[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 9 (Wednesday, January 24, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S335-S338]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




          REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL BODY ON NORTHERN IRELAND

  Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, last November, the British and Irish 
Governments acted jointly to create an innovative three-member 
committee, 

[[Page S336]]
called the International Body, to assess an extremely difficult issue 
that had become a serious obstacle to the peace process in Northern 
Ireland--how to remove all arms from Irish politics.
  Our former colleague, Senator George Mitchell, agreed to serve as 
chairman of the International Body, and he was joined by two other 
distinguished international leaders, Gen. John de Chastelain of Canada 
and former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri of Finland.
  The International Body issued its report earlier today, and I welcome 
it as a reasonable way forward for all sides in Northern Ireland. I 
hope all sides will make the fair and modest concessions needed to 
enable the peace process to move ahead.
  I commend Senator Mitchell, General de Chastelain, and Prime Minister 
Holkeri for their sensible approach to the difficult problem of 
decommissioning weapons. The International Body did its work well. 
Reasonable people who genuinely want peace have a priceless opportunity 
now to make the kind of progress needed to end the current impasse. It 
is time for all-party talks to begin.
  I believe that all of us in Congress concerned about Northern Ireland 
will find this report of great interest, and I ask unanimous consent 
that it be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

           Report of the International Body, January 22, 1996

    (By George J. Mitchell, Chairman, John de Chastelain, and Harri 
                                Holkeri)


                            i. introduction

       1. On 28 November 1995, the British and Irish Governments 
     issued a Communique which announced the launching in Northern 
     Ireland of a `` `twin track' process to make progress in 
     parallel on the decommissioning issue and on all-party 
     negotiations.''
       2. One track was ``to invite the parties to intensive 
     preparatory talks with a remit to reach widespread agreement 
     on the basis, participation, structure, format and agenda to 
     bring all parties together for substantive negotiations aimed 
     at a political settlement based on consent.'' This has become 
     known as the political track.
       3. The other track concerned the decommissioning of arms 
     and was set forth as follows in the Communique:
       ``5. In parallel, the two Governments have agreed to 
     establish an International Body to provide an independent 
     assessment of the decommissioning issue.
       ``6. Recognising the widely expressed desire to see all 
     arms removed from Irish politics, the two Governments will 
     ask the International Body to report on the arrangements 
     necessary for the removal from the political equation of arms 
     silenced by virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer 
     and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported 
     the use of arms for political purposes.
       ``7. In particular, the two Governments will ask the Body 
     to:
       --identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method 
     for full and verifiable decommissioning; and
       --report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of 
     those in possession of such arms to work constructively to 
     achieve that.
       ``8. It will be for the International Body to determine its 
     own procedures. The two Governments expect it to consult 
     widely, to invite relevant parties to submit their analysis 
     of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue and, in 
     reaching its conclusions within its remit, to consider such 
     evidence on its merits.''
       4. We are that Body. This is our report. We have no stake 
     in Northern Ireland other than an interest in seeing an end 
     of the conflict and in the ability of its people to live in 
     peace. Our role is to bring an independent perspective to the 
     issue. We are motivated solely by our wish to help. This 
     assessment represents our best and our independent judgement. 
     We are unanimous in our views. There are no differences of 
     opinion among us.
       5. To provide us with sufficient information to meet our 
     remit, we held two series of meetings in Belfast, Dublin and 
     London: the first, 15 through 18 December 1995; the second, 
     11 through 22 January 1996. In addition, we held an 
     organisational meeting in New York on 9 December 1995.
       6. In the course of our meetings we heard orally and in 
     writing from dozens of government officials, political 
     leaders, church officials and representatives of other 
     organizations and institutions. We received hundreds of 
     letters and telephone calls from members of the public and 
     met with many others. We thank all for their submissions. 
     Contributions from those who suffered losses during the time 
     of troubles but are strongly committed to the peace process 
     were especially moving. All the submissions have been 
     carefully reviewed and considered.


                             II. DISCUSSION

       7. Our examination of the issues and of the facts, and the 
     perspectives brought to us by those who briefed us or who 
     made written representations to us, convince us that while 
     there is no simple solution to the conflict in Northern 
     Ireland, the factors on which a process for peace must be 
     based are already known. We can indicate the way we believe 
     these factors should be addressed so that decommissioning of 
     arms and all-party negotiations can proceed, but only 
     resolute action by the parties themselves will produce 
     progress.
       8. That noted, we are aware of the enormous contribution 
     already made by individuals and groups in advancing the 
     process of peace in Northern Ireland to its current stage. 
     The tireless and courageous efforts of Prime Minister John 
     Major and Taoiseach John Bruton (and before him Albert 
     Reynolds) have been essential to the peace process. They have 
     been joined by other political leaders, institutions, 
     organisations and individuals in the promotion of peace.
       9. We consider our task in the light of our responsibility 
     to all of the people of Northern Ireland; the need for the 
     people to be reassured that their democratic and moral 
     expectations can be realised; and in the spirit of serious 
     efforts made by the British and Irish Governments to advance 
     the peace process.
       10. For nearly a year and a half, the guns have been silent 
     in Northern Ireland. The people want that silence to 
     continue. They want lasting peace in a just society in which 
     paramilitary violence plays no part. That was the dominant 
     theme expressed in the many letters and calls we received 
     from those in the North and South, Unionist and Nationalist, 
     Catholic and Protestant, Loyalist and Republican.
       11. Notwithstanding reprehensible ``punishment'' killings 
     and beatings, the sustained observance of the cease-fires 
     should not be devalued. It is a significant factor which must 
     be given due weight in assessing the commitment of the 
     paramilitaries to ``work constructively to achieve'' full and 
     verifiable decommissioning.
       12. Since the cease-fires, the political debate has focused 
     largely on the differences that have prevented the 
     commencement of all-party negotiations intended to achieve an 
     agreed political settlement. This circumstance has obscured 
     the widespread agreement that exists--so widespread that it 
     tends to be taken for granted. In fact, members of both 
     traditions may be less far apart on the resolution of their 
     differences than they believe.
       13. No one should underestimate the value of the consensus 
     for peace, and the fact that no significant group is actively 
     seeking to end it.
       14. In paragraph five of the Communique we were asked ``to 
     provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning 
     issue.'' It is a serious issue. It is also a symptom of a 
     larger problem; the absence of trust. Common to many of our 
     meetings were arguments, steeped in history, as to why the 
     other side cannot be trusted. As a consequence, even well-
     intentioned acts are often viewed with suspicion and 
     hostility.
       15. But a resolution of the decommissioning issue--or any 
     other issue--will not be found if the parties resort to their 
     vast inventories of historical recrimination. Or, as it was 
     put to us several times, what is really needed is the 
     decommissioning of mind-sets in Northern Ireland.
       16. We have asked ourselves how those who have suffered 
     during the many years of internal strife can accept the fact 
     that the establishment of a lasting peace will call for 
     reconciliation with those they hold responsible for their 
     loss and pain. Surely the continued suffering and bereavement 
     of individuals and of families should never be forgotten. But 
     if the focus remains on the past, the past will become the 
     future, and that is something no one can desire.
       17. Everyone with whom we spoke agrees in principle with 
     the need to decommission. There are differences on the timing 
     and context--indeed, those differences led to the creation of 
     this Body--but they should not obscure the nearly universal 
     support which exists for the total and verifiable disarmament 
     of all paramilitary organizations. That must continue to be a 
     principal objective.
       18. However the issue of decommissioning is resolved, that 
     alone will not lead directly to all-party negotiations. Much 
     work remains on the many issues involved in the political 
     track. The parties should address those issues with urgency.


     iii. recommendations: principles of democracy and non-violence

       19. To reach an agreed political settlement and to take the 
     gun out of Irish politics, there must be commitment and 
     adherence to fundamental principles of democracy and non-
     violence. Participants in all-party negotiations should 
     affirm their commitment to such principles.
       20. Accordingly, we recommend that the parties to such 
     negotiations affirm their total and absolute commitment:
       a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of 
     resolving political issues;
       b. To the total disarmament of all paramilitary 
     organizations;
       c. To agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the 
     satisfaction of an independent commission;
       d. To renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by 
     others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence 
     the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
       e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached 
     in all-party negotiations 

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     and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying 
     to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may 
     disagree; and
       f. To urge that ``punishment'' killings and beatings stop 
     and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
       21. We join the Governments, religious leaders and many 
     others in condemning ``punishment'' killings and beatings. 
     They contribute to the fear that those who have used violence 
     to pursue political objectives in the past will do so again 
     in the future. Such actions have no place in a lawful 
     society.
       22. Those who demand decommissioning prior to all-party 
     negotiations do so out of concern that the paramilitaries 
     will use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the 
     negotiations, or to change any aspect of the outcome of 
     negotiations with which they disagree. Given the history of 
     Northern Ireland, this is not an unreasonable concern. The 
     principles we recommend address those concerns directly.
       23. These commitments, when made and honoured, would remove 
     the threat of force before, during and after all-party 
     negotiations. They would focus all concerned on what is 
     ultimately essential if the gun is to be taken out of Irish 
     politics: an agreed political settlement and the total and 
     verifiable disarmament of all paramilitary organisations. 
     That should encourage the belief that the peace process will 
     truly be an exercise in democracy, not one influenced by the 
     threat of violence.


                   iv. commitment to decommissioning

       24. The second of the specific questions in paragraph seven 
     of the Communique asks us ``to report whether there is a 
     clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such 
     arms to work constructively to achieve'' full and verifiable 
     decommissioning.
       25. We have concluded that there is a clear commitment on 
     the part of those in possession of such arms to work 
     constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning 
     as part of the process of all-party negotiations; but that 
     commitment does not include decommissioning prior to such 
     negotiations.
       26. After careful consideration, on the basis of intensive 
     discussions with the Governments, the political parties, 
     religious leaders, the security forces, and many others, we 
     have concluded that the paramilitary organisations will not 
     decommission any arms prior to all-party negotiations. That 
     was the unanimous and emphatically expressed view of the 
     representatives of the political parties close to 
     paramilitary organisations on both sides. It was also the 
     view of the vast majority of the organisations and 
     individuals who made oral and written submissions. It is not 
     that they are all opposed to prior decommissioning. To the 
     contrary, many favour it. But they are convinced that it will 
     not happen. That is the reality with which all concerned must 
     deal.
       27. Competing views were advanced on prior decommissioning. 
     One was that decommissioning of arms must occur prior to all-
     party negotiations. We were told that the clearest 
     demonstration of adherence to democratic principles, and of a 
     permanent end to the use of violence, is the safe removal and 
     disposal of paramilitary arms, and that at this time only a 
     start to decommissioning will provide the confidence 
     necessary for all-party negotiations to commence. In this 
     view, all parties were aware of the need for prior 
     decommissioning before the cease-fires were announced and 
     should not now be able to avoid that requirement.
       28. In the competing view we were told that decommissioning 
     of arms prior to all-party negotiations was not requested 
     before the announcement of the cease-fires, and that had it 
     been, there would have been no cease-fires; that those who 
     entered into cease-fires did so in the belief they would lead 
     immediately to all-party negotiations; and that the request 
     for prior decommissioning, seriously pursued for the first 
     time months after the cease-fires were declared, is merely a 
     tactic to delay or deny such negotiations. In this view, the 
     cease-fires having been maintained for nearly a year and a 
     half, all-party negotiations should begin immediately with no 
     further requirements.
       29. We believe that each side of this argument reflects a 
     core of reasonable concern which deserves to be understood 
     and addressed by the other side.
       30. Those who insist on prior decommissioning need to be 
     reassured that the commitment to peaceful and democratic 
     means by those formerly supportive of politically motivated 
     violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the threat or 
     use of such violence will not be invoked to influence the 
     process of negotiations or to change any agreed settlement.
       31. Those who have been persuaded to abandon violence for 
     the peaceful political path need to be reassured that a 
     meaningful and inclusive process of negotiation is genuinely 
     being offered to address the legitimate concerns of their 
     traditions and the need for new political arrangements with 
     which all can identify.
       32. Clearly, new approaches must be explored to overcome 
     this impasse. That is the purpose of the six principles we 
     recommend. They invoke a comprehensive commitment to 
     democracy and non-violence that is intended to reassure all 
     parties to the negotiations.


            v. decommissioning during all-party negotiations

       33. One side has insisted that some decommissioning of arms 
     must take place before all-party negotiations can begin. The 
     other side has insisted that no decommissioning can take 
     place until the end of the process, after an agreed 
     settlement has been reached. This has resulted in the current 
     impasse.
       34. The parties should consider an approach under which 
     some decommissioning would take place during the process of 
     all-party negotiations, rather than before or after as the 
     parties now urge. Such an approach represents a compromise. 
     If the peace process is to move forward, the current impasse 
     must be overcome. While both sides have been adamant in their 
     positions, both have repeatedly expressed the desire to 
     move forward. This approach provides them that 
     opportunity.
       35. In addition, it offers the parties an opportunity to 
     use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one 
     step at a time during negotiations. As progress is made on 
     political issues, even modest mutual steps on decommissioning 
     could help create the atmosphere needed for further steps in 
     a progressive pattern of mounting trust and confidence.


  VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: GUIDELINES ON THE MODALITIES OF DECOMMISSIONING

       36. The first of the specific questions in paragraph seven 
     of the Communique asks us ``to identify and advise on a 
     suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable 
     decommissioning.''
       37. We recommend the following guidelines on the modalities 
     of decommissioning. These recommendations are realistic in 
     light of the nature and scale of the arsenals in question, 
     estimates of which were provided to us by the Governments and 
     their security forces. We believe these estimates to be 
     accurate.
       38. Decommissioning should receive a high priority in all-
     party negotiations. The details of decommissioning, including 
     supporting confidence-building measures, timing and 
     sequencing, have to be determined by the parties themselves.
       The decommissioning process should suggest neither victory 
     nor defeat.
       39. The cease-fires and the peace process are products not 
     of surrender but rather of a willingness to address 
     differences through political means. This essential fact 
     should be reflected clearly in the modalities of the 
     decommissioning process, which should not require that any 
     party be seen to surrender.
       The decommissioning process should take place to the 
     satisfaction of an independent commission.
       40. The decommissioning process should take place to the 
     satisfaction of an independent commission acceptable to all 
     parties. The commission would be appointed by the British and 
     Irish Governments on the basis of consultations with the 
     other parties to the negotiating process.
       41. The commission should be able to operate independently 
     in both jurisdictions, and should enjoy appropriate legal 
     status and immunity.
       42. In addition to having available to it independent 
     sources of legal and technical advice and adequate field 
     resources to receive and audit armaments and to observe and 
     verify the decommissioning process, the commission should be 
     able to call upon the resources and the relevant technical 
     expertise of the British and Irish Armies, when it is 
     appropriate.
       The decommissioning process should result in the complete 
     destruction of armaments in a manner that contributes to 
     public safety.
       43. The decommissioning process should result in the 
     complete destruction of the armaments. Procedures for 
     destruction would include the cutting up or chipping of small 
     arms and other weapons, the controlled explosion of 
     ammunition and explosives, and other forms of conventional 
     munitions disposal.
       44. The decommissioning process could encompass a variety 
     of methods, subject to negotiation, including:
       The transfer of armaments to the commission or to the 
     designated representatives of either Government, for 
     subsequent destruction;
       The provision of information to the commission or to 
     designated representatives of either Government, leading to 
     the discovery of armaments for subsequent destruction; and,
       The depositing of armaments for collection and subsequent 
     destruction, by the commission or by representatives of 
     either Government.
       Parties should also have the option of destroying their 
     weapons themselves.
       45. Priority should be accorded throughout to ensuring that 
     armaments are safely handled and stored, and are not 
     misappropriated.
       The decommissioning process should be fully verifiable.
       46. Whatever the options chosen for the destruction of 
     armaments, including the destruction of weapons by the 
     parties themselves, verification must occur to the 
     satisfaction of the commission.
       47. The commission would record information required to 
     monitor the process effectively. The commission should have 
     available to it the relevant data of the Garda Siochana and 
     the Royal Ulster Constabulary. It would report periodically 
     to relevant parties on progress achieved in the 
     decommissioning process.
       The decommissioning process should not expose individuals 
     to prosecution.
       48. Individuals involved in the decommissioning process 
     should not be prosecuted for 

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     the possession of those armaments; amnesties should be established in 
     law in both jurisdictions. Armaments made available for 
     decommissioning, whether directly or indirectly, should be 
     exempt under law from forensic examination, and information 
     obtained as a result of the decommissioning process should be 
     inadmissible as evidence in courts of law in either 
     jurisdiction.
       49. Groups in possession of illegal armaments should be 
     free to organise their participation in the decommissioning 
     process as they judge appropriate, e.g. groups may designate 
     particular individuals to deposit armaments on their behalf.
       The decommissioning process should be mutual.
       50. Decommissioning would take place on the basis of the 
     mutual commitment and participation of the paramilitary 
     organisations. This offers the parties another opportunity to 
     use the process of decommissioning to build confidence one 
     step at a time during negotiations.


                    vii. further confidence-building

       51. It is important for all participants to take steps to 
     build confidence throughout the peace process. In the course 
     of our discussions, many urged that certain actions other 
     than decommissioning be taken to build confidence. We make no 
     recommendations on them since they are outside our remit, but 
     we believe it appropriate to comment on some since success in 
     the peace process cannot be achieved solely by reference to 
     the decommissioning of arms.
       52. Support for the use of violence is incompatible with 
     participation in the democratic process. The early 
     termination of paramilitary activities, including 
     surveillance and targeting, would demonstrate a commitment to 
     peaceful methods and so build trust among other parties and 
     alleviate the fears and anxieties of the general population. 
     So, too, would the provision of information on the status of 
     missing persons, and the return of those who have been forced 
     to leave their communities under threat.
       53. Continued action by the Governments on prisoners would 
     bolster trust. So would early implementation of the proposed 
     review of emergency legislation, consistent with the evolving 
     security situation.
       54. Different views were expressed as to the weapons to be 
     decommissioned. In the Communique, the Governments made clear 
     their view that our remit is limited to those weapons held by 
     paramilitary organisations. We accept and share that view. 
     There is no equivalence between such weapons and those held 
     by security forces. However, in the context of building 
     mutual confidence, we welcome the commitment of the 
     Governments, as stated in paragraph nine of the Communique, 
     ``to continue to take responsive measures, advised by their 
     respective security authorities, as the threat reduces.''
       55. We share the hope, expressed by many on all sides, that 
     policing in Northern Ireland can be normalised as soon as the 
     security situation permits. A review of the situation with 
     respect to legally registered weapons and the use of plastic 
     bullets, and continued progress toward more balanced 
     representation in the police force would contribute to the 
     building of trust.
       56. Several oral and written submissions raised the idea of 
     an elected body. We note the reference in paragraph three of 
     the Communique to ``whether and how an elected body could 
     play a part.'' Elections held in accordance with democratic 
     principles express and reflect the popular will. If it were 
     broadly acceptable, with an appropriate mandate, and within 
     the three-strand structure, an elective process could 
     contribute to the building of confidence.
       57. Finally, the importance of further progress in the 
     social and economic development of Northern Ireland and its 
     communities was emphasised time and again in our meetings, in 
     the context of building confidence and establishing a lasting 
     peace.


                        viii. concluding remarks

       58. Last week we stood in Belfast and looked at a thirty 
     foot high wall and at barriers topped with iron and barbed 
     wire. The wall, which has ironically come to be known as the 
     ``peace line,'' is a tangible symbol of the division of the 
     people of Northern Ireland into two hostile communities. To 
     the outsider both are warm and generous. Between themselves 
     they are fearful and antagonistic.
       59. Yet, it is now clear beyond doubt that the vast 
     majority of the people of both traditions want to turn away 
     from the bitter past. There is a powerful desire for peace in 
     Northern Ireland. It is that desire which creates the present 
     opportunity.
       60. This is critical time in the history of Northern 
     Ireland. The peace process will move forward or this society 
     could slip back to the horror of the past quarter century.
       61. Rigid adherence by the parties to their past positions 
     will simply continue the stalemate which has already lasted 
     too long. In a society as deeply divided as Northern Ireland, 
     reaching across the ``peace line'' requires a willingness to 
     take risks for peace.
       62. The risk may seem high but the reward is great: a 
     future of peace, equality and prosperity for all the people 
     of Northern Ireland.

                          ____________________