[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 9 (Wednesday, January 24, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S338-S340]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
CHINA--TAIWAN DEVELOPMENTS
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to
read a story in today's New York Times on proposed military actions by
the People's Republic of China [PRC] against the Republic of China on
Taiwan. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear in the Record
at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. PRESSLER. According to the story, the People's Republic of China
has finished plans for a limited missile attack on Taiwan--an attack
that could come following Taiwan's first Presidential election, which
is scheduled for March 23.
This revelation is the latest in a series of intimidating tactics
that work to threaten Taiwan and destabilize East Asia. Between July 21
and July 26, the PRC conducted a series of ballistic missile test
firings 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan. All the missiles were modern,
mobile and nuclear capable. No country ever has held this level of
field tests for nuclear capable missiles before.
The results of that action were predictable--the stock market and the
local currency in Taiwan plunged. These ballistic missile exercises
resumed on August 15, and continued through the fall leading up to last
December's elections in Taiwan for the 164-seat Legislature.
Now comes word that the PRC has done more than just test its military
capability. It has matched its hardware testing with military
planning--a plan that calls for one ballistic missile to be launched
each day for 30 days.
As was the case with the missile tests, this recent report can be
seen as a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming
Presidential elections in Taiwan. There could be more to this story. I
believe this is an attempt to intimidate the Clinton administration and
test our Nation's resolve in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that the PRC
has advanced a limited but sustained missile attack plan indicates that
it believes the Clinton administration may do nothing to strengthen
Taiwan's defenses or come to its aid in the event of an attack.
It is not hard to understand why the PRC has come to this conclusion.
The Clinton administration's policy with respect to the Taiwan-Mainland
China issue is nothing short of confusing. The administration claims to
be advancing a policy of deliberate ambiguity. For example, high level
administration officials recently have been asked if the United States
would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack from the PRC.
Their responses were consistently and ominously vague.
The administration seems to believe that this ambiguity will be
enough to deter Beijing. Today's report indicates that the exact
opposite has occurred. I believe this policy of strategic ambiguity is
wrong and has failed. It is not just dangerous for the people of
Taiwan, it is potentially destabilizing for the entire East Asia
region. It is an approach that clearly advances the PRC's interests and
not our own. The administration's ambiguity policy has fueled the
belief within the PRC that the United States will look the other way if
PRC missiles are launched. Because of our ambiguity, the PRC believes
that it can achieve its policy goals at the very least through
intimidation and military posturing. Even if the PRC privately has no
intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our
ambiguity gives the PRC's military maneuvers greater credibility. It
sends a signal of weakness. It fosters a belief that we can be pushed
around by the PRC. It is a belief shared by many in Taiwan as well.
Indeed, this ambiguity has troubled other Asian democracies in the
region, compelling many--from Japan to the Philippines--to increase
their defense budgets.
Mr. President, as I said last August, in response to the PRC's first
ballistic missile exercise, the United States is faced with three
choices: First, we can do nothing, which appears to be the present
course. I believe that is not in the national security interest of the
United States. We must not allow Asia--a region of many thriving free
market, democratic societies--to be dominated by an aggressive,
nondemocratic power.
Second, at the other extreme, we could intervene should the moment of
conflict become imminent by interposing the United States Pacific fleet
in the Taiwan straits. President Truman did so in 1950. This, again, is
an extreme course and thus, should only be
[[Page S339]]
considered as a last resort. It is a course that could result in a
direct military confrontation with the People's Republic of China.
Finally, we can take what I believe is the wisest course, which is a
clear and unambiguous demonstration of political and military support
so that Asian democracies, including Taiwan can resist aggression. In
short, a clear statement of U.S. policy goals and conditions in the
region will promote peace and stability far better than the
administration's deliberate vagueness. Both houses of Congress have
come to this conclusion as well. Both the House and Senate versions of
the State Department authorization bill contain identical language that
would amend the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA] to supersede restrictions on
United States arm sales to Taiwan. These restrictions were imposed in a
August 1982 communique between the People's Republic of China and the
United States. The amendments to the TRA represent a clear statement by
Congress that the TRA requires the United States to provide Taiwan with
the appropriate means to defend itself.
This latter course achieves a number of important policy goals.
First, it demonstrates to all democracies in Asia that the United
States intends to work with them to ensure peace and stability in the
region. Second, it demonstrates support for the continued political
liberalization in Taiwan. Third, it sends a clear signal to the
People's Republic of China that the United States will not accept the
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland by force.
This latter point is important. Since President Nixon's overtures to
Communist China, this Nation has taken a one China policy. The advent
of that policy, coupled with the passage of the TRA, was designed to
foster a strong diplomatic and economic relationship with the People's
Republic of China, while sending a clear signal that our Nation would
defend against any forced reunification of Taiwan by the People's
Republic of China. Reunification, if it is to occur, must be done
through diplomatic means.
I have said before on the Senate floor that our relationship with
Taiwan is one of the ironies of history. Taiwan is a democracy and a
growing economic power. The United States is Taiwan's primary foreign
investor and trader. About 25 percent of Taiwan's exports go to United
States markets. Many of Taiwan's business, academic and cultural
leaders have studied in the United States. Yet, we do not have
diplomatic ties with Taipei.
We must not add tragedy to this irony. In the midst of all its
posturing, the People's Republic of China's real intentions are not
clear. Most experts are divided on the question of whether or not the
People's Republic of China actually will put its military plans into
action. We must leave nothing to chance. Regardless of the People's
Republic of China's intentions or its goals, the Clinton Administration
has to recognize that its current policy of strategic ambiguity has
failed. The United States needs to maintain a positive, constructive
relationship with both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It is
time we recognize that this triangular relationship can only be
furthered if all sides of this triangle understood United States policy
goals in the region.
It is time this Nation make very clear that we will not ignore direct
or indirect intimidation against an Asian democracy. It is time that
the administration not engage in any sales of advanced
telecommunications technology that could be used to further the
People's Republic of China's military capability. It is time that the
administration came to the conclusion that any military attack by the
People's Republic of China against any Asian democracy directly
threatens the crucial regional and national security interests of the
United States. It is time that we reassert that any reunification of
Taiwan with the mainland must not be done through military aggression.
Mr. President, when Congress returns next month, it is my hope that
Congress will take the opportunity to take a step toward a clear
definition of United States policy in the region, and demonstrate its
clear support for the democratic process underway in Taiwan. Given the
strong support for amending the Taiwan Relations Act, we may want to
consider making these changes through legislation independent of the
State Department authorization bill, and to pass this legislation
before the upcoming March 23 elections. That's one possible option.
Wherever democracy may emerge, the United States should demonstrate its
support for such efforts. I believe we should do so, hopefully with the
administration's cooperation, but if necessary, without it.
Exhibit 1
[From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 1996]
As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens
(By Patrick E. Tyler)
Beijing, January 23.--The Chinese leadership has sent
unusually explicit warnings to the Clinton Administration
that China has completed plans for a limited attack on Taiwan
that could be mounted in the weeks after Taiwan's President,
Lee Tenghui, wins the first democratic balloting for the
presidency in March.
The purpose of this saber-rattling is apparently to prod
the United States to rein in Taiwan and President Lee, whose
push for greater international recognition for the island of
21 million people, has been condemned here as a drive for
independence.
While no one familiar with the threats thinks China is on
the verge of risking a catastrophic war against Taiwan, some
China experts fear that the Taiwan issue has become such a
test of national pride for Chinese leaders that the danger of
war should be taken seriously.
A senior American official said the Administration has ``no
independent confirmation or even credible evidence'' that the
Chinese are contemplating an attack, and spoke almost
dismissively of the prospect.
``They can fire missiles, but Taiwan has some teeth of its
own,'' the official said. ``And does China want to risk that
and the international effects?''
The most pointed of the Chinese warnings was conveyed
recently through a former Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Chas. W. Freeman Jr., who traveled to China this winter for
discussions with senior Chinese officials. On Jan. 4, after
returning to Washington, Mr. Freeman informed President
Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, that the
People's Liberation Army had prepared plans for a missile
attack against Taiwan consisting of one conventional missile
strike a day for 30 days.
This warning followed similar statements relayed to
Administration officials by John W. Lewis, a Stanford
University political scientist who meets frequently with
senior Chinese military figures here.
These warnings do not mean that an attack on Taiwan is
certain or imminent. Instead, a number of China specialists
say that China, through ``credible preparations'' for an
attack, hopes to intimidate the Taiwanese and to influence
American policy toward Taiwan. The goal, these experts say,
is to force Taiwan to abandon the campaign initiated by
President Lee, including his effort to have Taiwan seated at
the United Nations, and to end high-profile visits by
President Lee to the United States and to other countries.
If the threats fail to rein in Mr. Lee, however, a number
of experts now express the view that China could resort to
force, despite the enormous consequences for its economy and
for political stability in Asia.
Since last summer, when the White House allowed Mr. Lee to
visit the United States, the Chinese leadership has escalated
its attacks on the Taiwan leader, accusing him of seeking to
``split the motherland'' and undermine the ``one China''
policy that had been the bedrock of relations between Beijing
and its estranged province since 1949.
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeman, asked to comment on
reports that the Chinese military has prepared plans for
military action against Taiwan, said he was awaiting a
response from his superiors. Last month, a senior ministry
official said privately that China's obvious preparations for
military action have been intended to head off an unwanted
conflict.
``We have been trying to do all we can to avoid a scenario
in which we are confronted in the end with no other option
but a military one,'' the official said. He said that if
China does not succeed in changing Taiwan's course, ``then I
am afraid there is going to be a war.''
Mr. Freeman described the most recent warning during a
meeting Mr. Lake had called with nongovernmental China
specialists.
Participants said that Mr. Freeman's presentation was
arresting as he described being told by a Chinese official of
the advanced state of military planning. Preparations for a
missile attack on Taiwan, he said, and the target selection
to carry it out, have been completed and await a final
decision by the Politburo in Beijing.
One of the most dramatic moments came when Mr. Freeman
quoted a Chinese official as asserting that China could act
militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the
United States because American leaders ``care more about Los
Angeles than they do about Taiwan,'' a statement that Mr.
Freeman characterized as an indirect threat by China to use
nuclear weapons against the United States.
An account of the White House meeting was provided by some
of the participants. Mr. Freeman, reached by telephone,
confirmed the gist of his remarks, reiterating
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that he believes that while ``Beijing clearly prefers negotiation to
combat,'' there is a new sense of urgency in Beijing to end
Taiwan's quest for ``independent international status.''
Mr. Freeman said that President's Lee's behavior ``in the
weeks following his re-election will determine'' whether
Beijing's Communist Party leaders feel they must act ``by
direct military means'' to change his behavior.
In recent months, Mr. Freeman said he has relayed a number
of warnings to United States Government officials. ``I have
quoted senior Chinese who told me'' that China ``would
sacrifice `millions of men' and `entire cities' to assure the
unity of China and who opined that the United States would
not make comparable sacrifices.''
He also asserted that ``some in Beijing may be prepared to
engage in nuclear blackmail against the U.S. to insure that
Americans do not obstruct'' efforts by the People's
Liberation Army ``to defend the principles of Chinese
sovereignty over Taiwan and Chinese national unity.''
Some specialists at the meeting wondered if Mr. Freeman's
presentation was too alarmist and suggested that
parliamentary elections on Taiwan in December had resulted in
losses for the ruling Nationalist Party and that President
Lee appeared to be moderating his behavior to avoid a crisis.
``I am not alarmist at this point,'' said one specialist,
who would not comment on the substance of the White House
meeting. ``I don't think the evidence is developing in that
direction.''
Other participants in the White House meeting, who said
they would not violate the confidentiality pledge of the
private session, separately expressed their concern that a
potential military crisis is building in the Taiwan Strait.
``I think there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese are
creating at least the option to apply military pressure to
Taiwan if they feel that Taiwan is effectively moving out of
China's orbit politically,'' said Kenneth Lieberthal, a China
scholar at the University of Michigan and an informal adviser
to the Administration.
Mr. Lieberthal, who also has traveled to China in recent
months, said Beijing has redeployed forces from other parts
of the country to the coastal areas facing Taiwan and set up
new command structures ``for various kinds of military action
against Taiwan.''
``They have done all this in a fashion they know Taiwan can
monitor,'' he said, ``so as to become credible on the use of
force.''
``I believe there has been no decision to use military
force'' he continued, ``and they recognize that it would be a
policy failure for them to have to resort to force; but they
have set up the option, they have communicated that in the
most credible fashion and, I believe, the danger is that they
would exercise it in certain circumstances.''
Several experts cited their concern that actions by
Congress in the aftermath of President Lee's expected
election could be a critical factor contributing to a
military confrontation. If President Lee perceives that he
has a strong base of support in the United States Congress
and presses forward with his campaign to raise Taiwan's
status, the risk of a military crisis is greater, they said.
A chief concern is that Congress would seek to invite the
Taiwan leader back to the United States as a gesture of
American support. A Chinese military leader warned in
November that such a step could have ``explosive'' results.
In recent months, American statements on whether United
States forces would come to the defense of Taiwan if it came
under attack have been deliberately vague so as to deter
Beijing through a posture of what the Pentagon calls
``strategic ambiguity.''
Some members of Congress assert that the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979 includes an implicit pledge to defend Taiwan if
attacked, but Administration officials say that, in the end,
the decision would depend on the timing, pretext and nature
of Chinese aggression.
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