[Congressional Record Volume 141, Number 207 (Friday, December 22, 1995)]
[Senate]
[Pages S19250-S19253]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

      By Mr. COHEN (for himself and Mr. Nunn):
  S. 1501. A bill to amend part V of title 28, United States Code, to 
require that the Department of Justice and State attorneys general are 
provided notice of a class action certification or settlement, and for 
other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.


           the protecting class action plaintiffs act of 1995

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Protecting Class 
Action Plaintiffs Act of 1995. This legislation is necessary to address 
a troubling number of instances where class action lawsuits have been 
filed on behalf of thousands, and in some cases, millions of Americans, 
but the suits have been settled in ways that do not promote the best 
interest of the plaintiffs.
  A class action is a lawsuit in which an attorney not only represents 
an individual plaintiff, but in addition, the suit seeks relief for all 
those individuals who have suffered an injury similar to the plaintiff. 
For example, a suit brought against a pharmaceutical company by a 
person suffering from the side effects of a drug, can, if the court 
approves it as a class action, be expanded to cover all individuals who 
used that drug.
  More often than not, these suits are settled. Settlement agreements 
provide monetary and other relief to class Members, protect defendants 
from future lawsuits, and stipulate how the plaintiffs' attorneys will 
be paid.
  All class members are notified of the terms of the settlement and 
given the opportunity to exclude themselves from the class action if 
they do not want to be bound by the agreement. All class action 
settlements must be approved by a court.
  Although the class action is an important part of our civil justice 
system, it is fraught with difficulties. The primary problem is that 
the client in a class action is a diffuse group of thousands of 
individuals scattered across the country, that is incapable of 
exercising meaningful control over the litigation. While in theory the 
class action lawyers must be responsive to their clients, in practice, 
the lawyers control all aspects of the litigation.
  Moreover, when a class actions is settled, the amount of the 
attorneys' fee, is negotiated between the plaintiffs' lawyers and the 
defendants. Yet, in most cases, the fee is paid by the class members--
the only party that does not have a seat at the bargaining table.
  In addition, class actions are now being used by defendants as a tool 
to limit their future liabilities. Class actions are being settled that 
cover all individuals exposed to a particular substance but whose 
injuries have not yet manifest themselves. As Prof. John Coffee of the 
Columbia Law School has written, ``the class action is providing a 
means by which unsuspecting future 

[[Page S19251]]
claimants suffer the extinguishment of their claims even before they 
learn of their injury.''

  In light of the incentives that are driving the parties, it is easy 
to understand how class action settlements can be abused. Plaintiffs' 
attorneys and corporate defendants can reach agreements that satisfy 
their respective interests--limiting the defendants' liability and 
maximizing the attorneys' fee. But, because the plaintiffs themselves 
do not participate in the settlement negotiations, they are sometimes 
left out in the cold. Again, as Professor Coffee has concluded, ``if 
not actually collusive, settlements all too frequently have advanced 
the interests of plaintiffs' attorneys, not those of class members.''
  Presumably, judges would not approve settlements that were unfair to 
the plaintiffs. But, it is difficult for judges to adequately 
scrutinize such settlements. In most instances, the only parties 
appearing before them--the plaintiffs' lawyers and the defendants--
support the settlement. Without anyone providing adversarial scrutiny 
to reveal the flaws in class action settlements, judges are apt to 
approve them, especially since they result in the removal of complex 
cases from crowded court dockets.
  I am familiar with one particularly egregious case where this is 
exactly what transpired. A constituent of mine, Dexter Kamilewicz, of 
Yarmouth, ME was a member of a class action lawsuit filed in Alabama 
State Court against BancBoston Mortgage Corp. The suit alleged that the 
bank was availing itself of ``free money'' by requiring its mortgage 
holders to maintain an excessive balance in their mortgage escrow 
account. After the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on a 
preliminary motion, the parties settled the case.
  Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to refund the excess 
money they were holding in escrow and provide a small amount of 
compensation to the plaintiffs for lost interest.
  BancBoston offered to pay the entire fee for the lawyers representing 
the class based on a formula that had been used to settle a different 
case. But the plaintiffs' lawyers rejected this offer. Instead, they 
insisted that their fees be paid directly from their clients' escrow 
accounts based on a formula that would provide them a more lucrative 
return.
  The bank assented to this process and the State court judge approved 
the settlement.
  Pursuant to the settlement, Mr. Kamilewicz received a check for $2.19 
in back interest, but did not receive any other refund because his 
escrow account did not have an excessive balance. Then, about a year 
later, Mr. Kamilewicz noticed on his annual bank statement that $91.33 
had been withdrawn from his escrow account for miscellaneous 
disbursements. The bank told him that the money was used to pay the 
class action lawyers. In essence, Mr. Kamilewicz paid $91.33 to the 
lawyers for work on a lawsuit that provided him with only a $2.19 
benefit.
  The class action lawyers, however, did quite well. According to a 
recent New York Times article about the case, they received $8.5 
million--over 20 percent of the $40 million refunded by the bank to 
class members. Not only is this a large fee, but one must consider that 
the $40 million refund was, and always would have been the plaintiffs' 
money. The only benefit of the lawsuit to the class was that they 
received the money in 1994 instead of when they closed their mortgages. 
The attorney fee in this case, therefore, bore no relationship to the 
actual benefit that the lawsuit provided to the class.

  Since the New York Times article ran, I have learned a bit about the 
lawyers who were involved in this case. In an unrelated case from 
Chicago, a judge would not even permit these lawyers to maintain a 
class action based on his view that they would not adequately represent 
the class. The judge commented on the record that:

       For five and a half years . . . I have been witness to 
     their unparalleled and shocking abuse of process; their 
     blatant manipulation of the rules of Court; their disregard 
     for orderly processes and Court orders; their discourtesy and 
     hostility to opposing counsel; their subversion of their 
     clients' best interests; their preoccupation with slanderous 
     accusations; their disinclination to trial preparation; their 
     unfamiliarity with and disregard for case law precedent in 
     their path; and their unabashed utilization of class action 
     techniques as a weapon to heighten litigation costs and 
     bootstrap modest individual claims into handsome class fees.

  The judge concluded that he ``could think of no plague worse than to 
have a Court impose [these lawyers] on absent and unsuspecting members 
of a class.''
  There are other problematic cases from across the country. In 
Philadelphia, a group of lawyers settled a set of cases for clients of 
theirs against a consortium of asbestos companies. In exchange, these 
same lawyers agreed to a class action settlement covering all other 
individuals exposed to the companies' asbestos. The class action 
settlement, however, provided less money for the class members than had 
been provided for the lawyers' individual clients.
  To make matters worse, this class action--Georgine versus Amchem 
Products--covers individuals that have been exposed to asbestos but 
have not yet become sick. How can these individuals make a rational 
decision about the merits of the settlement when they do not know 
whether they will become ill and, if they do, how serious their 
illnesses will be?
  This month's American Bar Association Journal contains an article 
about two competing nationwide class actions currently pending in two 
different State courts. These cases both concern defective polybutelene 
pipe that is causing floods in people's homes across the country. The 
case in Tennessee has settled for $850 million. It may cover over 3 
million homeowners. The case in Alabama is going to trial. Lawyers in 
the Alabama case are trying to convince homeowners to opt-out of the 
Tennessee settlement and join their case. Homeowners are receiving 
conflicting notices from both cases and are confused. As one of them 
said, ``I don't know about all this legal stuff . . . all I want is my 
walls fixed.''
  So there are a wide range of legal and ethical issues concerning 
class actions that are deserving of some careful attention from 
Congress. My legislation is a first step in this direction. It attempts 
to address the problem of class action settlements in two ways:
  First, it would require class action lawyers to notify the attorney 
general of States in which class members reside whenever a class action 
is settled. Providing notice to the attorneys general will enable them 
to scrutinize class action settlements and object to the court if the 
settlements fail to promote the consumers' interests. In my view, the 
participation of the attorneys general is critical to improve the class 
action settlement process.

  Second, the legislation would require that notices mailed to class 
members contain summaries written in plain, easily understandable 
language. Such summaries are necessary because most class action 
notices are lengthy and filled with legal jargon that the average 
citizen cannot understand. Anyone covered by a class action settlement 
should know the benefits they will obtain, the rights that they are 
sacrificing, and the way their attorneys will be paid, Today, most 
people simply throw away action notices like junk mail because they are 
too complicated and difficult to comprehend.
  In sum, the legislation will bring some sunlight into the class 
action process and, as we know, sunlight is the best disinfectant. It 
will enable State attorneys general to provide adversarial scrutiny to 
settlements and promote the interests of consumers when the plaintiffs' 
lawyers and corporate defendants are not. It will also give individual 
call members the information they need to make informed decisions about 
whether they wish to join a class action or be bound by a settlement 
agreement. This is a modest step, but one that I believe will be 
effective.
  Before closing, I want to make clear that I do not oppose class 
action lawsuits. Over the past three decades, class actions have been 
used to oppose racially segregated schools, obtain redress for victims 
of employment discrimination, and provide compensation for individuals 
exposed to toxic chemicals or injured by defective products. Class 
actions increase access to our civil justice system because they enable 
people to pursue claims collectively that otherwise would be too 
expensive to litigate.
  The difficulty of any litigation reform endeavor is finding ways to 
weed 

[[Page S19252]]
out the bad cases without closing the courthouse doors to those who 
have genuine grievances deserving of redress. Legislation that limits 
monetary recoveries or provides immunity for wrongdoers does not meet 
this litmus test. In an effort to deter frivolous lawsuits these 
measures have the perverse effect of limiting the remedies available to 
those with legitimate claims.
  The legislation I am introducing today is an example of the type of 
litigation reform that I believe will help to protect against unethical 
attorney behavior and curb abusive lawsuits. It will not limit the 
availability of judicial remedies for meritorious cases.
  I urge my colleagues to support the legislation and I ask unanimous 
consent that a copy of the bill and the New York Times article about 
the Kamilewicz case be included in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                                S. 1501

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Protecting Class Action 
     Plaintiffs Act of 1995''.

     SEC. 2. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT OF CLASS ACTION 
                   CERTIFICATION OR SETTLEMENT.

       (a) In General.--Part V of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after chapter 113 the following new 
     chapter:

                      ``CHAPTER 114--CLASS ACTIONS

``Sec.
``1711. Notification of class action certifications and settlements.

     ``Sec. 1711. Notification of class action certifications and 
       settlements

       ``(a) For purposes of this section, the term--
       ``(1) `class' means a group of similarly situated 
     individuals, defined by a class certification order, that 
     comprise a party in a class action lawsuit;
       ``(2) `class action' means a lawsuit filed pursuant to rule 
     23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State 
     rules of procedure authorizing a lawsuit to be brought by 1 
     or more representative individuals on behalf of a class;
       ``(3) `class certification order' means an order issued by 
     a court approving the treatment of a lawsuit as a class 
     action;
       ``(4) `class member' means a person that falls within the 
     definition of the class;
       ``(5) `class counsel' means the attorneys representing the 
     class in a class action;
       ``(6) `electronic legal databases' means computer services 
     available to subscribers containing text of judicial opinions 
     and other legal materials, such as LEXIS or WESTLAW;
       ``(7) `official court reporter' means a publicly available 
     compilation of published judicial opinions;
       ``(8) `plaintiff class action' means a class action in 
     which the plaintiff is a class; and
       ``(9) `proposed settlement' means a settlement agreement 
     between the parties in a class action that is subject to 
     court approval before it becomes binding on the parties.
       ``(b) This section shall apply to--
       ``(1) all plaintiff class actions filed in Federal court; 
     and
       ``(2) all plaintiff class actions filed in State court in 
     which--
       ``(A) any class member resides outside the State in which 
     the action is filed; and
       ``(B) the transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the 
     lawsuit occurred in more than 1 State.
       ``(c) No later than 10 days after a proposed settlement in 
     a class action is filed in court, class counsel shall serve 
     the State attorney general of each State in which a class 
     member resides and the Department of Justice as if they were 
     parties in the class action with--
       ``(1) a copy of the complaint and any materials filed with 
     the complaint;
       ``(2) notice of any scheduled judicial hearing in the class 
     action;
       ``(3) any proposed or final notification to class members 
     of--
       ``(A) their rights to request exclusion from the class 
     action; and
       ``(B) a proposed settlement of a class action;
       ``(4) any proposed or final class action settlement;
       ``(5) any settlement or other agreement contemporaneously 
     made between class counsel and counsel for the defendants;
       ``(6) any final judgment or notice of dismissal; and
       ``(7) any written judicial opinion relating to the 
     materials described under paragraphs (3) through (6).
       ``(d) A hearing to consider final approval of a proposed 
     settlement may not be held earlier than 120 days after the 
     date on which the State attorney generals and the Department 
     of Justice are served notice under subsection (c).
       ``(e) A class member may refuse to comply with and may 
     choose not be bound by a settlement agreement or consent 
     decree in a class action lawsuit if the class member resides 
     in a State where the State attorney general has not been 
     provided notice and materials under subsection (c). The 
     rights created by this subsection shall apply only to class 
     members or any person acting on their behalf.
       ``(f) Any court order certifying a class, approving a 
     proposed settlement in a class action, or entering a consent 
     decree in a class action, and any written opinions concerning 
     such court orders and decrees, shall be made available for 
     publication in official court reporters and electronic legal 
     databases.
       ``(g) Any court with jurisdiction over a plaintiff class 
     action shall require that--
       ``(1) any written notice provided to the class through the 
     mail or publication in printed media contain a short summary 
     written in plain, easily understood language, describing--
       ``(A) the subject matter of the class action;
       ``(B) the legal consequences of joining the class action;
       ``(C) if the notice is informing class members of a 
     proposed settlement agreement--
       ``(i) the benefits that will accrue to the class due to the 
     settlement;
       ``(ii) the rights that class members will lose or waive 
     through the settlement;
       ``(iii) obligations that will be imposed on the defendants 
     by the settlement;
       ``(iv) a good faith estimate of the dollar amount of any 
     attorney's fee if possible; and
       ``(v) an explanation of how any attorney's fee will be 
     calculated and funded; and
       ``(D) any other material matter; and
       ``(2) any notice provided through television or radio to 
     inform the class of its rights to be excluded from a class 
     action or a proposed settlement shall, in plain, easily 
     understood language--
       ``(A) describe the individuals that may potentially become 
     class members in the class action; and
       ``(B) explain that the failure of individuals falling 
     within the definition of the class to exercise their right to 
     be excluded from a class action will result in the 
     individual's inclusion in the class action.
       ``(h) Compliance with this section shall not immunize any 
     party from any legal action under Federal or State law, 
     including actions for malpractice or fraud.''.
       (b) Technical and Conforming Amendment.--The table of 
     chapters for part V of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 113 
     the following:

``114. Class Actions........................................1711''.....

     SEC. 3. APPLICABILITY.

       This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall apply to 
     all class action lawsuits filed after or pending on the date 
     of enactment of this Act.
                                                                    ____


                       [From the New York Times]

       Math of a Class-Action Suit: `Winning' $2.19 costs $91.33

       Dexter J. Kamilewicz never wants to win a class-action 
     lawsuit again--at least not when it costs him more than he 
     wins.
       Mr. Kamilewicz, a real estate broker in Portland, Me., 
     found out this year that he was among the winners of a class-
     action suit against his mortgage bank, the Bank of Boston. He 
     learned of his victory only when he spotted a $91.33 
     ``miscellaneous deduction'' from his escrow account that 
     turned out be his payment for lawyers he never knew he had 
     hired. His winnings were apparently just $2.19 in back 
     interest.
       Many class actions end with plaintiffs winning meager 
     awards while their lawyers walk away with millions of dollars 
     in fees. But the suit against the Bank of Boston has taken 
     that difference to a new level.
       ``This is the only class action that I have heard about 
     where the consumers won and ended up paying money out of 
     their own pockets,'' said Will Lund, superintendent of the 
     Maine Bureau of Consumer Credit Protection.
       The suit, which accused the bank of keeping excessive 
     amounts of its customers' money in escrow accounts, involved 
     a nationwide class of 715,000 current and former mortage 
     holders. The 300,000 current holders would up footing the 
     lawyers' bill for $8.5 million. Only after the case was 
     settled last year did some members of that group--just how 
     many is unclear--say they realized they ended up with a loss.
       Now the matter is back in court again and may soon be the 
     catalyst for Congressional action.
       Mr. Kamilewicz (pronounced CAM-eh-lev-itch); his wife, 
     Gretchen, and a third disgruntled plaintiff recently filed a 
     new lawsuit--which is itself seeking class-action status--
     that accuses the original plaintiffs' lawyers, as well as the 
     bank, of fraud. Both the bank and the lawyers say the 
     settlement was fair and deny doing anything wrong.
       Senator William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine, says he has 
     heard enough complaints about the settlement to propose a 
     corrective measure. His legislation, expected to be 
     introduced in the next month, would differ from other recent 
     efforts in Congress at tort reform in that it would protect 
     plaintiffs, rather than defendants, against the excesses of 
     lawyers.
       ``There is evidence from around the country that in many 
     instances class actions are benefiting lawyers to a much 
     greater extent than their clients,'' Senator Cohen said.
       Dozens of suits were filed in the early 1990's over escrow 
     accounts before Federal regulations were adopted to more 
     strictly limit the excess money that banks could hold in 
     the accounts. Scores of class actions of all sorts are 
     certified in Federal and state courts each year.
     
[[Page S19253]]

       In the Bank of Boston case, critics of the settlement note, 
     the lawyers' fees took the form of an assessment against the 
     escrow accounts that sometimes dwarfed the modest awards. 
     What is more, apart from a few dollars in back interest, the 
     ``awards'' were simply refunds of the plaintiffs' own money, 
     which would have been returned sooner or later even without 
     the suit. Mr. Kamilewicz and others who apparently had no 
     excessive amounts of money in their accounts were hit hardest 
     because they got no refund but still had to pay legal fees.
       Finally, the fees were larger than they should have been, 
     the critics say, because they were based not on the current 
     value of the refunds but on unrealistic projections of their 
     future worth.
       ``Lawyers' fees are often a problem in these kinds of 
     cases,'' said Jerome Hoffman, a former top official with the 
     Florida Attorney General's office, which had tried to block 
     the settlement. ``But this is probably the most egregious 
     case I have ever seen.''
       For their part, the plaintiffs' lawyers and a bank 
     spokesman noted that the settlement had been approved by a 
     state judge in Alabama, where the suit was filed.
       In the settlement itself, the bank denied doing anything 
     improper in handling the escrow. Money held in escrow is used 
     to pay real estate taxes and property insurance. Banks are 
     allowed to maintain a cushion of extra money to cover 
     increases in those costs, but the Bank of Boston was accused 
     of using a formula that often resulted in an excessively 
     large cushion.
       Ed Russell, the bank spokesman, declined to comment on the 
     new suit, filed this month in federal court in Chicago. But 
     several of the lawyers now being sued described it as 
     groundless. The lawyers are with Ezell & Sharbrough of 
     Mobile, Ala., and two Chicago firms, Edelman & Combs and 
     Lawrence Walner & Associates.
       One of the lawyers, Daniel A. Edelman, called the new suit 
     ``the most frivolous I have even seen.''
       But legal experts say that the dispute highlights the 
     problems associated with class actions. Consumers and 
     investors are often made parties without realizing it or 
     understanding that they may receive trivial amounts while 
     their lawyers make millions.
       Information in legal notices is often shrouded in dense 
     jargon. In some cases, lawyers for both sides may 
     intentionally cloud that information to mislead plaintiffs 
     about important issues, the experts said.
       ``It is not designed to be good communication,'' said John 
     Coffee, a professor at the Columbia University School of Law. 
     ``It is designed to convince a judge who can wave his magic 
     wand and approve a settlement.'' Stephen Gardner, a lawyer in 
     Dallas who has handled many consumer cases, added, ``A lot of 
     settlement notices are engineered by the parties to keep 
     class members in the dark about how much money the lawyers 
     are making versus how many dollars they are going to get.''
       To address that problem, Senator Cohen said his legislation 
     would, among other things, require the parties to disclose 
     proposed settlements to the attorneys general in all states 
     which plaintiffs reside.
       In settling its case, the Bank of Boston agreed to pay a 
     maximum of $8.76 in back interest to individual mortgage 
     holders. The bank also agreed to change its future escrow 
     accounting methods and refund about $30 million in excess 
     escrow payments. Normally, any extra money is returned when a 
     mortgage ends or is refinanced. All told, plaintiffs' lawyers 
     say, the settlement conferred about $40 million in benefits, 
     including estimated savings from the accounting change.
       ``Nothing fraudulent or improper took place,'' Mr. Edelman 
     said. ``There was an economic benefit in excess of $40 
     million and the lawyers received $8.5 million, and that is a 
     low-end number.''
       Even critics acknowledged that the plaintiffs' lawyers 
     helped their clients by getting the bank to change its escrow 
     practices. Still, they said the plaintiffs ended up with a 
     questionable deal on two fronts.
       For one, fees were assessed even against people like Mr. 
     Kamilewicz, who apparently did not have excessive amounts of 
     money in escrow, or not enough extra to produce a refund to 
     fully cover the fees.
       The fees were levied as a percentage of the balance in each 
     escrow account, court papers indicate. Mr. Russell, the 
     bank's spokesman, declined to comment when asked if the bank 
     knew how many accounts might not have had excessive amounts. 
     He also declined to discuss Mr. Kamilewicz's case.
       Speaking generally, Mr. Gardner, the Dallas lawyer, said 
     that in an escrow case of this size, at least several 
     thousand people would have no cushion at all in their 
     accounts.
       The other problem for the plaintiffs was the way the fee 
     was set, critics of the settlement said.
       After the plaintiffs won a partial summary judgment in 
     1993, negotiations to resolve the case began. Initially, the 
     bank offered to change its escrow accounting procedures and 
     to pay lawyers' fees of $500,000, court papers indicate. The 
     bank said that to take such money out of the escrow accounts 
     would result in a ``net out-of-pocket loss' to many 
     customers, the new lawsuit contends.
       Mr. Russell, the bank spokesman, declined to make the 
     bank's lawyers available. But one of the plaintiffs' lawyers, 
     John W. Sharbrough 3d, said the $500,000 offer did not even 
     cover the lawyers' expenses, and to negotiate fees with the 
     bank would have been unethical.
       In any event, the lawyers requested as their fee a third of 
     the $42 million in excess escrow that was then held by the 
     bank, a court transcript shows.
       A one-third award to plaintiffs' lawyers would not be 
     unusual in a typical contingency-fee case, like a personal 
     injury suit, where the settlement comes out of a defendant's 
     pocket. But since an escrow case involves the return of the 
     plaintiffs' own money, banks have frequently paid the 
     plaintiffs' legal bill using a fixed figure for each account.
       To justify a far larger fee, the plaintiffs' firms offered 
     expert testimony suggesting that consumers would realize a 
     significant windfall by getting their money back now rather 
     than later.
       For example, E.W. McKean, an accountant in Mobile testified 
     that if a consumer used a hypothetical $100 refund to reduce 
     the principal on a 20-year, $10,000 loan at 8.6 percent 
     interest, the benefit over time in lower interest payments 
     would be nearly $400 in current dollars.
       But consumer lawyers like Mr. Gardner said it was 
     unrealistic to place too much future value on small sums that 
     are recovered.
       ``This is like winning a scratch card,'' he said. ``People 
     are not going to invest this money.''
       Mr. Edelman, the plaintiffs' lawyer, disagreed, saying that 
     the future benefit of a recovery is a common yardstick for 
     determining fees.
       The judge in the case eventually awarded the plaintiffs' 
     lawyers 28 percent of the excess escrow, a pie that totaled 
     about $30 million when the fees were actually set.
       Mr. Sharbrough said that while some class members who got 
     in touch with him were initially confused about the 
     settlement, they were all pleased once it was explained to 
     them. Mr. Edelman said banks were probably behind the new 
     lawsuit because he had represented consumers in other class-
     action claims against financial institutions.
       Such an assertion would no doubt surprise Mr. Kamilewicz, 
     who said he started the ball rolling because he was so angry. 
     ``The issue isn't the $91,'' he said. ``The issue is behavior 
     standards.''
       Some lawyers are wishing him luck. ``Somebody ought to give 
     him a gold medal,'' said Peter Antonacci, the Deputy Attorney 
     General of Florida. ``This thing was begging to be done.''
                                 ______