[Congressional Record Volume 142, Number 6 (Wednesday, January 10, 1996)]
[Senate]
[Pages S117-S121]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




                     SOUTH AFRICA AND MIDEAST TRIP

  Mr. SPECTER. In accordance with my practice to report on foreign 
travel, this floor statement summarizes a trip which Senator Shelby and 
I took from December 28, 1995, through January 4, 1996, to South Africa 
and the Mideast, focusing on Intelligence Committee matters and the 
Mideast peace process with a stop at the International Criminal Court 
in The Hague en route back to Washington. Our itinerary was condensed 
and our trip was cut short to be able to return to Washington on 
January 4 in anticipation of possible Senate votes.
  A key purpose was to evaluate the PLO's compliance with the 
provisions of the Specter-Shelby amendment, enacted in 1994, 
conditioning United States aid on a change in the PLO charter striking 
language calling for the destruction of Israel and requiring ending of 
terrorism by the PLO.
  We met with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in Gaza on January 2, 1996, 
for approximately 1 hour. He explained his lateness saying he was out 
campaigning for other candidates. When we commented that he must have 
felt secure in his own election to be campaigning for others, he 
responded: ``Who Knows?''
  We were told the PLO election procedure had been modified because the 
number of seats had been expanded from 83 to 88 to accommodate late 
candidacies of members of Hamas. We then heard that the Hamas 
candidacies had been withdrawn due to pressure from Hamas leaders 
abroad.
  We urged Arafat not to change election procedures at the last minute 
which looked like rigging the election.
  When we asked about changing the PLO charter, Arafat said that would 
be accomplished within 2 months after the election scheduled for 
January 20, 1996. We emphasized the importance of eliminating the 
charter language calling for the destruction of Israel.
  Later on January 2, when we met with Prime Minister Peres, we asked 
him what he thought of the United States conditioning aid to the PLO on 
changes in the PLO charter and curtailing terrorism. Mr. Peres 
responded positively saying those provisions of United States law were 
supportive of Israeli interests. After our meeting with Mr. Peres, we 
told Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu of Arafat's promise to change the 
charter. Mr. Netanyahu said it was good that United States law had such 
a requirement, because Israeli law did not.
  Referring back to the Arafat meeting, we asked him what had happened 
to the Arabs wanted by Israel on charges of terrorism. The Israeli-PLO 
agreement required the PLO to turn over such Arabs to Israeli 
authorities. We had pressed Chairman Arafat on that subject last August 
31 when Senator Hank Brown and I met with him in Gaza. Arafat said some 
such terrorists had been prosecuted in PLO courts and some had been 
turned over to Israel. Finding that answer insufficient, we urged 
Arafat to do more on that subject.
  It was generally agreed by our Embassy that there had been marked 
improvement on terrorism in Israel during the past several months.
  Arafat talked at some length about his warnings to Prime Minister 
Rabin on the assassination risks Mr. Rabin faced.
  Arafat spoke about his efforts to aid in the Israeli-Syrian 
negotiations. He referred to a letter he had written to President Assad 
whom he described as a friend since 1963 when Assad was an Air Force 
officer. Arafat said he urged Assad to cooperate in the peace process.
  When asked about Iran, Arafat responded that he thought dialog was 
possible. He said he had complained to Rafsanjani about Iranian 
interference in the Israeli-PLO peace process and had told Rafsanjani 
that he--Arafat--would make internal trouble for Iran if Iranian 
interference continued.
  We also questioned Arafat about the PLO's hassling the Palestinian 
press about unfavorable new coverage. The PLO had detained an editor in 
custody. Arafat said the press had to respect the Government. We 
commented that Arafat couldn't get away with that in the United States. 
Arafat responded that he wasn't in the United States. He added that if 
he didn't take forceful actions, he would be undercut like the 
Government was in Algiers.
  Arafat complained that some donor nations had not fulfilled their 
commitments to aid the PLO. When asked, ``who?'', he replied that he 
preferred not to say, but ``instead to thank those who had not given as 
well as those who had given.''
  Arafat appeared poised, in good humor, and in good health.
  Our meeting later the same day with Prime Minister Peres and Likud 
leader Netanyahu presented a sharp contrast in style, content, and 
perspectives. The 1996 Israeli election, the first with the Prime 
Minister elected separately from the Knesset, will present 
diametrically opposed approaches to this nation's future. It would be 
hard to conceive of a more important election historically for any 
nation--especially a nation where survival is jeopardized by a single 
mistake.
  Mr. Peres articulated a vision for the future: peace, while facing 
substantial risks, with economic development and prospective prosperity 
as the glue to hold the region together. He said he was more value in 
100 hotels than 100 weapons.
  Mr. Netanyahu said he and his party were firmly opposed to expanded 
PLO authority which would lead to sovereignty and a Trojan Horse threat 
within Israeli borders. He decried any deal with Syria and President 
Assad, saying the Syria keeps only those commitments it cannot get away 
with breaking.
  Prime Minister Peres had a different approach saying that it was hard 
to make a deal with Syria, but once made, Syria kept its commitments. 
He approached the peace process with ideas as opposed to a concrete 
plan. He looked to building up rapport with the discussion of ideas 
before either side could defeat the process by seeing a proposal it 
felt compelled to reject.
  It is obvious that the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin has had 
more than a sobering effect on the region. Chairman Arafat's condolence 
call on Mrs. Leah Rabin was a symbolic statement that Israel has 
suffered too much from terrorism--although the ultimate blow came, not 
from the hand of an Arab, but a Jew. Whatever doubt President Assad had 
about a real division in Israel, no other proof could have been more 
persuasive.
  So, the currently visible battle lines being drawn in Israel are for 
its 1996 election. My view is the outcome will be determined more by 
events than personalities, policies, or programs.
  Throughout our trip, we assessed intelligence missions and 
capabilities. Terrorism was a dominant topic of conversation. In one 
African city, we were told of a plan to locate an Iraqi rocket launcher 
on a hotel roof in 1991 to take out the United States Embassy and our 
Ambassador. As we looked out the conference room window in the Embassy 
we could see the hotel roof, the proposed launching site. A vigilant 
intelligence operation produced information which prevented the attack.
  We were told that the 1986 U.S. Terrorist Protection Act has provided 
needed protection for U.S. personnel overseas. That legislation 
provided extra-territorial U.S. jurisdiction to provide for indictment 
in our courts for anyone who assaults, murders, or maims a U.S. citizen 
anywhere in the world.
  In another African capital, we discussed the recent reign of terror 
in Nigeria. We discussed the pending legislative proposals to impose 
sanctions on Nigeria with the consensus that such action would be 
successful only if supported by united international action.
  In Cape Town we met with Parliamentarians from the newly formed South 
African Intelligence Committee. They had many tough questions on the 
interaction between the Executive and Congress on legislative 
oversight. They asked bluntly if the CIA had too much power because of 
the perception that the CIA controlled the world. We responded by 
detailing our specific oversight actions to curtail excesses without 
unduly interfering with intelligence initiatives.
  When our turn came for questions, we asked the opinion of the South 
African parliamentarians on whether the Government of South Africa 
would cooperate by imposing sanctions against buying Nigerian oil. They 


[[Page S118]]
said yes, providing everyone else did. When advised that South Africa 
bought its oil from Iran, we asked the substitute question as to 
whether they would join in international sanctions by stopping buying 
oil from Iran. This question came too close for comfort and the 
parliamentarians made no commitment on the possibility of South African 
sanctions against Iran.
  Wherever we went, there was constant talk about the danger Iran posed 
by its terrorism and spread of fundamentalism. The discussion 
frequently boiled down to whether Iran had to be totally ostracized 
with maximum sanctions to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons 
on whether some dialog was possible or even a combination of both.
  The suggestion was made that if Israel could make peace with the PLO 
and Arafat, then it was worthwhile to undertake similar efforts with 
Iran. That point of view argued that no one would have suspected a few 
years ago that Yasser Arafat could be a partner for peace with Israel. 
Who would have expected that Arafat would be honored at the White House 
in 1993 after being implicated in the murder of the United States 
charge in the Sudan in 1974 and the murder of Mr. Leon Klinghoffer in 
the hijacking of the Achille Lauro.
  Iran probably poses the greatest threat to world peace today. There 
was general agreement on our travels that more attention needs to be 
focused on the Iranian threat.
  En route back to the United States, we stopped at The Hague in the 
Netherlands to meet with the U.N. team preparing for criminal 
prosecutions in the War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. This 
tribunal could make the greatest contribution of the decade--or perhaps 
the century--by establishing a deterrent to wars of aggression, 
genocide and crimes against humanity by bringing the perpetrators to 
justice.
  Several weeks ago, I had met with Justice Goldstone, the tribunal's 
chief prosecutor, when he was in Washington, DC. At that time, Justice 
Goldstone mentioned certain evidence, which might be in the hands of 
U.S. intelligence agencies, which could be useful and perhaps 
instrumental in the war crimes prosecution. In meeting with the staff 
in The Hague we discussed the specific evidence and its importance in 
their prosecutions. We advised we would pursue their requests with U.S. 
intelligence agencies. We have discussed these issues with ranking 
officials of U.S. intelligence agencies who advised that they will 
cooperate to the maximum extent practical.
  In addition we discussed the issue of witness protection, because of 
the obvious dangers posed for the witnesses who remain in that war-torn 
area. We discussed U.S. procedures for protecting witnesses both before 
trial and the possibility of creating new identities after trial to 
best guaranty witness security and obtain their testimony. Several 
members of the prosecution team were on loan from the FBI. We agreed to 
take up the issue of witness protection with appropriate officials of 
the FBI.
  We also had an extensive discussion about their limited budget and 
the fact that a number of their investigative team had to delay going 
into the field because of a limited budget. Concern was also expressed 
about the adequacy of U.S. participation in the war prosecution team 
and the problems which might arise if replacements were not obtained 
for personnel from the Departments of Justice, Defense, and State. We 
committed to take those issues up with the appropriate department 
heads.
  We observed the new courtroom which breaks ground in an international 
criminal trial. The trial proceedings will be conducted with three 
judges without a jury and there are booths for simultaneous translation 
in a number of languages.
  We commended the prosecution team on their historic efforts and 
promised to follow through to be of assistance in this most important 
venture. I ask unanimous consent that the indictments of Dusan Tadic a/
k/a ``Dule'' Goran Borovnica and also Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic 
be printed in the Congressional Record at the conclusion of this 
statement to demonstrate the importance of these criminal proceedings. 
Dusan Tadic is in custody and is scheduled to be tried sometime in the 
spring. Radovan Karadzic is the President of the Bosnian Serb 
Administration in Pale, and Ratko Mladic is the commander of the Army 
of the Bosnian Serbs.
  Mr. President, the trip was very useful along a number of lines, 
especially with conversations which Senator Shelby and I had with PLO 
Chairman Yasser Arafat on the Specter-Shelby amendment which conditions 
$500 million in United States aid to the PLO curtailing terrorism and 
changing their charter to eliminate references to the obliteration of 
Israel.
  The visit we had at the Hague, in the Netherlands, with the United 
States prosecution team for the former Yugoslavia, I think, poses a 
historic event later this spring with the trial of Dusan Tadic.
  I ask unanimous consent the indictment against Tadic be printed in 
the Record at conclusion of my presentation, and the pending indictment 
also as to Radovan Karadzic, who is the President of the Bosnian Serbs, 
and Ratko Mladic, who is the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, which 
really has the potential to establish a historic international 
precedent for the rule of law.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. SPECTER. There is a great deal that the United States can do to 
make a success of that venture by pressure to bring those not in 
custody into custody, with the obligations of Croatia and Serbia to 
turn them over, once they are observed in those countries, to the 
United Nations for trial, and with cooperation from our intelligence 
agencies on corroborative evidence and help from the FBI on protecting 
the witnesses.
  I yield the floor.

                               Exhibit 1

  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia--The 
Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Dusan Tadic a/k/a ``Dule'' and Goran 
                               Borovnica


                               indictment

       Richard J Goldstone, Prosecutor of the International 
     Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to his 
     authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
     (``The Statute of the Tribunal''), charges:
       1. From about 25 May 1992 Serb forces attacked Bosnian 
     Muslim and Croat population centers in the opstina of 
     Prijedor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, forcing most Muslims and Croats 
     from their homes and confining many thousands, including more 
     than 3,000 who were held in the Omarska camp, a former mining 
     complex. The accused Dusan Tadic a/k/a ``Dule'' a/k/a 
     ``Dusko'', participated in the collection and mistreatment, 
     including killings, of Bosnian Muslims and Croats in opstina 
     Prijedor within Omarska camp and outside Omarska camp, as set 
     forth below. The accused Goran Borovnica participated with 
     Dusan TADIC in killings outside of Omarska camp, as set forth 
     below:
       Background:
       2.1. In May, 1992, intensive shelling of Muslim areas in 
     the opstina Prijedor caused the Muslim residents to flee 
     their homes. The majority of them then surrendered or were 
     captured by Serb forces. As the Serb forces rounded up the 
     Muslims and any Croat residents, they forced the Muslims and 
     Croats to march in columns bound for one or another of the 
     prison camps that the Serbs had established in the opstina. 
     The Serb forces pulled many of the Muslims and Croats from 
     the columns and shot or beat them on the spot.
       2.2. On about 25 May 1992, about three weeks after Serbs 
     forcibly took control of government authority in the opstina, 
     and two days after the start of large scale military attacks 
     on Muslim population centers, the Serb forces began taking 
     prisoners to the Omarska camp.
       2.3. During the next several weeks, the Serb forces 
     continued to round up Muslims and Croats from Kozarac, 
     Prijedor town, and other places in the opstina and interned 
     them in the camps. Many of Prijedor's Muslim and Croat 
     intellectuals, professional and political leaders were sent 
     to Omarska. There were approximately 40 women in the camp, 
     and all the other prisoners in the camp were men.
       2.4. Within the area of the Omarska mining complex that was 
     used for the camp, the camp authorities generally confined 
     the prisoners in three different buildings: the 
     administration building, where interrogations took place and 
     most of the women were confined; the garage or hangar 
     building; the ``white house,'' a small building where 
     particularly severe beatings were administered; and on a 
     cement courtyard area between the buildings known as the 
     ``pista''. There was another small building, known as the 
     ``red house'', where prisoners were sometimes taken but most 
     often did not emerge alive.
       2.5. Living conditions at Omarska were brutal. Prisoners 
     were crowded together with little or no facilities for 
     personal hygiene. They were fed starvation rations once a day 


[[Page S119]]
     and given only three minutes to get into the canteen area, eat, and get 
     out. The little water they received was ordinarily foul. 
     Prisoners had no changes of clothing and no bedding. They 
     received no medical care.
       2.6. Severe beatings were commonplace. The camp guards, and 
     others who came to the camp and physically abused the 
     prisoners, used all manner of weapons during these beatings, 
     including wooden batons, metal rods and tools, lengths of 
     thick industrial cable that had metal balls affixed to the 
     end, rifle butts, and knives. But female and male prisoners 
     were beaten, tortured, raped, sexually assaulted, and 
     humiliated. Many, whose identities are known and unknown, did 
     not survive the camp. After the collection of thousands of 
     Bosnian Muslims and Croats in later May, 1992, groups of 
     Serbs including the accused later entered villages in which 
     Muslims and Croats remained, at which time they killed some 
     villagers and drove others from their homes.

  The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia--the 
  Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic


                               indictment

       Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecutor of the International 
     Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, pursuant to his 
     authority under Article 18 of the Statute of the 
     International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
     (``The Statute of the Tribunal''), charges Ratko Mladic and 
     Radovan Karadzic with genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
     violations of the laws or customs of war, as set forth below:

                      ``Safe Area'' of Srebrenica

       1. After war erupted in the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb military forces occupied Bosnian 
     Muslim villages in the eastern part of the country, resulting 
     in an exodus of Bosnian Muslims to enclaves in Gorazde, Zepa, 
     Tuzla, and Srebrenica. All of the events referred to in this 
     indictment took place in the Republic of Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina.
       2. On 16 April 1993, the Security Council of the United 
     Nations, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of its Charter, 
     adopted resolution 819, in which it demanded that all parties 
     to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
     treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which 
     should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile 
     act. Resolution 819 was reaffirmed by Resolution 824 on 6 May 
     1993 and by Resolution 836 on 4 June 1993.
       3. Before the attack by Bosnian Serb forces, as described 
     in this indictment, the estimated Bosnian Muslim population 
     in the safe area of Srebrenica, was approximately 60,000.

                 Attack on the Safe Area of Srebrenica

       4. On or about 6 July 1995, the Bosnian Serb army shelled 
     Srebrenica and attacked United Nations observation posts that 
     were manned by Dutch soldiers and located in the safe area. 
     The attack on the Srebrenica safe area by the Bosnian Serb 
     army continued through 11 July 1995, when the first units of 
     the attacking Bosnian Serb forces entered Srebrenica.
       5. The Bosnian Muslim men, women and children who remained 
     in Srebrenica after the beginning of the Bosnian Serb attack 
     took two courses of action. Several thousand women, children 
     and some mostly elderly men fled to the UN compound in 
     Potocari, located within the safe area of Srebrenica, where 
     they sought the protection of the Dutch battalion responsible 
     for the compound. They remained at the compound from 11 July 
     1995 until 13 July 1995, when they were all evacuated by 
     buses and trucks under the control of and operated by Bosnian 
     Serb military personnel.
       6. A second group of approximately 15,000 Bosnian Muslim 
     men, with some women and children, gathered at Susnjari 
     during the evening hours of 11 July 1995 and fled, in a huge 
     column, through the woods towards Tuzla. Approximately one-
     third of this group consisted of armed Bosnian military 
     personnel and armed civilians. The rest were unarmed 
     civilians.

                           Events in Potocari

       7. On 11 July 1995 and 12 July 1995, Ratko Mladic and 
     members of his staff met in Bratunac with Dutch military 
     officers and representatives of the Muslim refugees from 
     Potocari. At these meetings, Ratko Mladic informed them, 
     among other things, that Bosnian Muslim soldiers who 
     surrendered their weapons would be treated as prisoners of 
     war according to the Geneva Conventions and that refugees 
     evacuated from Potocari would not be hurt.
       8. On or about 12 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military forces 
     burned and looted Bosnian Muslim houses in and around 
     Potocari.
       9. On or about 12, July 1995, in the morning hours, Bosnian 
     Serb military forces arrived at the UN military compound in 
     Potocari and its environs.
       10. On or about 12 July 1995, Ratko Mladic arrived in 
     Potocari, accompanied by his military aides and a television 
     crew. He falsely and repeatedly told Bosnian Muslims in and 
     around Potocari that they would not be harmed and that they 
     would be safely transported out of Srebrenica.
       11. On or about 12 July 1995, at the direction and in the 
     presence of Ratko Mladic, approximately 50-60 buses and 
     trucks arrived near the UN military compound in Potocari. 
     Shortly after the arrival of these vehicles, the evacuation 
     process of Bosnian Muslim refugees started. As Muslim women, 
     children and men started to board the buses and trucks, 
     Bosnian Serb military personnel separated the men from the 
     women and children. This selection and separation of Muslim 
     men took place in the presence of and at the direction of 
     Ratko Mladic.
       12. The Bosnian Muslim men who had been separated from 
     other refugees were taken to diverse locations in and around 
     Potocari. On or about 12 July 1995, Ratko Mladic and Bosnian 
     Serb military personnel under his command, informed some of 
     these Muslim men that they would be evacuated and exchanged 
     for Bosnian Serbs being held in Tuzla.
       13. Most of the Muslim men who had been separated from the 
     other refugees in Potocari were transported to Bratunac and 
     then to the area of Karakaj, where they were massacred by 
     Bosnian Serb military personnel.
       14. Between 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995, Bosnian Serb 
     military personnel summarily executed Bosnian Muslim men and 
     women at diverse locations around the UN compound where they 
     had taken refuge. The bodies of those summarily executed were 
     left in fields and buildings in the immediate vicinity of the 
     compound. These arbitrary killings instilled such terror and 
     panic amongst the Muslims remaining there that some of them 
     committed suicide and all the others agreed to leave the 
     enclave.
       15. The evacuation of all able-bodied Muslim refugees 
     concluded on 13 July 1995. As a result of the Bosnian Serb 
     attack on the safe area and other actions, the Muslim 
     population of the enclave of Srebrenica was virtually 
     eliminated by Bosnian Serb military personnel.

                        Surrender and Executions

       16. Between the evening of 11 July 1995 and the morning of 
     12 July 1995, the huge column of Muslims which had gathered 
     in Susnjari fled Srebrenica through the woods towards Tuzla.
       17. Bosnian Serb military personnel, supported by armoured 
     personnel carriers, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and artillery, 
     positioned themselves along the Bratunac-Milici road in an 
     effort to interdict the column of Bosnian Muslims fleeing 
     towards Tuzla.
       18. As soon as the column reached Bosnian Serb held 
     territory in the vicinity of Buljim, Bosnian Serb military 
     forces attacked it. As a result of this and other attacks by 
     Bosnian Serb military forces, many Muslims were killed and 
     wounded and the column divided into several smaller parts 
     which continued towards Tuzla. Approximately one-third of the 
     column, mostly composed of military personnel, crossed the 
     Bratunac-Milici road near Nova Kasaba and reached safety in 
     Tuzla. The remaining Muslims were trapped behind the Bosnian 
     Serb lines.
       19. Thousands of Muslims were captured by or surrendered to 
     Bosnian Serb military forces under the command and control of 
     Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Many of the Muslims who 
     surrendered did so because they were assured that they would 
     be safe if they surrendered. In many instances, assurances of 
     safety were provided to the Muslims by Bosnian Serb military 
     personnel who were with other Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing 
     stolen UN uniforms, and by Muslims who had been captured and 
     ordered to summon their fellow Muslims from the woods.
       20. Many of the Bosnian Muslims who were captured by or 
     surrendered to Bosnian Serb military personnel were summarily 
     executed by Bosnian Serb military personnel at the locations 
     of their surrender or capture, or at other locations shortly 
     thereafter. Incidents of such summary executions include, 
     but are not limited to:
       20.1 On or about 13 July 1995, near Nezuk in the Republic 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a group of 10 Bosnian Muslim men 
     were captured. Bosnian Serb soldiers summarily executed some 
     of these men, including Mirsad Alispahic and Hajrudin 
     Mesanovic.
       20.2 On or about 13 July 1995, on the banks of the Jadar 
     River between Konjevic Polje and Drinjaca, Bosnian Serb 
     solders summarily executed 15 Bosnian Muslim men who had 
     surrendered or been captured. Amongst those killed were Hamed 
     Omerovic, Azem Mujic and Ismet Ahmetovic.
       20.3 On or about 13 July 1995, in the vicinity of Konjevic 
     Polje, Bosnian Serb soldiers summarily executed hundreds of 
     Muslims, including women and children.
       20.4 On or about 17 July 1995 or 18 July 1995, in the 
     vicinity of Konjevic Polje, Bosnian Serb soldiers captured 
     about 150-200 Bosnian Muslims and summarily executed about 
     one-half of them.
       20.5 On or about 18 July 1995 or 19 July 1995, in the 
     vicinity of Nezuk, about 20 groups, each containing between 
     5-10 Bosnian Muslim men, surrendered to Bosnian Serb military 
     forces. After the men surrendered, Bosnian Serb soldiers 
     ordered them to line up and summarily executed them.
       20.6 On or about 20 July 1995 or 21 July 1995, near the 
     village of Meces, Bosnian Serb military personnel, using 
     megaphones, urged Bosnian Muslim men who had fled Srebrenica 
     to surrender and assured them that they would be safe. 
     Approximately 350 Bosnian Muslim men responded to the 
     entreaties and surrendered. Bosnian Serb soldiers then took 
     approximately 150 of them, instructed them to dig their own 
     graves and then summarily executed them.
       20.7 On or about 21 July 1995 or 22 July 1995, near the 
     village of Meces, an excavator dug a large pit and Bosnian 
     Serb soldiers ordered approximately 260 Bosnian Muslim men 
     who had been captured to stand around the hole. 

[[Page S120]]
     The Muslim men were then surrounded by armed Bosnian Serb soldiers and 
     ordered not to move or they would be shot. Some of the men 
     moved and were shot. The remaining men were pushed into the 
     hole and buried alive.
       21. Many of the Muslims who surrendered to Bosnian Serb 
     military personnel were not killed at the locations of their 
     surrender, but instead were transported to central assembly 
     points where Bosnian Serb soldiers held them under armed 
     guard. These assembly points included, among others, a hangar 
     in Bratunac; soccer fields in Kasaba, Konjevic Polje, 
     Kravica, and Vlasenica; a meadow behind the bus station in 
     Sandici and other fields and meadows along the Bratunac-
     Milici road.
       22. Between 12 July 1995 and 14 July 1995, at various of 
     these assembly points, including the hangar in Bratunac and 
     the soccer stadium in Kasaba, Ratko Mladic addressed the 
     Bosnian Muslim detainees. He falsely and repeatedly assured 
     them that they would be safe and that they would be exchanged 
     for Bosnian Serb prisoners held by Bosnian government forces.
       23. Between 12 July 1995 and 14 July 1995. Bosnian Serb 
     military personnel arbitrarily selected Bosnian Muslim 
     detainees and summarily executed them.

                      Mass Executions Near Karakaj

       24. On or about 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military 
     personnel transported thousands of Muslim detainees from 
     Bratunac, Kravica and other locations to an assembly point in 
     a school complex near Karakaj. At this assembly point, 
     Bosnian Serb military personnel ordered the Muslim detainees 
     to take off their jackets, coats and other garments and place 
     them in front of the sports hall. They were then crowded into 
     the school building and adjacent sports hall and held under 
     armed guard.
       25. On or about 14 July 1995, at this school complex near 
     Karakaj, Ratko Mladic conferred with his military 
     subordinates and addressed some of the Muslims detained 
     there.
       26. At various times during 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb 
     military personnel killed Bosnian Muslim detainees at this 
     school complex.
       27. Throughout 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military 
     personnel removed all the Muslim detainees, in small groups, 
     from the school building and sports hall and loaded them on 
     trucks guarded and driven by Bosnian Serb soldiers. Before 
     boarding the trucks, many of the detainees had their hands 
     tied behind their backs or were blindfolded. They were 
     then driven to at least two locations in the vicinity of 
     Karakaj.
       28. Once the trucks arrived at these locations, Bosnian 
     Serb military personnel ordered the bound or blindfolded 
     Muslim detainees off the trucks and summarily executed them. 
     The summary executions took place from approximately noon to 
     midnight on 14 July 1995.
       29. Bosnian Serb military personnel buried the executed 
     Bosnian Muslim men in mass graves near the execution sites.
       30. On or about 14 July 1995, Ratko Mladic was present at 
     one of the mass execution sites when Bosnian Serb military 
     personnel summarily executed Bosnian Muslim men.
       31. The summary executions of Bosnian Muslim males, which 
     occurred on 14 July 1995 in the vicinity of Karakaj, resulted 
     in the loss of thousands of lives.


                              the accused

       32. Radovan Karadzic was born on 19 June 1945 in the 
     municipality of Savnik of the Republic of Montenegro. From on 
     or about 13 May 1992 to the present, he has been president of 
     the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale.
       33. Ratko Mladic was born on 12 March 1943 in Kalinovik 
     municipality of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He is 
     a career military officer and holds the rank of general in 
     the Bosnian Serb armed forces. From on or about 14 May 1992 
     to the present, he has been the commander of the army of the 
     Bosnian Serb administration.


                           superior authority

                            Radovan Karadzic

       34. Radovan Karadzic was a founding member and president of 
     the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) of what was then the 
     Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The SDS was the 
     main political party among the Serbs in Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina. As president of the SDS, he was and is the most 
     powerful official in the party. His duties as president 
     include representing the party, co-ordinating the work of 
     party organs and ensuring the realisation of the programmatic 
     tasks and goals of the party. He continues to hold this post.
       35. Radovan Karadzic became the first president of the 
     Bosnian Serb administration in Pale on or about 13 May 1992. 
     At the time he assumed this position, his de jure powers, as 
     described in the constitution of the Bosnian Serb 
     administration, included, but were not limited to, commanding 
     the army of the Bosnian Serb administration in times of war 
     and peace and having the authority to appoint, promote and 
     discharge officers of the army. As president, he was and is a 
     position of superior authority to Ratko Mladic and every 
     member of the Bosnian Serb army and all units and personnel 
     assigned or attached to the Bosnian Serb army.
       36. In addition to his powers described in the 
     constitution, Radovan Karadzic's powers as president of the 
     Bosnian Serb administration are augmented by Article 6 of the 
     Bosnian Serb Act on People's Defence. This Act vested in him, 
     among other powers, the authority to supervise the 
     Territorial Defence both in peace and war and the authority 
     to issue orders for the utilisation of the police in case of 
     war, immediate threat and other emergencies. Article 39 of 
     the same Act empowered him, in cases of imminent threat of 
     war and other emergencies, to deploy Territorial Defence 
     units for the maintenance of law and order.
       37. Radovan Karadzic's powers are further augmented by 
     Article 33 of the Bosnian Serb Act on Internal Affairs, which 
     authorised him to activate reserve police in emergency 
     situations.
       38. Radovan Karadzic has exercised the powers described 
     above and has acted and been dealt with internationally as 
     the president of the Bosnian Serb administration in Pale. In 
     that capacity, he has, inter alia, participated in 
     international negotiations and has personally made agreements 
     on such matters as cease-fires and humanitarian relief, and 
     these agreements have been implemented.

                              Ratko Mladic

       39. Ratko Mladic was, in 1991, appointed commander of the 
     9th Corps of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in Knin in the 
     Republic of Croatia. In May 1992, he assumed command of the 
     forces of the Second Military District of the JNA which then 
     effectively became the Bosnian Serb army. He holds the rank 
     of general and from about 14 May 1992 to the present, has 
     been the commander of the army of the Bosnian 
     Serb administration. In that capacity, he was and is in a 
     position of superior authority to every member of the 
     Bosnian Serb army and all units and personnel assigned or 
     attached to that army.
       40. Ratko Mladic has demonstrated his control in military 
     matters by negotiating inter alia, cease-fire and prisoner 
     exchange agreements; agreements relating to the opening of 
     Sarajevo airport; agreements relating to access for 
     humanitarian aid convoys; and anti-sniping agreements, all of 
     which have been implemented.


                          general allegations

       41. At all times relevant to this indictment, a state of 
     armed conflict and partial occupation existed in the Republic 
     of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the territory of the former 
     Yugoslavia.
       42. In each paragraph charging genocide, a crime recognized 
     by Article 4 of the Statute of the Tribunal, the alleged acts 
     or omissions were committed with the intent to destroy, in 
     whole or in part, a national, ethnical, or religious group, 
     as such.
       43. In each paragraph charging crimes against humanity, 
     crimes recognized by Article 5 of the Statute of the 
     Tribunal, the alleged acts or omissions were part of a 
     widespread or systematic or large-scale attack directed 
     against a civilian population.
       44. Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic are individually 
     responsible for the crimes alleged against them in this 
     indictment pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Tribunal Statute. 
     Individual criminal responsibility includes committing, 
     planning, instigating, ordering or otherwise aiding and 
     abetting in the planning, preparation or execution of any 
     crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 5 of the Tribunal 
     Statute.
       45. Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic are also, or 
     alternatively, criminally responsible as commanders for the 
     acts of their subordinates pursuant to Article 7(3) of the 
     Tribunal Statute. Command criminal responsibility is the 
     responsibility of a superior officer for the acts of his 
     subordinate if he knew or had reason to know that his 
     subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and 
     the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable 
     measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
     thereof.
       46. The general allegations contained in paragraphs 41 
     through 45 are realleged and incorporated into each of the 
     charges set forth below.


                                charges

             Counts 1-2 (Genocide) (Crime Against Humanity)

       47. Between about 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995, Bosnian 
     Serb military personnel, under the command and control of 
     Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, arrived in Potocari where 
     thousands of Muslim men, women and children had sought refuge 
     in and around the UN military compound. Bosnian Serb military 
     personnel, under the command and control of Ratko Mladic and 
     Radovan Karadzic, summarily executed many Bosnian Muslim 
     refugees who remained in Potocari.
       48. Between about 13 July 1995, Bosnian Serb military 
     personnel, under the command and control of Ratko Mladic and 
     Radovan Karadzic, summarily executed many Bosnian Muslim men 
     who fled to the woods and were later captured or surrendered.
       49. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men, who fled Srebrenica 
     and who surrendered or had been captured, were transported 
     from various assembly locations in and around Srebrenica to a 
     main assembly point at a school complex near Karakaj.
       50. On or about 14 July 1995, Bosnian Serb Military 
     personnel, under the command, and control of Ratko Mladic and 
     Radovan Karadzic, transported thousands of Muslim men from 
     this school complex to two locations a short distance away. 
     At these locations, Bosnian Serb soldiers, with the knowledge 
     of Ratko Mladic, summarily executed these Bosnian Muslim 
     detainees and buried them in mass graves.
       51. Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, between about 6 July 
     1995 and 22 July 1995, 

[[Page S121]]
     individually and in concert with others, planned, instigated, ordered 
     or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation 
     or execution of the following crimes:
       (a) summary executions of Bosnian Muslim men and women in 
     and around Potocari on 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995,
       (b) summary executions, which occurred between 13 July 1995 
     and 22 July 1995, of Bosnian Muslims who were hors de combat 
     because of injury, surrender or capture after fleeing into 
     the woods towards Tuzla.
       (c) summary executions of Bosnian Muslim men, which 
     occurred on or about 14 July 1995 at mass execution sites in 
     and around Karakaj.
       By their acts and omissions in relation to the events 
     described in paragraphs 13, 14, 20.1-20.7, 23, 26 and 28, 
     Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic committed:
       Count 1: Genocide as recognised by Article 4(2)(a) (killing 
     members of the group) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 2: A crime against humanity as recognised by Article 
     5(b) (extermination) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

 Counts 3-4 (Crime Against Humanity) (Violation of the Laws or Customs 
                                of War)

       52. By their acts and omissions in relation to the summary 
     executions of Bosnian Muslim men and women that occurred in 
     and around Potocari between 12 July 1995 and 13 July 1995, 
     described heretofore in paragraph 13, Ratko Mladic and 
     Radovan Karadzic committed:
       Count 3: A crime against humanity as recognised by Article 
     5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 4: A violation of the laws or customs of war as 
     recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the 
     Tribunal.

Counts 5-18 (Crimes Against Humanity) (Violation of the Laws or Customs 
                                of War)

       53. By their acts and omissions in relation the summary 
     executions of Bosnian Muslims who fled Srebrenica into the 
     woods between 13 July 1995 and 22 July 1995 as described 
     heretofore in paragraphs 20.1 to 20.7, Ratko Mladic and 
     Radovan Karadzic committed:
       Count 5: A crime against humanity (in relation to paragraph 
     20.1) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute 
     of the Tribunal.
       Count 6: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.1) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 7: A crime against humanity (in relation to paragraph 
     20.2) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute 
     of the Tribunal.
       Count 8: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.2) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 9: A crime against humanity (in relation to paragraph 
     20.3) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the Statute 
     of the Tribunal.
       Count 10: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.3) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 11: A crime against humanity (in relation to 
     paragraph 20.4) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the 
     Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 12: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.4) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 13: A crime against humanity (in relation to 
     paragraph 20.5) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the 
     Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 14: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.5) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 15: A crime against humanity (in relation to 
     paragraph 20.6) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the 
     Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 16: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.6) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 17: A crime against humanity (in relation to 
     paragraph 20.7) as recognised by Article 5(a) (murder) of the 
     Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 18: A violation of the laws or customs of war (in 
     relation to paragraph 20.7) as recognised by Article 3 
     (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.

Counts 19-20 (Crime Against Humanity) (Violation of the Laws or Customs 
                                of War)

       54. By their acts and omissions in relation to the summary 
     executions of Bosnian Muslim men at mass execution sites in 
     and around Karakaj, on or about 14 July 1995, as described in 
     paragraph 28, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic committed:
       Count 19: A crime against humanity as recognised by Article 
     5(a) (murder) of the Statute of the Tribunal.
       Count 20: A violation of the laws or customs of war as 
     recognised by Article 3 (murder) of the Statute of the 
     Tribunal.
       Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecutor.
       The Hague, The Netherlands, 14 November 1995.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont.

                          ____________________