[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 9 (Wednesday, January 24, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S338-S340]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                       CHINA--TAIWAN DEVELOPMENTS

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to take a moment to 
read a story in today's New York Times on proposed military actions by 
the People's Republic of China [PRC] against the Republic of China on 
Taiwan. I ask unanimous consent that this article appear in the Record 
at the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. PRESSLER. According to the story, the People's Republic of China 
has finished plans for a limited missile attack on Taiwan--an attack 
that could come following Taiwan's first Presidential election, which 
is scheduled for March 23.
  This revelation is the latest in a series of intimidating tactics 
that work to threaten Taiwan and destabilize East Asia. Between July 21 
and July 26, the PRC conducted a series of ballistic missile test 
firings 85 miles off the coast of Taiwan. All the missiles were modern, 
mobile and nuclear capable. No country ever has held this level of 
field tests for nuclear capable missiles before.
  The results of that action were predictable--the stock market and the 
local currency in Taiwan plunged. These ballistic missile exercises 
resumed on August 15, and continued through the fall leading up to last 
December's elections in Taiwan for the 164-seat Legislature.
  Now comes word that the PRC has done more than just test its military 
capability. It has matched its hardware testing with military 
planning--a plan that calls for one ballistic missile to be launched 
each day for 30 days.
  As was the case with the missile tests, this recent report can be 
seen as a blatant attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming 
Presidential elections in Taiwan. There could be more to this story. I 
believe this is an attempt to intimidate the Clinton administration and 
test our Nation's resolve in the Taiwan Straits. The fact that the PRC 
has advanced a limited but sustained missile attack plan indicates that 
it believes the Clinton administration may do nothing to strengthen 
Taiwan's defenses or come to its aid in the event of an attack.
  It is not hard to understand why the PRC has come to this conclusion. 
The Clinton administration's policy with respect to the Taiwan-Mainland 
China issue is nothing short of confusing. The administration claims to 
be advancing a policy of deliberate ambiguity. For example, high level 
administration officials recently have been asked if the United States 
would come to Taiwan's defense in the event of an attack from the PRC. 
Their responses were consistently and ominously vague.
  The administration seems to believe that this ambiguity will be 
enough to deter Beijing. Today's report indicates that the exact 
opposite has occurred. I believe this policy of strategic ambiguity is 
wrong and has failed. It is not just dangerous for the people of 
Taiwan, it is potentially destabilizing for the entire East Asia 
region. It is an approach that clearly advances the PRC's interests and 
not our own. The administration's ambiguity policy has fueled the 
belief within the PRC that the United States will look the other way if 
PRC missiles are launched. Because of our ambiguity, the PRC believes 
that it can achieve its policy goals at the very least through 
intimidation and military posturing. Even if the PRC privately has no 
intention for a direct military confrontation against Taiwan, our 
ambiguity gives the PRC's military maneuvers greater credibility. It 
sends a signal of weakness. It fosters a belief that we can be pushed 
around by the PRC. It is a belief shared by many in Taiwan as well. 
Indeed, this ambiguity has troubled other Asian democracies in the 
region, compelling many--from Japan to the Philippines--to increase 
their defense budgets.
  Mr. President, as I said last August, in response to the PRC's first 
ballistic missile exercise, the United States is faced with three 
choices: First, we can do nothing, which appears to be the present 
course. I believe that is not in the national security interest of the 
United States. We must not allow Asia--a region of many thriving free 
market, democratic societies--to be dominated by an aggressive, 
nondemocratic power.

  Second, at the other extreme, we could intervene should the moment of 
conflict become imminent by interposing the United States Pacific fleet 
in the Taiwan straits. President Truman did so in 1950. This, again, is 
an extreme course and thus, should only be 

[[Page S339]]
considered as a last resort. It is a course that could result in a 
direct military confrontation with the People's Republic of China.
  Finally, we can take what I believe is the wisest course, which is a 
clear and unambiguous demonstration of political and military support 
so that Asian democracies, including Taiwan can resist aggression. In 
short, a clear statement of U.S. policy goals and conditions in the 
region will promote peace and stability far better than the 
administration's deliberate vagueness. Both houses of Congress have 
come to this conclusion as well. Both the House and Senate versions of 
the State Department authorization bill contain identical language that 
would amend the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA] to supersede restrictions on 
United States arm sales to Taiwan. These restrictions were imposed in a 
August 1982 communique between the People's Republic of China and the 
United States. The amendments to the TRA represent a clear statement by 
Congress that the TRA requires the United States to provide Taiwan with 
the appropriate means to defend itself.
  This latter course achieves a number of important policy goals. 
First, it demonstrates to all democracies in Asia that the United 
States intends to work with them to ensure peace and stability in the 
region. Second, it demonstrates support for the continued political 
liberalization in Taiwan. Third, it sends a clear signal to the 
People's Republic of China that the United States will not accept the 
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland by force.
  This latter point is important. Since President Nixon's overtures to 
Communist China, this Nation has taken a one China policy. The advent 
of that policy, coupled with the passage of the TRA, was designed to 
foster a strong diplomatic and economic relationship with the People's 
Republic of China, while sending a clear signal that our Nation would 
defend against any forced reunification of Taiwan by the People's 
Republic of China. Reunification, if it is to occur, must be done 
through diplomatic means.
  I have said before on the Senate floor that our relationship with 
Taiwan is one of the ironies of history. Taiwan is a democracy and a 
growing economic power. The United States is Taiwan's primary foreign 
investor and trader. About 25 percent of Taiwan's exports go to United 
States markets. Many of Taiwan's business, academic and cultural 
leaders have studied in the United States. Yet, we do not have 
diplomatic ties with Taipei.
  We must not add tragedy to this irony. In the midst of all its 
posturing, the People's Republic of China's real intentions are not 
clear. Most experts are divided on the question of whether or not the 
People's Republic of China actually will put its military plans into 
action. We must leave nothing to chance. Regardless of the People's 
Republic of China's intentions or its goals, the Clinton Administration 
has to recognize that its current policy of strategic ambiguity has 
failed. The United States needs to maintain a positive, constructive 
relationship with both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It is 
time we recognize that this triangular relationship can only be 
furthered if all sides of this triangle understood United States policy 
goals in the region.
  It is time this Nation make very clear that we will not ignore direct 
or indirect intimidation against an Asian democracy. It is time that 
the administration not engage in any sales of advanced 
telecommunications technology that could be used to further the 
People's Republic of China's military capability. It is time that the 
administration came to the conclusion that any military attack by the 
People's Republic of China against any Asian democracy directly 
threatens the crucial regional and national security interests of the 
United States. It is time that we reassert that any reunification of 
Taiwan with the mainland must not be done through military aggression.
  Mr. President, when Congress returns next month, it is my hope that 
Congress will take the opportunity to take a step toward a clear 
definition of United States policy in the region, and demonstrate its 
clear support for the democratic process underway in Taiwan. Given the 
strong support for amending the Taiwan Relations Act, we may want to 
consider making these changes through legislation independent of the 
State Department authorization bill, and to pass this legislation 
before the upcoming March 23 elections. That's one possible option. 
Wherever democracy may emerge, the United States should demonstrate its 
support for such efforts. I believe we should do so, hopefully with the 
administration's cooperation, but if necessary, without it.

                               Exhibit 1

                [From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 1996]

         As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens

                         (By Patrick E. Tyler)

       Beijing, January 23.--The Chinese leadership has sent 
     unusually explicit warnings to the Clinton Administration 
     that China has completed plans for a limited attack on Taiwan 
     that could be mounted in the weeks after Taiwan's President, 
     Lee Tenghui, wins the first democratic balloting for the 
     presidency in March.
       The purpose of this saber-rattling is apparently to prod 
     the United States to rein in Taiwan and President Lee, whose 
     push for greater international recognition for the island of 
     21 million people, has been condemned here as a drive for 
     independence.
       While no one familiar with the threats thinks China is on 
     the verge of risking a catastrophic war against Taiwan, some 
     China experts fear that the Taiwan issue has become such a 
     test of national pride for Chinese leaders that the danger of 
     war should be taken seriously.
       A senior American official said the Administration has ``no 
     independent confirmation or even credible evidence'' that the 
     Chinese are contemplating an attack, and spoke almost 
     dismissively of the prospect.
       ``They can fire missiles, but Taiwan has some teeth of its 
     own,'' the official said. ``And does China want to risk that 
     and the international effects?''
       The most pointed of the Chinese warnings was conveyed 
     recently through a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
     Chas. W. Freeman Jr., who traveled to China this winter for 
     discussions with senior Chinese officials. On Jan. 4, after 
     returning to Washington, Mr. Freeman informed President 
     Clinton's national security adviser, Anthony Lake, that the 
     People's Liberation Army had prepared plans for a missile 
     attack against Taiwan consisting of one conventional missile 
     strike a day for 30 days.
       This warning followed similar statements relayed to 
     Administration officials by John W. Lewis, a Stanford 
     University political scientist who meets frequently with 
     senior Chinese military figures here.
       These warnings do not mean that an attack on Taiwan is 
     certain or imminent. Instead, a number of China specialists 
     say that China, through ``credible preparations'' for an 
     attack, hopes to intimidate the Taiwanese and to influence 
     American policy toward Taiwan. The goal, these experts say, 
     is to force Taiwan to abandon the campaign initiated by 
     President Lee, including his effort to have Taiwan seated at 
     the United Nations, and to end high-profile visits by 
     President Lee to the United States and to other countries.
       If the threats fail to rein in Mr. Lee, however, a number 
     of experts now express the view that China could resort to 
     force, despite the enormous consequences for its economy and 
     for political stability in Asia.
       Since last summer, when the White House allowed Mr. Lee to 
     visit the United States, the Chinese leadership has escalated 
     its attacks on the Taiwan leader, accusing him of seeking to 
     ``split the motherland'' and undermine the ``one China'' 
     policy that had been the bedrock of relations between Beijing 
     and its estranged province since 1949.
       A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeman, asked to comment on 
     reports that the Chinese military has prepared plans for 
     military action against Taiwan, said he was awaiting a 
     response from his superiors. Last month, a senior ministry 
     official said privately that China's obvious preparations for 
     military action have been intended to head off an unwanted 
     conflict.
       ``We have been trying to do all we can to avoid a scenario 
     in which we are confronted in the end with no other option 
     but a military one,'' the official said. He said that if 
     China does not succeed in changing Taiwan's course, ``then I 
     am afraid there is going to be a war.''
       Mr. Freeman described the most recent warning during a 
     meeting Mr. Lake had called with nongovernmental China 
     specialists.
       Participants said that Mr. Freeman's presentation was 
     arresting as he described being told by a Chinese official of 
     the advanced state of military planning. Preparations for a 
     missile attack on Taiwan, he said, and the target selection 
     to carry it out, have been completed and await a final 
     decision by the Politburo in Beijing.
       One of the most dramatic moments came when Mr. Freeman 
     quoted a Chinese official as asserting that China could act 
     militarily against Taiwan without fear of intervention by the 
     United States because American leaders ``care more about Los 
     Angeles than they do about Taiwan,'' a statement that Mr. 
     Freeman characterized as an indirect threat by China to use 
     nuclear weapons against the United States.
       An account of the White House meeting was provided by some 
     of the participants. Mr. Freeman, reached by telephone, 
     confirmed the gist of his remarks, reiterating 

[[Page S340]]
     that he believes that while ``Beijing clearly prefers negotiation to 
     combat,'' there is a new sense of urgency in Beijing to end 
     Taiwan's quest for ``independent international status.''
       Mr. Freeman said that President's Lee's behavior ``in the 
     weeks following his re-election will determine'' whether 
     Beijing's Communist Party leaders feel they must act ``by 
     direct military means'' to change his behavior.
       In recent months, Mr. Freeman said he has relayed a number 
     of warnings to United States Government officials. ``I have 
     quoted senior Chinese who told me'' that China ``would 
     sacrifice `millions of men' and `entire cities' to assure the 
     unity of China and who opined that the United States would 
     not make comparable sacrifices.''
       He also asserted that ``some in Beijing may be prepared to 
     engage in nuclear blackmail against the U.S. to insure that 
     Americans do not obstruct'' efforts by the People's 
     Liberation Army ``to defend the principles of Chinese 
     sovereignty over Taiwan and Chinese national unity.''
       Some specialists at the meeting wondered if Mr. Freeman's 
     presentation was too alarmist and suggested that 
     parliamentary elections on Taiwan in December had resulted in 
     losses for the ruling Nationalist Party and that President 
     Lee appeared to be moderating his behavior to avoid a crisis.
       ``I am not alarmist at this point,'' said one specialist, 
     who would not comment on the substance of the White House 
     meeting. ``I don't think the evidence is developing in that 
     direction.''
       Other participants in the White House meeting, who said 
     they would not violate the confidentiality pledge of the 
     private session, separately expressed their concern that a 
     potential military crisis is building in the Taiwan Strait.
       ``I think there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese are 
     creating at least the option to apply military pressure to 
     Taiwan if they feel that Taiwan is effectively moving out of 
     China's orbit politically,'' said Kenneth Lieberthal, a China 
     scholar at the University of Michigan and an informal adviser 
     to the Administration.
       Mr. Lieberthal, who also has traveled to China in recent 
     months, said Beijing has redeployed forces from other parts 
     of the country to the coastal areas facing Taiwan and set up 
     new command structures ``for various kinds of military action 
     against Taiwan.''
       ``They have done all this in a fashion they know Taiwan can 
     monitor,'' he said, ``so as to become credible on the use of 
     force.''
       ``I believe there has been no decision to use military 
     force'' he continued, ``and they recognize that it would be a 
     policy failure for them to have to resort to force; but they 
     have set up the option, they have communicated that in the 
     most credible fashion and, I believe, the danger is that they 
     would exercise it in certain circumstances.''
       Several experts cited their concern that actions by 
     Congress in the aftermath of President Lee's expected 
     election could be a critical factor contributing to a 
     military confrontation. If President Lee perceives that he 
     has a strong base of support in the United States Congress 
     and presses forward with his campaign to raise Taiwan's 
     status, the risk of a military crisis is greater, they said. 
     A chief concern is that Congress would seek to invite the 
     Taiwan leader back to the United States as a gesture of 
     American support. A Chinese military leader warned in 
     November that such a step could have ``explosive'' results.
       In recent months, American statements on whether United 
     States forces would come to the defense of Taiwan if it came 
     under attack have been deliberately vague so as to deter 
     Beijing through a posture of what the Pentagon calls 
     ``strategic ambiguity.''
       Some members of Congress assert that the Taiwan Relations 
     Act of 1979 includes an implicit pledge to defend Taiwan if 
     attacked, but Administration officials say that, in the end, 
     the decision would depend on the timing, pretext and nature 
     of Chinese aggression.

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