[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 207 (Friday, December 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S19263-S19264]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]




               START II TREATY RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

                                 ______


                  LUGAR (AND PELL) AMENDMENT NO. 3111

  Mr. LUGAR (for himself and Mr. Pell) proposed an amendment to the 
resolution of ratification to Treaty Document No. 103-1; as follows:

       In section 1(b)(2) of the resolution of ratification, 
     insert ``(A)'' after ``START II Treaty''.
       In section 1(b)(2), before the period at the end, insert 
     ``, and (B) changes none of the rights of either Party with 
     respect to the provisions of the ABM Treaty, in particular, 
     Articles 13, 14, and 15''.
       At the end of section 1(b) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new condition:
       (7) Implementation arrangements.--(A) The START II Treaty 
     shall not be binding on the United States until such time as 
     the Duma of the Russian Federation has acted pursuant to its 
     constitutional responsibilities and the START II Treaty 
     enters into force in accordance with Article VI of the 
     Treaty.
       (B) If the START II Treaty does not enter into force 
     pursuant to subparagraph (A), and if the President plans to 
     implement reductions of United States strategic nuclear 
     forces below those currently planned and consistent with the 
     START Treaty, then the President shall--
       (i) consult with the Senate regarding the effect of such 
     reductions on the national security of the United States; and
       (ii) take no action to reduce United States strategic 
     nuclear forces below that currently planned and consistent 
     with the START Treaty until he submits to the Senate his 
     determination that such reductions are in the national 
     security interest of the United States.
       In section 1(c)(2) of the resolution of ratification, 
     insert ``(A)'' immediately after ``Reductions.--''.
       At the end of section 1(c)(2), insert the following:
       (B) Recognizing that instability could result from an 
     imbalance in the levels of strategic offensive arms, the 
     Senate calls upon the President to submit a report in 
     unclassified form to the Committees on Foreign Relations and 
     Armed Services of the Senate not later than January 31 of 
     each year beginning with January 31, 1997, and continuing 
     through such time as the reductions called for in the START 
     II Treaty are completed by both parties, which report will 
     provide--
       (i) details on the progress of each party's reductions in 
     strategic offensive arms during the previous year;
       (ii) a certification that the Russian Federation is in 
     compliance with the terms of the START II Treaty or specifies 
     any act of noncompliance by the Russian Federation; and
       (iii) an assessment of whether a strategic imbalance 
     endangering the national security interests of the United 
     States exists.
       In section 1(c)(4) of the resolution of ratification--
       (1) strike ``the parties'' and all that follows through 
     ``national security interests'' and insert ``the President to 
     seek further strategic offensive arms reductions to the 
     extent consistent with United States national security 
     interests''; and
       (2) strike ``it is the sense of the Senate that'' and 
     insert in ``and''.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declarations:
       (8) Compliance.--Concerned by the clear past pattern of 
     Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and 
     continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation, 
     the Senate declares that--
       (A) the START II Treaty is in the interests of the United 
     States only if both the United States and the Russian 
     Federation are in strict compliance with the terms of the 
     Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and consent 
     to ratification, such compliance being measured by 
     performance and not by efforts, intentions, or commitments to 
     comply;
       (B) the Senate expects the Russian Federation to be in 
     strict compliance with its obligations under the terms of the 
     START II Treaty as presented to the Senate for its advice and 
     consent to ratification; and
       (C) given its concern about compliance issues, the Senate 
     expects the Administration to offer regular briefings, but 
     not less than four times per year, to the Committees on 
     Foreign Relations and Armed Services on compliance issues 
     related to the START II Treaty. Such briefings shall include 
     a description of all U.S. efforts in U.S./Russian diplomatic 
     channels and bilateral fora to resolve the compliance issues 
     and shall include, but would not necessarily be limited to, 
     the following:
       (i) Any compliance issues the United States plans to raise 
     with the Russian Federation at the Bilateral Implementation 
     Commission, in advance of such meetings;
       (ii) Any compliance issues raised at the Bilateral 
     Implementation Commission, within thirty days of such 
     meetings; and
       (iii) Any Presidential determination that the Russian 
     Federation is in non-compliance with or is otherwise acting 
     in a manner inconsistent with the object and purpose of the 
     START II Treaty, within thirty days of such a determination, 
     in which case the President shall also submit a written 
     report, with an unclassified summary, explaining why it is in 
     the national security interests of the United States to 
     continue as a party to the START II Treaty.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) Submission of future agreements as treaties.--The 
     Senate declares that following Senate advice and consent to 
     ratification of the START II Treaty, any agreement or 
     understanding which in any material way 

[[Page S19264]]
     modifies, amends, or reinterprets United States or Russian obligations 
     under the START II Treaty, including the time frame for 
     implementation of the Treaty, should be submitted to the 
     Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) Nature of deterrence.--(A) On June 17, 1992, Presidents 
     Bush and Yeltsin issued a Joint Understanding and a Joint 
     Statement at the conclusion of their Washington Summit, the 
     first of which became the foundation for the START II Treaty. 
     The second, the Joint Statement on a Global Protection 
     System, endorsed the cooperative development of a defensive 
     system against ballistic missile attack and demonstrated the 
     belief by the governments of the United States and the 
     Russian Federation that strategic offensive reductions and 
     certain defenses against ballistic missiles are stabilizing, 
     compatible, and reinforcing.
       (B) It is, therefore, the sense of the Senate that:
       (i) The long-term perpetuation of deterrence based on 
     mutual and severe offensive nuclear threats would be outdated 
     in a strategic environment in which the United States and the 
     Russian Federation are seeking to put aside their past 
     adversarial relationship and instead build a relationship 
     based upon trust rather than fear.
       (ii) An offense-only form of deterrence cannot address by 
     itself the emerging strategic environment in which, as 
     Secretary of Defense Les Aspin said in January 1994, 
     proliferators acquiring missiles and weapons of mass 
     destruction ``may have acquired such weapons for the express 
     purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a 
     fundamentally different calculus not amenable to deterrence. 
     . . . New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new 
     strategies should deterrence fail.''.
       (iii) Defenses against ballistic missiles are essential for 
     new deterrent strategies and for new strategies should 
     deterrence fail. Because deterrence may be inadequate to 
     protect United States forces and allies abroad, theater 
     missile defense is necessary, particularly the most capable 
     systems of the United States such as THAAD, Navy Upper Tier, 
     and the Space and Missile Tracking System. Similarly, because 
     deterrence may be inadequate to protect the United States 
     against long-range missile threats, missile defenses are a 
     necessary part of new deterrent strategies. Such defenses 
     also are wholly in consonance with the summit statements from 
     June 1992 of the Presidents of the United States and the 
     Russian Federation and the September 1994 statement by 
     Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, who said, ``We now 
     have the opportunity to create a new relationship, based not 
     on MAD, not on Mutual Assured Destruction, but rather on 
     another acronym, MAS, or Mutual Assured Safety.''.
       (iv) As the governments of the United States and Russia 
     have built upon the June 17, 1992, Joint Understanding in 
     agreeing to the START II Treaty, so too should these 
     governments promptly undertake discussions based on the Joint 
     Statement to move forward cooperatively in the development 
     and deployment of defenses against ballistic missiles.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) Report on use of foreign excess ballistic missiles for 
     launch services.--It is the sense of the Senate that the 
     President should not issue licenses for the use of a foreign 
     excess ballistic missile for launch services without first 
     submitting a report to Congress, on a one-time basis, on the 
     implications of the licensing approval on nonproliferation 
     efforts under the Treaty and on the United States space 
     launch industry.
       At the end of section 1(c) of the resolution of 
     ratification, add the following new declaration:
       (8) United states commitments ensuring the safety, 
     reliability, and performance of its nuclear forces.--The 
     Senate declares that the United States is committed to 
     ensuring the safety, reliability, and performance of its 
     nuclear forces. To this end, the United States undertakes the 
     following additional commitments:
       (A) The United States is committed to proceeding with a 
     robust stockpile stewardship program, and to maintaining 
     nuclear weapons production capabilities and capacities, that 
     will ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of the 
     United States nuclear arsenal at the START II levels and meet 
     requirements for hedging against possible international 
     developments or technical problems, in conformance with 
     United States policies and to underpin deterrence.
       (B) The United States is committed to reestablishing and 
     maintaining sufficient levels of production to support 
     requirements for the safety, reliability, and performance of 
     United States nuclear weapons and demonstrate and sustain 
     production capabilities and capacities.
       (C) The United States is committed to maintaining United 
     States nuclear weapons laboratories and protecting the core 
     nuclear weapons competencies therein.
       (D) As tritium is essential to the performance of modern 
     nuclear weapons, but decays radioactively at a relatively 
     rapid rate, and the United States now has no meaningful 
     tritium production capacity, the United States is committed 
     to ensuring rapid access to a new production source of 
     tritium within the next decade.
       (E) As warhead design flaws or aging problems may occur 
     that a robust stockpile stewardship program cannot solve, the 
     United States reserves the right, consistent with United 
     States law, to resume underground nuclear testing if that is 
     necessary to maintain confidence in the nuclear weapons 
     stockpile. The United States is committed to maintaining the 
     Nevada Test Site at a level in which the United States will 
     be able to resume testing, within one year, following a 
     national decision to do so.
       (F) The United States reserves the right to invoke the 
     supreme national interest of the United States to withdraw 
     from any future arms control agreement to limit underground 
     nuclear testing.


                               condition

       (a) Conditions.--The Senate's advice and consent to the 
     ratification of the START II Treaty is subject to the 
     following condition, which shall be binding upon the 
     President:
       (1) Presidential certification and report on national 
     technical means.--Within ninety days after the United States 
     deposits instruments of ratification of the START II Treaty, 
     the President shall certify that U.S. National Technical 
     Means are sufficient to ensure effective monitoring of 
     Russian compliance with the provisions of the Treaty 
     governing the capabilities of strategic missile systems. This 
     certification shall be accompanied by a report to the Senate 
     of the United States indicating how U.S. National Technical 
     Means, including collection, processing and analytic 
     resources, will be marshalled to ensure effective monitoring. 
     Such report may be supplemented by a classified annex, which 
     shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
     Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services 
     and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

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