 
START II has strong support from the American public, the national 
security community and many Members of this body. We must continue with 
our efforts to reduce these weapons of mass destruction, and 
ratification of START II is a critical step toward this end.
  I urge my colleagues to support this measure.
  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, 3 years after its signing by the United 
States and the Soviet Union, the second landmark Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty has finally come to the floor of the Senate for 
consideration. I want to join the overwhelming majority of my 
colleagues in strongly supporting the ratification of START II, and 
hope it will move quickly into force. Indeed, this treaty is key to our 
national and international security, and will help set the tone for 
what should be a more peaceful era.
  Mr. President, the risk of detonation of a nuclear device in Western 
Europe or the United States may have actually increased since the end 
of the Cold War. There are literally tens of thousands of weapons, and 
mass quantities of nuclear materials, in Russia's stockpile, and their 
safety and security are in question. Just one of those has to get into 
the hands of a rogue nation or a high-paying terrorist to threaten or 
destroy Washington, Bonn, London, or any other major metropolis.
  When START II goes into force, however, 8,000 strategic weapons--
4,000 from both Russia and the United States--will be tabbed for 
destruction. This will include the abolition of the core of the Russian 
nuclear arsenal--the deadly SS-18--and the multiple independent re-
entry vehicles [MIRV's], significantly reducing the likelihood of 
either side launching a nuclear first strike. START II, however, does 
leave intact our defensive, second strike capability.
  Implementation of START II, moreover--coupled with the Non-
Proliferation Treaty the United States signed earlier this year--would 
reflect monumental reform of our nuclear posture. Not only will these 
two treaties help reduce the possibility of an accidental launch or the 
sabotage of nuclear weapons and materials, they will establish a new 
approach toward global non-proliferation. As the United States and 
Russia will downsize their stockpiles, other nuclear countries could 
proceed with reduction of their arsenals. This will bring us several 
steps closer to successful conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test 
ban treaty.
  Perhaps the most significant achievements of START II would be the 
consecration of an international alliance against the scourge of 
nuclear war, rather than continuation of the build-up by nations which 
could each independently threaten a nuclear explosion.
  Mr. President, the post-cold war era brings an opportunity to reshape 
U.S. defense posture and policy. No longer will we have to rely on the 
threat of nuclear weapons nor, I believe, permanently deploy United 
States combat forces abroad, except in limited and rare occasions, in 
order to protect our interests.
  While we can all agree on the need--indeed the moral imperative--of 
ending the threat of nuclear war, there is an equal need for debate on 
where we go from here. For example, the mission and, indeed, the 
necessity of alliances such as NATO--anchored in nuclear doctrine and 
massive retaliation--are only now being reconsidered. The Bosnia 
operation is the most recent example of an unfortunate tendency to 
address, by a rather ad hoc process, questions regarding our role, 
mission and methods in the new era.
  The Congress, and particularly the Senate, will play a pivotal role 
in that debate, Mr. President. I have made clear my view that it will 
be incumbent on this body to assert its constitutional prerogative in 
shaping the future of our national security posture.
  Ratifying the START II treaty will be an important step in accepting 
and asserting our responsibilities. Time is of the essence, Mr. 
President. The Russian Duma will not ratify the Treaty until the Senate 
does, and, as we saw in last month's parliamentary elections in Russia, 
the Duma could become more anti-Western and regressive. We must lock in 
these reductions, and begin implementation of START II as soon as 
possible.
  The Senate has dallied long enough on issues of paramount importance 
to national security. START II and the equally vital Chemical Weapons 
Convention have unfortunately been held hostage by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. This has reflected badly on this Senate, and badly 
served US interests. Therefore, I am gratified that we are finally here 
today, debating START II, and would urge swift ratification of this 
treaty and the CWC. We must consolidate the gains the new era affords 
us, lest we revert back to the dangers and antiquated thinking of the 
cold war.
  Mr. DORGAN. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to ratify the 
second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty by an overwhelming vote. This 
treaty will receive bipartisan support because it makes an enormous 
contribution to our security. That is why I am glad to be part of a 
large group of Senators who support this treaty.
  President Bush and President Yeltsin of Russia signed the START II 
Treaty in January of 1993, in one of the greatest achievements of the 
Bush administration. Once President Clinton agreed on the 
implementation of the first START Treaty with the leaders of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine, START I came into force in 
December 1994, and the way was cleared for ratification of this START 
II Treaty by the Senate and the Russian Duma.
  I will not dwell on why it has taken so long for the Senate to take 
up this treaty. I will only note that the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee conducted no business meetings for 4\1/2\ months. It took 
courage for the Senator from New Mexico, Senator Bingaman, to block 
other Senate business in order to free the START II Treaty from a 
committee that had been shut down. So I want to congratulate him on the 
fact that the Senate is now debating this treaty. He has made a great 
contribution to our national security and our future by ensuring that 
this treaty come to the floor. 

[[Page S472]]

  Mr. President, the START II Treaty is the single greatest step in the 
history of arms control. It aims to eliminate ``first strike'' 
capability. It is the fear of a nuclear first strike--sometimes called 
a bolt out of the blue--that keeps the nuclear powers on hair trigger 
alert and encourages the nuclear arms race. But the START II treaty 
would enable the United States and the Russian Federation to rest 
assured that neither can knock the other out with a surprise attack.
  Each would retain enough of a deterrent to inflict punishing 
retaliation after a first strike, which means that a first strike would 
be a losing strategy. The United States would also retain a hedge 
against a breakout from the treaty in the event of a military coup or 
other reversal of democracy in Russia. The remaining U.S. arsenal would 
also defend us against rogue nations that might conceivably seek to 
threaten us or our allies with limited weapons of mass destruction.
  Even as we strive for peace and stability, we must not let our guard 
down. That is why it is essential that we retain a robust force of 
Minuteman III's, B-52 bombers and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles.
  It is important to note that the START II Treaty would eliminate the 
backbone of the Russian nuclear deterrent, the massive SS-18 land-based 
missile. The Russians have 188 of them, with 10 warheads each. If 
ratified, START II will require the SS-18's to be destroyed. More than 
2,000 other Russian warheads would also be destroyed.
  START II embodies the principle that the cold war is over. We built 
up our nuclear capability in order to outweigh the Soviet Union's 
numerical superiority in conventional weapons, especially in Europe. 
The Soviet Union is gone; the Berlin Wall is no more; Europe is no 
longer divided by Communist tyranny. Much of our nuclear arsenal has 
lost its purpose. By ratifying START II, the Senate would recognize 
that we have entered a new era.
  Ratification will also demonstrate American leadership. It will show 
the Russian Duma that the United States Senate is serious about arms 
control. It will lead the way for other nuclear powers to cut their own 
stockpiles of weapons. And it will demonstrate to nonnuclear states 
that the United States is living up to the commitment made when we 
signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, that we would work for an 
end to the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament.
  The START II Treaty would reduce the likelihood of an accidental 
launch or terrorist attack. Fewer nuclear weapons means better control 
over those weapons by a country's civilian leadership. Better control 
means a lesser likelihood that those weapons will fall into the wrong 
hands.
  Lastly, the START II Treaty is verifiable. The treaty continues the 
stringent START I verification regime of satellites and other 
intelligence, data exchange, notification, exhibition, and onsite 
inspection to detect and deter possible breaches of the treaty. But 
START II includes new verification measures, including observation of 
silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions, and 
inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads, and 
exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to 
confirm their observable differences.
  We North Dakotans know about nuclear weapons. After all, with our two 
Minuteman wings and our B-52 bombers, it has been said that North 
Dakota is the third strongest nuclear power in the entire world, after 
the United States and Russia. We have been a cold war arsenal for 
decades. We remain ready to help ensure peace in a new world.
  At the same time, North Dakotans are glad to see the nuclear shadow 
lightening. It is time to ratify the START II Treaty. Coupled with a 
strong defense, it will help build our national security. I urge my 
colleagues to support START II.
  Thank you, Mr. President. I yield the floor.
  Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate has had the opportunity to review 
and consider the START II Treaty for almost three years, and it is now 
offering its advice and consent to that treaty. I am pleased to endorse 
this treaty, which will substantially reduce the nuclear threat that 
has hovered for so many years like a dark cloud over both the United 
States and Russia. The START II Treaty builds on twenty years of arms 
control efforts ranging from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABM Treaty), through the SALT I, SALT II, and START I treaties.
  The START II Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on January 
3, 1993, commits the United States and Russia to deeper reductions in 
strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and goes beyond the START I Treaty 
to include warheads on heavy bombers. The START II Treaty also 
establishes a limit of 3,500 deployed warheads, a ban on all land-
based, multiple warhead ballistic missiles, and limitations on the 
number of warheads deployed on all submarine launched ballistic 
missiles. When taken together and fully implemented by January 1, 2003, 
START I and START II will have cut the deployed strategic weapons of 
the United States and Russia by approximately two-thirds.
  The Arms Control Observer Group, which I co-chair with the 
distinguished Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, has offered a 
package of nine amendments to the treaty document. These amendments 
address a number of concerns. Most importantly, one amendment states 
that nothing in START II changes the rights of either party to the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Another states the requirement for 
Senate advice and consent to any possible future amendments to START 
II. I commend Senator Stevens and all of the members of the Arms 
Control Observer Group for their efforts to review this important 
treaty.
  The START II Treaty is an important step forward for arms control. 
Arms control measures are a more sensible and cost effective means of 
addressing the actual threats to U.S. national security than are some 
of the costly and theoretical ballistic missile defense programs on 
which billions of taxpayer dollars have been lavished. I much prefer to 
spend money to destroy actual missiles and missile silos outright, than 
to spend money on exotic technologies of only hypothetical 
effectiveness. Reducing the threat by such concrete measures is the 
cornerstone of effective threat reduction, which also reduces the need 
to spend, spend, spend, on more and more costly and dangerous weapons.
  Mr. President, the nuclear sword of Damocles has hung by a thread 
over the lives of every U.S. citizen since we entered the nuclear age. 
Arms control measures like this START II Treaty do not remove that 
menacing sword, but each arms control treaty strengthens the thread 
suspending the sword, weaving it into a sturdy, and safer, cord.
  Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, I rise to offer some personal reflections 
on both the substance of this treaty and the process by which the 
Senate is considering it.
  Frankly, I am troubled by the casual, disengaged manner in which the 
Senate is exercising its advice and consent responsibilities. Clearly, 
there are numerous issues of importance to the country which demand our 
attention these days. But national security policy is not something 
that we can set aside and deal with only when it is convenient.
  Maintaining a strong and effective national security policy requires 
our constant vigilance. It requires that we rise above the kind of 
partisan politics which are so prevalent in Washington today. It 
requires that we submit prospective arms accords to rigorous 
examination and analysis to ensure that these treaties are verifiable, 
enforceable, and supportive of our national interests.
  But where has this scrutiny been? How many of my colleagues have 
actually sat down and reviewed the details of this treaty? How many of 
my colleagues have examined the verification regime, the intelligence 
assessments, the Russian strategic modernization program, and the 
political transition that is ongoing in Russia. With all due respect, 
other than select members of the Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and 
Armed Services Committees, I would say very few. That does not speak 
well for this institution. It does not speak well for those of us who 
have been elected to uphold the Constitution.
  Mr. President, I want to raise a number of issues that trouble me 
about this 

[[Page S473]]
treaty. First off, I am concerned by loopholes in the treaty that allow 
thousands of systems and warheads to avoid destruction. The treaty 
establishes central limits on deployed systems and accountable 
warheads, but it does not require destruction of many of these systems. 
Either side is permitted to retain a vast stockpile of nondeployed 
missiles, launchers, and warheads; but with the exception of the SS-18, 
only deployed systems are accountable. This can hardly be considered 
legitimate arms reduction.
  I am also troubled by the intelligence community's lack of confidence 
in its ability to verify Russian compliance. Although the 
administration has touted the effectiveness of the START verification 
regime, which START II continues, the intelligence community has been 
less convincing. In its report on the START Treaty, the Senate 
Intelligence Committee stated:

       Members of the Senate should understand, however, that U.S. 
     intelligence will have less than high confidence in its 
     monitoring of such areas as nondeployed mobile ICBM's, 
     the number of reentry vehicles actually carried by some 
     ICBM's and SLBM's, and some provisions relating to cruise 
     missiles and the heavy bombers that carry them.

  The Intelligence Committee's report continues, saying ``this 
committee remains deeply concerned, moreover, that Russia's former, and 
perhaps continuing, biological weapons program may indicate that the 
Russian military is capable of mounting or continuing a START 
violation, either in contravention of the wishes of Russia's civilian 
authorities, or with the knowledge or support of at least part of that 
leadership.''
  Mr. President, these are very sobering appraisals and they focus on a 
key point. Without full, unconditional compliance, no arms control 
agreement is worth the paper it is printed on. The former Soviet Union 
consistently violated every arms control agreement it was a party to. 
Indeed, on an annual basis, successive administrations cited Soviet 
violations of the SALT I and SALT II Treaties, the CFE Treaty, the INF 
Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 
and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
  But this pattern did not end with the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union. Today Russia is in violation of the Biological Weapons 
Convention and the CFE Treaty. They are also refusing to implement any 
of the nuclear security and weapons inspection agreements announced by 
President Clinton and Boris Yeltsin at their summit meeting last May.
  I have heard many of the treaty's supporters brush off the 
noncompliance issue as an effort to revive outdated cold war rhetoric. 
But how does one explain this continuing pattern of noncompliance in 
the so called ERA of glasnost? We are not talking about events that 
occurred 10 years ago, we are talking about the Russian's violating the 
CFE Treaty today by failing to destroy tanks, armor and other weapons 
based east of the Ural mountains. We are talking about Russia's failure 
to honor its commitments made less than a year ago in the joint 
statement on the transparency and irreversibility of nuclear arms 
reductions.
  And what about the recent Duma elections in which the nationalists 
and Communists in Russia gained 33 percent of the lower house seats? 
What about Boris Yeltsin's removal of virtually all pro-Western 
democratic reformers from his government? What about the continuing 
onslaught in Chechnya where innocent civilians are being routinely 
slaughtered in their homes and in the streets?
  If Russia is engaging in such ruthless behavior, and is continuing to 
violate its existing treaty obligations, all under the stewardship of 
Boris Yeltsin and the more liberal, pro-democratic forces, how can we 
realistically expect its behavior to improve with the hardliners now 
taking power. The truth is there is absolutely no indication that the 
Russian legislature will even ratify START II, let alone comply. In 
fact, according to administration officials, the Russians have 
essentially told us that they are delaying consideration of START II 
indefinitely while they reassess the treaty.

  At the same time, the Russians are trying to manipulate the START II 
ratification issue to coerce financial and military concessions from 
the United States. Specifically, the Russians have stated that unless 
we suspend NATO expansion, unless we continue to adhere unconditionally 
to the ABM Treaty, and unless we increase financial aid to Russia, they 
will not ratify START II. Where I come from that is called extortion. 
And it is wrong.
  Yet advocates of the treaty, in both the administration and Congress, 
are going along with these Russian threats, and using them as a 
rationale to slow NATO expansion, prevent the United States from 
defending itself against ballistic missiles, and increase foreign aid. 
But what about our sovereignty? What about the security of our Nation? 
What about the security of NATO and the newly independent democracies 
in Eastern Europe? How can we possibly bow to such extortion and allow 
Russia to effectively wield a veto over our national defense policies? 
It is morally, ethically, and strategically misguided.
  Mr. President, I am particularly troubled by the bogus linkage that 
has been drawn between the START II Treaty and national missile 
defense. There is no legitimate linkage between the two issues. The ABM 
Treaty was crafted during the cold war and is premised on the outdated 
doctrine of mutual assured destruction. But the world is now 
multipolar. The monolithic Soviet threat has been replaced by numerous 
regional threats. Mutual assured destruction is neither relevant to, or 
capable of deterring, these threats. The only responsible way to 
counter ballistic missile threats to our homeland is to develop and 
deploy national missile defenses.
  The truth is, missile defenses do not threaten Russia. If Russia and 
the United States are no longer adversaries, and are no longer 
targeting nuclear weapons against each other, how could the deployment 
of a limited defense against other potential adversaries threaten 
Russia in any way? How are we provoking Russia or undermining 
cooperation if we defend the American people against the likes of Kim 
Jong-Il, Saddam Hussein, or Moammar Khadafi?
  Those who say that any decision to protect the American people 
against ballistic missiles will kill the START II Treaty are engaging 
in pure fear mongering. It is irresponsible and unsupportable.
  Mr. President, against the current backdrop of political, economic 
and military turmoil in Russia, against the backdrop of continuing 
noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, and against the 
backdrop of uncertainty over the verification regime, why are we rubber 
stamping this treaty with very little consideration in the Senate? With 
so many questions unanswered, it seems to me that the most responsible 
course of action would be for the Senate to delay action until we have 
a better understanding of the military and political situation that is 
unfolding in Russia. We also should demand full compliance with all 
existing arms control accords before ratifying a new, major treaty. In 
my view, to ratify START II now, when Russia remains in noncompliance 
with other accords, would legitimize their behavior and thoroughly 
undermine our national security. We would, in effect, be rewarding 
their defiance. That can only encourage more violations, and further 
jeopardize our security.

  I urge my colleagues to carefully consider these issues. The 
Constitution clearly calls upon us to safeguard the interests of the 
Nation through the advice and consent process. While I support the 
initiatives recommended by the arms control observer group to help 
strengthen the resolution of ratification, they alone do not address 
the plethora of issues that remain outstanding. We do the Constitution 
and the American people a disservice if we fail to more thoroughly 
evaluate these issues prior to ratification. For these reasons I must 
oppose ratification.
  Mr. President, I ask that several articles be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1996]

   Russia Balks at Arms Accord--Failure To Implement Clinton-Yeltsin 
                  Agreements Frustrates U.S. Officials

                         (By Thomas W. Lippman)

       Russia has balked at implementing any of the nuclear 
     security and weapons inspection 

[[Page S474]]
     agreements announced by President Clinton and President Boris Yeltsin 
     at their summit meeting last May, throwing up a major 
     roadblock to U.S.-Russian cooperation in key security issues, 
     U.S. officials said.
       After a promising start on discussions aimed at carrying 
     out the agreements, the Russians pulled back and have 
     essentially suspended the talks, according to several 
     officials who said they were perplexed and frustrated by the 
     developments.
       Officials at the State Department, the White House and the 
     Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said it is unclear why 
     the Russians have backed away and there may be multiple 
     reasons. What is clear, they said, is that the mutual 
     inspections and data exchanges on weapons and nuclear 
     materials--which the presidents said would happen--are not 
     about to happen.
       The failure to carry through on the agreements does not 
     itself threaten U.S. security or U.S.-Russian relations, 
     officials said. But in the context of other recent 
     developments in Russia, such as the removal of almost all 
     pro-Western reformers from Yeltsin's government and the 
     appointment of a Russian nationalist. Yevgeny Primakov, as 
     foreign minister, it adds to a troubling recent pattern that 
     has clouded Washington's relations with Moscow.
       ``We hope to implement all the agreements presidents 
     Clinton and Yeltsin arrived at during their Moscow summit.'' 
     State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said. ``Over the 
     past couple of years we have found that some of these arms 
     agreements are very difficult, and it is sometimes necessary 
     to bring in senior officials because the bureaucracy in both 
     countries can only take them so far,'' Burns said. He added 
     that the United States and Russia are cooperating on many 
     other issues, such as the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia.
       Clinton and Yeltsin on May 10 issued a ``Joint Statement on 
     the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of 
     Reducing Nuclear Weapons,'' containing measures by which each 
     country could assure itself that the other was carrying out 
     promised nuclear weapons reductions.
       They said the two countries would ``exchange on a regular 
     basis'' detailed information on their stockpiles of weapons 
     and nuclear materials. They also said the two countries would 
     undertake ``reciprocal monitoring'' of the facilities where 
     they store nuclear materials removed from dismantled 
     warheads. And they said they would ``seek to conclude in the 
     shortest possible time'' a legal agreement ensuring 
     protection of the exchange data.
       None of it has happened. The legal agreement was never 
     negotiated, making it impossible to exchange classified data 
     and develop the ``chain of custody'' agreement sought by the 
     United States. And the United States refused to allow Russian 
     officials to inspect the only U.S. nuclear weapons 
     dismantlement facility, the Pantext plant near Amarillo, 
     Tex., because Russia would not allow U.S. inspectors to visit 
     a comparable plan there.
       In the same joint declaration, Clinton and Yeltsin ``urged 
     progress'' in carrying out a 1994 agreement by which Russia 
     was to cease producing plutonium, the key building block of 
     nuclear weapons. That has not happened either, officials 
     said, but for different reasons: The United States has been 
     unable to come up with the money to replace the electric 
     power and heat generated by the Russian plutonium-producing 
     reactors, so the reactors still are operating.
       Discussions on this issue are to resume later this month, 
     Energy Department officials said.
       The failure to implement the agreements contributes to 
     widespread suspicion in Congress about the ability and will 
     of the Russian defense establishment to carry out such 
     accords.
       That suspicion was manifest when the Senate began 
     consideration of the START II arms reduction treaty on the 
     Friday before Christmas. In that session, which attracted 
     little notice because of the timing, the Senate approved a 
     Resolution of Ratification that directs the president to 
     follow specific procedures in the event of Russian 
     noncompliance.
       ``In the event that noncompliance persists'' after 
     diplomatic approaches, the resolution says, the president 
     must return to the Senate for a determination of whether the 
     United States will continue to bound by the treaty.
       ``Obviously we all hope and require that the Russians fully 
     comply with START II,'' said Sen. John Kyl (R-Ariz.).
       ``But their record and the record of the former Soviet 
     Union with respect to compliance with arms control agreements 
     is somewhat dubious. I will note just a few of the areas of 
     violation in the past: the Biological Weapons Convention, the 
     Chemical Weapons agreements, the Missile Technology Control 
     Regime, START I and the conventional forces in Europe 
     treaties. All of these agreements have provisions that Russia 
     has in one way or another failed to comply [with],'' Kyl 
     said.
       The START II treaty, signed in 1991, requires the United 
     States and Russia to make further deep cuts in their nuclear 
     arsenals and delivery systems by 2003. During the pre-
     Christmas discussion, senators of both parties made clear 
     that they will ratify it by an overwhelming vote, but the 
     resolution they adopted specified that this country will not 
     be bound by its terms until it has been ratified by the 
     Russian Duma, a much more dubious proposition.
       Russian ratification is not imminent, several analysts 
     said, because of strong opposition in the recently elected 
     Duma, or lower house of parliament, where many members 
     reportedly regard its terms as skewed in favor of the United 
     States.
       The Senate resolution called on ``both parties to the START 
     II treaty to attach high priority'' to implementation of the 
     May 10 joint declaration so that compliance with START I and 
     START II can be verified, but did not make implementation a 
     condition of START II ratification.
       U.S. officials involved in the ``transparency and 
     irreversibility'' issue offered several explanations of what 
     might be holding up an agreement on the Russian side.
       ``The Russians have essentially told us they are doing a 
     reassessment. It probably has to do with the political 
     situation there,'' one said. ``They have a lot of communists 
     and nationalists in the Duma.''
       The Russians ``have very limited interagency 
     communication,'' another source said. ``Their vertical 
     communication is relatively poor. And there's the fiefdom 
     problem,'' an indirect allusion to the prickly and 
     independent Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov. 
     ``We're talking about letting out information about the crown 
     jewels,'' another U.S. official said. ``Both sides are pretty 
     nervous about it, but especially them.''
                                                                    ____


               [From the Defense News, Jan. 22-28, 1996]

                 CTBT Talks Hinge on China Test Stance

       The upcoming round of negotiations on a Comprehensive Test 
     Ban Treaty (CTBT), which begins Jan. 22 in Geneva, will be 
     the most crucial in the 38-nation talks, experts said last 
     week.
       An agreement on a draft text is necessary by the end of the 
     10-week session to meet a September U.N. deadline, John 
     Holum, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
     Agency, said Jan. 19.
       China's insistence that a CTBT treaty allow so-called 
     peaceful nuclear explosions is considered a key obstacle in 
     the talks, which are ruled by consensus. The other major 
     nuclear powers have rejected China's stance.
                                                                    ____


               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1996]

Japanese Foreign Minister Delivers Message of Commitment to the United 
                                 States

                         (By Thomas W. Lippman)

       Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda, in office barely 
     a week, raced through high-level Washington in the past few 
     days with a message of friendship, reassurance and commitment 
     to the U.S.-Japan security partnership in Asia.
       In meetings with President Clinton and his senior foreign 
     policy and national security advisers, Ikeda said the United 
     States and its troops in Japan are ``vital'' to the security 
     of a potentially unstable region.
       That Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sent him here on 
     short notice on his first official mission reflects the 
     Japanese government's view that the United States represents 
     ``our most important bilateral relationship,'' Ikeda said 
     yesterday.
       In the past such views might have been unremarkable. But 
     the alleged abduction and rape of a Japanese schoolgirl by 
     U.S. servicemen on Okinawa last year have led to questions 
     here and in Asia about the desirability of keeping nearly 
     50,000 U.S. troops in Japan.
       Essays have been streaming out of foreign policy think 
     tanks suggesting that the vigorous, economically strong 
     countries of the region should assume more responsibility for 
     their own security and the U.S. role perhaps should be 
     reduced.
       Absolutely not, said Ikeda, a former director general of 
     Japan's defense agency. In the absence of a regional 
     security framework such as NATO, he said, the United 
     States and its bilateral security agreements with Japan, 
     South Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan are the ``pivot'' 
     of Asia-Pacific stability.
       In a statement issued as he took office Jan. 11, Hashimoto 
     said ``the Japan-United States relationship is vital for the 
     peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, as well as 
     for the entire world.''
       Ikeda used similar language yesterday in a meeting with 
     Washington Post editors and reporters. The United States and 
     Japan, he said, will make ``the utmost effort to try to 
     prevent the Okinawa incident from becoming an obstacle to the 
     vital U.S. role in the region.''
       Clinton is scheduled to make a state visit to Japan in 
     April. On Friday, Ikeda and Secretary of State Warren 
     Christopher agreed to accelerate the work of a joint 
     commission studying the grievances of Okinawans about the 
     U.S. troop presence in the hope of devising a solution by the 
     time Clinton visits, according to State Department spokesman 
     Nicholas Burns.
       It may well take longer, Ikeda said yesterday. ``A solution 
     is very difficult to find,'' he said. ``The Okinawan people 
     want the troop presence drastically reduced. But the security 
     of Japan has to be considered as well. . . . We have to allow 
     the United States to perform its obligation.''
       About 26,000 U.S. troops, or more than half the forces in 
     Japan, are on Okinawa. Ikeda said possible outcomes include 
     the redeployment of some troops from Okinawa to other parts 
     of Japan, smaller U.S. bases and increased local input into 
     decisions by U.S. commanders.
       As potential sources of instability in East and Southeast 
     Asia, Ikeda cited economic 

[[Page S475]]
     chaos and political instability in North Korea, the presence of Russian 
     troops in the Pacific basin, military buildups in Southeast 
     Asian nations and territorial disputes such as the 
     overlapping claims to the Spratly Islands.
       He also noted that China's defense spending has been 
     increasing by about 20 percent a year. ``Japan is not 
     defining China as a threat or a risk,'' he said, but 
     Beijing's military buildup must be taken into account as ``an 
     objective fact.''
       In a paper published Friday urging the United States to 
     resist calls for reduction of its military presence in Asia, 
     former undersecretary of state Arnold Kanter said: ``So long 
     as the United States is seen to be both committed to 
     maintaining robust military forces in the region and reliable 
     in honoring in commitments, China's neighbors see less need 
     to respond to changes in its capabilities. This stabilizing 
     role performed by the U.S. presence also helps to reassure 
     countries in Southeast Asia about Japan, and Japan and South 
     Korea about each other.''
       Ikeda agreed. ``Other nations enjoy indirectly the benefits 
     of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, he said.
                                                                    ____


           [From the U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 29, 1996]

     Conversation With the President: The View From the Oval Office

 (President Clinton met for an hour in the Oval Office last week with 
  U.S. News White House correspondents Kenneth T. Walsh and Bruce B. 
                Auster. Excerpts of their conversation.)

       Bosnia. I'm more than satisfied with the troops.
       I have some concerns. I want them to hurry up and do 
     whatever we can to continue to improve [troop] living 
     conditions. We've got to get the laundry set up, better food. 
     That's a big part of morale. They're over there in a strange 
     place in a cold winter with a lot of mud, and I want them to 
     know that we're doing everything we can for the quality of 
     life.
       We have to supervise the separation of forces. After that, 
     as we monitor those areas, I'm still concerned, although 
     we're making good progress, about all the demining efforts. I 
     don't want to lose anybody to those mines.
       I'm just hoping that we have enough time to move this 
     civilian reconstruction effort fast enough so that people 
     will begin to see and feel the benefits of peace.
                                                                    ____


                [From the Defense News, Dec. 4-10, 1995]

    Russia Builds Up Nuclear Arsenal as Prospects for START II Fade

                          (By Anton Zhigulsky)

       Moscow.--As prospects dim for U.S. and Russian ratification 
     of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), Moscow is 
     quietly, yet steadily, bolstering its nuclear arsenal with 
     new and upgraded missiles and strategic bombers from its 
     neighboring Cold War client state of Ukraine.
       In addition to the 32 SS-19 intercontinental ballistic 
     missiles that Moscow intends to acquire from Kiev, Russia's 
     Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) is working to increase the life 
     span of its silo-based multiple-warhead ballistic missiles by 
     25 years.
       Moreover, Russian Defense Ministry sources say the 
     potential threat posed by expansion of NATO could accelerate 
     development and production of a new multipurpose battlefield 
     missile with a range of 400 kilometers. Earlier this year, 
     the Defense Ministry announced that the new missile was 
     successfully tested and could be deployed within two years.
       As for bombers, Moscow has decided to buy 19 Tu-160 
     Blackjacks and 25 Tu-95 Bears from Ukraine, Pyotr Deinekin, 
     Russian Air Force commander, said in a Nov. 28 interview.
       The Tu-160 bombers are sleek, thin-nosed aircraft that can 
     carry 12 air-to-surface missiles and fly 12,000 kilometers 
     without refueling, while the Tu-95 can carry up to four 
     thermonuclear bombs and fly 8,285 kilometers without 
     refueling.
       Deinekin said Moscow also is planning to receive more than 
     3,000 cruise missiles from Ukraine, but he refused to provide 
     further details about the potential cruise missile transfer.
       U.S. and Russian diplomats are gloomy about the chances for 
     ratification of the 1993 START II by the Russian parliament. 
     Neither the Russian Duma nor the U.S. Congress has ratified 
     START II, which would limit Moscow and Washington to between 
     3,000 and 3,500 nuclear warheads each.
       The START II treaty is languishing in the Duma as Russian 
     lawmakers gear up for scheduled Dec. 17 elections, according 
     to Russian and U.S. diplomats. No Russian lawmaker has 
     anything to gain from pushing the treaty, as nationalist 
     sentiment among the Russian public is running at a 
     fever pitch, these officials said.
       Sergey Rogov, director of the Institute of USA and Canada 
     in Moscow, said Nov. 16 that hard-line politicians also are 
     linking ratification of START II to key Western policy 
     decisions: no NATO expansion and no U.S. move to deploy 
     theater ballistic missile systems considered by Moscow to 
     violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. Rogov spoke 
     at a conference sponsored in Washington by the National 
     Defense University, Fort McNair.
       In another sign of the faltering U.S.-Russian strategic 
     relationship, Russian officials last week canceled planned 
     negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement to provide mutual 
     access to classified access to information about ongoing 
     nuclear disarmament efforts. The talks, known as the 
     Consultations on Safeguards, Transparency and 
     Irreversibility, were scheduled to take place here Nov. 27-
     28.
       While a State Department spokesman said Nov. 30 the talks 
     were canceled due to ``mutual inconvenience,'' other U.S. 
     government officials said last week the talks have been at a 
     complete impasse for some months. Russia's Atomic Energy 
     Ministry officials have been loath to provide access to 
     certain data U.S. nuclear experts consider crucial to 
     verifying dismantlement activities, U.S. experts said.
       Meanwhile, the acquisition of SS-19 missiles from Ukraine 
     should maintain Russia's nuclear potential through 2009, Col. 
     Gen. Igor Sergeyev, commander in chief of strategic forces, 
     told Interfax news agency on Nov. 24.
       Russia now has 150 silo-based SS-19 missiles, each with six 
     warheads; while the Ukraine has 90. Kiev inherited 130 of 
     these missiles after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 
     but has been sending warheads to Russian for dismantling, as 
     required by international disarmament agreements.
       A Ukrainian Defense Ministry source said all nuclear 
     warheads would be removed from Ukraine by the end of 1998. In 
     a Nov. 28 interview, he noted that Ukraine already has 
     transferred 40 percent of its 1,600 warheads to Russia for 
     dismantling.
                                                                    ____


       [From the Worldwide Weekly Defense News; Nov. 20-26, 1995]

              Hard-Line Russians Tout Nukes To Match West

               (By Theresa Hitchens and Anton Zhigulsky)

       Moscow.--A renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons is among the 
     elements of a new, more aggressive strategic posture toward 
     the West by hard-line politicians and military leaders in 
     Russia, who grow increasingly strident as planned 
     parliamentary and presidential elections near, and the health 
     of President Boris Yeltsin reportedly declines.
       Former Communists and populist party officials here said 
     the development of new strategic missiles is needed to 
     counter alleged Western conventional superiority. Moscow also 
     should reject a number of U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control 
     treaties, according to party leaders.
       Gen. Boris Gromov, Russian deputy foreign minister and head 
     of one of the most popular parties in the partliamentary race 
     scheduled for Dec. 17, said Nov. 14 that Moscow's strategic 
     policy inevitably will change after the elections.
       ``The United States remains Russia's main opponent in all 
     regions of the world, and the strategy should be changed 
     considering this fact,'' Gromov told a news conference here.
       Gromov's views are echoed by another prominent military 
     leader-turned popular politician, Gen. Alexander Lebed. The 
     platform of Lebed's party, Congress of Russian Communities, 
     promises to ``give back to Russia its former greatness.''
       Many of the new strategic concepts being embraced by hard-
     liners have been distilled in a new report being circulated 
     within the Russian Defense Ministry as an alternative to 
     current military doctrine. Called ``Conception of 
     counteracting Strategy Against Main Threats to the National 
     Security of Russia,'' the paper was written by Anton Surikov, 
     an analyst at the Moscow-based USA and Canada Institute of 
     the Russian Academy of Sciences.

  Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I am pleased to lend my voice to those of 
my colleagues supporting the passage of the treaty between the United 
States of America and the Russian Federation on further reductions and 
limitations of strategic offensive arms, known more commonly as START 
II.
  The original START Treaty mandated United States and former Soviet 
Union reductions to 6,000 strategic offensive nuclear weapons 
incorporated in intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers.
  START II goes further by limiting each country to 3,500 accountable 
warheads on strategic offensive nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles, 
and nuclear weapons on bombers in each country.
  This is a reduction of one-third of the number of deployed nuclear 
weapons each country managed in 1990.
  START II significantly reduces the United States and Russian nuclear 
arsenal. I am satisfied that the treaty provides an inspection regime 
that will verify compliance with the treaty, and that the United States 
will continue to have a nuclear response capability appropriate for any 
possible future threat.
  I recommend the Senators on the Arms Control Observer Group for their 
bipartisan investment in dialogue and compromise that has brought us to 
this moment. I also recognize the tireless efforts of the Arms Control 
Observer Group staff, and the members and staff of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in making START II a reality. 

[[Page S476]]
And I would be remise if I did not recognize President Bush for his 
foresight in negotiating this Treaty and signing it in January 1993.
  With the world awash in turmoil, Mr. President, we should all be very 
encouraged by the action of the Senate today in moving this treaty. The 
United States is the world's only superpower. And it is appropriate for 
the rest of us to bring leadership to the rest of the world, 
particularly with regards to the issue of weapons of mass destruction.
  I encourage the Senate to move the START II Treaty today with the 
knowledge that the future of mankind is more secure because of it.
  Thank you, Mr. President.
  Mr. DODD. Mr. President, today marks a truly historic moment in our 
Nation's history. Today we raise our voices in affirmation of peace and 
security not just for our generation, but for generations to come. 
Today we embark on a voyage toward sustained peace and nucelar 
stability.
  The START II Treaty is the single most comprehensive weapons 
reduction measure in modern history. It will forever end the continued 
proliferation of our nuclear stockpile and limit the level of those 
weapons to a fixed and verifiable number. I can think of no greater 
solution to the nuclear dilemma than that which is before us today.
  As a matter of history, let me remind my colleagues that this treaty 
is a product of strong bipartisan effort spanning three 
administrations, both Republican and Democratic. And as a member of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am humbled to stand here this day 
and participate in this important event.
  Finally, we must remember that today's action in no way reduces our 
national strength or resolve. Our vigilance remains strong, and our 
commitment to peace even stronger.
  This is the dawning of a new chapter in American strategic strength 
and peace, and I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting this 
historic measure.
  Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, today the Senate will provide its long-
overdue advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty. I 
believe that this may be the most significant accomplishment that this 
body will have in this Congress. That will depend on whether our action 
is followed by similar action in the Russian Duma in the months ahead.
  I regret that we were not able to take this action months ago. At the 
end of last March Senator Lugar predicted that the treaty would be 
ready for Senate debate in May. It should have been, but it wasn't 
through no fault of the Senator from Indiana. I hope that the 8 months 
delay has not hurt the treaty's prospects in the Duma. It clearly is 
overwhelmingly in Russia's interest, as well as our own, that this 
treaty go into force as soon as possible.
  Mr. President, this treaty will truly reduce the nuclear danger in 
ways unimaginable when I entered this body in 1983. Then we argued 
about nuclear freezes and nuclear build-downs at levels far above those 
stipulated in START II. Now the United States and Russia are truly 
reducing their nuclear stockpiles under the START I Treaty that went 
into force in December 1994 and we will reduce far further under START 
II. Land-based multiple warhead missiles, the most destablizing weapon 
of the cold war, will be eliminated. Arsenals in both sides will be 
reduced to 3,500 warheads and bombs. Far more of the strategic nuclear 
threat will be eliminated by this arms control agreement than anyone 
ever contemplated countering through missile defenses, even at the 
height of the exaggerated claims of the SDI program. President Bush was 
right to be proud of this treaty and his role in negotiating it.

  Mr. President, today's action will allow Vice President Gore to press 
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin next week to accelerate the Duma's 
consideration of the treaty. Newly appointed Foreign Minister Primakov 
has said that the Duma would await Senate action on the treaty. Now 
they not need wait any longer. I hope that they will complete their 
deliberations promptly.
  As the President pointed out in his State of the Union message the 
other night, this could be the year in which truly significant strides 
are made in arms control and in defining a safer, more stable world. I 
hope that our action today will be followed by a similar overwhelming 
vote by this body on ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention in the 
spring and by conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty among the 
nuclear weapon states by summer.
  If all that is accomplished and then fully implemented, our children 
and grandchildren will remember 1996 as a watershed year in the post-
cold-war era. And these accomplishments, if they can be achieved, will 
be remembered far longer, I suspect, than anything that comes out of 
the endless budget debate in which we have been engaged.
  I yield the floor.
  Mrs. KASSEBAUM. Mr. President, the Senate is debating whether to give 
its consent to a treaty between the United States and the Russian 
Federation that will significantly reduce the number of strategic 
nuclear weapons on each side. This is a solemn responsibility that our 
Constitution vests in the Senate, and nobody in this body undertakes 
this task lightly.
  The Senate has taken nearly 3 years to consider this agreement, which 
was transmitted to us in the last days of the Bush administration. Both 
the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee have 
conducted hearings on the treaty and have carefully reviewed its 
provisions. We have heard from negotiators, foreign policy experts, 
military officers, and many other analysts. We have heard many 
thoughtful arguments pro and con.
  Based on that record, I believe implementation of the second 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty [START II] is strongly in the national 
interest of the United States. This treaty, if implemented, will 
represent, in the words of President Bush, ``a watershed in our efforts 
to stabilize the nuclear balance and further reduce strategic offensive 
arms.''
  Let me be clear that the START II agreement, while important, leaves 
unresolved many difficult aspects of the cold war's nuclear legacy. We 
must find ways to secure and, ultimately, to destroy the fissile 
material from the dismantled arsenals of the United States and former 
Soviet Union. We must prevent proliferation both of nuclear materials 
and of delivery systems. We must pay the environmental price of 
cleaning up weapons sites.
  Above all, we must continue to adapt our defense and national 
security strategies to our times and to strengthen the relationship 
between ourselves and the Russians: We must ensure that those nuclear 
weapons that do remain on both sides will never be used.
  All of these difficult tasks lie outside the limited reach of the 
START II Treaty. But this treaty will meet one decade-old problem head 
on. It will significantly reduce the number of nuclear warheads on the 
Eurasian land mass that are capable of striking the United States. For 
that reason, I support it.
  The cold war is over, but the task of safely destroying much of the 
bloated nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet Union and the United 
States has yet to be completed. The START II Treaty, which entered into 
force 1 year ago in December, takes us in that direction. Already we 
have begun to see its results. In October, in a ceremony broadcast by 
many television news programs, Defense Secretary Perry and the Russian 
Defense Minister traveled to Whiteman Air Force Base near Kansas City 
to watch the destruction of United States intercontinental ballistic 
missile in accordance with START I, and Secretary Perry has attended a 
similar ceremony in the former Soviet Union.
  But START I alone is not enough. START II will carry on the 
unfinished business of dismantling the cold war's legacy of terror and 
strategic nuclear instability.
  Several of my colleagues have outlined in detail the treaty's 
requirements. In sum, I believe it is fair to say that START II serves 
America's national security interests in two basic ways.
  First, it would cap at 3,500 the number of accountable nuclear 
warheads that each side may possess. The START I limit is 6,000 
warheads on each side, and that agreement is not yet fully implemented. 
In practical terms, implementing START II means 

[[Page S477]]
the Russians will have to destroy roughly 4,000 nuclear weapons that 
today are in their arsenal.
  I, for one, believe that even START II will not complete the 
important work of nuclear arms control, and I would hope the 
administration will vigorously explore the option of pursuing a third 
strategic arms treaty to reduce further the allowable number of 
warheads and to include not only the United States and Russia but the 
other nuclear powers as well.
  Second, the START II Treaty would prohibit the use of multiple 
warheads [MIRV's] on missiles. The United States long has sought this 
important goal, which is key to a stable nuclear balance.
  I commend the majority leader, Senator Dole, for his decision to 
bring this important treaty before the Senate. Of course, the process 
of putting this agreement into force does not stop with the U.S. 
Senate. The treaty also must be approved by both houses of the Russian 
legislature. Significant political changes are underway in Russia, 
particularly in light of December's parliamentary elections and the 
coming Presidential election. It would be unfortunate, indeed, if this 
important agreement became entangled in Russia's internal political 
debates.
  For that reason, I believe the Senate must send a strong message of 
support. We must make clear that the United States is strongly 
committed to reducing our nuclear arsenal in the responsible manner 
outlined by START II as long as the Russians will do the same. I urge 
my colleagues to vote in favor of the resolution of ratification.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the vote that will occur later this 
afternoon on the resolution of ratification for the START II Treaty is 
a truly historical event in the course of man's attempt to curtail 
conflict and violence and resolve differences by peaceful means. It is 
an especially historical event in the much briefer but arguably more 
frightful history of the world's effort to prevent use in anger of the 
terrifying power of nuclear fission and fusion, power that was 
initially unleashed only five decades ago.
  When the Senate took up this this treaty on the floor on December 22, 
I spoke at some length concerning the potential benefits of this treaty 
for the United States, Russia, and, indeed, the entire world. I spoke 
of the great leap forward that this treaty represents as it is added to 
the foundation of earlier arms control agreements, notably including 
the original START Treaty signed by the United States and the Russian 
Federation in 1991 that provided for the first real reductions, rather 
than just limits on further growth, of strategic offensive arms of both 
nations. The leap forward that START II represents will increase the 
stability of the nuclear balance, ban deployment of the most 
destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system--land-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently 
targetable nuclear warheads [or MIRVs], and reduce the number of 
nuclear weapons the United States and Russia each possess to 3,500.
  The debate on December 22 is a part of the Record, and lays out 
clearly the history of this treaty, its importance to enhancing 
stability and reducing the likelihood of use of nuclear weapons in 
anger, and the specific provisions of the treaty. This information is 
contained in the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. 
Lugar] who served with distinction as a former chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, the remarks of the distinguished ranking member of 
the Committee, Mr. Pell, who also served admirably as a previous 
chairman of the committee, and my remarks and those of the other 
Senators who participated in that debate. It is not necessary to take 
the time of the Senate today to repeat or embellish those remarks. The 
treaty's record is clear. Its benefits are clear. It will pass 
overwhelmingly this afternoon.
  I am gratified that I was able to play a role in bringing us to this 
point by reaching an agreement with the chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, Mr. Helms to release for Senate floor action the 
treaty, which he was holding hostage until he could obtain floor action 
on the annual reauthorization bill for the State Department and its 
activities which he chose to use as a vehicle for provisions to 
dramatically reduce the structure of, and funding for, the agencies 
that implement our Nation's foreign policy and represent the U.S. 
interests to the rest of the world. The START II Treaty was and is too 
important to have been used in such a manner. While it should have been 
possible for the Senate to act on it much earlier than today, I am 
relieved that at least our action was not delayed beyond today, and am 
pleased to have played a role in liberating it so the Senate can give 
it ringing endorsement.
  Once again, Mr. President, I compliment Senator Lugar, Senator Pell, 
and all other Senators who have labored through the analytical and 
hearing processes to demonstrate conclusively that START II will 
significantly benefit the United States. I am fervently hopeful that 
the Russian Duma will act expeditiously and favorably on the treaty, 
sharing our recognition that it is strongly in the best interests of 
both nations, and that we do not discover that the delay in Senate 
consideration, during which Russia has experienced considerable 
political flux and has elected a number of new members to the Duma, has 
fatally injured the treaty. The treaty's ability to increase stability 
and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict will be even more important to 
the extent Russia's political unrest continues or accelerates.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, Although I have reservations concerning 
the START II Treaty, I intend to support the resolution of ratification 
reported from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Many of my 
concerns have been addressed in the package of amendments the Senate 
adopted on December 22, 1995, which were drafted by the Arms Control 
Observer Group.
  In addition to a number of hearings held by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
the Senate Armed Services Committee conducted two hearings on the 
military and national security implications of ratification of START 
II.
  The START II Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January 
1993, will hopefully contribute to the positive change in the 
relationship between the United States and the States of the former 
Soviet Union. If ratified and implemented by the United States and the 
Russian Federation, START II will represent a continuation of the 
unprecedented reduction of the strategic arsenals of both sides. But we 
must always keep in mind that reductions for the sake of reductions do 
not necessarily contribute to stability. Unless these reductions 
contribute to strategic stability, they can actually undermine our 
national security. If START II is implemented and complied with, I do 
believe that it will be stabilizing. If, however, its terms are 
modified to allow, for example, the retention of heavy, multiple-
warhead ICBM's, then this agreement could actually be destabilizing. As 
I stated back in 1992, when the committee considered the military 
implications of ratifying START I, I believe that stabilizing 
reductions in nuclear weapons are in the best interest of this Nation 
and humanity.
  Whether START II will contribute to or undermine stability will also 
be determined by other factors. For example, the United States must 
fully exercise its rights to maintain a survivable and reliable 
strategic deterrent force. In my view, we must also begin to rethink 
the basic concepts underlying deterrence. As the sides reduce their 
forces below START I levels, we must be concerned about the long-term 
survivability of the force in an offense-only configuration. In my 
view, we must begin to modify our strategic policy to incorporate a 
more balanced mix of strategic offensive and strategic defensive 
forces. In the long run, as the cold war confrontation fades, we may 
even make a complete change to a defense dominant posture.
  The long-term value of START II also depends on the sides' complying 
with its terms. In this regard, there is reason for concern. Russia has 
continued, to a very disturbing degree, the Soviet pattern of violating 
or circumventing the terms of various arms control agreements. Russia's 
failure to implement the agreements reached at last May's summit 
meeting is yet another reason for concern.
  If ratified, fully implemented, and complied with, START II will 
achieve three principal objectives: First, the 

[[Page S478]]
reduction of strategic nuclear warheads to a level at or below 3,500--
more than a two-third reduction over current levels; second, ban the 
deployment of multiple-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles; and 
third, obligate Russia to destroy all its SS-18 heavy ICBM's and to 
destroy or convert all its silo launchers for these missiles. If this 
last objective is not achieved, however, the stabilizing impact of 
START II will be seriously eroded.
  During the Armed Services Committee's consideration of the military 
implications of ratification of START II, I raised a number of 
concerns, including concern about whether Russia would ratify the 
treaty with amendments that would allow them to keep their MIRVd ICBMs, 
in particular the SS-18's. I was also concerned by administration 
efforts to unilaterally implement START II reductions prior to Russian 
ratification of START II. To date, Russia has not ratified START II, 
and I am not sure when it will. Until this happens and it is clear that 
START II will be implemented by both sides, I do not believe that the 
United States should take any irreversible actions to go below START I 
levels.
  In September 1994, the administration concluded a review of U.S. 
nuclear policy and its nuclear force posture to determine the 
appropriate strategic nuclear force for the United States in the year 
2003, when START II limits are supposed to be reached. The nuclear 
posture review [NPR] concluded that the United States would continue to 
rely on a ``Triad'' of strategic nuclear forces and a policy of nuclear 
deterrence to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access 
to strategic nuclear weapons, and as a hedge against a reversal in 
political reforms in Russia, which made START II possible in the first 
place.
  In essence, the Nuclear Posture Review recommended that the United 
States continue to maintain its nuclear triad, that it would maintain 
its mix of land, air and sea-based strategic nuclear delivery systems--
while reducing the number of warheads to bring the U.S. into compliance 
with START II provisions. However, that recommended level would be 
below the level authorized under START II.
  In addition to 20 B-2 bombers and 450-500 single warhead Minuteman 
III ICBMs, the NPR recommended that the U.S. triad include 14 Trident 
ballistic missile submarines versus 18 permitted under START II, and 66 
B-52H bombers versus 94 permitted under START II. The NPR also directed 
DoD and DoE to maintain a nuclear weapons capability without 
underground nuclear testing and without producing fissile material. In 
order to accomplish this requirement, the NPR directed that a number of 
actions take place: development of a stockpile surveillance engineering 
base; and the maintenance of capabilities that include the ability to 
refabricate and certify weapons types, design, fabricate and certify 
new nuclear warheads (if necessary), and maintenance and support of a 
science and technology base.
  Mr. President, given budget constraints, I remain concerned about the 
ability of the United States to maintain an adequate strategic nuclear 
force that would enable us to deter a nuclear attack. With regard to 
the future nuclear stockpile, I am concerned about the ability of DoD 
and DoE to meet its supply responsibilities. Quite frankly, I do not 
see how they will maintain the stockpile without underground nuclear 
testing.
  As directed by the Nuclear Posture Review, the United States will 
continue to require and depend on its strategic forces for the 
foreseeable future to deter a broad range of threats. In order to do 
this, we will have to move away from an offense-only policy of 
deterrence, which will require the United States to work cooperatively 
with Russia.
  As I stated during the Committee's hearing on May 6, we must move 
beyond the mindset of the ABM Treaty that equates vulnerability with 
stability. If we are to continue reducing our strategic nuclear 
forces--which is already the subject of interagency discussions--we 
must integrate defense into our deterrence policy and break the linkage 
between such reductions and the ABM Treaty.
  I have been troubled by the Administration's careless linkage of 
START II with U.S. missile defense programs and the ABM Treaty. 
Although I certainly agree that there is a relationship between 
strategic offensive forces and strategic defensive forces, I believe 
that the Administration is dangerously misguided in its 
characterization of this relationship. Not only is ballistic missile 
defense not a threat to deterrence and strategic arms control; it is 
complimentary and may even be essential if we proceed with further 
reductions. There is no reason why the United States and Russia cannot 
agree on a stabilizing plan to transition from Mutual Assured 
Destruction, which is fundamentally still our unstated policy, to a 
world of assured security through defensive deployments.
  We must come to terms with the fact that the ABM Treaty is outdated 
and must be revised and eventually replaced. By constantly reinforcing 
the mutual vulnerability logic that underlies the ABM Treaty, this 
Administration has simultaneously reinforced those in Russia who are 
most insistent on maintaining their destabilizing strategic offensive 
forces. Rather than trying to hold on to the Cold War relationship, the 
Administration should attempt to nurture U.S.-Russian cooperation in 
the area of missile defense and defensive stability.
  Before closing, I would like to amplify for purpose of this debate, 
my deep concern about actions taken by the Administration in the 
various arms control consultative commissions.
  The role of the consultative commissions is to enable implementation 
of arms control treaties. The consultative commissions are to provide a 
forum for the parties to make technical and administrative changes to 
the Treaty so that the provisions of the Treaty can be implemented. Or, 
if there is a disagreement, to provide a forum for the parties to 
discuss compliance questions.
  However, over the past couple of years, the Administration has used 
the consultative commissions of a number of Treaties, such as the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Conventional Forces 
in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and START, to make a number of changes that I 
would define as more than just technical or administrative changes. In 
fact, I view these changes as substantive in nature, modifying the 
Treaties in a way which changes the original understanding under which 
the Senate provided its advice and consent.
  The defense budget funds most of the costs of implementing arms 
control treaties, and as a result, to the extent it can, the Armed 
Services Committee has been monitoring these actions. As a result of 
some of these actions, the Committee has included language in the 
statement of managers for the defense authorization bills since 1993, 
requiring the Department of Defense to report to the Congress 30 days 
in advance of any agreement that would result in an increase in the 
costs of implementing the arms control agreements. DoD and 
administration efforts to inform the Congress prior to concluding these 
agreements, as well as recommending these changes, have been erratic at 
best.
  It is my view that the President should notify the Congress 30 days 
in advance of concluding an agreement in the consultative commission, 
any change to interpretations of provisions, or implementation 
modifications and obligations that result in increases to 
implementation costs, or differ from the Senate's understanding when it 
provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty. As an 
example of what I am referring to, let me ask unanimous consent that a 
copies of two September 1994 letters regarding a policy agreement on 
implementation of inspections under START, from the Secretary of 
Defense be printed in the Record.
  Mr. President, even though I have concerns about a number of issues, 
as I stated earlier, with the inclusion of the Arms Control Observer 
Group amendments, I will support START II.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                               September 21, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to inform the Committee 
     concerning an important issue that has arisen as we prepare 
     for the implementation of the 1991 START Treaty in the new, 
     multilateral context that has followed the breakup of the 
     Soviet Union.
     
[[Page S479]]

       The START Treaty, like the INF Treaty before it, provides 
     for certain inspection costs to be borne by the inspected 
     Party. This was based on the assumption that the U.S. and the 
     Soviet Union would conduct extensive inspections of each 
     other's territory, whereby one side's inspection costs would 
     be offset by the other party's inspection costs. This was 
     done with the expectation that there would be an essential 
     balance between the START inspections conducted by the two 
     sides.
       After the breakup of the Soviet Union, however, Belarus, 
     Kazakhstan and Ukraine proposed in the START Treaty's Joint 
     Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) to have these 
     inspection costs shifted to the inspecting Party. Given that 
     they had little, if any, interest in inspecting U.S. 
     facilities, they believed that such a change would be fair 
     and appropriate, whereas the U.S. intended to carry out fully 
     its inspection rights on their territories. They were 
     concerned, therefore, that START cost provisions would impose 
     on them an unbalanced cost burden.
       In the JCIC, the U.S. side has refused to shift these 
     costs. We have emphasized that we did not want any changes to 
     the Treaty's obligations. Russia likewise has refused this 
     proposal in the JCIC. Since Russia intends to carry out 
     extensive inspections of U.S. facilities, Russia, too, wanted 
     no change in these obligations.
       The approach that we are developing in the JCIC in order to 
     resolve this issue in the START context is similar to the 
     understanding that was worked out in the Special Verification 
     Commission (SVC) for the INF Treaty, which is the subject of 
     a separate letter to you. Under this approach, which is 
     consistent with the Treaty and the interests of the United 
     States, each inspected Party will be responsible for 
     inspection costs. However, for each six-month period in which 
     Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine chooses not to exercise its 
     right to notify and conduct inspections of U.S. facilities 
     under START, the U.S. will, as a matter of policy, reimburse 
     certain costs for supporting U.S. inspections conducted on 
     that Party's territory during the same period. These costs 
     would be reimbursed using funds appropriated to the 
     Department of Defense for treaty implementation purposes. If, 
     however, one of those Parties notifies and conducts an 
     inspection of a U.S. facility, thereby incurring host nation 
     costs for the United States (aside from one initial multi-
     party baseline inspection), the U.S. will not provide 
     reimbursement for any of its inspections on that Party's 
     territory during the given six-month period.
       This understanding will be reflected in an exchange of 
     policy statements between the U.S. and each of these three 
     Parties. We believe this represents an equitable solution 
     that serves the interests of all five START Parties, both 
     those (the U.S. and Russia) planning to make full use of 
     their inspection rights and those (Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
     Ukraine) that do not intend to do so.
       During the START Treaty's four-month period for baseline 
     inspections following entry into force of the Treaty, 
     seventeen inspections (four in Belarus, four in Kazakhstan, 
     and nine in Ukraine) would be required. Following the 
     baseline period, the United States probably would conduct a 
     total of between nine to thirteen inspections per year in 
     Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. OSIA estimates that future 
     START Treaty inspections would run at most about $10,000.00 
     per inspection.
       I want to emphasize that the exchange of policy statements 
     is strictly a policy understanding. It will not be legally 
     binding and no Treaty provision will be changed. The terms of 
     the START Treaty will have their full force and effect, and 
     each of these three Parties will have to carry out all of its 
     Treaty obligations. This understanding will bring no change 
     in the implementation of the START Treaty, which will be 
     carried out in full accordance with the advice and consent 
     already provided by the Senate. The Administration would not 
     consider this to be a precedent for any other area of START 
     implementation.
       We attach considerable importance and urgency to the need 
     to conclude this policy understanding with Belarus, 
     Kazakhstan and Ukraine. With the prospect of START entry into 
     force possibly occurring this fall, the priority objective of 
     the United States at the coming session of the JCIC is to 
     reach agreement among the five START Parties on all advance 
     preparations needed to ensure that START enters into force 
     smoothly and is carried out effectively. Reaching this 
     understanding on reimbursements with Belarus, Kazakhstan 
     and Ukraine will be essential to the achievement of this 
     overriding U.S. objective.
       I want to assure you that we will continue to keep the 
     Committee informed of key developments affecting START 
     implementation.
           Sincerely,
     William J. Perry.
                                                                    ____



                                     The Secretary of Defense,

                               Washington, DC, September 21, 1994.
     Hon. Sam Nunn,
     Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
         Washington, DC.
       Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to bring the Committee up 
     to date on an important issue that we have encountered in 
     seeking to preserve and implement the 1987 Intermediate 
     Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in the new, multilateral context 
     that has followed the breakup of the Soviet Union.
       As you are aware, the INF Treaty provides for certain 
     inspection costs to be borne by the inspected Party. This was 
     based on the assumption that the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
     would conduct extensive inspections of each other's 
     facilities, whereby one side's inspection costs would be 
     offset by the other party's inspection costs. The inspection 
     regime of the START Treaty was also based on this same 
     premise, namely, that there would be an essential balance 
     between the inspections conducted by the two sides.
       After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States 
     took steps to ensure that the twelve states of the former 
     Soviet Union would be bound by the prohibitions of the Treaty 
     and that the INF inspection regime would continue. Moreover, 
     the successor states themselves, meeting at Bishkek on 
     October 9, 1992, also made their own declaration expressing 
     their commitment to the Treaty.
       Of the four key successor states whose cooperation is 
     required to ensure the continued implementation of the INF 
     inspection regime, three of them, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the 
     Ukraine proposed, in the INF Treaty Special Verification 
     Commission (SVC), the forum for dealing with compliance and 
     implementation issues, to have these inspection costs shifted 
     to the inspecting Party. Given that they had little, if any, 
     interest in inspecting U.S. facilities, they believed that 
     such a change would be fair and appropriate, whereas the U.S. 
     intended to carry out fully its inspection rights on their 
     territories. They were concerned that INF cost provisions 
     impose on them an unbalanced cost burden. Indeed, Belarus, 
     Ukraine and Kazakhstan have not conducted a single inspection 
     of the United States' facilities since the demise of the 
     Soviet Union.
       The U.S. refused to shift these costs, making it clear that 
     the United States did not want to change the Treaty's 
     obligations. Russia likewise refused this proposal. Since 
     Russia intended to carry out extensive inspections of U.S. 
     facilities, Russia, too, wanted no change in these Treaty 
     obligations.
       This impasse was one of the factors behind the initial 
     delays in the U.S. being able to carry out its INF Treaty 
     inspection rights in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine after 
     the breakup of the Soviet Union. To resolve the issue, we 
     have worked out with each of these three Parties in the SVC 
     an understanding consistent with the Treaty and the interests 
     of the United States. Each inspected Party will bear the 
     costs of each inspection. However, for each six-month period 
     in which Belarus, Kazakhstan or Ukraine, as a matter of 
     policy, does not exercise its right to notify and conduct 
     inspections of U.S. facilities, the U.S., as a matter of 
     policy, will reimburse certain costs for supporting U.S. 
     inspections conducted on their territory during that period. 
     These costs would be reimbursed using funds appropriated to 
     the Department of Defense for treaty implementation purposes. 
     If, however, one of those Parties notifies and conducts an 
     inspection of U.S. facilities, thereby incurring costs for 
     the U.S., the U.S. will not provide reimbursement for any of 
     its inspections on that Party's territory during the given 
     six-month period.
       This INF understanding was reflected in an exchange of 
     policy statements between the U.S. and each of these three 
     Parties intended to cover the remaining period of the INF 
     inspection regime, through May 31, 2001. We believe this 
     represents an equitable solution that serves the interests of 
     all five Parties, both those (the U.S. and Russia) planning 
     to make full use of their inspection rights and those 
     (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) that do not intend to do 
     so. I want to emphasize that these policy statements are not 
     legally binding and that no Treaty obligations are being 
     changed. The terms of the Treaty remain in full force and 
     effect, and each of these three Parties must carry out all of 
     its Treaty obligations. There is no change in the 
     implementation of the Treaty regime, which is being carried 
     out in full accordance with the advice and consent provided 
     by the Senate in 1988. The Administration would not consider 
     this to be a precedent for any other area of Treaty 
     implementation.
       Following the exchange of policy statements, the U.S. was 
     able to resume its conduct of INF inspections on the 
     territories of the three Parties. We recently suspended such 
     inspections in order to consult with key Congressional 
     Committees on this matter.
       The United States has conducted seven INF inspections in 
     Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The costs for these 
     inspections was about $4,000.00 for each inspection. The 
     United States intends, in any given year, to conduct seven 
     total inspections in the combined territories of Belarus, 
     Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. OSIA estimates that future 
     inspections would run at most about $10,000.00 per 
     inspection.
       We place considerable importance on continuing U.S. INF 
     inspection activity in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Full 
     implementation of U.S. Treaty rights in these three key 
     successor states is essential not only to the preservation of 
     the INF inspection regime, but also in establishing the basis 
     for the effective implementation of the START Treaty with 
     these states.
       Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also have proposed, in the 
     START Treaty Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission 
     (JCIC), a similar understanding for the START Treaty, which--
     as in INF--would not be legally binding and would leave all 
     Treaty 

[[Page S480]]
     obligations fully in force. The U.S. side wishes to exchange such START 
     policy statements in the JCIC so as to be prepared for entry 
     into force of the START Treaty in the near future. We will 
     provide to you a separate letter describing the understanding 
     that is under consideration for START.
       Let me assure you that we will continue to keep the 
     Committee informed of key developments in both INF and START 
     implementation.
           Sincerely,
                                                 William J. Perry.

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, the Senate is about to vote on the START II 
Treaty. START II is an example of the bipartisan way in which foreign 
and defense policy should be conducted. President Bush negotiated it 
and President Clinton is seeking the Senate's advise and consent.
  In response to those who are now saying that the Senate is rushing 
into giving its advice and consent to this treaty, I would point out 
that this treaty came to the floor and is being considered under the 
provisions of several unanimous consent agreements reached over the 
course of the past 2 months.
  The Senate arms control observer group worked on a package of 
conditions and declarations to the resolution of ratification which 
were agreed to prior to Christmas. These conditions and declarations 
will not require any changes to the START II Treaty, however, they are 
the binding terms under which the Senate gives its advice and consent 
to this treaty.
  START II has received widespread bipartisan support because, if 
faithfully implemented by both the United States and Russia, it is in 
the United States interest. The treaty provides for further reductions 
in United States and Russian missiles and warheads. These reductions 
will be stabilizing because the treaty also, and most importantly, 
provides for the de-MIRVing of land-based missiles and the elimination 
of heavy ICBM's such as the Russian SS-18. These were U.S. arms control 
objectives throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations. 
Unquestionably, de-mirving and eliminating heavy ICBM's are the 
principal benefits of START II.

  We must keep in mind, Mr. President, that the Russian Federation must 
still take a number of actions to make the START II Treaty a reality. 
First, the Russian Duma must offer its consent to ratification. The 
prospects for such action are more uncertain after the recent 
elections--since Communists and extreme nationalists now represent more 
than a third of the Duma. Furthermore, the Russians and the Clinton 
administration must firmly commit not to backtrack on START II 
provisions. There is already talk of alleviating some of START II's 
burden on Russia in a follow on agreement. We will need to carefully 
watch out for the so-called nuclear summit next spring and its possible 
results.
  Mr. President, I would like to comment on the conditions 
and declarations to the resolution of ratification unanimously agreed 
to by the Senate on December 22. These address the strategic 
environment in which this treaty will operate and which it will help 
shape.

  The fact is that the strategic environment has changed since 
President Bush negotiated START II. In particular, the threat of the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles has sharply escalated. When, on 
June 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin agreed upon the foundations 
for START II, they also issued a joint statement on a global protection 
system endorsing United States-Russian cooperation on missile defenses. 
Since the beginning of the Clinton administration, however, talks on 
this idea have lapsed and our National Missile Defense Program has 
languished.
  Today, I would urge President Clinton once again to resume these 
discussions with Russia on cooperation on defenses. Let us recall that 
it was President Yeltsin who called for such cooperation in his January 
29, 1992 speech to the United Nations. Let us see what might be 
possible, while recognizing that talking does not give Moscow a veto 
over our programs.
  The Congress provided clear direction and substantial additional 
funding for missile defense programs. Unfortunately, President Clinton 
vetoed the defense authorization bill the first time around, precisely 
because it set out a course toward providing a national missile defense 
system.

  In my view--with Russian cooperation or without--it is high time to 
move forward on a missile defense system which protects America--from 
Alaska to Florida, and Hawaii to Maine. Included in the package of 
amendments we have adopted is a declaration which states that missile 
defenses are necessary and complementary to START II reductions.
  And so, as we give advice and consent to the START II Treaty we must 
be crystal clear: our vote in favor of START II is not in any way a 
reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty. Conversely--for those who would argue 
that the Senate should not give its advice and consent to the START II 
Treaty--withholding our consent to START II does not in any way affect 
the terms of the ABM Treaty or how the administration applies these 
terms.
  One of the binding conditions the Senate has approved unequivocally 
states that nothing we do here in any way alters our rights and 
obligations under the ABM Treaty. In other words, we can propose 
changes to the ABM Treaty or, if necessary, withdraw from the 
ABM Treaty in order to defend America.

  There are a few other pieces of the bigger picture we must keep in 
mind, including political developments in Russia. The amendment I 
offered--which was included in the manager's package--is a condition to 
the resolution of ratification which stipulates that the United States 
will not be legally bound by the START II Treaty if the Russian 
Federation does not ratify it. Furthermore, the condition requires the 
President to consult with the Senate if he decides to make reductions 
in our strategic forces below those currently planned. In that event he 
must also certify that such reductions are in the U.S. national 
security interest.
  With respect to concerns about treaty compliance, it is no secret 
that Russian generals and politicians are saying openly and privately 
that they will not implement the START II Treaty if ratified. Let us 
not forget that the track record of compliance of the former Soviet 
Union and Russia is seriously marred.
  The Soviet Union claimed to hold the ABM Treaty sacrosanct, but, 
wantonly violated it. For a long time, we have been worried about 
Soviet and Russian violations of the biological weapons convention. 
And, at present, Russia is in violation of the Conventional Forces in 
Europe [CFE] Treaty. One of the declarations to the resolution of 
ratification addresses the concern of potential violations to START II 
and requires the administration to brief and report regularly on 
Russian compliance with START II.
  Finally, we can reduce our missiles and nuclear weapons to START II 
levels. But we need to preserve the reliability, safety and security of 
the strategic weapons we retain. The United States needs to develop a 
new post cold war nuclear doctrine in this era where we are faced with 
multiple threats from different regimes. It may be time to update our 
aging nuclear force with new weapons designs.
  The Clinton administration is dismantling our nuclear weapons 
infrastructure and driving us toward a comprehensive test ban. 
Meanwhile, Russia is spending scarce resources on strategic 
modernization and updating its nuclear doctrine to include potential 
use against former Soviet States. I am pleased that one of the 
declarations included in the resolution of ratification speaks to the 
need to ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of our nuclear 
forces--which are and will remain, the cornerstone of our deterrent.

  Mr. President, I would like to remind my colleagues that it was the 
Bush administration which negotiated START II. And START II, like the 
first start treaty, was an outgrowth of the strategic arms reduction 
goals set by the Reagan administration. But, strategic arms control--
under both the Bush and Reagan administrations was part of a smart, 
judicious and comprehensive approach to our national security--not the 
centerpiece of U.S. national security policy. Since the Clinton 
administration came to office, there has been an overreliance on 
arms control and a penchant for clinging to outdated cold war era 
thinking.

  Mr. President, I am amazed at this administration, as well as some of 
my colleagues, and Moscow for their willingness to link the START II 
Treaty with the antiquated and hopelessly 

[[Page S481]]
outdated Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty. Missile defense for 
America must be priority one at a time when ballistic and cruise 
missiles are coming into the possession of more and more countries. 
According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the North Koreans are 
currently working on a missile that will be able to hit Alaska and 
Hawaii. Iran, India, and others are also working on their own programs. 
Missile defense is not a threat to the Russians. It offers protection 
to us--and potentially to the Russians--during a time when the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is escalating.
  Mr. President, I support START II. However, the Clinton 
administration and Moscow must not backtrack on de-MIRVing missiles and 
getting rid of the heavy SS-18's. The Clinton administration must also 
support the restoration of our aging nuclear infrastructure--almost 
two-thirds of which dates from before the mid-1970's. The President 
must also seek the strictest compliance from a Russia which is 
changing--and given the Duma elections, not for the better. Especially 
in light of the recent Russian elections, we must safeguard at all 
costs against unilateral U.S. implementation of START II. Furthermore, 
I urge the Clinton administration to join the Senate to reiterate--
loudly and clearly--the traditional U.S. position: START II and the ABM 
Treaty are in no way linked. START II is a good treaty for us and 
Moscow, but it should not--and must not--be used to keep us from 
pursuing a national missile defense system.

  Mr. President, notwithstanding the reservations, I think the Senate 
did the right thing this evening in overwhelmingly ratifying the START 
II Treaty.
  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first I just want to compliment Senator 
Dole, the majority leader, for his support of START II. As he pointed 
out, this was negotiated and supported by three Presidents, two 
Republicans and one Democrat. The majority leader's support of this 
treaty, bringing it forward in the way he has in the great bipartisan 
tradition of the U.S. Senate. I just want to add my thanks to him for 
his work in this area.
  Mr. President, the START II Treaty is overwhelming in our national 
interest. It deserves our full and strong support. It will require the 
reduction of thousands of nuclear weapons that could otherwise pose a 
threat to our security. It will eliminate the most destabilizing 
weapons. There is a military threat more fearsome than nuclear weapons. 
They alone have the capability to destroy entire cities and to cause 
unparalleled destruction of anything in their path.
  The prospects of a nuclear war are so terrifying that they are hard 
to imagine. That is why every President since President Truman has made 
it one of the Nation's highest priorities to control nuclear weapons 
and to prevent nuclear war. We came frighteningly close during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis to using nuclear weapons. There have been several 
nuclear crises since.
  That is why Defense Secretary Bill Perry, in testimony before the 
Foreign Relations Committee last March, quoted Andrei Sakharov saying:

       Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war 
     carries an absolute priority over all other considerations.

  Probably the best way to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war is to 
reduce nuclear weapons below the excessive levels of the cold war, 
particularly those systems that made the United States and the Soviet 
Union most insecure. Secretary Perry agreed with Sakharov's assessment 
and noted that the START II Treaty is about reducing the risk of 
nuclear war.
  The START II Treaty that is before us achieves what no other arms 
agreement has: It will eliminate all multiple warhead land-based 
missiles, known as MIRV missiles for their multiple independently 
targetable reentry vehicles. It will eliminate all of the Russian heavy 
SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the ICBM's that have 
particularly concerned our defense officials for so long.
  Those systems, those heavy SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
those MIRV, multiple warhead missiles are considered to be 
destabilizing and caused deep concern that in a crisis it would create 
pressures to use nuclear weapons, and to use them first. Eliminating 
these weapons is considered the most important single achievement of 
the treaty.

  Mr. President, I know that this treaty has broad and indeed vast 
support in this Senate, but we should not forget the historic nature of 
today's vote.
  This treaty was worked on for long periods of time, by Presidents 
Reagan and Bush, and then strongly supported by President Clinton. This 
is a historic day in the ratification of this treaty and should not go 
unnoticed because the Senate was so busily occupied in a whole host of 
other important matters.
  It not only will reduce and remove the most threatening of the 
missiles and the most destabilizing of the missiles, it also reduces 
the overall level of deployed long-range warheads to about two-thirds 
below the previous cold war levels. It will require the United States 
and Russia each to reduce to a level of some 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear 
weapons instead of the more than 10,000 long-range warheads at the end 
of 1990. This is a dramatic reduction.
  Finally, Mr. President, I want to comment briefly about the 
military's strong support for the ratification of the START II Treaty. 
The senior defense and military officials in this country are 
overwhelmingly supportive of the START II Treaty and for many months 
have urged us to act as quickly as possible to provide our advice and 
consent, to ratify the treaty so it can enter into force as soon as 
possible.
  The overwhelming, unanimous support in the military includes the 
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs, all of the Chiefs of Staff and their civilian and military 
colleagues at the Pentagon.
  This is what General Shalikashvili said now almost a year ago, March 
1 of last year, before the Foreign Relations Committee. He said:

       On the basis of detailed study of our security needs and 
     careful review of the Treaty, it is my judgment, and the 
     unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the 
     START II Treaty is in the best interests of the United 
     States. I recommend the Senate provide its advice and consent 
     to START II's ratification.

  Then at the same hearing General Shalikashvili explained his view of 
the value of START II, in part, in this way:

       As you well know [he said], START II builds on the progress 
     of START I, but goes beyond it, because it will restructure 
     our nuclear forces to eliminate instabilities that have 
     always been matters of great concern to military planners and 
     to our citizens alike. By this [he said], I'm of 
     course referring to the elimination of all land-based 
     missiles with multiple independently targeted re-reentry 
     vehicles, as well as the last of the land-based heavy 
     ICBM's, the Russian SS-18's.
       As Secretary Perry mentioned, [he went on,] we have always 
     been convinced that these particular systems are 
     intrinsically the most dangerous and unstable elements of our 
     strategic arsenals. Because they are vulnerable to a first 
     strike from the other side, they could impose a use-or-lose 
     decision that would be a very unstable factor in any crisis. 
     Eliminating these systems makes both of our nuclear forces 
     more stable deterrents.

  Finally, he said:

       More specifically, we concluded that the START II/NPR 
     force--

  The force that is left after the START II Treaty--

     is sufficient to prevent any foreseeable enemy from achieving 
     his war aims against us or our allies, not matter how a 
     nuclear attack against us is designed.
       In practice, this means that our nuclear forces must be 
     robust enough to sustain the ability to support an 
     appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable range of 
     response options, even in the event of a powerful first 
     strike that attempts to disarm our nuclear forces.

  He said in conclusion:

       Our analysis shows that, even under the worst conditions, 
     the START II force levels provide enough survivable forces, 
     and survivable, sustained command and control to accomplish 
     our targeting objectives.

  No matter what the attack is after START II, no matter how an attack 
is designed, it cannot succeed. That is one of the many accomplishments 
of the treaty.
  Its ratification today will not be noted in much of the media because 
of the huge number of other issues which are being debated in 
Washington, but for us in the U.S. Senate, looking at the ratification 
of a treaty worked so hard upon by three Presidents, it will be a 
banner day, not just for us, but, more important, for humanity that 
there has been such a huge reduction approved and that the most 
destabilizing nuclear weapons which we have 

[[Page S482]]
faced, which were the subject of years and years and decades of agony 
by President after President facing these forces so destabilizing to 
the world, that we have taken a major step today in bringing this to 
the floor for ratification.
  Now we must hope that the Duma in Russia will do the same, that they 
also will consent to the ratification of this treaty so that it can 
take full force and effect.
  When the Joint Chiefs of Staff try to imagine the worst possible 
military disaster, the worst possible nuclear attack upon the United 
States and our nuclear forces, they can come up with some horrible 
possibilities. That's their job, and they are consumate professionals. 
They have no doubt that the START II Treaty will leave us with more 
than enough nuclear forces to meet our security needs. That, Mr. 
President, is very powerful testimony and should erase any doubt that 
START II will permit adequate forces.
  In conclusion, General Shali had this to say:

       When both the United States and Russian strategic nuclear 
     forces are reduced to the levels established by this treaty, 
     our forces will remain roughly equivalent, but without the 
     unstable pockets that have troubled us for decades. This, 
     beyond even the considerable reductions to our nuclear 
     forces, is the beneficial hallmark of this treaty--a security 
     gain that is as positive for the Russians as it is for the 
     Americans.
       The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I have 
     no reservations towards this treaty, about the strategic 
     force reductions it entails, or about our ability to properly 
     verify that the Russians are complying with its provisions. 
     I, thus, encourage you to promptly give your advice and 
     consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty.

  Mr. President, this is compelling evidence from our Nation's senior 
officer that the START II Treaty is a good deal for American security. 
Few, if anybody, know more about the military perspective of our 
security requirements than General Shalikash-vili.


                START I implementation and relationship

  The START II Treaty is based on the START I Treaty, which was 
negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the 
Soviet Union dissolved, START I was expanded to include Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Belarus--in addition to Russia--as the new inheritors 
of the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union.
  One crucial aspect of this expanded START I process that people 
should understand is that when the Soviet Union collapsed, it produced, 
overnight, four nuclear weapon nations where there was just one before. 
And two of those overnight nuclear weapon powers--Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan--had larger nuclear arsenals than Britain, France, and China 
combined. As part of START I, the three newest nuclear weapon states 
signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonweapon states and pledged to 
eliminate all their nuclear weapons and be totally nuclear-free. That 
is a great nonproliferation success story, and those nations are all 
well on the way to eliminating their nuclear forces, as I will outline 
below.
  The START II Treaty is built upon the START I Treaty, and uses it as 
a foundation. START I provides the basic framework for START II, 
including definitions, rules, data exchanges, monitoring and inspection 
provisions, elimination processes, and so on. START I, which entered 
into force on December 5, 1994, provides a good example of what we can 
expect under START II, so it is useful to review START I briefly and 
how its implementation is proceeding.
  START I was the first arms reduction treaty, that is, it called for 
actual reductions in nuclear forces. It required overall cuts of about 
one third in United States and Soviet arsenals, and also calls for a 
50-percent cut in so-called heavy ICBM's, namely the SS-18. START I 
requires reductions in accountable weapons, that is, numbers agreed 
upon for purposes of the treaty, whether or not they are the real 
numbers. START I provided for limits on both the ``strategic nuclear 
delivery vehicles''--otherwise known as land-based and submarine-
launched ballistic missiles and bombers--and for accountable warheads. 
The treaty required reductions to 1,600 delivery vehicles and 6,000 
warheads by the end of a 7-year period of implementation.
  The reductions must be made according to a schedule of limits in two 
phases before reaching the final limits: Phase I permits no more than 
2,100 delivery vehicles and 9,150 warheads by December 5, 1997; Phase 
II permits no more than 1,900 delivery vehicles and 7,950 warheads by 
December 5, 1999. At the time of the data exchange for START I in 
September 1990, the United States had 2,246 strategic delivery vehicles 
and 10,563 warheads, while the Soviet Union had 2,500 delivery vehicles 
and 10,271 START accountable warheads. That is the baseline against 
which to measure implementation.
  In May 1995, Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe testified 
before the Armed Services Committee about START I implementation, just 
5 months after the treaty entered into force:

       U.S. implementation of START I continues to proceed 
     smoothly. We have deactivated all of our forces to be 
     eliminated under START I, by removing over 3,900 warheads 
     from ballistic missiles and retiring heavy bombers to 
     elimination facilities. We have already eliminated over 300 
     missile launchers and over 240 heavy bombers, putting us 
     below the first START I intermediate ceiling that will not 
     come into effect until December 1997.

  Secretary Slocombe also stated that:

       Our START I Treaty partners in the former Soviet Union are 
     also making great strides. Russia has moved rapidly on 
     launcher eliminations. Like the United States, the former 
     Soviet Union has already met the first intermediate ceiling 
     on launchers, with over 600 missile launchers and heavy 
     bombers eliminated thus far, in fact, it is very close to 
     meeting the second intermediate limit on launchers that will 
     not take effect until December 1999. The implementation of 
     START I and NPT obligations by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
     Ukraine continues to proceed, as over 2,700 strategic 
     warheads in these three countries have been deactivated, and 
     over 2,100 have been returned to Russia. Over 1,000 
     additional warheads have been deactivated in Russia itself. 
     The success of START I implementation thus far leaves us 
     confident that START II's limits can be achieved on schedule.

  More recently, the State Department provided my office with the most 
up to date information available on START I implementation. As of 
September 1, 1995, the United States had 1,727 START accountable 
deployed nuclear delivery vehicles--ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers--
compared to 2,246 in September of 1990. The United States had 8,345 
START accountable warheads, compared to 10,563 5 years earlier. The 
former Soviet Union [FSU] parties--Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine--collectively had 1,799 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles--of 
which 1,513 are Russian--compared to 2,500 5 years before. The FSU 
Parties had 8,859 START accountable warheads--of which 6,769 are 
Russian--compared to 10,271 warheads in 1990.
  Both sets of parties are below the Phase I limits that will not come 
into effect until December 1997. In addition, both the United States 
and the former Soviet Union are below their Phase II launcher limits 
that will not come into effect until December 1999. So implementation 
of START I is going very well, and well ahead of schedule. Given the 
close relationship between START I and START II, there is every reason 
to expect that START II will be an equal success, as the states.


                   verification and cheating concerns

  Mr. President, every arms control treaty raises concerns about 
verification and compliance--our ability to check that the other party 
isn't cheating. START II has the most comprehensive and intrusive 
verification provisions of any nuclear arms control treaty ever 
negotiated, a system that our defense and military leaders are 
confident will work well.
  When Defense Secretary Perry was asked in a Senate hearing why he 
felt confident that cheating would not be a problem in START II, he 
gave the following explanation.

       There are three factors which make cheating, I think, 
     improbable in START II. The first is just the general 
     openness of communication and exchange of personnel which now 
     exist between our two countries. For example, I have myself 
     been to the Russian test range at Baikonur. I have been to 
     the ICBM operational site at Pervomaysk. I've examined the 
     missiles in their control centers in great detail. I have 
     discussed detailed issues about these programs with the 
     scientists in the program and with the operational officers 
     in the strategic rocket force. That kind of communication 
     makes it very difficult to execute successfully a cheating 
     program.
       Second, there are in START I very comprehensive 
     verification procedures that go well beyond national 
     technical means. They 

[[Page S483]]
     require the sharing of telemetry data. They require various kinds of 
     cooperative measures, displaying the forces. They involve 
     continuous monitoring. They involve on-site inspection. This 
     is an exceedingly comprehensive form of inspection. So that's 
     the second reason that I think cheating is exceedingly 
     improbable.

  The third is that we have added on START II additional on-site 
inspections and exhibitions specifically pointed out verifying the 
configuration of the SS-18 silos and the actual bomber loadings. All 
three of these together, I think, give us a high degree of confidence 
that we are not going to be subject to cheating.
  General Shalikashvili reinforced Secretary Perry's answer with the 
following comment:

       Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Perry mentioned, START II 
     verification rests essentially on three pillars--intrusive 
     inspections, data exchanges and national technical means. 
     START II has 14 types of intrusive on-site inspections, 10 
     from the START I treaty and four new ones. Both treaties 
     require very detailed exchanges of data of strategic systems. 
     And certainly you're familiar with the ability of our 
     national technical means to oversee that.
       Given these factors, I would say, first of all, that I'm 
     very confident, and so are the joint chiefs, that the treaty 
     is effectively verifiable. Second, we think that it's very 
     difficult to picture a scenario that would give an advantage 
     to the Russians to cheat. They have already under this treaty 
     the ability to successfully accomplish deterrence and 
     accomplish the military task of covering necessary targets. 
     So any cheating would at best give them some ability to 
     increase their reserve. And the cost of being caught at 
     cheating would far outweigh any of that advantage. So 
     therefore, I see very little incentive for them to cheating, 
     but I'm also very confident that should they, we would be 
     in a very good position, through the inspections and 
     verification procedures, to detect that.

  It does not get much clearer than that. The Secretary of Defense and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff all agree that the START II Treaty is 
effectively verifiable. Furthermore, they can't even imagine a credible 
situation in which the Russians would have any incentive to cheat; they 
would not gain any appreciable advantage, and we would detect such a 
violation and would be able to respond if necessary. This is the first 
time I have ever heard our military say they cannot imagine a situation 
in which the other party could or would want to cheat on an arms 
control treaty.
  Before the Armed Services Committee last May, Gen. Wesley Clark, 
Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Staff, testified 
that: ``Both during and after the Treaty negotiations, we have examined 
multiple ways that the Russians could conceivably violate the Treaty to 
augment their forces. It is difficult to come up with a militarily 
relevant cheating scenario.'' The monitoring and verification 
provisions of the Treaty would prevent either side from violating the 
Treaty without being detected, but the Joint Chiefs cannot see an 
incentive for Russia to cheat because the Treaty will leave Russia with 
more than enough nuclear forces for its security needs. As General 
Clark explained it:

       Even at fewer than 3,500 warheads, Russia will have 
     sufficient warheads to cover their U.S. targets and still 
     maintain a reserve. Because of this, additional warheads 
     generated by cheating would only have marginal effect on 
     damage expectancy or would be used to increase sides' reserve 
     force. Since these additional warheads would have only 
     marginal effect on a Russian attack and would be very 
     embarrassing if detected, we can find little incentive to 
     carry out a military significant violation.

  I cannot think of a better combination of positive factors about a 
nuclear arms reduction treaty than we have in START I: It requires deep 
cuts--two-thirds below the 1990 levels--and eliminates the most 
destabilizing nuclear systems on both sides. It leaves both sides with 
adequate forces to protect their security. Its monitoring and 
verification provisions assure that START II is effectively verifiable. 
Finally, the treaty provides neither side with an incentive to cheat. 
It has been endorsed without reservation by the civilian and military 
leaders in the Pentagon, who have all urged numerous times that we 
promptly give our advice and consent to ratification. That makes it 
pretty plain that we should vote overwhelmingly for ratification and 
move the treaty closer to implementation.


                       SENATE ACTION ON START II

  Mr. President, the Senate has spoken clearly on its desire to act on 
the START II Treaty. For example, on February 2, 1993, Senator Dole, 
our current majority leader, cosponsored Senate Resolution 54, 
commending President Bush on the conclusion of the START II Treaty. 
That resolution stated that the Senate ``intends to take up the Treaty 
at the earliest possible moment in pursuit of its constitutional duty 
to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties.''
  On September 5, 1995, the Senate adopted unanimously an amendment to 
the Defense authorization bill urging prompt ratification of the START 
II Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. This amendment stated:

       It is the sense of the Senate that the United States and 
     all other parties to the START II Treaty and the Chemical 
     Weapons Convention should promptly ratify and fully 
     implement, as negotiated, both treaties.

  This provision was adopted by the conference on the Defense 
authorization bill, and appears in the conference report, so it will be 
part of the final Defense Authorization Act.
  Mr. President, on December 5 of last year, 35 of our colleagues 
joined with myself and the senior Senator from Illinois [Mr. Simon] in 
a letter to the majority leader urging that the Senate complete action 
on the START II Treaty during the first session of the 104th Congress 
in 1995. So it is clear that the Senate is on record in various ways as 
favoring prompt action on the START II Treaty.
  The Senate came very close to completing action on START II at the 
end of last year. That was a result of a unanimous-consent agreement 
worked out between the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. 
Helms, and Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. That agreement called for 
the treaty to be brought up for Senate consideration before adjournment 
of the 1st session of this Congress. And last month, on December 22, 
the Senate did take up the treaty, but did not complete action on it.
  Although we did not vote on the treaty, we did agree on several 
issues. We adopted a manager's package of amendments to the resolution 
of ratification, and agreed that when we return to the treaty there 
would be no other amendments in order. We also agreed that debate would 
be limited to 6 hours, with additional time for Senator Thurmond. But 
it was clear that the purpose of our action was to try to complete 
final action on the treaty as quickly as possible. That was certainly 
the spirit of the effort of the Arms Control Observer Group that came 
together to work out a package of amendments to the Foreign Relations 
Committee resolution of ratification.
  The Arms Control Observer Group, which is composed of members from 
the various committees of jurisdiction on arms control matters, 
gathered just before the end of last year to consider a series of 
amendments proposed by majority members in an effort to reach both a 
time agreement and secure a vote by Friday, December 22. The members 
acted in good faith, upon exceptionally short notice and, after 
considerable effort, reached agreement on the amendments as a means to 
complete action on the treaty before we adjourned for the year. 
Unfortunately, we only got a partial time agreement and no date certain 
for a vote. That was a disappointment. We failed to vote on the treaty 
before the end of the 1st Session of 104th Congress, and before the end 
of 1995, as had been the stated goal of the Senate.
  Now we have the opportunity, at long last, to vote in favor of the 
resolution of ratification and move this treaty toward entry into force 
and implementation. I believe that the Russian Government, and 
especially its Parliament, will have the wisdom to ratify this treaty 
because it is also so strongly in their security interest to do so.


                     Next steps in Arms Reductions

  Mr. President, the START II Treaty is an extremely important step to 
improve our security and reduce the danger of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear war. It will result in reductions of some two-thirds of the 
deployed long-range nuclear weapons of the cold war superpowers, and 
will restructure the remaining arsenals into more stable 
configurations. These are the most ambitious nuclear weapon reductions 
undertaken by the United States and the former Soviet Union. But they 
are not sufficient. There will remain after all the required START II 
reductions, as many as 3,500 long range warheads deployed by each side, 
and even more 

[[Page S484]]
warheads not deployed. That is far more than we need for our security, 
and poses more of a danger than we should accept. We need to continue 
the reductions begun by the START process, and reduce to the lowest 
level possible, including the other nuclear weapon states in the 
process at the appropriate time.
  At the hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary 
Perry was asked about further reductions in nuclear forces. He stated 
that further reductions are desirable and planned: ``I have always 
believed that we should reduce to the maximum extent we can, compatible 
with the threats and the potential threats from other countries. I 
think we can make dramatic reductions, though, beyond where we are 
today, if we have favorable political developments continu[ing] as they 
have been in the last 5 years or more.''
  Secretary Perry was then asked when he envisioned the nuclear weapon 
reduction process, which has been bilateral so far, involving the other 
acknowledged nuclear weapon countries to conclude further reductions. 
Secretary Perry gave the following reply:

       At the time when we start getting down to levels of nuclear 
     arms which are on the same order of magnitude of the levels 
     of the other nations. So far, even at the level of 3,000, we 
     have many, many more nuclear weapons than any--we and 
     Russia--than any other country. But we certainly envision 
     deeper cuts beyond the level of 3,000 to 3,500. And as we 
     start going down in the hundreds instead of in the thousands 
     of nuclear weapons, then I think it's not only appropriate; 
     it would be necessary to bring in the other countries who 
     have nuclear weapons.

  When asked what specific steps he envisioned to get to further 
nuclear weapon reductions, he stated the following:

       The sequence of events which I see is, first, we need to 
     get START II ratified in the Senate and the Duma. Secondly, 
     we need to get an agreement on implementation--on 
     accelerating the implementation between ourselves and the 
     Russians. Third, we need to mutually phase together the 
     accelerated draw-down. Fourth, we begin a discussion of START 
     III, which has enabled us to make further deep reductions. 
     We've already looked at those deep reductions, have pretty 
     good feelings about how far we can go. We believe they ought 
     to be bilateral. I think it is appropriate, at that stage, 
     though, to begin discussions with other countries, because if 
     the START III reductions are deep enough we're going to get 
     down to levels where we need to be talking with other 
     countries about this.


                               conclusion

  Mr. President, the evidence is both compelling and overwhelming: The 
START II Treaty is unquestionably in our security interest. It is long 
overdue for Senate action, and I welcome the opportunity for this body 
finally to ratify this treaty. I know the outcome will be very strong 
support for the treaty, and I hope the Russian Duma can take it up soon 
and then we can begin implementing the treaty soon.
  I would like to close by quoting the conclusion of General 
Shalikashvili's testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee on 
March 1, 1995:

       The START II Treaty offers a significant contribution to 
     our national security. Under its provisions, we achieve the 
     long-standing goal of finally eliminating both heavy ICBM's 
     and the practice of MIRVing ICBM's, thereby significantly 
     reducing the incentive for a first strike. For decades, we 
     and the Russians have lived with this dangerous instability. 
     With this treaty, we can at last put it behind us.
       The Joint Chiefs and I have carefully assessed the adequacy 
     of our strategic forces under START II. With the balanced 
     triad of 3,500 warheads that will remain once this treaty is 
     implemented, the size and mix of our remaining nuclear forces 
     will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against 
     any known adversary and under the worst assumptions. Both 
     American and Russian strategic nuclear forces will be 
     suspended at levels of rough equivalence; a balance with 
     greatly reduced incentive for a first strike. By every 
     military measure, START II is a sound agreement that will 
     make our Nation more secure. Under its terms, our forces will 
     remain militarily sufficient, crisis stability will be 
     greatly improved, and we can be confident in our ability to 
     effectively verify its implementation. This treaty is clearly 
     in the best interests of the United States.
       On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend that 
     the Senate promptly give its advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the START II Treaty.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I make a request that I understand may be 
objected to. I was going to ask, as in executive session, that the yeas 
and nays on the resolution of ratification accompany START II be 
vitiated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object----
  Mr. NUNN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The objection is heard. There is 1 minute for 
debate.
  Mr. DOLE. I yield the time back.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on 
agreeing to the resolution of ratification. The yeas and nays have been 
ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. LOTT. I announce that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Campbell], 
the Senator from Indiana [Mr. Coats], the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. 
Domenici], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Faircloth], the Senator 
from Texas [Mr. Gramm], the Senator from Arizona [Mr. Kyl], and the 
Senator from Alabama [Mr. Shelby] are necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from 
Colorado [Mr. Campbell] would vote ``yea.''
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. 
Hollings] is necessarily absent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kempthorne). Are there any other Senators 
in the Chamber desiring to vote?
  The yeas and nays resulted--yeas 87, nays 4, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 6 Leg.]

                                YEAS--87

     Abraham
     Akaka
     Baucus
     Bennett
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Chafee
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Daschle
     DeWine
     Dodd
     Dole
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Frist
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Grams
     Grassley
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Lugar
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Mikulski
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murkowski
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pressler
     Pryor
     Reid
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Santorum
     Sarbanes
     Simon
     Simpson
     Snowe
     Specter
     Stevens
     Thomas
     Thompson
     Thurmond
     Warner
     Wellstone

                                NAYS--4

     Ashcroft
     Helms
     Inhofe
     Smith

                             NOT VOTING--8

     Campbell
     Coats
     Domenici
     Faircloth
     Gramm
     Hollings
     Kyl
     Shelby
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas are 87; the nays are 4; two-thirds of 
the Senators present having voted in the affirmative, the resolution of 
ratification is agreed to.
  Mr. DORGAN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Dakota is recognized.

                          ____________________